The Thracian "Excursus" (2.95-101)
Thucydides begins his account of the third year of the war by relating the Spartan attack on Plataia and then moves to the simultaneous expedition by the Athenians against the Chalkidike, followed by Phormio's naval triumph in the Korinthian Gulf against the Peloponnesians on their way to Akarnania. During that winter, the Spartans, at the instigation of the Megarians, intended a surprise attack on the Piraieus, but "fearing the danger," they instead attacked Salamis and retreated when the Athenians came out in full force, in response to reports that their
[36] The disruption of the polis and expulsion of the inhabitants make it difficult to assess its postrevolt economic potential, as Poteidaian silver coinage ends in 432; bronze coins may have started to be issued then; certainly many appear in Olynthos, and lesser quantities at other sites; see Alexander, Potidaea , 93-94; Kraay, ACGC , 138.
[37] The editors of ATL believe that perhaps fifty talents came to the state from Poteidaia annually after the colony was founded but, curiously, offer no evidence in support, 3.345 and n. 101.
harbor had already been taken (2.93-4). In 2.95, Thucydides turns to the north.
Thucydides' narrative on activities in Thrace and Macedonia, introduced by the Odrysian king Sitalkes' plan to march against Perdikkas and the Chalkidians, is usually described as a digression with little importance for the History . Westlake, for example, includes it among the passages he calls "irrelevant," that is, of little or no significance in understanding the work or the progress of the war, and he is far from alone in this judgment.[38] By this view, Thucydides includes this digression simply because he was interested in Thrace and more knowledgeable about it than most Athenians; and, beyond confirming the historian's interest in this area, its only significance is to demonstrate that he is not so selective about choosing only material directly relevant to his subject as is usually thought.
Yet, as we shall see, this section of the work is not only relevant but also important in two respects: first, although it is true, as scholars have noted, that Sitalkes accomplished little in actual military terms, the relationship between Athens and Thrace and the former's need for Thracian support were both crucial in the war. Second, Thucydides sets out in this section to make several important arguments by means of comparison, one of his characteristic methods. Here, as elsewhere in making implicit or explicit comparisons between Athens and poleis or rulers, he focuses on power and wealth.
First, let us examine the significance of Sitalkes' activities in the progress of the war. To summarize, in the first year of the war, Athens successfully made an alliance with Sitalkes. Then, with the continuation of both the war and the siege of Poteidaia, the Athenians apparently gave high priority to securing strong support from the Odrysian kingdom. They clearly considered the situation in the region volatile and dangerous.[39] Perdikkas proved untrustworthy in his relations with Sitalkes, and this would affect the Athenians' interest in the area as well. Now, in winter 429, Sitalkes set out to fulfill his promise to the Athenians of ending the Chalkidian war in Thrace (2.95.2).
The Odrysian king's actions may have had little real or lasting effect in
[38] Westlake, Essays , 14-16; cf. also, among others, Gomme, HCT 2:241: "Most of this is digression, and the whole of it might almost be so described; for the event narrated, Sitalkes' invasion of Macedonia and Chalkidike, is of very little importance"; Ziegler, RhM 78 (1929):58-67; Pearson, CQ 33 (1939):51; de Romilly, Histoire et raison , 47 n. 1; Ridley, Hermes 109 (1981):35, who, however, at the same time notes that "the basic purpose of this excursus is to show the greatness of the Thracian kingdom ..."; Hornblower, Comm ., 371.
[39] Cf. 2.29, in which Thucydides gives credit to Nymphodoros for bringing Perdikkas over to the Athenians; whereas, in 2.95.2, we are informed that it was Sitalkes who reconciled Perdikkas to the Athenians.
the end, but he was successful in his initial invasion of Macedonia: he captured or laid waste many cities and territories and negotiated with Perdikkas (2.100-101.1). By making a tremendous show of force, he succeeded in terrifying many cities.[40] Indeed, Sitalkes and his army could have done enormous damage; instead, they only caused fear. The explanation is plain enough: the Athenians did not come with a fleet as promised and, consequently, left Sitalkes' army with insufficient support to wage war against the Chalkidians. The reason, Thucydides comments, was that the Athenians did not believe that Sitalkes would actually hold up his end of the bargain and come.[41] The Athenians' behavior effectively points up the lack of strong leadership in Athens in the absence of Perikles' direction.[42] It is dear that, had they kept their promise to Sitalkes, they would most likely have secured the northern Aegean and Thraceward district against revolts and Peloponnesian interference. Thucydides' attention to Sitalkes' strength and to the wealth of the area underscores the Athenians' blunder in allowing their relationship to deteriorate. That the Peloponnesians were concerned about the Athenian alliance with Sitalkes, and thus regarded it as potentially dangerous, is obvious from their attempt to intervene and destroy it.
Thucydides' inclusion of the Thracian and Macedonian episode, then, is more than a simple manifestation of his interest in the area; it is dearly useful to his argument. His detailed treatment of the extent of resources concentrated in the hands of the Odrysian king not only highlights Athenian folly but also relates directly to his conception and analysis of power.
First, Thucydides describes the extent of both the Thracian tribes either subject to Sitalkes or able to be used in military campaigns and their territory. This provides the context in which to judge and appreciate what follows, a discussion worth quoting in full:
The tribute (phoros ) from all the barbarian regions and the Hellenic cities, as much as accrued in the reign of Seuthes, Sitalkes' successor, who brought it to its height, amounted to a dunamis of about four hundred talents of money (arguriou ) in both gold and silver. No less a quantity came in in the form of gifts (dora ) of gold and silver, besides woven and plain stuffs and other accoutrements, and not only for Seuthes but also for the lesser kings and nobles.... Thus the kingdom came to exert great strength: for
[40] 2.101.2-4. Thucydides makes a point of alluding to the the fear with which Sitalkes was regarded.
[41] 2.101.2. There does not seem to be reason to doubt this explanation; cf. Höck, Hermes 26 (1891):81 n. 2; Busolt, GG 3.2,973; Adcock, in CAH 5, 206; Kagan, Archidamian War , 120.
[42] Connor, Thucydides , 75-78. Connor considers Perikles dead by this point, but that is not certain, although he seems dearly to be out of the picture.
of all those in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, it was unsurpassed in revenue of money (chrematon prosodo ) and in general prosperity, and second only in military strength and size of army to the Skythians. (2.97.3-5)
As is unsurprising by now, Thucydides' attention to periousia chrematon is focused and detailed: he supplies a specific figure, four hundred talents, for the amount of tribute coming in. He comments further that it is all money, argurion , consisting of both gold and silver.[43] He turns to gifts, indicating that their annual total was at least as much as the tribute; next, he elaborates on the importance of gifts as the essential mechanism for transacting business (
The Odrysian king's dunamis is linked implicitly with his wealth in photos and dora in a way that might remain almost Herodotean were it not for Thucydides' broader comparative purpose and previous analyses of power, such as those concerned with Minos and Agamemnon in the Archaeology, and in the evaluation of Athenian and Spartan power, where photos has been a chief gauge.[45] By this point in the History , the reader who encounters a detailed description of revenue in tribute and gifts—much of it immediately employable—centralized under the control of the Odrysian kings readily thinks of actual and potential dunamis through the use of money in war. The wealth of the Odrysian kingdom, especially by Thucydides' specification of gold and silver money, meets
[44] Thucydides is not concerned with the reciprocal aspect of the gift-exchange contract. On gift exchange, see M. I. Finley, World of Odysseus, passim ; also see Mauss, Gift , for discussion of the function of gift exchange and potlatch in archaic Melanesian societies; cf. also Hornblower's comments, Comm ., ad loc.
the criterion for extraordinary power. Yet Sitalkes does not wield naval power, at least not on any significant level; he has wealth but not a naval arche through which to project dunamis even more broadly. It is an easy step, however, to the view that the Athenians gravely erred in not following up on their alliance with Sitalkes, whom they initially wooed and cultivated in so determined a fashion.
Thucydides makes one final point in his comparative analysis of the northern empires. He notes in 2.97.6 that the Skythians were the largest group of people in Europe and that if they were united and made the wisest use of their resources (
The inferences that the reader draws from Thucydides' treatment of the Odrysian and Skythian empires are that greatness and power depend ultimately not on size or wealth itself but rather on unity and the concentration of wealth in the form of money so that it is readily expendable. But these alone may not be enough: wise counsel and intelligent use of resources are also essential elements in the formula for power. Thucydides' analysis of the Odrysian and Skythian empires readily fosters implicit comparisons and contrasts with Athens, both under Perikles and afterwards, and in different ways, Sparta.