1. Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago, 1988), 328–41; Abdallah Laroui, L’ideologie arabe contemporaine (Paris, 1967); Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York, 1988); Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven, 1988), 98–104; Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World (New York, 1991), 158–77; and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, 4 (December 1980): 423–53.

2. The importance of this omission is underlined by the fact that the Muhajir community, the Jama‘at’s main base of support at the time, was also the strongest advocate of land reform and populist politics. It had pressed the Muslim League to advocate land reform as early as 1949; U. K. High Commission, Karachi, disp. #31, 8/3/1949, DO35/8948, PRO.

3. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #102, 7/13/1950, 790D.00/8–1150, 5, NA.

4. Nu‘mani states that the Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an was read widely among the religious literati in the 1940s and did enjoy a certain following among them; see Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani, Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath Rifaqat ki Sarguzasht Awr Ab Mira Mauqaf (Lahore, 1980), 31–33.

5. This was also true of members of other religious movements, some of which were opposed to Pakistan, and hence waned in power after 1947; see Freeland Abbott, “The Jama‘at-i-Islami of Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 11, 1 (Winter 1957): 41. The followers of these movements, again mainly from the lower-middle classes, saw the Jama‘at as the only effective movement representing their sentiments and objectives, and hence they flocked to the Jama‘at. Two notable lieutenants of Mawdudi, Aqa Shurish Kashmiri—a close companion of Mawdudi—and Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, a senior Jama‘at leader, came from such a background. The former had belonged to the Majlis-i Ahrar, and the latter to the Tahrik-i Khaksar.

6. Ahmad reports that in 1990 of Jama‘at’s top fifteen leaders, nine held master of arts degrees, three had master of science degrees, one had earned a law degree (LL. B.), one had a bachelor of arts degree, and one had been educated in the traditional system. Of the fourteen, twelve had specialized in the humanities or the social sciences, and two in technical fields; Mumtaz Ahmad, “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago, 1991), 495.

7. This observation is confirmed by the Jama‘at’s leaders themselves. In an interview with this author, Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, the former secretary-general, stated that “the Jama‘at is by and large lower-middle class.” Binder, Ahmed, and Ahmad, too, confirm this finding in their studies on the party. Binder identified the Jama‘at’s supporters in the 1950s as those “drawn from the traditional middle classes, the students, and those who have failed to enter into the modern middle class despite achieving a bachelor’s degree;” Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), 8. Ahmed writes, “Jamaat-i-Islami’s social base is located amongst small businessmen, small land-holders, and urban lower middle class strata of shopkeepers, teachers, clerks and petty government officials”; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (New York, 1987), 112–13. Ahmad argues that the lower sections of the new middle classes and traditional petite bourgeoisie are the backbone of the Jama‘at; Ahmad, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” 496–500.

8. As a result of emphasis placed upon education in 1989, the Jama‘at had a literacy rate of 85 percent while the literacy rate in Pakistan stood at 28 percent; figures provided by the office of secretary-general. The Jama‘at did make some headway in attracting members of the Pakistan civil service, but these figures are not reflected in organizational records. Wary of government reaction, Mawdudi told his followers among the country’s bureaucrats that in the interests of the party’s long-run goal they should avoid official affiliation with the Jama‘at and to clandestinely support it from whatever position they serve. In later years the same policy was adopted vis-à-vis the personnel of the armed forces.

9. Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, Maududi: Thought and Movement (Lahore, 1984), 132.

10. Cited in Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, Qafilah-i Sakht Jan (Sargodha, 1965), and Khurshid Ahmad, Tazkirah-i Zindan (Karachi, 1965), which contain information on members of the shura’ arrested in 1963–1964.

11. JIKUS, 43.

12. Ibid., 43–44.

13. Cited in Ahmad, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” 495.

14. Following its creation, the Jama‘at made a concerted effort to translate Mawdudi’s works into local Indian languages, from Malayalam to Sindhi; see RJI, vols. 1–5. However, the scope of these efforts never matched the weight of the party’s efforts in Urdu, nor did it change the predominantly Urdu orientation of the movement.

15. According to the 1951 census, only 3.4 percent of Pakistanis identified themselves as Urdu speakers; cited in Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York, 1972), 12.

16. In 1955, for instance, with a view to expanding its base of support, the Jama‘at launched a three-year plan to teach Urdu to twenty-five thousand people; cited in RJI, vol. 7, 244.

17. Manifesto of Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan (Lahore, 1970), 4–5.

18. In a gathering of Jama‘at members in 1974, Mawdudi declared that the Jama‘at’s aim was not only gaining political success for itself but also, more important, preserving the unity of Pakistan. As such, he enjoined Jama‘at’s members not to be distracted from the legitimating function which their party performs at the national level nor swayed by the lure of ethnic politics, and hence to maintain the organizational unity and all-Pakistan poise of the Jama‘at; cited in ISIT(1), 47–49.

19. For instance, of the first thirteen nazim-i ‘alas of the IJT, only three were born in Indian provinces inherited by Pakistan (one in Punjab and two in North-West Frontier Province). The other ten were born in areas which today rest within India, and all belonged to the Muhajir community. See the biographical sketches of JVNAT, vols. 1–2.

20. ‘Ali Ahmad Khan, Jama‘at-e-Islami of Pakistan, Introduction Series, no. 2 (Lahore, 1954), 4–6.

21. Cited in Syed Riaz Ahmad, Mawlana Mawdudi and the Islamic State (Lahore, 1976), 176.

22. Syed Abul ‘Ala Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Karachi, 1955), 144–45.

23. Cited in Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Boulder, 1986), 44.

24. Cited in Herald (August 1992): 151.

25. Mawdudi’s speech was reprinted in A’in (April 25, 1985): 6.

26. Sayyid Abul Ala Maudoodi, “Muslim Women Must Participate in Islamic Movement,” Criterion 5, 5 (Rajab-Sha‘ban 1390/1970): 45 and 74.

27. ISIT(2), 49.

28. Ibid.

29. The motto defined Jama‘at’s new khidmat-i khalq (service to the masses) approach launched in 1972. See Rudad-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1972 (Lahore, n.d.), 22–23.

30. Ibid., 48–50.

31. In January 1979 the Jama‘at’s shura’ declared attracting new affiliates (mutaffiq-sazi) a major goal of the party, setting a goal of a 25 percent increase in their numbers, and directing the party to form committees and circles across Pakistan to accomplish this feat. Between March and May 1979 the drive brought 109,000 new affiliates to the Jama‘at, 50,000 from North-West Frontier Province, 32,000 from Sind, 22,000 from Punjab, and 5,000 from Baluchistan; ibid, 32.

32. In 1988 elections the Jama‘at won four and in 1990 five of Dir’s six provincial assembly seats. For more on these elections see chapters 8–10.

33. In 1990, however, the Jama‘at did better in Punjab than in North-West Frontier Province, at least in the contests for seats in the National Assembly. Moreover, it did better in the larger cities of Punjab than it had in the elections of 1988. For details see chapter 10.

34. It should, however, be noted that Muhajirs still predominate in many of Jama‘at’s top offices. For instance, in 1992 of the five deputy amirs, three were Muhajirs.

35. Interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi.

36. See the text of Qazi Husain’s speech to the “Jama‘at’s youth,” printed in Takbir (October 12, 1989): 42–43, wherein he argues fervently for expanding Jama‘at’s reach into the masses of illiterate Pakistanis. Qazi Husain himself is of the opinion that while the Jama‘at realized the importance of appealing to lower social strata after the 1970–1971 elections few structural changes were undertaken to reorient the politics of the Jama‘at. He therefore sees such an undertaking as the central focus of his leadership of the party; interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad.

37. Khurram Badr, Qazi Husain Ahmad (Karachi, 1988), 95–108.

38. Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in Takbir (June 30, 1988): 14.

39. JIKUS, 32.

40. RJI, vol. 6, 26–27.

41. SAAM, vol. 1, 384.

42. RJI, vol. 7, 244.

43. SAAM, vol. 2, 392–93.

44. Personal correspondence with Mawlana Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, 1989–1990.

45. The censure was published in Wifaq and Nawa’i-i Waqt in Lahore; also see Rana Sabir Nizami, Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan: Nakamiyun ke Asbab ka ‘Ilmi Tajziyah (Lahore, 1988), 102.

46. This issue has been extensively debated between Javid Ahmadu’l-Ghamidi, Khurshid Ahmad, Ahmad Nadim, and Na‘im Siddiqi in Ishraq throughout 1993.

47. Interview with Khurram Jah Murad in JVNAT, vol. 1, 78–79.

48. Nizami, Jama‘at-i Islami, 77–79.

49. The most notable advocates of opening up the Jama‘at in this category are ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Khurram Jah Murad, both Muhajir deputy amirs of the party; interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Khurram Jah Murad; also see interview with Khurram Jah Murad in Awaz-i Jahan (January 22, 1990): 10–14. In addition, journalists Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Muhammad Salahu’ddin, and Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami have become quite vocal on this issue. They are staunch supporters of the party but are not bound by the code of conduct which bars Jama‘at members from public discussion of party issues. Moreover, as editors of magazines and journals with large followings in the party, these men have been able to disseminate ideas about change directly into the Jama‘at, forcing the party to debate its future course of action.