Notes

1. Prabhacandra commences the topic of strimoksa at the end of his refutation of kevali-kavalahara (see Chapter II, n. 3) on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Arhat's possession of the Four Perfections—namely, infinite knowledge (ananta-jnana ), infinite perception (ananta-darsana ), infinite bliss (ananta-sukha ), and infinite energy (ananta-virya ). He now makes the further claim that the state of moksa, characterized by these four infinite qualities, is possible only to men and not to women. Technically speaking, moksa is achieved only at the end of the Arhat's life at the time of attaining Siddhahood; but the term can be applied to the earlier stage of the Kevalin also when these four qualities are perfected. See also Chapters I (n. 2) and II (n. 19).

2. Prabhacandra does not mention the Yapaniya by name, but as was seen above (section iii) he certainly draws very heavily upon the Strinirvanaprakarana and its Svopajnavrtti in writing this section of the Nyayakumudacandra . The word "Sitambara" does appear once in the text (see #39), but Prabhacandra probably uses that designation as a genetic term that would include the Yapaniya also, the chief proponent of strinirvana. Hence it is possible to identify the opponent in this section as the Yapaniya.

3. See Chapter II (#2).

4. On the Three Jewels, see Chapter II (n. 4).

5. See Chapter II (#7).

6. See Chapter II (#5-6).

7. See Chapter II (#10).

8. See Chapter II (#11).

9. See Chapter II (#12).

10. See Chapter II (#19).

11. See Chapter II (#15).

12. See Chapter II (#18).

13. See Chapter II (#20).

14. See Chapter II (#20).

15. See Chapter II (#21).

16. See Chapter II (#26). It should be noted that Prabhacandra here ignores both the reference to the jinakalpa mode of mendicancy, which came to an end after the time of Jambu (Chapter II, #23), and the Nisitha-bhasya scripture (Chapter II, #26), which lists twenty cases unfit for mendicancy including "a pregnant woman" and "a woman with a young child."

17. See Chapter II (#27).

18. See Chapter II (#28). On the Digambara rule allowing nudity for a nun on her deathbed, see Chaper II (n. 25).

19. See Chapter II (#29). The rule quoted here is from a Svetambara scripture, yet Prabhacandra allows it to be placed in the mouth of the Digambara, suggesting the possibility that this sutra was once common to both sects. In the Prameyakamalamarttanda , however, he merely states that the naked mendicancy for women is neither enjoined in the scripture nor witnessed in the world (na hi strinam nirvastrah samyamo drstah pravacanapratipadito va), p. 329.

20. See Chapter II (#31).

21. See Chapter II (#35 and #38).

22. See Chapter II (#43).

23. See Chapter II (#44). Prabhacandra ignores here the Yapaniya argument that a nun's case is similar to that of the monk who is allowed clothes because he is subject to one of the three defects recognized as valid grounds for not going naked (see Chapter II, #45-47). He also passes in silence the entire argument (Chapter II, #50-60) that the jinakalpa is not suitable for all—for an eight-year-old boy, for example—and that the sthavirakalpa (i.e., mendicancy with clothes, as understood by the Svetambaras) is an equally valid mode available to women.

24. Compare Chapter II (#39); see the sangraha-arya quoted.

25. See Chapter II (#40).

26. See Chapter II (#35).

27. See Chapter II (#41).

28. See Chapter II (#42).

29. See Chapter II (#66).

30. See Chapter II (#79).

31. See Chapter II (#85).

32. See Chapter II (#95).

33. See Chapter II (#96). Prabhacandra ignores the entire discussion (Chapter II, #97-113) on the relationship between word and meaning in determining the true meaning of the word "stri," as well as the Yapaniya doctrine that the sexual desire (veda) must correspond to the biological gender (linga); see Chapter II (#108-113).

34. See Chapter II (#114).

35. See Chapter II (#115).

36. See Chapter II (#117).

37. See Chapter II (#118).

38. See Chapter II (#119-126).

39. Prabhacandra appears to be the first to present the argument of the invariable relationship derived from the gamya-gamaka relationship in the context of strimoksa; it is not found in the works of Sakatayana.

40. This examination of the Buddhist theory on concomitance is found on pp. 446-448 of the Nyayakumudacandra .

41. See Chapter II (#16).

42. In the Naiyayika view, independent parts are related to a whole by the separate element known as inherence (samavaya ). The Jainas reject samavaya as being a separate entity, for in their view there is merely a "qualified identity" between the part and the whole.

43. The word "Sitambara" is not found in the earlier work, the Prameyakama-

lamarttanda , and this is the only time it is mentioned in the Nyayakumudacandra . I have been unable to identify the particular Svetambara writer who might have raised this so-called Naiyayika argument. Most probably Prabhacandra himself anticipates such an objection and puts it in the mouth of the opponent.

44. Bharata, the eldest son of Rsabha, the first Tirthankara, is the first of the twelve cakravartins who ruled the earth during the current half of the time cycle according to the Jaina cosmology. See Chapter V (n. 18). Bharata is said to have attained moksa in that very life. For the legend of Bharata, see JPP , p. 204.

45. The word "subha" (auspicious) must be understood here as suddha (pure). Both sects have maintained that auspicious (i.e., meritorious) deeds take one to heaven but do not lead to moksa. Spiritual liberation is possible only through pure actions—that is, actions which do not generate new karmas. In the popular literature the word "subha" has often been used to represent both the subha and the suddha categories of action. For a discussion on these two categories, see Jaini (1985).

46. See Chapter II (#20).

47. A passage in the text (#45, lines 3-8) that correlates in detail which beings are reborn in which hellish or heavenly abodes is omitted in the translation.

48. See Chapter II (#13).

49. See Chapter II (#21-22).

50. See Chapter II (#21).

51. A Jaina monk may exercise such supernatural powers in order to protect other Jaina mendicants from calamities wrought by cruel kings or demigods. See, for example, the story of the Digambara monk Visnukumara in the Brhatkathakosa (no. 11).

52. This is presumed to be the result of such good deeds as giving alms to monks who have performed great austerities. It is said that such a person's alms vessel will never run out of food, even if a cakravartin's army were to feed from it for an entire day. For details on this and other yogic powers attained by Jaina monks, see JSK I, pp. 475-487.

53. See Chapter II (#21).

54. The Jainas believe that animals possessed of reasoning power and the five senses (samjni) are capable of realizing the right view (samyagdarsana) as well as assuming specific types of minor restraints (anuvrata), such as refraining from killing. Animals are thus considered to be able to attain the fifth gunasthana, a status identical to that of the Jaina laity. See Chapter II (n. 13).

55. See Chapter II (#31).

56. See Chapter II (#33).

57. See Chapter II (#33, last line).

58. See Chapter II (#35).

59. Most Indian religious schools agree that the acts of charity only lead to rebirth in auspicious existences. Meritorious actions themselves are never the direct cause of moksa; cumulatively, however, they may enhance one's opportunities to assume the mendicant restraints, thus indirectly helping the achievement of moksa.

60. See Chapter II (#35-36).

61. The Digambara tradition maintains that the whisk broom is given up by Kevalins, as well as by monks in meditation. There was also a (heretic) Digambara

sect based in the city of Mathura (Mathurasangha) called nispicchika (see Chapter V, ii) that gave up the use of the whisk broom in the belief that it was not essential for leading the life of a mendicant. See JSK I, p. 346.

62. This argument of a Digambara monk not lifting the fallen piece of cloth (thrown over him) is new. Compare in this connection the Svetambara story of Mahavira that after his renunciation he had carried a single piece of cloth on his shoulders for a year but did not care to pick it up when it fell on thorns and thus he happened to become a naked (acelaka) monk. See JPP , p. 13.

63. See Chapter II (#52).

64. See Chapter II (#34).

65. See Chapter II (#34, last line).

66. See Chapter II (#44).

67. See Chapter II (#41).

68. The four types of idle talk include conversation about family and so forth. The four passions are anger, pride, deceitfulness, and covetousness. See Gommatasara-Jivakanda , verse 34.

69. See Chapter II (#34). In the Strinirvanaprakarana , it is the Digambara and not the Yapaniya who argues that women are required to wear clothes in order to dispel shame and hence the Jina is not to be faulted for forbidding nudity to them.

70. In the corresponding section of the Prameyakamalamarttanda (pp. 331-332) Prabhacandra quotes eight verses that ridicule the claim of the clothed monks that they are free from desire (virakta ) despite the wearing of clothes. The eighth verse sums up the Digambara position: only those who are broken by the afflictions arising from women and those who are bound by attachment to the body accept clothes. It is proved thereby that they are not free from either the internal or external bonds. (striparisahabhagnais ca baddharagais ca vigrahe, vastram adiyate yasmat siddham granthadvayam tatah.)

71. The Digambaras maintain that shame (lajja) is a virtue for lay people (being, in their case, the basis for appropriate modesty) but a hindrance for those following the higher path of mendicancy. They do not consider nakedness to be invariably associated with freedom from desire, but assert only that the wearing of clothes always indicates the presence of desire. Those made uncomfortable by public nudity might argue, therefore, that the mendicant should retain his clothes until he is free from all desire (i.e., until he actually becomes vitaraga at the twelfth gunasthana), since the external act of going naked does not itself make one free from internal desire. The Digambaras would answer that while discarding one's clothes is not equivalent to abandoning one's shame (the latter involves eradication of the libido itself), taking the vow of nudity at the initial stages of mendicancy is nevertheless important as it amounts to a total renunciation of the household life and its worldly possessions.

72. See Chapter II (#48).

73. See Chapter II (#64-66).

74. See Chapter II (#73).

75. See Chapter II (#69).

76. All Jainas have traditionally believed that only a man can become a Tirthankara. An exception to this rule is to be found in the Svetambara belief that the nineteenth Tirthankara, Malli, was a female. See Chapter II (n. 54).

77. See Chapter II (#71). It should be noted that Prabhacandra is using this Svetambara text (quoted also by the Yapaniya author) to make the point that nuns are equal to monks.

78. See Chapter II (#87).

79. See Chapter II (#89). Both sects believe that the process of the destruction of karmas begins at the eighth gunasthana, which is not accessible to anyone but a mendicant. (For exceptions to this rule in the Svetambara tradition, see Chapter VI, n. 13.) From this doctrine flows the Digambara claim that a woman who is barred from taking the mendicant vows—that is, from reaching the sixth gunasthana—cannot rise to the eighth gunasthana. Thus in their view a woman's anatomy itself is obstructive in initiating the process of the destruction of karmas.

80. Compare the verse quoted in Chapter II (#89).

81. See #27 and Chapter II (#95).

82. The reason for rejecting the authenticity of this verse is evidently the word "linga," which can only mean the physical sign of gender (as opposed to the word "veda" in #82, which can mean both the gender as well as the internal sexual feeling) and hence is not acceptable to the Digambaras. For an alternative text, see Chapter VI (#8 and n. 8).

83. The Prakrit Siddhabhakti is attributed to Kundakunda (see Pravacanasara , intro., p. 25) and is daily recited by the Digambara monks. It should be noted that this verse was not quoted by Sakatayana, but Prabhacandra offers it as an alternative text to support the Digambara theory that only men can attain moksa.

84. See Chapter II (#115). For an additional argument that women do not have the necessary samhanana (joints of the bones) to achieve the higher states of meditation, see Chapter IV (#10).

85. Both sides agree that animals—who can also experience any of the three kinds of sexuality regardless of their biological gender—are incapable of attaining moksa, since they do not possess the necessary human body.

86. According to the Digambaras, one cannot attain sukladhyana, a necessary antecedent to moksa, in a female body. For additional qualifications, see Chapter VI (#79 and n. 21). For details on the sukladhyana, see JPP , pp. 255-259.

87. See Chapter II (#117).

88. The former and the latter moksas refer to the attainment of Arhatship and Siddhahood, respectively. See note 1.