PART III—
TWO PROVINCES
Up to here at both the national and the local level, the account of royal policy and agrarian change has been essentially episodic: of evolving theories of agrarian reform, of the struggles of ministers to solve social ills and fiscal crises, and of the evolution of different towns. The last chapter drew some general lessons from the histories of seven towns, but their validity is limited by the very uniqueness of these towns.
In an attempt to establish some historical regularities at a more macro level, the last part of this study deals with two provinces: Salamanca and Jaén. Rather than be fully descriptive, it looks at the structure and development of the rural society and economy in the form of variables that can be quantified and compared. Thus we may attempt to establish correlations between structures existing at the time of the catastro, the evolution of the next half century, and the changes that disentail produced.
The choice of these provinces results from the structure of the administration of the desamortización at the local level. Permanent commissioners of the Amortization and Consolidation Funds were established in every provincial capital and in the major cabezas de partido, while a number of lesser cabezas de partido had commissioners temporarily located in them. At least 137 localities appear as seats of commissioners at one time or another. For ease of collecting data, it made sense to choose the sales handled by certain commissioners, because they can be easily identified in the Madrid notarial archives. After some trial and error, I selected the documentation of two permanent commissioners, those in
the cities of Salamanca and Jaén. The commissioner at Jaén had charge of the entire province, but in Salamanca province the extensive partido of Ciudad Rodrigo in the southwest was administered by a commissioner in that city, and I did not record his sales. My study of Salamanca province therefore lacks this territory.
They proved fortunate choices. The provinces are located in different regions of central Spain, providing examples of both sides of the Salamanca-Albacete line, and each province has considerable variety of landscape and social structure, facilitating comparative analysis. Both provinces were also areas that preoccupied the royal reformers, and they had a high percentage of church property sold.
Chapter XV—
The Social and Economic Spectrum of Jaén and Salamanca
The province of Salamanca is the southernmost of the kingdom of León. It is located south of the Rio Duero, which drains the northern meseta of Castile, a frontier region that was captured from the Muslims and settled during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the second major push of the Reconquest. To the west it borders on Portugal and to the south is separated from Extremadura by the central mountain range. To the north and east it has no clear boundary, for the flat, rich grain-bearing tableland of the northern meseta extends south into Salamanca and forms the core of the province.
The capital city, Salamanca, sits on high ground above the Rio Tormes, and the tableland stretches out in all directions around it. Under the old regime most of this plain belonged to the partido of Salamanca, the portion of the province directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial capital and thus of the crown. To the southeast, the plains bordering on Ávila province formed the partido of Alba de. Tormes, which belonged to the señorío of the Duque de Alba; and to the west, beyond the partido of Salamanca, was that of Ledesma, most of which was part of the señorío of the Duque de Alburquerque.
Farther to the southwest, the plain spreads on into the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo, second only to that of Salamanca in extent. It accounts for most of the frontier of the province with Portugal and Extremadura. As explained before, because the royal commissioner for the disentail of Carlos IV located in Salamanca city did not deal with the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo, it is not included in this study.
The sierras in the south of the province contained in the eighteenth century a number of partidos, all under seigneurial jurisdiction. These included those of Miranda del Castañar, Montemayor, and Béjar, lying in the valleys of the sierras of Peña de Francia and Béjar, most of which are still part of the province of Salamanca. The province also embraced the partidos of Barco de Ávila, Piedrahita, and El Mirón, in the valleys to the north of the massive Sierra de Gredos, which were transferred in the nineteenth century to the province of Ávila. When we observed the town of El Mirón, we formed a sense of what these sierra regions were like.
Leaving Salamanca and crossing the central sierras and the meseta of New Castile one reaches the kingdom (reyno ) of Jaén, as it was still known in the eighteenth century. It forms the northeastern corner of Andalusia. The Guadalquivir River, whose basin forms the heart of Andalusia, rises in the imposing Sierra de Cazorla, which separates Jaén from the kingdom of Murcia to the east. To the north, the Sierra Morena lies between Jaén and La Mancha, while to the south a series of sharp ranges divide it from the kingdom of Granada. Only to the west does Jaén lack a clear geographic frontier; the province of Córdoba occupies the next portion of the Guadalquivir valley. The eighteenth-century kingdom was somewhat smaller than the present province, for the partido of Orcera now belonging to it was added from La Mancha and Murcia in the nineteenth century.
When we looked at the town of Baños, we saw that the main route from Castile entered Andalusia through Jaén after crossing the Sierra Morena by the passes of El Viso or Despeñaperros. Jaén was the first Muslim kingdom conquered by the Christians after the decisive victory of Las Navas de Tolosa—northernmost town of the kingdom—in 1212. The twin cities of Baeza and Úbeda fell rapidly, and then the Christian forces gathered their strength for a generation before pushing on to Jaén, Córdoba, and Seville in the middle of the century. Granada, to the south, held out until after 1480.
For two and a half centuries the southern mountain ranges of Jaén province were the frontier between the Christians and the Muslims, as they had been earlier between rival Muslim kingdoms. Today the fortresses that dominate the towns of Jaén and the numerous towers scattered along these mountains bear witness to this history. Even the names of many towns recall the military past: Alcalá la Real, La Guardia, Torre del Campo, Torreperogil (Torre Pedro Gil), Torredonjimeno, and the simple Torres. Other names are evidence of later resettlement: Villa-
nueva del Arzobispo, Villanueva de la Reina, Mancha Real, La Carolina (in the eighteenth century), and more recently Puente del Obispo.
In order to grasp the structure of rural society and economy of these two provinces and how it was evolving at the end of the old regime, one may start by observing how individuals behaved in the disentail. The data come from the deeds of deposit (escrituras de imposición) recorded in Madrid by the two notaries Juan Manuel López Fando and Feliciano del Corral. We met these documents in Chapter 5, where they formed the basis for calculating the extent of disentail throughout the monarchy. They are copies of the acknowledgments that the crown gave to the former owners of disentailed properties and redeemed censos specifying the amount of royal indebtedness to the former owner and the annual interest payment due on it. Between 1 January 1800 and 30 January 1801, deeds of deposit were also issued by provincial notaries. My best estimate is that the deeds of the two Madrid notaries cover about 75 percent of the sales outside Madrid province. A search through the historical archives of the provinces of Jaén and Salamanca unearthed only a few examples of deeds of deposit registered at the provincial level. Since they are not complete, I judged that their inclusion would distort more than strengthen the results, and I have based the study of the provinces and their zones on the Madrid records alone.
The deeds of deposit are printed on standard forms of three pages, which quote in extenso the royal decrees and specify the nature of the royal obligation. They provide blank spaces in which the notaries recorded the location of the commissioner, the name and location of the former owner, the date of payment for the purchase, the name(s) of the buyer(s) or the redeemer(s) of censos, the amount paid and the form in which paid (hard currency, vales reales, etc.), the number of installments for payment, and usually the type and location of the property. Each document contains up to fourteen items of usable data. I found and recorded 4,642 deeds for Jaén province and 3,314 for Salamanca.
The first step in preparing the data for analysis was to group together all the purchases made by each individual. One here faced the problem familiar to demographic historians who have reconstituted families: the name of an individual often appears with more than one spelling. Spanish orthography had not yet been standardized, and notaries sometimes recorded one and sometimes two surnames (apellidos). There are also many common Christian names and surnames in Spanish, so that identical names do not necessarily refer to the same person. I used my best judgment. If similar names appeared in the same town, I usually as-
sumed that they belonged to the same individual; if in distant towns, I did not. On the whole, the likely error is of treating the purchases of one individual as if they were made by two or more, rather than vice versa.
I concluded that 2,552 individuals made purchases in Jaén (1.8 purchases per buyer) and 2,148 individuals in Salamanca (1.5 purchases per buyer). These include 67 "unnamed" individuals in Jaén and 233 in Salamanca, my solution for dealing with deeds which read "so-and-so and two others," "so-and-so and his companions," and "various persons." In the case of unspecified plurals, I assumed three buyers. In all cases of more than one buyer, I divided the amount spent equally among them, for lack of information on each buyer's share. One must remember that the identity of the buyers and the amount they spent individually were of marginal interest in the deeds, which were contracts between the king and former owners. The information essential to this study was frequently omitted or entered hastily, for the copyists of the Madrid notaries produced fifty deeds per working day on the average, and in years of intense activity many times more.
In order to proceed, I ranked the buyers in each province in ascending order according to the amount they spent. This procedure produced Lorenz curves, with the cumulative percent of buyers plotted against the cumulative percent of the amount they spent. By their nature, the curves rise slowly at first and sharply at the end. I then divided the purchasers ranked on the curves into four levels as shown in Figure 15.1. In both provinces the small buyers in Level 1 are more numerous than the large buyers in Level 4, although the amount spent by the latter totaled ten times that of the former, a clear indication of the disparity among the buyers.
2
Once one has accomplished this step, it becomes possible to compare the characteristics of the different levels of buyers and the patterns they followed in making their purchases. Three features prove revealing: the type of property the buyers acquired, the terms of payment, and the legal estate of the buyers. The months, years, and seasons in which the buyers made their payments were also compared, but with no meaningful results. The decisive factor in determining when a buyer could make a purchase was the date that the royal commissioner put the property up for sale. The data indicate that this decision was not related in

Figure 15.1.
Allocation of Buyers to Four Different Levels
NOTE: Buyers are ranked in ascending order of
the amount of each individual's total purchases:
Level 1 —buyers of the bottom 5 percent of total purchases (0–5.0 percent)
Level 2—buyers of the next 15 percent of total purchases (5.1–20.0 percent)
Level 3—buyers of the next 30 percent of total purchases (20.1–50.0 percent)
Level 4—buyers of the top 50 percent of total purchases (50.1–100 percent)
any regular pattern to the level of buyer to which the property would appeal.
Table 15.1 shows how each level of buyers of Jaén province divided the amount it spent among the different types of property and the redemption of censos. By showing the share of their money that each level of buyers devoted to each type of property, this table reveals their preferences, with arrows to identify the trends. The lower was the level of buyers, the more their money went into arable, vineyards, orchards, and redemption of censos, and there was a strong but not complete trend in this direction for urban properties (Level 2 devoted a larger share than Level 1 to this type). On the other hand, the higher the level of buyers, the more they spent on olive groves and rural estates.
|
The table demonstrates a feature of the disentail that we already encountered in the individual towns of the province. One may recall that the catastro revealed that nonresident owners preferred to lease properties whose cultivation required large labor inputs (intensive agriculture) while tilling directly with hired labor and the administration of stewards the properties that called for less labor or whose production was oriented toward the outside market. Large resident landowners and local religious institutions had similar preferences, although they followed them in a smaller proportion of the cases. The economic rationality became evident when one considered the costs of the various inputs for the different types of property and the net income resulting from leasing compared with direct administration. Table 15.1 shows that when it came time to buy disentailed properties, the large buyers preferred the kinds of property that large and nonresident owners had learned was most profitable to exploit directly: olive groves and rural estates (that is, cortijos). These properties produced for the market and relied primarily on seasonal hired labor. Large buyers were not eager, however, to outbid smaller buyers for labor-intensive lands and those whose produce went mostly to feed the town, with the result that the lower levels of buyers spent a larger proportion of their money on these categories. This is notably the case for arable not located in cortijos and therefore probably distributed in small plots. Although they account for only a small part of the disentail, vineyards and orchards also went proportionately more to the lower levels.
The lower levels also demonstrated a stronger preference than the upper for urban properties and the redemption of censos. In both instances the upper levels were following a comprehensible investment policy. For them, in most cases, the purchase of buildings in the town nuclei would mean buying rental properties, from which they could expect a limited income. Leasing buildings to others attracted them no more than leasing agricultural lands. For small buyers, however, the prospect of owning a house rather than renting one had enough appeal to persuade them to spend money here rather than compete for farm land. The reasoning with censos was similar. Whether large buyers were proportionately more or less encumbered with censos than small buyers one cannot know, nor does it matter, since the amounts redeemed were not enough to have represented major shares of local indebtedness. For large buyers, the prospects of investing in market agriculture was on the whole more attractive than paying off obligations bearing 3-percent in-
terest. Smaller buyers, with fewer prospects of production for the market, showed a greater preference to redeem their debts.
All in all, the evidence reveals that as a group the people of Jaén with disposable wealth at the time of the disentail had acquired a fund of comprehensible economic reasoning. The disentail of Carlos IV placed a sufficient number of properties of various types on the market for this reasoning to produce regular patterns in the purchases of them. The trends in Table 15.1 are too clear to be the product of pure chance. Only one form of property shows no trend: improved and irrigated lands. This exception is puzzling, because most of these would be labor-
|
intensive properties and in the towns we looked at large private owners preferred to lease them to others.
At first sight, the pattern of property acquired by the different levels of buyers in Salamanca province appears unlike that of Jaén (Table 15.2). Whereas in Jaén there was a clear trend for the smaller buyers to acquire proportionately more arable, Salamanca shows no such trend although there is an indication that larger buyers directed their purchases toward arable more than the smaller ones. The difference, however, is more apparent than real. Large buyers in Jaén interested in the grain market bought cortijos, classed as "rural estates." In Salamanca, as we saw in the two towns of La Armuña, large buyers acquired the collections of numerous small grain plots that the ecclesiastical institutions had built up and whose purchase the peasants could not afford. Unimproved arable was the predominant type of property in Salamanca, accounting for 59 percent of all the money spent; even though arable was also highest in Jaén, it represented only 32 percent. The difference between the provinces lay in the willingness of large buyers in Salamanca to acquire arable to lease to peasants, as the church had done. In Jaén much commercial production was conducted with administrators and hired labor, in Salamanca with tenant farmers. Rural estates in Salamanca meant primarily alquerías and despoblados, which produced both grain and livestock. As in Jaén and for the same reason, the trend in purchasing rural estates was strongly toward the top buyers.
In Salamanca the sales included a number of pastures. The table shows that they were of two kinds, large pastures that could carry extensive herds and appealed to the wealthy, and smaller ones primarily for household animals. Commercially oriented pastures went to the top level, but below Level 4, the trend was toward the smallest buyers, who were prepared to pay extravagant prices, as was the case in El Mirón.
In other respects, the two provinces were similar. More obviously than in Jaén, large buyers shied away from labor-intensive properties, especially the improved or irrigated plots, most of them walled cortinas so typical of this part of Spain. They also spent a smaller share of their money to redeem censos, and they avoided urban properties (even though the inclusion of Salamanca city in the provincial analysis means that substantial urban properties, out of reach of small buyers, figure in the table). Curiously, in both provinces, the level that showed the greatest propensity for buying urban properties was the second, not the bottom, so that this preference was not a straight linear function of wealth.
One is led to conclude that wealthy buyers had a different mentality
than more modest ones, more open to the possibilities of the market. Before accepting this conclusion, however, there is an alternative explanation that should be considered. Perhaps the difference was simply one of opportunity. In the most obvious case, wealthy buyers spent more of their money on rural estates than small buyers. The fact is that most rural estates went for high prices because of their size, and the simple act of buying one automatically placed the buyer into one of our top levels because its cost was greater than the total amount spent by a single buyer in the lower levels.
There is one way to test whether opportunity or a different economic outlook was the primary motivating factor in the different choices of the various levels. If one tabulates only those individual purchases made by all buyers that cost less than the "breaking point" between Levels 1 and 2, that is, those purchases that a person in the lowest level could have made, one can observe whether the preferences observed for all purchases are repeated here (Table 15.3). The test is not conclusive because the upper levels spent only a small percentage of their money on purchases in this price range, and the trends turn out to be fewer and weaker than when all purchases are considered. Nevertheless, those that do appear run in the direction one would expect if the big buyers had different goals than the small buyers. In Jaén the big buyers put a greater share of their money into olive groves than the small ones, and in Salamanca the small buyers preferred vineyards and orchards, in all three cases trends that were found when all purchases were tabulated. It would appear that there was indeed a difference in mentality among the levels, large buyers as a whole showing more interest in properties that were directed to the market and could be profitably cultivated with hired labor, whether they were making large or small purchases.
3
Wealth not only gave access to properties oriented toward the market but reduced the ratio of price to expected return, making expensive properties attractive in more ways than one. The royal decrees organizing the disentail, one recalls, offered the buyers a choice of ways in which to pay for their purchases, the basic choice being between payment in hard currency or in vales reales. From the beginning, preference was given to bids in hard currency (metálico or efectivo), and within a year bids for less than the assessed value (the minimum bid was two-thirds of it) could be made only in hard currency. Moreover, the smallest
|
vale real was worth 150 pesos face value, or some 2,260 reales. Sales concluded for less than this amount should have been paid in efectivo. Since the vales were depreciated, however, one finds properties going for around 2,000 reales being paid for with a vale real, but below this price, payment was almost exclusively in hard currency.[1] For sales concluded after 16 August 1801, the deeds of deposit provide an additional item of
[1] The deeds covering payment in vales usually say that payment was made in vales reales "and the balance in hard currency" (y su preciso en efectivo ) but do not list how much in each medium. Jaén deed C9404 (1801) went for 1,605 reales paid with a vale real, the lowest in the two provinces.
information, the relation between the price paid in hard currency and the assessed value, because the king now recognized his debt to the former owner for the full assessed value even if the buyer had paid less in hard currency. Until November 1802 the king also gave the former owner a 25-percent bonus if the sale netted more in hard currency than the assessment. Because bidding in hard currency could begin at two-thirds of the assessed value, sales for the assessed value ("en su tasa") or more in hard currency could result only from competing bids and show us that in these cases demand was high. Conversely, payment in vales reales suggests that there was little bidding and relatively cheap acquisitions, for a bidder could forestall further bids in vales by offering hard currency. While payment in vales had to be at least for the full assessment, vales were usually depreciated by over one-third, making the "minimum"
|
bid actually lower than the minimum bid in efectivo (see Figure 6.1). What terms the different levels of buyers used in making payment thus tell us something about the conditions under which they acquired their properties.
Tables 15.4 and 15.5 show the results. The trends are strong in almost all categories. The higher the level, the greater the proportion of its purchases paid for with vales reales. To a certain extent, the trend is inevitable, since all purchases below about 2,000 reales had to be paid for in efectivo. However, the lowest level included all buyers whose total purchases reached 4,000 reales in Salamanca and 3,390 reales in Jaén. Even the first level thus was not ruled out from the use of vales. Sales recorded as paid in hard currency at or above the assessed value after August 1801 were concluded after active bidding, and so were a large proportion of those paid for in hard currency at a price below the assessed value. The lower levels made more of their purchases in this way. The wealthier bidders, in other words, faced competition less fre-
|
|
quently, and they paid for their purchases more often in depreciated vales. Smaller buyers competed more actively against each other and got less favorable terms as a result. This is the case even when one considers only those purchases below the "Level 1–2 breaking point," although the larger buyers had to use hard currency more often for these small purchases than for their others (Table 15.6).
The difference between upper and lower levels is more marked in Salamanca than Jáen. In Salamanca the bigger and smaller buyers seem almost to have lived in distinct economic worlds. Level 4 buyers made four-fifths of their purchases for vales, Level 1 only one-fifth (Table 15.5). Conversely, Level 1 paid hard currency proportionately more than four times what Level 4 did. Big buyers here were into an economy based on paper money, received, most likely, for commodities sold on the national market or furnished to the crown for its armed forces. Smaller buyers lived in a world of cash on the line. They could not bid for the large properties, but the rules of the game meant that they could keep each other from using vales to buy church lands. They fought each other at the auctions, not their economic superiors.
In Jaén the trends were the same, but the differences were less marked.
Vales reales dominated the economy here less, only 45 percent of payments were made in this medium, compared to 70 percent in Salamanca (Table 15.4). The biggest buyers used vales six times more than the smallest, but the small buyers used hard currency proportionately only one and a half times as much as the large buyers.
When one considers entire provinces, as here, the range of economic means of the buyers in Salamanca appears much greater than that in Jaén. We saw earlier, however, that the distinction in types of property acquired by the different levels was more marked in Jaén. Putting both sets of evidence together, one can conclude that in both provinces there were two types of economy present, one involved in production for a nonlocal market (olives and wheat being most important harvests) and the other of a variety of products—fruits, vegetables, lesser grains, flax in Salamanca, grapes in Jaén, as well as wheat—for local consumption (self-sufficiency would be a misleading term). The market economy dealt primarily in vales reales, the local economy in hard currency. Production for the former minimized the input of labor, intensive farming was directed to the latter. In actual practice, almost every locality and most individuals participated in both economies, but each was located at a different point on a continuum that ran from the limiting case of all production for the nonlocal market to the other extreme of all for local consumption. At this time, no individual would have reached the first limit, but many small farmers (although probably not many buyers) may have been at the second limit, except that their payments for rent and tithes would enter the larger market. Disentail reinforced this spectrum.
The information on terms of payment permits one to distinguish also between purchases paid for at once and those paid for over several years. Time payments were not very advantageous; they had to be made in three installments: at the time of purchase and on the next two anniversaries, with interest on the last two. As a result this method was little used: 1.5 percent of the total payments in Jaén, 0.4 percent in Salamanca. Jaén shows a slight trend for smaller buyers to use this arrangement more,[2] Salamanca no trend. If conceived to help the less affluent to compete for the properties, the measure had a negligible effect. Again one perceives that so far as the local rural world was concerned, Spain's was still primarily a cash economy.
[2] Level 1: 2.5 percent; 2: 1.8 percent; 3: 1.6 percent; 4: 1.3 percent.
4
Finally, the data in the deeds of deposit enable one to establish a limited social profile of the people involved in the two economic worlds. First they tell us the appellation of the buyers. Some were called don or doña, but the majority not. Since these were notarized documents, it is more than likely that the use of the title depended on a legal privilege or, if not a specific document, on a well-recognized public reputation. Of the persons who made more than one purchase, a few appear at times with the don and at others without it, but they are a minority. The consistency of usage for each individual is remarkable, especially when one recalls that these were résumés of the original documents and that the name of the buyer was of marginal interest.[3] To call oneself don was not a matter of caprice but a recognition of a legal or at least semiofficial status. Among those who regularly appear with the title don are priests, who can be identified by the abbreviation pbro. (presbítero ) after their name. I have kept them as a separate category.
Table 15.7 indicates the proportion of dons and doñas and priests among the different levels of buyers in the two provinces. There are virtually no titled aristocrats (condes, duques, and marqueses) among the buyers (most aristocrats probably hid behind the name of an agent), but those that appear are grouped with the dons. (The previous tables have been based on the amount spent by the buyers; this one counts individuals, not the amounts they spent.) The table reveals very clear trends. In both provinces 70 percent of the buyers in Level 4 (highest) were entitled don or doña. With Level 1 buyers the trends run the other way: almost 90 percent without any qualification in Salamanca province, 70 percent in Jaén.
It is not easy to know who had the privilege of displaying the title don at the end of the old regime. Hidalgos (nobles) were distinguished in this fashion, and they were undoubtedly the most important part of the group. But it is certain that not all who enjoyed the appellation were legal nobles. The census of 1797 shows 785 nobles in the province of Jaén, 7 percent fewer than the buyers identified as don; and in the portion of Salamanca under study, some 441, 8 percent fewer than the buyers.[4] Since it is inconceivable that all hidalgos bought properties,
[3] See Appendix O.
[4] The category "noble" of the census of 1797 is equivalent to hidalgo; one can tell because the census of 1787 uses the term "hidalgos," while the census of 1797, in repeating the totals of 1787, calls them "nobles." For the province of Salamanca the census of 1787 gives a total of 567 hidalgos. In the region studied here, that is, without the partidoof Ciudad Rodrigo, the individual town returns of the census give a total of 533 hidalgos, 94 percent of the provincial total. The census of 1797 shows 470 nobles in Salamanca; the same proportion gives 441 in the region studied. (For the Censo español . . . de 1787 and the Censo de . . . 1797 , see Appendix A. The individual returns are in Real Academia de la Historia, legajos 9-30-2, 6240 to 6242 and 6259 [the last for the city of Salamanca].)
|
there must have been many buyers called don who were not included as nobles in the census. Who were they?
It is very likely that the census takers underreported the number of hidalgos. The preface to the census of 1787 says that pressure was applied to eliminate from the number of hidalgos the persons who were not entitled to the privilege, and the number in the census of 1797 is
even less. This last gives 14 percent fewer hidalgos for the province of Jaén than the census of 1768 does for the bishopric of Jaén, and for the province of Salamanca 12 percent fewer than the bishoprics of Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo in 1768. Since three partidos of the province—Barco de Ávila, Piedrahita, and El Mirón—were in the bishopric of Ávila, the decline in Salamanca between 1768 and 1797 was even greater.[5] It is probable that the censuses of 1787 and 1797 counted fewer hidalgos than the persons who were reputed to be hidalgos and that if these persons bought disentailed properties, they had themselves listed as don in the deeds.
This could account in part for the number of buyers called don, but more can be explained by other categories of men addressed as don because of their vocation, whether or not they were hidalgos. Such were the priests, as already noted. The deeds reveal that high servants of the crown, officers of the armed forces, and notaries appear as don (they could, of course, also be hidalgos, as were Campomanes and Jovellanos). In the various town catastros, men with official and semiofficial positions enjoyed the title: doctors, surgeons, apothecaries, and administrators of the tobacco monopoly. The census of 1797 lists 404 notaries, doctors, surgeons, and apothecaries in Jaén (against some 785 nobles) and some 450 in our portion of Salamanca (against 441 nobles). Nevertheless, the royal government strove to limit the use of the appellation. A decree of 1775 allowed notaries (escribanos) the right to sign with the title don only if they were hidalgos.[6] Our evidence suggests that the practice was more liberal than the letter of the law, but the consistency in the use of the appellation don in the deeds of deposit indicates that it was applied only to persons with a recognized right to it.
We can conclude that the buyers who disported the don or doña had a proper claim to the title. They formed an elite of "notables," of which the true hidalgos were the most important (and probably the most numerous) part, the top stratum of the society of the old regime, not counting the exiguous high aristocracy. Table 15.7 shows that these notables dominated the top level of buyers in both provinces, the people who could spend fortunes for church properties.
This conclusion ill fits the stock hidalgo of literature and history, the threadbare and deluded Quijote. The Cervantine image was alive and
[5] The census of 1768 appears at the beginning of the published Censo . . . de 1787 .
[6] Decreto del Consejo (14 Sept. 1775), Nov. rec., VII, xv, n. 11. A RC of 19 May 1801 established, among other imposts to support the Consolidation Fund, a fee of 550 reales "for the authorization for notaries [escribanos] who are in possession of nobility to sign themselves don" (ibid., n. 12, and in more detail in AHN, Hac., libro 8053, ff. 195–200).
well in the mentality of the eighteenth-century reformers, recognizable in the scornful portrait of the rural noble painted by José Cadalso: "He takes the air majestically in the sad square of his impoverished village, wrapped in his poor cape, admiring the coat of arms above the door of his half-ruined house, giving thanks to God for having created him don Fulano de Tal."[7] A picture that twentieth-century historians have not abandoned,[8] but our provincewide analysis of the disentail brings its accuracy into question. It is not the first such piece of evidence; the reconstruction of the society of Lopera and Baños in Part 2 already revealed the economic and political power of the local hidalguía. We shall return to the issue when we look at the big buyers in Chapter 19.
Priests followed the same trend as the dons, toward the higher levels of buyers. Not all priests can be identified, because the qualification pbro. was not always added in the deeds,[9] so that the trend toward the larger buyers may be exaggerated, but it is not spurious. Part 2 has shown that in the towns of Salamanca the income of the priests was among the highest in the parishes, that in those of Jaén the priests belonged to the best families. In Chapter 19 we shall see another, higher clerical world represented among the buyers, that of cathedral canons, capellanes, and university professors. Their means permitted a significant number of them to make purchases that placed them among the upper levels of buyers.
One can also identify the gender of the buyers from the deeds, in this case relying on their first names and the title doña (Table 15.8). If one considers all women as a group, one finds no trend in the proportion of buyers who were women from level to level in either province, but when the women are divided between those who were called doña and the others, the same trends become apparent as among the men, doñas being more common in the top levels and commoners at the bottom. That is, family and social level, not gender, determined the economic behavior of women. (Because some of the "unnamed" buyers in Table 15.7 would have been women, the correct trend for commoner women would be toward an even stronger presence in the lower levels that Table 15.8 shows, especially in Salamanca.)
With this added information one can give a social definition to the economic spectrum observed earlier. The persons who engaged in the commercial agricultural economy, those who had developed a capitalist
[7] José Cadalso, Cartas marruecas, Carta 38, quoted in Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad española, 116. Fulano de Tal is the Spanish equivalent of "so-and-so."
[8] Callahan, Honor, Commerce, and Industry, 8.
[9] See Appendix O.
|
mentality, were typically (but not exclusively) hidalgos and priests and other notables with official positions. The other economy, of production for local consumption, belonged primarily to commoners. The deeds of deposit tell one nothing about their occupation, but the largest number would have been peasants, like the vecinos of La Mata and El Mirón or the labradores peujaleros of Las Navas. Others may have been muleteers or bakers or craftsmen. When we come to study the big buyers, we shall find persons who may be properly classified as bourgeois—administrators of estates and merchants—in the upper levels. One may suppose that others of this kind are unidentified in the lower levels; after all, even the lowest buyers would have had some kind of standing in their towns. But the bourgeois would have been a minority in all levels.
The cases of Jaén and Salamanca indicate that Andalusia and Castile at the end of the old regime had a dual agricultural economy and a corresponding dual society. At one extreme was a peasant society producing primarily for local consumption; marked by high labor inputs; relying on hard currency (when not on barter), which the peasants saved carefully and brought forth to bid against their neighbors when given the chance to buy plots of land of their own. For such buyers, the disentail offered the opportunity to acquire the lands they farmed. At the
other extreme, the notables and a lesser number of wealthy commoners controlled the market economy; sought to minimize the costs of labor on their lands; and accumulated depreciated vales reales, which they could use to buy those disentailed properties that could expand their commercial output. Though functionally and socially different, the two economies were not physically separate. Most individuals connected with agriculture engaged in both, to a greater or lesser extent. In the towns of Jaén those who concentrated on the market lived cheek by jowl with the others; in Salamanca, the commercially oriented were more likely absentees residing in the provincial capital or the cabezas de partido. Such is the general picture that emerges from the provincewide analysis of the deeds of deposit. To refine it, we can turn to the variations among the geographic zones within the provinces.
Chapter XVI—
Jaén Province:
The Determinants of Growth
In order to proceed, I have divided the two provinces into a number of zones that I have sought to make geographically and economically homogeneous. They have been drawn on the basis of maps and studies of the physical landscape and geology and extensive personal travels throughout the two provinces by automobile. The purpose is to establish units with different social and agrarian patterns that can be used for a comparative analysis of their evolution.
The division of the province of Jaén into zones is not obvious. Except in the mountains, the region has a low rainfall, weather stations reporting a mean annual precipitation ranging from 487 millimeters at Cazalilla near the Guadalquivir River to 601 millimeters at Jaén. Conversely, evaporation is high everywhere. There is not much difference in annual mean temperature either, ranging from 16° to 18° centigrade. Climate, in other words, is relatively similar throughout the study region, with a cool, moist winter and spring, and a hot, dry summer.[1]
In the eighteenth century and still today, agriculture predominated over grazing, even in the mountain valleys; and agriculture was, and is, marked everywhere by a division between wheat fields and olive groves. The marls that predominate are excellent for olives but less favorable to
[1] Information on the geography and climate of Jaén province comes from Higueras Arnal, Alto Guadalquivir, and Lázaro, Elias, and Nieves, Regímenes de humedades. In addition, I was given invaluable help by don José María Ontañon and doña María del Carmen Cid of the Centro de Estudio Hidrográfico, Madrid, whom I consulted at length and who traced maps of the soils of Jaén for me.
the cultivation of wheat, and over the centuries olives have been gradually replacing wheat. Today there are districts where the rolling hillsides of red or brown earth are dotted as far as one can see with silvery green olive trees set out in precise geometric patterns, columns of plumed soldiers marching up hill and down. In few places of the world has reason tamed nature so successfully. Yet, lest we forget that this is Andalusia, the two or three trunks that make each tree, taunting imposed discipline, become circling dancers with arms flung back in their own flamenco ritual. But go on a few kilometers and the unbroken rows of trees give way to rectangles of alternating olive grove and grain fields, the latter verdant and waving in the spring, sprinkled with brilliant flowers, then brown and parched after the June harvest.
There are few level plains, for the basin of the Guadalquivir undulates in waves of different lengths, heights, and directions. On reaching the southern ranges, the land rises sharply, and a short way up the olive trees give way before thin soil or barren limestone rock, the stark mountains wrapped in flowing green polka-dotted skirts, Gypsy maidens decked out for a perpetual fiesta of the local Virgin. The richness of Jaén's rolling basin, with its broken pattern of olive groves, wheat fields, and stark white towns, the towering ranges on the south and east, the wild, wooded Sierra Morena on the north, make the province a constantly varied vision of beauty.
As is common in southern Spain, the inhabitants of Jaén are gathered into large settlements. In the census of 1786, Jaén had seventy-four cities and towns, with an average population of 2,380. Both for military defense and to escape the heat of summer and the danger of epidemics, most towns of Jaén stand white and nucleated at high points in their territories. Baños is a good example. In the Guadalquivir basin many sit on hilltops, and at the southern and eastern edges of the basin they are located up the base of the mountains, with their fields stretching out beneath them and the barren slopes above serving as protection from attack. The capital city, Jaén, at the foot of the Sierra de Jabalcuz, is a perfect example, dominated by the Castillo de Santa Catalina, which commands the two approaches from Granada, the older western road that circles the higher ranges and the newer road south through the sierra. On the northern limits of the province, the ranges are lower and several towns nestle in saddles where roads pass through the hills, as does Navas.
Close by the towns, where water flows either from streams or wells, lie the irrigated huertas with their vegetable plots and fruit trees. In the
eighteenth century, and still today, the closest land to the nucleus was called the ruedo, the most intensively cultivated zone that is not irrigated. Beyond is the campiña of the town, not to be confused with the term campiña applied generally to the basin of the Guadalquivir as opposed to the sierra. In the empty spaces between the towns of the basin there were, and are, scattered residences and farm buildings of the large estates, the cortijos that roused the ire of Carlos III's reformers and of those of the Second Republic and the casas de campo in the major olive groves. In the case of Baños, we saw that this land use reflects the pattern known as von Thünen's rings, with the intensity of cultivation depending not only on quality of soil and availability of water but on the distance from the town nuclei.
I divided the province into nineteen zones (Map 16.1). Five are located fully in the valley of the Guadalquivir, in the western part of the province. Three have rich soil, centering on the cities of Andújar (Zone JA); Arjona (JB), which includes the town of Lopera, studied in Part 2; and Linares (JE). In the ensuing analysis, they are referred to as rich basin zones. The two other zones in this region are further south, in a rolling plain where salt deposits have reduced the fertility of the soil. Santiago de Calatrava zone (JC), made up of three distinct blocks because of the way the municipal boundaries run, is near the Córdoba frontier, while Mengíbar zone (JD) is in the center of the province. They are called poor basin zones. South and east of this region are four zones whose towns have their lands in the valley of the Guadalquivir and their town nuclei against the foothills of the southern and eastern ranges. Identified here as south basin zones, they are Martos (JF), Jaén (JG), Mancha Real (JH), and Cazorla (JI). The Sierra Morena zone, JJ (Baños), is in the foothills of this range and is made up of the town we studied and a similar one called Vilches. Two rolling ridges or hog's backs (lomas ) rising between rivers in the northeastern part of the province are the location of four zones, the two to the west rich loma zones: Baeza (JK) and Ubeda (JL); and the other two poor loma zones: Santisteban (JN), which includes the town of Las Navas of Part 2, and Villanueva (JM). Finally five zones are located south of the basin of the Guadalquivir. Three of them are sierra zones, Bédmar (JO), Pegalajar (JP), and Cambil (JQ); and two lie in broad valleys in the south, isolated from the rest of the province, Alcalá la Real (JR) and Huelma (JS), the southern valley zones. Appendix P provides a detailed description of the geography, population structure, and political status of these zones.

Map 16.1.
Zones of Jaén Province
2
Few readers will have been surprised to learn from the previous chapter that two types of economy existed in the provinces—market and local—and that they can be associated with different social groups, although the prominent role of nobles and clergy in commercial agriculture may seem paradoxical at first. If we turn to the data for the individual zones within the provinces, we can refine this simple observation, for the zones show that the different factors associated with the two types of economy come together in a variety of ways to produce distinct
subpatterns, which in turn help us to understand the economic forces at work in rural Spain at the end of the old regime.
When added to the deeds of deposit, the midcentury catastro and various censuses provide a diachronic perspective. The detailed information of the catastro on individual property holding in each town, which made possible the studies in Part 2, is unmanageable at the provincial level, at least for this study. The royal bureaucracy in the eighteenth century, however, extracted much of the information from the reports and their results have fortunately been preserved in most cases. The Archivo General de Simancas has a precise listing of the property of the largest owner in each town, the hacendado mayor, including his, her, or its (if it was an institution) name and residence. Simancas also has a copy of the responses to the forty questions that formed the first part of each town survey, with data on the number of vecinos, houses, people in various occupations, wages, prices, types of harvest, tithes, taxes, and similar matters ("Respuestas generales" or "Interrogatorio general"). Even these questionnaires are not readily usable in extenso—they may run to fifty folio sheets for one town—but their contents were extracted and tabulated in large volumes now in the Archivo Histórico Nacional. This series normally has three volumes for each province, the first ("Estado seglar") devoted to the property and other income of laymen and secular institutions (including the town council, that is, town property); the second ("Estado eclesiástico") for that of ecclesiastical institutions, foundations, and funds; and the third ("Eclesiástico patrimonial") for that of individual clergymen. For purposes of the present study, I have assembled these data, already quantified town by town, into totals for the zones within the province. Unfortunately, for Jaén only the volume summarizing the information of the secular estate has survived.[2]
A number of eighteenth-century censuses have been preserved that give the population (vecinos or total inhabitants) of individual towns. The "Vecindario general de España," located in the Biblioteca Nacional and already described in Chapter 1, gives the vecinos around 1712. The number of vecinos at the time of the catastro (ca. 1752) can be obtained from the respuestas generales, question 21, but it has also been tabu-
[2] For most towns the information is drawn from AHPJ, Catastro, maest. segl. The volumes with this information are missing for the following towns, and I obtained it from the copy in AGS, Dirección General de Rentas, Única Contribución, libros 323–27: Albánchez, Alcalá la Real, Cabra de Santo Cristo, Castillo de Locubín, Fuente del Rey, Higuera de Calatrava, Jabalquinto, La Guardia, Los Villares, Lupión, Marmolejo, Tobaruela, Torre del Campo, and Torrequebradilla.
lated from the towns of Salamanca province in a document in the Real Academia de la Historia.[3] The same place houses the original individual town returns of the census taken in 1786 and published the next year. These record the number of each sex, single, married, and widowed, in each of six age groups, as well as the number of individuals in various legal estates and occupations.[4] Finally, I have made use of the number of vecinos and inhabitants recorded for each town in 1826 by the royal geographer Sebastían de Miñano.
The information on the sales has been described in the last chapter. It is now, however, broken down by zone, and within each zone by level of buyers.[5] The level of each buyer is determined by his location on the Lorenz curve of the zone.[6] Thus in a zone where purchases were priced low, a buyer who appeared in Level 3 or even 2 in the province may be placed in Level 4, and vice versa. Buyers in Level 4, or any other level, do not spend equal amounts of money from zone to zone and are not equally wealthy. Table 16.1 gives a sense of the difference among the zones in Jaén province in this respect. It shows the mean purchases of Level 1 and Level 4 buyers and of all buyers in each zone. If one compares the mean amount spent by all buyers in each zone, as shown in this table, with the mean town population in each zone (Table 16.2), one finds a rough, direct relationship (r = .52). One can deduce that, as a general rule, in larger towns, the upper levels of society, those that furnished the buyers of disentailed properties, had more money than the corresponding levels in smaller towns. The correspondence is far from exact, however, r2 = .275, meaning that only about one-fourth of the variation in the amount spent can be attributed to the size of the towns in the zones.
By using the commercial market–local consumption spectrum that emerged from the global look at the two provinces, one may distinguish the zones in Jaén province by the strength of the orientation of their agriculture toward a wider market, as revealed by the nature of the prop-
[3] Real Academia de la Historia, leg. 9-30-3, 6258, no. 13. It is dated 30 Jan. 1760, but it comes from the returns of the catastro. Ibid., no. 14, is a later census of vecinos dated 14 Aug. 1772. I entered it in my analysis, but it proved of little use.
[4] Ibid., legajos 9-30-2, 6228 and 6240–42; 9-30-3, 6259.
[5] All sales but one (in an isolated town not included in any zone) could be assigned to zones. Where the location of the property was not specified in the deed of deposit, I assigned the sale to the zone in which the religious institution that was the former owner was located. No doubt some lay elsewhere, but not enough to invalidate the analysis. The number of sales in each zone is JA, 186; JB, 147; JC, 22; JD, 28; JE, 179; JF, 283; JG, 911; JH, 289; JI, 263; JJ, 116; JK, 762; JL, 482; JM, 273; JN, 208; JO, 47; JP, 160; JQ, 59; JR, 146; JS, 80; Total 4,641.
[6] See Chapter 15, section 1, esp. Fig. 15.1.
|
erties disentailed. For instance, although some olive oil was consumed locally, one can posit that most owners and buyers of olive groves were conscious of a national and even an international market and involved in it. Unfortunately, arable land, the largest type of purchase, involving 32 percent of the money spent, could produce wheat and other grains either for local consumption or for the broader market, so that the amount of it disentailed in each zone does not help one distinguish the economy of the zone. On the other hand, cortijos and other rural estates, which can be identified, did produce primarily for the broader market. Table 16.3 and Map 16.2 distinguish the zones by the percent of the total purchases devoted to olive groves and to rural estates. The higher the readings, the more the zone can be assumed to produce for the market economy.
Olive groves are strong in the north and west of the province, cortijos in the south and east. The only zones with strength in both types of cultivation are Andújar (JA), bordering Córdoba province on the Guadalquivir River, and Mancha Real (JH), between the Guadalquivir and the southern ranges. The two zones in the northeast (JM, JN) and a belt of
|
zones in the center and south (including the zone of Jaén city) do not show up as high in either type of clearly commercial property (JD, JF, JG, JK, JP, JQ, JR).
To understand better the economy of the various zones, one can distinguish them according to the orientation toward the market of the different levels of buyers. The purchases of each level show if it was primarily interested in buying properties directed toward market production and was able to acquire them. I shall divide the zones into three
|
categories according to these criteria, using the premise that olive groves and cortijos were engaged more in market production than other types of property. Some grain grown in small plots was also destined for the outside market, of course, but since much of it would be for local consumption, the marketed proportion of the grain not grown in cortijos would be less than that of the cortijos. Vines would also be directed toward an outside market, but most fruits and vegetables would be too perishable.
The three categories of zones are as follows:
Type A. All levels of buyers into the market. Those zones where both Level 4 and Level 1 buyers directed their purchases toward market-oriented properties. To qualify for this type, Level 4 buyers (highest) must devote the largest share of their purchases to olive groves or rural estates or both together, and Level 1 buyers (lowest) must either devote a larger share of their purchases to olive groves than to arable or must

Map 16.2.
Jaén Province, Rural Estates and Olive Groves in Disentail, 1799–1807
have olive groves as their next choice after arable. The second alternative for Level 1 buyers is necessitated by the fact that in most zones sales of arable outweighed considerably sales of olive groves, so that Level 1 buyers, even if they preferred olive groves, had more arable available to purchase. Zones where Level 1 buyers preferred urban properties, improved or irrigated plots, or the redemption of censos to olive groves do not qualify for this type.[7]
Type B. Top levels of buyers into the market. Those zones where Level 4 is into the market but Level 1 is not, under the terms defined above. These are primarily zones strong in cortijos, where Level 1
[7] In Zone JO, Level 1 preferred improved or irrigated plots to olive groves (24 percent to 21 percent), but they also bought many vineyards (14 percent). Since vineyards produced for the market, I have included this zone in this category. (It is impossible for Level 1 buyers to have rural estates as their preferred type of purchase, since most of these were cortijos, whose price was greater than the total amount spent by someone in Level 1, and thus rural estates are not used as a criterion for considering the market orientation of these buyers.)
|
buyers did not have available olive groves that would put them into the market.[8]
Type C. No levels of buyers into the market. Those zones where neither Level 4 nor Level 1 is into the market as defined above. Although these zones obviously sold some produce on the outside market, the nature of the properties that were disentailed indicates that this commerce was not conducted on a major scale and was not the primary objective of local agriculture.[9]
Table 16.4 shows the distribution of the zones into these three types.
3
One may now proceed to compare these different types of zones on the basis of other known characteristics. For instance, the mean amount spent by the buyers in each zone proves to be related to the extent that the buyers were into the market. If one ranks the zones according to the mean amount spent and draws a line between numbers 11 and 12, as is done in Table 16.5, one finds that seven of the nine zones in Type A (all levels into the market) and four of five zones in Type B (top levels into the market) are above this line. All the zones in Type C (no levels into the market) are below the line. Zones JH and JO, belonging to Type A, fall below the line. The considerably smaller mean amount spent by their buyers than those of other zones in Type A indicates that these two zones had a distinct economic level and deserve to be grouped separately. I have therefore divided Type A into Types A1 and A2 . The same is true for Zone JQ in Type B, which becomes the only zone in Type B2 . These subcategories are already incorporated in Table 16.4. Henceforth most of the discussion will exclude Type A2 and Type B2 zones, which are too few in number to draw conclusions about the significance of their characteristics. With these exceptions, being into the wider market, whether by all levels of buyers or by the top levels, meant that the properties sold in the zone were more expensive and the average buyer spent more than in the zones that were not into the market.
[8] Zone JP shows a high demand among Level 1 buyers for improved or irrigated plots (23 percent). Some of these were probably devoted to market gardening for nearby Jaén city, but I do not count this as production for a wider or national market.
[9] This categorization ignores the purchases of Levels 2 and 3. In most cases Level 2 preferences reflect Level 1, while Level 3 is closer to Level 4. Thus Type A is properly called "All levels of buyers market oriented" and Type B "Top levels market oriented."
|
Map 16.3 shows that these types reflect geographic affinities. Except for the two unclassified poor zones, JC and JD, marked by infertile soil, small towns, and few purchases, most of the central and west of the Guadalquivir valley consists of Type A zones (all levels into market). Type B zones (top levels into market) form a ring around this block on the east and south, while Type C (no levels into market) are peripheral in the northeast and southwest. Only one Type A zone is not contiguous to the others, JR (Alcalá la Real), made up by the three rich valleys in the southwest. Type A2 zones (all levels into the market, small purchases) lie next to each other on the eastern edge of the A zones, and the B2 zone (top levels into the market, small purchases) is nearby, in the long valleys above Jaén city.
Because of the way in which being into the market is determined, with the bottom levels depending on the purchases of olive groves and the top levels on either olive groves or rural estates, one would expect Map 16.3 to reflect closely Map 16.2, which shows the zones of heavy purchases of olive groves and rural estates. There is a similarity but by no means an identity. All the zones that had a large proportion of their

Map 16.3.
Jaén Province, Types of Zones
sales in olive groves do, in fact, fall into Type A (except Zone JC, not classified for lack of sufficient sales), but so do four other zones that were not strong in olives. In three of these, the small buyers sought the available olive groves within their means, while the upper levels went for rural estates. In the fourth, JO (a Type A2 zone), Level 1 got into the market by buying vineyards as well as olive groves. Three of the six zones strong in rural estates thus fall into Type A, leaving only three others for Type B, along with two others not strong in rural estates. Those zones that had a large share of their sales in either rural estates or olive groves belong to one of the types that were into the market—and quite properly so—but by concentrating their purchases on the available rural estates (JP) or olive groves (JQ), the upper level of buyers placed two other zones among those where the upper levels were into the market.
One may question whether the division of the zones into these three types in reality represents different orientations toward the wider mar-
ket. It could, for instance, be simply a reflection of the size of their towns, with Type A zones containing the largest towns and Type C the smallest. (One recalls that we have found a rough correlation between the mean size of the towns and the mean amount spent by the purchasers.) If one treats these three types of zones as random samples drawn from an imaginary larger population of zones with similar characteristics and applies a test of significance to the differences in the size of their towns in 1786, one finds no significant relation between town size and the three types. The mean town size has the expected trend, but the difference in town size varies so widely within each type of zone that the difference is not significant.[10] The three types of zones thus reflect something other than town size.
Another possibility would be that the types offer a measure of general economic activity and not simply the market orientation of agriculture. To explore this possibility, one must go back fifty years to the information in the catastro. Table 16.6 shows the proportion of artisans and craftsmen among the vecinos in each zone in the early 1750s. On the surface, the three types of zones do seem related to artisan production. The mean number of all craftsmen per thousand vecinos declines from Type A1 , to B1 , to C and, disaggregating the crafts, so do the numbers of carders and weavers and of tailors. On the other hand, the number of sandalmakers (alpargateros) per thousand vecinos is highest in Type C zones and lowest in Type A1 , responding perhaps to the greater isolation of Type C towns. Tests show that these trends are not significant, however, because of the wide variation among the readings within each type of zone (again treating the three types of zones as if they were random samples drawn from a larger population). The same is true of the income of the retail food stores per vecino, although here there is a hint of a possible relationship.[11]
In fact, other factors can be more readily associated with at least two types of crafts. The concentrations of carders and weavers, for instance, are found in the zones with the largest mean town population, and indeed, they are located in the large towns. Jaén, Ubeda, Baeza, Alcalá la Real, and Andújar, the only municipalities in the province with over two thousand vecinos, had 109 of the 115 carders in the province and 148 of the 156 weavers. Alpargateros also have a different association.
[10] Mean town population: Type A = 3,230, B = 2,960, C = 2,680. Despite the apparent trend, the null hypothesis, that all three types come from the same parent population, is not disproved by an analysis of variation, whether one uses the mean town population for each zone, or the individual population readings of all the towns.
[11] An analysis of variation shows F = 1.75. For a 20 percent probability, F = 1.87.
|
The high concentrations (over ten per thousand vecinos) all occur in the four loma zones and Cazorla, contiguous in the east. Theirs was a regional specialty.
On the other hand, one kind of activity recorded in the catastro correlates well with the three types of zones. This is the income of muleteers (arrieros). Table 16.7 shows the income per vecino from muleteering in the zones, and Map 16.4 locates the towns that reported income from
|
muleteering. Type A1 zones have a mean per vecino income from arrieros of 19.5 reales; Type B1 , 5.8; Type C, 0.9. An analysis of variation shows that there is less than a 5-percent probability that these differences occurred by chance. Even more conclusive is a comparison of the number of towns in each type of zone that had a major sector of muleteering (here defined as having a minimum of one thousand reales total annual income for all the arrieros in the town). Eighteen of twenty-seven towns in Type A1 , zones reach this figure, three of twelve in Type

Map 16.4.
Jaén Province, Income from Muleteering, ca. 1750
B1 , and only one of eleven in Type C. The difference in proportions is significant at the 1-percent level.
Of course, active muleteering could be independent of the nature of local agricultural production, as is shown by zone JQ, the deviant case labeled Type B2 . It had the largest arriero income per vecino of all the zones. It lay on the new road from Madrid to Granada through the sharp valleys south of Jaén city, and all its arriero income came from the two towns nearest the border with Granada, Campillo de Arenas and Noalejo. Relatively small mountain towns, they specialized in transport independently of their agricultural activity. Zone JD was a similar
case, second in income per vecino from arrieros only to JQ. All of its arrieros were located in one town, Mengíbar, site of the main ford across the Guadalquivir River on the way south to Jaén and Granada. A small town, it was nevertheless the largest of five in this poor valley zone and prospered from its location. Surrounded by zones actively into the market (Type A1 ), it stood in a natural spot to develop muleteering.[12] Elsewhere the variation in the amount of muleteering income among the three types of zones lends support to the proposition that the types do in fact represent different orientations toward commercial agriculture. Although positive proof is lacking, all the information adduced leads to the conclusion that the three types of zones differed in the market orientation of their agriculture but not significantly in other forms of economic activity except muleteering, which can be seen as a forward linkage of commercial agriculture.
4
Having determined the extent of the involvement in the market of the agriculture of the different zones, we may proceed by observing how this factor is related to their social structure. To begin with, I shall use the information provided by the sales during the disentail. One statistic is especially revealing: the proportion of the buyers who were notables (as defined in Chapter 15). Table 16.8 gives these figures for Levels 1 and 4 and all buyers, broken down by type of zone. Among the three types of zones, there is a significant difference in the proportion of buyers who were notables. Zones with all levels of buyers into the market (Type A1 ) had the highest proportion (46 percent), zones not into the market (Type C) the lowest proportion (30 percent), while those where only the top levels of buyers were into the market were in between (35 percent). This trend appears also among Level 1 (small) buyers, but not to a statistically significant extent among Level 4 (large) buyers. The previous chapter showed that there were many more notables among the top buyers in the province as a whole, and the table shows that to be the case in the individual zones (except the zones not included in the three types because they had few buyers). Not here, however, but in the lower levels does a clear pattern emerge of the proportion of buyers who were notables directly correlated to the extent of involvement in the wider market.
[12] For its location at the main ford, see Biblioteca Nacional, Tomás López, "Atlas particular," and Laborde, View of Spain 2 : 108.
|
The census of 1786 reveals that the pattern was not peculiar to buyers alone but characterized the population as a whole. The zones where all levels of buyers were into the market (A1 ) were those with the largest proportion of nobles among the residents. The census called for an enumeration of the hidalgos in each town, a piece of information not included in the questionnaire or provincial summaries of the catastro. Table 16.9 shows the number of hidalgos per thousand adult males in each zone. In many respects the accuracy of the census for Jaén is suspect, as already noted in the case of Baños, so that the number of hidalgos reported may not be correct. The trend is clear, however. The ratio of nobles to adult males is distinctly higher in all but two Type A1 zones than in Type B1 , zones (the two deviant A1 , zones are contiguous in
|
the north center). Two of the Type C zones show a lower proportion of hidalgos than the large majority of Types A1 and B1 zones, but the third, JM in the northeast, has the highest ratio of all zones. (The high count is in the two newer towns Villacarrillo and Villanueva del Arzobispo, the other older, pre-conquest town Iznatoraf reported only one noble. One cannot tell from the data whether the deviance of JM is real or the result of an enthusiastic census taker.) Except for these three cases the pattern reflects the picture drawn from the sales: the more fully a zone was involved in the outside market for agricultural products, the larger was its class of hidalgos.
This information permits us to look again at the conclusion reached in the last chapter about the relation between social class and commercial agriculture. The data in Tables 16.8 and 16.9 indicate an apparent paradox. The zones of local economy (Type C), where the average amount spent by the buyers was low, mostly located on the periphery of the province, had the fewest nobles and the most distinctly stratified group of buyers (small buyers having a far smaller proportion of nobles than large buyers). By contrast, the wealthy zones, where all levels of buyers were into the market and the average amount spent by buyers was high, had the most nobles and reveal the least stratification among
the buyers. The percentage of nobles is higher and more evenly distributed among the levels. Zones in which only the top levels of buyers were into the market lie in between.
If one recalls from Part 2 the contrast between Baños and Lopera on one hand (both located in zones where all levels of buyers were into the market, JJ and JB), and Navas on the other (zone JN, no levels into the market), one can posit a conclusion. The first two had a wealthy resident elite headed by a number of hidalgo families. Their elite formed a distinct layer at the top of the social pyramid (8 percent of the vecinos in Baños, 10 percent in Lopera, see Tables 11.20 and 12.14), which ran their towns and extracted wealth from the land without getting their hands dirty. But in Navas there was only one landowning don out of 214 male vecinos, the notary. The information provided by the present chapter indicates that this contrast can be generalized to the entire province. One can conclude that there were two distinct typologies of social structure in Jaén province. Towns in zones actively engaged in commercial agriculture attracted more wealth and developed a strong resident economic, social, and political elite of which hidalgos formed a major part. Nonnobles were a vast majority of the vecinos, but among the buyers they were a bare majority (a minority in two zones), and even at the lowest level of buyers they were not an overwhelming majority. The conclusion of the last chapter is reinforced: the presence of commercial agriculture and a strong resident hidalgo class went hand in hand.
At the other extreme, areas involved primarily in a local economy did not produce or attract a resident elite of this nature. A few hidalgos were present and formed the apex of the social pyramid. When they bought disentailed lands, they sought the best properties, having the most money to spend, and dominated the top level of buyers, where they might be joined by outsiders. But they left to local commoners the largest amount of land put on sale. Although there was greater disparity in the composition of the buyers, this reflected a smaller and weaker, not a stronger, local elite.
Type B zones, where the top levels of buyers were into the market, are a halfway stage between the two extremes. Disentailed property here was split more evenly between what was commercially oriented and what was produced for local consumption. The elite of notables, smaller than in Type A zones, stressed the purchase of market-oriented properties, leaving the less expensive properties to the noncommercialized, nonnotable sector of the towns.
5
This analysis of the relationship between the different types of agricultural activity and social structure offers a static picture of the rural world of Jaén at the end of the old regime. Our next task will be to make the picture move, to demonstrate evolution during the half century under study and discover the forces at work. The data will not always permit the sequence to be fully in focus, but the picture will be instructive, nonetheless.
One may start by determining in which zones the market economy was expanding. For this purpose, one would like to compare the proportion of land devoted to harvests for the market at the time of the catastro with that shown by the sales, but the data available do not permit so precise a comparison. The catastro of each town states the area devoted to each type of cultivation and the value of the annual harvest,[13] while the records of the sales give the price but not always the size of the ecclesiastical properties that were sold. The extent of land devoted to the various harvests at the time of the sales is unknown, but from the available data one can compare the value of land devoted to cereals and olive groves at the time of the catastro with that shown by the sales. If the ratio of olive groves to arable shows an increase between the two dates, one can assume increasing production of olive oil for the market. There is unfortunately no way of determining an absolute increase in grain production for the market, but because the demand for olive oil was outdistancing that for grain, as will be explained below, greater participation in the market was likely to show up as an increasing ratio of olive groves to arable.
Even here there are difficulties. One saw in Chapter 5 that the ratio of catastro value to sales price varied widely among the properties devoted to different cultivations. One must adjust for the different markup of the two types of property when comparing figures from the two sources. Table 16.10 shows the results.
My comparison of the figures (Column D of Table 16.10, which measures the change in olive tree cultivation vis-à-vis arable in each zone) is based on three assumptions, all of them open to some error: (1) that the sales represent a true cross section of the cultivated land in each zone between 1799 and 1807; (2) that the ratio of the markup of olive groves
[13] This information is in the introduction to the survey of property owed by laymen in each town, the libro maestro seglar. Where maest. segl. is lost, I used the earlier estimate in AGS, resp. gen. QQ 10, 12, 13, 14 (see n. 2 above).
|
to arable between the catastro and the sales is everywhere similar (that is, 43 : 24); and (3) that the lands sold whose use is not specified are on the whole arable. How open to error this procedure can be is seen in the figures for zones JK and JN, both of which show a considerably smaller ratio of olive groves to arable in the sales than in the catastro. If one assumes that olive cultivation was expanding at least as fast as grain production, the readings for these zones suggest that one should allow a margin of error of at least 50 percent in comparing the two ratios. Greater growth than 50 percent in Column D provides a strong presumption of expansion of olive groves in the second half of the century. Zones JR, JL, JP, JS, JH, JO, JQ, and JC show such expansion.
Map 16.5 makes the result visual. Assured growth occurred primarily in the south of the province: the three southern sierra and the two southern valley zones. Two other zones were contiguous to older olive regions, JC in the west and JL on the Loma de Ubeda, next to Baeza zone. The other zone to show growth, JH (Mancha Real), was the only Guadalquivir basin zone with an established olive production at mid-

Map 16.5.
Jaén Province, Concentration of Olive Groves, ca. 1750,
and Expansion of Olive Groves, 1750–1800
century that definitely revealed expansion. The traditional olive areas in the north and west, Andújar, Arjona, Linares, Baños, and Baeza, either did not expand olive groves or expanded so little as not to show up in this analysis. (Zone JN, also an olive zone in 1751–53, showed an apparent decline in olives and in the sales appeared as a region not into the market. It was a marginal zone as far as commercial agriculture was concerned. Las Navas was located here.) On the other hand, five of the eight zones of confirmed growth had few olive trees in 1750.
This apparent paradox may be partially the effect of the statistical procedure: it is easier to achieve a high proportional increase when starting from a low base. The range of the estimates in Column D is so wide, however, as to indicate that the difference in rate of growth was real. For all the shakiness of the table, it suggests that the expansion of olive production in Jaén province took place in waves. A first wave, antedating 1750 and not observed in this study, had affected the rich basin zones JA (Andújar), JB (Arjona), JE (Linares) as well as the two loma zones JK (Baeza) and JN (Santisteban) and the Sierra Morena zone JJ (Baños). In the half century of this study growth here either slowed or came to a halt. Other zones that had turned toward olives before 1750 continued to expand, JH, JO, and JP. JH (Mancha Real) was in the basin south of the river, JO (Bedmar) and JP (Pegalajar) in the sierras nearby. Finally, a new wave of expansion after 1750 hit many of the zones not previously affected, leaving only two in the east and a belt of three in the center still strongly committed to grain as the cash crop in 1800. These last, oddly, include Martos (JF) and Cazorla (JI), today among the areas in the province most intensively dedicated to olive cultivation. Apparently their specialization did not begin until after the fall of the old regime.
That most zones strongly devoted to olive cultivation in 1750 give little evidence of growth in production over the next half century presents a puzzle. During this period the price of olive oil rose somewhat faster than that of wheat. According to the price tables published by Earl Hamilton for New Castile, if the mean of annual prices for the decade 1751–60 is assigned the index number 100, during the decade 1791—1800 the mean price of wheat was 196, of olive oil 230.[14] At the end of the century olive oil had a wider market than wheat. It was being exported from Spain to northern Europe, whereas the market for wheat was limited to central Spain, since the periphery imported grain from
[14] Hamilton, War and Prices, Appendix 1.
abroad.[15] Why should landowners already engaged in producing olive oil not continue to push into an expanding market? The answer may be economically rational if one considers that the expansion of olive groves could entail taking over arable land. The use of labor for the cultivation of olives and grain is complementary. The harvests are about six months apart, with olives in winter and grains in the summer, and the plowing of olive groves and the pruning and care of the trees can be done during the slack seasons for grain growing (Figure 16.1). So long as the local labor did the cultivation of olives, the opportunity costs of expanding olive production were low. Although the chapters on Baños and Lopera show that migratory labor was used for grain harvests and thus presumably was available for olive harvests as well, the marginal cost of migratory labor would be higher. The differential rise in the price of olive oil was not great enough to encourage unbalancing the established economy by turning grain fields to olive groves. Pastures and wastes would be sacrificed, but most of these were public lands and could be turned to private use only by corrupt means. Expansion into pastures and wastes was probably going on, but if a balance of wheat and olives was being maintained, it would not show up in Table 16.10. In other words, under prevailing circumstances, there was a limit to the proportion of land that could be economically devoted to olives, and the older olive regions of the Guadalquivir basin appear to have approached this limit by 1750. Only a sharp drop in the price of wheat vis-à-vis olive oil, such as occurred at the end of the nineteenth century when American wheat invaded the world market and the international demand for olive oil rose sharply, would create conditions that would encourage the expansion of olive groves beyond this limit.[16]
If this were the full explanation, the proportion of land devoted to olive production would have stopped in all zones at about the same level. This was not the case, however. In the zones that showed no clear growth between 1750 and 1800 (JA, JB, JE, JJ, JK), the ratio of the value of olive harvest to arable harvest ranged from 34 to 225 percent in the 1750s. The ratio was highest in Andújar (JA), a zone that in many ways was unique. The mean amount spent here by buyers was twice as high
[15] According to Laborde, View of Spain 2 : 75, 132–33, Cádiz and Málaga exported olive oil to northern Europe (along with wines and dried fruits). Townsend, Journey Through Spain 3 : 30, corroborates the export of oil from Málaga. Laborde says Andalusia also shipped some oil (together with much wheat) to other parts of Spain (2 : 131). For wheat imports to Spain: Anes, "Agricultura española," 258.
[16] For the expansion in demand of olive oil after 1880, especially in South America, see Vicens Vives, Historia 5 : 238–39.

Figure 16.1.
Seasonal Demand for Labor in Grain Fields and Olive Groves
SOURCE . Martínez Alier, La estabilidad del latifundismo. Appendix 1,
no. 3, pp. 350–51 (based on Consejo Económico Sindical de Córdoba,
"Bases para un plan de desarrollo económico de la provincia," June 1962).
NOTE : The greatest demand for labor comes in February and March. In
February the end of the olive harvest overlaps with fertilizing the arable
(a task perhaps not performed in the eighteenth century). In March, pruning
and cultivating the olive trees overlaps with weeding the grain fields. Much
of the harvesting of olives and weeding of grain fields is done by women.
as in any other zone (Table 16.1), and the total land disentailed that was olive groves and cortijos was higher than in any other zone (76 percent, Table 16.3). One can see some reasons for its peculiarities. Within it lay the wide alluvial basin of the Guadalquivir River, the most fertile soil in the province. The English traveler Joseph Townsend commented on its location "in a rich and highly cultivated plain," and the Frenchman Alexandre de Laborde noted that "the land about is very fertile and produces a great deal of corn, oil, wine, honey, fruit and game."[17] Equally important, no doubt, was its location on the highway from Ma-
[17] Townsend, Journey Through Spain 2 : 296–97; Laborde, View of Spain 2 : 111.
drid to Seville and Cádiz. The continual traffic on this road, making it easy to import grain and migrant labor, combined with its fertility, could encourage its landowners to develop olive production beyond the level of the balance with arable that would be favored elsewhere. Evidence for the importance of the Andalusian highway is also provided by Baños (JJ) zone. Also on the highway, it was the other zone that had stabilized at a high ratio of olives to arable (107 percent).
6
If we return now to the categorization of the zones into three types of orientation toward the outside market at the end of the century, we find a clear and suggestive relationship between these categories and the evidence of increase in olive cultivation (Table 16.11). Type A1 zones, where all levels of buyers were into the market, show little expansion (only one zone of seven). These are the zones of relatively large, established hidalgo elites. At the other extreme, all three Type C zones, not into the market, also show no evidence of significant expansion of olive production. Expansion occurred in Type B1 zones (three of four), those with only the top levels of buyers into the market and thus with a narrower elite than A1 zones. Four other zones also gave evidence of expansion. Three were the deviant cases of types A and B, those that were into the market but with average purchases much lower than the majority of the zones of their types, and the fourth was zone JC, not included in any type because of its few sales. The B2 zone was acting like B1 zones, expanding its olives. The difference that calls for explanation is between A1 and A2 zones, since the former were not expanding their production. Table 16.8 shows that the A2 zones (the two contiguous zones east of the zone of Jaén city, JH, Mancha Real and JO, Bedmar) had a similar percentage of their buyers who were noble as the A1 zones. There was also much income from arrieros in this region, concentrated in JH zone (see Table 16.7 and Map 16.4), another characteristic of A1 zones. Although similar in these respects to A1 zones, the A2 zones had not seen their wave of expansion recede by 1750 and were still in full growth. Perhaps their distance from the major arteries of traffic explains their late blooming and the modest fortunes of their elites. If so, they provide another example of the influence of communications on economic growth.
The main conclusion to draw from Table 16.11, however, is that the zones where the top buyers were devoting the largest proportions of their capital to acquiring cortijos were those where the expansion of
|
olive production was most pronounced. (Compare Table 16.4, Types A2 and B1 .) Commercial agriculture was old here, but it had been directed to grain production, hence the cortijos; now the rural entrepreneurs were discovering the advantages of olives, for they were nowhere near the limit of efficient use of labor in the olive groves.
An apparently extraneous factor may clarify the forces at work, the jurisdiction over the towns. Spanish municipalities could be under any of four types of jurisdiction: (1) directly under the crown (royal or realengo ); (2) under lay señores, that is held by a hereditary grant to a noble family (señorío lego ); (3) under ecclesiastical señores, such as episcopal sees and monasteries (señorío eclesíastico ); and (4) under the military orders founded in the Middle Ages (señorío de orden militar ). The last were effectively under the crown since the king of Castile became the permanent grand master of the orders in 1523. Table 16.12 shows the percentage of each type of zone under each jurisdiction. It is based on the population rather than the number of towns, so as to avoid giving undue weight to small places, of which many were under señorío lego. Towns in A1 zones, which experienced the wave of growth in olive production prior to 1750, were overwhelmingly under royal jurisdiction (89 percent of the population), either in royal municipalities or in the territory of the Order of Calatrava. In Type C zones, not into the market and not expanding, only 46 percent of the population lived under royal jurisdiction. Except for Type B2 (zone JQ), those zones experiencing the current wave of expansion (Types A2 , B1 ) were closer to Type C than to Type A1 , zones, with respect to the jurisdiction under which they lived.
|
Why was this so? Did señorío retard economic growth, or did the kings of Castile, when they gave towns to new lords, consciously retain for themselves the ones that were most economically evolved? The rulers had granted seigneurial jurisdiction over the towns of Jaén at various times (Map 16.6). Since the province formed a part of the frontier of Granada until the conquest of this kingdom, strategic considerations were central to the early decisions on jurisdiction. In 1231, before the conquest of the kingdom of Jaén was complete, Fernando III assigned the strategic fortress of Quesada, on the southeastern frontier, to the archbishop of Toledo to capture and defend. Quesada soon fell, and in the next twenty years Cazorla and Iznatoraf and the villages in their region were added to what became known as the Adelantamiento de Cazorla, under the jurisdiction of that prelate, who ruled through a local official called the adelantado until the seventeenth century. The Muslims captured Quesada in 1303, and after it was recovered, Alfonso XI kept it under the crown, subject to the city of Ubeda. The rest of the adelantamiento remained with the archbishop through the eighteenth century. Cazorla was the main center south of the Guadalquivir, but to the north Iznatoraf was superseded by two villas created by the archbishop in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries out of villages within this town's limits: Villanueva del Arzobispo and Villacarrillo.[18] Elsewhere in Jaén, the usual royal policy was to keep the main towns and those along the frontier under the king's jurisdiction. Of the latter, only Bedmar received a señor before 1400. Various places in the north of the province were given out before 1410, notably the jurisdiction of Santisteban del Puerto and some towns between Bailén and Baeza, but not these two important centers. As the war against Granada proceeded in the fifteenth century, the two frontier fortresses of Alcaudete and Huelma received señores, as well as Bailén. The remaining seigneurial jurisdictions were granted by the Habsburgs, except for the small town of Los Villares in the southern sierra apparently not given out until Felipe V.[19]
In the eighteenth century the king still had the towns along the main highways to Seville and Granada except Bailén on the Andalusian highway, Alcaudete on the old road to Granada, and Noalejo on the new
[18] Rivera Recio, Adelantamiento. I am indebted to Stanley Brandes for this reference.
[19] See Ladero Quesada, Andalucía, 56–64, for the fifteenth century and earlier, and Guia oficial de España, 1902 , 244–322, for the rest. The latter gives the date of the original grant of the title. It may not coincide with the grant of señorío over a specific town, but it is the best evidence readily available.

Map 16.6.
Jaén Province, Jurisdictions and Residences of Señores
one. Through the Order of Calatrava he also held the west. Although strategic considerations entered into the alienation of jurisdiction, conscious economic planning does not seem to have been involved. The economic evolution of the towns under lay señorío thus appears to have been more an effect than a cause of the type of jurisdiction.
Señores received tribute from their towns, but the case of Navas, one of the first given out, unless widely atypical, indicates that this tribute was not heavy. One has to look for indirect rather than direct effects of seigneurial domination to account for the relative backwardness of their towns. Evidence for such effects is not hard to find. One feature is the residence of the señores. Of twenty-five towns in all zones under señorío
lego, seventeen had señores who resided in Madrid at the end of the eighteenth century and three others lived elsewhere outside the province (Córdoba, Granada).[20] Only three resided in the province, but none of them in the town of which he was señor. (The residence of the señores of two towns is unknown.) Lay señores were thus by the middle of the eighteenth century overwhelmingly absentees (if they had ever been residents), most of them living in Madrid. The lord of the towns of ecclesiastical señorío was the archbishop of Toledo, also nonresident.
Benign neglect by an absentee señor or señora might not have been prejudicial, were it not for the fact that in most cases he was also the owner of extensive properties in the towns under his jurisdiction, indeed he was frequently the largest property holder (hacendado mayor). This was so in seventeen of the twenty-five towns of señorío lego, in fifteen of the twenty towns whose lay señor lived outside the province (Map 16.6).[21] In two other towns under señorío lego the largest property owner, who was not the señor, also lived outside the province. The hacendado mayor was much more likely to be an absentee in towns under señorío lego than under other forms of jurisdiction (Table 16.13). Eighty-two percent of the population under royal jurisdiction lived in towns where the largest property owner was either a vecino or the municipal council, and an additional 13 percent where he lived somewhere else in the province. For the population under lay señorío the situation was almost the reverse: only 18 percent lived in towns where a vecino was the hacendado mayor; 72 percent were in towns where he lived outside the province (for 57 percent, in Madrid). Towns of the military Order of Calatrava had a pattern close to that of realengo towns, except that more hacendados mayores lived elsewhere in the province (in Baeza, Jaén, Martos, and Huelma) than in the town itself. The six towns in the eastern part of the province under the archbishop of Toledo were very similar to royal towns. Lay señorío stands out as the only jurisdiction where the largest owners were heavily absentees. In conceiving the effect of this fact on economic development, it seems proper to assume that absenteeism among other large owners was more likely where the largest owner was an absentee.
A second potential disadvantage of lay señorío appears in the relation between the property in the hands of the hacendado mayor and the total property in the town (Table 16.14). In towns of this jurisdiction the
[20] The residence of twelve is identified either by resp. gen. Q 2 or by the list of hacendados mayores in AGS, Dirección General de Rentas, Única Contribución, libro 328; and five others by a survey made for Napoleon in 1808: ANP, AF IV, 1608 , 2 : 46.
[21] List of hacendados mayores (see above, n. 20).
|
|
largest owner had a far greater proportion of all the property (a mean of 35 percent) than elsewhere. The mean for realengo is 10 percent, and for the other two types even lower. Nor is this the result simply of the smaller size of towns under señorío lego;[22] the hacendados mayores had on the average much larger properties than elsewhere. The mean income from their properties was over seventy thousand reales, in other jurisdictions forty thousand or less (see the table). Thus towns under señorío lego had a much higher concentration of property than other
[22] The mean town population in 1786 for the different types of jurisdiction was realengo, 3,410; military order, 2,360; señorío lego, 1,280; señorío eclesiástico, 2,760.
towns, with the largest property frequently in the hands of the señor himself. Furthermore these large owners were far more likely to be absentees than those elsewhere. In the distribution of property and nonresidence of the largest owners, towns of lay señorío formed a class by themselves.
If these characteristics explain why towns under lay señorío had responded less than others to the lures of the market, they should correlate with the extent that the zones were into the agricultural market, but in fact they do not. If concentration of property in the hands of hacendados mayores were a cause of economic backwardness, one would expect a trend of less to greater concentration from Type A1 to Type C zones, but no such trend shows up. Nor should this be surprising. Large properties were more rather than less commercially oriented than others. Absenteeism of the hacendado mayor does not provide such a trend either.
The towns of señoro lego had a different characteristic that more likely accounts for their slower economic growth. They did not attract a strong hidalgo elite. The census of 1786 indicates that towns under lay señorío averaged 3.5 hidalgos per thousand adult males, while those under other forms of jurisdiction averaged between 17.6 and 25.0 (Table 16.15). In almost three-fourths of the towns under lay señorío there were no hidalgos present; the proportion of towns without hidal-
|
gos was between one-fifth and one-third for other jurisdictions. Small towns as a rule had a smaller proportion of hidalgos than big ones, but the difference between towns under lay señorío and others cannot be accounted for only by their smaller size.[23] When all towns under lay señorío with populations over one thousand are compared with royal towns in the same population range, the former still have a strikingly smaller proportion of nobles, as the table shows. In the six towns under the archbishop of Toledo in the eastern part of the province, hidalgos were as dense as in towns under the crown. The incompatibility between señorío and hidalgo residents applied only to señores who were laymen.
One of the characteristics of Type A1 zones was a prosperous hidalgo elite, as shown by the census of 1786 and the characteristics of the purchasers (Tables 16.8 and 16.9). We see now that even though royal towns had such an elite, those under lay señorío did not, or did to a much lesser extent. For reasons that may have been largely social, hidalgos preferred to live in towns where they were directly under the king rather than under another noble.[24] In royal towns they had the government effectively in their hands and the church as well, to judge from Baños and Lopera. Their relative absence surely was related to the undeveloped state of the economies of towns of señorío lego.
Although lay señorío appears to have been a major factor contributing to economic backwardness in Jaén province, ecclesiastical señorío was not, according to the evidence developed here. Only one of the six towns under the archbishop of Toledo had an absentee hacendado mayor, they did not have a high concentration of land ownership (the proportion owned by hacendados mayores was even lower than in royal towns), and three had a large contingent of hidalgos. In all these characteristics they resembled royal towns. Yet they were all located in zones that showed no commercial expansion in our period.[25] The only appar-
[23] The increasing proportion of hidalgos as town size grows is as follows (total hidalgos over total males 25 and over, census of 1786): towns with populations 30–499, 3.2 hidalgos per 1,000 adult males (N = 13 towns); 500–1,499, 10.6 (N = 22); 1,500–2,999, 9.8 (N = 17); 3,000–14,999, 16.8 (N = 16); over 15,000, 48.4 (N = 1, Jaén city). The concentration of hidalgos in the larger cities of Jaén (and the rest of Andalusia) was already the case at the end of the sixteenth century (Molinié-Bertrand, "'Hidalgos,'" 80).
[24] Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad española, 326, remarks that under the Habsburg rulers, "when a town fell under señorío, the more illustrious families expatriated themselves so as not to be subject to someone they considered of equal or lesser rank than they." Vassberg, Land and Society, 98–99, also reports a strong preference in the sixteenth century for royal jurisdiction over señorío.
[25] They were two of the three towns in Zone JI, the only Type B zone not to give evidence of commercial expansion, all three of the towns in Zone JM, and one of four in Zone JN (both Type C).
ent reason for the backwardness of these regions was their geographic isolation in the northeast and east of the province, away from any major transportation artery. The 1787 map of Tomás López shows no direct road from either Cazorla or Villanueva del Arzobispo west to Jaén, Ubeda, or the main Andalusian highway, or east to Murcia. The only connection was a local north-south road. Even today it takes a considerable detour from any regularly traveled route to reach these towns.
7
One might anticipate a relationship between the different types of zones and their demographic structure. Certain connections have already appeared involving the size of towns. Town size was related to jurisdiction and to the proportion of hidalgos in the population, but it was not significantly related to the type of zone. Population changes between the four main census dates, 1712, 1751–53, 1786, and 1826, would give an indication of the different demographic development of the various zones, provided of course that the data are sufficiently reliable. Unfortunately, we have plenty of evidence that the data are not very good. The towns were big, census takers hardly went from door to door, and they had to accept the information available from the municipal officials and the clergy. The information in the catastro is probably the best, but this gives only the vecino count. The 1712 census of vecinos is everywhere notoriously low, for the respondents feared that it would be used to impose taxes or military conscription. Rather than attempt to establish real growth rates, I have compared the figures in the consecutive censuses, looking for different patterns of growth among the types of zones and hoping that errors in reporting would balance out (Table 16.16). While the different types of zones show markedly different growth rates, the variation among the zones within each type is so great that these differences are not statistically significant. One does find a meaningful pattern, however, for the middle time period, from the catastro to the census of 1786, if one takes not the types of zones but the individual zones. Comparing the population change of those zones that showed an expansion of olive cultivation against those that did not, one finds a more rapid population growth among the former, statistically significant at the 1-percent level.[26]
[26] Since the vecinos reported by the catastro do not include the clergy, I subtracted the number of clergy in 1786 from the total population before comparing it with the vecino count of 1751–53. Zones JC and JD omitted.
|
This information provides convincing evidence that the zones that we have determined were expanding their commercial agriculture were also undergoing a more rapid population growth than either those zones already heavily commercialized by 1750 or those not yet significantly commercialized in 1800. Before 1751–53 and after 1786, the population was also increasing, but no distinct patterns emerge among the types of zones or between those zones expanding commercially and those not doing so between 1750 and 1800. If population growth was related to the expansion of commercial agriculture, as the data strongly indicate, then the distinct wave of growth that we have identified in certain parts of the province did not begin much before 1750 or extend much after 1800. Commercial growth would certainly have been present in the province, especially after 1800, but following a different pattern. Indeed, I propose that the disentail changed the pattern by giving an opportunity for commercially oriented elites of all zones to expand their activities.
The demographic mechanisms whereby the expanding zones grew faster than the others between 1751–53 and 1786 cannot be satisfac-
torily determined by the available data. The information provided in Table 16.16 reveals no statistically significant difference in family size in 1751–53 among Types A1 , B1 , and C, nor does any turn up between the zones growing commercially and those that were not. Likewise, the census of 1786 shows no significant correlations for the proportion of the population under sixteen (that is, for a younger and presumably more rapidly expanding population) or for the proportion of males in the labor force (over sixteen). One may assume that part of the differential growth was due to migration and part to natural increase, but the available data do not enable us to sort out the factors.
8
The analysis of the nature and evolution of the different zones of Jaén province has been complex, but when all the features are assembled a clear pattern emerges. The transition from agricultural production for local consumption to that for a wide market proceeded in various stages. Sometime before 1750 the richer sectors of the Guadalquivir basin and some adjacent loma and foothill regions had developed a strong commercial agriculture based on the balanced cultivation of wheat and olive groves. Other regions to the east of these, the zones of Ubeda, Cazorla, and Huelma, had numerous cortijos devoted to commercial grain production but few olives. Some of the province was only weakly oriented toward the market at this time: a belt of the Guadalquivir basin marked by saline soils unpropitious for grain, running from Menjíbar to Martos and including at this time the zone around Jaén city, and certain outlying regions: the southern valleys of Alcaudete and Alcalá la Real, the sierra valleys south of Jaén, and the loma around Villanueva del Arzobispo in the northeast.
How long this pattern had been in existence this study cannot say. The flimsy demographic data covering the first half of the century do not reveal any pattern of evolution in this period. The province had been known for its olives since at least the sixteenth century, but we do not know the area and extent of olive production at that time or the changes that had occurred since.
The towns of advanced commercial agriculture in 1750, those with a balance of grain and olives, had as a rule strong sociopolitical elites, of which hidalgos were the outstanding sector, including clergy of hidalgo background. Hidalgo families, in fact, stood out as the commercial agricultural class par excellence in Jaén. These towns had other distinctive
characteristics. Many had a prosperous sector of muleteers, and their largest landowners, the hacendados mayores, were more likely to be local residents than in other regions. They were also more likely to be under royal jurisdiction. Towns under lay seigneurial jurisdiction, in contrast, on the whole lacked both a strong hidalgo elite and advanced commercial agriculture at the beginning of our period.
A wave of expansion of olive cultivation swept over portions of the province in the second half of the century—the only stage of economic growth that this study can identify and describe. In these regions a demographic spurt responded to the improving economic conditions. The regions of the north and west that had already achieved a balance of arable and olive groves did not experience this wave, but the region east and south of the city of Jaén, although already actively involved in the cultivation of olives in 1750, did expand this crop. In addition most of the zones that had specialized in grain production for the market in 1750—the regions of cortijos and few olive groves—participated in this wave. Together they formed a semicircle around the east and south of the older olive area. These were less wealthy zones, with a weaker hidalgo elite and extensive lay señorío. The general expansion of economic activity in Spain in the second half of the century drew these sectors into olive production, overcoming their less propitious social structure and relative geographic isolation.
By 1800 only three zones in the east and northeast—Cazorla (JI), Villanueva del Arzobispo (JM), and Santisteban (JN)—and Martos zone (JF) in the west lacked evidence of active commercial production. (All regions, of course, shipped some products out for sale, the question is one of degree.) The first three contained the six towns of ecclesiastical señorío, but this does not appear to be the cause of their backwardness, which our information can assign only to their geographic isolation. Martos, in contrast, was on the old road to Granada and belonged to the Order of Calatrava. The explanation for its failure to take off before 1800 would appear to be its soil. A saline marl, it is not conducive to good arable, with the result that the zone had not developed the export of grain. Although its soil is ideal for olives—as one can see today from its virtually seamless blanket of silver-green trees—it had only a weak hidalgo elite in the eighteenth century (Table 16.9) and little commercial orientation. Its case indicates that entry into commercial agriculture in the old regime came first via the sale of grain and not directly with olives. Oil production required a significant capital investment: ten to fifteen years' wait after planting for the production of the first harvests,
and the building of olive mills. The commercial growth of grain could provide the needed savings. A later wave of olive expansion would turn Martos into one of the richest olive zones in Spain, as it would Cazorla in the east, but not until after the old regime.
Wide commercialization of agriculture thus begins in most parts of Jaén well before the end of the old regime. Four factors interacted to determine the rhythm of the different regions: the quality of the land, the accessibility of major highways, the nature of jurisdiction, and the presence of a prosperous, largely hidalgo elite, which ideally included the hacendado mayor. Originally, the development of this elite depended greatly on the other three factors, most notably the type of jurisdiction.
The example of Jaén province indicates that lay señorío—feudalism, if one wishes—retarded the transformation of agriculture into commercial production by removing the largest owners from the towns and discouraging the presence of hidalgos and no doubt by other subtler means not detected through our data. The economic takeoff of the late eighteenth century, however, affected towns of señorío lego as well as others, moving them into olive oil, where they were not inhibited by factors such as poor soil or poor communications.
Although señorío was an obstacle, hidalguía was not. Hidalgo families formed the core of the sector that developed the local agricultural potential. Hidalgos too might be considered feudal, especially because a good part of their property was tied up in vínculos and mayorazgos, but they were far from being anticapitalist as a group. The reformers of Carlos III's reign, one recalls, roundly condemned entail as harmful to the economy and hidalgos as an idle, parasitic class. Jovellanos claimed that no one in Andalusia was investing in the improvement of agriculture because entail made owners neglectful absentees. Cortijos too they found evil; they wanted these estates divided into prosperous homesteads. In their eyes, the laws of property in Andalusia had created a class of poderosos who were taking over whole towns and impoverishing the laboring poor.
The present study indicates that the reformers misread the situation. Vinculos in some instances were surely neglected, as were other types of property, but as a group the notables were interested in agricultural development. Cortijos offered them the wherewithal to pursue further commercialization through olive groves. They included many poderosos, for we have seen them in control of municipal governments and they exploited the large and powerless class of jornaleros. But what eco-
nomic initiative existed was largely in their hands. More like members of the English gentry than the royal reformers appreciated, very different from the popular perception of the lazy impoverished hidalgo stereotyped by the authors of the Golden Age and accepted uncritically by later historians, they seized a good possibility when it arose.
Such a possibility came with the desamortización of Carlos IV. These hidalgos and other notables associated with them were eager to break entail—the entail of the church—if they could get more land for themselves, and this meant members of the hidalgo families who had entered the clergy as well as the heads of families. Notables were of course not the only buyers, but they dominated the top levels and were proportionately much more numerous among all buyers than in the population as a whole. Disentail strengthened their class and pushed it toward greater commercial orientation.
Everywhere commoners also bought lands, in most zones in larger numbers than the notables. Properties that were not market oriented were more likely to go to them, and those that needed intensive labor input. Commoners with available capital also bought commercial properties, especially olive groves, and thus established a common interest with the notables. This was especially the case in those zones of grain culture, where the hidalgo elite was exiguous. Desamortización did not mean the displacement of an older landed class by a new class of capitalists but rather the invigoration of the older class by adding new recruits and by giving its more driving individuals a chance to excel. In the process, it accelerated the commercialization of agriculture.
Chapter XVII—
Salamanca Province:
Hardening the Patterns
The patterns discovered in Jaén most likely existed elsewhere in the Guadalquivir valley, but they were not representative of Castile as a whole. This truth is proclaimed when one turns to Salamanca province, for almost none of the characteristics of Jaén are found here. Most of the people who lived in the countryside of the portion of the province covered by this study inhabited small towns and villages that were set relatively close together and enjoyed more egalitarian societies than the large agrarian towns of Jaén.
Geographically and socioeconomically there is much greater contrast among the regions of Salamanca than of Jaén. The portion of the Old Castilian plain that surrounds the city of Salamanca is another world from the hill towns and upland valleys of the southern sierras. The sharp contrasts facilitate comparison, with the result that I have divided the province into only nine zones, while Jaén has seventeen (Map 17.1).
Four zones make up the plain. Its communities are larger and more prosperous to the north and east, where the earth is rich and deep, than to the south and west, a land of thin, sandy soil, better suited to pastures than to fields of grain. In our time, interspersed among the villages like La Mata and Villaverde were many despoblados like Narros and Pedrollén. Armuña zone (SA) north of Salamanca city and Alba de Tormes zone (SB) in the northeastern corner of the province can be classed as rich plains zones. The other two zones, south and west of the city, will be identified as poor plains zones. Charro zone (SC), which includes Pedrollén, lies on either side of the road to Ciudad Rodrigo and Por-

Map 17.1.
Zones of Salamanca Province
tugal, and Ledesma zone (SD) to the north of it borders on the province of Zamora.
There are three sierra zones. On the east (and now in Ávila province) is Piedrahita zone (SI), occupying the valleys north of the Sierra de Gredos. El Mirón is on its northern edge. Just west of it, Béjar zone (SH) is dominated by the sierra of that name and lies astride the main pass between Old Castile and Extremadura. The large town of Béjar was already an important woolen center in the eighteenth century. Finally the zone of Miranda (SG) lies beneath the Sierra de la Peña de Francia. The towns through here are large by comparison with those of the plain. Steep, narrow, cobbled streets lined with two- and three-story granite houses, many still boasting coats of arms from past ages, provide human features that combine with the majesty of the sierras to make this one of the most picturesque corners of Spain.
The two remaining divisions do not fit either of these types. Aldeadávila zone (SE) is the northwestern corner of the province, bordering on
Portugal, where the Salamanca plain gives way to rolling hills and glaciated outcroppings that furnish the material for abundant stone walls. Reminiscent of the sierras, its towns spread out around granite churches with imposing square towers. Salvatierra zone (SF) lies in the center of the province, a relatively poor upland region that juts out into the plain from the ranges to the south. Its thin soil barely covers a shale base, and the small villages, abundant in slate, resemble those of the Charro plain to the west. Although these two zones are very different from each other, they have the common label of hilly zones. Appendix Q gives a detailed description of the geography, population, and political status of the zones.
How unlike Jaén Salamanca province is, one can judge from a simple comparison. In Jaén the mean amount spent by the buyers in each zone was directly proportional to the mean size of the towns in the zone: the bigger the towns, the more each buyer spent. In Salamanca precisely the opposite correlation appears. If one compares Table 17.1 with Table 17.2, which gives the mean town size, one sees that the larger the size of the towns, the smaller amount each buyer was likely to spend (r = –.58). The correspondence again is loose, only about one-third of the variation in the amount spent can be attributed to the size of the towns,
|
|
and the correlation is significant only at the 10-percent level. As the present chapter proceeds, however, it will become apparent that the relationship is not fortuitous. The challenge is to produce a different concept of both structure and change to apply to this province.
The analysis of Jaén province was based on a distinction among the zones according to the extent of the orientation toward the outside market of the lands purchased by the different levels of buyers. At first sight the information provided by the sales in Salamanca province does not allow one to draw a similar distinction here.[1] Table 17.3 gives the basic information on the purchases made by Level 1 and Level 4 buyers. We can assume that the purchasers of rural estates were investing in com-
[1] Many sales in Salamanca province could not be used for analysis of the individual zones. Salamanca city, unlike Jaén, has a small término, so that the 233 sales within its limits were very largely urban properties. I have not included the city in any zone. In addition, the records of many sales of rural properties owned by religious institutions of the city did not state where the properties were located. The vast majority would have been in nearby towns in the partido of Salamanca city, like La Mata, Villaverde, and Pedrollén. But the partido of Salamanca is divided among three zones, SA, SB, and SC, and there being no way to determine in which zone each unlocated sale belonged, they had to be excluded. These are 657 sales (out of a total of 3,314 for the province). Finally, a few towns named in the Salamanca deeds could not be found, and some towns in different zones had the same name, so that 68 sales could not be assigned to any zone. The final number of sales that could be allocated is 2,356: SA, 368; SB, 554; SC, 97; SD, 207; SE, 200; SF, 102; SG, 185; SH, 242; SI, 401.
|
mercial property, but only in the plains zones did estates form a sizable part of the disentail. These were alquerías and despoblados similar to Pedrollén or to Narros before it was colonized from La Mata in the 1780s, large properties dedicated to both arable and grazing usually leased for payment in money and kind to the farmers who exploited them.[2] Level 4 purchasers here, who bought most of the estates, were into the outside market. So, of course, were the buyers of large collections of arable plots that would be rented to small farmers for specified payments in wheat and other products. The large outside buyers of the arable plots whom we observed in La Mata and Villaverde were among these people. The plots they purchased, however, were identical to those bought by local farmers found in Level 1, who would be more oriented to domestic consumption than the market so that purchases of arable land in Salamanca are not useful as an indication of the extent of the buyers' involvement in the market.
In contrast, big buyers in the mountain zone of Béjar (SH) devoted the largest share of their purchases to pastures. Here Level 4 buyers were very different from their counterparts in the plains: they spent on the average thirty-three thousand reales; those of the plains four to ten times as much. Béjar zone had many sheep, twenty-two per vecino engaged in agriculture, but five others had more sheep per vecino (Table 17.4). The zone had few cows, yet the disentail indicates that more of its land was devoted to pastures than anywhere else. To what purpose? One may guess that they were leased to the owners of transhumant sheep. The main north-south sheepwalk (cañada) of the Mesta crossed the central sierras by the pass of Béjar, and the largest and best share of the wool shorn in Salamanca province still came from transhumant sheep.[3] One may logically conclude that many of the pastures acquired by the top buyers of Béjar zone were rental properties to be leased to sheep owners, most of whom resided in other parts of Castile. These were capitalist investments. The buyers were indirectly involved in the market for wool, and they probably had some sheep of their own.
The sales reveal little about the commercial orientation or lack of it of the smallest buyers. Everywhere except in Béjar zone they spent the largest share of their money on arable, whose orientation is indeterminate. This was true, of course, in Jaén too; but unlike Jaén, the second choice of the Level 1 buyers also offers few clues to the extent of their commercial orientation, except in the sierra zones.
[2] See Chapters 7 and 9. Chapter 18 will take up the subject of the despoblados and alquerías.
[3] Larruga, Memorias 34 : 307–9.
|
In Béjar zone (SH), while the largest buyers were looking for pastures to rent, the smallest buyers had their eyes turned to the outside agricultural market. Although they spent more in paying off censos than on any other item, they devoted almost a third of their capital to their second choice, improved and irrigated plots. All of the plots that Level 1 buyers acquired were linares, enclosed plots planted with flax and usually irrigated. Flax, like grain, could be grown either for domestic use or for sale to centers of linen weaving. According to the contemporary author of a survey of economic activity in Spain, Eugenio Larruga, the cultivation of flax was widespread in Salamanca province, but only certain areas harvested it commercially. He lists 131 towns in our zones where it was cultivated (Table 17.5), but only 16 grew more than a small amount for local use. According to Larruga's list, which of course may not be complete, a larger proportion of the towns in Béjar zone grew flax than in any other zone, and they sold much of it to Extremadura or traded it to outsiders for soap and olive oil.[4]
[4] Ibid., 35 : 1–19.
|
The raising and preparation of flax for linen was highly labor intensive. Farmers selected the most fertile fields in their towns, plowed them five or six times, fertilized them heavily and scattered seed liberally, using three times as much seed as they would for grain. Once the flax was up they weeded by hand, and they devoted great care to the harvest. The process of turning the harvested flax stalks into linen was further time-consuming. The linseed for next year's planting must be beaten out, the stalks soaked for a week or ten days in a stream, dried, and gently pounded to remove the skin. The women then took over, beating the flax with a wooden swingle, combing and cleaning it, making it ready for spinning.[5]
The purchase of linen fields agrees precisely with the pattern described in Chapter 15. Highly labor intensive, the cultivation of flax interested the smaller buyers, those prepared to exploit the land person-
[5] Ibid., 19–21.
ally. Thirty-nine percent of the "improved" fields disentailed in Béjar zone were flax fields (linares). Level 4 buyers devoted only 5 percent of the money spent for improved fields to flax fields, Level 1 buyers 100 percent.[6] A significant proportion of the small buyers in Béjar zone were commercially oriented, one is led to conclude, but at the cost of great personal input.
The lowest level of buyers in the other two sierra zones also revealed distinctive preferences related to the nature of local agriculture, but it is less clear that they were oriented toward an outside market. In Miranda del Castañar zone (SG), only 29 percent of Level 1 purchases were arable, while 23 percent were orchards. All of these were chestnut groves, a regional specialty,[7] but most chestnuts were probably consumed locally, since grain was scarce. Level 1 buyers did make 13 percent of their purchases in vineyards and 8 percent in olive groves, no doubt with an outside market in mind, but as a group these buyers cannot be classified as commercially oriented.
Much the same can be said of the smallest buyers in Piedrahita zone (SI). Although half their purchases were arable fields, 22 percent were pastures. At midcentury this zone had the largest number of sheep and cattle per vecino in agriculture of all the zones in the province. Our study of El Mirón showed that pastures were the most sought-after purchase in the region, but they were much more likely to be used for cattle than for sheep, which could graze on the hills and stubble. Some cows and steers were produced for the market, but again, the smallest buyers in this zone did not belong structurally to commercial agriculture.
These inferences exhaust the information presented by the type of property purchased by different levels. The examples of La Mata and Villaverde in Armuña indicate that the nucleated towns of the rich plains zones (but not their despoblados) had a virtual grain monoculture, a conclusion reinforced by the high percentage of arable land in the disentail in these zones (Table 17.3).[8] Here every farmer, and thus every level of buyers, had to be involved to a greater or lesser extent in the sale of grain.
One is left with a sense that the picture is incomplete and selective. Reviewing the conclusions developed in Chapter 15, one discovers another approach. A much greater proportion of the purchases were paid
[6] Level 2, 79 percent; Level 3, 72 percent.
[7] Larruga, Memorias 35 : 21.
[8] On the grain monoculture of this region, see García Fernández, "Champs ouverts," esp. 695–701.
for in paper currency—vales reales—in Salamanca than in Jaén (70 percent compared to 45). Large buyers everywhere used vales reales more than small buyers and were more oriented toward the national market. Furthermore, a separate analysis of Salamanca province shows that properties oriented toward commercial agriculture were paid for in vales much more than those for home production. This at least is the logical conclusion from a comparison of the sales of rural estates and improved or irrigated fields. Eighty-six percent of the payments for rural estates—most of which would be oriented toward market production—were made in vales reales. The latter account for only 35 percent of payments for improved or irrigated fields—labor-intensive huertas, enclosed fields for herren (fodder harvested green), flax fields, and the like, not all directed to domestic consumption, of course, but of all the categories the one most fully of this kind.
Basically the argument being developed is that, although arable formed the largest proportion of the sales in most zones, and one cannot distinguish between arable bought for commercial purposes and arable bought for subsistence agriculture from the deeds' descriptions of the properties, one can predict reasonably well the orientation of the purchases by the currency used in payment. Table 17.6 provides this information for Level 1 and Level 4 buyers. In all the plains zones and both hilly zones Level 4 buyers paid for more than 70 percent of their pur-
|

Map 17.2.
Salamanca Province, Types of Zones
chases with vales. This includes the four zones where Level 4 buyers put a quarter or more of their money into rural estates. In the three sierra zones Level 4 buyers paid for about half their purchases in vales, and were probably much less market oriented than their counterparts elsewhere. While Level 1 buyers used vales much less, those of SA, SB (rich plains), SD (poor plains), and SE (hilly) paid for 18 percent or more of their purchases in vales and were probably involved in the market to a significant extent.
On the basis of this analysis, which is less conclusive than one might wish, one can now assign the Salamanca zones to the categories developed for Jaén (see Table 17.1 and Map 17.2).
Type A. All levels of buyers involved in the outside market
A1 . Large purchases
Rich plains zones: SA (Armuña), SB (Alba de Tormes)
Poor plains zone: SD (Ledesma)
Hilly zone: SE (Aldeadávila)
A2 . Small purchases
Sierra zone: SH (Béjar)
Type B. Top levels of buyers involved in the outside market
B1 . Large purchases
Poor plains zone: SC (Charro)
B2 . Small purchases
Hilly zone: SF (Salvatierra)
Type C. No levels of buyers involved in the outside market
Sierra zones: SG (Miranda), SI (Piedrahita)
2
With no more than four zones in any one type, statistical correlations become almost impossible to establish, yet one can seek apparent relationships between the types and the social and economic characteristics of the zones. Certain obvious features show no correlation. This is true of mean town size (Table 17.2). Type A1 zones span the whole range from the next to the lowest (Ledesma) to the next to the highest (Aldeadávila). Industrial activity is also not related to the extent into the agricultural market (Table 17.7). There is less cloth making (fewer carders and weavers) in the commercially oriented Types A1 , B1 , and B2 zones than in Types A2 and C.
The table is drawn up so that geographic comparisons can also be observed, and it shows that the pattern of crafts can be explained much better by geographic affinities than by the extent of commercial agriculture. Cloth making was concentrated in the sierra zones, with SH (Béjar) far ahead of any other, obviously because the city of Béjar was a major woolen center of Castile. This region, one recalls, grew much flax, while SI (Piedrahita) had more sheep per peasant family than any other zone. Much of the wool and linen was woven locally, a task performed by professional carders and weavers, such as those we met in El Mirón.[9]
Table 17.7 shows that the total proportion of craftsmen in the popu-
[9] Zones SD, SE, and SF also grew flax, and this may explain their slightly larger proportion of clothmakers. All zones did some weaving, but the catastro summary does not distinguish between woolen and linen weavers.

lation reflects closely the number of carders and weavers. SD (Ledesma) is a deviant case, however; with few involved in cloth making it still has one of the highest proportions of craftsmen. This deviance is misleading, for it reflects a problem inherent in the study of the zones of Salamanca. The plains zones were dominated by three cities: Salamanca (population 16,438 in 1786), Ledesma (1,844), and Alba de Tormes (2,293). Salamanca city lies at the junction of three zones, and I excluded it from them. Alba de Tormes is in zone SB and Ledesma in SD. All these cities had a concentration of crafts serving their residents and the richer members of their hinterlands. If Ledesma is excluded from zone SD, the proportion of craftsmen becomes similar to that of the other plains zones. Alba de Tormes had less impact.
In sum, craftsmen tended to concentrate in the cities, but only Béjar had a specialized industry. Elsewhere, the sierra zones had more crafts-
|
men than the plains zones, in part no doubt because the town size was larger in the sierras. But in part one can also observe that the proportion of craftsmen was negatively correlated to the commercialization of agriculture. We can recall that the craftsmen in La Mata and Villaverde, both in the rich plain of Armuña, were hard pressed and declining, faced by the competition of outside products brought in along the lines of communication that served to export their harvests. Artisans in the larger and more isolated sierra towns fared better, and their zones had more craftsmen than the plains, with the hilly zones in between. One may conclude that the concentration of crafts responded to two factors: positively to the production of local wool and flax and negatively to the commercialization of agriculture.
Because the greater concentration of cloth making in the sierra zones does appear in a region of noncommercial agriculture, it exhibits one of
the characteristic features of the putting-out system.[10] The appearance is misleading, however. Domestic weaving does not give evidence of being a new development in the sierras in the eighteenth century or of being organized as proto-industry. Nor did it offer an opportunity for economic growth. Béjar continues until now to be a center for woolen manufacture, but in the transition to modern factories, it destroyed the artisan production of the towns around it.[11] The case of the sierras thus does not invalidate my earlier conclusion that the lack of the necessary commercial infrastructure precluded the emergence of a proto-industry in central Spain similar to that in northwest Europe or the Spanish periphery. One cannot extrapolate directly from Salamanca to all Castile, of course, but historians who have been looking at early modern Spanish industry tend to support this conclusion.[12]
In Jaén muleteering was associated with market-oriented agriculture. Table 17.7 reveals no similar association in Salamanca. It is true that the two zones with the most transport activity, Armuña (SA) and Béjar (SH) have all levels of buyers involved in market-oriented agriculture (Types A1 and A2 ), but the concentration of arrieros in other Type A zones was among the lowest in the province. Again, geographic location, not commercialized agriculture, was the dominant factor. It worked in two ways. First, the sierra zones engaged in muleteering as they did in crafts, as compensation for poor agricultural potential. Second, towns that sent out arrieros were located on or near the main north-south highway from Andalusia and Extremadura through Béjar and Salamanca to León, Burgos, and the north (Map 17.3). It passed through Zones SH (Béjar), SF (Salvatierra), and SA (Armuña). A number of towns with arrieros were clustered in the vicinity of Salamanca. The city drew heavily on the food production of the surrounding plain, but our study of La Mata and Villaverde showed that their muleteering activity did not depend on transporting grain to the city, done rather by the farmers themselves. Muleteers served the city in other ways, in long-range operations to the north coast, Extremadura, and Madrid, that is, along the old Roman road. Although the arrieros in the region may have got their start from furnishing Salamanca city, their clientele was now located throughout the northern half of Castile.
[10] See Jones, "Agricultural Origins of Industry."
[11] González Enciso, "Protoindustrialización en España," 35. His Cuadro 5 gives the number of looms in four towns of the region, based on Larruga, Memorias. The catastro, however, shows weavers in all but four of the thirty-two towns of the partido, 525 altogether, although it does not specify what material they worked (AHN, Hac., Catastro, Salamanca, estado seglar).
[12] González Enciso, "La protoindustrialización en España."

Map 17.3.
Salamanca Province, Income from Muleteering, ca. 1750
In Jaén too, muleteering was a function of highways, those between Castile and Seville or Granada. Zones JD in the poor basin and JQ in the southern sierras owed their income from transportation to their location on the Madrid-Jaén-Granada road, for they, like Salvatierra and Béjar zones in Salamanca, were in poor agricultural districts. In Jaén we found that the presence of a major road also fostered commercial agriculture, especially specialization in olives. The main road of Salamanca had no such effect. Comparative advantages of location and type of soil determined the production of grain and livestock for the market, factors stronger than a secondary road system.
Despite such marked differences, at least one attribute of commercial agriculture was common to both provinces. The Madrid records of the sales show only about two-thirds as many men and women entitled to call themselves don and doña among the buyers in Salamanca as in Jaén, but here too they were associated with commercialized agriculture. In all zones, as we have come to expect, a far higher percentage of

big buyers were notables than small buyers (Table 17.8). Furthermore a greater proportion of buyers was notable in Type A1 and B1 zones than in the others, that is, zones where the top levels or all levels of buyers were into the market and spent a large amount per capita. A2 and B2 zones, where the amounts spent were small, had considerably fewer buyers called don or doña, similar in this respect to Type C zones, which were not into the market.
The census of 1786 supports this association. The zones where all levels of buyers were into the market (Types A1 and A2 ) had more hidalgos per thousand adult males than other zones (Table 17.9), with one apparent exception: SA (Armuña) had slightly fewer than SG (Miranda). The reason is easy to perceive. Salamanca city was the cabeza de partido for SA, as it was for zones SC and part of SB. The hidalgos associated with partido administration or who lived off the income of its lands were to be found in the city. In the sierra zones, including SG, the hidalgos lived in the zones; and they did also in SD (Ledesma), the zone with the highest proportion of hidalgos. The town and village structure was much

different from that of Jaén, but the association of hidalgos with commercial agriculture appeared here too.
Yet there was a difference even in this respect. The hidalgos of Jaén lived by and large in the towns where they owned and exploited their properties, forming the dominant portion of the local political and economic elites. In Salamanca province, with its myriad small towns and hamlets, this was not the case. Hidalgos clustered in the larger places: the mean population of towns with hidalgos was between 1.6 and 4.2 times as great as the mean population of all towns in the zones. Even if
one considers only towns that reported at least ten vecinos in the catastro, no zone had hidalgos in more than 40 percent of the towns. The zones identified as having all levels of buyers into the market (Types A1 and A2 ) had their hidalgos more widely scattered, that is, present in a larger percentage of their towns, than other zones. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the fact that most towns in all parts of the province, especially the smaller places, had no resident hidalgos. If nobles had a morethan-proportionate role in commercial agriculture and in making purchases during disentail, it had to be as absentees.
In Jaén we found that the presence of hidalgo residents was negatively correlated with lay señorío. In Salamanca lay señorío differed in important ways from that in Jaén, and its impact on the economy is far


Map 17.4.
Salamanca Province, Seigneurial Jurisdictions
NOTE : Based on Mateos, Salamanca, Map 9.
less obvious. Much more of the province was under this type of jurisdiction, as one can observe from Table 17.10 and Map 17.4. Three-quarters of the population in the study area lived under lay señorío (two-thirds if one includes Salamanca city, which was royal).[13] The only administrative division primarily under royal jurisdiction was the large partido of Salamanca city, while nine smaller partidos were entirely under lay seigneurial control.[14] The situation was not so clear cut as this, however, because throughout the province there were "exempt towns" (villas eximidas), outside the jurisdiction of the partido within which they lay geographically.[15] The only zones with a majority of the population
[13] For the whole province the figure was 66.3 percent (Mateos, Salamanca, 39).
[14] Partidos of Alba, Barco de Ávila, El Mirón, Piedrahita, and Salvatierra, all under the Duque de Alba; Béjar under the Duque de Béjar; Ledesma under the Duque de Alburquerque; Miranda under the Conde de Miranda; and Montemayor under the Marqués de Castro Monte.
[15] The situation is spelled out in detail in España dividida en provincias. On the grant of exempt status in the sixteenth century, see Vassberg, Land and Society, 165–69.
under royal jurisdiction were those lying mainly in the partido of Salamanca: SA and SC.
The striking difference between señorío in Jaén and Salamanca was that the former was accompanied in two-thirds of the towns by the ownership of the largest properties in the town. This was not the case in Salamanca; of 419 places with separate catastro returns that were under señorío lego, the señor held the greatest share of real property in only 29 places (7 percent).[16] All señores hacendados mayores were absentee owners; most of them resided in Madrid.[17]
The three largest señoríos in the province reveal the nature of señorío here. The señores had the rights of jurisdiction, with the corresponding income from fines and appointments to municipal offices, and the crown at some time in the past had given them the alcabalas, or sales tax, and the tercias reales, the royal two-ninths of the tithes. These sources could produce considerable income, but they were called alienated rights (derechos enajenados ) because the loss was to the crown, not the subjects, since the latter would have had to make the payments in any case.[18] In fact the crown got very little from these territories, as we saw in the case of El Mirón.
The Duquesa de Alba, who lived in Madrid, was señora of five partidos covering the eastern sector of the province, all zone SI and most of SB and SF, 129 places of the catastro. In only 12 was she the largest owner of real property, including five cotos redondos, in which she was virtually the sole owner. In 11 other places she was hacendada mayor by virtue of the payments she received, and the catastro record of hacendados mayores permits us to appreciate how much of the local economy was absorbed by these payments. In 8 towns it ranged from 7 to 22 percent of the annual income from the land; in 3 cabezas de partido from 29 to 46 percent. These figures are misleading, however, because agriculture provided only part of the income of the towns. Cabezas de partido had many craftsmen and paid more alcabalas as a consequence, while towns in the sierra drew much income from livestock, yet neither of these types of income can be readily calculated from the catastro. The share of the gross town product going to the Duquesa de Alba was therefore less than these percentages, perhaps between 5 and 15 percent.
[16] In sixty-three places the señor was also the hacendado mayor, but in many of these his "hacienda" or property consisted not of land but of the complex feudal dues, taxes, and tithes paid to him. For a discussion of the wide variety of taxes, dues, and rights accruing to señores in Salamanca province, see Mateos, Salamanca, 39–53.
[17] Eight señores, hacendados mayores in fifty-eight towns, lived in Madrid.
[18] AHN, Hac., Salamanca, libro 7479.
The economic impact of the señorío of the Duque de Béjar was about the same. Lord of the partido of Béjar (the major portion of zone SH), he was hacendado mayor in 25 of the 32 towns of the partido, but in 20 of them because of his seigneurial rights. His income ranged from 3 to 76 percent of the income from agriculture in the town. These figures are even less indicative of the duke's true share, because income from livestock and from cloth making was high here. In 3 towns where the duke's income was over 60 percent of the harvests, it came mostly on alcabalas levied on local manufactures.[19]
The position of the Duque de Alburquerque was very different. Señor of the partido of Ledesma in the northwest (most of zone SD and part of SE), he had jurisdiction over 186 places but was hacendado mayor only in Ledesma, cabeza de partido, because of payments received as señor. Since Ledesma was a town of craftsmen, the weight of his señorío was comparable here to that of Alba and Béjar in their partido capitals. Outside Ledesma his presence was nowhere as onerous as that of the hacendados mayores.
Since seigneurial jurisdiction in Salamanca seldom entailed extensive ownership of real property and it absorbed most of the income that would have gone to the crown otherwise, it could have had little adverse economic effect. It may even have been helpful. Lay señorío in Jaén discouraged the presence of hidalgos. Not so in Salamanca, to judge from Table 17.11. Hidalgos were concentrated in the provincial capital and the cabezas de partido, but outside these places, regions of seigneurial jurisdiction had almost twice as many hidalgos proportionately as regions under the crown. Towns under lay señores were more than twice as likely to have a noble in their midst as royal towns. Since the presence of hidalgos is a good indication of commercialized agriculture, señorío in Salamanca does not appear to have discouraged it. Among the Type A1 zones, those most commercialized, Zone SD had the highest proportion of nobles and of noble buyers; it also was the zone with the greatest percentage of purchases made with vales reales, our best evidence of market-oriented farming (Tables 17.6, 17.8, and 17.9). It was dominated by the señorío of Alburquerque.
Why were the effects of lay señorío so different in the two provinces? One might expect that, being an older region of Christian Spain, Salamanca received an earlier form of señorío, less burdensome to its subjects. The major jurisdictions, however—Valdecorneja (the partidos of
[19] Baños, Béjar, Candelario.
|
Piedrahita, El Mirón, and Barco de Avila), Alba de Tormes, Béjar, Miranda del Castañar, and Ledesma, were given to señores in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, no earlier than major portions of Jaén.[20] Although one cannot rule out the influence of earlier practices in the two regions, physical and human geography appear to account for the different nature of señorío. In Salamanca the towns were small, close together, peopled by self-employed peasant farmers. They gave little scope for building up large seigneurial properties in the fashion of the cortijos that could be carved out of the wastes that surrounded the large Andalusian towns. The lords chose to be satisfied with little real property and pushed instead to take over the royal income, the alcabalas and royal share of the tithes. As we shall see in the next chapter, large exploitations did exist in Salamanca, the cotos redondos comprising entire census units. They too were the product of geographic forces: many were in royal lands, and few of those lying in seigneurial regions belonged to their señor. The example of Salamanca suggests that seigneurial assumption of jurisdiction and royal revenues did not drive
[20] Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana ("Espasa Calpe"), s.vv. names of cabezas de partidos. For Valdecorneja: Lunas Almeida, Historia de Valdecorneja, 24.
away hidalgos and affect economic development adversely, as did the connection of señorío with large absentee ownership, found in Jaén.[21]
3
Except for the relationship between hidalguía and commercial agriculture, this static picture of the province has developed few leads toward explaining the extent of involvement of the zones in production for outside markets. Geographic characteristics keep coming up as the most important, indeed the decisive, variable. More enlightening could be the evolution of the zones between the time of the catastro and the first disentail. One cannot, however, proceed to compare the cultivation in the 1750s with that around 1800, as we did in Jaén. Even though the sales permit one to infer the different land uses at the turn of the century, the catastro is unmanageable for this purpose. With over eight hundred towns and villages, each with its individual survey in various volumes, an analysis of the catastro to determine land use was beyond my resources. In addition, Salamanca had no obviously expanding crop, such as olives were in Jaén, that could serve to distinguish areas moving into the national market from those that were not.
I am thus not able to observe changes taking place in the second half of the century. However, because of the large number of towns involved, it proved possible to compare the process of disentail with the conditions prior to its inception or, more correctly, with the conditions revealed by the catastro. This is a relationship that we could infer only indirectly in Jaén.[22]
In following the process of disentail in the various towns in Part 2, we repeatedly found that the groups that benefited most from the desamortización were those that already had a strong position within the agricultural economy. The process itself seemed to favor such an outcome. Because the sales were at auction, they tended to put the land into the economically strongest hands. In a rural economy one could expect that the groups with the most disposable capital would be those that owned or controlled the land. It can thus be expected that the sales would strengthen existing patterns of control of the land—except, of course, that ecclesiastical owners would lose out. The Salamanca data allow one to test this hypothesis in two different ways.
The first involves the concentration of landowning. If the sales re-
[21] See Appendix R.
[22] An earlier version of the following analysis appeared as Herr, "Vente des propriétés de mainmorte."
inforced existing patterns, the acquisition of land should be concentrated among the buyers in proportion to the concentration already existing. The most obvious test of this proposition would be a comparison of two sets of Gini concentration coefficients (drawn from Lorenz curves) for each of the zones, one for landowning as shown by the catastro and one for the purchases. Neither is available, however, the first because of the prohibitive time that would be needed in the archives, the second because the Gini coefficients of the zones vary substantially according to the way the researcher decides to divide purchases made by more than one buyer among the different buyers (information on how they were in fact divided not being given in the Madrid records).[23]
Using the kinds of data with which we are familiar, however, one can develop surrogate indexes of concentration that permit a satisfactory test of the proposition. For the index of concentration of ownership at the time of the catastro, I used the product of two statistics. One was the percent of the total property in the zone that was owned at midcentury by the hacendados mayores (the largest property owner in each town). The catastro records in Simancas give the income of the hacendados mayores, and the provincial summaries of the catastro in Madrid provide data for obtaining the total income from land in each zone.[24]
Although this statistic alone is a simple index of concentration, I decided to multiply it by a second statistic: the ratio between the mean income of the properties of the hacendados mayores and the mean income of all properties. The reason for this step is that the size of not only the largest properties but the others as well determines the extent of concentration. There is more concentration (as measured by a Lorenz curve) where there are one or a few large properties in the midst of many small ones than where all properties are relatively large. The mean income of the properties of the hacendados mayores could be obtained directly, but that of other properties could only be approximated. For this purpose, the income of the properties of the hacendados mayores was subtracted from the total income in the zone, and the remainder was divided among the estimated number of other properties in the zone.[25]
The index of prior concentration is the product of these two statis-
[23] See Appendix S.
[24] The provincial summary in Madrid: AHN, Hac., Catastro, Salamanca, estados seglar, eclesiástico patrimonial, and eclesiástico, under "letra D" of each volume, gives the number of measures of land in each town belonging to each type of owner, broken down according to the annual income from each measure of land. The calculations are extensive, but made easier with a computer.
[25] See Appendix S.

tics. It can be looked on as the area of a rectangle. The vertical side is the percentage of property in the zone owned by the hacendados mayores, and the base is the ratio of the mean income of the properties of the hacendados mayores to the mean income of the other properties (Table 17.12).
The index of the effect of sales on concentration of landholding is a similar rectangle derived from the sales records. The base of the rectangle also represents a comparison of large to small properties, in this case the ratio of the mean amount spent by the buyers in Level 4 (the largest buyers) to that of the buyers in Level 1 (the smallest buyers). Rather than use the simple ratios, which run from 23 : 1 to 210 : 1, I sub-
stituted their logarithms. The reason is that the range is very high, the largest reading being over nine times the smallest. The other statistic in this index, to be described next, has a range of only 2.6. Multiplying them together would give an excessive weight to the first. The logarithm reduces the range to 1.7, less than that of the other statistic but not so dissimilar.
The vertical side of the rectangle is the percentage of buyers in Level 4 who bought more than one property. At first sight this figure may not seem directly comparable to the percentage of land owned by hacendados mayores used for the earlier index. It was chosen because this index was intended as a measure of change due to the sales, not of the already existing concentration of the lands being sold. Properties being farmed as single units were not ordinarily divided before their sale. Therefore the lowest concentration effect (the greatest increase in the number of landowners through the sales) would result if each property went to a different buyer. The percentage of buyers who bought more than one property is thus a measure of how much concentration was effected above this minimum. It is proper to use only Level 4 buyers in each zone because, smallest in number (they ranged from 3 to 12 percent of all buyers), they had the greatest effect on the pattern of landholding: by definition they accounted for 50 percent of the purchases. The index and its components are given in Table 17.13. (One should stress that even though this index measures the extent to which the sales created new large holdings in the hands of laymen, it is not a measure of the absolute change in concentration. Some religious endowments consisted of various properties that were sold off separately, thus tending to decrease the existing concentration of ownership. The absolute change was the difference between these two contrary effects, which I have not attempted to calculate.)
When the two indexes or sets of rectangles, one of the prior concentration of landowning and the other of the effect of sales on concentration, are compared, they give a high coefficient of correlation, r = .89. Statistically this means that the correlation could have occurred by chance less than once in a hundred cases (it is significant at the 1-percent level). Although the indexes are the products of circuitous calculations, they offer strong support for the validity of the proposition.
Figure 17.1 graphs the result, the regression line of the effect of the sales on the prior concentration. The resulting pattern supports both the division of the zones into types of participation in the market and into geographic regions. Type A1 zones (SA, SB, SD, SE) fall in the middle of

the pattern, with Type B1 (SC) far out on its own and Type C (SG, SI) together at the other extreme. Zones in the different geographic regions are even more closely associated, poor plains zones (SC, SD) with high concentration, sierra zones (SG, SH, SI) with low concentration, and zones in the other two geographic regions are also proximate to each other.[26]
[26] The statistical strength of the correlation depends greatly on the outlier SC. Without it, the correlation coefficient drops to 0.59, and consequently the correlation line swings clockwise. The pattern loses its statistical strength, being valid only at between the 10-percent and 20-percent level. What weakens the correlation is the deviance of Zone SB, which shows a much higher effect of concentration from the sales than the regression would predict.

Figure 17.1.
Salamanca Province, Regression of Concentration
Effect of Sales on Concentration of Prior Ownership
4
The nature of the data makes possible another test of the proposition that the sales at auction strengthened existing patterns of landholding, by comparing the amount of absentee ownership in each zone before the sales with the amount of property bought by nonresidents. We know already that absentee ownership was a strong characteristic of the province.[27] In the studies of individual towns we observed that around Salamanca city the large blocks of property were in the hands of outsiders and that nonresidents were the biggest buyers, a fact confirmed above for the province as a whole, since we saw that notables were the major buyers and they were largely absentees. Most hacendados mayores at
[27] Absentee ownership is defined as ownership of the property in a place by persons or institutions domiciled outside the place; nonresident buyers similarly are those domiciled outside the place where the property is located.

midcentury were also outsiders (Table 17.14). Some relationship between prior absentee ownership and absentee buying is apparent; the data permit us to test statistically the strength of the correlation.
To obtain an index of prior outside ownership (Table 17.15), I used three figures. The first (Column A) was the proportion of the land in each zone owned by absentee hacendados mayores. It is an accurate statistic of how large a share was owned by certain absentees, namely those who were the largest owner in the town. To get an approximation of absentees among other landowners, I used the ratio of the total value of the land in towns with absentee hacendado mayores to the total value of all the land in the zone (Column B), on the assumption that towns with absentee hacendados mayores would also have a larger share of smaller absentee owners. The third statistic (Column C) is drawn from information on ecclesiastical ownership, since much land belonged to religious institutions and foundations located outside the small places.

It represents an attempt to calculate the percentage of land in the hands of outside ecclesiastical owners. To obtain it, the share of land owned in each zone by ecclesiastical institutions is multiplied by the share of all the land in the zone that was located in towns where the hacendado mayor was an ecclesiastical institution. The final index is a simple mean of these three statistics. One should stress that the index does not represent an estimate of the proportion of land owned by outsiders; its purpose is to permit a comparison among the zones.
The index of sales made to outside buyers also had to be derived indirectly, for the Madrid notaries' deeds of deposit did not usually state the residence of the buyers, although where it was given I noted it. A search of local notarial records unearthed the residence of many of the largest buyers. In addition, unlocated persons who bought property in more than one town were considered residents of the town where they made the most purchases and nonresidents elsewhere. Those persons with names preceded by don not identified as priests, who bought in towns where the census of 1786 showed no hidalgos, were also considered nonresidents. (Not all laymen called don were hidalgos, but hidalgos were probably the most numerous group among them.)[28] The purchases thus identified as made by outsiders were totaled and divided by the total amount spent in the zone. The result, in Table 17.16, shows that the share of the sales in each zone that appears to have gone to outsiders ranges from 9 to 82 percent.
When the index of prior absentee ownership is compared to that of nonresident buyers, the two give a surprisingly high coefficient of correlation, r = .97. Figure 17.2 illustrates the close relationship between the two, r 2 = .94, implying that the amount of land that was bought by outsiders was 94 percent determined by the amount owned by outsiders before the sales.[29]
Where the land was in nonresident hands (much of it ecclesiastical), potential outside buyers would know about the possibilities, the channels of information were good. They could take over existing leases and tenants from the present ecclesiastical owner; the transactions costs of the purchase were low. Furthermore, where local farmers owned little, they also were likely to have little capital. As in La Mata and Villaverde, they might bid for small collections of arable plots but not for holdings
[28] See above, Chapter 15, section 4.
[29] The correlation coefficient in this case does not depend heavily on one outlying point.


Figure 17.2.
Salamanca Province, Regression of Sales to
Nonresident Buyers on Prior Outside Ownership
of many plots spread over various villages, and certainly not for a coto redondo like Pedrollén. But where the land was in local hands—in the sierras and to a lesser extent in the hilly zones—outsiders knew less about it and the residents had proportionately more wherewithal. Wealthy investors had less information and less interest in these regions, and vecinos were the main buyers.
As one can expect, outside owners and buyers were present in greater numbers where agriculture was oriented toward the national market (Type A1 and B1 zones). They used more vales reales than elsewhere to make their purchases. The zones with fewer outside owners and buyers not only paid much more in hard currency, but buyers also bid more against each other—there were more payments in specie above the minimum bid (Table 17.17). Chapter 15 distinguished in both provinces two types of agriculture: market oriented and local. The former was charac-

terized by greater use of vales reales, extensive cultivation, larger participation of hidalgos, and, we can now add in the case of Salamanca province, greater absenteeism. Regions of local agriculture relied more on hard currency, had more intensive farming and less land in the hands of outsiders, and were more socially egalitarian.
Chapter 15 concluded that all areas had some of both kinds of agriculture, indeed that most individuals were involved in both kinds. The more wealthy the individual, the greater his participation in the market was likely to be. What we find in Salamanca is that the distinction is not only social but regional, much more so than in Jaén. The plains around Salamanca City, including the partidos of Ledesma and Alba de Tormes, were strongly marked by commercial agriculture. The sierra zones were much less defined by external contacts. This was true even of Béjar zone (SH), which, because of its livestock and flax, was oriented toward the wider market. Its buyers had comparatively little money and were local people, like those of the sierra zones on either side. In the plain, the poor zones had more outside buyers and less active bidding at all levels than the rich zones. The latter had a more prosperous peasantry that offered an impediment to complete domination from without, peasants who were themselves participants in the greater economy.
The close relationship between prior outside ownership and the extent of purchases by nonresidents, together with the high correlation between prior concentration of ownership and concentration in buying, offers convincing evidence in support of the proposition that in an area where the economy was basically rural, sales of entailed land at auction, as provided by the desamortización of Carlos IV, perpetuated and accentuated existing patterns of landholding; they did not create new ones.
The two provinces do not offer evidence on how the result might differ in an area that was industrializing or whose economy was changing in other ways, but one can predict that the correlation between prior conditions and the redistribution of land would be weaker. Buyers with capital from sources other than agriculture could be expected to accentuate concentration and absentee ownership. The regions around Salamanca city offer some support for this view. The three zones surrounding it were SA, SB, and SC. Figure 17.1 shows that zones SB and SC are above the regression line, indicating that the effect of the sales was greater than the regression predicted. The deviance is especially notable in SB. If the correlation is recalculated without these three zones, the coefficient of correlation, r, rises from .89 to .95 (significant at the 1-percent level). Figure 17.1 shows the new regression line. Salamanca
city had no modern industry, and most of its income came ultimately from the plains around it. The university, the cathedral, and its many parishes and religious orders owned land and received tithes from farmers in this region. The city's merchants dealt in grain. Its craftsmen furnished their products to clerics, señores, hacendados mayores, and merchants who resided in the city and to the vecinos of the surrounding towns, drawing indirectly on the agriculture of the region. But Salamanca was also the capital of the province, receiving some of royal revenues that came from beyond the partido, and its artisans no doubt sold their wares throughout the province, the silver jewelry of the charro costume, for instance. Local grain was shipped to Madrid and the north, and the city's merchants received a share of the profits. The university drew students from throughout Castile.[30] Its leading citizens thus had available more capital than that produced by local agriculture, and this can explain the greater concentration of purchasing than that predicted by a regression line based on the structure of prior landholding. Its example offers support for the proposition that nonagricultural sources of income could hasten the concentration of landowning in a period of desamortización, provided, of course, that the recipients of such income chose to invest it in agriculture, and especially in commercially oriented farming.
Disentail encouraged the commercialization of agriculture by offering lands to men and women interested in a profitable investment, whatever the source of their capital. In this respect it carried out the wishes of Jovellanos and the royal reformers. Nevertheless, its impact in a country like Spain, where agriculture was by far the major occupation, was determined primarily by existing conditions, which it served to accentuate rather than mitigate. And this, of course, is not what Jovellanos had predicted, at least in the long run.
[30] See Kagan, Students and Society, 202–210, Map 5.4, and Appendix A, Table 4. The latest date for the geographic origin of students given for the University of Salamanca is 1690, but the pattern would be similar in 1800.
Chapter XVIII—
Salamanca Province:
The Despoblados and Alquerías
Because eighteenth-century reformers believed that the Spanish countryside suffered from a lack of population, they found the cause of the agricultural backwardness of the province of Salamanca in its large number of despoblados, a verdict that recent historians have echoed.[1] Several despoblados have played a role in our story. Royal plans to repopulate them led to the migration of settlers from La Mata to the despoblado of Narros de Valdunciel. The vecinos of Villaverde did not move their residence, but they broke grazing land in the neighboring despoblados of La Cañada and La Cañadilla, increasing their harvests in this way. Sixty percent of Pedrollén was sold in the disentail, but it had been and remained a single exploitation, rented by one tenant, so far as one can tell from the census returns.[2]
Despoblados resembled the cortijos of Andalusia, another abomination of the reformers, but they differed in essential ways. Pedrollén, although a single exploitation, had several owners and the shares could be sold separately. Many despoblados, legally single properties called cotos redondos or términos redondos, were owned in shares by various people, but I have found no such case of a cortijo. The latter were carved out of vacant municipal land and may have had their origin before the Reconquista. The despoblados were the result of a historical process since the
[1] See García Zarza, Despoblados, 88 and passim; and Domínguez Ortiz, "Ruina de la aldea," 110. Domínguez Ortiz does not consider specifically the case of Salamanca.
[2] Although Pedrollén was called an alquería in the official index (nomenclátor ) of 1789, it was listed as a despoblado in 1769 (García Zarza, Despoblados, 146).
Reconquista that removed the inhabitants from an established village, or so at least the name implied. The Christian resettlement of Salamanca took place after the middle of the eleventh century, apparently in the form of many small villages and hamlets placed in close proximity. A despoblado arose when the population of a village was reduced to one or two families or disappeared altogether, but even when all fixed population vanished, the name and administrative unit persisted. Cortijos were not separate political or census units.
Why despoblados had declined is not clear. The times of greatest loss of population would appear to be the hundred years following the Black Death and the seventeenth century, periods of plague and demographic crisis throughout western Europe. Two authors who have studied similar deserted villages in France argue, however, that plagues alone cannot account for the complete disappearance of villages. The destruction and military levies of wartime played their part in driving away the inhabitants. Permanent depopulation did not result, however, unless other causes prevented resettlement once the hardships had passed. One might be adverse physical conditions, another the desire of a landowner to build up his estate. The smaller the hamlet, the more likely it was to disappear, but it was rare for a place to be abandoned completely. Some farmstead, some group of people remained to keep alive its name.[3]
The story in Salamanca is similar, suggesting that the causes were not unique to this region or to Castile. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz believes that small settlements disappeared in the centuries after the reconquest because the insecurity of the open countryside drove the peasants to seek safer and more healthy locations. After 1250 there was a great demand for settlers in Andalusia, and many may have been attracted by this opportunity.[4] Eugenio García Zarza, who has studied the despoblados of Salamanca most closely, points to the action of noble lords, desirous of creating large estates as a basis for political power during the struggles of aristocratic bands in the fifteenth century. They forcibly moved peasants to larger towns, a procedure renewed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the crown was again weak. Seventeenth-century wars with Portugal, destructive and demanding in money,
[3] Pesez and Le Roy Ladurie, "Deserted Villages," 95. A fuller version of this study appears as Pesez and Le Roy Ladurie, "Le cas français." This volume includes Cabrillana, "Villages désertés en Espagne," 461–512, which attempts to identify the despoblados in much of Spain but does not cover the territory of the crown of Castile north of the central sierras. Anes, Crisis, 181 n. 29, questions its figures.
[4] Domínguez Ortiz, "Ruina de la aldea," 106–7. On migration to the south, see MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages, 70–72.
and the increasing tax burdens, which hit the remaining peasants ever more heavily as the others fled or died, completed the desertion of the villages.[5] Curiously, these historians make no mention of the Black Death as a contributing cause to the depopulation, although students of medieval France and England have stressed its central role in the redistribution of population. Plagues of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are known to have laid waste Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre.[6] In 1350 the Black Death had spread so widely in Castile that Alfonso XI wrote to Pedro IV of Aragon, expressing his concern about the loss of population and the number of his subjects going to Rome to obtain a papal indulgence.[7] The following year, the Cortes of Castile heard complaints that the great mortality had raised the price of agricultural labor to such heights that owners were being forced to abandon cultivation.[8] The plague may well have been the event that triggered the early desertion of the smaller places in Salamanca.
What is unique about Salamanca is the large number of despoblados that appeared, far above anything found in France or the rest of Spain. The catastro identified 113 in the study area, while the nomenclátor of 1789 raised the number to 197, plus another 93 in the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo.[9] Most lay in the poor plains southwest and west of Salamanca city, that is, on the large property side of the Salamanca-Albacete line, but a number were also in the rich plains north and east of the city. Almost indistinguishable from the despoblados were places called alquerías, large properties tended by one or several families. Although this name, derived from the Arabic word for a small settlement, does not imply that they were ever larger, the available censuses show that many had had more people in the past.[10] The catastro does not identify alquerías as such, but the nomenclátor names 151 of them in the study area, located in the same regions as the despoblados, and 30 more in the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo.
[5] García Zarza, Despoblados, 36–51, 65–82.
[6] Vilar, Catalogne 1 : 464–66; Vicens Vives, Manual, 163–64; Cabrillana, "Villages désertés en Espagne," 493–95, 504.
[7] Letter referred to in Pedro IV of Aragon to Alfonso XI of Castile, 30 Mar. 1350, in López de Meneses, Documentos acerca de la peste, 377–78.
[8] García Fernández, "Champs ouverts," 707–8.
[9] AHN, Hac., libro 7476, letra D: Partido of Salamanca, 78; of Alba, 11; of Ledesma, 24. García Zarza, Despoblados, 149–51, lists these.
[10] Instituto geografico y estadístico, Nomenclátor . . . de 1900 2 : 356, defines an alquería in Salamanca as "a rural house inhabited by the owners or tenants of surrounding fields used for the cultivation of cereals."
Why this concentration of deserted villages in Salamanca? The activities of noble estate builders and the destruction of war and taxes were not peculiar to this region. One must look for a scenario that fits the local situation. From the ninth to the eleventh century, the region was a no-man's-land between the Christian monarch of León and the Muslim states south of the central sierras and was virtually without permanent residents. After the reconquest of Toledo in 1085, the future province of Salamanca came permanently under Leonese rule. Salamanca city was fortified and given a cathedral, and the smaller places, Alba de Tormes and Ledesma, also became strongholds. Rural settlement was done in small nuclei, villages and hamlets of only a few families. Some settlers came as organized groups originating in a town in the north, others had been collected under the leadership of some enterprising individual of higher social status. Frequently the name of the new village reflected the origin of the settlers or the person who founded it. Such toponymic evidence indicates that the new inhabitants came from all over: Galicia, León, the Basque lands, and Navarre to the north as well as a large number of Mozarabes (Christians who had been living in Muslim territories) and Moriscos (converted Muslims) from the south.[11]
Settlement tended to follow the old Roman road from León to Salamanca and south through Béjar to Mérida, spreading out to the east and west from it. The rich Armuña plain north of Salamanca city was repopulated before the mid-twelfth century; by 1200 its towns were substantial nuclei. The poorer zone south of the city filled up a generation or two later, and the southern sierras between about 1190 and 1230. One can picture these early hamlets as a half-dozen or so houses and a few sheds around a small unpretentious church. The nearby arable had been distributed in fields to the settlers in a reparto, while the common pastures and woodland lay beyond. It is possible that some places were private estates with only a few permanent hands, protoalquerías, especially those in the poor plains bearing the name of the founder. Many villages were required to make payments to the cathe-
[11] Four places named Naharros (Narros), a Naharillos, and two Naharra reflect the immigration from Navarre, while three Gallegos, two Galleguillos, and a Nava Gallega, that from Galicia (six of these thirteen places were despoblados or alquerías in 1789). There was also a Córdoba, a Cordobilla, and a Mozárvez (Mozárabes), a Morisco, and a Castellanos de Morisco. Founders' names appear in Aldehuela de los Guzmanes, Gutierro Velasco, Martín Pérez, Andrés Bueno, Gimén Gómez, Velasco Muñoz, and so forth (all of these being despoblados in the eighteenth century). See Julio González, "Repoblación de la 'Extremadura,'" 241–45, and Julio González, "Reconquista y repoblación," 176–81. These are the sources for this and the next paragraph.
dral of Salamanca, but jurisdiction lay with the council of one of the fortified centers, Salamanca, Alba de Tormes, or Ledesma; the basis was already established for the later partidos. Except for a few places under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, señorío did not come until later; the cities and villages were royal.
When hardship came in the form of plague and civil strife in the fourteenth century and later, those settlements located where the natural conditions were least favorable, notably in the thin topsoils south and west of Salamanca city, suffered most. The villagers still alive in the smallest villages, places with less than ten families, some as few as two, chose to go to bigger towns or were forced to do so by local magnates who desired unobstructed use of the fields. But the places did not disappear from official records. The owners chose to preserve their names and identity so that they would not be taken over by neighboring towns as common wastes and pasture.[12] These places had never flourished under farming, and the rise of migratory and sedentary sheep raising after the fourteenth century made them profitable as pastures, turning them into permanent despoblados.
Angel Cabo Alonso, the leading historical geographer of the province, emphasizes the importance of geographic conditions in explaining the appearance of despoblados. They were found, he says, in the plains where the underlying rock formation lay closest to the surface of the sedimentary deposits, leaving little soil cover for crops. He theorizes that after the reconquest the larger settlements were along the rivers and streams, while the future despoblados were smaller hamlets that appeared in the hilly interfluvial spaces and never became populous villages.[13] One needs a case-by-case study to test this hypothesis. It undoubtedly applies to many places, but not all, because there are authenticated accounts of forcible removal of villagers in the fifteenth century,[14] while the first census available, from 1534, still shows numerous vecinos in many places that would be despoblados in the eighteenth century.[15] What seems indisputable is the importance of the physical characteristics of the plains, first in attracting early settlers into numerous small hamlets and then in proving unsuited to the permanent arable culture needed to support so many nuclei. The settlers had set up life in the
[12] See García Zarza, Despoblados, 28–29.
[13] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 65–66. Anes, Crisis, 181–86, also questions the belief that all despoblados had once been populated centers.
[14] García Zarza, Despoblados, 36–48.
[15] Tomás González, Censo . . . siglo XVI, Appendix 5.
way familiar to them, only to discover too late that the physical reality would not accept it here. Theirs was not the last such experience, witness the American Dust Bowl of the 1930s.
2
The data collected for this study permit one to look at the despoblados in several new ways. Most of the following discussion is limited to the despoblados for which there are individual surveys of the catastro, but, unlike previous studies, it also considers the alquerías. Table 18.1 shows what percentage of the catastro units in each zone fell into these two categories. Those with the greatest concentration of despoblados and alquerías were the four plains zones, SA to SD, and the hilly zone SF that juts between zones SB and SC. The following analysis is limited to these five zones.
Most of the despoblados were smaller in area than the units that had survived as towns; in three of the five zones they had a mean size less than half that of the regular places. According to the returns of the catastro, their mean size ranged from 490 fanegas (about 220 hectares) in
|
|
zone SD (Ledesma) to 1,150 fanegas (about 510 hectares) in zone SB (Alba de Tormes; Table 18.2). In fact 43 percent of them contained less than 250 hectares, a figure that has been considered the minimum size of a large property or latifundio in twentieth-century Spain.[16] Alquerías tended to be somewhat larger, although still smaller than settled towns. A community located in such a place, especially where the land was poor, was at a decided disadvantage when faced with climatic catastrophes or human violence.
The evidence from censuses permits one to assign the decline in population of most despoblados and alquerías to one of three periods: prior to the census of vecinos of 1534, between 1534 and the census of vecinos of 1712, and the period between 1712 and 1826, for which we have the catastro (ca. 1751–53), the census of 1786, and Miñano's dictionary with figures for 1826. Table 18.3 shows the distribution among these three periods of those places for which some census data are available. Since the first census is for 1534, we can know only whether a place was at its demographic low point by that date. We do not know that it had ever been larger, and in view of the doubts of Cabo Alonso on this question, one should leave it open. Some certainly had been larger at some previous time.
[16] See Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, 21, Map 1.
|
Fifty percent of the despoblados and alquerías for which there are census data had become depopulated by 1534 or had never been large. Ledesma (SD) zone had the most marked early decline, with 65 percent of its small places in this category. The other half of the places, those that lost their population after the sixteenth century, are of greater interest to us. Without zone SD for which we lack 1712 figures, seventy-nine places lost their settlers before 1712 and forty-nine after that date. Most of the first group had between five and twenty-four vecinos in 1534 and had dropped to two vecinos or less by 1712. They had gone from small towns of twenty to a hundred people to a family or two tending an estate, or even to no one at all. A few continued their decline into the eighteenth century. Riolobos (SB) had thirty-six vecinos in 1534 and was down to six in 1712. By 1751 it had only one household and in 1786 only a man and a woman, not married. Arauzo, nearby, had thirty vecinos in 1534, ten in 1712, and only two in 1751; there were at least seven other similar places.
From official reports and literary sources, it is evident that the big decline came in the seventeenth century, a time of epidemics, war, and heavy taxes.[17] Marginal arable fields, some of them probably first broken in the sixteenth century, returned to pasture, the number of sedentary sheep increased, and peasants collected into the larger villages.[18] A document dated 1661 protesting the dire effects of the war with Portugal claimed that the partido of Salamanca city had seen the number of towns (lugares) decline from 270 to 100 in eight years and the number of vecinos from four thousand to two thousand, an exaggeration, of course, but evidence that contemporaries were aware of the impact of these difficult times.[19] A study of the villages northwest of Paris found that those with five to twenty households were especially susceptible to disappearance in the late medieval and early modern periods.[20] The fate of the towns of Salamanca seems to demonstrate a similar critical mass, under twenty-five households they were likely to become despoblados, an outcome to which they were also inclined by their smaller extent and poor soil.
The places that lost their population after 1712 were mostly of a different kind. Of the forty-nine places in the four zones in this category,
[17] See García Zarza, Despoblados, 65–82.
[18] See Anes, "'Depresión' agraria."
[19] Anes, Crisis, 117. See ibid., 88–126, on the seventeenth-century depression.
[20] Guy Fourquin, "Villas et hameaux du nord-ouest de la région parisienne en 1332," Paris et l'Ile de France 9 (1957–58): 141ff., cited in Pesez and Le Roy Ladurie, "Deserted Villages," 74–75.
only five had more than 4 vecinos in 1712, none more than 7.5 (widows heading households counted as half vecinos). By the time of the catastro, twenty-eight reported no vecinos at all. Most of these appear never to have been even hamlets—only ten show up in 1534, all with 7 vecinos or less—just estates whose owners decided to reduce the number of people living on them in the eighteenth century or whose inhabitants chose to move to nearby villages and walk to their work. These are places that fitted the definition of alquerías, yet they were called despoblados.
Historians have repeatedly blamed the señores for the despoblados, echoing the accusations of eighteenth-century reformers.[21] Their lords are accused of driving off the peasants to extend their señorío. The case of Arauzo, already mentioned above, became notorious for its continual decline since the sixteenth century. Its location on the road to Madrid from Salamanca and its great size, 2,350 hectares, largest despoblado of all, made it conspicuous. The alcalde of the adjoining town in 1768 reported that its señores, the Marqueses de Almarza, resident in Salamanca city, "kept buying the houses, lands, and chattel of the vecinos and inhabitants, until they became the largest owner. Afterwards they realized that they had more to gain by letting it become deserted and turning it into a coto redondo. And for its exploitation they did not want to rent small pieces to the vecinos, who ended by leaving, and thus little by little the houses and buildings fell into ruin as the farmers left."[22] It is tempting to see the success of the Marqueses de Almarza as a function of their señorío and to attribute the actions of other nobles as well to its evils. In the last chapter we saw, however, that señorío in Salamanca had little adverse effect on the rural economy because it was seldom associated with extensive ownership of the land. Similarly, the facts indicate that the despoblados cannot be blamed on it, for in few places were the large owners also the señor. Most of the despoblados and alquerías were either in royal territory (almost all zone SC was royal and it had the most despoblados) or in the señoríos of the Duques de Alba and Alburquerque. Out of thirty-four despoblados and five alquerías in her señoríos, the Duquesa de Alba was hacendado mayor in only four despoblados and two alquerías, the Duque de Alburquerque in none of those under his jurisdiction, forty-three despoblados and ten alquerías.
[21] García Zarza, Despoblados, 61–65; Domínguez Ortiz, "Ruina de la aldea," 115–16. Domínguez Ortiz, Régimen señorial, 25, quotes the eighteenth-century reformer Martínez de Irujo complaining of the actions of the señores.
[22] Response to the royal survey by the alcalde of Ventosa (1768), quoted in García Zarza, Despoblados, 31 and 67.
The Marquesa de Almarza was also hacendada mayor in Arauzo, and this role is the proper clue to her behavior. From the point of view of the owner, the ideal despoblado or alquería was obviously a coto or término redondo, a single property. Although there is no official list of términos redondos, the catastro supplies information on ownership that permits one to identify many of them.[23] In zone SA 33 percent of the despoblados and alquerías can be identified in this way as términos redondos; in zone SB, 34 percent; SC, 59 percent; SD, 58 percent; SF, 58 percent; with a total of 49 percent for the five zones. The records of the disentail of Carlos IV, however, indicate that these were not all. Both noble and ecclesiastical owners had developed términos redondos, but nobles had been much more active since the sixteenth century, and among the nobles, titled aristocrats had been most successful.[24]
There was no reason, of course, that large owners should acquire all the available property only in despoblados and alquerías. Forty-two towns in these five zones not classified officially in this manner also had but one owner; thirty-nine of them in the poor plains zones.[25] One might suspect that these were also tiny villages that the bureaucracy had not yet got around to labeling despoblados or alquerías, but in fact only five had fewer than forty people, and nineteen had over one hundred. The population of two was greater than five hundred, Matilla and San Muñoz, both in Charro zone (SC).[26] In both the only landowner was also the señora, the Duquesa de Uceda, who resided in Madrid. She was lord and owner of all the land in two other towns as well, in the same zone, Vecinos and Olmedilla. Altogether in these four places she owned 2,650 hectares of arable and 3,700 hectares of pasture, which she must have rented out to the inhabitants, since she had no animals of her own. In these four towns lived 246 families, their houses being their only real property. Cases like this gave a bad reputation to señorío, but they were the exception, not the rule. Titled aristocrats were sole owners of eighteen other towns, hidalgos of seven, and ecclesiastical institutions of twelve, but only in two belonging to aristocrats was the owner also
[23] To identify términos redondos, I took all places where the area of the property attributed to the hacendado mayor was 99 percent or more of the recorded area of the place. If the despoblado was owned in shares, as many were, this process would not detect it. (Area of hacendado mayor from AGS, Dirección General de Rentas, Única Contribución, libro 536; total area from AHN, Hac., libros 7746–48.)
[24] Seventy-five percent of the términos redondos that had become depopulated since the sixteenth century belonged to nobles, that is, hidalgos and títulos.
[25] SA, 2; SB, 1; SC, 23; SD, 16; SF, 0.
[26] Matilla, 106 vecinos in 1751, 588 population in 1786; San Muñoz, 105 and 568.
señor.[27] It was and is a popular misconception that señorío had any significant economic impact in Salamanca province. To be the hacendado mayor gave one much more leverage than to be the señor; for centuries the region had been more capitalist than feudal.
3
That large landowners as a group followed a policy of creating despoblados must indicate an economic motive behind their behavior, for a desire to strengthen their señoríos has not proved to be the correct cause. Another widely accepted explanation is that they wanted to turn arable land into pasture, responding to the returns offered by the rise of transhumant sheep raising since the Middle Ages. Antonio Ponz, an eighteenth-century cleric who journeyed through Spain gathering information on art works and in the process recorded many acute observations about the state of the society and economy, blamed sheep raising for the appearance of the despoblados in Extremadura and Salamanca. In Spain as in England, sheep were eating men, and recent historians repeat this judgment.[28] The scarcity of labor that resulted from the demographic decline of the seventeenth century would have encouraged owners in this course, especially where the fertility was marginal.
Eighteenth-century data, however, do not show that despoblados specialized in grazing livestock at that time. The geographer Cabo Alonso has found from a survey of the catastros of a number of despoblados that some of them were indeed dedicated to pastures, but in others well over half the land was arable.[29] An analysis of the catastros of all despoblados was beyond my resources, but the provincial summary provides a reasonably reliable alternate approach. Its report of the income from the land in each place furnishes the data to obtain the mean income from each measure of land. Experience with the catastro reveals that a place with a mean return of under five reales per year per measure was largely pasture; between five and nine, pasture and poor quality arable; between ten and nineteen, mostly poor arable; and twenty
[27] Villalba de los Llanos of the Conde de Ablitas and Vilvís of the Marquesa de Almarza, both in SC.
[28] Ponz, Viaje de España, 699, 1111–13 (Tomo VIII, Carta 3 [Extremadura], and Tomo XII, Carta 9 [Salamanca]); Anes, Crisis, 170–77. Ponz quotes extensively a complaint of the clergy of Salamanca to the crown, protesting that the creation of despoblados had deprived it of income from tithes.
[29] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 76–80.
|
and over, medium to good arable.[30] Table 18.4 shows how the alquerías and despoblados in the various zones fall into these categories. Very few places were used purely for pasture, less than a fifth in every zone except SF. In the two rich plains zones, more than two-thirds were primarily oriented toward grain harvests, in the poor plains zones about half.
The catastro's census of livestock confirms the finding that despoblados were not especially dedicated to grazing. Table 17.4 shows that the zones with despoblados had many animals per vecino, although not as many as the mountain valleys of Piedrahita (SI) zone. The concentration of sheep and cattle was a feature of the zones, however, and not specific to the despoblados and alquerías. Table 18.5 shows that measure for measure of land, as a general rule despoblados and alquerías had fewer rather than more cattle and sheep than the more populated places. The only categories in the table where the depopulated places showed a concentration of livestock were not primarily devoted to pasturage but were involved in arable farming: in zones SB and SC such despoblados had proportionately more cattle than larger places and such alquerías had more sheep. It is significant that animal husbandry was found where there was active farming. In Salamanca at this time, specialization in breeding livestock separately from growing grain had not yet developed.[31]
We are left with a paradox. Here are tiny places, housing only one, two, or three families, existing next to towns with five, ten, or more times as many people, yet engaged in virtually identical forms of agriculture. How can one explain this? Again the catastro comes to our aid. It tells us nothing, we know, about who rented the fields and pastures or who exploited them with hired labor, only who owned them. One can, however, use indirect evidence to create a reasonably reliable picture of
[30] A measure of pasture land was seldom assigned more than 8 reales per year return, and much of it was worth only 1 or 2 reales. Poor arable that could be sown with rye every third year was about 8 to 12, with wheat somewhat higher, 15 to 20. Rich wheat land in La Mata, sown every other year, returned 56 reales, and the poorest rye land there, 24. The scale can be judged from the mean return of the towns studied in Part 2: La Mata (prosperous rich plains town, SA), 40; Villaverde (struggling rich plains town, SA), 38; El Mirón (declining sierra town, SI), 11; Santa María del Berrocal (prosperous sierra town, SI), 20; despoblados, La Cañada (SA), 23; La Cañadilla (SA), 22; Narros (SA), 22; Pedrollén (SC), 5.
[31] The catastro evaluated the actual use of land, not its potential value. A mean revenue of 10 or more reales per year in Table 18.4 could not have been achieved without considerable land actually under cultivation. It is true that despoblados with much pasture and few animals might have been rented to outsiders whose animals would have been listed under their home towns, but Table 18.4 shows that only a small proportion of the despoblados were primarily pasture.


what was going on in the despoblados. The first step is to estimate whether the residents listed in the small places were numerous enough to produce the return reported from these places.
According to my calculations, Pedrollén produced a gross income from agriculture and livestock of some 800 EFW (see Table 9.8), although some of this income was the result of pasturing animals outside its limits. The provincial summary of the catastro, however, reported its land to produce 5,685 reales, that is 380 EFW, about half what I calculated. Most of the disparity is the result of the low income that the catastro assigned to pastures. In La Mata and Villaverde, towns of the rich Armuña district, my calculations of gross income from the land are also higher than the return reported in the provincial catastro summary (1.5 and 1.2 times as great), although the difference is less than for Pedrollén, partly because there was less animal husbandry.
The wealthiest labrador in La Mata (the casa excusada) had a gross income of some 600 EFW, but at the above rate, he would have farmed land evaluated in the catastro at 400 EFW. He used five yokes of oxen, thus needing four additional hands (including any grown sons), at least during plowing. In Villaverde, where per capita income was lower, the richest labrador had a gross income of 400 EFW, and the reported return on his share of the land would be 333 EFW. These figures give us an idea of how much land, in terms of its reported harvest, a fully employed farmer could handle.
Since the alquerías and despoblados had more pasture than the towns of La Armuña and pastures were undervalued in the catastro, the gross return on the amount of land that one vecino could work would be less than that produced by the wealthiest labradores in Villaverde and La Mata. Land reported to return about 300 EFW (4,200 reales) would be the maximum for one man in the rich plains zones; in the poor plains zones, with more pastures, the limit would be lower, say 200 EFW. In despoblados and alquerías that had a higher return per vecino than these limits, one can be reasonably certain that part of the land was being worked by men from nearby towns. Of course, if despoblados and alquerías showed no vecinos at all, all the labor was being done by outsiders. For example, the despoblado of Riolobos in the rich plains (zone SB) had land producing 4,530 EFW (63,390 reales) according to the catastro summary and only one vecino. At one full-time farmer for each 300 EFW, it needed fourteen additional farmers. Cente Rubio (zone SB) had no vecinos, but with land producing 1,603 EFW, we can posit that it employed five or six full-time farmers from outside. San
Pedro de Azerón in the poor plains (zone SC) produced 620 EFW and had one vecino. It needed at least two more farmers. These calculations furnish only the roughest sort of estimate, intended to show the nature of the situation. In all likelihood outsiders who worked in the depopulated places did so only part-time, after caring for their fields in their home towns. The number of individuals involved was therefore probably much higher than the estimated full-time outsiders.
Table 18.6 indicates the situation in the five zones. One sees from the last column that the small places required more than twice as much labor as their vecinos could produce. Rather than as self-contained units, one can think of them as low-pressure areas, inadequately tended, with few or no permanent workers, which drew in peasants from surrounding high-pressure zones, towns with more than a full complement of workers. But these peasants moved in and out when the seasonal needs required their presence, returning home in the evening, leaving the despoblados again empty. These were not the cortijos of Jaén, for the workers from outside lived close enough to make the daily journey except perhaps in the rush of the harvest season. And they were not cortijos for another reason: the people who farmed them in this way were not day laborers but tenant farmers, most probably labradores with their own draft animals. They worked for their own account and paid rent at a predetermined rate. We saw some of them in both La Mata and Villaverde. There was even a local term for their plots; they were called tierras entradizas.[ 32] Not all depopulated places were farmed in this way, of course. Pedrollén, which does not figure as needing additional workers, was rented to a single tenant as one exploitation. Three vecinos of nearby towns, nevertheless, labored on it as hired help.
The permanent personnel in the small places did not have a normal demographic structure, as one can observe by comparing the population pyramids of places with less than twenty people in 1786 to those of the towns surrounding them (Figure 18.1 and Appendix T). In the four plains zones, medium-sized towns have fairly regular pyramids, although one can see a shortage of young unmarried females, gone probably to be domestic help in bigger places. The small places show a disproportionate number of unmarried males under twenty-five and few old people. Most of the people considered resident by the census takers do not appear attached to the places, many young hired hands and a
[32] The term can be found, among other places, in the royal provision on the repopulation of the despoblados, Nov. rec., VII, xxii, 9, art. 21 (15 Mar. 1791).
|
few married couples, who would include the current large tenants like the one at Pedrollén and their wives.
Beyond these general characteristics, however, Table 18.6 reveals that not all small places were alike. For the first time alquerías and despoblados appear with different features. Over a third of the despoblados had no vecinos at all; this was true of only four alquerías. The latter, in other words, had permnanent personnel, at least a guard, the montarraz. Permanent residents also furnished a larger portion of their labor needs. With 217 vecinos for 78 alquerías, almost 3 per place, they needed only 137 additional full-time hands from outside. Despoblados barely averaged 1 vecino and needed over one and a half times as many farmers from outside. The owners of alquerías seem to have supervised their exploitation much more than those of despoblados.
There was a difference among regions too. In the rich plains north and east of Salamanca city (zones SA and SB), the despoblados needed 5 times as many outside farmers as they had vecinos, whereas in the poor plains (SC, SD) and in the adjacent hilly zone, SF, they were more nearly self-sufficient. The despoblados of the rich plains zones were scattered among relatively large towns.[33] Demographic pressure, we saw, drove the peasants of La Mata and Villaverde to break soil in neighboring despoblados. There was evidently less pressure in the poor plains.
In the 1750s, the time of our data, neither La Mata nor Villaverde had overflowed much into the despoblados; the flood would come later in the century. Asked to report on the possibility for resettling the despoblados, the corregidor of Salamanca in 1769 replied that they could support six times as many vecinos as they then had.[34] Table 18.6 estimates that in the 1750s the despoblados were employing between two and three times as many farmers as there were vecinos. The examples of La Mata and Villaverde indicate that as the century wore on, the depopulated places were accommodating more and more nearby farmers. No doubt their soil was less productive than that of neighboring villages or they would not have become abandoned, but as population grew they were being reincorporated into the overall pattern of agriculture.
In most cases, however, they were not being repopulated, only recultivated. Events of earlier centuries had concentrated the population in fewer units. The units were now growing and expanding their radius
[33] Excluding despoblados and alquerías, the mean town size in the zones was rich plains, SA 300, SB 310; poor plains, SC 140, SD 170; SF 240.
[34] The report dealt with the whole province, including the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo (García Zarza, Despoblados, 91 and Table, 143–47).

Figure 18.1.
Salamanca Plain, Population Structures of Small
Places and Medium-Sized Towns (see Appendix T)
of cultivation rather than undergoing fission. The regions of deserted villages in France experienced the same phenomenon.[35] It would be tempting to ascribe the choice to the peasants themselves, kept in their
[35] Pesez and Le Roy Ladurie, "Deserted Villages," 85. See also Cabo Alonso, "La Armuña," 393–94.

NOTE : Since there is no limot to the top age group, a
span of seventeen years is used for convenience only.
native villages by the charms of social intercourse, but the economics of the situation suggest another explanation.
The mean productivity of labor was far higher in the despoblados than in the villages. The estimate used above for production on the despoblados and alquerías was an average return to labor of 300 EFW per man in the rich plains and 200 EFW in the poor plains. The overall
gross return from land per vecino engaged in agriculture in the rich zones was 110 EFW and in the poor zones 60 EFW (including residents of populated and depopulated places). The difference is impressive. One might object that the estimate for return per farmer in the depopulated places is excessive (although, if it is, they needed even more outside labor than deduced above). An easy calculation will respond to this objection. One can compare the mean return per measure of land and the mean income per vecino engaged in agriculture in the nine zones of the province (Table 18.7). The results reveal a striking fact. The mean return of a measure of productive land is related to the geographic characteristics of the zones, as one might expect. The rich plains zones had land of high return per measure, the poor plains zones a low return. The sierra zones were also high, in part because of the high value of crops like flax, and the hilly zones were intermediate. But the income per vecino engaged in agriculture does not correlate with the productivity of the land. The five zones with a large number of despoblados and alque-
|
rías have the highest readings in per capita income, although they include the three zones with the poorest soil. It seems correct to conclude that despoblados and alquerías raised the mean productivity of agricultural labor in these zones because the productivity of farmers was greater here than in the neighboring towns, thus reinforcing the assumption made above. One can recall that Pedrollén had the highest per capita income of all our towns, though little went to the laborers.
One might be led to conclude that alquerías and, especially, despoblados were a boon to the vecinos of nearby towns, who could expand their income on land where the marginal productivity of their labor was higher than that in their towns. On the other hand, the Ricardian model we found applicable to individual towns in Part 2 would postulate that the excess return from the depopulated places would go to the owners, who could benefit in high rents from the competition among prospective tenants. As population increased in the towns and exploitations became subdivided by inheritance or new leases, young farmers would be looking for any solution to the economic squeeze. They would pay high rents for entradizas, even though these required a greater input of their own and their draft animals' time in travel. In Part 2 we concluded that the rent for Narros jumped 50 percent in three decades as the town councils of La Mata and Carbajosa de Armuña competed for its use.[36] Nearby, the vecinos of Villaverde paid about 38 percent of the harvest as rent in the despoblados of La Cañada and La Cañadilla at midcentury, whereas the rent for land in Villaverde was about 31 percent of the harvest, itself a high rate.[37] Rents kept going up, but harvests did too. Our information on harvests is sporadic, and the ratio of rent to harvest in any specific year depended greatly on the size of the harvest. In 1789 the ratio for these despoblados was 34 percent; the rent established for La Cañada in 1803 was 37 percent of the good harvest in 1801 (1803 was a famine year). In 1805 rents were lowered, harvests were good, and the ratio for La Cañada and La Cañadilla together was 22 percent.[38] One gets the impression that owners and tenants were agreed on a rent equal to 35 to 40 percent of the harvest, higher than any recorded in the towns. Owners clearly gained, but peasants in the rich zones might get more return for their labor too, since per capita harvests were two to three times as high in the despoblados, if my earlier reasoning is valid.
[36] See above, Chapter 7, section 7.
[37] See Chapter 8, section 1, and Table 8.10.
[38] From above, Chapter 8, section 5, and the Villaverde tithe register (AHPS, Hacienda, libro 167).
In the poor zones some labradores faced rack rent, to judge from complaints to the crown.
These examples on the whole support the Ricardian model. Although peasants who succeeded in getting leases to despoblados received a greater marginal return for their labor than they did in their villages, especially at the end of the century when inflation raised the price of their harvests, most owners exerted themselves to siphon off any excess per capita income, once the rigidities of the situation were overcome. This fact explains why peasants did not move into the despoblados: the owners did not let them because they sensed that a permanent settlement would soon reduce the marginal productivity of labor and the share the owner could extract.
We can now understand the economic motivation behind the creation of despoblados. A corollary of this conclusion is that a larger share of the production in the despoblados and alquerías reached the national market than in the adjoining towns. Whether the tenants paid in grain or sold grain and animals to pay in currency, more of their harvests and livestock were diverted from local consumption. Despoblados monetized and commercialized agriculture. No doubt they had been doing so since they first appeared at the end of the Middle Ages.
4
The complaints of extortionary rents in Salamanca and other provinces that reached the crown in the 1760s roused the interest of the royal counselors. In 1769 the corregidor of Salamanca surveyed the situation under his jurisdiction. From the replies to his questions, he drew up a list of 202 "despoblados," among which he included alquerías and even a number of lugares and several villas, all of which he judged to fit within the meaning of the term. He reported 302 vecinos living in them but said that they could support 1,692 vecinos, if properly resettled. His estimate was surely optimistic; in some places he proposed settling 30 to 70 families, and he apparently did not make clear that much of the land was being tilled by residents of neighboring towns who would have to be among the settlers or lose their leases. He responded, no doubt, with what he believed his superiors in Madrid wanted to hear.[39]
Carlos III at once appointed a superintendent for the resettlement of
[39] García Zarza, Despoblados, 91–92. Pages 142–47 give the corregidor's table. I have not been able to locate all his despoblados. Most fall in Zones SA, SB, and SC.
despoblados in Salamanca province,[40] but before any concrete steps were taken the Conde de Aranda was sent to Paris as ambassador, Olavide fell, and the project languished. A royal cédula of 1781 revived it, establishing juntas de repoblación (resettlement boards) in Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. The first consisted of the royal corregidor, the alcalde, and other representatives of the city. A further order of 1784 spelled out the procedure the juntas were to follow.[41] One can see the hand of Campomanes behind the project. He had recently become president of the Mesta, and he was using his position to weaken the restrictions that sheep, raisers enforced on the use of the land. The cédula stated that resettlement would eventually return to farming all land that had once been arable. To prevent a future reversion to pasture, the cédula put strict limits on the use of the land.
According to the regulations, settlers (colonos) would get enough arable to plant 22.5 fanegas a year, this being considered what a yoke of oxen could plow. The actual extent would depend on the number of years in the local crop rotation. The plots would be designed as large as possible, while giving each settler equivalent amounts of different qualities of land (what is now called parcellary concentration was already in the minds of the royal planners). The new colonists would also get the use of pastures and waste, but pastures not required by the colonists would be left to the graziers. In keeping with all Carlos III's projects for internal colonizing, strict rules prevented the union of different holdings or their exploitation by outsiders. Impartial experts would determine how much rent each settler or grazier would pay to the owner, but the total rent currently being received for a despoblado could not be increased. Each settler was required to build a house within two years and pay the owner a small permanent quitrent (canón ) for it in addition to the rent of his land. Although the owners kept title to the despoblados, control over the renting and use of the land was taken out of their hands. Most large owners, either noble or clerical, would have their property in entail. The reform did not break the entail of despoblados, but it created an overriding entail of a different kind.
The royal reformers aimed to avoid the Ricardian trap by fixing the rent and the Malthusian trap by keeping the lots at family size, but in doing so they created a rigid system that was bound to hinder economic
[40] RC, 28 Nov. 1769, cited in ibid., 89.
[41] Nov. rec., VII, xxii, 9 (15 Mar. 1791), repeats this RC. See García Zarza, Despoblados, 95–98.
development. If the harvest on a fanega of land averaged about 4.5 fanegas of wheat, as in Pedrollén, a labrador would collect about 100 fanegas of wheat a year, gross. Seed, tithes, and rent would bring this down to between 50 and 65 EFW, a bare minimum for a family of five. On better land, the return would be higher, but the project, even under favorable conditions, would severely limit the contribution of the colonos to the national market. The owner's share would still be commercialized, but it would not increase as new land was put under the plow. The ideal of the reformers was to turn despoblados into ordinary villages; we have just seen that this meant reducing per capita production and the proportion going to the owner and to the market. In the long run there was little in it even for the peasants. The reformers might try to exorcise Ricardo; they had no way to expel Malthus.[42]
A number of candidates applied for settlement in various despoblados, but few achieved their wish. Those who benefited from existing conditions maneuvered to gut the program. Owners labeled the process confiscation (despojo ), appealed to the courts, and directed threats at prospective colonists. Towns whose vecinos already farmed the despoblados joined in the complaints, while the large graziers worked behind the scenes to dissuade the juntas from taking action. In 1787, after years of petitioning, the sexmeros of the partido of Salamanca were given a vote in the junta. One from each of the four cuartos of the partido, they were elected biennially by the alcalde and one regidor of each town together with the large tenants of the alquerías and despoblados. They represented the existing exploiters of the land rather than the owners, but they too spoke in opposition to resettlement, arguing that the proposal had been conceived without attention to local conditions. Many despoblados did not have sufficient arable land to support a new town, they insisted correctly.[43]
The extant records of the operation indicate that the junta de repoblación in Salamanca sent the Council of Castile proposals for resettlement of forty-eight despoblados and alquerías. At least twenty of them in our study area were selected for colonizing along with five other small places not officially despoblados or alquerías.[44] Miñano shows that twelve of these actually registered some growth in population by
[42] García Zarza observes that the niggardliness of the concessions virtually condemned the reform to failure (ibid., 98, 124).
[43] Ibid., 93–95, 111–12, 126–32.
[44] Ibid., 102, 105–6, 110–11. García Zarza does not name the places. See also Cabo Alonso, "La Armuña," 394.
1826, but four other despoblados and alquerías also grew without royal resettlement. In all, though, only six of these places added more than thirty people by 1826; Narros de Valdunciel, bordering on La Mata, was one of the largest. Three in the rich plains zones, including Narros, had high incomes at the time of the catastro, indicating that they were being farmed by vecinos of nearby towns, who may have moved into them as those of La Mata did into Narros. The other three, in poor plains zones, appear to have been underexploited at midcentury, and the growth represented inmigration of families not previously associated with them. None of these three was officially a despoblado or an alquería.[45] Most of the other places targeted for resettlement had lost their population in the eighteenth century. The conditions that had recently turned them into despoblados—either the nature of their economy or the pressure of their owners—could not be easily reversed.
Although the creation of six viable towns (and a seventh in the partido of Ciudad Rodrigo)[46] was not a negligible accomplishment, both contemporaries and later writers have looked on the effort as a failure. The information developed above indicates that the objective of turning despoblados into prosperous villages was unrealistic. Most of them lacked an adequate base for an independent community—one of the main reasons the population had declined in the first place—and to a greater or lesser extent they had become integrated into the economies of neighboring villages, which needed their resources. As we saw, most despoblados and alquerías were no more devoted to pasture than the villages around them. Whatever they might have been in the seventeenth century, they were not now grazing reserves kept from more productive use by the Mesta or other livestock interests.
Few despoblados and alquerías became new villages, but the population of the others was not stationary. The censuses indicate that the number of people living in them was on the rise, although a clear distinction appears among the zones (Table 18.8). In the rich plains (SA, SB) and Ledesma zone (SD), the number of vecinos in the depopulated places grew markedly—between 50 and 100 percent—in the threequarters century after the catastro, far outstripping the overall growth of these zones. In Charro zone (SC) and the adjoining hilly Salvatierra zone (SF) the small places hardly grew at all, yet the zones experienced a
[45] Villanueva de los Pabones (Zone SA, pop. in 1826, 82); Narros (SA, 60); Riolobos (SB, 38); El Tejado (SC, 50); Canillas de Torneros (SC, 48); Carnero (SC, 40).
[46] Fuenteliante, see García Zarza, Despoblados, 108–9.
|
relatively rapid growth. (After 1826, one no longer has separate population figures for despoblados and alquerías because they were incorporated into adjoining towns.)
A comparison of this pattern with Table 18.4 reveals that the two zones whose despoblados and alquerías showed little population growth were those where these places had the poorest land, primarily pasture and poor arable. The plains of Salamanca and the adjoining hills of Salvatierra were splitting into two different lines of evolution. In the rich grain land north and east of Salamanca city, people were moving into the despoblados, creating a more equal spread of population across the countryside, although the numbers were too small to establish new nuclear villages. In the poor zones, population growth, which was proportionately faster at this time than in the rich zones, took place in the existing towns, increasing the contrast between town and despoblados. The experience of Ledesma zone (SD) lay between these two patterns. Despoblados and alquerías had been a feature of all the plains; developments in our period were making them typical only of the poorer plains and adjoining hills of shale. Since the nineteenth century, the additional contrast has developed that these former despoblados have become pri-
marily devoted to livestock, vast expanses featuring live oak groves and known familiarly as dehesas. This was not the situation in the eighteenth century; it appears to have developed in conjunction with a sharper distinction between private estates and land-hungry villages.[47]
5
The juntas de repoblación limped on into the 1790s, without effecting new settlements. Several times their members, many of whom were sympathetic to the groups currently exploiting the despoblados, expressed the wish to be disbanded, adducing that the regular provincial officials could carry on their task adequately. Finally in July 1801 the king dismissed the junta of Salamanca. That of Ciudad Rodrigo lived on, inactive, until 1816.[48] By 1801 the disentail of Carlos IV was in full swing, pointing the future of the despoblados in a radically new direction. Campomanes and his collaborators wished to keep the entails that bound the despoblados but break their effect by forced colonization. The juntas found such strict regulation unattractive and unworkable; their response promised a warm welcome to a policy that would let the land market determine their future. Under the decrees of September 1798 those portions of despoblados and alquerías that belonged to obras pías and related ecclesiastical foundations became liable to sale at auction.
Within a scant decade, the disentail affected many more despoblados than the juntas had modified in twice that time, for the groups that had opposed resettlement were eager to take advantage of the sales. The records preserved in Madrid show disentail involving forty-six despoblados and alquerías. Thirteen were sold in their entirety, and shares of twenty-five others, ranging from 4/43 to 6/7 (the median is 1/3). In eight more places the disentail involved individual fields and a house. About one-seventh of the despoblados and alquerías shown in Table 18.1 were affected, with the highest proportions in the rich plains zones, SA (17 percent) and SB (15 percent). One full término redondo and shares of three others, all still officially classified as lugares, also went on the
[47] García Zarza's title and text imply that the despoblados were dehesas in the eighteenth century. Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 87–88, also seems to depict the despoblados as vast pastures in the eighteenth century, although their owners did not own the livestock. He believes in the next century the landowners also became the livestock owners.
[48] García Zarza, Despoblados, 132–34, citing real provisión of 24 July 1801.
block.[49] Since many of the early sales were not recorded in Madrid, the disentail undoubtedly touched more places than these. Even in the Madrid records, a disproportionate number of the sales of entire despoblados occurred in the first years: half in 1799 and 1800. Both the crown and the buyers found them tempting, the crown because their disposal provided a rapid influx of currency for a minimum of paper work, the buyers because their administrative costs were low and the owner's share of the return high.
The affected despoblados fall into two distinct groups, and so do the people who bought them. The most common sale was of an entire despoblado or alquería, or of a share in one of them. In either case, the description of the property indicates that it was exploited as a unit, that is, that it was a término redondo. Thirty-five of them were far smaller and poorer than the average. At midcentury their mean annual return was under 500 EFW, with only six producing over 600 EFW. Those that were sold as a single unit, that is, those that had previously belonged to only one owner rather than a consortium, were especially small.[50] Nor did they have much potential for growth. I estimate that at midcentury the thirty-five places needed only forty-seven outside farmers. Further breaking of ground would occupy more men, but the small size and inferior quality of the land set limits that would be quickly reached.
The data from the catastro do not show términos redondos to be smaller than other depopulated places. Why then were those sold off so little? The answer is that obras pías and related ecclesiastical institutions were part or full owners of places that were below average in size.[51] One can only guess that in making bequests to charitable and religious funds, property owners over the previous centuries had contributed their less valuable holdings. For our purpose the discovery means that the sales of Carlos IV touched the small end of the distribution of términos redondos, not a random sample of the phenomenon.
[49] The places sold in their entirety, with the number of the Madrid deed, were SA, Arroyo: A1156 (1799), Cañedino: C12687 (1802), Tesonera: A2869 (1800); SB, Lagartera: A609 (1799), Revilla la Alta: C45113 (1806); SC, Agustines: A4002 (1800), Alizaces: A11880 (1803), Porquerizos: A5767 (1800), Tabaruela: A5767 (1800); SD, Contiensa: A11091 (1802), Noguéz: C31879 (1804), Valderas: C1427 (1800); SE, Vidola (lugar): A11882 (1803).
[50] Their production averaged only 400 EFW, and their area was well below the normal size of despoblados. Mean size of términos redondos sold as a single unit: SA 170 hectares (N = 3), SB 102 hectares (N = 2), SC 258 hectares (N = 4), SD 360 hectares (N = 3). Compare Table 18.2.
[51] The despoblados identified by the catastro as owned entirely by obras pías and related institutions had the following mean size: SA 80 hectares (N = 2), SB 440 hectares (N = 5); SC 245 hectares (N = 7), SD 120 hectares (N = 4). Compare Table 18.2
In eight despoblados and alquerías individual plots were sold, implying that they were not términos redondos. They were not typical either, for they were at the other end of the spectrum. Zaratán (zone SC), in which a huerta was sold, although classed as an alquería, had twenty-eight people in the census of 1786. With 950 hectares and an annual product of 1,200 EFW at midcentury, it was far more populous, extensive, and productive than the ordinary alquería. Narros was even bigger, richer, and after the resettlement of 1789, more populous. As a group these eight places had active economies in 1750. Their mean annual return was 1,700 EFW, and only one produced less than 600 EFW. Only this last needed no outside labor; the other seven had twelve vecinos and, by my estimate, required the labor of forty nearby farmers.[52]
Disentail provided the opportunity for individuals to establish themselves as farmer-owners in them, something the royal colonization had failed to do. The kind of person who rented tierras entradizas now took the opportunity to buy them. Two vecinos of La Mata fit this description, Josef Rodríguez and Julián Gómez, who joined forces to buy some fields in Narros.[53] It is hard to identify such people in the Madrid records because the deeds seldom give their residence. Gabriel Gómez, who purchased eight fields in the despoblado of Malpartida (SC), could have been a nearby labrador, for he was not called don. Antonio Angozo was a vecino of Zaratán, where he bought the huerta mentioned above and a house.[54]
The people who bought entire términos redondos or shares in them were quite different. The majority belonged to the top level of buyers and had no intention of farming themselves. They were addressed as don and lived at a distance, half of them in the city of Salamanca, three in Ledesma, cabeza de partido, a few in other big towns, three outside the province. They bought not to farm but to invest, letting others do the dirty work. Most of these individuals will appear again in the next chapter on big buyers, so we need pursue them no further here. With them were some lower-ranked buyers, about whom we can tell very little. Nine made only one purchase, acquiring shares in various términos redondos, all located in the poor zones, SC, SD, and SF. Two men and a woman lacked the don or doña. Not large investors in disentail, they chose to become partners in ownership of a despoblado, where,
[52] These places were SA, Narros; SB, Castañeda, Pinilla, Revilla de Cantalpino, Sordos; SC, Malpartida, Pedro Martín, Zaratán.
[53] C28355, C29393. See Table 7.24.
[54] C21233, A7552.
since they were minor shareholders, the burden of administration would lie in other hands.[55] Others in this range, five men and one woman, made more than one purchase, usually acquiring arable plots as well as shares in despoblados. Buyers interested in términos redondos came from all kinds of social and economic categories. They resembled each other only in that all had money to spend and chose a despoblado as a sound investment.
6
Today as one travels southwest from Salamanca through the Charro district or west past Ledesma toward Vitigudino, one is struck by the welltended dehesas with their neatly trimmed live oaks, their stone walls, and their herds of black cattle. Most of these, as the students of Salamanca point out, were despoblados in the eighteenth century.[56] There is a tendency to read back the present situation and think of the despoblados as estates devoted to livestock throughout modern times, providing riches for idle absentee owners. The protests directed to Carlos III by owners of large herds who rented despoblados reinforce this image. They show, however, that in the eighteenth century, the ownership of land and livestock was in separate hands; today the landowner is also proprietor of the cattle. Cabo Alonso has proposed that disentail permitted tenants to acquire the property and thus unite land and livestock in the same hands.[57] The information developed here suggests a different course of events. In the eighteenth century there was little specialization in most despoblados. They produced grain and raised cattle and sheep as a secondary activity, differing little from the towns around them. No perceptible change had occurred by the end of Carlos IV's reign or, according to information developed by Cabo Alonso, even by the time Mendizábal revived disentail in the 1830s. In our deeds of disentail the term término redondo is applied to sixteen places, dehesa to only three, all of them in the rich plains zones, not the primary area of today's dehesas.
Specialization in livestock and the development of the live oak dehesa would appear to be a development of the nineteenth century, an economic response to urban growth and the railroads.[58] It corresponded to
[55] A2719, A4534, C18271, C21844, C24826, C51294, C53903, C53970, C59214.
[56] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos"; García Zarza, Despoblados.
[57] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 75–76, 88.
[58] Little is known about the course of livestock production in the nineteenth century. See Vicens Vives, Historia 5 : 240–42.
the extension of olive groves in Jaén. Both involved production for the market based on the exploitation of comparative factor advantages, which deemphasized arable farming. Olive groves in Jaén and pasturage in the poor plains of Salamanca had long traditions; the change represented a new emphasis, not a new departure. The evidence available for this study indicates that the extension of olive cultivation began in parts of Jaén before the catastro and spread to other zones in the second half of the century. In Salamanca it would appear that the turn to pasturage took place during the demographic lows of the late Middle Ages and the seventeenth century, with an emphasis on sheep. In the eighteenth century there was a recovery of arable farming, only to be followed in the nineteenth by a return to livestock, this time directed not at the market for wool but for meat, and secondarily for fighting bulls.[59] Owners took over the management of the operation, expelled the tenants, and acquired livestock.
Economic forces, not the disentail, were primarily responsible for the change. Did the disentail of Carlos IV play any role? In the long run, no doubt it did. It took property away from religious foundations and put it into private hands, which were looking for income and would perceive the advantages of change when the time came. More important, it broke the entail on these properties. When the process was completed by the abolition of vínculos and mayorazgos in 1836, the division of términos redondos into fixed shares would be unfrozen. One active owner could now buy out his partners and exploit the property aggressively. We know very little of the details of the process, however.
The reform of Carlos III did not work because it conflicted with established interests and current practice at all levels. Disentail did work because it joined crown and active economic forces in common objectives. Has the result been bad? Certainly there would appear to be more social justice in a prosperous peasantry than in well-kept estates enriching absentee owners. Carlos III's advisers considered the despoblados a social and economic evil, and they sought to fulfill their own ideal of independent farmers. Historians too have judged the persistence of the despoblados and their evolution into the modern dehesa a cause of social and economic injustice.[60] One of the major reasons for Spain's failure to industrialize in the nineteenth century has been found in the lack
[59] On the raising of fighting bulls, see Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 90.
[60] García Zarza takes this position strongly, although he recognizes the unsuitableness of many despoblados for resettlement (Despoblados, 88). Domínguez Ortiz also finds persistent bad effects in the despoblados ("Ruina de la aldea," 110).
of an adequate market among the rural population, in turn blamed on the unequal distribution of land.[61] We have seen that the income from the land per vecino in agriculture was highest in the zones that had despoblados. If this income had not gone to absentee owners, logically it would have raised the purchasing power of the peasants. According to the accepted line of reasoning, the wealth that flowed to the absentee owners might have been economically justified if it had been invested in productive enterprises, but most of it was wasted, economically speaking, in conspicuous living, at best supporting specialized crafts and importers of foreign luxuries. When the landowners invested, they put their money into the purchase of more land, attracted by the desamortización, rather than into improvements in land already owned. This capital ended up in the hands of the state, which paid off its creditors rather than using it to create a suitable infrastructure for economic growth.
One can question this interpretation, however, on the basis of developments in Salamanca, because the province had regions both of large properties and of a prosperous peasantry. Nowhere, of course, have we found in the eighteenth century the private farmer owning his fields or enjoying a guaranteed exploitation of the land, as desired by the reformers, but the peasants of the rich plains zones received more than the minimum needed for subsistence, in some cases a good deal more, to judge from our studies of La Mata and Villaverde. Return from the land was high (Table 18.7), and custom limited the rents. Many vecinos took advantage of the disentail to buy land. If any peasants were to provide a market for industry, these should be they. In contrast, large properties predominated in the poor plains zones and hilly Salvatierra zone. Although the output per vecino in agriculture was not so high as in the rich zones, it was higher than in the sierra zones. Here, however, the Ricardian trap on lands that had no customary rent drove down the income of the peasants, as evidenced in Pedrollén, where only the tenant had a respectable income. These peasants were a less promising market for industry. A comparison of the two examples should bear on the case at issue.
The only statistics readily available for comparison are population figures, and they tell us little (Table 18.9). All regions grew in population between the censuses of 1786 and 1857 and between 1826 and 1857. The rates of growth reveal no patterns that can be clearly associated with either geography or agricultural economy. The rich plains
[61] See, for example, Jordi Nadal, "Failure of the Industrial Revolution."
|
would appear to have been growing faster than the poor plains between 1786 and 1826, but the pattern is reversed between 1826 and 1857. One might argue for some exogenous explanation—the Napoleonic war, for example—or one may simply suspect the accuracy of Miñano's figures for 1826. Even if a consistent pattern were to appear, however, one cannot know whether population growth was a sign of prosperity or was producing a Malthusian squeeze on resources, as it did in La Mata in the late eighteenth century.
A greater indication of the economic effect of the nature and size of exploitations may be deduced from the demographic behavior of the local urban centers. If the countryside were furnishing a market, it should
have spurred the growth of the centers of distribution. The main ones were the cabezas de partido. Salamanca city was the economic focus for most of the plain. Its population declined in the quarter century after the disentail of Carlos IV and still had not recovered its 1786 level by 1857 (Table 18.9). The first census that shows a larger population is 1877. Alba de Tormes, which shared the leadership of the rich plains with Salamanca, grew much more slowly than its zone. On the other hand, Ledesma, capital of a poor plains zone with despoblados that evolved into dehesas, grew more rapidly than its zone. Obviously the rate of population increase depended on many variables, but there is no indication that the rich plains of Salamanca offered a rural market that might have decisively supported an industrial revolution.
The sierra zones provide another check. The return from the land per vecino in agriculture was low, but the land was mostly in local hands, and disentail increased the peasants' share of it. Patterns of land purchase showed a more egalitarian society and less involvement in the market, despite the production of wool and flax. Even a casual visit to the area reveals houses in the towns and villages that betoken former prosperity, and dates on lintels indicate the period of the construction of many to be the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century, these areas appear to have planted their linen fields with potatoes, increasing food production but not marketable income.[62] Despite this apparent well-being, the peasants provided little market for outside goods, to judge from available indications. With the exception of Béjar, which enjoyed a manufacturing boom, the cabezas de partido did not keep up with local population growth.
This line of reasoning, admittedly inconclusive, does not support the theory that Spain had the potential for an industrial revolution based on a peasant prosperity that could come from a wide distribution of land. A more tenable argument can be made that the términos redondos and the dehesas they evolved into, by specializing in animal husbandry, offered an economic stimulus. Even if the owners invested none of their income in productive enterprises (a fact that is assumed rather than known, some may have bought railroad stock, while the mere fact of creating dehesas involves some investment in the land), their role may have been beneficial. By drawing income from the countryside to the city, they encouraged urban growth. Economic historians have distinguished between cities as engines of growth and parasitic cities that suck
[62] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 89.
the surplus from their hinterlands through tithes, rents, and feudal levies. Madrid has been identified as the prime example of such a parasite.[63] Although most of our big buyers, the purchasers of despoblados, lived in Salamanca city and other places nearer than Madrid, their role fits that of an elite fueling parasite cities.
Recently, E. A. Wrigley has questioned whether any city could play the role of parasite. Even though the per capita income of peasants might increase momentarily if the exactions of cities were suppressed, he argues cogently, the real issue is not the immediate result but the potential for growth in the future. "To consume the surplus in the countryside, rather than surrender it for consumption in cities to meet the needs of a ruling urban elite, is no doubt gratifying to those whose bellies are filled as a result, but it is reasonable to view it as a small matter where the surplus is consumed, and a much more serious matter that it is disposed of, whether in town or country, in a way which makes it improbable that the next generation will be any better clad, housed or fed than the present."[64] In preindustrial economies, specialization of function was the primary means of increasing total production; it was replaced later by technological advance. For specialization there must be transport. The cities offered the needed market to stimulate improvements in transportation and agricultural specialization and thus lay the basis for industrial growth. To pursue Wrigley's argument further, "As Adam Smith emphasized . . . the ultimate source of most wealth remained the land and the most effective way of ensuring that the investment of capital added to productivity was to invest it in agriculture. It was because the growth of towns helped to liberate more fully the productive capacity of the countryside that their growth was important. The existence of towns made it both feasible and sensible for agricultural producers to specialize."[65]
The argument can readily be extended to the case at hand. In the despoblados and the dehesas that replaced them, the owners cut as big a share as they could from the pie, and most of this entered the market. To increase the number of tenants would have reduced the owners' slice and retarded specialization, and a reparto would have gone even further in this direction. The owners must have sensed as much when they fought Carlos III's attempt to settle farmers on despoblados. By con-
[63] Ringrose, "Perspectives," 77–81; Ringrose, Madrid and the Spanish Economy, chap. 13 (esp. 324).
[64] Wrigley, "Parasite or Stimulus," quote on 298.
[65] Ibid., 301.
trast, in their own way, the peasants of La Armuña obtained their reparto. By the twentieth century the arable plots had passed into their hands, and even several alquerías had been sold to groups of peasants. Absentees had found more profitable uses for their capital.[66] But these peasants, who looked so promising, did not produce a market for industrial goods. Rather, their wheat monoculture, cultivated with increasingly outmoded technology, depressed them into economic dependency on the advanced regions of Spain.[67] They suffered also from the grip of Malthus, as had the medieval settlers of the future despoblados and as any new settlers would have done, whom a reparto of despoblados in the nineteenth century might have produced. Desamortización of the despoblados proved to be a more effective engine of economic progress than the luckless reforms of Carlos III. The Ricardian trap can appear more unjust than the Malthusian trap because it is inflicted on the peasantry by identifiable individuals whose power and style of life arouse our sensibilities, but considered dispassionately it is more favorable to the ultimate improvement of society and no more painful. The way to exorcise Malthus was through Ricardo, and then both could disappear.
[66] Cabo Alonso, "La Armuña," 376–78, 401–3, 411. This is a truly fine study of the evolution of our "Armuña zone."
[67] See Sánchez Albornoz, "Castilla en el siglo XIX."
Chapter XIX—
The Big Buyers
One subject remains before this study is complete. Part 3 has sought to analyze the evolving agrarian structures of Jaén and Salamanca provinces, stressing the patterns that can be discerned from a quantitative analysis of the catastro, censuses, and sales by disentail. It has shown the critical importance of the largest buyers for understanding the forces behind the economic changes. Chapter 15 concluded, one recalls, that the Level 4 buyers in both provinces, that is, those few large buyers who spent half the total amount, were engaged as a group in commercial activities before the disentail and showed a preference for acquiring disentailed properties that were oriented toward production for the market. In other words, they represented the capitalistic sector of the two provinces. We saw also that they had a high proportion of men addressed as don, members of the social and professional elite. What remains is to look more closely at these individuals, almost all of whom escaped us in Part 2 because they resided in larger places than its seven towns.
The deeds of deposit recorded in Madrid tell us whether a buyer was addressed as don, doña, or by a more selective title. Sometimes the deeds add the residence, and if a buyer had a high position in government or armed forces, it may appear. Beyond this, however, the deeds of deposit, our primary source for the study of disentail at the provincial level, tell us nothing about these individuals.
To learn more about them, one must turn elsewhere. Most promising and accessible are the notarial records of the two provinces. (Spanish notaries kept copies of all the documents they witnessed, and those that
have withstood the erosion of time are now assembled in the provincial historical archives.) These records are far too extensive to be searched in full for this study, but the archives of the contadurías de hipotecas, provide a way into them. The contadurías, those offices established by Carlos III in the partidos to record in abbreviated form all exchanges and liens of real property, noted the residence of the buyers of disentailed properties, indicating the date and the notary of the original deed of sale. A review of them shows if the buyers engaged in other transactions involving real property in the area. Since an individual tended to rely on one notary to handle all his affairs, one can discover other activities of a buyer by looking through the records of the notary who recorded his purchase of disentailed property. At best, this approach is hit-or-miss and time-consuming, but it does permit one to draw conclusions about this important group of people.[1]
2
In Salamanca province there were eighty-five buyers in Level 4, divided by sex and title as in Table 19.1. I have been able to identify the residence (vecindad ) of fifty-six of them.[2] Thirty-seven lived in Salamanca city, thirteen in other towns of the province, and six outside the province. The capital of the province had 66 percent of those whose residence is known. Although that of twenty-nine buyers is unidentified, it is likely that many of them also lived in Salamanca city, in view of the nature and location of their purchases. Only one other place in the province, Ledesma (zone SD), cabeza of the largest partido after that of Salamanca city, had two big buyers. Alba de Tormes (SB), Béjar (SH), and Barco de Ávila (SI), also cabezas de partido, had one each, and the other eight were found in secondary towns. To judge from the disentail, Salamanca city, with its cathedral, university, provincial administration, and regional market, dominated the province not only in comparison with other towns in the province but with the rest of Spain.
The big buyers known to be living in Salamanca city were a distinguished group. Only one lacked the appellation don or doña. I have
[1] To compound the inherent difficulties, I had a suitcase stolen containing most of my notes from extended research in both provinces. Although I reassembled most of the material lost on this occasion, my resources permitted me to make only an abbreviated search of the notarial records for a second time.
[2] For the large buyers in Salamanca I have used the following sources: AHPS, Contaduría, libros 850–56; Sección Notarial, legajos 3463, 3464, 3470, 3626, 3629, 3844, 5637, 5908, 5909, 5912, 5913.
|
gleaned additional information about all but seven and have grouped them as shown in Table 19.2. Four were clergymen, two of them prebendaries of the cathedral. (The latter included don Lorenzo Piñuela, the second buyer in both La Mata and Villaverde.) At least four and maybe a fifth belonged to the faculty of the university. Six were involved in various levels of government, including two notaries (escribanos). Of these, two served the crown as administrators of the Consolidation Fund (the concept of conflict of interest had not yet developed), and two others were associated with the municipal government: one was the widow of a former regidor whom we have met as the buyer of half the término redondo of Pedrollén and the other was don Antonio Rascón, Vizconde de Revilla y Barajas, a hereditary regidor. Another six were in the legal profession. Seven were engaged in business, as merchants, stewards (administradores) of landed estates, and a farmer of church revenues. (Among the merchants was don Josef Puyol, fourth buyer in La Mata, and don Francisco Alonso y Moral, biggest buyer in Villaverde.)[3] Agriculture was represented by a landowner and a livestock owner. The only person not styled don or doña was one of the stewards.
The church, the university, the state, and the municipal council, the
[3] The two brothers don Josef and don Manuel Puyol made all their purchases together, appearing in the deeds as "D. Josef Puyol y hermano, vecinos y del comercio de Salamanca" (for example, AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, f. 322). A contemporary list of merchants of Spain dated 1806, now in the archives of the Banco de España, even names them this way (Archivo del Banco de España, legajo 708). Evidently partners, I have considered them as a single buyer.
|
law courts, commerce, and estate management—all traditional institutions of the old regime—provided the bulk of the large investors in disentailed land who lived in Salamanca city. If we look among the buyers below Level 4, we find others of the same callings. Three more members of the university faculty turn up, two more priests attached to the cathedral, and five other notaries. Others involved in business are identified also, although fewer than one might expect: a woolen manufacturer and two estate stewards for ecclesiastical institutions. One can also add
a second titled aristocrat who was a vecino of Salamanca, the Conde de Villagonzalo.[4]
Of the thirteen Level 4 buyers who lived in other towns in the province, I have information on only five. Three were involved in large scale agriculture. Antonio Toribio y Galán lived in Villares de la Reina, just north of Salamanca city. He was evidently a labrador, and had been chosen a procurador general of the cuarto of Armuña.[5] Manuel García Serrano was a labrador and ganadero (livestock owner) in Rodas Viejas (zone SC), a town of fifty-four inhabitants and two labradores in 1786. Manuel Moro was a rentero (tenant) in Otero de María Asensio, an alquería twelve kilometers southeast of Salamanca city in the bend of the Rio Tormes (zone SB). It had only nine inhabitants in 1786: a labrador and his wife, two farm hands under twenty-five, three servant girls, and two small children. This sounds very similar to the establishment at Pedrollén, yet here the tenant was able to buy over one hundred thousand reales' worth of properties in six nearby towns: arable plots, pastures, and a storehouse. Unlike the tenants of Pedrollén, Moro had amassed capital out of his undertaking and now set himself up as a major landowner, the person we have met who most resembles an eighteenth-century English farmer or a French fermier général. None of these men was accorded the title don; money did not at once procure such status. They were rural bourgeois in the classic sense of the term, and their money came out of the land. The royal councillors never heard complaints from such men, and they have been lost to historians as a result.
One of the other two identified residents of provincial towns was don Eugenio Alonso y Pizarro, a vecino of Ledesma, who farmed the royal monopoly in salt, tobacco, and playing cards. Doña Manuela de Onís, wife of the "excelentísimo señor don Josef de Onís," a member of the Consejo de Estado, was the other. She lived in Cantalapiedra (SB) and purchased three widely scattered major properties: a despoblado término redondo in zone SC and another despoblado and half a dehesa, both in zone SB. The total population of the three places in 1786 was four people. Wife of a prominent government official, she reminds us of doña María Vélez y España, the widow of a Salamanca regidor who bought the major share of Pedrollén, and not at all of the tenant farmer Manuel Moro just observed above. In sum, the identified large buyers
[4] See Appendix V for details on all these people.
[5] Cabo Alonso, "Antecedentes históricos," 87–88. The role of procurador general of a cuarto (district) of the partido of Salamanca is not clear, but it appears to have been associated with the sexmeros (see above, Chapter 18, section 4).
outside the provincial capital appear to have drawn their wealth from the land or from the state.
Seven Level 4 buyers lived outside the province, of whom six can be identified. Most important without question was don José Antonio Caballero. A reactionary statesman who ingratiated himself with Carlos IV, he was influential in bringing about the fall of Jovellanos in 1798 and succeeded him as secretary of grace and justice. For the next decade he was the leading opponent of Godoy, a champion of ecclesiastical reaction.[6] His politics did not prevent him from profiting from the disentail. In 1806 together with his father, the Marqués de Caballero, he bought thirty-five plots of arable land and part of a término redondo in Salamanca province.[7] After the death of his father the following year, he inherited the title of marqués and set these properties up as a mayorazgo.[8]
Other distinguished Madrileños who bought in Salamanca province include the Duque de la Roca, and the Duque de Alba, both grandes. Alba did not spend enough to raise him to the top level of buyers; he acquired part of the despoblado of Martín Vicente, located in his señorío of Alba de Tormes. Also from Madrid was a military figure, don Josef María Cano Mucientes, sargento maior of the Provincial Regiment of Burgos and a member of the Órden de Carlos III,[9] whom we met earlier as the biggest buyer in La Mata. His choice of Salamanca for his purchases is understandable, for his father, don Pedro Cano Mucientes, was a vecino of Salamanca city, the Level 4 buyer whom we know to be a landowner. The military career had favored his son; he invested almost three times as much as his father in the disentail, becoming fourteenth buyer in the province.
A more interesting case is that of don Cosme de Trespalacios, a lawyer in Madrid whom we came to know as a major buyer in Villaverde. A native of Asturias, he married a woman from Santander. Why he chose to invest in Salamanca is a mystery, but in 1800 alone he made at least nine purchases there totaling 438,000 reales, mostly in the rich Armuña district, using local agents.[10] He continued to acquire properties, in-
[6] See Herr, Eighteenth-Century Revolution , 419–21, 431.
[7] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 856, ff. 77r–93r, 146r–150r, 218r–219r, 293r–294r (1806).
[8] Ibid., ff. 330r–v, 352v–353r, 365v–366r, 402r–v, 403r–v, 440v–441r. Caballero's purchases were made too late to be recorded in Madrid, so that he does not figure among the eighty-five buyers listed in Table 19.1, but his purchases totaled 284,000 reales, placing him among the top twenty buyers.
[9] Ibid., libro 850, f. 455r–v (1799), and libro 851, ff. 145r–146r (1800).
[10] Ibid., libro 851, ff. 53, 75, 110, 132, 268, 289, 318, 347, 381 (1800).
cluding a término redondo south of the city in 1803.[11] In 1804 he moved to Tejares, a town across the river from Salamanca,[12] and by 1806 he was a vecino of Salamanca itself. When the sales ended, he had spent at least 1,200,000 reales for properties, making him almost the largest purchaser in the province. He died in 1812, leaving a fortune worth 7,760,000 reales plus 2,900 fanegas of wheat and 2,700 fanegas of barley, a hoard of grain worth another fortune in this year of famine.[13] Disentail gave this court lawyer an opportunity to become a powerful landowner and speculator in grain.
Three other Level 4 buyers resided outside the province. The señor don Manuel Cambronero lived in Valladolid, where he was an oidor (judge) in the Chancillería, and he was also a ministro honorario of the Consejo de Hacienda.[14] Don Martín de Ganá was a vecino and merchant of Bilbao. Finally, Josef Mateos Delgado is identified as a vecino of the lugar of San García. The nomenclátor of 1789 lists two San Garcías, one in Segovia, the other in Ávila near the Salamanca border. The obvious supposition is that Mateos Delgado was a vecino of the latter, probably a labrador, for he lacked the don. Still, it is odd that a labrador of Ávila would buy a whole despoblado named Agustínez, in full Charro country, ninety kilometers to the west of his home. The San García of Segovia was a major center for grain trade, with some twenty merchants in the 1780s who bought wheat in local markets throughout Old Castile and resold it in Madrid, making a profit that outraged the Council of Castile.[15] Mateos Delgado could well be such a figure, seeking the respectability and the assured returns of landowning. Agustínez was small, with only seven residents in 1786, but it had good arable land and a mill, a choice morsel. The buyer paid 450,000 reales for it in 1800, in vales reales, it is true, but this was the largest purchase in the entire disentail in the province.[16] Surely our man is the grain speculator, not the labrador.
One cannot leave this list of outside buyers without mentioning other royal officials whose recorded purchases did not raise them to Level 4.
[11] Ibid., libro 854, ff. 117r–119v (1803), término redondo La Reduelga in Cilleros el Hondo.
[12] Ibid., libro 855, ff. 46r–47r (1804).
[13] The inventory of Trespalacios's estate appears in AHPS, Sección Notarial, libro 3639, f. 365ff (López Villanueva, 1813). The late don Antonio Moreno Moreno of the AHPS kindly gave me this information.
[14] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 854, f. 68v (1804), and libro 856, f. 189r (1806).
[15] García Sanz, Desarrollo y Crísis, 183–86.
[16] Madrid A4002 (1800).
The Marqués de la Granja was intendant of Burgos: he bought two-thirds of a término redondo.[17] Don Joseph Joaquín Fernández de Ocampo was corregidor of Santo Domingo de la Calzada (Logroño), his purchase an entire término redondo and numerous arable fields.[18] Finally one finds among the buyers don Juan Meléndez Valdés, the famous poet. In 1781 he had obtained a chair in humanities in the University of Salamanca. From here he moved to Valladolid as a judge and to Madrid as fiscal in the crown court of the capital. In 1798, after the fall of Jovellanos, he was banished to Medina del Campo and soon to Zamora (just north of Salamanca). From here he and his wife, a native of Salamanca, made at least two purchases of arable fields in the northwest corner of the province (zone SB), spending some 64,000 reales, of which he borrowed 58,000. He set himself up as an absentee landlord, complete with administrative steward, whom he instructed to establish new leases and take delinquent tenants to court.[19]
3
About the Level 4 buyers in Jaén province I have much less specific information, partly because the notes I originally collected from the notarial records were stolen and partly because of the structure of the province. Jaén city did not dominate its province in the way that Salamanca did. Landed wealth was held by families and churches in each town, not as in Salamanca, concentrated to a high degree in ecclesiastical and university foundations of the capital. One result is that the disentail was carried out in a less concentrated fashion. In Jaén, Level 4 buyers were 6 percent of all buyers (151 of 2,550); in Salamanca, only 4 percent (85 of 2,147). Of the 151 Level 4 buyers, a place of residence is known for 80, and a probable residence can be assigned to 45 others. Of these 125, Jaén city had 28, or 22 percent of those known, in comparison with 66 percent for Salamanca city. Fifteen other towns had more than one; the most important were Baeza with 18, Ubeda with 11, Andújar and
[17] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, f. 451r (1800).
[18] Ibid., libro 850, 435v–437r (1799), Madrid A2867 (1800), C25577, C25584, C25585 (1803).
[19] One purchase of twenty-two arable plots in Villaflores for 4,050 reales in efectivo, Madrid, C29373 (1803). The other sale is noted by Meléndez's biographer, an unspecified number of wheat fields in the same town for 60,512 reales, borrowing 58,000 from a private individual to make the payment (Demerson, Don Juan Meléndez Valdés, 238–41). This sale does not appear in the Madrid deeds under Meléndez's name.
|
Martos with 8, and Bailén with 7. Because the buyers were so dispersed, it is difficult to find them in the notarial records.[20]
I have information on fifteen of the twenty-eight buyers known to live in Jaén city and have assigned them to the categories shown in Table 19.3. Nine, 60 percent of those known, were associated with the church, the state, or the municipality. They included a prebendary of the cathedral, a member of the Royal Council of the Indies who lived in Jaén (the biggest buyer in the province), a retired surgeon of the royal navy, and the commissioner in charge of selling disentailed properties, who, like
[20] For the big buyers of Jaén I have used the following sources: AHPJ, Contaduría, libros 4412, 4426, Protocolos, libros 2183, 2254, 2255. Unfortunately, the notes from eight other notarial volumes were stolen from me.
his counterparts in Salamanca, used his position for his personal advantage. Two got their income from the land, so far as the available data indicate. Another was an important cloth merchant with dealings as far away as Murcia, still another apparently a silk merchant. Two buyers belonged to the tertiary sector: a steward of estates and a purveyor of building stone, the latter the only member of the group not to be titled don.[21] My research also produced information on four buyers in Level 3 in the city, not much of a sample but one that reinforces the picture. Two were municipal officers, one a canon of the cathedral and one a noble of caballero rank. Church, state, and city dominate the known big buyers, but with hardly half the Level 4 buyers of the city identified, conclusions must be cautious.
Twenty-nine Level 4 buyers in the province lacked the distinction don, a smaller percentage than in Salamanca. The residence or probable residence of twenty-seven is known. Only five lived in Jaén city. One finds them in second-rank places: four of eleven buyers in Ubeda, three of seven in Bailén, all four of Cazorla, the only buyers in four smaller places.[22] The Madrid records can be deceiving. Antonio Balenzuela, Level 4 buyer in Lopera, was buying for don Juan Nepomuceno Morales, a lieutenant colonel in Córdoba, as we saw in Chapter 12. But these commoners were in any case a minority. In twenty-one towns (out of thirty-two towns with Level 4 buyers) all the buyers were either priests or titled don. Although I have no further information on them, they recall the hidalgo and clerical notables of Baños and Lopera. Since the wealth of the province was in land, one can be reasonably certain that most of these buyers, scattered through the large agricultural towns of Jaén, were members of the local landowning oligarchy, who took advantage of disentail to strengthen their position.
Only three Level 4 buyers from outside the province have fallen into my net. One was don Josef Pérez Caballero, member of the Royal Council of Hacienda resident in Madrid, the biggest buyer in Baños. Another was the just-mentioned army officer of Córdoba. The third was don Francisco de Paula San Martín y Coello, a prebendary of the cathedral of Seville.[23] Only the last turns up in the Madrid records; the others became known through the town studies in Part 2. This means that other large outside buyers may lie hidden behind local agents. Yet their number is unlikely to be great. Jaén was not subject to extensive outside ex-
[21] See Appendix W for details.
[22] Lopera, La Iruela, Sabiote, Ibros.
[23] AHPJ, Protocolos, libro 2183, ff. 20r–23v (1802), Madrid C14301 (1802).
ploitation, but it is significant that the three who have become known point again to the church and state as sources for investment capital.
4
It is impressive how traditional these groups of large buyers appear. In Jaén city the church, the crown, the municipality, the navy, land, cloth trade. When one adds the hidalgo elite of the other towns, one has a good sample of the upper crust of Andalusian society of the old regime. So too in Salamanca, priests with fat benefices, university professors, city councillors, servants of the crown, grain merchants. Buyers from outside were high officers in the royal government and armed forces, clergymen, a court lawyer, a Bilbao merchant, a grande. Government, church, land, and commerce were the major sources of capital for these big investors, although one must assume that some wealth also was inherited.
Merchants were an important minority, but one should not think of them as a rival group to the established elite. Almost all were dons, and indeed merchants were fully entitled to the honor. Since the seventeenth century the kings had authorized hidalgos to be members of the mercantile consulados of the major commercial cities, and the Bourbon kings rewarded successful merchants and manufacturers with hidalguía.[24] Nobility could be purchased by wealthy commoners. The famous expatriate and renegade priest, José María Blanco, tells us that his father, a rich merchant of Seville, in midcentury bought a privilege of nobility for himself and his heirs.[25] The Bank of Spain preserves a list of large merchants of the monarchy in 1806 and 1807, where the majority, but not all, appear as dons.[26] We may assume that the merchant-dons among our buyers were either legally hidalgos or considered themselves to be their equals.
Conversely the established elite was not divorced from business. The doctor don Josef Pando, professor of civil law at the university, had a second vocation (or was it his first?) in administering the property of others. In 1799 he obtained, or renewed, the contract to be steward (administrador) of the Marqués de Almarza, owner, we saw, of Arauzo, the largest despoblado of the province. He had two guarantors (fiadores), a
[24] Callahan, Honor, Commerce, and Industry, 15–31.
[25] Blanco y Crespo, Letters from Spain, 68 (the person described is himself).
[26] Archivo del Banco de España, legajo 708. I owe this information to David Ringrose.
municipal regidor and don Anselmo Prieto Hermosino, a merchant of the city and also a Level 4 buyer.[27] He renewed the contract in 1803, this time using as backers another faculty member and don Josef Iglesias de la Casa, about whom we know only that he was a Level 3 buyer.[28] Pando also administered the property of a priest, precentor of the cathedral, and at one point acted as fiador, placing a lien on his properties, for the steward of the Royal Asylum of Salamanca.[29]
There was a network of wealthy vecinos of Salamanca who guaranteed fulfillment of one another's contracts, always, no doubt, for a consideration that does not appear in the contracts. Another member of it was doctor don Antonio Reyrruard, also of the university. He stood guarantor for a patrono (trustee?) of a religious endowment,[30] and in 1789 he had been involved in founding the Compañía de Comercio of Salamanca, an association of clothiers and jewelers, although in what capacity is not clear.[31] Don Pablo Reyrruard—from the unusual name probably an immediate relative of don Antonio—was fiador for the farmer of royal taxes in the large town of Cantalapiedra and also administered the property of a large landowner.[32]
The desamortización gave many of the big buyers an opportunity to line their nests. Doctor don Francisco de Candamo, a member of the university community, not only bought for himself but acted on occasion as agent for Trespalacios before the latter moved from Madrid to Salamanca.[33] Notaries also got into the act. Don Carlos María Pérez Albarez de Rueda, a notary distinguished by the ownership of a vínculo, acted as an agent,[34] while don Juan de Andraca, a notario mayor of the ecclesiastical court of Salamanca, lent money to buyers of disentailed properties in the form of mortgages. The latter also had business relations in Segovia, but the nature is not stated.[35] These men all belonged to
[27] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 850, f. 475r (1799).
[28] Ibid., libro 854, ff. 5v–6r (1803).
[29] AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5912 (Bellido, 25 Oct. 1803); Contaduría, libro 855, ff. 57v–58v (1804).
[30] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, ff. 2r–3r (1800).
[31] Larruga, Memorias, 30 : 46: "Doctor Reiruard" signs a request to the corregidor to authorize meetings of the company.
[32] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 856, ff. 209v–210r (1806); libro 851, ff. 194r–201v (1800).
[33] Ibid., libro 851, ff. 53r, 110r, 225r–227r (1800), Madrid A2727, A2738– 39 (1800).
[34] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, f. 143 (1800); for his vínculo, libro 855, f. 64r–v (1804).
[35] Ibid., libro 852, ff. 140v–141r (1801) for the mortgage, and ff. 141v–142r for the original sale; also Sección Notarial, legajo 3463, f. 75 (Gómez de Cifuentes, 8 Nov. 1800), for another mortgage.
privileged orders, but they acted just like the men of affairs. Don Francisco Alonso y Moral, grain merchant and one of the biggest buyers, also was an estate steward.[36]
A fuller search through the notarial records would undoubtedly turn up more examples of big buyers who served the state, church, and university yet were making money on the side in dealings in property and commerce. Their cases add support to the indication derived in Chapter 15 from the fact that Level 4 buyers paid for their purchases with a greater percentage of vales reales than other buyers, to wit, that many already participated in the world of commerce before the disentail began, whatever their official vocation might be.
Let us look with greater care at the activities of a couple of these men. Pando, the professor of civil law, came directly in touch with peasants through his role as estate steward. Some of them turned to him when they found themselves in need of money. In October 1799 vecinos of Cabrerizos (Armuña), evidently tenants of his principal, promised to repay Pando 15 fanegas of wheat after the next harvest.[37] Again in 1803 he came to the aid of peasants: three hundred reales to one group in January, 120 fanegas of rye to the town council of Cubo de Don Sancho in May to be repaid in cash on 15 August at forty-two reales each.[38] Prospects of a crop failure had raised prices, and Pando insisted on full value and perhaps a little more, and in money, in case the price fell after the harvest.[39] The contracts mention no gain for Pando, but everyone knew the realities of life. With emoluments and other perquisites from his chair, his income as estate administrator (in Jaén administrators got 10 percent of the income of the owner), the hidden interest on loans to hard-pressed farmers, and other sources we may not have uncovered, Pando was able to become one of the largest buyers in the province: one purchase of arable fields in 1802, four in 1803, six in 1806, six in 1807, plus a quarter of a término redondo and an elegant house in Salamanca city.[40] His purchases totaled almost one million reales. He certainly did not give his students his undivided attention.
An even more striking case is that of don Francisco Alonso y Moral.
[36] AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5909, f. 32 (Bellido, 3 Apr. 1800).
[37] Ibid., legajo 5908, f. 229 (Bellido, 6 Oct. 1799).
[38] Ibid., legajo 5912 (Bellido, 27 Jan. and 9 May 1803).
[39] The Correo mercantil, 2 May 1803, lists wheat as selling in Salamanca at 51 reales per fanega, barley at 34. Rye usually sold higher than barley (see Anes, Crisis, Gráfico 40).
[40] Madrid C18654 (1802), C29389–92 (1803), C47400–01, C47408–9, C47411, C50320 (1806), C51231, C51233, C51245–46, C51305, C53145 (1/4 of término redondo of Llen), C53897, C53983 (1807).
Although identified as a merchant ("del comercio") of Salamanca, his extracurricular activities were very similar to those of Pando. He administered the mayorazgo of at least one wealthy owner and was judicially appointed administrator for the embargoed properties within the province of Salamanca of a grande living in Venice, to insure payments of his debts in Spain, including those to the crown.[41] He was one of the many persons Trespalacios engaged to handle his affairs, and was twice guarantor for don Pablo Reyrruard, once for him to take over the administration of an embargoed estate and once to obtain the lifting of an embargo on an estate under litigation that Reyrruard had inherited.[42] The estate was important: Alonso y Moral guaranteed Reyrruard to a limit of one million reales. Although they acted together on occasion in their affairs, Reyrruard owed Alonso significant compensation for this service.
Alonso y Moral's commercial activities involved agricultural products, primarily grain and also hides.[43] He would contract during the winter for wheat to be delivered after the following harvest.[44] During the crisis years of 1803–4, this activity took on a new form, as he lent wheat to peasants desperate for seed or food. Between 23 March and 26 April 1803 he made nineteen loans of grain "for our urgent needs" to farmers in fourteen towns, mostly of La Armuña, averaging a mere seventeen fanegas each, all repayable on 15 August.[45] But 15 August came and the harvest had been disastrous. The farmers turned to Alonso for further credit, but now they found his terms had changed. On 16 September he advanced farmers living in the city the money to buy sixty-nine fanegas of wheat at seventy-eight reales; in reality, he must have sold them the wheat at this price against future payment, since this was some five reales below the going price.[46] In October peasants began to besiege him for help. He gave it in grain, but he demanded repayment in cash on 15 August 1804, quoting a price somewhat below the market and insisting on an acknowledgment of his generosity in the contracts.[47]
[41] AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5909 (Bellido, 3 Apr. and 4 Sept. 1800).
[42] Ibid., legajo 5912 (Bellido, 7 Dec. 1803); Contaduría, libro 851, ff. 194r–201r (1800), libro 855, ff. 15r–16r (1804).
[43] For grain, see below; for hides, AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5912 (Bellido, 17 Oct. 1803).
[44] For example, ibid., legajo 5909 (Bellido, ten contracts between 1 Jan. and 11 Feb. 1800 for 285 fanegas of wheat).
[45] Ibid., legajo 5912 (Bellido, 1803).
[46] Correo mercantil, 12 Sept. 1803, Salamanca wheat price 84 reales; 19 Sept., 82 reales.
[47] One contract reads, "at 68 reales per fanega, which we admit is moderate, much below the price which it has at present and which we accept" (AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5912 [Bellido, 16 Oct. 1803], vecinos of Aldeaseca de Armuña).
In some cases no grain may have changed hands. Alonso, now a powerful landowner, was converting the rent in kind that had been due on 15 August into cash at what had been the August price and taking credit for his kindness.[48] By the end of the year, Alonso had made fifty such loans to farmers of villages near Salamanca.[49] In these same years we discovered that religious institutions simply carried forward in kind the arrears of their tenants.[50] Alonso converted arrears to money at famine prices and paraded his few farthings of charity. His tenants' true opinion of him does not come through in the contracts; they could now feel the sting of the disentail. These were men and women such as we came to know in La Mata and Villaverde, some of whom had bought fields themselves with their savings. Crisis years and a creditor like Alonso could wipe out their gains. Alonso's books, were they ever to turn up, could tell a fuller story.
5
For his part, Alonso responded to the desamortización with acumen. The registers of Salamanca record forty-four purchases totaling 1,369,000 reales, spread over all the years from 1799 to 1807 except 1804.[51] The vast majority consisted of collections of arable plots in the rich Cuarto de Armuña (zone SA), although some spilled over into the adjoining Cuarto de Valdevilloria (SB) (Map 19.1). Thrown in were some meadows and a few houses. In 1804, when he acted as fiador for Reyrruard to the tune of one million reales, he placed a lien on 539 arable plots, seven meadows, and eight houses, located in twelve towns and Salamanca city. They were not his entire holdings, for his purchases included some 210 plots and ten meadows in twenty-four other places. Between 1805 and 1807 he bought 208 more arable plots and seven meadows. Altogether he acquired almost a thousand plots and twenty-five meadows. When we recall that La Mata had 551 plots and thirty-three meadows for twenty vecinos in agriculture and Villaverde 1,354 plots and eighty-eight meadows for forty-three vecinos in agriculture, we can appreciate
[48] See for example, ibid. (16 Oct.), vecinos of Castellanos de Villiguera. Wheat price 73 reales, Correo mercantil, 15 Aug. 1803.
[49] All AHPS, Sección Notarial, legajo 5912 (Bellido, 1803).
[50] See above, Chapter 7, section 2.
[51] The contaduría records for Salamanca partido. The Madrid records show forty-one sales for 1,268,000 reales. They do not all match, and at least in one of the Madrid sales he acted as an agent. My analysis is based on contaduría; those in Madrid that are thereby omitted would not change the pattern.

Map 19.1.
Purchases of Alonso y Moral, Merchant of Salamanca
the extent of his acquisitions: enough arable land to support a fair-sized town with thirty vecinos devoted to agriculture, perhaps six hundred to seven hundred hectares of prime wheat land and corresponding pastures for the plow teams.
He could not buy large blocks of land in the villages of Armuña, for land was owned in collections of small scattered plots, but he specialized in arable and made his purchases in a limited region. A circle twenty kilometers in diameter would include almost all of them, and within it, he concentrated on certain towns. Villaverde was one of these. In La Mata, on the other hand, he bought nothing, even though it was within the circle.
Only two purchases did not fit this pattern. In 1800 he bought a granary with an attached house and offices eight kilometers west of the city, outside the cirlce.[52] It would be used in his business independently of his new holdings. The other exception was a portion of the despoblado of Chinín, southeast of Salamanca, purchased late in 1807.[53] It came as
[52] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, f. 452r–v (1800), Cabras Malas.
[53] Ibid., libro 856, f. 374r–v (1807).

Map 19.2.
Purchases of Trespalacios, Advocate of Madrid and Salamanca
part of a sale that included land in two of his towns of Armuña and was his only purchase of an alquería or despoblado. He did not want to deal with large tenant farmers, preferring to concentrate on his established business as a grain merchant and on leasing to peasants in return for prime candeal wheat, where he could turn a pretty penny on their arrears, should the occasion arise. He was a man of affairs who knew the advantage of specialization.
He had his ear closer to the ground than the advocate, don Cosme Trespalacios. Living in Madrid, the latter made twelve purchases in Salamanca province between 1800 and 1803, and after he moved to Salamanca, another seven (Map 19.2). In all he spent 728,000 reales, about half what Alonso y Moral spent. Like Alonso, he preferred sets of arable plots that he could rent, especially in La Armuña, and he picked up some six hundred plots and nineteen meadows, two cortinas, and four houses. But he did not concentrate his purchases as much as Alonso; the towns in which he bought most heavily were not close to each other. His acquisitions also included a término redondo in the middle of the Charro district, about ninety hectares with a pasture of 250 live oak trees.[54] He apparently did not have quite Alonso y Moral's sense of purpose.
Trespalacios's purchase of a término redondo follows, in fact, a dif-
[54] Ibid., libro 854, ff. 117r–119v (1803), La Reduelga in the término of Cilleros el Hondo.

Map 19.3.
Purchases of Sánchez de Onís, Priest
ferent strategy evident among those purchasers who invested in these large properties. They chose to buy in widely different locations. Take the priest don Segundo Sánchez de Onís, who spent 1,408,000 reales, the largest sum in the province (Map 19.3). He bought three términos redondos in their entirety, one in the Cuarto de Armuña (SA), one in the partido of Alba de Tormes (SB), and one in the partido of Ledesma (SD); in addition he bought part of a dehesa in the cuarto of Peña de Rey (SB) and another in the province of Zamora.[55] He also bought five sets of arable fields in Cantalapiedra, on the border of Valladolid province (SB).[56] His holdings now stretched seventy kilometers east and west and perhaps fifty north and south, if indeed he made no other purchases outside Salamanca province. Unfortunately, none of the documents tell us where he lived.
Quite different people followed this pattern. The university professor don Antonio Reyrruard bought a término redondo in the partido of Ledesma (SD), arable fields in four towns of Armuña (including La Mata and Narros, SA), and a fourth interest in a dehesa in the partido of Alba de Tormes (SB), all forming a triangle about forty by thirty by
[55] TR Cañadino, Madrid C12687 (1802), TR Lagartera A609 (1799), TR Valderas C1427 (1800), part of dehesa Val de Santiago C10790 (1801), one half of dehesa La Macadina (in Zamora province), C1276 (1800).
[56] Madrid C13211, C16563, C17235 (1802), C42462 (1805), C45577 (1806).

Map 19.4.
Purchases of Sánchez García
thirty kilometers, with Salamanca at the center.[57] Don Francisco Sánchez García may have lived in the western part of the province, since he spread his purchases around the partido of Ledesma (SD and SE, Map 19.4). He bought a house in Santa María de Sando and a fifth interest in a nearby término redondo[58] and added arable and enclosed cortinas in ten towns located sixty-three kilometers east and west and thirty-four north and south. A similar case, the Bilbao merchant don Martín de Ganá: in one purchase he acquired a number of grain fields in seven towns north, east, and south of Salamanca; in another a término redondo—a whole town with nearly three hundred inhabitants seventy-five kilometers to the west near Portugal; and finally in a third purchase more fields and a house in Salamanca.[59] Was he planning to move to Salamanca? Perhaps, but for all we know, he was buying in other provinces too.
Unlike Alonso y Moral, these men were spreading their properties widely and buying both arable plots and great estates devoted in large
[57] TR Contiensa, ibid., A11091 (1802), 1/4 dehesa Revilla de San Pedro, A1155 (1799), tierras in Armuña, AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, ff. 66r–v, 111v, 227r (1800).
[58] Madrid, C1343 (1800), TR Valdesuero C30195 (1804).
[59] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 851, ff. 29v–30r (1800) lands, ff. 63v–66r house, Madrid A11882 (1803) TR lugar de Vidola.
part to livestock. Twenty-three Level 4 buyers acquired despoblados, and twenty of them made more than one purchase. But of those twenty, only two bought nothing but despoblados, both of them women. One was the now-familiar widow Vélez y España. Besides her share of Pedrollén, she bought three other towns in their entirety. Although all in the Charro district, they formed a diamond twenty by thirty kilometers.[60] The second was Doña Manuela de Onís, wife of the royal councillor, who bought two despoblados in the partido of Alba de Tormes. Other buyers of despoblados sought in addition all kinds of holdings, preferring arable fields, with houses, pastures, and irrigated plots coming only in package deals. We have seen that large buyers were not generally attracted by labor-intensive land or urban properties. Most wealthy investors sought diversity, especially geographic diversity, not homogeneity.
We may recall that peasants living in the towns of the partido of El Mirón, far enough away from Salamanca city to be beyond its economic control, also crossed their village boundaries in their purchases of land. Those in the valley of the Corneja river, where they could farm profitably, acquired pastures in the barren hills of El Mirón, not just for the oxen of their plow teams but for dozens and hundreds of sheep as well.
The strategy of these buyers, both big and modest, was not new. Religious institutions had scattered their holdings widely, as we can tell from a number of account books of convents and monasteries that have been preserved. The Salamanca convent of Santa Isabel of Observant Minorite nuns as of 1807 received in annual rent 817 fanegas of wheat and 34 fanegas of barley for fields in twenty-three towns spread over a region fifty kilometers from east to west and twenty-five north to south (zones SA, SB, and one town in SC).[61] In 1800 the rents of the convent of Corpus Christi in Salamanca of the same order totaled 702 fanegas of wheat and 7 of minor crops. They came from twenty-nine places (two outside the province) stretching sixty-five kilometers in one direction and forty-five in the other (Map 19.5).[62] The convent of La Concepción of the same order had concentrated its property more: in 1800 752 fanegas of wheat from twenty-one towns in a region thirty-five by twenty-five kilometers.[63] In 1805–6 the Augustinian monks who ran the Colegio de Nuestra Señora de la Vega drew 1,367 fanegas of wheat and 162 of barley from twenty-three towns spread out fifty-five kilometers by
[60] Ibid., A5767 (1800), lugar of Porquerizos, A11880 (1803), lugares of Taberuela and Alizaces.
[61] AHN, Clero, libro 10888.
[62] Ibid., libro 10880.
[63] Ibid., libro 10854.

Map 19.5.
Properties of the Convent of Corpus Christi, Franciscan Nuns of Salamanca

Map 19.6.
Properties of the Colegio de Nuestra Señora de la Vega,
Augustinian Monks of Salamanca
thirty (Map 19.6).[64] The nuns of Saint Bernard, monastery of Nuestra Señora del Jesús, richer than any of the above, owned a number of despoblados as well as many arable fields. Their income in 1800 was 1,467 fanegas of wheat and 19,358 reales in cash (at 50 reales per fanega another 387 EFW), plus minor payments in chickens and straw, delivered from twenty-four places, eighty kilometers east to west and ninety north to south. Their property reached into Zamora, Toro, and Ávila provinces.[65]
It is true that religious foundations obtained much of their property through bequests, and the luck of the draw could determine where they would receive gifts. Yet the account books show that they occasionally bought and sold properties, so that their holdings were not absolutely frozen. Also they could encourage contributions that would fit their plans. They had a clear preference for properties that they could rent for a return in grain, a commodity that could be consumed or easily marketed. Of this sample, only the monastery of Nuestra Señora del Jesús had wide holdings in pastures and despoblados that brought in cash. Religious institutions were not, of course, averse to owning despoblados and términos redondos. In the previous chapter we saw how many they had and how many were disentailed. But even though most of them liked to receive good, white candeal wheat, they liked to see it come in from a wide circle around Salamanca city. The new secular owners seem to have inherited their concept of estate building from the religious orders.
The great noble houses of Spain had also traditionally spread their holdings, sometimes across different regions of the peninsula. We saw that the Duque de Alba, or, in our time, the Duquesa de Alba, was señor of five partidos of Salamanca and had estates there. The duque also was largest landowner in five places in Andalusia and señor in nine others.[66] The Duque de Medinaceli was the largest landowner in twenty-four towns located in three of the four provinces of Andalusia and had other estates hardly less notable in Catalonia and other parts of Spain. Just running this vast establishment kept thirty accountants busy in Madrid.[67] The Duque de Medina Sidonia, the Duque del Infantado, the Du-
[64] Ibid., libro 10653.
[65] Ibid., libro 10668.
[66] See above, Chapter 17, section 2; Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 42, 54.
[67] Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 42, 54, and Herr, Eighteenth-Century Revolution, 96.
que de Osuna, and numerous more modest grandes and other titled aristocrats followed the same pattern to a greater or lesser extent.[68]
This study does not provide us with a map of a grande's estates, but we can observe some of the activities of a minor local titled aristocrat, don Antonio Rascón, Vizconde de Revilla y Barajas, vecino of Salamanca with a hereditary office of regidor. I do not have a list of his property prior to disentail, but it included at least one despoblado in the Charro district (SC), which he rented out.[69] He exploited the disentail to acquire a portion of a término redondo in zone SD, arable fields in four towns north, south, and west of Salamanca city, a pasture in the foothills of the Sierra de la Peña de Francia in the south of the province, plus a number of properties unlocated in the deeds of deposit.[70] Meanwhile he used his influence to obtain a lease—in perpetuity—for a vast pasture called Sierra Menor owned by the city and located on the northern slopes of the Sierra de la Peña de Francia. It contained 1,140 huebras (over 500 hectares), and the vizconde got it for only 1,140 reales a year.[71] He would appear to have owned large herds in at least two parts of the province, for which he was acquiring extensive pastures through purchase and lease, while at the same time receiving rent in kind from arable plots located in many different places.
Whatever their status—clergymen, laymen, aristocrats, peasants, or religious institutions, local residents or absentees, old or new owners—they all followed a similar approach to landowning: spread your properties widely and hold various types of land. The pattern had its roots deep in the old regime and was still very much in force. According to the generally accepted explanation, no rational, or even irrational, economic planning lay behind the aristocratic practice of scattered estates. Critics have explained it by pointing to the institution of the mayorazgo, which was developed with the primary purpose of protecting future generations of a titled family from the ravages of a spendthrift heir and thus maintaining Spain's nobility from economic decline.[72] When two heirs to mayorazgos married, their estates would be brought together in
[68] See Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 32–48 and Map 3. Nader, "Noble Income in Sixteenth-Century Castile," 417–21, describes how a vast network of properties was built up from New Castile to Granada.
[69] Pelagarcía, see AHPS, Contaduría, libro 855, f. 167 (1805).
[70] TR Zafroncino, Madrid C14699, 14700 (1802); arable, C12683, C13158, C17953 (1802), AHPS, Contaduría, libro 853, f. 96 (1802); unlocated Madrid C14645 (1802), C50319 (1806), C51247 (1807).
[71] AHPS, Contaduría, libro 855, f. 84r–v (1804).
[72] This is the explanation offered by Carr, "Spain," 48–49. It is a commonplace.
the hands of succeeding generations, much as Charles V brought together his vast empire across the face of Europe. If royal marriage alliances produced dynastic monarchies, aristocratic marriages produced what might be called dynastic landholdings.
These vast estates have been roundly denounced. To read the economic history of Spain is to hear repeatedly the dirge that its grandes, who enjoyed their princely incomes without caring a fig for the condition of their estates or the suffering of their peasants, were over the centuries responsible for the low productivity of Spanish agriculture and the poverty of the countryside. Unable to live on more than a small portion of their estates, they gave up any attempt to be resident owners and escaped to Madrid, center of the royal court and of social intercourse with their peers, leaving their estates and their peasants to the mercies, neither tender nor enlightened, of their stewards.
Structurally one may well compare the aristocratic penchant for broadcasting their estates to the well-known feature of north European open-field farming, the scattered collections of strips worked by individual peasant households. Its inefficiency has also been frequently censured, both by eighteenth-century agricultural reformers like Arthur Young and by later economic historians. Scattered strips wasted the time of the peasants and their draft animals in unnecessary trips back and forth across their village fields and raised the cost of fencing to prohibitive levels even where local law and custom might have permitted enclosure. Recently, the economic historian Jan de Vries has compared the economic advantages of integrated peasant family farms to the disadvantages of exploitations consisting of scattered strips. In contrast to aristocratic entails, which are blamed for assembling excessively large holdings, the strip system, according to de Vries, led to unchecked distribution of the parcels among heirs and resulted in individual exploitations that could not engage the full labor of the owners or support their families.[73] The arguments hold equally well for the irregular scattered plots of Castile.
Some people in Spain were aware of the arguments in favor of concentrated ownership. In 1803, one may recall, the king authorized owners of mayorazgos and other lay entails to sell their outlying holdings in order to purchase disentailed properties nearer their main estates, "to facilitate . . . the gathering of the scattered estates that belong to them, in which [possibility] they have so much interest because of the savings
[73] De Vries, Dutch Rural Economy, 1–17.
in cost of administration and because of the advantage of being able to attend themselves to achieving the improvement of which the estates are capable, with great potential benefit to the public welfare from the advance and general development of agriculture."[74] How many noble owners took advantage of this offer is not known. The example of the large Salamanca buyers suggests that very few were, like Alonso y Moral, convinced of the benefits of concentration.
Opportunity, of course, controlled to a certain extent what they could buy, but so many properties were going on sale that they could pick and choose, as Alonso y Moral did. The explanation lies not in constraint or even accident, but in conscious motivation. Their strategy implied little direct involvement with the farming of their lands. They did not intend to inspect their holdings in person or through their stewards, certainly not regularly. Instead they were happy to sign leases with tenants who took full charge of what went on in the fields and fulfilled the wishes of their landlords by presenting their rent in kind or in coin each year on the appointed day. Miguel Artola argues correctly that the policy of great owners of leasing their lands to others who carried out the direct exploitation was a rational economic decision when their properties were so dispersed that they were perforce absentee owners in most places.[75] His implication is that the dispersal forced the policy on the owners. The example of the buyers in Salamanca indicates that the policy was accepted wisdom and governed the creation of estates, both great and small, rather than vice versa.
In an attempt to explain the enigma of why the system of scattered strips common to English villages was established in the Middle Ages and preserved long after the development of markets for agricultural products had shown the advantages of consolidation, Donald McCloskey has argued that farmers practiced it because it diminished the risk from natural disasters and consequent poor harvests. Scattered strips were an economically rational arrangement in an age that did not yet know crop insurance.[76] Fifty years ago Marc Bloch reached much the same conclusion with reference to the pattern of scattered strips in France: "If the plots were dispersed . . . everyone had some hope of avoiding the full impact of the natural or human disasters—hailstorms, plant diseases, devastation—that might descend upon a place without
[74] RC, 3 Feb. 1803. AHN, Hac., libro 8555, no. 6375.
[75] Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 49–51.
[76] McCloskey, "Persistence of English Common Fields."
destroying it completely."[77] In his study of the agrarian economy of early modern Poland, Witold Kula applies a similar explanation to the vast dispersed estates of the Polish nobility. While they created difficulties and expenses of administration, they provided a form of insurance from natural calamities and the destruction of war. Since most disasters would affect only part of the country at one time, the nobleman could use the product of his unscathed properties to rebuild those that had been devastated.[78] A letter of Pliny the Younger written at the end of the first century after Christ reveals that the policy of distributing one's landholdings may be of very ancient origin. Debating whether to buy a fine rural estate contiguous to one he owned, and intermixed with it, which would provide the advantage of using the same agent for both, he reasoned, "I don't know whether it is prudent to venture so much of one's property under the same climate, and to the same casualties; it seems a more sure method of guarding against the caprices of fortune, to distribute one's possessions into different situations."[79]
Spanish society of the old regime was permeated with a timeless folk wisdom that admonished anyone who looked to the land for his income not to put all his eggs in one basket. Scattered aristocratic estates dominated Spain at the national level, and scattered plots dominated the grain districts of Castile at the village level. In between, ecclesiastical owners and big buyers dispersed their holdings throughout their regions. Glorified peasants, they turned the plains around Salamanca into a vast three-field system. The mentality that preferred dispersal ran the social gamut from top to bottom. Scattered plots were not the creation of peasants alone. Indeed, in most instances, the peasant rented his plots in a set from a larger owner, very likely a religious institution before disentail and an individual afterwards. In turn the predecessors of the current owners may have received them as a series of bequests or purchased them from peasants, with the actual origin of the dispersal being lost in time, in Spain as in northern Europe.
In a classic passage, Marc Bloch described how the medieval French lord in the process of substituting rent for labor dues from his serfs transformed himself from the manager of a business—an entrepreneur, if you will—into a stockholder in the land.[80] Our wealthy Castilian buyers acted like the later medieval lords, but it would be a mistake to
[77] Bloch, Caractères originaux 1 : 56.
[78] Kula, Economic Theory, 146.
[79] Pliny, Letters, book 3, letter 19.
[80] Bloch, Caractères originaux 1 : 100–101: "Il cesse d'être un chef d'entreprise. . . . Il est devenu un rentier du sol."
see only the past in their behavior. Quite the contrary, they can be likened also to modern investors who spread their portfolios to hedge their bets. The rent these men received in fanegas of wheat or reales de vellón hardly differed from dividends on blue-chip stocks. While the harvest of the farmer rose and fell, the yield to the owner remained relatively fixed, depending only on the stability of the markets for grain and currency. The farmers had to come to Salamanca to sign the lease and to deliver the rent; transactions costs were minimal for the owner. Theirs was a strategy of investors, not managers.
6
Dispersal had its limits, however, as our maps indicate. The religious institutions had established the economic control of Salamanca city over the surrounding plains, and the new buyers, with rare exceptions, stayed within this orbit. Political administration appears to have reinforced transportation networks and the markets in determining the shape of different ecconomic regions. Don Francisco Sánchez García (Map 19.4) bought widely but kept within the partido of Ledesma. The peasants around El Mirón bought within their much smaller partido. An observation of Jaén province is eloquent in this respect, for here the acquisitions of the large buyers did not range as broadly as those of their Salamanca counterparts.
In Jaén province 744 people made more than one purchase in the disentail. Of these, the Madrid records give evidence of only 37 (5 percent) buying in more than one town. They included only 19 (13 percent) of the Level 4 buyers. These documents state the location of properties for only half the sales;[81] nevertheless, it is clear that buying across town lines was the exception, not the rule. Furthermore, almost all those who bought in more than one place acquired property in adjacent towns, usually centering on a cabeza de partido. Ten bought in Jaén city and adjoining towns such as La Guardia and Los Villares, 6 in Baeza and its neighboring towns, 3 in Andújar and places adjacent. Cazorla was another such regional center although not a cabeza de partido. It dominated the southeastern corner of the province and had 4 such buyers. When the residence of the buyer is known, in all but one case it is the leading town. Jaén province, in other words, appears to have been made up of a collection of small local economies through which some buyers,
[81] Of 2,831 purchases made by multiple buyers, that is, an average of 3.8 purchases per buyer, 1,377 are located.

Map 19.7.
Jaén Province, Purchases Across Town Lines
but a definite minority, spread their purchases (Map 19.7). Or rather, in view of what we learned in Part 2, each municipality that produced olive oil was an economic unit tied directly into the national market rather than dependent on a regional intermediary. This economic decentralization can explain why Jaén city had a much smaller proportion of the province's big buyers than Salamanca city did. Indeed, the buyers were more locally oriented than the religious institutions, for the lands bought by an individual in a single town often belonged to institutions located in various towns. The institutions, in accepting bequests, had taken them from farther and wider than the new buyers cared to.
Only eight individuals bought in markedly different parts of the province, and then only one or two purchases would be separated from their main concentration. Don Joaquín Muñoz, a Level 4 buyer from Martos, made eight purchases in his own town, arable fields, two olive groves, and a house, and he also bought two olive groves in Jaén.[82] Don Juan Torralba, a Level 3 buyer of Ubeda, bought four sizable fields, several houses, and a baker's oven in his city and one large field in Jaén.[83] But compare these rare cases to don Juan Pablo Casanova, a Level 4 buyer of Jaén, with twenty-seven purchases for 357,000 reales. Eighteen are located in the adjoining town of La Guardia, an olive grove in Pegalajar, also adjoining, and three in Jaén itself (the rest are unlocated). A similar figure was don Ignacio Pérez de Vargas, vecino of Andújar, one of the leading buyers in the province, who made thirty purchases and spent 830,000 reales. Eleven of his purchases are stated to be in Andújar, three in Villanueva de la Reyna, and four in Marmolejo, adjoining towns in the rich basin of the Guadalquivir. His purchases in Andújar were mostly arable, with some olive groves; those in the other towns were only olive groves and one vineyard. We saw in Part 2 that nonresidents preferred olive groves to arable because of the ease of administration. Pérez de Vargas followed this path. Even these men were rare. A more common figure was don Cristóbal Jurado y Vargas of Ubeda. A Level 4 buyer, he made fourteen purchases, all apparently in Ubeda.[84] Juan Francisco Nebrera, vecino of Baeza and Level 4, made twenty-three purchases, all apparently in Baeza.[85] And many others like them.
The records used for this study do not identify the locations of the properties within the boundaries of the towns, and a search through the original deeds of sale, which could produce such information, was beyond the resources of this study. The términos of the towns of Andalusia are much more extensive than those of Salamanca. That of Jaén was the largest in Andalusia,[86] about twenty-five by twenty kilometers at its widest points (leaving out the mountains behind it). Adding La Guardia and Pegalajar, where Casanova bought, one obtains a region some
[82] Madrid A6832, A6856, A6864, A6887, A6889, A7108, A7269, A7272, A7275, C11240 (all 1801), C22081 (1802).
[83] Ibid., C668 (1800), A8723 in Jaén (1801), C23771, C25347, C25349 (1803), C30960 (1804), C41130, C41145 (1805).
[84] Eleven are specifically identified in Ubeda, the other three belonged to institutions of Ubeda.
[85] Same reasoning, ten and thirteen.
[86] 152 km (Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 23).
twenty-five by twenty-seven kilometers. The fertile part of Ubeda is about twenty-five by eighteen kilometers (it has a tail of virtual desert stretching south fifteen kilometers more). The group of towns centering on Baeza measures twenty-three by twenty-eight kilometers, those of Cazorla, twenty-four by eighteen (omitting the Sierra de Cazorla to the east). These are all, however, extreme limits of the términos, and in the eighteenth century the cultivated areas were much smaller. The large buyers no doubt scattered their purchases within the cultivated zones of their towns, but almost all kept them within clearly defined geographic and economic units that centered on nucleated settlements. In Salamanca purchases were spread over regions stretching two or three times more each way, and many villages could lie between the properties of a single buyer.
The villages of the wide plains of Salamanca were economically dependent on the provincial capital, whereas Jaén city had much less impact on the units politically under it. Although this difference can be associated with the distinct buying patterns, one has the impression that the Jaén buyers, many of them already local landowners, saw themselves as managers rather than investors. They may well have intended to oversee the actual farming more than the religious institutions whose place they took. Chapter 16 showed us that Jaén province had been expanding its olive groves and commercializing its agriculture for many decades, and its landowning class was aware of the potential for further growth. Purchasers, especially large purchasers, would have a more-than-average share of this awareness. Desamortización provided an opportunity to accelerate the development of Jaén agriculture.
The last chapter showed that it hastened commercialization in Salamanca, but here it was through buyers who were not prone to management, and almost in spite of them. The commercialization of the countryside progressed in the nineteenth century in the términos redondos, despoblados that became cattle ranches devoted to the production of meat. Their owners planted them with live oaks, surrounded them with stone walls, and produced the magnificent estates visible today. Arable farming on small plots became a less attractive investment, as the growing population of the villages pressed more and more against the limits of production. By the end of the century, the absentee owners had sold off the plots to the peasants, no doubt seeking to transfer their capital to more obvious growth sectors. Thus, ironically, Alonso y Moral, the one buyer with a clear sense of commercial purpose, was setting out on a dead-end road in acquiring his thousand arable plots. The buyers with
the investor's mentality, who hedged their bets by purchasing both despoblados and scattered plots, found themselves on one main road even as the other led them nowhere. Commercial expansion would not hit the open-field villages until the parcellary concentration of the Franco era produced larger, economically viable holdings and state credit permitted a technological transformation: modern agricultural machinery, deep-well irrigation, and a smaller, more efficient labor force. Then sugar beets, soy beans, and sunflowers, modern commercial crops, would replace wheat, with its large component of subsistence consumption.
At the top level of buyers the disentail attracted the established elite of the old regime. Where these were men who already were experiencing the opportunities of a wider market, as in Jaén, disentail would be an impetus toward more rapid development. Where, as in Salamanca, the elite that produced the buyers looked on the land as an investment in a sure but stable source of income, the effect of disentail would be much less radical. New land was being put under the plow, as we have seen, but in the despoblados and términos redondos, not in the nucleated villages, which already cultivated all their land. Here was the growth sector, and here, later, would be the sector of development toward livestock, but the buying patterns of the purchasers of términos redondos show that they were not aware of the difference. The lesson came to later generations. Once again we see that disentail could act as a catalyst for change, but the changes it led to—agricultural as well as social— depended on existing conditions, one of which was the mentality of the people with money to invest in land.
Chapter XX—
Between Two Ages
On Friday evening, 18 March 1808, reports reached Madrid of rioting in Aranjuez and, on Saturday afternoon, of the discovery and arrest of Manuel Godoy, believed by large numbers of Spaniards to be the cause of their country's ills. The populace was already alarmed by news that French troops were approaching the capital after occupying various cities in the north of the country, reputedly on a mission to protect Spain from a possible British invasion. The news from Aranjuez drew a crowd to the palace of Godoy—today the ministry of war on the Plaza de Cibeles—which it entered and sacked, tossing into a huge bonfire his papers, paintings, and precious furniture. That evening, while Carlos IV was signing his abdication in Aranjuez, the crowd spread through Madrid, laying waste the houses of Godoy's relatives and supporters and those of royal officials to whom the public allocated a share of the blame for its suffering. These included the residences of Manuel Sixto Espinosa, director of the Consolidation Fund, and Miguel Cayetano Soler, secretary of hacienda.
No one was more responsible than Soler for the desamortización carried out by Carlos IV. He had been named secretary of hacienda in the dark spring of 1798, replacing the much-heralded Francisco de Saavedra, who in his few months in office had failed to restore the royal credit. Soler it was who convinced the king to sign the decrees of 19 September 1798 that set disentail in motion, arguing that only this measure could save "the stability and very existence of the government." Soler then drew up the detailed instructions to carry out the sales, and during
the last ominous decade of the old regime, he held responsibility for royal finances, drawing upon himself opprobrium for the fiscal catastrophes and the attack on church property. The mob that sacked his house set out to find him. According to Godoy's memoirs, they encountered him leaving church after hearing mass, accompanied by a monk, and assassinated him. Such was the recompense of the angry citizens of Madrid for his struggle to save the king's credit and reform the property structure of Spain, the only mortal atonement they exacted in these days of rioting.[1]
Next to their desire to obtain recognition of the accession of Fernando VII at home and abroad and their concern over the presence in Spain of Napoleon's forces, the fiscal crisis was the most immediate worry of the young king's advisers. They sought to cast the blame for it on the administration of the Consolidation Fund. On 22 March a royal order closed the fund and placed its affairs in the hands of the Council of Castile.[2] At this news, the opponents of desamortización spread the report that Fernando VII had stopped the sale of ecclesiastical properties. This was but wishful thinking, for the new king needed this source of funds as desperately as his father had. On 12 April the Council of Castile published a letter discrediting the rumor and informing the public that "the sale of secularized ecclesiastical properties and the other affairs and taxes of Consolidation will continue as heretofore."[3]
The state of Spain's finances goes far to explain the decision of Napoleon to intervene directly in the struggle to determine who would rule the country. He induced Fernando VII to come to him at Bayonne, in southwest France, and there on 6 May forced him to return the crown of Spain to his father:, who ceded it to the French emperor. Napoleon in turn bestowed it on his brother Joseph and sent him off to Madrid to occupy his new throne.
In the face of the popular revolt that greeted his accession, Joseph Bonaparte sought to institute policies that would save his crown. Among
[1] Godoy, Memorias 2 : 249 n. There is some confusion about the fate of Soler. Marti Gilabert, Motín, 81, 204, accepts Godoy's account. Antonio Escudero, Cambios ministeriales, 41–43 and Cuadro sinóptico, says Fernando VII confirmed Soler in his position on 19 March (before his death as reported by Godoy) and he was not replaced until 15 October, by the Junta Suprema Central. Escudero refers to the records of the Sección de Estado in AHN. Artola, España de Fernando VII, 3–4, says Fernando VII replaced Soler with Azanza and ordered his goods confiscated. He gives no references. Godoy was not a witness to events in Madrid on 19 March, but a number of his intended audience would have been, and he had no desire to bring discredit on his memoirs by an obvious false statement.
[2] Circular, 23 Mar. 1808, AHN, Hac., libro 6013.
[3] Circular, 12 Apr. 1808, ibid.
these, he proposed to continue disentail under the laws promulgated by Carlos IV. He also extended the process to the properties of other owners, notably the religious orders, the military orders, and the Inquisition, all of which were abolished, and the properties of the Spanish grandes who were supporting the popular rising against him. He converted these forms of wealth into "national properties," copying a French term that Carlos IV had not used. Compared to the tremendous mass now available for disentail, Joseph's government was able to sell little, even in the provinces that it controlled, and what it did sell went at low prices for vales reales or equally discredited cédulas hipotecarias, which Joseph issued. The properties were disposed of without auction, largely to members of his government, French army officers, and some individuals who sought to curry favor with his regime. This was one desamortización that had little permanent effect. On his return in 1814 after the defeat of Napoleon, Fernando VII annulled Joseph's sales, while most buyers fled the country to escape reprisals.[4]
In contrast to Joseph, the supporters of Fernando at the outset of the war made the end of disentail one of their priorities. The rising in La Coruña on 30 May 1808 led to the creation of a provincial junta of Galicia, which met for the first time on 5 June. The next day its first act was to ask for contributions from the clergy and wealthy laymen and to stop the sale of ecclesiastical properties, "in view of the generosity of their owners."[5] We do not know if juntas that headed the uprising in other provinces also suspended the disentail. On 25 September the Supreme Central Junta, composed of deputies of the provincial juntas, came together in Aranjuez. One of its most anguishing problems was to find money to supply the Spanish armies and maintain the state apparatus. Yet its early decrees included one, of 16 November 1808, that suspended the sale of all ecclesiastical properties covered by the decrees of 1798 and the papal bull of 1806.[6] Thus the lines were drawn. Joseph Bonaparte would use the wealth of the church to save the credit of the state; the Central Junta, in the name of Fernando VII, would protect the church against further plunder.
Some Spaniards were not satisfied with the end of disentail and wanted to recover what had been sold under Carlos IV. Their efforts lasted almost ten years but proved futile. The decree of the Central
[4] See Mercader Riba, "Desamortización en la España," and for a specific example, Porres Martín-Cleto, "Aproximación a la desamortización." For the legislation of Joseph Bonaparte, Coleccion de los Reales Decretos.
[5] García Rámila, "España ante la invasión francesa," 523.
[6] RC, 16 Nov. 1808, AHN, Hac., libro 8059, no. 6964.
Junta of 16 November 1808 nullified the sales paid for in vales reales for which a notary had not yet issued the deed of sale. Two months later, however, the junta had to revoke this very modest concession because experience had revealed that the vales reales in question had already been spent for the needs of the state and "ultimately because it would compromise the public faith and the reputation of the sovereign, who has declared these sales inviolable."[7]
Facing continued defeats by French troops, the Central Junta in January 1810 convoked a meeting of the Cortes of the nation and then disbanded. The Cortes met at Cádiz in September. The opponents of disentail now turned to them for help. A small book addressed to the Cortes by Juan de la Reguera Valdelomar, a judge of the Chancery of Granada, voiced their sense of outrage at the measures of Carlos IV. He titled it Petitions for the Redress of Grievances Inflicted in the Fatal Reign of Carlos IV Directed to the Spanish Nation Assembled in General Cortes. Reguera asked the Cortes to annul the sales of properties of obras pías, hospitals, the Jesuits, other ecclesiastical bodies, and the Colegios Mayores, as well as family entails. Such an act would mark "the happy beginning of the nation restored through its meeting in general cortes" and would undo the ravages emanating from the decrees of 19 September 1798, "fateful day, harbinger of the ruin of Spain, which disguised tyranny under the mask of sovereign authority and hid the face of greed behind the cape of the general good. . . . Cruel day on which the pitiful poor, healthy and ill, were despoiled of all the comforts ministered by the charity of their brothers. . . . Sacrilegious day, on which the largest part of the property and the income of the churches was usurped."[8]
The Cortes of Cádiz, dominated by the spiritual heirs of the reformers of Carlos III's day, turned a deaf ear to such petitions. On the contrary, the Liberals of Cádiz talked of renewing the disentail, despite its association in the public mind with Godoy and Joseph Bonaparte. They voted to guarantee the national debt, both the part inherited from the old regime and the part occasioned by the war against Napoleon, with the sale of the "national properties" (copying Joseph Bonaparte's term). They did not carry over the legislation of Carlos IV but limited the backing for the debt to estates of partisans of Joseph, of the military orders, of the crown not used as residences by the royal family, and of any monasteries and convents that the war would leave permanently closed.[9] The
[7] RC, 27 Jan. 1809. ibid., no. 6972.
[8] Reguera Valdelomar, Peticiones, 1–5, 168.
[9] Decrees of 22 Mar. 1811 (royal properties) and 13 Sept. 1813 (other owners), Tomás y Valiente, Marco Político, 43–54.
Cortes took a markedly different position on a problem involving municipal lands, the bienes de propios, which were rented out as a source of municipal income. From the beginning of the war, a number of villages and towns had sold propios to cover the exactions that French and Spanish armies had levied on them or for other urgent expenses.[10] In an attempt to bring order to this process, the Cortes decreed that all propios should become private property, half being sold to pay public debts occasioned by the war, the other half being given in small lots to persons who had contributed to the war effort, whether as soldiers or otherwise, and to other landless vecinos.[11]
The Cortes had not time to put its disentail into effect, and on his return at the end of the war Fernando VII declared all its legislation null and void. Under his restoration, the enemies of desamortización renewed their efforts to get the sales of Carlos IV annulled. Some former owners asked to have returned the estates that had been sold on time payments, whose payment had not been concluded before the French invasion. After careful consideration of the entire question, however, the Council of Castile advised the king to approve these sales if the purchasers would make full payment promptly. The council held as a general rule that "the maintenance of the sales of ecclesiastical estates and those of obras pías carried out according to the relevant royal cédulas was a matter of strict justice, and many would be the difficulties and evils that must follow from adopting any other measure." The king proclaimed the opinion as royal policy in a cédula of 10 March 1817.[12] The decision of Fernando VII to uphold the disentail carried out under his father closed the question.
The story of desamortización had only begun, however. Fernando himself ordered the sale of baldíos to pay the royal debt.[13] The brief Liberal regime established by the Revolution of 1820 put on the block the property of monasteries and the military orders, but Fernando once again canceled the sales that it effected, when the army of the king of France restored him to full authority, although purchasers succeeded in recovering their acquisitions after his death.[14] The first Carlist War that
[10] Ibid., 55–56. The sale of propios by towns of Salamanca province and the Basque provinces, both regions exploited by French armies, is studied by Fernández de Pinedo, "Entrada de la tierra," 112–23; María Paz Alonso Romero, "Ventas de bienes municipales"; and Ortiz de Orruño, "Desamortización civil."
[11] Decree of 4 Jan. 1813, Tomás y Valiente, Marco político, 55–62.
[12] RC, 10 Mar. 1817, AHN, CCR, no. 2634.
[13] Tomás y Valiente, Marco político, 65–66.
[14] Nadal, Fracaso de la revolución industrial, 58–59.
followed the accession of his daughter Isabel II in 1833 brought a renewal of disentail on a large scale. Many conservative clergymen supported Fernando's brother don Carlos in his claim to the crown, and partly in retaliation for their position, the Liberals who controlled Isabel's government decreed on 8 March 1836 that the properties of all religious orders, male and female, would be sold at auction and the proceeds applied to paying the national debt. (Male orders were closed at this time and female orders a year later.) On 29 July 1837 the desamortización was extended to the properties of parishes and bishoprics except for buildings used for religious services, although the execution of this decree did not begin until 1841.[15] In 1836 the Liberals also abolished the entail of noble and other private estates. Henceforth all family properties could be divided up among the heirs or sold if the owner desired.[16] The author of the laws of 1836 and 1837 was Juan Álvarez Mendizábal, a banker from Cádiz who had long been resident in England. Credit for initiating the process of ecclesiastical disentail has traditionally been assigned to him—erroneously since the ill-fated Soler deserves it—and his name has since been infamous among Spaniards devoted to the church.
In 1839 the Carlist War ended, and the more conservative Moderado party that captured the government in 1844 revoked the laws of Mendizábal, although it permitted sales to continue at a slower pace. The last and most decisive stage of desamortización began after the Revolution of 1854. The law of 1 May 1855, named after Pascual Madoz, the deputy who proposed it, provided again for the sale of church properties and introduced the sale of municipal properties on a national scale, except those that were actually used by the vecinos in common, and of certain other public properties.[17] Under the Madoz law, disentail continued until the twentieth century. Local studies indicate that in some places more property was sold during the peaceful and conservative regime that followed the Restoration of 1876 than during all the preceding period.[18]
It is not possible at present to say how much land was sold and it
[15] Tomás y Valiente, Marco político, 75–86.
[16] Clavero, Mayorazgo, 367–70, 381–84.
[17] Simón Segura, Desamortización, 191–99.
[18] See, for example, Cámara Urraca and Sánchez Zurro, "Impacto de los capitales urbanos," and Quirós Linares, "Desamortización de 1855." In the partido of Olmedo (Valladolid), 9.1 million reales were spent 1821–44; 11.0 million 1856–91 (Rueda Hernanz, "Beneficiarios del proceso desamortizador," Cuadro 11, p. 87). This gives no breakdown for before and after 1876.
probably never will be, but one can hazard a rough approximation. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the church owned land in the kingdom of Castile that produced about 20 percent of the total income from farming and pasturage.[19] The ecclesiastical properties were almost all sold, and their total sale price was about two-thirds of the total price of all properties disposed of by desamortización in the nineteenth century.[20] Thus one can estimate that roughly 30 percent of all the land of Castile (measured by the value of its annual product at the time of sale, not its area or economic potential) changed hands as a result of the process of disentail. One can only guess that a similar proportion of the land in the rest of Spain was also involved.
By the end of the century many Spaniards considered what had occurred a national disaster. Especially those who were critical of the social and political structure of the country blamed desamortización for much of what had gone wrong. One such person was Joaquín Costa, the prominent enemy of the oligarchic government that ruled Spain after 1876 and critic of the agrarian philosophy of Jovellanos whom we met in Chapter 2. Strongly influenced by the American reformer Henry George, he believed that the only basis for a successful democratic revolution in the nineteenth century would have been an egalitarian distribution of the land, achieved by a division of the properties in entail among farmers under permanent leases. The only good measure he could identify in the whole process was the law of 1813 of the Cortes of Cádiz, "which called all citizens to the enjoyment of the land." Its failure "involved the failure of the entire revolution."[21]
From the other end of the political spectrum, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, eloquent defender of the role of Catholicism in the history of the country, denounced the motives behind desamortización and its effects:
The church lost, but the state gained nothing. In the last analysis the only ones who have benefited are not the Spanish farmers and landowners but a profiteering horde of speculators and gamblers on the market. Lacking the generous feeling of the former owners and interested only in despoiling the land they have seized, they have done nothing to ameliorate the decline, the backwardness, and the poverty of the tenants. Instead, with the passage of time, they have called into being in the pastures of Extremadura and the
[19] According to Table 5.5 the total value of all properties in Castile at the time of the catastro was 1,248 million reales. Table 5.4 shows the value of ecclesiastical properties as 237 million reales, 19 percent of the total. There are no comparable figures for the kingdoms of Aragon.
[20] See Herr, "Significado de la desamortización," 82–83 n. 76.
[21] Costa, Colectivismo, 156 (chap. 3, sec. 17).
fields of Andalusia the terrible specter of what is known as "the social question," never before visible in Spain even in the distance.[22]
The judgment that disentail was nothing but a vast political maneuver that crushed the peasantry so that an unprincipled mob of speculators might wax rich became a commonplace among succeeding generations of Spaniards. According to the accepted view, Spain lost its chance for a true agrarian reform and instead was saddled with the later problems of the countryside. Despite the intentions of Spanish liberals, desamortización accentuated social inequality, making large properties larger and reducing the peasants to hungry laborers.[23] The English historian Gerald Brenan further darkened the picture. In his classic work, The Spanish Labyrinth, he observed another consequence: by taking away the property of the church the liberals deprived it of economic independence. The clergy found itself forced to turn for support to the powerful sectors of society, thereby abandoning the lower classes to the prophets of anarchism and violent revolution.[24]
With the progress of historical writing, Menéndez Pelayo's profiteering horde of speculators, founders of the new Spain, was baptized with the more familiar name of bourgeoisie. The father of the contemporary Spanish historical school, Jaime Vicens Vives, described desamortización as "the political measure imposed by the bourgeois revolution."[25] More recently, Francisco Tomás y Valiente, in his history of the legislation affecting disentail, concludes: "All of them [the projects to divide land among the poor] failed, and the only one that prospered was the one that most suited the interests of the bourgeoisie, which in this way consumed its revolution by means of the desamortización."[26] This widely accepted interpretation of Spain's nineteenth-century disentail thus not only preserves the vision of it as a national disaster—the failure of a democratic revolution—but incorporates it into a general pattern of modern history: Spain, like other Western countries in modern times, passed from a feudal-agrarian stage to a bourgeois-capitalist one. The bourgeois revolution in Spain took place in the nineteenth century. Because the triumph of capitalism is based on the freedom of exchange of
[22] Menández Pelayo, Historia 6 : 229–30, 238.
[23] Such is the verdict, for instance, of Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics, and Men, 54–60, and more recently, Simón Segura, Desamortización, 282–83, 295–96, and Tomás y Valiente, Marco político.
[24] Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, 43–47, 188–92.
[25] Vicens Vives, Historia 5 : 94.
[26] Tomás y Valiente, Marco político, 162, and Tomás y Valiente, "Recientes investigaciones."
the factors of production and the rights of private property, its achievement in Spain involved the liquidation of communal farming practices and the entail of landed estates. The bourgeoisie effected the desamortización and profited from it at the expense of both the old landowning class and the peasantry. Such is this account.
2
For over two decades, historians of modern Europe have been challenging the simple interpretation of the nineteenth century as the age of bourgeois triumph. Antonio Gramsci perhaps deserves credit for discovering, in his meditations in a prison of Mussolini, that the bourgeoisie, rather than draw the other sectors of society into a conflict with the traditional landowning estate, joined with the older ruling class to dominate the new parliamentary political structure; but he believed that this was a peculiar Italian phenomenon, a betrayal of the bourgeois role exemplified in the French Revolution.[27] It fell to the English historian Alfred Cobban to deny that the French Revolution itself, that archetype of modern upheavals, resulted from the ascent of a specific bourgeois class based on a new form of economic activity and that it brought such a class to power.[28] Nor, his colleague F. M. L. Thompson has argued, did the industrial revolution produce the political and social triumph of the bourgeoisie even in England, that most advanced of countries, at least not before the end of the century.[29] Since the 1960s, many historians have further discredited the accepted view of a nineteenth-century bourgeois revolution, substituting a picture of the continuing empire of an older aristocratic class both socially and politically, even where industry was replacing agriculture as the leading economic sector. Still in awe of courts and titles, new industrialists and moneyed merchants deferred to the dominant social stratum, mimicked its attachment to the land, welcomed the brides it proffered, and ultimately rejoiced in the legitimation of titles of their own. Rather than a victorious struggle of capitalist class against feudal, the nineteenth century witnessed the embrace of the new bourgeois by the old aristocrats.[30]
[27] Gramsci, "Notes."
[28] Cobban, Social Interpretation of the French Revolution. Cobban had earlier announced his new view in Myth of the French Revolution.
[29] Thompson, English Landed Society.
[30] For convincing descriptions of the successful "embrace" (the term is Thompson's), see the chapters on Britain (F. M. L. Thompson) and Germany (Fritz Stern) in Spring, European Landed Elites; Mayer, Persistence of the Old Regime. A vision of the embrace in Spain appears in Bernal and la Peña, "Formación de una gran propiedad agraria," 157;and more generally in Herr, "Spain," 104–5. The embrace even appears in new interpretations of Latin American history, notably in Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development, 66–69 (the authors see the initiative coming from the newer economic statrum).
The present study indicates that a similar critical rethinking of the Spanish case is in order, for it does not support the contention that desamortización was the idea and the instrument of a new bourgeoisie. The spirit that conceived the measure, which inspired Jovellanos and Soler and before them Campomanes and Olavide, was a desire to serve their monarch and people. Some historians have seen in Jovellanos an agent of the rising bourgeoisie, but the process by which he reached his famous Informe de ley agraria, which popularized the idea of economic freedom in property relations, involved a logical development of ideas on political economy. Class interests did not motivate the reformers, except insofar as their conception of the evils of entail led them to criticize a legal institution that, while available to all classes, was manifested most prominently by titled aristocrats and ecclesiastical bodies.
The characteristics of the buyers do not support the accepted interpretation either. The buyers appear to fall into three distinct categories, distinguished by the source of their wealth and their position within the economic structure. Among the biggest purchasers in the regions studied, those who held positions within church and state are conspicuous. The two largest buyers in La Mata, that prosperous village in the Armuña district of Salamanca, were a military officer resident in Madrid and a prebendary of the cathedral of Salamanca. In the neighboring Villaverde, the same prebendary and an advocate living in Madrid until he moved to Salamanca in 1803 were the second and third buyers. The person who acquired the 60-percent interest in the despoblado of Pedrollén was the widow of a regidor of Salamanca city. The story in the towns of Jaén is much the same. In Baños the largest purchaser (he bought over a quarter of the properties sold) was a member of the royal Council of Hacienda, resident in Madrid; in Lopera it was a lieutenant colonel in the army, who lived in Córdoba. Analysis of the big buyers in the two provinces validates the finding.[31] One of the top purchasers in Salamanca was the enemy of Godoy and Jovellanos, the man who displaced the latter as secretary of grace and justice, José Antonio Caballero. Of the vecinos of Salamainca city who were among this group in their province, over one-third were members of the clergy or the university faculty or held state or municipal offices (Table 19.2). The information on Jaén
[31] See above, Chapter 19.
is less complete, but we found that of the big buyers who resided in the provincial capital whose position is identified, 60 percent were associated with the church, the state, or the municipality (they were a third of all the big buyers living in that city, including those whose occupation is unknown [Table 19.3]). There is no assurance, of course, that the funds these individuals used to make their purchases came primarily from their positions; they may have been independently wealthy. No doubt some of them were, especially among the clergy, as we found in our Andalusian towns, but enough such persons appear among the leading purchasers to conclude that for many of them their incorporation into church or state provided the wherewithal for their acquisitions.
They reveal an important feature of the economy of old-regime Spain. A major portion of the gross national product flowed into the coffers of the monarchy and the church, from taxes, tariffs, and tithes (of the tithes, the tercias reales went to the king, where he had not given them away) and in the case of the church also from rents and seigneurial dues. The transference of this flow to the royal bureaucracy and armed forces and to the members of the clergy and other ecclesiastical employees was a major factor in the national economy. Madrid flourished out of this redistribution of income, while the city produced few tangible products in return, as David Ringrose has demonstrated.[32] The impact of this administered economic flow accounted also for the prominence of state and church officials among our buyers. To judge from our cases, state and church were more powerful forces than commerce or industry in allocating the national product to individuals, for the only merchant we have found purchasing on a national scale was don Martín de Ganá of Bilbao, who was a major buyer in Salamanca, with purchases spread seventy-five kilometers across the province.[33] The monarchy, the church, and to a lesser extent, local government gave the economy of old-regime Spain the peculiar characteristic of redistributing wealth to persons who were not engaged in production or distribution of either agricultural or manufactured goods. This redistribution was justified mainly by services of an administrative, military, or religious nature. It did not take the form of social services, as in a modern welfare state, although the church and its foundations imparted charity and the crown gave some aid to the victims of natural disasters. Redistribution benefited not the needy but those who were—or whose official position
[32] Ringrose, Madrid and the Spanish Economy. On the role of the church in the redistributive economy, see Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society, 46–52.
[33] See above, Chapter 19, section 5 Josef Mateos Delgado of San García may also have been a merchant of this type.
made them—a wealthy sector. The first category of buyers is thus the beneficiaries of the old-regime redistributive economy.
The other two major categories of buyers represent the two poles of the dual agricultural economy that existed in the two provinces under study. At one extreme were the local and regional notables, who drew income out of the marketing of products of the soil and livestock and took the opportunity of disentail to extend their estates or move directly into ownership. At the other extreme were those who labored in the fields and directed their harvests primarily to local consumption, although their tithes and rents reached the wider market, usually through the hands of the notables. The wealth of both these groups came from agriculture, which was the most productive economic activity in Spain. Agricultural prosperity strengthened the ability of both groups to respond to the opportunity of disentail. The second group, those who labored in the fields, however, faced the combined Malthusian and Ricardian trap, the fact that more mouths or higher rents were always a potential, if not an actual, threat to consume any addition to their output. The success of their response to disentail depended in large part on their particular stage of the Malthusian and Ricardian cycles.[34]
Although they did not produce the goods with their own hands, the notables acted as a hinge between the people who did the work of farming and the outside world. They included the leading landowners and their administrators and those men who otherwise dealt in the products of the soil. It would require a tedious investigation into notarial records, of which this study has only scratched the surface, to come close to identifying all the buyers who were landowners, but we have seen good evidence that landowners were a major portion of the more important buyers. In Salamanca province there was a strong positive correlation between outside ownership and the proportion of disentailed properties bought by outsiders (Figure 17.2), and outsiders on the whole were far bigger buyers than local ones. This is not proof that the outside buyers were already owners, but it does suggest that their wealth came out of agriculture, and undoubtedly many of them were already owners. In Jaén the records of notaries and registers of real estate show that a number of purchasers served as administrators of estates or were engaged in the farming of royal taxes and ecclesiastical revenues.[35] Many of them were landowners too, for they guaranteed the fulfillment of their contracts with their own real property as collateral. And where the notables
[34] See above, Chapter 14.
[35] See Table 11.23, Baños; Table 12.17, Lopera; Table 13.14, Navas.
were not owners, agriculture formed the ultimate source of their income. This was true also of merchants, like don Francisco Alonso y Moral of Salamanca, whose wealth came from dealing in grain and hides.
The notables included the local oligarchies or elites. Many, if not most, of them were entitled to the honorific don before their given names. Heading them were the hidalgos of Old and New Castile and Andalusia (where hidalgos were fewer than in the north), like the petty oligarchs of Baños and Lopera. Among them would be the poderosos, those villains who peopled the complaints directed to the Council of Castile in the days of Carlos III,[36] but they were a more numerous group than the poderosos. Surprisingly few titled aristocrats have appeared among the buyers. It is likely that some used agents, whose names appear on the deeds of deposit recorded in Madrid in place of the true buyer, but this cannot be the full explanation. Titled aristocrats do not appear to have shared the land hunger of the layers just beneath them, perhaps because of their already extensive holdings.
The local clergy also belong among the notables, in terms of social status and economic position, even though they owed most of their wealth to the redistributive economy of the church. The income from tithes and from the properties belonging to the capellanías and benefices placed even the curates of villages like La Mata, Villaverde, and El Mirón on a higher plane than the body of their parishioners; and in Jaén many priests belonged by blood to the notability. In fact, members of the secular clergy were expected to have property of their own, for the catastro of midcentury divided real property into three categories: secular, ecclesiastical, and eclesiástico patrimonial, the private possessions of individual clergymen. We found one priest of Baños who had to produce real property as collateral before he was entrusted with the administration of the estates of his capellanía.[37] Our towns in Jaén do not confirm Gerald Brenan's belief that the clergy of Spain was close to the common people until desamortización deprived its members of independent income and forced them into an alliance with the upper class. Desamortización, if anything, by depriving clergymen of the source of their fat emoluments, discouraged the scions of wealthy families from entering the church and brought the priests closer to the common people.
Some of the lay notables had found their way to the trough of the church or monarchy in the contracts they obtained to farm tithes and
[36] See above, Chapter 1, section 4.
[37] See above, Chapter 11, n. 48.
taxes; but the wealth of this group came primarily from the market of agricultural products. A market economy had existed for centuries in foodstuffs—no urban community is possible without it—and it was expanding in the eighteenth century because of demographic and urban growth. As Marx recognized long ago, the first large English capitalists, those who made profits from their capital investments and the labor of others, were landowners.[38] Across the Channel, in Marc Bloch's forceful words, "In France, as in England, it was agriculture rather than industry that first provided a platform on which capitalism (for want of a better word) could display the disingenuous illusions and cruelty of its admirable and creative genius, decked out in the naivete of youth."[39] The analysis applies at least as well to Spain and certainly to Castile, because of the central role of agriculture in its economy.
Even though the notables whom we have encountered were capitalists, most of them were not entrepreneurs. They followed the practice of aristocratic houses and large religious establishments of not concentrating their holdings. This was especially true of the large buyers in Salamanca, who spread their purchases so widely that there was no way they could manage them directly or ask an administrator to visit them regularly. The Salamanca merchant Alonso y Moral was an exception, for he demonstrated an appreciation of the benefits of specialization, limiting his purchases to arable fields in specific towns of La Armuña. This does not mean that the other large buyers did not respond to demands of the market or to changing relative costs of the factors of production. Owners of despoblados at the end of the century leased part of their pastures to nearby labradores to be broken for grain harvests. In Jaén, unlike Salamanca, many large buyers took a direct role in managing their holdings. Their society had long been familiar with cortijos and olive groves, estates whose production was oriented to the market and required a relatively low labor input, and they preferred to acquire these properties. Aware of the commercial potential in olive oil, landowners were busy turning grain fields into olive groves, even though this meant they sacrificed ten or more years' income from the land. But where there was no demonstrated gain to be achieved from new uses of the land, the notables let the peasants follow accepted practices and took their profits in the form of rent.
The third category of buyers was found mainly among those who spent small amounts of money. They came out of the sector that was
[38] Marx, Capital, vol. 1, part 8: "So-called Primitive Accumulation."
[39] Bloch, French Rural History, 231–32.
personally engaged in tilling the land and raising the livestock and providing the products consumed locally. Most of them were called, and have been called here, labradores. The category also included some market gardeners (hortelanos), who, like the labradores, were independent farmers, and a few hired hands and animal herders, who worked for wages and their keep. We can think of them collectively as the peasantry, although this study has used the term sparingly. They also produced for the market, either because they paid tithes and rent in kind, which was later marketed, or because they had to sell their own products in order to make these payments in money. Some were engaged in commercial agriculture for their own account, such as the wealthy labradores of the Armuña villages, the tenant farmer of Pedrollén, and the owners of large flocks of sheep in the sierra town of El Mirón. The socioeconomic pyramids of the various towns reveal that the more successful of these men had net incomes not far off those of the rank-and-file notables of Jaén. Their share of the purchases of disentailed properties increased directly as the distance of their towns from urban centers. They dominated the process in the partido of El Mirón and in the out-of-the-way Andalusian town of Navas.
Because they counted on their own labor to produce their harvests, they acted differently when they bought. Naturally they could not buy Andalusian cortijos, despoblados of Salamanca, or large collections of arable plots in La Armuña, but they welcomed announcements of small sets of arable plots and labor-intensive exploitations like irrigated huertas and cortinas. For these they were prepared to bid against each other until they paid in hard currency more than the assessed value, and this meant half as much again as the minimum bid allowed. They acted, in fact, in the classical way that the Russian economist A. V. Chayanov would predict, thinking of the product they would obtain and not the labor needed, for the labor of the family was not a variable input cost but an overhead. The food and clothing of the family members was roughly the same however much they worked. Not that the peasants were devoid of entrepreneurial spirit. In Navas, the small labradores were turning some of their grain fields into olive groves. In La Armuña they experimented regularly with different rotations, seeking what would return the most, and they were eager to take up new leases in nearby despoblados. Those who bought fields also managed to acquire leases to plots that their neighbors had been farming, thus doubly improving their station within the village economy.
These three categories do not exhaust the buyers. Some in La Ar-
muña were muleteers, toilers in the rural growth industry that has played a large role in our story, some in Jaén were bakers, others perhaps craftsmen. But the three categories identified above constitute the major sectors that responded to the offer of ecclesiastical lands. It is no coincidence that they also resemble the three groups that were distinguished by the different geographic extent over which they scattered their purchases.[40] First are the buyers whom we found acquiring lands at considerable distance from their places of residence, such as the residents of Madrid who bought in Salamanca or Jaén. In spreading their purchases over a wide area, they mimicked on a modest scale the aristocratic houses, whose scions also resided in the royal capital. The demands of Madrid were creating an integrated market for agricultural products in Castile and Andalusia, and these buyers had learned how to exploit it. Most of the men whom we have met who fitted this description belong to the category of buyers who drew their wealth from the redistributive activity of the royal government as members of the royal bureaucracy or armed forces. Of course some men who bought on a national scale got their capital from elsewhere. Don Martín de Ganá, the Bilbao merchant was associated with the productive economy, although the documents do not say what he bought and sold.
Below the men with a national vision were the buyers who scattered their acquisitions within the limits of regional economies. They belong mostly to the second category of buyers identified above, the landowners and others engaged in the marketing of agricultural products. Here, we found, they had a precedent for their pattern of purchase in the distribution of properties of the large ecclesiastical institutions located in the provinces, widely scattered but limited to local economic regions. They were presumably responding to previously acquired familiarity with their province or partido.
Finally, the peasants limited their purchases to their own village and those around it, not only because they had less to spend, but because they had walked and worked here since childhood and could not now travel further afield to till the land. They replicated in their own hands the allotments of scattered plots they had previously rented, which had long formed the characteristic of arable agriculture in northern Castile, as in most of Spain and western Europe. They had little choice in the matter, of course, since this is how the exploitations existed and were put on the market. Most buyers at all three levels, I have argued, were
[40] See above, Chapter 19, section 5.
responding to an accepted wisdom that held that however rich one might be, one should spread one's possessions widely to minimize the risks from natural and other disasters.[41]
All three categories went back far in time, and none could be readily called a bourgeoisie, except for some of the merchants and administrators. The top two levels were clearly engaged in a market economy, and in this respect were capitalists. One may well ask, is this absence of a bourgeoisie from among the buyers not the effect of a specific situation of Spain during the last decades of the old regime? When the absolute monarchy had been destroyed by the War of Independence and the Liberal revolutions that followed, was not the later desamortización of Mendizábal and Madoz the means whereby the bourgeoisie came to power? After all, the historians and polemicists who have denounced desamortización for this achievement hardly knew about its beginning under Carlos IV, on which the above conclusions are based.
3
The vision of desamortización as the fulfillment of the bourgeois revolution was formulated before much active research on desamortización had been carried out. In recent decades it has become the favorite topic for investigation in the history of nineteenth-century Spain, itself an area of study that has opened up only in the last generation. A careful bibliography on desamortización made in 1981 found 12 titles between 1900 and 1959, 21 in the 1960s, and 135 in the 1970s, plus another 21 theses in progress.[42] The influential Instituto de Estudios Fiscales of the ministry of hacienda supported conferences on the theme in 1977 and in 1982; in the latter seventy-nine papers were presented.[43]
This fascination with the subject has led to questioning of the role of the bourgeoisie as the prime mover of desamortización, although the interpretation still has its defenders.[44] I have explored the issue before, proposing that, far from succumbing to a new bourgeois class, the Spanish landed elite in the nineteenth century maintained its economic
[41] See above, Chapter 19, section 5.
[42] Rueda Hernanz, "Bibliografía" (I do not count the entries that are tangential to desamortización).
[43] "Desamortización y hacienda pública," Madrid, March 1977, and "Jornadas de desamortización y hacienda pública," Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, Santander, 16–20 Aug. 1982. Francisco Tomás y Valiente directed both conferences.
[44] The most prominent is Tomás y Valiente. Besides his classic book, Marco político, he upholds this position in "Recientes investigaciones." He elaborated further in his concluding remarks to the 1982 Santander conference, "Reflexiones finales."
control over the countryside and political control over the central government.[45] A summary of the arguments will place the present conclusions in better perspective.
The position in favor of desamortización as the instrument for a bourgeois revolution relies on two major arguments. The first amounts to a matter of definition. According to it, the bourgeoisie may be the same segment of society as the former "feudal" class; not its social origins or the origins of its wealth determine its identity but the way in which it exploits the economy. Antonio Miguel Bernal, who has worked extensively on conditions in the nineteenth-century Spanish countryside, explains the position in this way:
I really believe that this type of owners [the new and old Andalusian landowners of the nineteenth century who exploited the land to supply the domestic and foreign market] can be considered a "bourgeoisie" because their economic power is tied not so much to the direct ownership of the land as to the system of exploitation of the land. . . . The system of property does not matter as much as the fact that they hold economic decisions in their hands. . . . The control of production, the control of labor, political control are all in the hands of this group of exploiters of agriculture. I believe that these are three essential requirements for any bourgeois group.[46]
Effectively, this line of reasoning maintains that the dominant class in a capitalist economic system is a bourgeoisie, whatever its other characteristics may be. If the capitalist class and the bourgeoisie are defined as synonymous,[47] then of course one need not raise the question whether capitalism was introduced by the rise of the bourgeoisie or vice versa. It does not help our understanding of what happened in history, and yet it is amazing how commonly the argument in favor of a nineteenth-century bourgeois revolution is reduced to this tautology. In the present case it is not even correct in its premises, because nobles under the old regime, both the hidalgos of Lopera and the titled aristocrats who owned cortijos in Navas, one of whom was its señor, controlled production, labor, and the local political power. The Spanish case supports those like Marx who find the origins of capitalism in the large landowners of the old regime.
The second basis for holding that desamortización formed part of a
[45] "Significado de la desamortización"; "Spain"; and "Elite terrateniente."
[46] Remark made during a discussion published in La question de la "bourgeoisie", 77–78. The entire discussion, 77–86, is of great interest. Bernal's position did not find unanimous support.
[47] As, for instance, Wallerstein does in Modern World System, 351: "The capitalist class (the bourgeoisie ) has claimed to be the universal class."
bourgeois revolution is substantive, namely that research into specific regions has regularly found that a major portion of the rural properties were bought by residents of cities, such as provincial capitals and, above all, Madrid. Since these purchasers obviously did not till the soil themselves and furthermore did not have aristocratic titles (although many had the honorific don ), the authors class them as bourgeois. This conclusion begs the question of the provenance of the capital they used for their purchases, for if it came out of land they already owned, desamortización was not producing a new class but simply reinforcing an old one. This study has revealed how the increasing commercialization of agriculture under the old regime could produce the necessary savings.
In fact, on closer scrutiny, the mid-nineteenth-century process appears very similar to the one that had already taken place under Carlos IV. There continued to be three main types of buyers, those who bought on a national scale, among whom residents of Madrid predominated; those who lived in provincial cities and spread their purchases around local economic regions, centering on their cities; and the small rural owners and tenants, who bought in their towns and those adjoining, more numerous than the first two types although the total quantity of their purchases was less. The last group was more common in the north, where villages were small, and the share of the total sales that went to them increased in direct relation to the distance of their villages from urban centers. In general, the wider the area in which a buyer operated, the larger the properties he acquired. Although none of the studies explicitly develop this pattern, one can deduce from them that it approximates what happened at different times in Ciudad Real (New Castile),[48] Alava (Basque Provinces),[49] Navarre,[50] Gerona and Barcelona (Catalonia),[51] and Valencia.[52]
The studies just mentioned all deal with a limited period. For the par-
[48] Simón Segura, "Desamortización en Ciudad Real."
[49] Extramiana, "Quelques aspects du désamortissement."
[50] Donézar, Desamortización en Navarra, 279–309. He divides the buyers into "the rich of Madrid" (royal counselors, bureaucrats, army officers, and bankers) and a "regional middle class," which includes both the residents of the four major cities of the province and the leading taxpayers of the rural towns.
[51] Simón Segura, Desamortización en Gerona; Simón Segura, "Desamortización en Barcelona." In Barcelona a large proportion of the property sold under Mendizábal was urban, and Barcelona merchants were conspicuous among the buyers of both urban and rural properties. The article does not distinguish these categories quantitatively.
[52] Pardo Tomás, "Desamortización." A significant number of merchant landowners of Valencia city and local titled aristocrats appear among the buyers. The studies referred to in the paragraph do not analyze the buyers in the way I do; the conclusion is my own. My reasoning is explained in part in "Significado de la desamortización," 76–79.
tido of Olmedo of Valladolid province, located to the northeast of Salamanca, Germán Rueda Hernanz has investigated the identity of the buyers of properties disentailed from 1821 to 1891, using not only the records of desamortización but lists of voters, taxpayers, and property owners.[53] Almost all the local buyers he finds to be labradores, but they range from "potentates," relatively wealthy landowners living in the partido capital who bought hundreds of arable plots, down to tenant farmers who seized the opportunity to buy the plots they had been renting. The local buyers obtained 51 percent of the land sold (by area, not purchase price), and those of bordering rural areas another 10 percent. As one would predict from my findings for Salamanca, they bid very high for their purchases (two and three times the assessed value), especially the smaller buyers, and they took over 80 percent of the vineyards and irrigated horticultural plots, whereas they got less than their share of pastures and pine groves (a local specialty).
The rest of the buyers lived in the city of Valladolid or in Madrid. Buyers in the provincial capital were professional people, involved in law or politics, while of those in Madrid, we know only that some had moved there from Valladolid. A study of the province as a whole in the years 1836–53 shows that the more distant a region was from the city of Valladolid, the lower the share of land purchased by residents of the city. It would appear that, as in Salamanca, the urban residents, middle-range buyers, extended their purchases within an economic region that the city dominated, but little beyond it.[54] Most of the buyers in Valladolid had disposed of their properties by 1879, and so had the buyers resident in Madrid. Rueda calls these people speculators and bourgeois, but he points out that they accounted for only 40 percent of the land and that the rest cf the beneficiaries were people directly engaged in agriculture.[55]
The nature of the persons who bought on a national scale, that is, outside their economic region, is of interest because it reveals whether they continued to rely on wealth redistributed by the church and state, as
[53] Rueda Hernanz, "Beneficiarios del proceso desamortizador."
[54] Rueda Hernanz, Desamortización, en Valladolid, 178–79. Urban buyers predominated in all levels of purchasers in the zone around the city and in all but the lowest level of purchasers (those buying under 20 hectares) in those zones of the province south and east of it. In the distant zones of the province to the northwest and southwest, local buyers predominated at all levels. Unfortunately Rueda does not distinguish between urban buyers living in Valladolid and outside the province, but the majority lived in Valladolid. This impressive monograph has established the author as the leading historian of desamortización of his generation.
[55] Rueda Hernanz, "Beneficiarios del proceso desamortizador," 65–66.
at the end of the old regime. Some of the Madrid residents who bought in Navarre in the desamortización of Mendizábal were local people who had moved to the national capital as public servants or deputies, and others were high army officers, who may have become familiar with the region during the Carlist War. Their occupations suggest that their capital came from redistributed wealth or was of Navarrese origin.[56] The role of Madrid residents increased as time went on and changed in nature.[57] They were major purchasers in Ciudad Real after 1855, not only for resale but to keep and exploit, using local administrators.[58] The most famous buyers were the Safont brothers, José and Manuel, members of a wealthy Catalan family now resident in Madrid, who acquired properties in the four Catalan provinces plus Madrid, Toledo, Segovia, Salamanca, Seville, and Mallorca.[59] Evidently merchants, their activity shows that commerce and perhaps industry were beginning to challenge the state as sources of large wealth. But their brother Jaime, who bought land in various towns of Catalonia and houses in Madrid and Seville, was an administrator of ecclesiastical properties in Barcelona.[60] Acting as agents and brokers in the purchase of disentailed properties became a recognized occupation, and speculation, that is, buying with the intention of reselling, took an increasing share of the sales. These activities centered in Madrid, in part because bidding on all major properties could be made there as well as in the provincial capitals.[61]
In the middle of the century enterprising Spaniards were exploiting a number of opportunities presented by the activities of the government: railroad shares, elegant suburbs called ensanches, mines, banks, and, no doubt, although we know little about it, military contracts. To make a business of buying and selling national properties, whether for oneself or for others, fitted naturally into the ethos of the period. Desamortización at its height was a different kettle of fish from what it had been at the end of the old regime, but then the Spain of Isabel II and the Moderado order, which brought together the old aristocratic landowning sector with newly enriched urban groups, was not the Spain of the en-
[56] Donézar, Desamortización en Navarra, 307–8.
[57] Simón Segura, "Desamortización en Ciudad Real," 98–102, 108.
[58] Donézar, Desamortización en Navarra, 284; Simón Segura, "Desamortización en Barcelona," 130.
[59] Simón Segura, Desamortización en Madrid, 96; Porres, Desamortización en Toledo, 416. José Safont was born in Vich in 1803 and had brothers who stayed in Catalonia (Simón Segura, Desamortización en Gerona, 24n).
[60] Simón Segura, "Desamortización en Barcelona," 127.
[61] Simón Segura notes that Madrid buyers became particularly important in the provinces after the desamortización of 1855; under that of Mendizábal, local buyers dominated in the provinces ("Desamortización en Ciudad Real," 98).
lightened Bourbons, who had tried, however unsuccessfully, to control the oligarchies in defense of the producing sectors and thus of the monarchy as a whole. And yet the original patterns of disentail held firm, with the mass of rural properties going to regional elites and village labradores, who got their wealth out of the land, directly or indirectly. If a glittering bourgeoisie was attracting the limelight at center stage, it was, at least in part, as a product of desamortización, rather than desamortización being its creation.
4
If desamortización was not brought on by a bourgeois revolution in Spain, how does one analyze its causation? The evolution of rural society in two provinces at the end of the old regime, which is the core of this book, provides some evidence on this score. The story told here began with the growth of population. Demographic expansion was common to eighteenth-century Europe. It probably resulted from the disappearance of the plague, increased agricultural output, more effective central governments, better communications, changes in the nature of warfare, and other developments that helped induce an economic revival of the Atlantic world. Higher birth rates and lower death rates were a natural response. Some of the demographic growth nevertheless remains unexplained by the obvious economic forces, for in Spain it took place not only in the periphery of the peninsula, already well integrated by maritime communications with the rest of the Atlantic world, but also in the central meseta, a region little affected by the developments just noted until the nineteenth century. Although historians will continue to seek explanations for the eighteenth-century beginning of the modern population explosion, for the purpose of analyzing the process that led to desamortización, demographic growth, whatever the reasons behind it, can be posited as an independent and underlying cause. This proposition should come as no surprise, for a number of historians in the past generation have singled out population as an independent or quasi-independent force in European history. The names of Walter Abel, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, and Douglass North come to mind, among other.[62]
[62] Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur; Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World. Abel and Le Roy Ladurie attribute the long agrarian cycle of early modern Europe to demographic fluctuations; North and Thomas the evolution of European economy and political structure in the Middle Ages and early modern period to them.
In the present Spanish case, demographic growth can be seen to cause at least two other kinds of developments. A first effect was to change the factor relations in agriculture, depressing the price of labor relative to land, while inducing a rise in the market prices for agricultural products. The result was to make land an attractive investment and encourage the expansion of commercially oriented agricultural production, which involved new uses of land: pasture to arable, arable to olive groves, and so on. Complaints had reached the Council of Castile from various parts of the peninsula about high rents, with accusations about the exorbitant demands of the poderosos who dominated the local economies, and we have found some support for the complaints in the accounts of religious institutions that owned land in the towns of Salamanca.
The desire for land led persons at all levels associated with agriculture to respond eagerly to disentail. The massive sale of ecclesiastical properties under Carlos IV's decrees of 1798 is proof of the widespread desire for land. By 1805 the Consolidation Fund, in charge of the sales, was running out of the properties first designated for disposal and had to turn to those of hospitals, asylums, and similar charitable foundations, originally exempted from the process. Another example of the land hunger is the success of the buyers of the lands in defending their purchases against attempts to annul the sales, finally winning their case in 1817. During the war against Napoleon, as mentioned earlier, local governments met their urgent needs by selling land of the town council, often in a shady fashion, to village potentates. Although these sales were strictly illegal, the buyers managed to resist all later attempts to return the land to the villages.[63] After 1823 the government of Fernando VII tried to annul the desamortización of the revolution of 1820, yet the buyers established their titles under Isabel II.[64] These are but explicit evidence of the powerful demand for land present in all levels of Spanish society.
Events in Spain were part of a general Western development at this time. Everywhere a basic change was taking place in the relation of individuals to agricultural production and the land. One feature was the abolition of serfdom and the "feudal" obligations of peasants to their lords where they still existed, notably in central and eastern Europe, although the most famous example was the night of 4 August 1789 in the
[63] See n. 10 above.
[64] See Mateos Rodríguez, "Desamortización en Sanabria."
French National Assembly.[65] Another feature of the development was to put land into private hands, and among the private hands into those that would produce more for the market. The case of English parliamentary enclosures is best known and has long been understood as a measure to make agriculture more productive and hence more commercial. Spaniards like Jovellanos, who argued for the benefits of private property and the right to enclose plowed fields, knew something of the English case. In the 1790s a development much closer to them was the decision of the French revolutionaries to sell ecclesiastical estates to pay the royal debt. The motivation for this legislation has been usually described as anticlericalism developed during the Enlightenment, together with a belief in the advantages of private property. Historians have tended to overlook the fact that the Revolution began because of the need to bolster the royal credit. The members of the National Assembly would hardly have made the decision to sell the estates of the French church if they had not believed that there was a strong demand for land, which would produce much income for the state from this step. In France as in Spain, a pull was present to make the auctioning of church properties a promising way to resolve the royal debt, and the pull in both countries went back to a rise in population.[66]
It has been shown that the curve of the volume of English enclosures coincided closely with the price curve for wheat,[67] convincing evidence that the desire to profit from high agricultural prices induced English landowners to modify local property arrangements and in the process pick up a share of the village commons. In Spain, disentail also coincided with high grain prices. Earl Hamilton's figures show that in the five years 1796–1800 grain prices were the highest they had ever been, following an upward trend that went back to midcentury.[68] This was not the first coincidence between prices and desamortización. The properties that had belonged to the Jesuits went on sale in 1769, and sales
[65] Blum, End of the Old Order, describes this development throughout Europe.
[66] Alexis de Tocqueville is one who recognized the importance of the high price of land at the time of the Revolution: "'Land is always sold above its true value,' a shrewd contemporary observer remarked, 'and this is due to the Frenchman's inveterate craving to become a landowner' " (Old Regime, 24 [book 2, chap. 1]).
[67] Chambers and Mingay, Agricultural Revolution, 82–84, and Fig. 1. Following Ashton, Economic History of England, they also acknowledge the role of fluctuations in the interest rate but assign it much less importance than Ashton does. In Spain the interest rate was fixed by law and custom except on royal loans, but these were discredited.
[68] Hamilton, War and Prices, 183, Table 12. The price indexes in Old Castile and Andalusia went over 200 for the first time in 1791–95, and in 1796–1800 were 239 in Old Castile, 251 in Andalusia (1726–50 = 100).
reached their peak in 1770–71. Agricultural prices had declined slightly since the famous peak of the mid-1760s but were still above those in any earlier period.[69] The same epochs, 1760s–1770s and the years after 1795, were when the parliamentary enclosure movement was most active in England.[70]
Prices fell during the Restoration—thus the decision to disentail in 1820 took place in a deflationary period and cannot be accounted for by a sudden desire for land—but it is revealing that the two major dates in the history of desamortización, 1836–37 (Mendizábal's legislation) and 1855 (the Madoz law), both followed close on high agricultural prices. The years 1830–36 were years of low grain production in Andalusia and soaring prices, with famine in 1834, which became known as "the bad year."[71] The price level remained high until the end of the Carlist War in 1839. Similarly the period 1853–55 witnessed high grain prices in western Europe because the Crimean War cut off shipments from Russia.[72]
Supporting evidence for the direct effect of the international grain market on land redistribution comes from across the Atlantic. In the United States the federal government was busy selling public land in the Midwest between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Civil War. Here too the curve of sales followed closely that of wheat prices. Both peaked in 1836 and 1854–55, with wheat prices almost double their usual level and land sales five to ten times as high as average.[73] Historical writing has explained the Spanish legislation of 1836 and 1855 as the product of the current political situation, which on both occasions temporarily put the Progresista party, committed to desamortización, into power. It is hard to escape the conclusion, however, that the international grain market was partly responsible for the attractiveness
[69] Yun Casalilla, "Venta de los bienes," Appendix 1 for sales; Hamilton, War and Prices, 172–73 and 183, Tables 11 and 12, for prices.
[70] Chambers and Mingay, Agricultural Revolution, 83, Fig. 1.
[71] Ponsot, "Rendement des céréales," 479; Ponsot, "Andalousie occidentale," 105; Sánchez-Albornoz, "Integración del mercado nacional," 173 n. 20.
[72] For nineteenth-century Spanish prices, see Sardá, Política monetaria, 302–3, Table 1 (prices in Barcelona, see esp. those for wheat, barley, olive oil); and Sánchez-Albornoz, Crisis de subsistencias, Appendixes 1 and 2 (Aragon, 1780–1895; Seville, 1827–58). Artola, Contreras, and Bernal, Latifundio, 120–35 and Cuadro 22, shows that rents for cortijos in Andalusia rose after 1750, reaching their high point in 1800–1810. A period of decline followed, especially marked in the 1820s, until a sudden change in trend in 1836–37.
[73] For the sales: Cole, "Cyclical and Sectional Variations." Cole attributes the peaks to waves of speculation. The association with wheat prices is made by North, Economic Growth of the United States, 136–37 and Appendix 2, Table A-11.
of these laws at these dates. In the United States the distribution of public lands and in Spain the legislation creating them and putting them up for auction were both responding to developments affecting all the Western world.
It was not only that the desire for land was more acute when agricultural prices were high but also that potential buyers had the means. Our study of the villages of Salamanca showed that many peasants could pay for their purchases out of savings generated in a few years' time. Similarly it is probable that a large proportion of the cost of enclosures in England came out of current income.[74] Legislators who were pressed for money to finance wars and other emergencies, like those in France after 1789 and those in Spain constantly after 1794, could appreciate this potential source of funds, and they came up with land to put on the market. This was not their only possible solution. One could issue paper money or attempt new taxes or levy forced impositions or borrow or repudiate national debts. Carlos IV tried all these expedients except the last, which his advisers feared would destroy the monarchy. The only one that succeeded was desamortización, because it was the only one that offered the holders of savings something desirable in return. Men and women eager and able to buy land in response to the expanding agricultural markets were a pull factor in the process of disentail, and moments of high agricultural prices inspired legislators to respond to the pull.
If the attraction of land because its products were in ever-increasing demand was the first way in which demographic growth sparked the process leading to desamortización, the second involved the policies of the royal government. Rising population put pressure on food supplies, especially in those areas of Spain that communicated poorly with the sea and the broader Atlantic community. The share of the harvests that peasants kept for themselves probably declined per capita and the real wages of rural workers were threatened, but the most obvious result was shortages and high prices in the commercial sector of agriculture, on which the cities relied for their supplies. In the heart of Castile, Madrid was growing, and its demands dominated the agricultural market of the meseta. Campomanes, impressed by physiocratic authors who proposed economic freedom in agriculture, convinced Carlos III to free the domestic grain trade in 1765, in the hope that the measure would induce greater production. It effected no immediate decline in prices,
[74] Chambers and Mingay, Agricultural Revolution, 82–83.
and riots broke out in Madrid and many other places in the spring of 1766, the famous Motín de Esquilache.
Although many blamed the popular risings on the new policy, the king and his ministers maintained it. In addition, the royal counselors sought more direct ways to increase food production. The king ordered municipalities to distribute commons and wasteland to active farmers in the south and west of the country, but without much success because the local notables, who sensed a threat to their hold on their inferiors, circumvented the royal orders. The king also undertook the colonizing of vacant regions in the Sierra Morena and Andalusia. The colonies took root, and their organizers claimed vast harvests of grain, yet the problem of supply continued. An attempt of the 1780s to repopulate despoblados in Salamanca province had very limited results, again because of the resistance of the large owners.
These experiences convinced the advisers of Carlos III, of whom the most important was Campomanes, to explore conditions in the countryside in the hope of discovering a new agrarian law, which would end the legal barriers to agricultural efficiency and in the process organize rural society on a more just foundation. On their advice, Carlos III issued instructions to the intendants to survey the situation in their districts and propose reforms and then requested opinions on their reports from local authorities and royal judges. The resulting opinions and recommendations were frequently at cross-purposes with each other. Various municipal authorities defended the traditional municipal and royal controls of grain markets and bread prices, and some of them urged an additional control over rents. Other informants, more modern in their outlook, like Olavide, intendant of Seville and director of the recently established colonies, recommended a measure of economic freedom for landowners but hung tenaciously to ultimate royal control of the economy through guidance of the ways that freedom would be implemented; at least one person, the dean of the Audiencia of Seville, Francisco Bruna, writing before Adam Smith had published his Wealth of Nations, proposed absolute freedom to owners in the use or renting of their lands.
The incompatibility of the various kinds of advice given to the crown goes far to explain the failure of the royal government to devise a policy out of these recommendations and its decision to turn to the Royal Economic Society of Madrid for a solution. During the decade that this body struggled with the problem, Adam Smith became known to interested Spaniards, and many of the confused minds inside the Economic
Society welcomed the logical simplicity of the tenets of laissez-faire. When Jovellanos recommended a solution to the agrarian law that rested on economic freedom, drawing on Smith but echoing the judge Bruna, his proposal won majority support of the society not only in 1787, when he first voiced it, but in 1794 when he presented it at length in his momentous Informe de ley agraria. Given wide publicity, Jovellanos's work convinced the royal advisers that the end of legal restrictions on the transfer and use of land was the most pressing need for the improvement of agriculture.
Many thinking Spaniards, like many thinkers elsewhere in the West at the time, believed that the most productive farmer as well as the most reliable citizen was the small landowner. Inspired by this belief, the Informe de ley agraria foresaw that, everywhere physical conditions permitted, the abolition of entail and the freedom to exchange private property would in the course of time produce a country of prosperous owners of family farms, since, as the most productive users of the land, they would be able to pay most for it on the open market. The redistribution of the countryside into small farms might take time, but the working of economic laws would make it inevitable. Although Jovellanos was not directly involved in the decrees of disentail of 1798, his line of thinking was instrumental in the decision of Soler and Carlos IV.
The conviction that legal restrictions on the ownership and inheritance of real property were economically deleterious molded more than the decision to disentail ecclesiastical property. The decrees also empowered owners of secular mayorazgos and vínculos to sell their lands and deposit the proceeds in the Amortization Fund. At the same time, they facilitated the liquidation of permanent and temporary liens on property (censos or cánones), by payments made in vales reales. Other legislation authorized owners of mayorazgos to sell entailed estates far from the main body of their holdings in order to buy land nearby, to simplify management and improve agriculture. Owners of mayorazgos were also permitted to "buy" properties out of entail by depositing their assessed value in the Amortization Fund. The mayorazgo, destined by its terms for the oldest son or in default of a son for a collateral heir, would henceforth take the form of deposits in the royal fund, while the current holder of the mayorazgo could leave the real property that he had bought out to one or more of his other children. Siblings would vie for parental love, customs would improve, and property would circulate. Carlos IV and Soler did not venture to attack religious or lay entails in the form of royal obligations, but their acts pointed logically in
the direction of abolition, and within three decades legislation would catch up with logic. By then, landowners had discovered the benefits of free property.
Although the train of events that led to the Informe de ley agraria and the decrees of Carlos IV began with concern over the need for more food supplies, this causative force is quite different in nature from the demand for land that motivated the purchasers. Here we have a clear example of the role of ideas in history. Nothing in the agricultural or land market or in demographic growth determined that the classical economic doctrine of laissez-faire would become popular at this time. The success of the new doctrine lay in the contemporary infatuation with rational solutions to human problems and the belief that the evils of society were mostly the effect of laws and institutions inherited from times when rulers did not listen to reason. The other solutions for an agrarian law proposed in response to the royal inquest were all more involved, less purely logical, and therefore less convincing to contemporaries who believed themselves enlightened.
Nor, as already noted, can one attribute the popularity of the new economic doctrine to the appearance of a new social class. The men who made or applauded these decisions were not typically bourgeois; most belonged to the well-established sectors of society. They were servants of the crown, joined by some aristocrats, landowners, and prelates of the church, such as the members of the Economic Society of Madrid who applauded Jovellanos's proposals. If anything marked them, it was a desire to serve their country and make the interest of the public their guiding star.
History seeks to recount and explain the sum of the activities of the individuals alive in the place and time it is dealing with, but the historian is obviously unable to discover the relations among all their experiences, their thoughts, and their actions. What the historian can hope to do is to identify the main forces affecting the lives and behavior of the people in question, analyze the apparent relationships among the forces, and assign to each its role in the events of the time. Such a historical analysis is not an abstract exercise, however, but should reflect the reality of the past age, because the evidence that the historian uses comes from the people of the time, as is the case here. On these terms, the conclusion to this story is that ideas had a life of their own, independent, at least analytically, of changes going on in society. The demographic evolution and the shortage of food decided the government to take action in the agrarian sphere, and the new economic doctrine determined the
form of the legislation. In the terms of Aristotelian philosophy, population changes were an efficient cause, and new economic theory provided the formal cause for desamortización and the other acts freeing property.
If, in time-honored historical terminology, these were underlying causes, the immediate cause for the initiation of ecclesiastical disentail in September 1798 was the crisis in royal finances brought on by the wars of the French Revolution. Following the declaration of hostilities with Britain in October 1796, traffic with the empire in America fell victim to the British navy, royal revenues declined, military expenses skyrocketed, and the resulting deficits threatened public faith in the royal credit. Offerings of loans were not fully subscribed; exactions on the clergy and wealthy landowners produced more resentment than return; and the vales reales, circulating royal bonds that served as paper money for large payments, were exchanged far below par. Soler, won over by the arguments put forward by Jovellanos, convinced the monarch that the disentail of church properties was the last resort to avoid possible threats to his throne and assured him that the measure would benefit both the state and the people.
Since the 1760s the reformers had been calling for the redistribution of the baldíos, which by common accord belonged to the king, not ecclesiastical properties, whatever their harmful effects might be. The immediate cause for the switch to the latter as the object of the first major desamortización was the imperative need for money and the fact that ecclesiastical estates, actively used and providing income to their owners, could bring in a good price, far more than baldíos, which would require inputs of labor and capital before they could be fully exploited. At first sight the crown intended no harm to the church. The measure promised the institutions that they would not lose income, since 3-percent interest on the sale price might well be more than their current net return. Until around 1806, when the Consolidation Fund fell behind in its payments, the institutions had little cause for complaint.
But many persons were aware that royal paper was more shaky than solid land and buildings. The king had to take measures against members of the clergy who denounced the disentail as an attack on the church or found more subtle ways to sabotage the process. Why was the Spanish church the first major owner to suffer from desamortización? It is not usual to think of it as weak. An obvious reason is the ideology of the Spanish enlightenment. Enlightened ministers like Campomanes and Jovellanos and publicists like Luis Cañuelo, editor of El censor,
criticized the idle and perhaps debauched life of the religious orders and the neglect of their lands, harmful to the economic welfare of the country.[75] Jovellanos complained bitterly, "What is left of [Spain's] former glory except the skeletons of its cities, once populous and full of factories and workshops, of stores and shops, and now only peopled by churches, convents, and hospitals, which survive amid the poverty that they have caused?"[76] Goya mocked the gluttony and hypocrisy of monks and priests in his Caprichos.
Anticlerical criticism was directed in part at the charitable institutions, precisely those that the decree of 1798 earmarked for despoiling. Beginning with Campomanes and his associate Bernardo Ward in the middle of the century, various reformers called for the care of indigents, orphans, cripples, and the aged to be transferred to the state. In their eyes, the methods of the religious asylums and hospitals only served to prolong and worsen the condition of these persons.[77]
With this spirit present in the government, the decision to turn to the property of the church to guarantee the safety of the crown came easily. On its side, the church did not present a united front. Priests were conscious of the interests of their families as well as of their institutions. Those like the Andalusian clerics whom we found in the towns of Jaén were members of local elites, owed their positions to their social connections, and were motivated by family interests. The priests with more modest origins, common in the north, thought in terms of their heirs, nephews being the most likely, whose place in society many of them were already furthering by supporting their education.[78] Many of the sales went to priests. In addition, a number of clergy, those labeled Jansenists, were convinced that the wealth of the church was harmful to its mission and thus could approve of desamortización on religious grounds. In these ways, the divided loyalties of members of the clergy meant that the church was not an independent force; it was more vulnerable to arguments in favor of despoiling it than its imposing position suggested.
Just as in 1798, the later applications of desamortización were all expressly directed at reducing the national debt. As a result, historians have frequently seen the guarantee of the public credit (and, not inciden-
[75] Sarrailh, Espagne éclairée, 628–61; Herr, Eighteenth-Century Revolution, 183–93.
[76] Jovellanos, Informe, 100.
[77] Sarrailh, Espagne éclairée, 526–35; for Campomanes, Laura Rodríguez, Reforma, 109–11.
[78] See Herr, "Comentario," 276.
tally, the repayment of loans owed to the bourgeoisie) as the primary motivation for it. The debt was, however, as this study should make clear, only the immediate inducement, the push that made the king jump in the river. The river was there because land was in high demand, and the road that led the king to it was the evolution of thought in the Enlightenment. Desamortización came out of a push and a pull. The immediate push was the need of the king for money, the long-term push, the belief among his leading advisers and the influential sectors of society that economic freedom and private property were the panaceas for the problems of both the state and society. The pull was the demand for land among those Spaniards who had money, because the rising price of foodstuffs made land a productive investment. We saw above that these people owed their available capital primarily either to the economic flows redistributed by the state and the church or to income from the commercialization of agriculture.
5
Jovellanos believed that freeing property relations and the land market would make properties pass rapidly from one owner to another and bring into existence a society of small landowners. With this expectation, desamortización fits into the fiscal and economic policies pursued by Soler and Godoy. Wherever possible, the counselors of Carlos IV sought to find a solution for the state's need for money that would lay the burden on the large landowners and the church, leaving the more productive sectors of society unscathed.
Critics of desamortización like Costa have blamed it for the failure to achieve the yeoman society of the dreams of the advisers of Carlos III and Carlos IV, which remained the ideal of agrarian reformers down through the Second Republic. By the time the liberal economist Alvaro Flórez Estrada was criticizing developments in the 1830s, he saw the only solution in a redistribution of land by the state to small farmers, a reparto, as it was called. The critics of desamortización have held up the concept of reparto as the opposite side of the coin, the proper solution to the evils of the Spanish countryside, which desamortización only magnified. Since Jovellanos and his audience were so convinced that desamortización would effect a reparto of its own, one may well ask where they went wrong.
Drawing on the findings of this study, one can propose a number of answers. At the simplest level, one can with hindsight say that Jovellanos,
giving expression to the thought of the men of the Enlightenment and the classical economists, had too uncomplicated an understanding of the workings of human society. He argued persistently that bad laws were responsible for the social evils he observed, most specifically the laws of entail, and that the proper modification of the laws would produce the desired change in society. Furthermore, the most important laws needing change were those involving the use of the factors of production. He was convinced that economic freedom would introduce the most productive form of economy by the simple working of the marketplace. His Ley agraria was somewhat more complex than this, for he argued that one should abandon the corrupt society of the city for the purifying air of the country, but he believed that economic freedom, by bringing prosperity to agriculture, would draw people back to the bosom of Mother Earth.
Things were far from this simple. The decrees of 1798 worked to introduce economic freedom into Spanish rural society, but they produced little change in the society itself. Our study of seven towns demonstrates that, even when property was made free, social structures were "sticky," difficult to change. Customs and attitudes were too ingrained to be altered by legislative fiat. The more prosperous labradores of the Salamanca plains acquired plots of their own, but in Jaén the social layer that labored and the one that owned would remain the same, and property would move very little vertically between layers. What disentail produced was an acceleration of change, not a new direction.
The experience of Carlos III's efforts at agrarian reform should have warned Jovellanos, for the king could not obtain significant compliance with any decree that threatened the position of the rural oligarchies. Soler and Godoy had the same trouble with new taxes that affected these groups adversely. The taxes were not paid, except perhaps in token fashion. Desamortización succeeded because it found a welcome among the sectors that Jovellanos and Soler wished to weaken. One can say that it succeeded because the push and pull factors coincided. When they were working at cross-purposes, that is, most of the time, the pull factor, the forces coming out of society, proved stronger than the push factor, the theories and objectives of the government. Social structures were closer to an immovable mass than royal decrees were to an irresistible force. The weakness of the crown's side was in a lack of linkage between the central government and local society. The king's authority might be absolute, insofar as no one could challenge it legally or effec-
tively at the center, but the king lacked the machinery to enforce his wishes, for power at the local level rested with those who controlled municipal institutions, and these were the local notabilities.
After the mid-nineteenth century, with popular sovereignty and parliamentary democracy, the potential was present to overcome the resistance of the wealthy rural sectors. The latter then discovered how to keep their property even without entail. They developed the phenomenon of the cacique, the agent and defender of the interests of the local established groups. By political control, the wealthy sectors or the caciques acting for them could hound critics and troublemakers and remove judges and officials who looked too closely into how owners handled workers or paid their taxes. Caciquismo made sure that the deputies chosen to parliament would not enact unwanted laws and that the reform measures that did get written or that came down from the past would not be carried out if they hurt the dominant sectors.[79] By insuring that the legislature and the ministry were bound to the established sectors, these sectors became even more invulnerable than in the old regime. Caciquismo represented a more effective linkage of central government to local society than the bureaucracy of the absolute monarchy, because it replaced conflict between the two. Through political control, the wealthy owners forestalled the working of a free economy and kept their properties in the family without entail. The first reason that Jovellanos's optimistic prediction that by abolishing entail "the natural vicissitudes of fortune will make [properties] pass rapidly from one owner to another"[80] was not fulfilled was that it placed too much confidence in the word of the written law, overlooking the power of the accepted political culture, which condoned a phenomenon like caciquismo.
The second reason Jovellanos's vision did not materialize is that he misconstrued the economic realities of rural Spain. Economic freedom did indeed bring change. But change was already going on, for, as noted above, both owners and tenants were responding to market incentives. Jovellanos did not perceive the changes in progress. Throughout this study we have found that disentail accelerated economic developments, because it gave those who were getting the most out of agriculture the opportunity to control more land directly. If Jovellanos had not been so convinced that entail prevented rational change, he might have realized
[79] See Herr, "Spain," 112–19, for a discussion of caciquismo and the political control of the nineteenth-century elites.
[80] Jovellanos, Informe, 98.
that the high price of food was inducing the commercialization of agriculture and that economic freedom would accelerate the trend, to the benefit of the dominant groups.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the family farms he longed for would not have increased the food reaching the cities, the need that inspired the reforms in the first place. Despite the prevalent tendency in the world toward larger exploitations, there are those who contend that even today small farms can be more productive than large ones.[81] Their arguments echo the conclusions put forward in the 1920s by Chayanov, but in these terms the question at hand is badly phrased. At the stage of economic development in which Spain found itself in the nineteenth century, it required that a large share of agricultural output reach the market. A small farm tended by a dedicated family might produce more per hectare than a large one, but freed from the Ricardian trap, the farmer and his household would consume much of the additional product, with the result that the surplus available to feed other sectors might decline. A strong case has been made for English farming being more economically productive than French in the nineteenth century, not because English farmers got more per acre out of the land but because they did so in larger exploitations with fewer men. It was not the productivity of land that counted but the productivity of labor. The French peasant farm might be the ideal of agrarian reformers, but it kept too many men on the land, depressed investment, and created an inadequately capitalized agriculture. Indirectly it put a damper on French industrialization.[82]
This study has been able to test whether large or small exploitations produced a greater surplus in one instance, a comparison of the despoblados of Salamanca with the neighboring villages of small peasant farmers.[83] It found that the mean product per man engaged in agriculture was higher in plains zones with many despoblados than in the plains zones where villages predominated, even though the value of the harvest, hectare for hectare, was considerably higher in the village zones. Most of the excess product of the labor of the peasants who worked the despoblados was not going to them but to the owners, a result of the Ricardian squeeze we identified throughout our towns. The
[81] Defenders of the small individual farm include McPhee, "A Reconsideration of the 'Peasantry,' "13 and passim, and Robert Forster, "Obstacles to Agricultural Growth," 1600–1603.
[82] O'Brien and Heath, with Keyder, "Agricultural Efficiency."
[83] See above, Chapter 18, section 3.
larger exploitations monetized and commercialized agriculture. A reparto would not have solved the problem of high prices in the cities, for it would have reduced the share of the harvests reaching the market. It might temporarily have given the peasants a larger income, but the case of La Mata indicates that no redistribution could keep up with population growth and raise the standard of living of peasants permanently. Jovellanos showed the mind of a development economist in his reasoning, but our evidence indicates that his desire to create small family farms did not respond to the needs he wished to meet. He was not conscious of the Malthusian trap.
6
Since disentail did not produce the results Jovellanos anticipated, the question remains, what were its effects. The beneficiaries of the sales, we have seen, were primarily people who drew their resources either from the redistributive economic force of the state and the church or from the productive force of agriculture. The latter could be the notables of the towns of Jaén or the absentee exploiters of the Salamanca plains or the more successful labradores. In the process, the relative position of the strata was not transformed, but it was modified. As a group, the labradores of Armuña who bought lands increased their total harvests by more than the produce of their newly owned fields, evidence that they were also being awarded more leases. They were distancing themselves from their fellow vecinos. By taking over ecclesiastical properties, the successful members of the Jaén elites increased the power of the elites as a whole within their municipios but did not alter the nature of society. In Navas, a town without a strong hidalgo sector, the labradores peujaleros were among the gainers, creating a stronger local group vis-à-vis the absentee aristocratic owners. One result of desamortización under Carlos IV was to strengthen the upper sectors of local rural society, who held a middle position beneath the truly powerful sectors of the country, the aristocrats and other owners of latifundia and the top echelons of church and state. The term rural bourgeoisie suggests itself, but because it implies a specific conceptualization of the process of social and economic transformation, I prefer not to use it.
Large buyers of lands that the ecclesiastical owners had leased would continue to lease these lands to labradores and others. But whenever a buyer acquired lands that had been leased to farm as his own property,
the proportion of the property available to rent declined. Thus desamortización had the added effect of reducing the class of renters, increasing the division between the local upper group and the wage earners. The changes may have been hard to detect at first, but over the long run, desamortización would have the effect of increasing local social and economic distinctions.
The statement has become commonplace that the entire process of desamortización reduced the lower agricultural classes to the level of penurious day laborers, because it deprived them of the use of the common lands, a resource that provided them some independence from the control of the landowners. The rise of rural anarchism has been seen as a direct response to the loss of this resource.[84] This interpretation rests largely on the assumption that the smaller labradores and the jornaleros benefited from the common lands before desamortización. The information provided in this study, coming primarily from the catastro, tells us little on this score, but it does offer some insights. There are two issues involved. The legislation of Carlos III was motivated by the desire to create more independent small farms out of the common lands and baldíos, which were expected to provide needed food for the cities. The failure of his reforms resulted in large part from the opposition of local oligarchies to giving an independent source of income to the men who worked for them.[85] The example of the término privativo of Baños indicates that even where a specific royal grant had long entitled every vecino to plant a crop on municipal land, in practice very few jornaleros did so, whereas a number of wealthy vecinos had carved out of the término privativo cortijos that had become effectively their private property. For whatever reason—whether because the jornaleros lacked the tools and capital to farm or because they wished to avoid conflict with their superiors or because the alternative of temporary employment elsewhere presented less challenge—they preferred to work in nearby towns during their harvest season.[86] If Baños is typical, the indication is that since few Andalusian jornaleros cultivated crops on municipal lands before desamortización, they did not lose any effective right to farm as a result of it.
The use of public lands for farming was only one issue, however, though the most discussed under Carlos III. Tierras de aprovechamiento
[84] Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, 108–10; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, 80; Gilmore, "Land Reform and Rural Revolt."
[85] See above, Chapter 1, section 5.
[86] See above, Chapter 11, section 4.
común were counted on also to furnish pasture for the animals of all vecinos. In addition, poor vecinos by tradition had the right of derrota, pasturage for their animals on privately owned fields after the harvest.[87] In the small towns above the Salamanca-Albacete line, vecinos appear to have maintained the right of pasturage on municipal lands down to the present century. Where the issue was more relevant is on the other side of the line. My sources have nothing to say about the use of pastures by individual vecinos, but they do suggest that the loss of grazing rights did work some economic hardship on the lower classes of Andalusia. In the three towns of Jaén at the time of the catastro, the number of jornaleros who owned animals exceeded those without, and locally owned animals were pastured within the town limits,[88] so the question of pasture was a real one. Demographic growth, the extension of commercial farming, and desamortización would all affect the situation. One can anticipate that as population increased, most new members of the towns would belong to the class of jornaleros, and their very numerical growth would weaken their economic position and ability to resist the demands of landowners. Very likely the proportion of jornaleros who owned animals declined, but those who did would suffer from a law of 1853 that abolished the right of derrota[89] and from the disentail of municipal lands carried out according to the Madoz law of 1855. They did not necessarily have to give up their animals, but they would henceforth have to compensate the owners for the right to pasture. The declining position of the jornaleros resulted much more from demographic growth, which made labor cheaper and more vulnerable. Because desamortización could be associated with specific acts of legislation, however, the popular mind attributed to it the effects of more general developments that were increasing social distinctions, and anarchist activists could exploit this belief.
The desamortización of Carlos IV, we have seen, accelerated the commercialization of agriculture and the process continued in later periods.[90] One is left with the paradox that most observers of Spanish agriculture judged it backward for the next century or more. In part, of
[87] Gilmore, "Class Consciousness," 152. On the derrota, see Vassberg, Land and Society, 13–18.
[88] AHPS, Catastro, resp. gen. Q 20, asked how many animals the vecinos owned and if any were pastured outside the término. I take the silence on this last question, except in La Mata, to mean they were pastured locally.
[89] Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, 109n.
[90] Vicens Vives, Manual, 585–86; Anes, "Agricultura española," 256–62. On a specific region, the province of Valladolid, Rueda Hernanz, Desamortización en Valladolid, 355. I discussed the question in "Significado de la desamortización," 90–91.
course, backwardness exists in the eyes of the beholder. Compared to the situation in 1800, the one in 1900 was certainly more specialized and commercial, and Spain, if behind northwest Europe, was more advanced than vast parts of the world. Yet the accusation has some validity. Although desamortización did increase the land market, other conditions remained that hampered progress. Change in farming methods in central Spain could not begin in earnest until the advent of the railroads after midcentury made it easier to compete with world areas linked to the sea.[91] Even greater change would be introduced in the twentieth century with the appearance of automotive transportation, artificial fertilizers, and irrigation, both artesian and canalized. We saw how these developments affected La Mata, replacing the traditional grain monoculture.[92]
The brakes were institutional as well as technological. The most obvious was the pattern of tiny scattered plots found throughout Castile. Large holdings in the plains around Salamanca city involved not single exploitations but the assemblage of collections of numerous arable plots, to be rented out to local farmers. One of the aspects of eighteenth-century enclosure in England was the redistribution of properties into larger units that could be fenced economically. The process was expensive, requiring special teams of experts and often entailing tension and conflict among the local owners. In the desamortización of Spain there was neither time nor money for surveys, which indeed would not have been useful since the plots for sale were surrounded by others that were not. All the evidence uncovered here indicates that under Carlos IV properties were sold as they were already defined, except that some large sets of plots were subdivided. After 1855 commons and wastes were divided before they were sold; otherwise the practice was undoubtedly to sell properties "as is." Since, worker for worker, large exploitations were already more productive than small plots, the continued existence of the plots kept the marginal productivity of labor low.[93] It was no accident that the collections of plots assembled by the big buyers of Salamanca in 1800 were disposed of to the local peasants by 1900. After 1950 a concerted state program of parcellary concentration reassembled tiny scattered holdings into tracts on which modern
[91] See Ringrose, Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 192.
[92] See above, Chapter 7, section 11. On the persistent grain monoculture of Castile in the nineteenth century, see Sánchez-Albornoz, "Castilla en el siglo XIX."
[93] The best theoretical explanation of the economic disadvantages of scattered strips or plots is de Vries, Dutch Rural Economy, 4–17.
agricultural machinery could be used efficiently. Until then, however much the land market was freed, the creation of large contiguous blocks was virtually impossible.
Later observers of the Spanish rural scene, however, pointed their fingers most accusingly at the attitude of the large owners, who, they protested, preferred to sit back and enjoy an adequate income from their estates rather than pitch in to find more productive methods of exploitation that would benefit everyone. Again, our findings lend some support to this charge, although not in the censuring form of this criticism. When large buyers spread their purchases around a broad area, with the outlook of investors rather than entrepreneurs, they were following accepted wisdom, which is understandable as a method of avoiding risk from natural or human disasters. Unable to supervise directly the exploitation of their properties, they were content to rent them to local farmers, as the religious institutions had done before. At the end of the old regime, the practice did little economic harm because, given the technology of the time, direct supervision by the owners could produce little if any improvement. Even the reformers who wished to see the Spanish countryside peopled with small farmer-owners did not foresee them introducing better methods, only being more diligent in the use of those that were practiced. Nevertheless, as I argued earlier, this investor mentality could persist when technological improvements, notably the railroad, became available, slowing response to new possibilities. It helps account for the accusations leveled later at Spanish landowners, but it is a condition whose cause cannot be laid at the doorstep of desamortización, which, if anything, favored the more venturesome of the people associated with the agricultural market economy. It thus even helped to destroy the older mentality.
This conclusion has a bearing on another common criticism of the process of desamortización, that it diverted private savings from more economically productive investments. In particular, it has been suggested that it contributed to slowing industrialization in Spain in the nineteenth century, by comparison with its northern neighbors.[94] This argument loses much of its force for two reasons. First, buyers who were searching for a safe investment and finding it in the traditional form of land were not likely to put their savings into undertakings with which they were unfamiliar and trust the management of strangers.
[94] Giralt, "Problemas históricos," 389–93; Nadal, Fracaso de la revolución industrial, 83–84.
Railroads, perhaps, might attract them, with a proper royal guarantee (although the continual discount in the market value of royal bonds revealed how shaky even such a guarantee could be), but not new industries.
Second, much of the "investment" in disentailed properties involved the exchange of depreciated royal notes for solid buildings and grounds. Between 1800 and 1808 the Consolidation Fund received about twice as much in vales reales at full face value as in hard currency (Table 5.2). To judge from the example of a district of the province of Valladolid, the proportion paid in depreciated royal obligations remained at this high level through the desamortización of Mendizábal (in 1821–23 only royal notes were accepted), but it declined after 1855, when government paper was accepted for only its market value.[95] Whether at market value or at full face value, however, this paper had little use as a resource for industrialization, especially for the purchase of capital goods abroad. Furthermore, the most likely sources for productive investment were the large buyers, notably those whom historians like to label speculators. Yet, as we have seen, under Carlos IV these persons were making most of their payments in depreciated paper, and this evidently remained the case up to midcentury.[96] Small buyers, who struggled with each other for arable plots, huertas, and cortinas, paying in solid coin, were not a potential source of funds for industrial development.
Royal governments used land to compensate the public for the resources that had been expended in wars against the French revolutionaries, Great Britain, Napoleon, the rebels in Spain's colonies, and the Carlist opponents of Isabel II. In each case the decision to go to war was taken (or had been forced on the government) before the desamortización took place; the choice of war or development was never presented, at least not before 1850. Given the realities of the situation, one cannot logically make the charge that desamortización drew large amounts of capital out of private hands, where it was a potential source of productive investment, and placed it in public hands, where it was put to the noneconomic uses of war.[97]
Desamortización did not fulfill the high hopes of Jovellanos for rural reform or produce all the economic growth that was possible. Neverthe-
[95] Rueda Hernanz, "Beneficiarios del proceso desamortizador," 88–90 and Cuadro 11.
[96] Tables 15.4 and 15.5 for the purchases in Jaén and Salamanca provinces under Carlos IV. For later periods, Rueda Hernanz, "Beneficiarios del proceso desamortizador," 91.
[97] Rosa, "Property Rights," makes this charge in the case of southern Italy. It is implied in the criticisms of Spanish desamortización noted above.
less, if one looks at the reality of the situation, one cannot not label it a failure. A distribution of the Spanish countryside into small farms was impractical, and, to judge from the evidence uncovered here, it would have led to less rather than more production for the market, thus delaying urbanization and industrialization. In fact, by freeing a large proportion of the land of Spain and redirecting much of it into the hands of men who oriented it toward current market demands, desamortización did encourage economic growth. One can hardly believe that the religious institutions whose lands were sold would have been more innovative than most new owners. As for the common lands, whose loss Joaquín Costa lamented and indirectly attributed to Jovellanos, the redirection of their use would certainly have been slower if they were left untouched. Desamortización was more a catalyst for processes already under way than an independent agent of change, but when the good and the harm it accomplished are balanced on a scale, the good comes out on top.
7
One can perceive a broad lesson for the modern history of the West in this story of court and country Spain. In other Mediterranean countries and in Latin America, as in Spain, the forced sale of ecclesiastical and public properties was one of the most important aspects of the introduction of modern economic freedom. To learn how it began in Spain, who was behind it, and who benefited from it thus expands our understanding of the triumph of economic liberalism. The example of Britain, leader of the industrial revolution, has caused historians to conclude that laissez-faire was a product of the rise of commerce and industry and the appearance of a bourgeoisie based on them. Spain, however, was very different from Britain, and yet it accepted a version of economic freedom at the same time as Britain. The British case thus does not provide the full explanation for the rise of laissez-faire economics.
In Spain the process leading to the freedom of exchange in real property can be traced back to demographic expansion beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, especially urban growth, which increased the demand for marketable agricultural products. The relative value of land rose, attracting a potential public for disentail. At the same time, high food prices, by creating a threat to public order, forced the royal government to consider how to increase agricultural output.
Here the role of ideas came into play. The enlightened sectors of so-
ciety, including the royal advisers, accepted the doctrine that laissez-faire was the only rational rule for economic activity. Without the new economic thinking one cannot explain the attack on entailed property. However much the groups actually or potentially engaged in the agricultural market were hungry for land, they could not introduce legislation, nor were they likely to propose the new doctrine on their own. The pattern of their purchases shows that their mentality was far more traditional than that of Jovellanos and Soler, who carried the day with the enlightened elite and the king. Once the established groups saw economic freedom in action, however, they fell under its spell. They became aware that laws of entail, which had been established to protect their interests, were in fact working against them. Their pull joined the push from the royal government to carry forward the undertaking with remarkable speed.
The resemblance of the Spanish experience to major aspects of the introduction of freedom of property in England and France—enclosure in the one and the confiscation and sale of ecclesiastical properties by revolutionaries in the other—leads to the proposition that, just as in Spain, the explanation for the rise of economic liberalism elsewhere lay not simply in the beginnings of the industrial revolution and the rise of a commercial and financial bourgeoisie but at a deeper level in the interaction of demographic expansion and enlightened rationalism. The effects of demographic expansion made people aware of the disadvantages of restraints on factor and commodity markets, while enlightened rationalism gave economic freedom the aura of natural law. And economic liberalism, in thought and in action, was instrumental in the triumph of modern capitalism and the transformation of the old regime into the contemporary world.