Chabrias and the Campaign of 378
Sometime between mid-May and mid-June 378, Agesilaos arrived at Thespiai. There he allowed his men a few days' rest while he received reports and prepared to lead his army agaist the Thebans. Now com-
bined with the force left by Kleombrotos, Agesilaos' army numbered 1,500 cavalry and over 28,000 infantry, at least 20,000 of which were hoplites. The assembly and preparation of Agesilaos' full force also allowed the Thebans time to position themselves in readiness behind their fieldworks and to effect their own union with the army brought by Chabrias.[40]
Diodoros remarks that "when the Athenians learned of the arrival of the Lakedaimonians in Boiotia, they went straight to the support of Thebes" (15.32.2). Given the urgency of timely support for the Thebans, we may assume that the intelligence was carried by visual signal relay from outposts on the frontier to Chabrias' camp at the Dema. Chabrias, the mastermind of the defensive strategy now deployed against Agesilaos' host, was effective commander of the Athenian force. His term of of-rice as Athenian strategos had technically not yet begun, however, so command officially resided with the strategos Demeas, son of Demades.[41] The force under the command of these two men consisted of both mercenary and citizen hoplites, 5,000 in round numbers, almost certainly mercenary peltasts in addition to that number, and 200 Athenian cavalrymen (Diodoros 15.32.2; see also appendix III). The force set out from its camp behind the Dema wall and proceeded by the most direct route to Thebes. This led northwest past Phyle and Panakton, across the Skourta plain, and down into the Asopos valley, entering Theban territory some-where in the vicinity of Skolos. The total distance by this route from the
[40] Agesilaos must have invaded Boiotia just before the grain harvest (as Archidamos, Agesilaos' father, had invaded Attica, Thucydides 2.19.1, and Gomme 1956, 70-71). Ac-cording to the Boiotian rule of thumb, harvest began while the Pleiades were rising (i.e., after ca. May 12) and went on until the time for winnowing, which began when Orion appeared (ca. June 23; Hesiod Works and Days 383-84, 597-99, see Gomme 1956, 708). On the size of Agesilaos' army, see appendix VI. Xenophon Hell . 5.4.38-41 and Diodoros 15.32.2-33.4 are the primary sources for the account that follows here. See Munn 1987, 111-21, for a detailed review of these and other sources and of the topography of this campaign.
Dema to Thebes is just over sixty kilometers. To judge by comparison to Sphodrias' march, this distance could be accomplished in a single day only with great difficulty, if the army was on the move for twelve to fourteen hours. More likely, the march was divided over two days, especially since the arrival of the Peloponnesians in Boiotia was probably signaled only toward the end of their last day of march. A short march in the evening followed by a long march the next day would seem to be the most likely way for Chabrias to have brought his supporting force to the Thebans. The resulting assembly of the Thebans and their allies was an army that numbered hardly more than 12,000 hoplites, perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 light-armed infantry, and at least 1,700 cavalry.[42]
Agesilaos set out from Thespiai along the route previously used by Kleombrotos, moving into the upper Asopos valley to enter Theban territory at Kynos Kephalai. There he was held up for several days along the line of the Theban stockade by defensive maneuvers of the Thebans described by Xenophon. Eventually, when the Theban routine had be-come familiar to Agesilaos, he succeeded in crossing the stockade by surprising the defenders in an early morning march.
Through discreet omissions, Xenophon provides a consistently favor-able impression of Agesilaos' skill in this campaign. According to Xenophon, Agesilaos distinguished himself first by crossing the troublesome stockade and then by devastating Theban fields "up to the city." There-after, he withdrew to Thespiai, and after arranging affairs there, he crossed Kithairon to Megara, where his army was disbanded. Other sources provide different perspectives, and of the events neglected by Xenophon, the most significant in this campaign was the encounter between Chabrias and Agesilaos, which is described by Diodoros and other sources dependent upon Ephoros.[43]
The event was a face-off and not a battle, but it was remarkable from the Theban and Athenian perspective because it demonstrated the in-ability, or the unwillingness, of Agesilaos to commit his army to pitched battle against vastly outnumbered defenders. Credit for this defensive victory is given to Chabrias, whose fame is attested not only by the acclamations he is said to have received on this occasion, according to Ephoros, but also by the account of Demosthenes, who recites this encounter
[42] These numbers are based on Diodoros 15.26.4, reporting the total numbers of hoplites and cavalry assembled at Thebes the previous winter. Note that, with war directly threatening Attica now as well, the Athenian cavalry contribution to the Thebans is understandably reduced. See the discussion in appendix VI.
[43] Diodoros 15.32.5-6, 33.4; Polyainos 2.1.2; and Nepos 12.1 are chief among these other sources. On the interpretation of these events, see the discussions of Anderson 1963, and 1970, 89-90; Buckler 1972; and Munn 1987, 117-21.
as the first in a list of notable achievements of Chabrias (although it is chronologically not the first), remembered soon after the death of that distinguished general.[44]
The encounter between Chabrias and Agesilaos took place immediately after Agesilaos had led his army across the stockade and into Theban territory. The penetration of their defenses by the Peloponnesians meant that the Thebans and Athenians had either to withdraw to Thebes or to take up a new defensive stance unprotected by any fortifications. They adopted the latter course, although it meant that Agesilaos might have his pitched battle if he chose to attack.
The Theban and Athenian army arrayed itself along the crest of a long and gently sloping hill to face the phalanx of the Peloponnesians, which approached from below. Action was begun by Agesilaos, who sent his skirmishers against the enemy formation, "testing their disposition to fight" (Diodoros 15.32.4). These men were easily dispersed by the Theban and Athenian light troops counterattacking from higher ground. Although our sources do not mention them in this connection, the more numerous Theban and Athenian cavalry probably also aided in neutralizing the Peloponnesian light troops, as well as their cavalry, since the terrain of the battlefield was everywhere well suited for cavalry. The result, in any event, was that the two phalanxes now stood face-to-face, ready to advance to battle.
This moment was the creation of Spartan strategy, and battle now was imperative if the war against Thebes were to succeed. As he had done sixteen years earlier, Agesilaos began his advance to battle against the Thebans and their allies, leading the Spartans at the fight end of his line. On the former occasion, the two armies were roughly a match in numbers. Now it was clear to all that Agesilaos led the superior force. The orderly advance of the Spartans, "a solid mass of bronze and scar-let," as Xenophon described it in 394 (Agesilaos 2.7), was intended to intimidate—it was arrayed
The front rank of the Theban force, holding the right half of the
[44] Diodoros, Polyainos, and Nepos (above, note 43) all probably reflect the account of Ephoros (see above, note 4 on Diodoros; for Polyainos, see Melber 1885, 541-45, Phillips 1972, 297-98; on Nepos, see Bradley 1969, 308-9). Perhaps because more members of his audience were likely to have been present on the occasion as hoplites, Demosthenes 20.76 (quoted below, note 93) begins his list of Chabrias' achievements with a reference to this event.
allied line, was composed of Gorgidas' elite corps, the Sacred Band, who made their debut on the battlefield that day. The front rank of the Athenian force holding the left half of the line must likewise have been made up of an elite corps, in this case Chabrias' seasoned mercenary hoplites.[45] The success of the following maneuver is incomprehensible otherwise.
Moving up the gradual slope, Agesilaos must have looked anxiously for a sign that the enemy was about to lose heart, a sign that would encourage his allies to press home their attack just as he knew the Spar-tans would, following his lead. In a moment, his own will was broken by an incredible sight.
When the opposing lines were still separated by at least two hundred meters, but when the moment of commitment was fast approaching, the troops led by Chabrias, "as if by a single word of command," suddenly removed their shields from their shoulders, propped them against their knees, and stood at ease, with their spear butts resting on the ground, points straight up in the air. Gorgidas commanded his men to adopt the same stance. The maneuver was probably performed only by the front rank. Its unison required the confidence of a well-drilled team. Its execution by the entire army would have been both unduly risky and exceedingly difficult in the close order of a mass formation with its nerves at the breaking point. In fact, Polyainos reports that the maneuver was executed in place of the expected command to charge, indicating that it came at the moment when an army needed to steel its resolve to fight by acting rather than by passively awaiting the enemy's charge, which was a sure formula for panic and flight. The effect of this maneuver by the elite front rank was threefold: it reassured the ranks behind that the men at the front were united in obedience to their commanders; it pre-vented a precipitate charge, which could have dangerously weakened the formation of the allies; and it signaled to the Peloponnesians that neither the Thebans nor the Athenians were going to give way, but that
they were all of one mind and well prepared to take up their arms, close ground, and fight it out at the decisive moment. Before that moment came, Agesilaos commanded the trumpeter to sound the retreat.[46]
The Peloponnesian phalanx was withdrawn to the level plain, where it stood in formation for some time, offering the Thebans and Athenians their chance to initiate battle. No one could expect the Thebans and Athenians to attack the more numerous Peloponnesians on ground that favored their numbers, however, so Agesilaos offered the inducement of showing the Thebans the devastation of their land. None of this had the effect Agesilaos desired. Although the Peloponnesian phalanx there-after moved unchallenged across the flat land south of Thebes, skirmishing between light troops and cavalry on both sides must have been vigorous, and it is hard to believe that the Peloponnesians had the better of any such engagements. The reason is the superior numbers of the The-ban and Athenian cavalry, who had already taken their toll on the Peloponnesian cavalry and peltasts even before Agesilaos had crossed the stockade. Diodoros reports that Agesilaos' army returned to Thespiai in possession of "a great quantity of spoils" (15.32.6). Xenophon, perhaps here closer to the truth, is content to report that Agesilaos "cut and burned," or "devastated" Theban fields (Hellenika 5.4.41; Agesilaos 2.22).
Although he never mentions Chabrias in this campaign and never describes the battle that almost was, Xenophon does allude to the stand-off in his encomium of Agesilaos when he observes that, after crossing the stockade, Agesilaos "offered to do battle with the Thebans both in the plain and in the hills, if they chose to fight" (Agesilaos 2.22). By this, Xenophon acknowledges what Ephoros recorded, namely, that Agesilaos himself declined to initiate battle despite his strength. He had failed to achieve the most essential objective of the campaign against Thebes, and without a blow he had even allowed his army to be turned back in the face of an inferior enemy. That failure was remarked upon at the time:
The Spartan advisers, who accompanied Agesilaos, and his officers ex-pressed to him their surprise that Agesilaos, who reputedly was a man of
[46] On the maneuver of Chabrias, see the sources and discussion cited in note 43 above. The full impact of the maneuver can be appreciated only in the context of the norms of hoplite warfare, and these are ably described by Hanson 1989, esp. 96-104, on the psycholog of the critical moments before closing with the enemy. The decision to dose with the enemy was made not infrequently on the basis of visible evidence of their impending panic; cf. Brasidas' charge against the Athenians at Amphipolis (Thucydides 5.10.5-8) and, presumably, Agesilaos' attack against the Argives at Koroneia, who fled before coming to blows (Xenophon Hell . 4.3.17).
energy and had the larger and more powerful force, should have avoided a decisive contest with the enemy.[47]
Agesilaos' response, according to Diodoros and Xenophon, was to assert that the Lakedaimonians had won the victory without a blow, for though he, as the invader, had offered to do battle, the defenders had declined to fight and had allowed him to plunder Theban land, granting to him the sign of the unchallenged victor. This, however, was mere exculpation on the part of Agesilaos, a sop to discouraged comrades and allies, and encomiastic hyperbole on the part of Xenophon. The more important consideration, also acknowledged by Agesilaos, was that men who displayed such resolve as his enemies would not yield to intimidation and would fight it out, at great cost to both sides. Knowing his own army and understanding the tactical situation, Agesilaos judged that the risk of defeat to the Spartan side was too great.[48] His judgment on that score deserves full credit.
Chabrias had trumped Agesilaos. Although he and his men, facing the Spartans, might well have broken and run, avoiding the consequences of battle and knowing that the consequences of flight were more remote for them than for the Thebans, he and they had stood firm and had preserved intact the vital link between Thebes and Athens that now held Sparta at bay. Their failure to stop Agesilaos from laying waste to a part of Theban land was trivial by comparison to Agesilaos' failure to break that link. The stand near Thebes was proof in action of the resourceful-ness and the resolve of Chabrias and his allies to deny the Spartans the benefit of their strength in numbers, the very source of Spartan power. This was the same resolve that the Dema wall demonstrated in stone.
Frustrated at his first attempt, Agesilaos was compelled to recognize that instead of holding a tighter noose around Thebes, Spartan forces in Boiotia would now themselves have to endure the assaults of the more confident Thebans. The fortification of Thespiai, Agesilaos' last act be-fore leaving Boiotia in 378, was an open acknowledgment of this state of affairs.[49]
[48] Agesilaos' rationale: Diodoros 15.33.1; Xenophon Ages . 6.3. On the less-than-wholehearted enthusiasm of Agesilaos' Peloponnesian troops at this time, see Plutarch Ages . 26.3-5 ( = Mor. 214a = Polyainos 2.1.7); Polyainos 2.1.21; and, more generally, Isokrates 14. 15.