Politics

During Amir Fakhr al-Din's long rule (1593–1633), a group of chieftains had established themselves quite firmly as quasi-feudal tax-collectors and administrators in the central and southern parts of the Mountain and the Wadi al-Taim. While these chieftains were mostly Druze, they also included non-Druze such as the Maronite Khazins and Hubaishes in Kisrawan and the Sunni Shihabs in Wadi al-Taim. The vested interests thus created, combined with Fakhr al-Din's legacy, enabled the Ma'ns to remain in charge. Quite understandably, this area began to be called the "Druze Mountain."^[18]

Some of the Druze warlords, mostly led by the 'Alam al-Dins and the Arslans, challenged the Ma'ns at times, but to little effect. Likewise, the Ottoman governors of Saida and Damascus took advantage of the differences between Druze chieftains to keep them in check, but as a rule they recognized the autonomy of the Druze Mountain under the Ma'ns. The power relationships initiated by Fakhr al-Din became self-generating and acquired a systemic quality, despite the occasionally bitter struggles to renegotiate and readjust them. This political regime is known as the amirate (imâra ) period in Lebanese history, for the official title of Amir Fakhr al-Din was adopted as a distinction of high nobility by all his descendants as well and attributed even to his ancestors. Members of other families considered to be the Ma'ns' equals by Druze traditions, such as the 'Alam al-Dins and the Arslans, also adopted the title of amir, which came to imply princedom in the Lebanese political idiom.^[19]

The amirate of the Ma'ns came to an end in 1697, when Fakhr al-Din's only male successor, his youngest son Husain Ma'n, chose to remain in Istanbul, where he had been brought up and had risen to a senior position in the Ottoman bureaucracy.^[20] The amirate regime continued, however, under the leadership of a new family, the Shihabs, whom the Druze

Mountain chieftains chose as successors to the Ma'ns. The 'Alam al-Dins challenged this decision, but in 1711 the Shihabs and their supporters defeated the 'Alam al-Din party at 'Ain Dara and ousted them from the Mountain. The expelled Druze settled in Hauran and eventually established their own "Druze Mountain" there—in present-day southwestern Syria. In the Mountain, the enclaves were redistributed according to the new balance of power that emerged among the chieftains after 'Ain Dara. The Abi-l-Lama's, the Junblats, and the 'Imads, along with the Shihabs, were the main beneficiaries of the new arrangements. The Arslans' holdings, however, were significantly reduced.

For over a hundred years after 'Ain Dara, the Shihabs remained the paramount clan of the old "Druze Mountain" without a serious internal or external challenge. Under the Shihabs the amirate regime struck firmer roots, and from about the 1760s onward expanded to cover the northern parts of the Mountain—that is, the original "Mount Lebanon." Earlier in the century, the Himada family of Ba'lbak and 'Akkar had collected the taxes of "Mount Lebanon" on behalf of the governors of Tripoli. With the assistance of the Shihabs and the intervention of the governor of Damascus, the sheikhs of "Mount Lebanon" ended the Himadas' control and gave their allegiance to the Shihabs. "Mount Lebanon" remained within the jurisdiction of Tripoli and the "Druze Mountain" within Saida's, but until 1807 two different Shihabi amirs were usually responsible for these two regions, reflecting the intensification of ties between the north and the south during the amirate period.

An intricate network of influential families sustained the amirate regime. These stood in a hierarchical relationship to one another, defined by each family's inherited social status and its actual power at any given time. Certain fixed titles (amîr, muqaddam , chieftain-sheikh, and village-sheikh, in descending order) rooted in the military-administrative history of the Mountain proclaimed the inherited status of the families. A conventional code of behavior defined the rights and privileges of the families by their titles and regulated marriage and other relations between them. The code clearly justified social stratification and facilitated the circulation of power within the ruling stratum. The actual distribution of power, however, depended not so much on title as on the agricultural resources controlled by a family and its ability to use these resources without being divided within itself.

Control of resources involved, above all, possessing a muqâta'a . In Ottoman practice, muqâta'a expressed the claim to a specific state revenue farmed out to an individual for a specific period of time. In the eighteenth century, it was commonplace to assign to capable individuals, on a lifetime

basis, the agricultural taxes due from an area, along with the task of maintaining the public security within it. These tax-farmers operated within a hierarchical network of provincial power magnates but under certain restrictions imposed by a centrally coordinated high-cultural, judicial, financial, and military-administrative setup. The Mountain was linked to this network, but peripherally so. There, tax-farming evolved in a rather peculiar way, and the so-called muqâta'a-jis , or "tax farmers," were able to establish themselves more firmly and autonomously than their colleagues elsewhere.^[21]

To a considerable extent, the Mountain's isolation and tortuous terrain protected the autonomy of its magnates and enabled them to strike deep roots on its different hills. The Shihabs were recognized as the overarching tax-farmers first in the "Druze Mountain" and then also in the northern parts of the Mountain. They exercised this privilege directly only in certain areas, and elsewhere apportioned it to other powerful families of various social ranks. These muqâta'as often corresponded to the sharply separated enclaves (iqlîms ) and subdistricts of the Mountain and were considered the hereditary domain of the families in charge. In general, the muqâta'ajis enjoyed the support of the peasants who worked in quasi-feudal dependence on them. There was some objective ground for this support; as discussed earlier, these peasant families had long-term vested interests in the land they worked. The terraces they built and the trees and vines they planted made their lives more firmly fixed than those of the dry-agriculture lowland peasants. These circumstances and the importance of cooperation in their agricultural activities called for a stable leadership that could provide reasonably long-term security and also arbitrate disputes with sufficient moral and political authority.^[22]

That the overlords belonged to prestigious lineages helped to enhance their authority, particularly when their followers believed themselves descended from common ancestral origins, as was largely true with the Druze peasants—though by no means peculiar to them.^[23] Even when this was not the case, the overlords still acted as custodians of the moral and religious traditions of the communities living on their muqâta'as . Thus both Druze and Maronite lords endowed land for the construction and maintenance of churches and monasteries for the Maronite peasants whom they encouraged to settle their domains.^[24] A close relationship developed between religious and secular heads, who sometimes belonged to the same family. Thus the Junblats, who were late-comers to the Mountain, owed their hard-earned prestige as much to the fact that 'Ali Junblat, the architect of the family's power base, was a great sage, one of the 'uqqâl , as well as a successful military-political leader.^[25] Likewise, the Khazins

produced many of the Maronite prelates, including several patriarchs.^[26] The muqâta'ajis were so concerned to maintain a moral authority over the communities under their rule that they sometimes converted to Maronite Christianity. Thus the Druze Abi-l-Lama's of Matn turned Maronite as Matn became overwhelmingly Maronite in time. A branch of the Shihabi family likewise converted to Maronite Christianity, and a few of the amirs toyed with the idea in order to enhance their influence over their Maronite followers.^[27] The moral and political authority of the muqâta'ajis , combined with their socioeconomic position, helped them become entrenched in the enclaves under their control.

Struggles within and between the muqâta'aji families, however, tended to weaken their hold on their domains. Although the claim of a family over a specific muqâta'a was accepted as hereditary by the conventions of the Mountain, this principle was not entirely unchallengeable. (Indeed, contrary to the impression given in many historical accounts, the amirate represents a dynamic, changing pattern of relationships.) The more powerful families could clearly establish patronage over others, if not actually take over their domain. Families that were unable to maintain a united leadership were particularly vulnerable to external manipulation. Since the muqâta'a was accepted as the domain of the family, an incumbent muqâta'aji could be challenged by other members of the family, or the domain could be divided among his heirs. Successive splits could, in a few generations, reduce the members of the family to mere village sheikhs, even if they continued to bear lofty titles. The frequency of fatal confrontations between close relatives underlined the importance of maintaining a united leadership within the muqâta'aji families.^[28]

A particularly successful family in this regard was the Junblats. They were only chieftains, and had acquired even that status only after 'Ain Dara, in 1711, but they developed themselves into the richest and most powerful family of the Mountain. Their rise clearly challenged some of the other muqâta'ajis , as witnessed by the emergence of the so-called "Yazbaki" alliance against the Junblats. The Yazbaki-Junblati struggle provided a dyadic pattern to the power struggles in the Mountain. All notable families and rival factions within families aligned themselves with either one side or the other, as dictated by their interests at any particular time. To a certain extent, shifts from one faction to the other helped maintain the balance and hence the status quo. The dyadic pattern of the rivalries also enabled the ruling amirs to act as arbiters between the conflicting parties in a way that reinforced the paramountcy of the Shihabi house over other families. The Shihabs were not immune from problems of succession, however. A Shihabi claimant to the amirate was hence left with little

choice but to seek the support of other notables and magnates, who could effectively determine the outcome of a contest insofar as they could reach a consensus among themselves. If they failed to do so, the governors of Saida and Tripoli, and under certain circumstances also the governor of Damascus, would get involved to settle the matter. After all, it was the governors who invested the amir, in the name of the sultan, with the authority to oversee the affairs of the Mountain.^[29] Such intervention did not always prove advantageous to the mountaineers' collective interests and internal stability.

It is apparent that while certain centripetal forces kept the magnates of the Mountain together, there were also centrifugal forces dividing them. Their common interests vis-à-vis both the peasant families and the neighboring power centers pulled them together. The legacy of Fakhr al-Din Ma'n provided a model for cooperation, and recognition of this model by the representatives of Ottoman authority enhanced its legitimacy. The Shihabi family emerged as primus inter pares around which other magnate families moved. A code of social interaction guided the formal relations between them and distinguished them from the rest of the society. A balance of power took form among the families, as each struck roots in distinct, easily defensible, and basically self-enclosed enclaves where fixed socioeconomic relations defined the social landscape. Shifting alliances maintained the balance, as certain families increased their relative power for one reason or another. Recognition of the ruling amir's arbitration authority helped to diffuse tensions and reinforced his centrality in the regime. Centralized administrative institutions and regular enforcement powers on which the amir could rely to impose his authority were absent, however. The fragmented and decentralized nature of the regime, and of the social structure in which it was nested, prevented concentration of the resources necessary to build an institutionalized political center.^[30] Under these circumstances, the amirate remained a regime of shifting parapolitical alliances and counteralliances of influential families and family factions that controlled the human and material resources of the Mountain's various districts and subdistricts.