PART II
ELITE CONFLICTS
AND CADRE ISSUES DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

4
Conflict Structures

Historically speaking, by the time of the CR, the cadre system had displayed many structural weaknesses. Although it was originally conceived as an instrument for revolution, social transformation, and control over society, the cadre corps developed an identity different from that of the masses. Comfortably entrenched in the bureaucratic apparatus, they exercised enormous powers as agents of the party-state, enjoying many privileges. At the same time, opportunities for entering privileged positions were decreasing as the expansion of the party-state's bureaucracy and overall economic growth slowed down and competition for educational opportunities, the first step toward upward mobility, intensified.^[1] All these factors produced accumulated but suppressed tensions in the society, which affected intraparty debate.^[2]

The cadre system itself became the focus of elite conflicts. Worrying that the cadres were becoming a new ruling class, negating the very ideal of the revolution, Maoist leaders saw the need to redistribute scarce goods, including educational opportunity and political power, as a remedy. In contrast, Liu Shaoqi and his followers were more sensitive to the interests of the cadres and were willing to co-opt middle-class intellectuals into the cadre corps because their skills and expertise were needed for economic development, which would in turn expand the chance for upward mobility. To the Maoist leaders, accepting professional elites into the ruling structure was a betrayal of the revolutionary goal of raising

[1] Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.); Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton ) (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982).

[2] James Townsend, "Intra-Party Conflict in China: Disintegration of an Established Party System," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 284–310.

the status of peasants and workers, who were the backbone of the Chinese revolution.

Political considerations also entered into the ideological dispute. Mao was losing his control over the gigantic party-state bureaucracy largely because of his hostility toward the bureaucratization of the cadre corps. By contrast, Liu Shaoqi was gaining popularity with his pragmatic policies and his respect for the vested interests of the cadre corps.^[3] The highly centralized cadre system further intensified the competition for control over the corps; any elite group that controlled the cadres could control the party-state. Moreover, the absence of a retirement system and the monopoly of political power by cadres made it a life-and-death matter for each individual cadre to maintain his or her position.^[4] In brief, the rigidity of the cadre system further aggravated the inner elite conflict.

When Mao initiated the CR by removing the party-state's control over society and mobilizing the masses against the elites, a multitude of social conflicts that the party-state had previously suppressed surfaced, allowing the divided elites to exploit them for their own political interests. How to deal with the issues that the unprecedented scale of mass mobilization constantly raised further divided the elites and masses. Each phase of the CR raised new ideological and political questions. And each decision made to resolve these difficulties produced new groups that either benefited or suffered from the official decision, thereby changing the existing conflict structure.

The Purge Pattern

At the initial stage of the CR, the question of who should be purged was decided in the process of mass mobilization, not by the party organizations with due authority. The Chinese masses in every unit split into numerous factions, often forming alliances with mass organizations outside their units. The bureaucrats also manipulated the question to protect themselves or to lead the movement in the direction of their choice. Of course, official policy was

[3] For Liu Shaoqi, see Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-Ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).

[4] Michel Oksenberg, "Exit Patterns from Chinese Politics and Its Implications," China Quarterly , no. 67, September 1976, 501–18.

to purge only the "powerholders taking the capitalist road." But often the chaotic and factionalized mass movement could not make a distinction between cadres who followed the alleged revisionist line and Maoist cadres who followed the "proletarian road."

As chaotic as the decision on a particular cadre might have been, the basic cleavage between the radicals and the conservatives, which cut across the horizontal demarcation line of the elite and masses, shaped the outcome of the purge. Each side had its own ideology and policy preferences, which were largely determined by the characteristics of each side's membership.^[5]

The radical forces, represented by the Jiang Qing group at the top and recruited largely from discontented social groups—which existed primarily outside the locus of power in the Chinese ruling structure—saw their interests best served by drastic political change. They consistently pursued a radical policy, defending the reforms of the CR or even demanding further reform. They used the basic goals of Marxism and the political principles as defined in Mao's thought to justify their challenge to the structural legitimacy of the party organizations.

In contrast, the conservative mass organizations, mainly consisting of better-off social groups and supported by the military establishment, shared the party organization's interest in maintaining the status quo. The conservative forces tried to limit changes to a minimum or to reverse the radical reforms implemented during the CR. By stressing the structural legitimacy of the party organization in the name of Leninist tenets, the conservative forces emphasized the organizational principle in order to defend the correctness and legitimacy of decisions reached by due process. Each camp, of course, justified its position in ideological terms. But they were also more than willing to push their views to the extreme for maximum political gain.

Differences between radicals and conservatives crystallized over the questions of who should be purged and how to evaluate the cadres. Maoist radicals tended to emphasize the horizontal cleavage between the masses and the elite as the demarcation line be-

[5] For details of the conflict along the cleavage, see Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

tween participants and targets. The Liuist leaders stressed the vertical cleavage between those inside and those outside the party. As a result, the scope of the purges expanded gradually from "bourgeois academic authorities," to "black gangs" (who protected the academic authorities), to "monsters and freaks," and finally to "powerholders taking the capitalist road within the party." The radicals pushed for a more comprehensive purge, while party leaders endeavored to keep it as narrow as possible. When the Maoists pinpointed more categories to purge, the party organization responded by attempting to restrict the targets to those specifically mentioned. Consequently, the party organization was continually one step behind the Maoist leaders.

Over the question of how to evaluate the cadres, the Jiang Qing radical group stressed the cadres' political performance over class background, political action over intention, and performance records in "the fifty days" (at the early stage of the CR) over the past seventeen years' records. By contrast, the conservatives stressed class background, party membership, and past records, while condemning the radicals as anti-Communist elements simply exploiting the CR to vent their resentment of the CCP.

We do not know how the two conflicting views determined the actual outcome of the purge. But since we know who was purged during the two years of mass mobilization between 1966 and 1968, tables 10–15, constructed with biographical data on individual cadres, allow us to glimpse the purge pattern (from which we can infer the CR conflict structures).

Table 10 demonstrates the devastating impact of the CR on the formal authority: about 60 percent of the top political leaders lost their positions in the CR. Particularly affected were party and government organizations, whereas the impact on the military was the least. Although the elite conflict was not organized along institutional lines, the differential impact was due to the different functional areas for which each institution was responsible and the different political powers each institution wielded. Not only was the military least affected, but it also aggrandized its political influence by default.

Although the career background of each individual cadre is not exactly the same as the type of organization he belonged to, table 11 shows that the leaders whose careers had evolved around poli-

tical works suffered the most, and 67 percent of the specialists lost their positions. By contrast, professional soldiers suffered the least. This again indicates that the mass movement was squarely directed against the powerholders. In table 12 the 70 percent purge rate of central leaders (in contrast to only 54 percent of local leaders) indicates that the impetus to radicalism came from the center, and the Gang of Four's influence was quite limited at local levels.

Kang Sheng allegedly condemned eighty Central Committee

members; of whom sixty-six were purged, only fourteen surviving (table 13). This indicates that Kang Sheng—and by inference the Gang of Four—exerted enormous influence in selecting who was to be purged. The surviving fourteen must have been leaders with their own political influence who were powerful enough to protect themselves or people who were protected by Mao. The fact that thirty persons who were not accused by Kang were purged indicates the complexity of the conflict at the top level. Although not being accused by Kang does not necessarily mean that they were protected by the radicals, it is obvious that the radicals' influence on the matters of purge and survival was not total.

Table 14 shows that field army affiliation was clearly correlated

with the rate of purge. Former officers of the Fourth Field Army fared much better than those of other field armies. The rise of Lin Biao might have reduced the possible charge against the former Fourth Field Army officers, whereas the purge of the leaders of other field armies (Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi) made their officers more vulnerable. Or Lin Biao might have protected his field army officers, who would otherwise have been toppled. That 42 percent of the former Fourth Field Army officers were purged, however, indicates that the conflict in the CR was not exclusively along the line of field army affiliations.

Table 15 demonstrates that seniority affected the political fate of the military officers; the older they were, the more likely they were to be purged. Obviously, the CR centered conflict among the

senior party leaders with substantial political power. Even most of the purged Fourth Field Army officers were senior ones with political status independent of Lin Biao. They either refused to join Lin's group, thus forfeiting his possible protection, or he might have actively tried to remove them as obstacles to his rise to power. Whichever was the case, Lin Biao's strategy was to protect the junior officers who had affiliations with his field army, thereby reinforcing the existing ties by renewing their indebtedness to him. The CR offered the younger generation an opportunity to be promoted, with less room for the older generation of officers, who had already reached top positions. Actually, 57 percent of the third to eighth generations were promoted whereas only 16 percent of the first generation of military leaders were promoted during the CR. On the whole, my biographical data indicate that the purge rate among high-ranking cadres was higher than among low-ranking cadres. Particularly vulnerable to the purge were those who had enjoyed rapid promotion before the CR and those who held multiple positions at the time of the CR. Also, of the ninety-four persons who had studied abroad, about 64 percent of them were purged, with only 36 percent surviving.

This purge pattern reveals that the CR destroyed the formal authority of the party-state because the powerholders or leading cadres represented the formal authority when the degree of institutionalization was low. As the powerholders defended themselves by invoking the structural legitimacy of the organization, the rebels rejected the organizational norms, rules, and procedures in the name of the higher authority of Mao's thought.

The only political authority that was formally accepted as a standard for judging all political conduct was the radicalized version of Mao's thought and his personal decisions, frequently known as "great strategic decisions." Every political actor claimed to follow Mao's line and ideology, but each political group interpreted the meaning of Mao's thought and his specific instructions in light of their particular political interests. Almost anyone, regardless of position and organizational affiliation, was vulnerable to the charges of anti-Maoism from some quarter. That one was following an order coming through the regular channels of authority neither guaranteed safety nor implied that one was a good cadre. On the contrary, those who stuck to the Leninist organizational principle

were condemned as "docile tools" with a "slave mentality." Colleagues often blamed one another, and subordinates challenged superiors, quite often disguising their political ambition in the name of the revolution. The mass movement challenged the moral and ethical foundations of the entire political community.

As a witch-hunt atmosphere permeated the entire society, the choice available for each individual was either to purge or to be purged, and people quickly learned that it was better to accuse before being accused. There were many grounds for accusation and persecution: opposing Mao's line, having a bad class background or blotted political record, and so forth. Caught in the dilemma between what they really believed to be right and what they saw as politically advantageous, some people refused to compromise their conception of basic human decency, but the more opportunistic were willing to go against their own conscience by laying false charges and providing concocted evidence. Others were compelled to do so under coercion and torture.

As the mass movement created terror and chaos, which resulted in struggle, dispute, and policy changes, and exposed most cadres to the charge that they made some errors (according to the criteria used at any given moment), only personal trust allowed people to share their inner feelings and maintain confidentiality.^[6] Usually trust came from personal ties based on friendship, belonging to the same unit, or sharing the same birthplace, but even these bonds provided no security against betrayal. The CR offered many temptations for the self-interested to betray trust. In brief, the importance of informal ties increased in inverse proportion to the weakening of the formal authority.

Situational Groups and Rehabilitation

The purge pattern indicates that the conflicting groups during the CR do not fit neatly into any of the conflict groups suggested in the standard literature. They were too complex to be explained as "tendency groups," those people with a similar ideological pro-

[6] S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients, and Friends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

pensity that leads them to take similar positions on various specific issues.^[7] Nor can they be called "opinion groups," which are issue-specific, because the elite conflicts were too intense, severe, and well structured. Although the conflicts involved institutional cleavages among the party, the government, and the military, the formal authority of Mao, which all institutions accepted, and the diffused power bases of the various conflict groups limited the applicability of "institutional groups" on which the theory of bureaucratic politics has developed. Many informal groups based on personal ties were active in the CR, but it is difficult to ascertain to what extent they became political groups actually affecting the outcome of the conflicts. It is a "faction" concept that has been most widely used in analyzing the dynamics of the CR. By definition, a faction is very limited in size and capability, and, therefore, factional politics result in "immobilism."^[8] The idea of a micro-group such as a faction is of limited use because the CR conflicts involved almost all Chinese, including both the masses and the political elite. The CR conflicts, moreover, caused many ideological and policy disputes, which frequently ended in real changes in these areas—a situation that runs counter to the meaning of a faction.

Because of the large number of political groups that emerged during the chaotic process of the elite conflicts and mass mobilization, the numerous issues over which they clashed, and the constantly forming and changing coalitions, it is extremely difficult to identify convincingly the factors that led to the CR. Instead, looking at how conflicts were structured in terms of the various groups that came into existence as a result of the mass mobilization, I propose to use the concept of "situational group," referring to the

[7] Franklyn Griffiths, "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-Making," in Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 335–77.

[8] For the factional model, see W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," China Quarterly , no. 46, 1963, 668–99; Andrew Nathan, "A Factional Model for CCP Politics," China Quarterly , no. 53, 1973, 34–66; Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Studying of Informal Groups in CCP Politics," China Quarterly , no. 65, 1976, 98–113; Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1981); Ralph W. Nicholas, "Faction: A Comparative Analysis," 55–74, and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," 123–46, both in Steffen W. Schmitt, James Scott, Carl Lande, and Laura Guasti, eds., Friends, Followers, and Faction (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).

position in which a group finds itself as a result of a particular state policy.^[9] This concept is particularly appropriate to Chinese revolutionary politics, which relies heavily on political power to change the entire social structure. Because of the decisive and omnipresent role of the party-state in China, many groups—for example, the poor and the unemployed, which in Western countries would be labeled sociological groups—are more accurately defined as situational groups. The members of a situational group may or may not have a common group identity, but they are keenly aware that their situation is the result of state policy.

One situational group was composed of victims of the CR—the purged. Although they were off the political stage for a while (depending on when they were rehabilitated), they constituted a coherent political group, and after Mao's death they became the "rehabilitated cadres" who regained power. Among them were different subgroups. Some were officially denounced as "renegades, spies, and traitors" and then expelled from the party (e.g., Liu Shaoqi). Others were condemned as "powerholders taking the capitalist road," imprisoned for a while, and then released (e.g., Deng Xiaoping). There was also a group of cadres who were criticized and put aside by the masses. Their cases were never officially concluded. This situational group had many personal reasons to challenge the validity of the CR. They recognized Mao's mistakes, while holding the Gang of Four and Lin Biao responsible for the hardships they had suffered.

A second group consisted of leaders who were criticized but never officially purged or demoted; despite the profound crisis, this group of cadres managed to survive. As purge and counter-purge continued, they became more important in the overall distribution of power. Three examples are Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Ye Jianying. Although they enjoyed close personal relations with Mao, they had ample sympathy for their less fortunate comrades whom the CR victimized. They had no reason to defend the CR other than protecting Mao's position in Chinese history.

A third group included cadres who occupied middle-echelon positions in the party-state at the beginning of the CR and who were promoted upward (regardless of their desires) as the purges

[9] William Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968).

created vacancies at the top. As the de facto beneficiaries of the CR, they developed a deep personal loyalty to Mao, although they may have had personal reservations about some of his decisions. They tended to defend the CR on the whole, while rehabilitating some of its innocent victims as long as Mao's overall reputation was not undermined. Hua Guofeng and Wu De are examples of this type of cadre.

The fourth and last group consisted of those who initiated the CR and spurred the mass movement. Within this group were two subgroups: the Gang of Four, who controlled propaganda, and Lin Biao's group, which consisted mostly of military officers. Both used Mao's thought to initiate the CR, and both contributed to the development of Mao's personality cult. They had every reason to defend the CR while resisting the rehabilitation of cadres, particularly senior ones, whose return would threaten their own power position.

Analyzing the CR elite conflicts in terms of situational groups offers several advantages that the other types of conflict groups cannot. First, the situational group can accommodate ideological differences among the elites. Broadly speaking, the victims of the CR were on the right of the ideological spectrum, whereas the initiators of the CR were on the left. The survivors and the beneficiaries were between the two extremes. Second, the situational model can deal with the problem of size in conflict groups. Since the CR involved all the cadres as well as a large number of ordinary Chinese, the factional model based on personal ties cannot fully explain its dynamics and outcome. Moreover, unlike the factional model, the situational group does not assume that major elite conflicts are organized along cleavages based on informal ties, thus avoiding the question of formal and informal authorities. At the same time, the situational group differs from an opinion group—in which one can change one's position depending on the issue—because its members' positions are largely determined by their own political interests. In addition, the situational group possesses more group cohesiveness than the tendency group.

Most important, with this concept one can effectively address the question of rehabilitation, the issue around which elite conflicts centered. Understandably, all members of each situational group saw their crucial personal interests at stake in this issue.

The practice of allowing purged cadres to return to the political scene seems to be unique to the CCP, contrasting sharply with Stalin's policy.^[10] The traditional Chinese belief that man is fallible and yet also malleable through education provided the philosophical justification for cadre rehabilitation. Mao strengthened this traditional belief by emphasizing the need to reeducate cadres who made mistakes and, by departing from some Leninists' view that the Communist Party is infallible.^[11]

Rehabilitation, when fairly used, can perform several positive functions. It can work as a mechanism for administering justice and for allowing cadres to ask for reviews of their cases. Without such minimal protection, no political system can survive for long. At the same time, rehabilitation helps the decision-makers to correct their mistakes, assuage their guilt, and learn from their experiences. For ordinary Chinese citizens, the existence of rehabilitation can act to sustain their faith in the sincerity and, therefore, the legitimacy, of the party. Rehabilitation also benefits the Chinese political system by serving as a vehicle for keeping the cadres united by bringing back those who have strayed from the correct path. In addition, the political system can make good use of disgraced cadres' experiences.

Ideally, rehabilitation should be decided on the basis of the correctness or incorrectness of the original decision. But many political factors influenced each decision. First, whether the original decision was right or wrong depended on both subjective political judgment and the official line at a given moment. Since declaring a decision was wrong also raised the question of the decision-makers' culpability, those who made the decision usually defended it; the opposition, of course, capitalized on any problematic decisions.^[12]

Most important, whom to rehabilitate, particularly among

[10] In Chinese, "rehabilitation" (pingfan ) implies the overthrowing of an original disciplinary decision. The reasons most often cited for such reverals include false accusations, calumnious evidence, or excessively severe punishment. Rehabilitation usually entails the restoration of honor, the reinstatement of the disgraced cadre in his original position, and the payment of the wages he would have received during the period of his disgrace.

[11] Pingfan Ziliao Huibian (Guangdong, 19 January 1968), in Hongweibing Ziliao Huibian (Washington D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Material, 1978), 5010–5022.

[12] For this point, see Hong Yung Lee, Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution .

upper-echelon political leaders, had (and always has) profound ramifications for the distribution of power as well as for policy. For this reason the distribution of power at a given moment decisively influenced cadre rehabilitation, and whenever a major change occurred in power distribution, the demand for rehabilitation increased.

From the beginning, the CR was concerned with who should be purged and who should be protected or rehabilitated. Although all cadres were attacked in one way or another during the mass movement, some of the attacked managed to survive or to be liberated at early stages of the mass movement. More cadres were liberated when Mao proceeded to set up a new power structure in the form of a revolutionary committee. The three-in-one formula offered some cadres opportunities to join the new power structure as "revolutionary cadres." But who was qualified to be a "revolutionary cadre" was heatedly disputed, and every faction tried to maximize its power position in the new revolutionary committee by supporting the cadres of its own choice. Generally, PLA representatives in each unit, who had access to cadres' dossiers, made personnel decisions on cadres. The Jiang Qing group exerted its influence in the units with which it was concerned—generally those at central and provincial levels. However, at these high levels, the group could find only a few "revolutionary cadres," and worse still, most of them happened to have "other political problems."^[13] The radicals' influence over the formation of revolutionary committees at lower levels was further diluted because decisive authority came from the provincial revolutionary committee, which was dominated by local PLA leaders with the support of conservative mass organizations.

Large-scale "liberation" took place in 1968, when Mao launched the campaign to purify class ranks. Part of this campaign was known as "settling cases" (dingan ) by rendering official judgment on each cadre. At that time the cadres' status was uncertain: almost

[13] For instance, Liu Geping of Shansi, Wang Xiaoyu of Shandong, and Pan Fusheng of Heilongjiang joined the rebels. However, almost all such cadres had disappeared by the Ninth Party Congress (1969), probably because their "political problems which—referring to past mistakes"—made them vulnerable to attack by conservative forces.

all of them were criticized by the masses, but they were neither removed from their posts nor formally reinstated.

Unlike the case in earlier phases, this time new formal authorities—the revolutionary committees, Workers Mao's Thought Propaganda Teams, or the Military Affairs Commission—investigated each cadre, particularly focusing on class background (i.e., whether the one in their dossier was correct or not) and any suspicious past problems. Final decisions were supposed to be made impartially and objectively, but because of rampant factionalism, simplistic charges abounded, and even a single accusatory letter from the masses or an accusation in a mass meeting could trigger a lengthy process of investigation. As a result, many (what were later called) "false accusations," "mistaken decisions," and "trumped-up charges" were produced in the campaign.

After two years of chaotic mass mobilization, it was not easy to determine who was good and who was bad. All the decision-making bodies were split between radicals and conservatives, who violently disagreed even on basic standards of right and wrong. Moreover, two years of prolonged struggle exposed the weaknesses of every cadre. The chaos of the mass movement made it difficult to separate cadres who sought only their own interests from those who pursued what they believed to be the public good. Some cadres stood firmly for what they considered the right course, but unfortunately they turned out to be on the wrong side—at least from the Maoist viewpoint. Other cadres found in Mao's call to criticize powerholders a chance to vent accumulated resentments against their superiors. Still others were wholly opportunistic and unprincipled, changing their allegiance to whichever side seemed to be winning.

Another group of cadres, known as "wanderers" (xiaoyao pai ), withdrew from the whole movement, adopted an indifferent attitude, and tried to enjoy themselves. Many cadres who honestly reported their class origin and political history to the party were victimized because of "bad records"; those who managed to keep their records clean by lying claimed to be true revolutionaries. Dedicated Communist cadres who had faithfully carried out official policies prior to the CR drew heavier criticism from the masses than the "old good persons" (lao hao ren ). There was a compelling

need to untangle things and bring some semblance of justice and order to the situation. Veteran revolutionary cadres, who had led the Chinese revolution to success, came under fire from former KMT partisans. Many opportunists, who had compromised with the Japanese, the KMT, and the CCP, also surviveed the CR without having passed a "soul-searching test."

To make matters even more complex, the official definition of those to be purged was ambiguous and constantly changing. At the initial stage, the official target was defined as the "bourgeois academic authority." Then it expanded to include "powerholders taking the capitalist road," but the radicals and conservatives disagreed on how to define "capitalist roaders." The radicals insisted on purging all the cadres guilty of "the bourgeois reactionary line" (which suppressed the spontaneous mass movement). However, since almost 90 percent of the cadres had carried out the wrong line, the official policy changed to distinguishing between people who had willingly carried out the mistaken line and those who had simply followed orders coming down through regular organizational channels.^[14] Eventually, even those who were guilty of the bourgeois reactionary line were allowed to repent when the official description changed to "stubborn powerholders who took the capitalist road, but refused to reform."^[15]

Eventually the official category to be purged was reduced to "renegade and spy." Capitulating to the enemy by revealing party secrets and by selling out comrades, even when captured by the enemy, is against the principles of Leninism. To call a cadre a renegade is the most effective tactic for discrediting any party cadre in the public eye. Unlike other political mistakes, whose seriousness diminishes over time and with the introduction of different interpretations, being a renegade is an almost unforgivable sin. For this reason, Liu Shaoqi was labeled a renegade. Once applied, these labels substantially decreased anyone's chance for a verdict reversal, even when the political atmosphere changed drastically. In fact, those who had been condemned as renegades—mostly those from the "white" areas—were the last to be rehabilitated.

[14] Gongren Zaofan Bao , 10 April 1969.

[15] Renmin Ribao , 1 January 1964.

Figure. 1. 
Distribution of Rehabilitation by Years
Source . Sample includes all persons who served on any 
of the Eighth to the Twelfth Central Committees.

The concept of situational groups, their coalitions, and their conflict over the issue of rehabilitation are powerful tools in explaining the process and outcome of elite conflicts (see fig. 1).

Despite two years of mass mobilization, many old cadres managed to survive under the protection of Zhou Enlai. They represented continuity for the regime. Mao did not have either the capability or the will to purge all the old cadres. Besides their continued existence, there was the Lin Biao incident, which further weakened the political forces who had initiated the CR. The incident also deprived the Cultural Revolution Small Group, dominated by Madam Mao and her followers, of a powerful coalition partner, with whom it shared a common interest in safeguarding the accomplishments of the CR.

Immediately following Lin's death in 1971, a large number of senior cadres were rehabilitated (see figure 1). This intensified the Gang of Four's (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen) conflicts with the survivors, in spite of Mao's effort to make the two groups cooperate. The Jiang Qing group renewed the mass campaign under the excuse of criticizing Confucius and Lin Biao in order to promote the CR rebels and to strengthen their power positions, while accusing the senior cadres

of attemping to "reverse the achievements of the CR." During this period of intensifying conflict, 1975–76, the rate of rehabilitation dropped substantially.

The Gang of Four even failed to form a coalition with the CR beneficiaries, whose political interests lay in limiting the number of rehabilitated cadres. Instead, the Gang's political ineptitude pushed the beneficiaries to form a coalition with the CR survivors—a coalition which eventually moved against the Gang. However, by cutting a potential partner, the CR's beneficiaries left themselves vulnerable. Moreover, they could not persuade the survivors of the CR to refrain from rehabilitating their old colleagues. As shown in the figure 1, the number of rehabilitated senior cadres increased in 1977 and 1978. When Deng Xiaoping, returned to power in 1978 and almost all the CR victims were reinstated, the de facto beneficiaries were doomed.

After easing out Hua Guofeng, Deng formed a broad coalition with the rehabilitated and the survivors, both of whom had suffered greatly. Since the winning coalition had no vested interest in the CR, it could totally repudiate it and initiate political and economic reforms. While inducing the rehabilitated cadres to retire through a special retirement system (see chapter 10), Deng Xiaoping promoted the younger generation of technocrats to the highest positions in the Thirteenth Party Congress.

5
Lin Biao: Military Man

After two years of mass mobilization that almost paralyzed the formal authority of the party-state, there were three contending situational groups at the top level. One was Zhou Enlai, the leader of the government functionaries, to whom not only the surviving cadres and the beneficiaries but also the purged leaders increasingly looked for leadership. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing groups were the initiators of the CR; the former controlled the "gun" while the latter controlled the "pen." Mao had close personal relationships with these three groups. One could even say that Mao was using Zhou Enlai to handle the administrative function of the party-state, the Gang of Four to mobilize the masses and ideologically justify the CR, and Lin Biao to control the military, on which he increasingly depended to maintain social order.

The political interests of the three groups converged and clashed. At the beginning of the CR in 1966, the Jiang Qing group and Lin Biao shared common interests. Both wanted to remove a large number of central political leaders to create vacancies within the bureaucracy for their own followers. Furthermore, cultivating Mao's personality cult served the interests of both groups, which were close to Mao.

However, the two groups had disparate support bases. The core members of Jiang Qing's group were the ideologues whose political interests lay with the mass mobilization of the disadvantaged social groups and who wanted to change the existing power structure. By contrast, Lin Biao's support came from military officers, whom he skillfully protected and then promoted to leadership positions during the CR. Although Lin's formal position was second only to Mao's, he lacked Mao's charisma, his contact with the masses was very limited, and his influence over the civilian bureaucracy was minimal. Lin Biao's political aim, therefore, was not to mobilize the masses and then modify the existing system but

to take over the system from within. Lin used his formal authority to develop a factional network by promoting his personal followers to key positions in the military and expanding the military's influence over the civilian bureaucracy. Perceived as Mao's faithful disciple and as a close collaborator of the Gang of Four, Lin Biao had to produce a continuous flow of rhetoric.

The political interests of the two groups diverged when local mass organizations clashed with local military leaders. The Jiang Qing group, mostly composed of what the Chinese call "petty intellectuals," wanted to use the masses to seize military power at the local level, whereas Lin Biao had to be sensitive to the institutional interests of the military, particularly those of local military leaders. Lin thus found himself under opposing pressures: pressure from the Jiang Qing group to support the radical Red Guards and pressure from local military leaders to defend the PLA's interests. Caught in this dilemma, he cooperated with the Jiang Qing group against the senior leaders, at the same time competing with the radicals to fill vacancies created by the purges with his own people.^[1]

Zhou Enlai must also be factored into this uneasy relationship between the Jiang Qing and Lin Biao groups. Whether it was because of a lack of personal ambition or his skillful maneuvering, Zhou succeeded in building a public image as an impartial premier honestly trying to carry out Mao's policy within objective constraints. He protected the party and government leaders as far as his power and influence allowed, but when it became impossible to do so without a serious confrontation with other elite groups, he publicly dropped his defense and acted as a conciliator and moderator rather than as an advocate of any partisan position. Apparently, he used universal criteria rather than particularistic ones in selecting targets and defending victims. Perhaps he did not need to engage in factional politics because his administration of the government was essential to the daily life of the society. The combination of political skill, a consistently moderate position, high prestige among the entire cadre corps, and Mao's trust caused

[1] For this point, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiusuo, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tebie Fating Shenpan Lin Biao, Jiang Qing Fangeming Jituan Zhufan Jishi (Beijing: Falu Chubanshe, 1982); and Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1984), vol. 3.

even the Jiang Qing group to respect him, at least publicly, although privately the radicals regarded him as the "third headquarters" commanding the cadres' loyalty—a man who somehow managed to survive the CR's turbulence.

Zhou and Lin were both opposed to the Gang of Four's stragtegy of mass mobilization, and both had very practical views on policy. If they could have formed a coalition against the Gang of Four, it would have been very powerful.

Power Base

Selecting the Ninth Central Committee

The three groups clashed over the issue of who should be promoted to the Ninth Central Committee. The Gang of Four wanted to promote the CR rebels—"those who have proven themselves in the CR"—while removing "all the hidden class enemies in the party."^[2] The Zhou Enlai group tried to strengthen cadre representation in the new Central Committee, whereas Lin Biao was in favor of giving a large share of political power to military leaders.

When the twelfth plenum of the Eighth Party Congress was convened in October 1968, only forty Central Committee members out of ninety-seven (ten had died), less than a quorum, were allowed to attend. The meeting, therefore, first decided to promote ten alternate members in order to reach a quorum. In addition, some leaders of the revolutionary committees and some PLA leaders also participated with voting rights.^[3] The meeting expelled Liu Shaoqi as a traitor and renegade.

Since local party committees had not yet been restored, each provincial revolutionary committee selected delegates to the next National Party Congress. Tension along the border after a brief clash with the Soviet Union caused the national delegates, instead of directly attending in person, to select a presidium that would

[2] For reconstruction of the party, see the untitled monograph [Materials on Party Reconstruction], in Hongweibing Ziliao Huibian [Washington D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1978], 5029–42.

[3] Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Guanyu Jianguo Yilai de Rugan Lishi Wenti de Jueyi (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 1983), 389.

exercise authority in the name of the congress. The presidium first chose its own leaders and then made basic decisions on how to select new Central Committee members: it limited the number of full and alternate members to 250 and the number of Eighth CC members to be reelected to 53, and it also specified the groups whose members would be automatically "elected."^[4]

Each provincial delegation nominated candidates to the CC and forwarded their names to the presidium. After collecting all the names, the presidium first voted on the lists of names, most of which had more candidates than could be elected, and then reviewed the qualifications of each candidate. The discussion developed into a heated clash among Zhou Enlai, the military, and the Gang of Four, which wanted to bring in many rebels.^[5] After negotiating about each name to appear on the final list, members of the presidium each cast one vote for or against the list. It was approved unanimously. "Because there were too many nominees from the military and the mass representatives," 279 members were elected to the CC, exceeding the limit set up by the presidium. It took almost ten days for the presidium to select the CC members.^[6]

As table 16 demonstrates, the PLA was the group that gained the most from the CR. Its local representation at the Ninth CC also increased substantially as a result of the loss of leaders from the central party and the government, a sign that power had become decentralized. But the gains made by local leaders did not benefit provincial party leaders, for the local leaders were PLA members who took power at the expense of their civilian counterparts. According to my preliminary estimate, out of 225 provincial party secretaries at the time of the CR, only 98 (43 percent) managed to survive. By contrast, of the 8 regional PLA leaders at the Eighth CC, only 1 was permanently purged.

Conflict over the selection of Politburo members was more intense. Mao reported to the congress:

[4] Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Dangshi Jiaoyan Ziliaozu, ed., Zhonggou Gongchandang Lice Zhongyao Huiyiji (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 2:242; Zhongguo Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi, ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang Lice Daibiao Dahui (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1983), 66–72.

[5] Zhongguo Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi, ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang .

[6] Ibid.

I have faith in some of my old comrades who made mistakes. Originally there was a long list of twenty people [of old cadres], and I considered it good to make all of them Politburo members. Later someone advanced a shorter list of ten people, and I thought the list was too short. Most [of the old cadres] are middle roaders, and [I] am opposed to the long and the short lists and favor a medium size list of about twenty persons.^[7]

The twenty-person Politburo included eight new members. Six of them turned out to be from Lin Biao's group; the Jiang Qing group obtained four seats.^[8]

Lin Biao's Followers

Tables 17–19, constructed on the basis of biographical information that I have collected, attempt to identify Lifts power base by analyzing those purged with him. Lin's political influence in the Ninth CC was quite modest: only 16 percent of its members were purged with him. Moreover, his modest political influence was largely limited to the military; forty-nine of sixty-six members purged with him were military men (constituting 40 percent of all military representatives in the committee), whereas only 5 percent of the mass representatives and 16 percent of the cadres failed to make it into

[7] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue Cankao Ziliao; Wenhua Dageming Shiqi (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xueyuan, 1983), 4, no. 4 (1983): 278.

[8] The Lin group include Ye Qun, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Qiu Huizuo, and Wu Faxian. The Jiang Qing group members were Xie Fuzhi, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.

the Tenth CC. Despite his impressive array of formal titles, his political influence in the Chinese bureaucracy was rather limited. As a professional military man, he had no experience to help him as the head of a civilian bureaucracy. Nor did he possess any charismatic qualities, either physical or intellectual.

Even within the military, Lin Biao drew his supporters largely from former Fourth Field Army officers (see table 18). Moreover, as shown in table 19, most of his supporters were from the second (32 percent) and third (27 percent) generations of military leaders, whereas his influence on the first generation of senior military leaders was quite limited (18 percent).

This skewed distribution of Lin Biao's followers within the military demonstrates that his control was very tenuous, and the military was not free from factional, regional, and organizational rivalries. Furthermore, Mao, as chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, was not about to give him a free hand.

None of the most senior leaders (except Chen Boda) was implicated in the Lin Biao affair. Many of them apparently did not take him seriously, as indicated by Luo Ruiqing's remark: "I never though that guy would fill the position [of Defense Minister]."^[9] Even during the CR, when Lin's power was rapidly increasing, many senior military leaders looked at his political maneuvers with contempt and tried to distance themselves from him and the Gang of Four. Lin could not pressure them to join his informal group because they had direct access to Mao, which they used to clarify their status.^[10]

Lin Biao's most loyal followers were from the second echelon of military leaders, mostly from the former Fourth Field Army, which had been close to him for a long time. These followers were Huang Yongsheng, former commander of the Guangdong military region (who was promoted in 1968 to be chief of staff), Qiu Huizou, director of the quartermaster department, Li Zuopeng, commander of the navy, and Wu Faxian, commander of the air force. All of them helped Lin purge Lo Ruiqing by secretly collecting incriminating information against him. During the CR, Lin enhanced their dependency on him by personally protecting them at the most crucial moment—when they were criticized as powerholders by the masses. In return, these former Fourth Field Army officers de-

[9] Interview in Beijing, 1988.

[10] Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu , vol. 3.

veloped personal loyalties to Lin, regarding him not only as a formal superior but also as an informal leader.

In addition to these high-level leaders, Lin Biao also cultivated a group of loyal followers among junior air force officers, with whom he did not have any direct work relations. The key link between Lin and these personal followers was his twenty-one-year-old son, Lin Liguo, who was a physics student at Beijing University when the CR started. Lin Biao first asked Wu Faxian to take care of his son during the initial stages of the CR. Later he instructed Wu to make his son deputy director of the air force's management office and operational department so that Lin Biao himself could help the development of air defense strategy through his son. Wu was more than willing to oblige. He convened the party committee of the air force, which decided that "every matter in the air force should be reported to Lin Liguo, and everything should be under his control and command." In addition, the political department of the air force adopted five measures: "Think of Lin Liguo all the time, ask him about everything, protect him everywhere, take him as our leader, sincerely comply with his demands and his every command."^[11] Under the protection of Wu Faxian, Lin Liguo gathered together a dozen middle-level air force officers.^[12]

The Lin Biao group closely approximates an archetypical faction. First, its key membership included a few former Fourth Field Army officers and second- and third-generation military officers from other field armies who owed their promotion to him. They developed very close personal ties, which resulted in complex mutual obligations. For instance, Lin Biao protected Wu Faxian, and in return Wu accepted Lin's son into the air force, helped him get promoted into key positions, and tolerated his factional network within the air force.

Moreover, the second layer of Lin Biao's group, which consisted of ambitious air force officers, whom his son recruited through the secret channels of patronage, also approximates the typical factional model: the faction was based exclusively on personal ties, the officers were motivated by ambition, and they were dedicated to

[11] Yan Jiaqi, Wenge Shinian Shi (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 341–42.

[12] For the Lin Liguo group, see ibid., 319–97; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiusuo, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

their patrons without much consideration for formal rules. Because they did not have their own power base, they were willing to engage in factional activities, deeply involving themselves in preparing the 571 program (wu chi yi , a Chinese homonym with armed uprising). Obviously, they expected to be rewarded if their plan succeeded.

However, Lin Biao's senior military followers—Huang Yongsheng, Li Zoupeng, Wu Faxian, and Qiu Huizuo—were not directly involved in the conspiracy, according to available data revealed during their trial. They behaved circumspectly during the critical period; although they apparently knew Lin Liguo's plan, they neither actively participated in it nor exposed the plan to an appropriate authority. At the same time they gave Lin Liguo all the support they could mobilize through their formal authority and transmitted to Lin Biao the content of the speeches that Mao made during his trip to military regions. Probably their positions were too high for them openly to participate in obvious antiparty activities.^[13]

This pattern of behavior again reveals a complex and subtle mix of formal and informal ties in Chinese politics. Because of a strong tradition of formal bureaucracy, incumbents of formal organizations tend to use their discretionary powers to help their factional interests, but not so far as to jeopardize their formal authority.

Rehabilitation

At the Ninth Party Congress Mao emphatically stressed the need for unity. Lin Biao also endorsed a policy of moderation. He urged that only cadres of the three categories be purged and that "good people who made the mistake of following the capitalist road" be set free, "if they raise their determination and if the masses are willing to forgive them."^[14] Thereafter, the news media began to publish articles discussing cadre rehabilitation. However, instead of urging large-scale rehabilitation, these articles simply reported some experiences of rehabilitated cadres to prove a general point.

[13] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiusuo, Zhonghua Renmin .

[14] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 278.

On the question of how to evaluate cadres, an article about an experience in Shanghai suggested that the regime should (1) consider each cadre's major characteristics and actions rather than minor ones; (2) look at the circumstances and historical conditions in which cadres made mistakes (and forgive those whose mistakes resulted from following instructions passed down through organizational channels); (3) survey the entire history and work of each cadre, not just his work during the CR; (4) evaluate each cadre's performance throughout the CR, not just during a particular period; and (5) take into account the cadre's attitude toward his own mistakes. This formula represented a clear victory for the moderates and a setback for the radicals, who insisted on using cadres' performance records from the early stages of the CR as the major criterion for rehabilitation.^[15] When the entire work record was used as the principal criterion, most cadres passed the test and were consequently liberated.

A statement accompanying the liberation of Liu Bing, former deputy secretary of Qinghua University, shows how the five conditions worked in one case.

Liu Bing joined the revolution in his youth. Having investigated and researched his record after 1949, particularly after he came to Qinghua in 1956, everyone came to the following conclusion. He had a very close relationship with a handful of counterrevolutionary revisionists, but this relationship derived from his work [rather than from personal ties]. Liu Bing never took part in counterrevolutionary activities. In his work, he followed the counterrevolutionary education policy, but never with the intention of restoring capitalism or of opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary education policy; and he never took part in any criminal activity. Because of the insufficient transformation of his bourgeois worldview, he spread rightist views, but he did not violently attack the party or socialism. By his failure to put proletarian politics first, he overemphasized "functional work" and employed a few bad persons. Yet he never surrendered to the renegades.^[16]

Newspaper discussions also offered some examples of "good cadres who made mistakes." For instance, before the CR a Shanghai cadre set up three mottoes to observe personally: (1) not to be economically corrupt, (2) not to lead a decadent life, and (3)

[15] Renmin Ribao , 3 March 1969.

[16] Ibid., 1 June 1969.

not to pursue fame. Despite this cadre's personal integrity, he implemented the bourgeois reactionary line during the CR.^[17] Obviously this type of cadre was regarded as a "good person who had made mistakes." Another criterion used to determine whether a cadre was good or not was class background. Any cadre who came from a family who had suffered exploitation was presumed to be good.

Newspapers also addressed the subject of the masses' opposition to cadre rehabilitation. There was still strong resistance to rehabilitation from mass organizations because the masses were afraid of retaliation from cadres against whom they had once struggled.^[18] And the lingering effects of CR factionalism often made those in charge of cadre rehabilitation unable to reach a consensus on a particular cadre.

Although we do not know how these model cases were applied to each individual cadre, we know that most of the cadres liberated before Lin Biao's fall were specialists whose expertise was greatly needed to help units function smoothly. A preliminary count has revealed that only thirteen provincial-level cadres, but a much larger number of government leaders, were liberated before Lin Biao's purge. Most of the 127 ministerial-level government cadres freed by June 1971 were former vice ministers.^[19]

It is very likely that the Gang of Four would have opposed rehabilitating any cadres, if possible, whereas Zhou Enlai would have brought back as many cadres as possible. Documentary evidence about Lin Biao's attitude toward cadre rehabilitation is contradictory; he was accused, on the one hand, of having opposed it and, on the other, of having schemed to use the grievances of purged cadres in his own move against Mao.^[20] His real position seems to have been between these two extremes; he was willing to rehabilitate lower-level cadres, but he refused to allow the return of high ranking cadres because they would have posed a threat to his position. In fact, most of the cadres at the basic production level were liberated prior to Lin Biao's fall.^[21]

[17] Ibid., 28 March 1969.

[18] Ibid., 14 April 1969.

[19] For instance, see Zhonggong Yanjiu 4(9) (July 1972):42–51.

[20] Ying-mao Kau, The Lin Biao Affair (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Science Press, 1975), 84; Daily Report , 21 June 1976.

[21] China News Analysis , no. 311, 8 May 1969; no. 315, 12 June 1969; Hong Qi , no. 6, 1978.

Political Strategy

Although Lin Biao is known as a brilliant military strategist, he rose to power primarily because he actively encouraged the cult of Mao. He introduced Mao's approach of "politics in command" to the PLA and succeeded, to a certain extent, in restoring that body's sagging morale after the purge of Peng Dehuai. During the CR, he pushed Mao's personality cult to new heights. "Every sentence in Chairman Mao's work is a truth. One single sentence of his surpasses 10,000 of ours. . . . We must carry out not only those instructions we understand, but also those we fail to understand for the moment, and in the course of carrying them out, we must try to understand them."^[22]

Lin Biao's thought pattern, aptly labeled a "barracks communism" by Lowell Dittmer, shows the traits of a military man, particularly in his penchant for reducing complex and ambiguous matters to simple propositions.^[23] During the CR, he divided the leading cadres into two categories: those who paid attention to important matters and those who were preoccupied with minor matters. Although we do not know whether he undertook any serious study of Marxism-Leninism or any other theoretical literature, he left several boxes of cards containing excerpts from various Marxist writings, organized under such headings as "relations between superior and subordinates," "cadre policy," "seeking truth," and "dialectics."^[24]

Although Lin Biao rose to be Mao's official successor during the CR, as vice chairman of the CCP, his real power was precarious because his influence was overshadowed by Mao, who was too powerful and unpredictable to be trusted. Lin knew about Mao's habit of using confidants and then dropping them.^[25] Although he was fourteen years younger than Mao, his poor health made it doubtful that he would outlive him.^[26] As defense minister he was legally subordinate to Premier Zhou Enlai, his for-

[22] New China News Agency (Beijing), 23 January 1968.

[23] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[24] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 336.

[25] Ying-mao Kau, Lin Biao Affair .

[26] Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road and Socialist New Victory During New Line" (unpublished paper), 1987, 24.

mer teacher at Whampao Military Academy. In the propaganda field he had no reliable partners except for the Gang of Four, over whom he did not have any formal authority.

With his power base limited to military officers, largely from the Fourth Field Army and those from the second and third generations, Lin attempted, first, to strengthen the political authority of the military, second, to obtain formal authority over the bureaucracy as chairman of the state, and, third, to mobilize his factional followers for a coup attempt.

Using The Military

Although Mao had to rely on the military to restore any semblance of order after two years of chaotic mass mobilization, the elite groups' interests in the military's deep involvement in politics diverged. For Mao, who invented the phrase "the party controls the gun," military involvement was a temporary measure to control the mass movement. The Gang of Four saw that their interests lay in weakening the military's political influence while increasing that of the rebels in the newly established power organs at the local level. Zhou Enlai shared Mao's view, regarding use of the military as an expedient measure to prevent civil war.

Given Lin Biao's heavy reliance on the military for his support, it is clear that he benefited from the institution's increasing political influence during the crisis of the CR, although he did not totally control it. For example, as vice chairman in charge of the daily operations of the Military Affairs Commission, he could legitimately interfere with the operations of the military control commissions that were imposed even on some central government ministries.

The rising tension along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 helped the military to maintain its active involvement in politics. After the armed clash in Chenbao island, Lin Biao expanded the military's control over industry at the expense of the State Council under Zhou Enlai.^[27] Using the need to prepare for war as an ex-

[27] On the border clash, see Thomas Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," American Political Science Review , vol. 66, December 1972, 1175–1202. For Lin Biao's exploitation of the incident, see Jingji Jihua Yanjiu , 20 November 1983.

cuse, he extended the military's authority over many industries at the expense of the State Council.^[28] He also gave the military jurisdiction over small industries that could produce small weapons, and he planned to set up an "independent and complete national defense industry" under his control. Furthermore, Lin Biao reportedly intervened in the work of the economic planning agency by ordering it to replace "balance" as the main guiding principle of economic planning with "the battle perspective." Subsequently, the military share of the national budget increased by 34 percent in 1969, by 15 percent in 1970, and by 17 percent in 1971. In these years, defense industry and science received more than 11 percent of the total reinvestment of the state (in 1968 it had received only 9 percent). The state bureaucracy under Zhou Enlai was losing its jurisdiction over a large portion of industry.

Lin Biao reportedly issued Order no. 1 on 18 October 1969 "behind the [back of] Chairman Mao." Under the pretext of "strengthening war preparation to prevent the enemy's sudden attack," this order put the entire military on alert, set up command structures, and appointed officers to command posts.^[29] After Order no. 1, Lin's followers dispersed old senior leaders to different parts of China.^[30] The objective was to remove them from the decision-making process at the center and to prevent them from forming a coalition against Lin. It was easy to keep close surveillance over them through the reliable local military units, and Lin took the precaution of forbidding these older leaders from communicating with one another.^[31] Only on 19 October did Lin Biao report to Mao (by telephone recording), "following the practice of first beheading and then reporting," therefore forcing Mao to acquiesce in his decision. Upon hearing the report, Mao's first comment was that the order should be burned.^[32]

Not surprisingly, after Lin Biao's death all his decisions made in the name of war preparations were reversed. All industry was returned to the control of the State Council. In contrast to Lin's

[28] Jingji Jihua Yanjiu , 23 November 1983.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu , vol. 3.

[31] Ibid.

[32] The implication of Mao's comment was that the order should be regarded as if it had not been issued. Ibid.

strategy of preparing for war, which inevitably increased the power of the military, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai opted for the goal of overcoming China's diplomatic isolation by improving Sino-American relations. In addition, Mao attempted to limit the power of the military: he later reduced its involvement in local politics by sending soldiers back to their barracks and transferring political authority to provincial party committees. "At the moment [our military] promotes politics [wen ], but does not promote military affairs [wu ], and it has already become a cultured army [wenhua jundui ]."^[33] By February 1971, the center decided to transfer the authority to investigate May 16 elements to the national committee headed by Wu De, thus depriving the local military of the chance to use this investigation to increase their political influence.^[34]

Issues of State Chairmanship

Lin and his followers tried to overcome his weakness in the civilian bureaucracy by making him the formal head of the state, as chairman of the PRC, the position that was abolished with Liu Shaoqi's purge.^[35] The Gang of Four apparently wanted to exploit the issue in order to weaken Zhou Enlai's position.^[36] Viewing the revision of the state constitution as "an opportunity for the redistribution of power," the Gang of Four argued that the new constitution should include an article stating that "on the basis of the Central Committee of the CCP's nomination, the premier and members of the State Council will be appointed and dismissed." According to this draft, the chairman of the CCP would concurrently be "a head of the proletarian dictatorship," whereas the premier would also be a "first minister" in charge of management offices under the chairman.^[37]

Mao, probably happy with the three groups conflicting and cooperating under his authority, expressed several times his objection to restoring the state chairmanship. Zhou Enlai was

[33] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 301.

[34] Ibid., 298.

[35] For Lin's maneuver at Lushan, see Zheng Derung and Zhu Yang, eds., Zhongguo Gongchandang Lishi Jiangyi (Jilin: Jilin Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), 181–93.

[36] Chen Hefu, ed., Zhongguo Faxian Leibian (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1980), 353.

[37] Ibid.

more than happy with Mao's opposition. But Lin Biao pushed the issue. He made an unauthorized move by stating "Chairman Mao is a genius," and the "chairmanship of the state should be established" in his opening speech at the second plenum of the Ninth Party Congress held in August 1970 in Lushan. Lin's followers endorsed his speech, demanding that it be distributed and studied.^[38]

Mao counterattacked. Declaring "it is unprecedented for a few persons to attempt to confuse 200 Central Committee members," he personally convened a Politburo meeting, which decided to stop discussion of Lin Biao's speech, to cancel the central-north China group's report prepared by Chen Boda, and to order Chen to submit to self-criticism. A few days later, Mao wrote "My Opinion," which repudiated Lin's and Chen's theories of genius. In addition, probably alarmed at Lin's move, Mao took several additional measures to weaken Lin's position. He ordered the PLA to rectify its work style (zuofeng ) by initiating the campaign "against arrogance and complacency" and by placing Zhou Enlai in charge of the campaign. Mao also dispatched Ye Jianying to work in the management section of the Military Affairs Commission in order to let "some air in" and reorganized the Beijing military region by transferring the Thirty-eighth Field Army, which was suspected of being loyal to Lin Biao, out of Beijing—the strategy Mao himself described as "digging out Lin's wall."

Coup Attempt

After the Lushan conference Lin Biao realized not only that his plan for peaceful succession had failed but that he had also exposed his purpose so fully that he was in political trouble. He thus concluded, "Struggle by words will not do; only using weapons can work." Knowing Mao well enough to realize that he would probably move against him at the forthcoming third plenum of the Ninth Party Congress (planned for September 1971), Lin thought it

[38] According to the official interpretation, proclaiming Mao's genius was intended to achieve two objectives for the Lin Biao group. First, it would discredit Zhang Chunqiao, who failed to recognize Mao as a genius. By criticizing Zhang, Lin Biao could seize hegemony over ideology from the Jiang Qing faction. The second objective was to establish the triumvirate of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, with a parallel triumvirate of assistants—Engels, Stalin, and Lin Biao. Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road."

would be better for him to move first. His son and his factional followers developed a secret contingent coup plan of the 571 program.^[39]

Not sitting idly by, Mao was maneuvering to further isolate Lin Biao politically. From mid-August to 12 September 1971 Mao traveled around the south talking with leaders of the big military regions, provinces, and municipalities. In his talks, he made his displeasure with Lin Biao amply clear: "A certain person is impatient to be the state chairman; he wants to divide the party and seize power. . . . Making one's own wife the management office chief is not appropriate." With regard to his role in Lin Biao's rise, he said, "Of course, I have some responsibility."^[40]

After being informed of Mao's move by means of two different sources, Lin Biao ordered the activation of the 571 program.^[41] Lin Liguo's group busily discussed possible methods of assassinating Mao, ranging from using napalm and rockets to destroy Mao's train to sending assassins to murder him. Probably because he had been informed of "some abnormal action" on the part of Lin Biao's followers, Mao changed his travel schedule and immediately returned to Beijing.^[42] When the Lin Liguo group discovered that Mao had left for Beijing, they changed their coup plan and decided to escape to Guangdong. In Canton, they planned to convene a meeting of cadres above the divisional level and then to use the radio broadcast system to declare the establishment of a separate regime. Reportedly, they planned to ask for help from the Soviet Union.^[43]

"A comrade in the central management office" (probably Wang Dongxing) informed Zhou of Lin Biao's plan to escape to the Soviet Union.^[44] Zhou ordered that no plane take off without the joint approval of Mao, Zhou, Huang, Wu, and Li Zuopeng, commander

[39] Lin Liguo called his secret group a "fleet" in admiration of the Japanese naval spirit as depicted in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! For the most detailed information on his coup plan, see Yan Jiaqi, Wenge Shinian Shi , 356; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin .

[40] Jiefangjun Bao , 25 November 1980.

[41] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 112.

[42] Hu Hua reports that Zheng Shiqing, the head of Jiangxi province, informed Mao at Nanchang (at the end of August) of Lin Liguo's activities. Hu Hua, "Marching on a Tortuous Road."

[43] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 142–49.

[44] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 3, 1981, 59.

of the navy, who was responsible for airport security. Nonetheless, at midnight, Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo decided to escape, probably because they had heard about Zhou's suspicions. Around 2 A.M. , when Lin's plane was getting close to the limits of Chinese air space, Wu Faxian asked Zhou whether or not to shoot the plane down. Zhou went to Mao for a decision. Mao said, "Heaven wants to rain, and a woman wants to marry. Let him go."^[45] On the afternoon of 14 September, Zhou received a report from the Chinese embassy in Mongolia stating that the plane had crashed. We still do not know why.^[46]

[45] Ibid.

[46] Some speculate that the plane was shot down; others guess that the plane ran out of fuel. Hangkong Zhishi , no. 9, 1981, 26–29.

6
The Gang of Four: Ideologues

Lin Biao's fall reduced the contending political groups to radical ideologues and bureaucrats, the latter headed by Zhou Enlai. Mao tried to bring the two warring groups together, relying on the ideologues to maintain a revolutionary momentum, while counting on the bureaucrats to preserve order and run the economy. However, the two groups were bound to clash on many issues created by the Lin Biao incident. The innocent victims of Lin's conspiracy had to be rehabilitated. But thorny issues were who the innocent victims were, how many of those purged should be rehabilitated, and who should fill the power vacuum created by the purge of Lin's followers and the military's return to barracks. Understandably, Zhou's group wanted to reinstate disgraced cadres in order to correct Lin Biao's mistakes and to remedy the "absolute shortage of experienced cadres," whereas the Gang of Four wanted to promote CR rebels in order to establish their power base within the party-state apparatus.

Power Base

The official news media often referred to the CR radicals as "the Gang of Four's factional system" (xitong ), which "had its own platform, line, policy, theory, and supporting members." The two contradictory terms "faction" and "system" accurately capture the complexities of the CR radical group. The behavior of the four radical leaders—Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen—displayed all the characteristics of a faction. Thanks to close personal ties with Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan became members of the Cultural Revolution Small Group in the initial stage of the CR and then were promoted to the Politburo with her. Wang Hongwen, a leader of the radical workers organization in Shanghai, probably owed his rise to

Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, who must have recommended him to Mao. United by friendship, the four radicals thought as one on every issue, and each of them developed complex factional networks involving subleaders and their followers. They frequently gathered followers into "study groups" or "writing groups," which acted as confidential networks for their factional activities.^[1]

But the Gang of Four was more than a faction because it had developed a well-defined ideology and political program. It regarded itself as representing "Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters" at the central level and the "new, rising political forces" at the mass level. Often the Gang of Four managed to make official its radical ideology, program, and policy so that they were implemented at the organizational level. It mobilized disadvantaged and discontented social groups against the existing political authority. The recruitment of such well-known followers as Zhang Tiesheng and Wen Hongsheng was based not on narrowly defined personal ties but on what they had done and stood for during the CR. Only after recruitment did followers become close to the Gang of Four. The well-known followers represented a certain type of person rather than unique individuals. The Gang of Four's power base both reflected and shaped its cadre policy.

Selecting the Tenth Central Committee

Immediately after the Lin Biao incident, Zhou Enlai, who was delegated by Mao to manage the daily work of the center, took a moderate domestic and international course for China.^[2] In dealing with the chaotic domestic scene, he demonstrated his political acumen, deftly compromising with the radicals in order to restore a semblance of political stability.

Thanks to Zhou's willingness to compromise with the Gang of Four, the two sides apparently reached an agreement on how to convene the Tenth Party Congress at an extended Central Commit-

[1] Daily Report , 29 June 1977, p. E2; Hong Qi , no. 11, 1977; no. 5, 1979.

[2] In the rural area, Zhou initiated a moderate policy of paying attention to the needs of collectives and individuals, and in the foreign policy arena, he diffused military pressure from the Soviet Union by inviting President Nixon to Beijing.

tee meeting held in May 1973. Qualifications for delegates to the congress included "good political performance during the CR," a criterion that the radicals may have insisted on. As for old cadres who had "made serious mistakes, if they underwent self-criticism, they should be allowed to be delegates." However, a veteran cadre with a "questionable history" was not to be elected. The delegation would be selected by "negotiation" and "voting." A quota probably demanded by the radicals was set up for each occupational category: 30 percent for workers, 25 percent for lower-middle and poor peasants, 19 percent for "revolutionary" cadres, and 5 percent for "revolutionary" inellectuals. The Jiang Qing group also managed to set up an age quota for the delegation: 80 percent of the worker and peasant delegation had to be between eighteen and fifty-five; the same age group had to constitute about 60 percent of the military delegates, cadres, and revolutionary intellectuals.^[3]

Preparations for the congress proceeded secretly; delegates from each province met in its capital under the pretense of "study classes."^[4] These meetings selected an election committee of 104 members with Wang Hongwen as chairman.^[5]

The election committee used the Ninth CC members as the basis for selecting new CC members, first removing Lin Biao's followers (a total of forty-seven people) and then filling the vacancies with those selected by the election committee from the pool of nominees recommended by provinces and municipalities. Heated debate between the two groups ensued. The Zhou Enlai group managed to place some rehabilitated cadres (such as Deng Xiaoping, Wu Lanfu, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, and Li Jingquan, all of whom were Eighth CC members, but had failed to enter the Ninth CC).^[6] The Gang of Four, by contrast, argued vehemently on behalf of the CR rebels, even nominating nonparty member CR rebels on the grounds that they "had joined the party ideologically, although they have not yet joined the party organizationally." A substantial

[3] Zhongguo Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi, ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang Lice Daibiao Dahui (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1983), 107.

[4] Ibid., 111.

[5] In addition, Wang Hongwen was in charge of revising the party constitution, and he assumed the chairmanship of the preparatory committee for electing the Tenth CC. Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Li Desheng were vice chairmen. Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 112.

number of the young CR rebels entered the Central Committee. For example, Zhang Chunqiao pushed hard for Zhu Gejia, a Shanghai student who had been sent to Xinjiang, in spite of objections from Zhou's group. The final meeting, which was attended by all delegates and lasted only four days (from 24 to 28 August), approved the final list of Tenth CC members.^[7]

Officially labeled "a congress of unity, a congress of victory, and a congress full of vigor," the Tenth Party Congress produced a well-balanced outcome in terms of the membership of the Central Committee; 30 percent were from the PLA, 33 percent were cadres, and 37 percent were representatives from the masses.^[8] This balance was achieved by removing 40 percent of the PLA's Ninth CC members from office and adding twenty-five PLA candidates (six were liberated PLA leaders), forty-three cadres, and forty-eight leaders of the masses. This kind of balance would have been impossible without a conscious effort to maintain equilibrium. Theoretical justification for such equal representation came from the principle of the three-in-one formula—which was first introduced in 1967 as a means to form the revolutionary committees with representatives from the cadres, the military, and the mass organizations—on which the Jiang Qing group probably insisted in order to increase mass representation.

The radicals had reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Tenth Party Congress. Mass representation made spectacular gains in the Tenth CC, mainly at the expense of PLA leaders; it increased from a mere 25 percent in the Ninth CC to 37 percent in the Tenth CC. By contrast, the PLA's proportion decreased from 43 percent in the Ninth CC to 30 percent, whereas cadre representation increased slightly from 31 percent to 33 percent. In terms of numbers of representatives, cadres were behind the masses. Yet if we take into account the difference between full members and alternate members by giving double weight to each full member, we see that cadres had more power than delegates from the masses.

[7] For the heated debates at the meeting, see ibid., 117–18.

[8] In the Tenth CC, some of the old cadres—Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Wu Lanfu, Li Jingquan, Li Baohua, Liao Chengzhi, Yang Yong, Chen Chiwei, and Wang Zhen—entered the Tenth CC. But such Gang of Four followers (who were known to have "horns on the head, and scars on the body") as Wang Xiuzhen, Xu Jingxian, Ma Tienshui, Yu Huiping, Jin Zumin, Zhou Hongbao, Chu Chiayao, Dang Zhishan, Xia Fangen, and Xie Zhengyi were also added. Ibid.

Followers in the Tenth Central Committee

Since we know who among the Ninth CC members was purged with the Gang of Four, tables 21–26 attempt to delineate their power base among the three groups. In table 21 we see that under half of the Tenth CC members (41 percent) were removed from their seats when the Gang of Four fell. The scope of this purge indicates that the gang's influence was much more powerful than Lin Biao's: almost twice as many people were purged in Lin Biao's group as purged in the Gang of Four's. Of the 41 percent of the Tenth CC members who failed to make it into the Eleventh CC, 55 percent were mass representatives (54 percent of all the mass representatives at the Tenth CC), 26 percent were PLA representatives (37 percent of all the PLA representatives), and 19 percent

were cadres (17 percent of all the cadres). Needless to say, the Gang of Four controlled the majority of the mass representatives at the Tenth CC.

Table 22 shows a similar distribution of the Gang of Four's influence nationwide: their supporters were heavily drawn from the mass organizations; the 59 percent purge rate among the mass representatives is likely to be lower than the actual figure, because many of the mass leaders who had originally made it into the Eleventh Party Congress were later dropped. The radicals' influence among the PLA was surprisingly high; about 45 percent of PLA members in the sample were identified as having been purged with the Gang of Four. The radicals' weakest point was among party leaders: only 11 percent of them disappeared with the Gang of Four. Twenty-five percent of the government leaders were also purged with the Gang. The 71 percent purge rate of those who held multiple positions clearly indicates that the main power base of the Gang of Four was the former rebels whom they had promoted to leadership positions after Lin Biao's fall.

Table 23 examines the correlation between the number of promotions after 1971 and the probability of being purged with the Gang of Four. Undoubtedly, their followers were those whom the radicals worked hard to place in leadership positions—the beneficiaries

of the gang's cadre line. By contrast, table 24 clearly demonstrates the unpopularity of the radicals among the senior cadres; only six members of the Eighth CC were identified as members of the Gang of Four group.

Table 25 shows that the Gang of Four's ties with any particular field army were very weak because none of the radical members had any particular field army ties—except for Xie Fuzhi. Most of the military leaders who were purged with the Gang of Four were junior officers whom the gang patronized, promoting them to leadership positions on the basis of their "revolutionary spirit." This point is made particularly clear in table 26, which shows that 38 percent of the fourth to eight generation of military leaders were purged with the Gang of Four, although they constituted only 14 percent of all military leaders who reached a high enough level to be included in the sample.

In short, the Jiang Qing group did well at the Tenth Party Congress, partly thanks to Mao's support and Zhou Enlai's willingness to compromise for the sake of unity. They succeeded in making Wang Hongwen vice chairman of the party, probably as a representative of the masses and the younger members. However, a closer look reveals the weakness of the Gang of Four's position. First, they could not command a majority in the Politburo: the radicals controlled five votes (including Kang Sheng), whereas the beneficiaries, headed by Hua, had eight, the survivors had seven, and the rehabilitated had only one. In terms of simple arithmetic, the Gang of Four obviously needed the cooperation of Hua Guofeng's group to carry any majority vote in the Politburo.

More seriously, the ideologues' power base at the provincial level was very tenuous. None of the mass representatives of the Tenth CC

carried the title of first or second secretary to a provincial party committee. Moreover, twenty-eight of the mass leaders at the Tenth CC did not even sit on the standing committee of their provincial party committees. Many of them were instead chairmen or vice chairmen of provincial trade unions, which controlled the newly organized militia. Despite the two years of mass mobilization that disrupted, the entire ruling structure, the CR radicals failed to find entry into party committees once they were reactivated. For this reason, radicals wanted to "open the party committees and make revolution," while "relying on the leftists, not on the party."^[9] In their inability to control the party committees, they frequently set up new party committees—"officials of movement," "underground fighting groups," or "artillery brigades"—to replace the existing leadership of the party organ.^[10] Unlike the Lin Biao group, which tried to seize power from within, the Gang of Four used mass mobilization to seize party committees' power from the outside. They publicly declared, "We must support the revolt of large numbers of the masses in factories against the factory leadership and certain leaders of the third ministry. [We] should seize the power that must be seized."^[11]

Cadre Policy

Ideology

The Gang of Four developed an elaborate ideology, which, while eloquently articulating some of Mao's basic concerns (e.g., the bureaucratization of the party), also directly served its political interests. A good example is Zhang Chunqiao's 1975 article, "On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," which addressed a central theoretical question: how can one explain the existence of class struggle in a society where the means of production are collectivized and in a Communist Party that theoretically represents the working class? Zhang's answer politicized the concept of "class," making explicit points already discernible in Mao's writing. According to Zhang, not just the distribution of the means

[9] Hong Qi , no. 5, 1979.

[10] Daily Report , 29 June 1977, E2.

[11] Dagong Bao (Hong Kong), 27 January 1977.

of ownership but also economic reward and political power can serve as the basis for forming a class. By arguing that the inequality stemming from differential wages as well as from differential power distribution can also be a basis for class formation, Zhang logically justified in Marxist terms the existence of class struggle in socialist China and in the Communist Party. Any party leader advocating a policy that aggravated the differential distribution of power and wealth could be considered a capitalist roader. In this regard Zhang's view resembles Djilas's devastating criticism of the Communist elite as the "new class," a view articulated by such ultraleftist organizations as the May 16 group and Sheng Wu Lien.^[12]

To the concept of a politicized "class," Zhang Chunqiao added the notion of a "new stage": each new stage of revolution even within a socialist country requires new leadership and new enemies. Whatever the validity of his argument may be, its political significance is clear: he provided a theoretical justification for attacking veteran party leaders and social groups that had benefited from the Chinese revolution—in the name of continuing the revolution.

In order to reach the point where some party leaders could be made into targets of a new revolution, Zhang proposed a distinction between ideology and organization, which the Leninists believed to be inseparable.

There are undeniably some comrades among us who have joined the Communist Party organizationally but not ideologically. In their world outlook they have not yet overstepped the bounds of small production and of the bourgeoisie. They approve of the dictatorship of the proletariat at a certain stage and within a certain sphere and are pleased with some victories of the proletariat because they gain from them. Once they have secured their spoils, they feel it is time to settle down and feather their cozy nests. As for exercising an all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and as for going farther than the first step on the 10,000-mile [li ] march, sorry, let others do the job: here is my stop—I must get off the bus.^[13]

[12] Zhang Chunqiao, On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975); Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York; Praeger, 1957).

[13] Zhang, On Exercising All-Around Dictatorship , 18.

Once ideology and organization were separated, it became possible to argue that those who had led the CCP to the establishment of the People's Republic of China were plausible objects of this new revolution. Zhang allegedly declared, "The current targets of revolution are the democrats who used to eat bran in the old society, were wounded in the war resisting Japanese aggression, shouldered guns in the war of liberation, and crossed the river [the Yalu River] in the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea."^[14] Those who joined the revolution after 1949 were not exempt. "The poor and middle peasants reaped the benefits of land reform. They do not demand a socialist revolution and do not have a revolutionary character any more, whereas the landlords and rich peasants who have been suppressed for almost twenty years are opposed to the capitalist roaders, and their rebel spirit is the strongest."^[15] To the CR radicals, the party's leaders had too much interest in retaining the status quo. "When the war ended, they made profits and rose to the positions of influence; because of their vested interest in the new status quo, they can no longer advance."^[16] In the realms of ideology and policy, "they practice revisionism; in dealing with foreign countries, they practice capitulationism."^[17] These people should be the major targets of the revolution, not "traitors or secret agents, and not types engaged in corruption and degeneration."^[18]

Zhang Chunqiao analyzed workers in a similar fashion. He divided them into four age groups. The first group consisted of "veteran workers" who had started work before the liberation, usually as foremen or technical workers receiving high wages. Their political consciousness, according to Zhang, was not sufficient because "their position has changed and their livelihood has changed." The second group worked initially as "apprentices" both before and after liberation. Although "they had good feelings toward the party and are now the 'backbone' of the factories, they

[14] Hong Qi , no. 8, 1977, 60.

[15] Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[16] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," Issues and Studies , 14(7) (July 1978):81–102.

[17] Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[18] Ibid.

are influenced too much by 'Soviet revisionism,' and therefore they are too much concerned with material incentives."^[19]

The third group of workers entered factories around 1958 as

contract and temporary workers who suffered under the revisionist line. They rose to the revolution in 1966. Their understanding of line struggle is high, and they have excellent morale and good feelings toward the CR. The problem is that their understanding of the party is rather poor, and their attitude to labor is not quite satisfactory. They don't know what they can and cannot do. Some people have selfish motives in fomenting rebellion. They always go backward after seizing power. In a certain sense they are the new lumpenproletariat. Zeng Guofan used this kind of person to suppress the Taiping Rebellion, and Chiang Kai-shek used to rely on them. These are part of the foundation of our party.

The fourth group covers "new worker," those who became workers after participating in the CR as Red Guards. "They are enthusiastic, simple, eager to learn, with quick reflexes and very few experiences of struggle; they are childish and need tempering."^[20]

Recruitment

While attacking the veteran cadres, the Jiang Qing group endeavored to promote "the new rising forces" (i.e., the CR rebels) who had proven to be "highly sensitive to the two-line struggle, strong in their class view, willing to defend Mao's revolutionary line, and courageous in their opposition to revisionism."^[21]

More specific criteria advocated by the CR radicals included "daring to struggle against the bourgeois reactionary line," "being willing to go against the tide," having a "clear standpoint," being "familiar with leadership" or "being supported by the masses," and "cherishing deep feelings." All these phrases refer to rebels willing to take on the existing leadership. A Yunnan rebel summarized Zhang Chunqiao's elaborate argument in the following way: "The major contradiction at the socialist stage is between capitalist roaders and rebels. 'Rebels' are advanced elements and the basic

[19] Beijing Informer , 16 June 1977.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1977, 7–12.

force for the revolution; they are 'the essence of humankind.' . . . [One] should take rebel ideology as the guiding principle, and democracy should be given to only rebel factions."^[22]

Since the term "rebel" was too controversial and too vague to be an official criterion and since most of the rebels were young, the Gang of Four advocated the promotion of "young" people, insisting that "the group around twenty-five years old should have one-third of all leadership positions; those forty-five or older are not fit for such positions."^[23] Simple-minded rebels made slogans such as "the older, the more revisionist; the older, the more inclined to the right; the older, the more counterrevolutionary."^[24] At the radicals' insistence, the meaning of the three-in-one formula was altered so that it referred to the young, the middle-aged, and the old, not to the PLA, the revolutionary cadres, and the mass representatives. Having one-third of every leadership group consist of young people became an official policy.

The radicals were accused of having used "two surprise attacks." One recruited unqualified persons to the party, and the second promoted them to high office by skipping several grades—the practice that Deng Xiaoping satirically labeled "helicopter promotion." For example, a Shanghai rebel who had graduated only from middle school was sent to a northeastern province where he became deputy director of the provincial propaganda department. Another Shanghai rusticated youth was ordered into the party by the Gang of Four and was eventually elected to the Tenth CC.^[25] Some people who were not yet party members became party secretaries.^[26]

The radicals apparently used several illegal methods to promote their followers to positions of power. First, when the radicals controlled a unit's organizational department, they used it arbitrarily to replace lower-level leaders with their own followers. Second, they relied on their factional communications channels to scout for

[22] The simpler-minded radicals used "high grade and high wage" to determine who were the powerholders. Renmin Ribao , 4 June 1977.

[23] Among the leaders of the revolutionary committee of Linxian county in Henan about 40 percent were "young people." Renmin Ribao , 5 June 1974. Also for promotion of "young people," see Renmin Ribao , 19 October 1973; 25 October 1973.

[24] Renmin Ribao , 6 October 1977.

[25] Ibid., 26 April 1978.

[26] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1977, 7–12.

potential candidates. For the central government leadership, "they prepared a list of a dozen persons to be appointed to the posts of minister, vice minister, and department and bureau director under the ministries. Some Shanghai cadres were so appointed." Third, "when the former rebels were not allowed to join the party, they complained to Jiang Qing, who specifically instructed the party committees involved to admit them on the grounds that they had 'rebelled and have revolutionary enthusiasm. . . . If you are not willing to introduce them, I will do so. . . . You should rely on that kind of people.'"^[27]

Another widely used illegal method of effecting promotions was the study session. More than 65 percent of the graduates of the Anhui provincial study session attended by workers and peasants were appointed to leadership posts above the county (xian ) level. Similarly, the Anhui provincial party school was a key instrument for recruiting factional members and placing them in leadership positions. When a particular rebel was rejected by party branches at his workplace, the Gang of Four's followers often used their authority to take the case to another unit or to set up a new, temporary branch, which admitted the person. This way of joining the party was known as "entering the party after flying over the sea."^[28] Thus, the Gang of Four "violated party rules and regulations, randomly destroyed the party's cadre management principle, and disregarded materials in the dossier, frequently changing the conclusions that had been reached organizationally and adding forged materials." Through such means, a railway party committee recruited 106 persons in eight days. The CR rebels openly declared, "the party charter is only for consultation"; "rebelling is the only qualification for joining the party, and the best application to it."^[29]

Since most radicals, at least at the beginning of the CR, came from undesirable class backgrounds, the people they recruited were vulnerable to charges of being "political riffraff, reactionary, literary radicals, the scum of society, and dregs and monsters carrying a counterrevolutionary black banner." Since many of them had been politically backward before the CR and were imprisoned

[27] Renmin Ribao , 14 March 1977.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

by the military because of their challenge to the PLA in 1967, they were also condemned: "Those who stank in the past now smell fragrant because they are out of prison."^[30] Since they were activists in the CR, they were also accused: "Their 'heroes going against the trend' were criminals—corrupt thieves, speculators, degenerates, and violators of state laws. Their comrades included those who participated in beatings, lootings, and destruction—the hooligans who disrupted the social order." What the Gang of Four called those with the strongest revolutionary enthusiasm were those who sent secret intelligence to them, filed complaints with them, and wrote pledges of loyalty to them. What they called "new rising forces were those who did not go to work every day, who were unproductive, undisciplined parasites."^[31]

We have no way of knowing how many former rebels were made cadres and then promoted. However, the scattered official figures available seem to indicate that personnel changes in some basic units were sweeping. For instance, the seventh machine-building ministry changed almost 80 percent of the leadership in Beijing factories under its jurisdiction in 1976.^[32] At Wuhan Steel Mill, seven of eleven secretaries were ousted, and the remaining four ran away, reducing production by 45 percent in 1976.^[33] New cadres accounted for 39 percent of the Wushun municipality revolutionary committee.^[34] Radicals in one district allegedly appointed ninety-five new members to county-level standing committees. In Zhengding county 126 young cadres were promoted to deputy secretaries of twenty-five communes.^[35] In one county of Qinghai province, almost 380 cadres were subjected to struggle meetings, more than half of all commune-level cadres were purged, and 201 out of all 321 production-brigade-level cadres were replaced by rebels. Shunde county, in Guangdong province, reported that 25 percent of brigade party committee members were young cadres.^[36] More than two-thirds of all cadres in twenty-three brigades of a Jiangxu province commune were young people (the

[30] Ibid., 4 June 1977.

[31] Ibid., 17 May 1977; ibid., 4 June 1977.

[32] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," 139.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Renmin Ribao , 9 June 1973.

[35] Ibid., 10 July 1974.

[36] Ibid., 21 March 1973.

average age was thirty; they had proven themselves during the CR). Another source reported that new cadres amounted to 61 percent of 176 production team cadres.^[37]

During this period, many workers were promoted to cadre positions. At one factory in Henan county, twenty-five workers out of a total of 1,000 were promoted to cadre status.^[38] The Beijing Transformer Factory reported that 30 percent of its cadres and 70 percent of its leading cadres were newly promoted.^[39] The Fuzhou railway bureau reported that one-third of its leadership was composed of newly promoted young people.^[40] In brief, many basic-level units carried out official policy by staffing approximately one-third of their revolutionary committees with the young, but not all of the young people were adherents of the Gang of Four. Who was promoted depended largely on the old cadres' choices.

In 1969, when party rebuilding started, official policy was "to eliminate wastrels, renegades, spies, counterrevolutionaries, and stubborn capitalist roaders." A commune in Henan province reported that it had expelled 3.4 percent of its party members; 1.8 percent more were subjected to various disciplinary measures. Although we do not know what percentage of new recruits entered the party with the aid of the Gang of Four's network, the increase in party membership during the period was very rapid. One Chinese source claimed that "a substantial portion of the 6 million recruited in 1969–73 is suspected to have been composed of rebels."^[41] In the ten years of the CR, the total number of party members doubled to 32 million. This means that on the average, 1.6 million new members were recruited each year.

A majority of the new recruits were under the age of thirty.^[42] At the Gang of Four's insistence, women were actively recruited. Beijing reports that "the overwhelming majority of new recruits were under thirty-five years of age, and women constituted 25 percent of the total."^[43] As a result, the proportion of women among new

[37] Ibid., 14 September 1973.

[38] Ibid., 19 February 1974.

[39] Ibid., 22 October 1973.

[40] Ibid., 27 August 1973.

[41] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 2, 1985, 57–64.

[42] Beijing Review , 1 July 1973; New China News Analysis (Shanghai), 30 June 1973; New China News Agency (Shenyang), 2 July 1976.

[43] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," Issues and Studies 11(2) (February 1975):94–105.

party members increased from about 10 percent in 1966 to 27 percent in 1973.^[44] Another group that the regime actively recruited during this period were ethnic minorities.^[45] Youths who had been sent to rural areas provided a large pool of young people from which new members were recruited.^[46] Most new recruits had good class backgrounds. For instance, 45,000 of the 60,000 new members admitted by the Beijing party committee between 1966 and 1973 were "workers, former poor and lower-middle peasants or children of such families"; just under 3,000 were "revolutionary intellectuals working in the fields of culture, health, science and education."^[47]

Rehabilitation

The fall of Lin Biao, one of the main architects of the CR, put decision-makers in Beijing in a quandary: they had to rehabilitate Lin's victims, but they could not reverse official decisions made during the CR, decisions that usually originated from Lin Biao and were endorsed by Mao. It proved extremely difficult to distinguish Lin's decisions from those made by others during the CR. Many purged cadres demanded rehabilitation on the grounds that they had been his innocent victims.^[48] According to the Gang of Four's charge, Deng Xiaoping, with tears in his eyes, declared in one of his self-criticism sessions that he was "the arch enemy of Lin Biao" and consequently Lin had wanted to "put him in a death situation."^[49] Moreover, the Zhou Enlai and the Jiang Qing groups disagreed about who should be rehabilitated.

According to a Taiwanese source, Wang Dongxing, vice chairman of the CCP at this time, sent a list of ten types of cadres to be liberated and ten types not to be liberated to a specially convened work conference. He ended his instructions by remarking, "This is party 'policy.' If there are any errors, I request comrades to point

[44] Joan Mahoney, "Problems in China's Party Rebuilding," Current Scene 15(3) (March 1977); Robert Martin, Party Recruitment in China: Pattern and Prospect (New York: Columbia University, Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute); Renmin Ribao , 27 June 1973.

[45] Renmin Ribao , 6 October 1973.

[46] NCNA (Beijing), January 21, 1975; Beijing Review , no. 22, May 31, 1974, 20.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Daily Report , 7 November 1978.

[49] Xuexi Yu Pipan , no. 5, 1976, 18–20.

them out. I personally assume responsibility."^[50] This blunt statment implies how sensitive the issue was.

Official policy granted rehabilitation to all cadres who had been purged because of their opposition to Lin Biao's line and to his rise within the party. All those who had been purged for errors in "supporting the left" during the CR were exonerated. As noted, many cadres had supported conservative mass organizations during the CR, and for that reason they were rejected by the radicals. Now all cadres who were active in the CR for either conservative or radical organizations became eligible for rehabilitation. Another category included those who were dismissed from office for their lack of "enough revolutionary drive," one of the criteria advanced by Lin Biao for evaluating cadres.^[51]

Official policy also declared that "renegades, enemy spies, and alien classes" should not be rehabilitated even if they had opposed Lin Biao in the past. It also made a distinction between decisions made with Mao's approval and decisions made by Lin Biao alone. Decisions not to be reversed included those made "in accordance with conclusions drawn by our organization after Lin Biao and Chen Boda had reported to the central authority for intructions and obtained approval." Another point reads:

During the great proletarian CR the central authority, acting on Mao's instruction or his approval, made certain resolutions pursuant to the comments submitted by the central departments and provinces. Except for some individual cases which were not properly handled because Lin and Chen had furnished wrong information or issued false orders and directives in Mao's name, which are now being further studied, the overwhelming majority of cases were correctly handled. This should be affirmed and no reversal of the verdict on any of these cases should be allowed.^[52]

Regardless of how these ambiguous and somewhat contradictory policy lines were actually applied to an individual cadre, many high-ranking cadres purged during the CR reappeared, not in a group, but one by one, after Lin Biao's fall. On 1 August 1972, the founding day of the army, such old cadres as Chen Yun, Wang

[50] Daily Report , 24 March 1975, E5.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

Zhen, and Zheng Daiyuan appeared. At every important occasion thereafter, Zhou Enlai brought some more old cadres forward. For instance, Chen Zaidao, the commander responsible for the open challenge to the central authorities by the Wuhan workers in 1967, made his first public reappearance on Army Day, in 1972.

The most surprising comeback was that of Deng Xiaoping, who made his first public appearance in March 1973 escorted by Wang Hairong, Mao's niece. According to a Chinese source, Deng wrote a letter to Mao exposing Lin Biao in August 1972. Commenting on the letter, Mao said,

He does not have historical problems. In the Soviet period he was rectified by leftist opportunist Wang Ming. . . . During the liberation war, he helped Liu Bocheng to make a great contribution [to the final victory]. Besides, after [the CCP] entered cities, he did some good things. For example, he led our delegation to Moscow, and he did not surrender to the pressure of the Soviet Union.^[53]

Later Deng Xiaoping acknowledged his indebtedness to Mao. "Before my second fall in the CR, Chairman Mao wanted to protect me, but did not succeed. The main reason was that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four hated me very much. Their hatred toward me was not as deep as toward Liu Shaoqi, but they did not want to be soft on me. They sent me to Jiangxi to labor. In 1973, Chairman Mao transferred me to Beijing."^[54] Deng acceded to the position of vice premier on 3 March 1973.

In addition, Mao personally rehabilitated many other high-level leaders. In November 1971, he exonerated those involved in the "February Adverse Current."^[55] On 6 January 1971 he personally attended the funeral of Chen Yi.^[56] Sensing that Mao was burying old grudges against some veteran cadres, Zhou Enlai had Renmin Ribao publish an editorial entitled "Punish for Future Use, and Cure the

[53] Mao acknowledged that Deng had made many contributions to the revolutionary struggle as early as 1972: "I have said it before and I want to say it once again." Zhongguo Gongchandang Lishi Jianyi (Jilin: Jilin Chubanshe, 1982), 2:2.

[54] Qixi Niandai , no. 10, 1980, 54.

[55] The term "February Adverse Current" refers to top leaders' opposition to Mao's radical policy of allowing Red Guards to seize power. Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1984), 3:859.

[56] Zhou Enlai instinctively realized the significance of Mao's attendance and told Chen Yi's relatives to transmit the news to other cadres. Zhang Tianyi, Zhonggong Dangshi (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 345.

Disease to Save the Patient," which boldly declared that "the old cadres steeled in long revolutionary struggles are the party's greatest treasure."^[57] After that, Zhou continued to liberate some cadres and intellectuals, while improving jail conditions and banning physical torture of disgraced cadres.

While the disgraced cadres reappeared one by one, the media renewed the discussion of cadre liberation at the lower level—a theme that had been absent from public news since 1969. This time public discussion went further than before in several ways. First, discussion now focused on the cadres' rich experience of political and functional work, a characteristic of cadres that would have been denounced as counterrevolutionary. By contrast, revolutionary zeal was no longer mentioned as a necessary trait of cadres. Numerous articles describe how experienced older cadres corrected wrong decisions (presumably initiated by inexperienced young cadres), thus avoiding waste.^[58] The phrase "bourgeois reactionary line" was dropped from official use, and the nature of the mistakes made during the CR—the central theme in 1969 discussions—was ignored. When the issue came up, it was only used to argue that cadres who had made mistakes once would be less likely to do so in the future.^[59]

Second, primary emphasis was now given to the "bold and proper use of cadres' work ability" rather than to simple liberation. Clearly the new campaign was aimed at reinstating most of the old cadres in their jobs or in equivalent positions. One provincial newspaper declared,

Those who have already been liberated and who are capable of normal work must quickly be given suitable work. For those who have not been properly assigned, the necessary adjustments must be made after proper investigation and study. Those who are incapacitated must be taken care of according to party policy and actual circumstances. As for those who have not been liberated, their cases must be handled without delay so that appropriate decisions can be reached.^[60]

[57] Renmin Ribao , 24 April 1972.

[58] Survey of China Minland Press (supplement), no. 302, 8 June 1972, 9–11.

[59] Daily Report , 25 April 1972, B2.

[60] Ibid., 3 March 1972, D3; 22 March 1972, E2.

Numerous sources reported that more than 90 percent of all old cadres had regained their positions of leadership in either party committees or revolutionary committees.^[61] For the sake of properly utilizing the cadres' manpower, transferring across functional lines was officially prohibited.^[62]

Third, the work of liberation was carried out by party committees, which by this time had regained their dominant position over other mass organizations including revolutionary committees. Lower-level party committees played a leading role; they set up special sections to handle cadre liberation, organized numerous work conferences to educate cadres on the "party's cadre policy," and on many occasions sent out special investigation teams to check that old cadres were appropriately employed at the basic level.^[63] They arranged for work for those who were unemployed and made readjustments for those who had not been assigned to jobs suitable to their experience.^[64] The official slogan at the time was, "if there is even one cadre who has not been treated in accordance with party policy, the party's cadre policy cannot be considered to have been thoroughly implemented."^[65] Some party committees even organized mobile reportage teams to publicize the good results of carrying out party cadre policy. Discussions of cadre liberation seldom mentioned mass participation.

It seems that virtually all cadres at and below the county level and in basic production units had been liberated by the end of 1972. Some county committees had arranged suitable work for the "few cadres who made serious mistakes and who are not fit to carry out leadership work any more in accordance with party policy." Even the treatment of those with historical problems was changed. Special investigation teams were organized to clear up their problems as speedily as possible, and those whose cases were not yet settled were given temporary assignments.^[66] Only "old and physically feeble cadres" failed to regain employment, and they were treated as retired cadres, not as purged ones. Due respect was given

[61] Ibid., 30 May 1972, C1.

[62] Ibid., 18 January 1973, D9.

[63] Ibid., 28 April 1972, C2; 3 May 1972; 30 November 1972.

[64] Ibid., 3 April 1972.

[65] Ibid., 4 April 1972, C5.

[66] Ibid., February 1972, D4.

to retired cadres. To make use of their experience, old cadres were allowed to take part in party committee meetings dealing with their specialties.^[67]

Political Strategy

Having come to power by purging party leaders during the mass mobilization stage and feeling insecure about their political future, the Gang of Four used whatever formal authority they had to strengthen their power position by recruiting and promoting former rebels to leadership positions within the bureaucracy. After consolidating their own domination in one organization or area, they tried to "colonize" others, often using the news media to interfere with the operation of other organizations—in violation of the jurisdiction and command structure of each field. At the same time they vigorously defended their own exclusive jurisdiction over the propaganda machine.^[68] When it was difficult to penetrate an institution, as was the case with the military, the Gang of Four tried to set up a parallel organization. Their establishment of a militia not under the control of regional PLA commanders, although obviously justified by Mao's military concept of a people's war, was basically intended to develop the Gang's own coercive forces. Having been able to control such mass organizations as labor unions, it endeavored to enhance the political influence of these organizations vis-à-vis the party committee.

In their efforts to consolidate their power positions and to obtain new positions of dominance, the Gang of Four used three different but related methods. First, they tried to promote their followers to key leadership positions of the bureacracy through renewed mass mobilization. When their method failed, they openly demanded their share of power in the government organization. In the last days they combined pressure from the top and bottom by enlisting Mao's support and mobilizing the social forces that benefited from the CR in order to get rid of Deng Xiaoping, a representative of the rehabilitated cadres.

[67] Ibid., 12 January 1973, C28–29, C31, F1.

[68] For instance, in September 1975, the State Council tried to publish a new journal called Ideological Frontline , and Mao approved the project. But because of opposition from the Gang of Four, no issues were published. Hong Qi , no. 8, 1978.

Renewed Mass Mobilization: The Campaign Against Confucius and Lin Biao

Wholesale rehabilitation renewed conflicts between former rebels and their former victims, now rehabilitated. Since the number of leadership positions had probably diminished because of administrative streamlining, old and new cadres now had to compete for the limited number of positions, the former basing their claims on their work ability and experience, the latter stressing their revolutionary zeal. Once reinstated, the old cadres reiterated their previous view that "there is no good man among the rebels." Moreover, they were inclined toward revenge. "To get even with those who struggled against us should be considered a lenient measure. What is wrong with venting one's spleen?"^[69] To them, the CR was "a dark night of ravaging floods and savage beasts," which had been absolutely unnecessary. What China needed after the Lin Biao incident was to "sweep the temple, invite the real gods, return old marshals to their posts, and send little soldiers back to their barracks." To the radicals, the old cadres were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to repudiate them.^[70]

Related to the question of rehabilitating old cadres and the promotion of CR rebels was how Lin Biao's policy should be defined and who should be criticized as his followers.^[71] Zhou Enlai and the old cadres regarded Lin as an ultraleftist who exploited the CR for political gain. Zhou's characterization made the Gang of Four and their followers vulnerable to the same charge, while justifying the rehabilitation of the victims of ultraleftist errors.^[72] The Gang of Four viewed Lin as an advocate of ultrarightism. Thus, criticism of Lin's mistakes could justify the campaign against the military, which had ruthlessly suppressed the Red Guards in 1968, and

[69] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 94–105.

[70] Wang Hongwen insisted that when the old cadres "were liberated and put back in power, they sought every opportunity to liquidate the masses." Ibid.

[71] The conflict between the old cadres and the CR rebels was particularly serious in Zhejiang, where Tan Qilong, a veteran cadre who was made first party secretary, replaced the CR radicals with rehabilitated cadres under the excuse of "carrying out leadership readjustment." Renmin Ribao , 20 March 1978. For Wang Hongwen's support of the Zhejiang rebels, see Beijing Review , 4 February 1977, 10.

[72] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 101.

other kinds of rightist tendencies, while not raising the issue of the excesses of the mass movement or the purges it engendered.^[73]

Endorsing the Gang of Four's view, Mao approved the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, which enabled the Gang to kill two birds with one stone. By equating Lin with Confucius, who endeavored to "revive states that were extinguished, restore families whose lines of succession were broken, call back to office those who had retired into obscurity,"^[74] the Gang of Four was able to challenge Zhou Enlai, who was guilty of similar offenses. At the same time they put pressure on the military leaders who had suppressed the revolutionary movement in the preceding state, but who now looked upon Zhou as a counterbalance against the radicals.

Once the campaign started, the Gang of Four pushed for mass mobilization, focusing its attack on "going through the back door," which ultimately aimed at the nepotism of veteran party and military leaders. They had particularly harsh words for local military leaders now resisting the renewed mass campaign.^[75] "What is the use of building an army, if it departs from the class line, the line struggle, and the ideological revolution?"^[76] Wang Hongwen was more blunt:

Soldiers are told to obey orders unconditionally and absolutely. We must know that they are required to obey your orders conditionally, not unconditionally. They should obey whatever conforms to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought and rebel against whatever does not. All members of the Communist Party execute the instructions of the higher level on the basis of self-consciousness. We should judge the correctness of an order in terms of its line. We only execute correctly following the correct line. They will not be implemented if they are not correct.^[77]

Apparently surprised at the radicals' reckless effort, Mao banned any discussion of "entering through the back door," but he en-

[73] For changes in labeling Lin's mistakes from ultrarightist to ultraleftist in the official criticism, see William A. Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958–1981 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

[74] Hong Qi , no. 2, 1978, 2.

[75] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 102.

[76] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue Cankao Ziliao: Wenhua Dageming Shiqi (Beijing: Zhonggua Renmin Zhengzhi Xueyuan, 1983), vol. 4, no. 4, 278.

[77] "Comrade Wang Hongwen's Report at the Central Study Class," 99.

couraged the campaign. As the movement spread across the nation, there was no shortage of grievances. All the CR conflicts, plus the new grievances that the mass movement had raised and that had then been ruthlessly suppressed by the military, surfaced again. In addition, many decisions made by the military came under attack.

To make matters more complicated, the radicals' intention to use the campaign to "cultivate new cadres" further intensified the conflict between the rehabilitated and the newly appointed cadres.^[78] After Wang Hongwen, the newly elected vice chairman of the CCP, called for training a million revolutionary successors and promoting them to posts of leadership at all levels, public discussion of cadre rehabilitation stopped. The news media began instead one-sidedly to stress the revolutionary qualities of young cadres and their contributions during the CR, while criticizing the old cadres' attitude toward the newly promoted young ones.^[79] "If we fail to see this fundamental fact [that the young cadres possess revolutionary zeal] and talk of nothing but qualifications, we will not be able to select a large number of outstanding young people for leading posts."^[80] Meanwhile, the radical leaders told their followers what was at stake. "Some powerholders are trying to reverse the achievements of the CR by reinstating all pre-CR leadership, irrespective of their political history or their attitude toward the CR. They made a serious error in personnel management."^[81]

By this time, public discussion had made it clear that cultivating new cadres meant placing them in powerful positions, not making them decorative aides to old cadres.^[82] Resistance to the promotion of young cadres ("young men are unstable, [and] men without mustaches are immature") came under increasingly severe criticism.^[83] For instance, Guangming Ribao bluntly declared: "Maturity in handling things should be judged on the basis of one's class, one's consciousness of line struggle, and one's general orientation, not on the basis of one's age."^[84] A thesis reminiscent

[78] Daily Report , 19 July 1972, B1–4.

[79] Ibid., 10 October 1973, D1; 16 November 1973, B1.

[80] Ibid., 22 March 1973.

[81] Guangming Ribao , 15 July 1977.

[82] Daily Report , 15 October 1973, F1.

[83] Ibid., 2 May 1973.

[84] Ibid.

of CR rhetoric, that of the two-line struggle, was reintroduced to bolster the radicals' position. One provincial radio broadcast declared, "which line [old] cadres should follow and what stand they should take concerning the training and promotion of new cadres are questions at the heart of the struggle between the two classes, the two lines, and the two ideologies."^[85] Criticisms became increasingly harsh. "Many leading cadres failed to uphold the basic line, [and] they imposed a bourgeois dictatorship on the masses."^[86]

Some party committees, largely dominated by the military and old cadres, took evasive measures by simply creating new positions for the younger cadres, thus swelling their ranks in spite of the official policy of administrative simplification.^[87] Others put up a strong fight.

Consequently, workers' unrest, strikes, and armed clashes between rival youth groups spread. Beijing was swamped by petitioners. The leading cadres resorted to a familiar method: some of them simply left their posts as they did at the initial stages of the CR. The economy suffered.

Determined to dislodge the veteran cadres at any cost, the Gang of Four declared that "to disrupt the production of one factory is to put a knot around the neck of the faction in authority," and that "the loss belongs to the state, the responsibility belongs to the faction in authority, and the power belongs to us."^[88] Mao was not, however, in a position to sacrifice the economy for the sake of evolution.^[89] Nor could he agree to the Gang of Four's view that "rebelling against the leadership is going against the tide." He reportedly declared that "the CR has been going on for eight years. It is time to settle down. The entire party and the army should unite."^[90] With Mao's change of mind, the campaign came to an end.

[85] Ibid., 11 June 1973, C1.

[86] Ibid., 21 June 1976, T4. Guangming Ribao , 16 March 1977; 9 May 1977.

[87] Daily Report , 14 March 1974, D5.

[88] Hong Qi , no. 12, 1976, 48; Dagong Bao (Hong Kong), 27 January 1977, 13 December 1976.

[89] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 21, 1974."

[90] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue , no. 4, 1983, 369.

"Forming a Cabinet": Pressure from Above

Having failed to strengthen their power base at the basic level through mass mobilization, the radicals tried to gain a large share of government positions by using the politics of confrontation at the top level. When preparation for the forthcoming National People's Congress was undertaken, Jiang Qing first pressured Zhou Enlai to hand over some government power—probably including the post of chief of staff of the PLA—to the radicals, but she failed to obtain his concession. The radicals then took their case to Mao in the city of Changsha. Wang Hongwen complained to Mao that Deng, unhappy with the CR, did not support the "newborn things" and that Zhou Enlai, although seriously ill, was always busy meeting with the other old leaders. Mao allegedly advised Wang to see Zhou Enlai often and not to form a faction with Jiang Qing. "You should be careful about her."^[91]

While rejecting the radicals' bid to "form a cabinet," Mao suggested making Deng Xiaoping first vice premier, vice chairman of the party, and chief of staff of the PLA. Authorized by Mao, Zhou made the final decisions about personnel after "repeated consultation with other veteran cadres" in the hospital. He gave the ministry of culture and the ministry of physical education to the radicals, but refused the Gang of Four's demands for the ministry of education.^[92] The radicals came away with very few government positions. Although Zhang Chunqiao became vice premier, second to Deng Xiaoping, only four of the twelve vice premiers could be regarded as close associates of the Jiang Qing group.

According to a Taiwanese source, the true picture was different. Mao initially supported the Gang of Four's effort to form a cabinet and obtained Zhou's agreement in selecting cabinet members. But the old cadres in the Politburo strongly opposed the idea. Zhu De allegedly said, "If Premier Zhou does not assume premiership, the position should be rotated and should come to me."^[93] After work-

[91] Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiusuo, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tebie Fating Shenpan Lin Biao, Jiang Qing Fingering Jituan Zhufan Jishi (Beijing: Falu Chubanshe, 1982), 92.

[92] Renmin Ribao , 17 January 1986.

[93] Zhonggong Yanjiu 11 (23) (March 1977).

ing out their differences in secret meetings, these Politburo members collectively confronted Zhou Enlai with the threat of splitting the party center. Mao had to retreat.

Once placed in charge of the government, Deng Xiaoping proceeded to straighten out the mess created by the CR. He prepared three documents dealing respectively with industry, science and technology, and the academy of sciences. These documents not only repudiated many policies adopted after the CR but also explicitly blamed the Gang of Four for the economic dislocation. For instance, declaring that in many units power was held by "unreformed petty intellectuals, brave elements, and bad people," one version of the "Twenty Articles on Accelerating Economic Development" demanded rectification of the basic leadership. Undoubtedly the group to be rectified were the young cadres who had been promoted by the Jiang Qing group.^[94] To the radicals, those whom Deng wanted to rectify were "the revolutionary intellectuals" and "those people carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."^[95]

Given the explicitness of the language used in the party program, whatever hopes Mao and Zhou Enlai might have entertained of uniting the rehabilitated cadres and the Jiang Qing group were completely shattered. Now the liberated cadres and the Jiang Qing group found themselves in a situation where one group had to go. In Chinese parlance, the three documents that the liberated cadres prepared were either fragrant flowers or poisonous ones; they could not be both.

The Campaign Against "Rightist Reversal Trends"

The frontal clash between the Gang of Four and the old cadres took place over the issue of educational policy. When Liu Bing, president of Qinghua University, complained that the CR educational policy lowered the quality of higher education, the Gang of Four mobilized the worker-peasant-soldier (gong nong bing ) students, who obviously owed their place in higher educational institutions to the CR's radical admissions policy. The educational debate even-

[94] Issues and Studies , 13(7) (July 1977):90–114.

[95] Hong Qi , no. 10, 1977, 77.

tually developed into a public campaign against "the rightist wind to reverse the correct verdicts," which, among other things, specifically condemned Deng's three documents as the concrete manifestation of the reversal effort. By December 1975, the campaign was widely reported in the official media, and by 1976, although his name was not yet explicitly mentioned, Deng Xiaoping came under attack as the leader of the "rightist reversal wind."^[96]

The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January 1976 changed the distribution of power in the Politburo. Since Dong Biwu and Kang Sheng were dead, Zhu De and Liu Bocheng mortally ill, and Deng Xiaoping in deep political trouble, the veteran cadres' political power in the Politburo substantially diminished, whereas the beneficiaries of the CR (headed by Hua Guofeng and including Wang Dongxing, Wu De, and Chen Yonggui) emerged as the crucial bloc in the conflict between the Gang of Four and the older leaders. Mao chose Hua Guofeng over Zhang Chunqiao as acting premier, and his appointment was announced on 3 February.^[97]

Understandably, the Gang of Four was unhappy with Hua's appointment, for to them he was not only behind Zhang Chunqiao in seniority, but he was also incompetent, too close to the old veteran cadres, including the late Zhou Enlai, and deeply involved in preparing one of Deng's three documents, "On the Question of Science and Technological Work."^[98] The Gang of Four used the mass media they controlled to surreptitiously criticize Hua.

Although Deng's disgrace helped Hua become acting premier, Hua displayed an ambivalent attitude toward the anti-Deng campaign. He must have known about the Gang's frequent engagement in factional activities and their unpopularity in contrast to Deng's high prestige among old cadres. Mao advised him "not to be anxious and to take your time." Hua criticized Deng in such a manner so as not to upset normal bureaucratic operations: he advised provincial leaders to continue the anti-Deng campaign but cautioned that Deng's problem was "contradiction among the peo-

[96] Harry Harding, "China After Mao," Problems of Communism , 26 (March–April 1977):1–18.

[97] It is reported that Mao asked Ye Jianying to persuade Deng to submit another self-criticism and that Deng refused. Zhou Xun, ed., Deng Xiaoping (Hong Kong: Guangjiaojing Pub., 1979).

[98] Hong Qi , no. 10, 1977, 72–80.

ple" and that neither Deng nor those who had supported his 1975 modernization plans should be purged.^[99]

The Gang of Four, in contrast, took a strong anti-Deng line, frequently making unauthorized appearances and speeches to reinforce their position. Consequently, the campaign against Deng intensified in 1976, and posters publicly denouncing him appeared in Beijing by the end of February. In early March the Gang of Four used the name of Chi Heng to publish an article entitled "From Democrats to Capitalist Roaders," in Hong Qi magazine, defining the main target of the campaign as "a handful of capitalist roaders within the party who have refused to repent." The article explained, following Zhang Chunqiao's theory, how a large portion of party veterans had become "bourgeois democrats and capitalist roaders." Renmin Ribao also published Mao's undated statement, "You are making a socialist revolution, and yet you do not know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road." Around this time Mao reportedly called Deng a bourgeois democrat who had never been a Marxist. "He said he would never reverse the verdicts," Mao observed. "His words cannot be trusted."^[100]

The Tiananmen Square incident of April 1976 was the turning point in the Gang of Four's attack. When the spontaneous commemoration of Zhou by a large crowd gathered in the square turned into an open protest against the radicals, the Gang of Four persuaded Mao that Deng was responsible. The center made two decisions on 7 April 1976: to remove Deng from all his offices and to appoint Hua as premier and first vice chairman of the CC. Although stripped of all official power, Deng continued to enjoy the veteran cadres' support.^[101]

After the Tiananmen incident, the Gang of Four expanded the scope of the original campaign with a view to replacing old cadres with young rebels. Deng Xiaoping was publicly condemned for having opposed the promotion of young cadres "because their

[99] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[100] Xuexi Yu Pipan , October 1976.

[101] For Deng's activities during this crucial period, see South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 25 February 1977, 1.

positions are high, their experience is nil, and they do not know what to do."^[102] Deng's view that promotion should be made one grade at a time was criticized as a sinister attempt to "suppress the new cadres who emerged during the CR." Declaring that "a nation-wide network of the capitalist roaders had been formed," the radicals advocated the policy of dragging out "Deng's representatives in provinces" "layer by layer," and carrying out "large-scale surgery on the leadership."^[103] The rehabilitated cadres were obviously their major target. Jiang Qing demanded a public apology for the rebel groups from the old cadres. Zhang Chunqiao joined her: "Every official has made mistakes and every mistake will be opposed. As a result, there is now no single county party committee member who can be trusted, no single prefectural party committee member who can be trusted; among the provincial party committee members and those of the center, no one can be trusted except Chairman Mao."^[104]

During the height of the campaign against rightism, the radicals put pressure on provincial party leaders to promote former rebels to leading positions. Jiang Qing went to Tianjin and demanded that the municipal party committee adopt a quota system for young cadres. According to one source, Jie Xuemao, the first secretary, refused to carry out her wish. Yet Tianjin municipal radio reported that the municipal party committee actually made it a policy not to approve wholesale personnel appointments at lower levels unless they included the required percentage of young cadres.^[105] The Inner Mongolia party committee decided that every provincial, municipal, district, and county party committee would promote two or three young people to positions of leadership by the end of 1976. Some organs without enough qualified young people dispatched teams to look for them.^[106]

In some areas, many young cadres holding positions as deputies were promoted to positions as heads, while erstwhile heads became mere deputies and were forced to retire.^[107] In units where

[102] Hong Qi , no. 6, 1976, 30.

[103] Ibid., no. 2, 1977, 11; Renmin Ribao , 19 February 1975.

[104] China News Analysis , November 1976, 581.

[105] Renmin Ribao , 19 February 1975.

[106] Shijian (Inner Mongolia), January 1978, 28–37.

[107] Daily Report , 15 October 1973, F1.

young people were not promoted, rebels holding positions of deputy chiefs openly challenged their superiors, accusing them of obstructing the movement.^[108] Followers of the Gang of Four in Baoding district illegally fired three district party secretaries and appointed ninety-five young cadres above the county level.^[109]

When Mao died in September 1976, three situational groups shared the power of the Politburo: the radicals with four seats, the beneficiaries of the CR with seven seats, and the survivors of the CR with five seats. Despite the obvious fact that Hua Guofeng's beneficiaries constituted almost a majority, standing between the radicals and the survivors, the Gang of Four failed to form a coalition with them. Instead, they pushed them to collaborate with the old cadres.

[108] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977 (Part III)," Issues and Studies , 14(9) (September 1978): 78–100.

[109] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," 142.

7
The Beneficiaries and the Victims

After arresting the Gang of Four, the coalition of CR beneficiaries and surviving veteran revolutionaries faced several urgent issues. The first was how to justify its extraordinary move against Madame Mao's radical group while at the same time establishing the authority of Hua Guofeng. Then it had to deal with how to characterize and criticize the Gang of Four's political errors and determine how best to investigate and purge it, without undermining the legitimacy of Mao and the CR. Finally, the coalition had to address the subject of the ongoing anti-Deng campaign, as well as the question of who should be rehabilitated as innocent victims of the Gang of Four. All these interrelated questions were given more concrete form in the issue of Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation, the issue which had profound policy and power implications for Hua.^[1]

From the very beginning, Hua Guofeng had few options in resolving these issues. As a beneficiary of the CR, Hua could not negate the CR or Mao. But he had to repudiate the Gang of Four and demonstrate that his ideology and policies differed from theirs. Since Hua benefited from Deng's purge, initiated by the Gang of Four, bringing him back posed a serious threat to his own political survival. In contrast, the survivors, his coalition partners, could move in either direction on all issues except Mao's legitimacy.

Given this dilemma, the possibility was slim that Hua and his followers could initiate a new ideology and policy by critically reevaluating the political decisions made during the CR. The only available strategy was to uphold Mao's legitimacy while narrowly limiting the scope of criticism, purge, and rehabilitation. In fact, Hua

[1] For Hua's position on these issues, see "Speech on the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture," Beijing Review , 1 January 1977, 31–43; 31 March 1978; 16 June 1978.

upheld Mao's view that a bourgeoisie existed in the Communist Party, but he condemned the Gang of Four's attack on the old cadres on the grounds that, although some veterans had indeed been in error, the radicals' struggle against them was excessive. Hua declared an end to the CR, but he defended its achievements by specifically endorsing Mao's continuous revolution, while promising to revolutionize the government's superstructure.^[2]

The Issue of Rehabilitation

Hua approached the question of rehabilitation with caution. According to a Taiwanese source, a document from the central organizational department, dated October 1976, laid down guidelines for purging and rehabilitation. It specified that only "those who were rejected, attacked, removed from positions, or expelled from the party by the Gang of Four for their resistance to the [Gang of Four's] counterrevolutionary line" would be reinstated. At the same time, it refused to review cases involving "renegades, spies, Trotskyites, counterrevolutionaries, KMT elements, or degenerates," as well as all cases for which the organization had already arrived at a conclusion.^[3] Anyone demanding the reversal of such cases would be punished. In brief, rehabilitation was intended for only a small number of CR victims, and even the right to reopen cases was denied to the majority of victims.^[4]

The beneficiaries justified their policy in terms of defending "whatever Mao had said and decided." Otherwise, they argued, many past decisions would be challenged.

If we always look backward, we will always be settling accounts with bygone things. We will have to negate the "Cultural Revolution," and then everything from the "Gang of Four" to the Socialist Education Movement in cities and villages, from the Lin Biao affair to the Lushan conference. If the Lushan conference is negated, we will have to negate the socialist transformation of industry and commerce, the antirightist struggle, the Great Leap Forward, and then the people's commune policy. If it were not for this tendency to look backward, there could be no such statement as, "There were mistakes

[2] Ibid., 1 January 1977.

[3] Zhongyang Ribao (Taiwan), 4 November 1976.

[4] Renmin Ribao , 28 August 1979.

in the general line, and it is difficult to make another Great Leap Forward, the people's communes are no longer acceptable, and the 'three Red Banners are at half-staff.' " Whether this view is advanced by the masses of the people or by people in the cultural realm, I can definitely say that it is a serious mistake to make this assertion. If we settle accounts with bygone things one after another and invalidate one stage after another, how can socialism exist?^[5]

The pressure to bring Deng back was, however, too strong for Hua.^[6] Deng enjoyed not only the sympathy and understanding of the surviving as well as the rehabilitated cadres, but also the genuine support of the Chinese masses. Provincial leaders and Politburo members allegedly petitioned the CCP for Deng's rehabilitation. Particularly outspoken were Chen Yun and Wang Zhen, who pleaded eloquently at the February central work conference for Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation "for the sake of the Chinese revolution and China's needs"; Chen and Wang also asked that the decision on the Tiananmen incident be revoked. Despite Hua's refusal to publish the speeches, they spread widely by word of mouth.^[7] Ordinary people also expressed their wishes by placing small bottles (xiaoping ) along major streets.^[8] Then Deng Xiaoping wrote two letters to Hua, one promising support and the other expressing willingness to work at the front line.^[9]

According to numerous sources, Deng's offer prompted a hot debate at meetings on the highest level. Most of the veteran leaders favored Deng's rehabilitation; Xu Shiyu was especially vehement. Like Hua, most beneficiaries of the CR initially objected to reinstating Deng on the grounds that Mao had approved his dismissal. Under pressure, Wang Dongxing finally agreed to bring Deng back, on the condition that Mao's decisions would not be reversed.^[10] Another Chinese source reported that Hua Guofeng

[5] "Zhang Pinghua's Speech to Cadres in the Cultural Field," Issues and Studies , 14(12) (December 1978), 91–119.

[6] For the anti-Deng campaign after the fall of the Gang of Four, see William A. Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958–1981 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

[7] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 20 January 1983.

[8] Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 59.

[9] Ming Bao (Hong Kong), 9 July 1979.

[10] Feijing Yuebao 1 (23) (19 January 1979):65–68.

did not open his mouth during the debate, and when Chen Yonggui finally voted for Deng's rehabilitation, those in favor had only one vote more than those opposed.

Dens made his first public appearance at the third plenary session held on 16 July 1977. This meeting reconfirmed Hua's appointment to the chairmanship and reinstated Deng to all of his previous positions: member of the standing committee of the Politburo, vice chairman of the CCP, vice chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and chief of staff of the PLA. At the meeting they also decided to expel the Gang of Four from the party.

Table 27 shows how in the newly elected Eleventh Central Committee, cadre representation increased from 33 percent in the Tenth CC to 42 percent, whereas mass representation decreased from 37 percent to a mere 29 percent, and the PLA's from 30 percent to 26 percent, thereby breaking the almost perfect balance among the three groups achieved in the Tenth CC. Among the sixty-three cadres who were added to the Eleventh CC, nineteen of them were former Eighth CC members, and the rest included many rehabilitated cadres, for example, Cai Suli (Henan party committee), Yu Mingtao (central-south party bureau), Wan Li (Beijing party committee), and Kang Xien (former petroleum minister). Moreover, even such controversial cadres as Xiao Wangdong, former deputy minister of culture, and Wu Lengxi, former editor in chief of Renmin Ribao , who had been especially attacked during the CR, now joined the Central Committee. Altogether more than a third of the sixty-three new members were rehabilitated cadres. The majority of the remainder at the time of the CR were middle-level cadres who had survived the mass purges and obtained positions on revolutionary committees. To a striking extent, then, the Eleventh CC was composed of rehabilitated cadres.

Table 28 examines the survival rate of those who entered the Eleventh CC for the first time and those who were left over from the Tenth CC. The difference between the two groups in terms of the percentage of those who failed to make it into the Twelfth CC is amazingly small (47 percent versus 45 percent). This may mean that Hua's preference was weakly reflected in the process of selecting cadres (except in the case of mass representatives), or else his preference did not differ very much from that of the rehabilitated. From table 28 we can also infer that Hua did not remove all of the Gang of Four's sympathizers from the committee. If so, Hua might have intentionally protected them as a potential coalition partner. Or perhaps he simply did not have enough time and organizational capability thoroughly to investigate their followers.

Table 29 shows that rehabilitation almost guaranteed survival; 97 percent (100) of the rehabilitated cadres of the Eleventh CC en-

tered either the Twelfth CC or the Advisory Commission, whereas only 3 percent (three) of them can still be considered as purged.

Despite the large influx of CR victims, the Eleventh Party Congress as a whole still upheld Mao's thought as a guiding principle, and reconfirmed class struggle and continuous revolution as the main tasks of the socialist revolution in the revised party constitution. In his report about political work, Hua again elaborated his view of continuous revolution, condemning the "powerholders taking the capitalist road," "bourgeois legal rights," and "the sole emphasis on productive forces," while only promising to uphold "proletarian dictatorship in the various fields." It was later reported that Deng objected to a certain part of Hua's speech when he was shown a draft, and many other veteran cadres criticized Hua's wholesale praise for the achievements of the CR. Hua, however, rejected all the criticism.^[11]

The Eleventh Party Congress apparently represented a moment of compromise between those who had suffered and those who had prospered during the CR. Even though many old cadres recovered their positions, Deng Xiaoping's group agreed to the rhetoric of the other side, which insisted on Mao's ideological legitimacy. But what the other side may not have foreseen was that these rehabilitated cadres, with their extensive experiences, were very skillful in political maneuvering. Moreover, increasing criticism of the Gang of Four and anyone involved with them inevitably called for a reevaluation of the soundness of Mao's thought.

Purging the Gang of Four Followers

Those whom the CR had favored and those who had been victims differed on the nature of the Gang of Four's mistakes and the number of their followers. Viewing the radicals as a conspiratorial group, the beneficiaries tried to limit the scope of the purges and rehabilitation and to uphold all of Mao's decisions, whereas the victims were determined to remove their luckier or more politically adroit confreres in order to reverse any of Mao's decisions that seemed wrong to them.

[11] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 20 January 1983.

During Hua's leadership public criticism of the Jiang Qing group—which was carried out under tight control of the party organization, lest embarrassing questions for the beneficiaries were raised—underwent three different stages as Hua had originally envisioned: the first focused on the exposure of the Gang's "plot to usurp power," the second dealt with their "past criminal records," and the last condemned the "ultrarightist essence of their counterrevolutionary revisionist line."^[12]

The central leadership headed by Hua prepared official criticism materials, setting the tone for each stage of the campaign. Taking cues from official materials, various units published criticism of the radicals' concrete crimes in their units. Condemning the Gang of Four as "typical representatives of the bourgeois inside the party" who had "subverted the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to restore capitalism," the first batch of official materials focused largely on their characters and class backgrounds, which they had allegedly falsified to "sneak into positions of authority." The second batch stressed the radicals' efforts to usurp political power against Mao's will since the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, while failing to touch upon the radicals' activities in the earlier stages of the CR.^[13]

The official view—that the radicals were an "ultrarightist conspiratorial" group that had betrayed Mao's instructions in an attempt to seize power—turned the thrust of the campaign to those who "endeavored to restore capitalism," while failing to correct "leftist errors" in the official line.^[14] Arguing that investigating the Gang of Four would create an atmosphere favorable to capitalist trends, the beneficiaries initiated the "double-blow movement" to investigate the Gang's followers and to check the "destructive activities of the class enemy," who undermined the collective economy at the basic level.^[15]

As to the question of who should be regarded as the Gang of Four's followers, the beneficiaries insisted that "only a few [had] participated in the Gang's conspiracy." In particular, the central

[12] Zhonggong Yanjiu 12(19) (15 September 1978):99–108.

[13] "Document of the Central Committee (Zhongfa ), No. 37, 1977," Issues and Studies , 14(7), July 1978, 81–102.

[14] Renmin Ribao , 7 April 1977.

[15] Beijing Review , 1 January 1977; 10 March 1978.

organizational department specified in October 1976 who should be purged. First, only close associates of the Gang of Four were vulnerable, whereas those who "involuntarily cooperated with the Gang" were to be forgiven. Second, close associates were safe if they recanted. Third, people who had merely done or said something wrong were not be included in any punitive measures. Hua Guofeng reiterated a similar line in all his public speeches, stressing that most of the cadres who had done or said something wrong deserved education, not punishment.^[16] He divided even the "backbone elements" into those who recanted by exposing the crimes of the Gang of Four and the "stubborn elements."^[17] Thus, even the radicals who had genuinely sympathized with the Gang could defend themselves by insisting that their relationship was merely organizational and that "my problem was that of carrying out orders, and [the mistakes] cannot be charged to my account."^[18] As for who should replace the Gang's associates, Hua reiterated Mao's five requirements for a revolutionary successor and the three-in-one formula of young, middle-aged, and old cadres.^[19]

Hua Guofeng was very slow in changing the provincial leadership, either because of his limited organizational capabilities or because of his desire to protect Gang of Four sympathizers. For instance, before Deng's formal comeback in July only seven provincial first party secretaries had been replaced, while many leaders suspected of having had close connections with the Gang were allowed to stay in power.^[20] Guo Yufeng, who later turned out be a Gang of Four associate, stayed on as director of the organizational department, formally heading the campaign against the radicals until the end of 1977.

Furthermore, rank-and-file cadres were not eager aggressively to pursus the Gang's followers. At that time they were confused and totally demoralized by the constant changes in official policy. Many of them had learned that making too many enemies was not

[16] Renmin Ribao , 13 April 1977.

[17] Zhonggong Yanjiu 12(19) (15 September 1978):99–108.

[18] Renmin Ribao , 16 April 1978; 12 June 1978.

[19] Ibid., 20 March 1978.

[20] Some of the provincial leaders Hua appointed turned out to have close relationships with the Gang of Four. For instance, Liu Guangtao was made first secretary of Heilongjiang province in January 1977, only to be removed by the end of the year.

good for their careers. Moreover, the leadership of each unit was still so splintered that carrying out an objective and fair investigation was impossible.^[21]

Despite the proliferating articles denouncing the Gang of Four, the campaign to "expose and criticize" did not have much impact in 1977. According to his opponents, Hua's campaign "investigated only small matters, but not big matters; investigated only the lower level, not the upper level; investigated only outside matters, not inside matters; investigated only matters tangentially related, not immediate matters."^[22] As a result, only a few very well-known radicals were investigated and dismissed.^[23]

As more victims of the CR were reinstated to politically influential positions, the campaign against the radicals was bound to expose Hua's tactics of "tacit discontinuity and overt defense" of the CR and Mao Zedong's thought.^[24] When the public campaign expanded to touch upon the Gang's specific policies—particularly "production relations" versus productive forces and the role of profit and material incentives in economic management—it became obvious that the Gang's policy was ultraleft rather than ultraright.^[25] This compelled the beneficiaries to change the official label to "ultraleft in appearance, but ultraright in essence."^[26]

Nonetheless, the victims of the CR were not willing to accept the validity of this new label. For instance, Renmin Ribao questioned whether the Gang of Four carried out a "proletarian dictatorship or fascist dictatorship?"^[27] Once the Gang's dictatorship was labeled fascist and its ties with Lin Biao openly discussed, it was a matter of time before the radicals were condemned as ultraleftists.^[28] The change in terminology brought about an upsurge of articles de-

[21] Renmin Ribao , 22 June 1978.

[22] Ibid., 13 January 1978.

[23] For instance, the Gang of Four's followers in Shanghai—Ma Tianxiu and Xu Jingxian—and at Beijing University—Wang Lianglong, Li Jiaokun, and Guo Conglin—were arrested and investigated.

[24] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[25] For instance, see "The Gang of Four's Attack on 'Sole Productive Forces' Is an Attack on Historical Dialectics," Renmin Ribao , 11 January 1978.

[26] Ibid., 6 February 1977; October 14, 1977; 7 March 1978.

[27] Ibid., 11 June 1977.

[28] Joseph, Critique of Ultra-Leftism , 184, 168; Renmin Ribao , 23 March 1978; 3 April 1978.

manding the correction of ultraleftism and, by implication, the Maoist line on beneficiaries. A Renmin Ribao article argued that if the Gang of Four's mistakes were not correctly identified as ultraleftist, there would be no way to correct them. As evidence, the article explained how Wang Ming's error in calling Li Lisan's policy ultraright justified the ultraleftist mistakes that Wang continued to make. Other articles made it plainer that without a thorough criticism of the Gang of Four's ultraleftism, the old cadres could not be rehabilitated.^[29]

Public criticism eventually expanded to raise the question of those who had benefited from the CR by managing to muddle through the mass movements ("remaining faction"), by adjusting themselves to whatever was the prevailing trend ("wind faction"), and by shaking up the political structure ("earthquake faction").^[30] The translations of these picturesque Chinese terms point to the questionable relationship of the beneficiaries with the Gang of Four at the early stage of the CR.

From the beginning, Deng Xiaoping advocated the removal of broader categories of radicals. In his speech to the municipal party secretaries on 27 December 1977, he established three criteria for determining who should be purged.^[31] First, all those who collected materials against Zhou Enlai and Zhu De during the CR, "irrespective of intentions, positions, abilities, and political performance," should be investigated and removed from office. This applied also to the masses, who had acted without ulterior political motives. Second, all those who had developed close relationships with Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, had acted on their instructions, and had cultivated them before and during the CR were to be dismissed from positions of leadership regardless of seniority and whether or not their actions caused any bad effects. Those who did not incur the people's resentment should not be punished, but instead of staying in leadership positions, such cadres should be forced "to earn their bread through laboring." Third, all cadres who had persecuted old cadres and collected "black materials"

[29] Renmin Ribao , 3 March 1979.

[30] Ibid., 10 January 1978.

[31] Feijing Yuebao , 21(7), January 1989, 25–30.

should be dismissed even if they had done so in the name of Mao Zedong's thought.^[32]

Scrutiny of the Gang of Four's followers stepped up when Hu Yaobang assumed responsibility for the central organizational department in December 1977. He acted decisively, changing the leadership of organizational departments at lower levels and appointing newly rehabilitated cadres to leadership positions at the provincial level. Local newspapers began to criticize several provincial leaders for their close ties with the Gang of Four and for their efforts to keep the lid on the campaign against the Gang.^[33] The newly reinstated cadres had many political reasons thoroughly to investigate the radicals who had attacked them. They adjusted the leading personnel on the lower levels and dispatched work teams to supervise the criticism. For instance, the new provincial party secretary of Shanxi province organized ten investigation teams with 100 cadres to check the results of the previous campaign to criticize the Gang of Four.^[34] The Jilin provincial party committee first rehabilitated five old cadres who "had suffered the most from the Gang of Four's persecution" and then placed them in charge of organizing the work teams to be sent out to the various units. Even lower-level units organized and sent out work teams to subordinate units.^[35] By mid-1978, the issue of how to handle cadres promoted in "the two surprise attacks" had surfaced.^[36] Although official policy was to decide cases individually, it seems very likely that almost all of those who had benefited from "helicopter promotion" eventually lost their positions.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Xie Xuekong of Tianjin was removed from his office in June, Wu De in October, Zeng Shaosha of Liaoning and Yu Daiching of Inner Mongolia in October, Li Ruishan of Shaanxi in December, Liu Zhenxun of Henan in October, and Saifudin of Xinjiang in February. The reorganization of the State Council removed such persons as Wang Yang, Li Chitai, and Sha Feng, who were not yet criticized by name. Through the summer of 1978 a few more provincial leaders, whose connection with the Gang of Four was not very obvious, came under attack too and eventually were removed from office. Provincial party leaders who came under public attack during this period in early 1978 include Saifudin of Xinjiang, Li Ruishan of Shanxi, Lung Daichung of Inner Mongolia, and Zhang Boshan of Hunan. See Beijing Ribao , 7 December 1979; Renmin Ribao , 30 March 1978.

[34] Renmin Ribao , 11 June 1979.

[35] Ibid., 13 February 1978.

[36] Ibid., 28 June 1978; 4 September 1979.

After the third plenum in December 1978, Hua Guofeng declared that the check on the Gang's followers had been completed. But rehabilitated cadres continued to stress the importance of thorough checking, and they launched what they called reexamination (fu cha ) of the radicals.^[37] More stringent criteria to verify previous campaign investigations were set up by various units. For instance, the Anshan Steel Mill Corporation organized sixteen inspection teams that used thirty criteria to see whether a unit had carried out its campaign properly.^[38]Renmin Ribao recommended that six conditions be met before ending the campaign against the Gang of Four.^[39] The rehabilitated cadres eventually put the Gang on public trial and adopted the "Resolution on Some Historical Questions," which officially acknowledged Mao's mistakes in the CR. The Gang's associates were further investigated as the "three types of people" during the party rectification campaign of 1983–85.

The "Two Whatevers" and "Practice"

The fundamental differences between the beneficiaries and victims of the CR were brought into sharp focus by the seemingly innocuous question, what constitutes the criteria for determining truth? The beneficiaries took the position that "whatever Chairman Mao said and decided" should be upheld, whereas the rehabilitated emphasized "practice" (shijian ) as the "sole criteria for empirical truth."

The beneficiaries coined the phrase "the two whatevers" (liang ge fanxi ) to use as "the basic weapon" for rejecting demands to reinstate Deng Xiaoping and to reverse the decision about the Tiananmen Square incident.^[40] By contrast, pragmatic Deng Xiao-

[37] For instance, see ibid., 14 April 1978 for the several investigations carried out by the Nanjing municipal party committee.

[38] Renmin Ribao , 13 May 1978; 20 January 1979.

[39] They were (1) thorough investigation of those who joined the Gang of Four to seize power, (2) criticism of the Gang's revisionist line, (3) readjusting the makeup of the leadership group by expelling Gang followers, (4) complete rehabilitation of cadres who had suffered as a result of false charges or mistaken or wrong decisions, (5) restoration of the good traditions of the party, and (6) unity and stability. Renmin Ribao , 5 January 1979.

[40] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 30 January 1983; Cankao Ziliao , 24 March 1963.

ping (who reportedly declared even before the CR that regardless of whether it is black or white, any cat that catches a mouse is a good cat) had many reasons to stress "practice." Even before his official rehabilitation, he allegedly objected to "the two whatevers" view in his letter to the party center.^[41] No sooner had he been rehabilitated than he publicly argued that the essence of Mao Zedong's thought was to "seek truth from facts."

The final showdown between "the two whatevers" and "practice" views took place at a work conference organized to discuss the upcoming third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress (held from 10 November to 15 December 1978). According to official Chinese sources, Hua Guofeng initially objected to the idea of convening the conference, and when the meeting was held, he tried to limit discussion to economic questions. Once the meeting began, however, many veteran leaders demanded that "some historical problems" be discussed. For instance, Chen Yun argued (in his speech to the northeastern group) that prior to discussing economic issues, some remaining historical cases should be resolved. "Without resolving these questions, there is no way of unifying the entire people." In particular, he raised questions about six cases: (1) the case of sixty-one counterrevolutionary people including Bo Yibo, (2) the central organizational department's seventy-seven decisions made in 1937 and the wrong decision made in 1940 about the "two political systems," (3) the problems of Tao Zhu and Wang Hoshou, (4) the Peng Dehuai problem, (5) the Tiananmen Square incident, and (6) the question of Kang Sheng. Other veteran cadres followed Chen Yun by tabling a motion to discuss the "January Power Seizure," the "February Adverse Current," the "Campaign to Criticize Deng," and even the question of the CR and Mao himself. The heated debate between the two groups lasted thirty-six days—"the longest meeting after the fall of the Gang of Four"—finally adjourning after deciding that everybody would be allowed to speak freely on these issues at the third plenum.^[42]

The third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, which some Chinese regarded as the "Second Zunyi Conference" (Mao emerged as the supreme leader of the CCP after the first Zunyi Conference

[41] Daily Report , 24 August 1981; Renwu , no. 1, 1982, 10.

[42] Dangshi Tongxun , no. 2, 20 January 1983.

in 1935), was a watershed in many regards. It adopted economic development as the regime's ultimate goal, while promising not to use mass movements as a means to implement policy. At the meeting, the balance of power tilted toward the rehabilitated cadre group, and Deng Xiaoping emerged as the number one leader. Old cadres like Huang Kecheng, Wang Renzhong, Hu Yaobang, and Yang Shangkun regained not only their honors but also important government and party positions. Hu was elected to the Politburo and appointed third secretary of the disciplinary committee. By contrast, although many beneficiaries retained their seats on the Politburo or the Central Committee, they lost other powerful and influential positions.

In retrospect, Hua Guofeng's chance of survival was always slight. The purge of the Gang of Four, whose ideology was further left than his own, exposed him to political pressure from the right. Once their common enemy was overthrown, Hua's group did not have the leverage to keep the old cadres behind him. Although the survivors initially made efforts to bring Hua's group and the rehabilitated cadres together, they chose the rehabilitated over the beneficiaries when they were forced to make a choice, because the beneficiaries lacked deep personal ties among themselves—ties that would have reinforced political ties. Many of them had not even had work relations before being promoted to leading positions at the center, and after Mao's death they did not have any patron to bind them together. Without such informal ties, no beneficiary was willing to risk his chance to survive individually by backing another.

Neither did the beneficiaries have enough time to develop a broad power base in the party-state bureaucracy, although some had support in the provinces from which they originally came (e.g., Hunan for Hua Guofeng, Henan for Qi Denggui). Their relation to military leaders at central and local levels was very tenuous. In addition, they could not resort to mass mobilization, the method that the radicals used for inner party struggles. Moreover, they did not even have any mass constituency to mobilize (because most Chinese people were thoroughly disenchanted with the CR). The beneficiaries, therefore, pursued the strategy of defense and compromise, yielding to the pressure of their adversaries on issue after issue. In turn, the rehabilitated effectively used a guerrilla strategy

of nibbling at the beneficiaries' power base and then finally destroying them as a coherent political group. The rehabilitated cadres, with more political experience, a stronger power base in the bureaucracy, and higher prestige positions, were destined to win once Deng Xiaoping was reinstated for the second time.