B—
Primary Versus Secondary Goods

The distinction between primary and secondary goods is derived from Rawls (1971, 90-95; 1993, 178-87), but as I conceive it in the context of comprehensive pluralism, it differs in many significant respects from the conception developed by Rawls. As understood here, primary goods are goods that inhere in the second-order conception of the good, or goods considered as such within each of the various first-order conceptions of the good present in the relevant polity. Primary goods deriving from the second-order conception of the good shape the substantive constraints of comprehensive pluralism and need not therefore be subjected to interperspectival comparison. In contrast, the remaining primary goods—whether they inhere within each relevant first-order conception of the good as a matter of necessity or of contingency—do figure in interperspectival comparisons and have priority over all other goods, which are thus relegated to the status of secondary goods.

It may be objected, however, that according automatic priority to primary goods is not always warranted because the fact that a given good is valued within each of the perspectives involved does not automatically warrant that such good is equally important for each of these perspectives. Suppose, for example, that all relevant perspectives regard achieving a minimum of subsistence for each individual as an important good, but that such good ranks as the highest priority from the standpoint of certain perspectives but not from that of others. Suppose further that pursuant to one of the conceptions of the good involved, abiding by certain religious precepts is a greater good than securing enough food for all the members of the faith. Under these conditions, if the only way to feed all members of the polity is by producing food using means that contravene the religious precepts identified above, and if no other means would be adequate for purposes of feeding all but those who feel bound by the religious precepts in question, then it would appear that giving priority to primary goods would violate the precept commanding that the highest-ranking goods within each perspective be pursued before addressing the next highest good within any perspective.