Applying Deleterious Epithets

The presence of troops in the oil zone, as in the rest of the country, contributed to the insecurity of economic and human life in Mexico. Troop depredations began and intensified with the Revolution itself. In the 1911 rebellion against Díaz, marauding bands of armed men operated in the oil zones. They came down the rail line from Tuxpan to sack the oil camp at Furbero, burning railway bridges on the way. Farther north, the El Aguila managers worried about the effect of an armed attack on Potrero del Llano No. 4. Ominously, someone had cut the telephone wires to the camp at Potrero. Cowdray acted prudently. He took out fire insurance, at a premium of 2.5 percent, on 2.5 million barrels of oil per year.^[98] Cowdray even suggested that the owner of the Hacienda Potrero del Llano, Crisóforo B. Peralta, who was receiving substantial royalties from the company, ought to organize its defense. "[T]he Peraltas are so largely interested in the Potrero field that they ought to be extremely alert in doing all they can to assist in ensuring its safety."^[99]

The series of revolts against Madero, commencing in 1912, brought additional problems of oil-camp security. At the time, El Aguila and other companies were engaged in expanding their pipeline and terminal facilities. None of the companies deemed the political disturbances to be sufficiently dangerous to abandon their construction plans. On the other hand, the oil companies would have suffered more if they had

not been able to get rid of their oil. In August 1912, armed "bandits" attacked the oil camp of Ixhuatlán on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Because the American drillers were getting edgy, El Aguila's general manager, J.B. Body, protested to the Madero government and asked for protection. Gen. Félix Díaz then led a rebellion in the Huasteca region and captured the virtually undefended port of Tuxpan. Only a few others supported the Díaz rebellion, his first of many, and government troops soon arrested and transported him to a military prison in Mexico City.^[100] In February 1913, Díaz conspired with Generals Bernardo Reyes and Victoriano Huerta to produce La Decena Trágica, the ten tragic days of bombardment in Mexico City between army forces in the National Palace and rebel army forces in the Ciudadela. That particular rebellion cost Reyes his life and Madero first the presidency, and shortly afterward, his life too.

Within a year, as the rebellion against Huerta took shape, the oil zone became even more involved. Rebel raids indicated to the foreigners that federal troops were ineffective at protecting the countryside. In May 1913, a Constitutionalist force plundered La Corona's camp at Pánuco.^[101] The Constitutionalist troops under General Aguilar began to occupy the southern fields. They besieged a small garrison of federal troops at Tuxpan during November 1913, eventually sending them fleeing to Tampico. Thus far, the oilmen were much relieved to report no damage. "I strongly consider that our relationship with the natives from the district between Tuxpan [sic ] and Tampico is such that our property will not be generally attacked," said Lord Cowdray, optimistically.^[102] Thereafter, only Tampico would remain under federal control for the rest of the year. The rebels controlled the countryside.

But conditions in the countryside only worsened following the American occupation of Veracruz and the victory of Carranza over Villa. Manuel Peláez led a local rebellion against the Constitutionalists in the oil zone. Constitutionalist officers lost control of their troops; pay was scarce, liquor was not; and rivalry between fellow officers exacerbated the depredations in the oil zone. Troops often entered the oil camps for supplies. They ate the camp's food, confiscated the livestock, and fed the camp's fodder to their own animals. The Penn-Mex Fuel Oil camps reported total losses of $84,252 and 594,544 pesos during the Revolution; Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company set its losses at 1.6 million pesos; Transcontinental's losses of equipment and food amounted to $45,866.^[103] The officers courteously scattered about receipts and chits for the goods they took. In June 1914, El Ebano camp

lost three thousand pesos in cash and four thousand pesos worth of fodder to a visiting Constitutionalist force. The oil men preferred that the Constitutionalist troops remain in the towns of Topila and Pánuco rather than be stationed among the oil camps. Under the influence of alcohol, the soldiers became uncontrollable, dangerous, insolent, and "very obstreperous."^[104] Operations were disrupted on many mundane levels. Reported William Green of Huasteca:

I have many of the annoyances to which we are subjected by these Constitutionalists, such as the commandeering of our launches, demands on our commissaries, the holding up of emissaries between one station and another where the telephone lines are down. We are practically without mules at Casiano at present.^[105]

Moreover, the officers, each of whom recruited and paid for their own troops, displayed a good deal of friction and rivalry among themselves. A hierarchy of command hardly existed among Constitutionalist officers like Generals Millán and Alemán (father of the later president Miguel Alemán); Colonels Alberto Herrera, Adalberto Tejeda (later governor of Veracruz), Agapito Barranco, Tito Hernández, and Enrique Hernández; and Lieutenant Colonel Luis Ramos. In the southern fields, Constitutionalist officers were said to be recruiting oil workers by bragging about the abundant opportunities for looting and the violating of girls.^[106] Most of the time, the many armed groups composing rival forces went about avoiding each other and aggrandizing themselves.

The refining and exporting cities, like islands of rock in a churning and frothy sea, were only seldom threatened by contending armies. Tuxpan was calm under Aguilar, as was Tampico after the Federalists surrendered. In 1917, Generals Alvarado and Maycotte led three thousand government troops into Minatitlán to clear out the rebels who under Gen. Cástulo Pérez had threatened the Tehuantepec National Railway. The Constitutionalist generals conferred with A.S. Gulston, manager of the Minatitlán refinery, about garrisoning the oil camps at Filisola and San Cristóbal. Gulston became very apprehensive. He did not wish to antagonize the opposing armed faction on the isthmus. "[I]t is somewhat difficult not to appear as taking a prominent part in connection with advising them what operations they should undertake," Gulston admitted.^[107] In the countryside, no area was permanently cleared during the Revolution. Yet another rebellion by Félix Díaz in southern Veracruz and Oaxaca preyed on isolated, small

garrisons of Constitutionalists. In May of 1918, a band of six hundred men under Pafnuncio Martínez raided Minatitlán, killed twenty soldiers of the local garrison, threw their bodies into the barracks, which they set on fire, and took 45,000 pesos in currency and 25,000 pesos in goods from the El Aguila refinery. "I had no idea that so many as 600 rebels in one gang could exist in the Isthmus," exclaimed Lord Cowdray.^[108] The government troops swept through the area again, apparently finding few of the rebels.

The depredations and demands of armed troops in the oil zone were unsystematic and arbitrary. In the process, the oil camp managers became veritable diplomats. They learned to deal with the demands of the different factions, giving in here, resisting there, and making every general feel important. For the Huasteca company, William Green handled these chores in the southern fields. His description of one day, 1 March 1918, in the life of a supervisor is instructive of this diplomacy, as well as of Green's contempt for the Mexican officers with whom he was dealing:

On my return to Tampico from my last trip, General Acosta, who is in Tampico at present, sent for me to say that General de las Santos [sic ] had instructions to pay me the money I advanced them when we first met at Ojital. [S]ince the $1000 [pesos] I gave to Pruneda and the $1500 [pesos] I gave to Acosta, I gave $2000 [pesos] to Robinson, Jefe de Armas, Tampico, for rations for Acosta's troops; in all I have receipts for $4500 [pesos], and I will receive that as soon as the pay of Acosta's troops becomes due again. Instead of paying this to the soldiers General de las Santo [sic ] will pay it to me. . . .

Acosta tells me that many companies have made bitter complaints both against him and General Pruneda, and he informed me that he had taken pains to let his command know this, and he has especially recommended the Huasteca Petroleum Company to the consideration of all his subordinates. . . . He thanked me most effusively for not having made reports against him to [President] Carranza or [General] Dieguez, and told me that he would show his appreciations for this consideration on my part. Of course, I cannot vouch for Acosta, as this undiscopline [sic ] mob is very hard to handle, but taking into consideration our helplessness I believe it to our interests to lead him through these paths, on the theory that you can catch more flies with molasses than you can with a shot gun.^[109]

Such diplomacy, if indeed this is the word that describes Green's dealings with the local commanders, occupied a great deal of time. Their local problems multiplied considerably as new military commanders were assigned and reassigned throughout the oil zone. Generals Acosta, Pruneda, and De los Santos were replaced by other commanders from outside the district, who brought in their loyal troops.