A. «Anticipation of Death,» and «Resoluteness»
In his Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge , Fichte elaborates on all those acts of the self that do not appear among the empirical states of consciousness but rather make empirical consciousness possible. Among them is an act Fichte refers to in the sentence «The self posits itself as determined by the not-self. »[1] This act gives rise to the assumption that in the self the opposite of «activity»[2] is posited. Fichte calls this opposite «Leiden.» [3] In everyday language, Leiden (suffering) or leiden (to suffer) is a straightforward word
signifying experiences of pain. A person can «leiden an einer Krankheit» (suffer an illness) or «Schmerz leiden» (suffer pain), either physically or mentally. However, we mustn't think of these meanings when it comes to the acts of the self. Thus, Fichte adds a note in which he not only points to the inappropriateness of «painful feeling» with regard to pure consciousness but even declares «painful feeling» to be a mere «connotation» of Leiden.[4] At a significant point, the English translators of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit , John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, thought one should keep a phrase of Heidegger's clean of its everyday meaning. In contrast to Fichte, however, they did not use the corresponding English everyday word in order, thereafter, to cleanse it of its everyday meaning. Rather, they translated it in such a way that its everyday meaning could no longer be recognized at all. They translated as «anticipation ,» «anticipatory resoluteness ,» and «anticipation of death» (BT 349, 349, 350,
353) what in the German text reads as «Vorlaufen,» «vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, » and «Vorlaufen zum Tode» (SZ 302), or «Vorlaufen in den Tod» (SZ 305). They cannot be blamed for this, since in a note they remark on the German word «vorlaufen» and its literal meaning, «running ahead» (BT 350, n. 1). Heidegger's language is difficult even for native German speakers and even more difficult to translate into other languages. Yet, one might regret that in the English translation the emphasis has shifted or has even been reversed. «Anticipation» and «to anticipate» refer primarily to a mental activity, whereas the phrase «to run (ahead)» is primarily used for a physical motion. In German this difference is even more pronounced, for antizipieren (also vorwegnehmen and vorhersehen) exclusively designates mental activities and never physical motions, whereas «vorlaufen» is used exclusively for physical motions and never for mental ones.[5]
Furthermore, if one anticipates (antizipiert, vorhersieht) some situation or event, one assumes that there is a temporal difference between the moment of anticipation and the occurrence of the anticipated situation. It is this time difference that allows one to prepare oneself in thought or action for this situation in order to get out of its way or to benefit from it or even to gamer support from others. However, with vorlaufen one does just the opposite. Someone läuft vor when he leaves a group, a place, or a house he has been in so far and runs out, alone, into the open. In doing so one often exposes oneself to insecurities and dangers from which one had previously been protected by the group or house. Thus, vorlaufen is often the crossing of a line that, as in the case of the Greek city wall (the 
, the 
, 
, the definition), provides the individual inside with shelter from, and identity in opposition to, the dangerous, undefined outside. As long as I am inside the walls, I am able to anticipate the moves of the enemy outside who beleaguers me; correspondingly, I can anticipate and strategically plan my future moves. However, as soon as I laufe vor, I deprive myself of this safety zone as well as of the time difference and expose myself immediately to the
dangers of the outside from which I had previously been protected. Thus, a Vorlaufen is an Übersetzung from one's secure place, one's 
within one's own city, into the insecure and dangerous open. A Vorlaufen is by no means an anticipation of danger. Rather, I immediately expose myself to the danger precisely by abandoning the security I had hitherto relied on in my earlier acts of anticipation. To summarize: When one läuft vor, one annihilates the interval between the moment of anticipation and the occurrence of the anticipated situation; one abandons the shelter of the wall, which enabled one to anticipate dangers and to prepare oneself for them, and one runs straight ahead into the dangers outside the wall. Detractors of the security within walls and definitions, however, will say that in the moment of danger, or decision, one's 
, one's proper, or authentic, place is outside where the danger is, amid the seductions and dangers of war, madness, and eros. The place within, the actual city, they say, is either boring or has already become endangered by some foe outside or inside itself. (That the inhabitants don't notice this danger is just a further proof of how threatening the situation has become.) Thus, one has to run ahead, to run out, in order to get rid of the city or in order to return and save, or reshape, the city.
Since «to anticipate» does not have the sense of physical motion, the translation forecloses the associations that could hardly have been avoided by German readers who «ran into» Heidegger's phrase in the years between World War I and World War II. «Entschlossen in den Tod vorlaufen» (to resolutely run ahead into death) was how the acts of those who were later called the «Helden von Langemarck» (heroes of Langemarck) were characterized. World War I was the first war characterized largely by trench warfare. The front lines hardened quickly. Entrenched, the armies lay opposite each other. This situation could have gone on for years and years, with sufficient materiel and Daseine as, in the later Heidegger's term, «standing-reserve [Bestand ]» (BW 298; VA 20)[6] or «human resources» (BW 299; «Menschenmaterial,» VA 21). Already in November 1914, however, the «Helden von Langemarck,» young German students, most of them Freiwillige (volunteers), had stepped out of the trenches into the open and, with the German national anthem on their lips, had run toward the French trenches. In terms of military strategy, this was sheer suicide and completely counterproductive. Nonetheless, or precisely because of this, they became the paradigm—the myth in the sense of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence —for all other German soldiers. As one can read in books on World War I written by conservative or right-wing authors, every German soldier was supposed to be capable of doing the same and had to follow, to imitate, or to repeat the actions of these «Helden yon Langemarck» in order to become himself a «Held.» The most outstanding ones proved to be the «Helden von Verdun» (heroes of Verdun). Through their actions, these «Helden» gave rise to one of the most powerful myths of the political Right in the years of the Weimar Republic. The «Helden von
Langemarck» and the «Helden von Verdun» symbolized the resoluteness and the gallantry of «der deutsche Soldat» (the German soldier). He would have won the war if only he had received sufficient support from the «Heimat-front» (the home front). Such was the stuff of the so-called Dolchstoßlegende (the legend of the «stab in the back») according to which the Helden were not killed by French bullets coming toward them from the front, but were stabbed in the back by those at home. In this way the German loss of the First World War could be attributed to the «vaterlandslose Gesellen» (unpatriotic knaves), including communists, social democrats, Jews, and liberals, who—as those who propagated the legend of the «stab in the back» maintained—through lack of enthusiasm, subversive activities, and creeping apathy reneged upon the brave promise represented by the «Helden von Langemarck.»[7]
One might feel tempted to use the situation of the «Helden von Langemarck» as the methodological ideal type to interpret Heidegger's concept of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). Yet, even without it, one cannot overlook an ambivalence of the German word Entschlossenheit that Heidegger entschlossen exploits and that many of his concepts share, namely, to have an active as well as a passive aspect. Entschlossenheit is the noun form of entschlossen (sein) (to be determined or to be resolute). Entschlossen, in turn, is the perfect participle of (sich) entschließen for instance, ins Kino zu gehen (to determine [oneself] to go to a movie, to decide to go to a movie). Entschließen consists of the prefix «ent-» and the verb «schließen» (to close, to shut, to lock, to finish, to end, to terminate). Looking back on one's decision one says, «Ich habe mich (dazu) entschlossen (, ins Kino zu gehen)» (I have decided [to go to a movie]). As the result of such a decision, «man ist entschlossen» (one is determined, one is resolved). One uses this phrase, «Ich bin entschlossen» (I am resolved) mainly to indicate that one's mind is made up. Thus, if someone doubts my decision, I reply by adding to «Ich bin entschlossen» the adverb «unwiderruflich!» (Ruf is call, thus, irrevocably! Or beyond recall; one might also say «Unwidermflich! Diese Sache ist für mich abgeschlossen.» Beyond recall! For me this issue is settled, or finished.) As already the grammar of this sequence shows, by making a decision one brings oneself into a stable state, the state of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). Being in the state of resoluteness, that is, having made the final decision, a person manifests activity and strength. In the state of resoluteness, he can no longer be seduced by the many voices talking to him. That is, «er hat sich abge schlossen (gegen diese Stimmen).» Abgeschlossen is the perfect participle of the verb «abschließen,» which consists of the prefix «ab-» and the verb «schließen»; thus, «abschließen» is «to lock up» or «to seal off» (and also to close, to end, to terminate). Thus, «Er hat sich abgeschlossen gegen diese Stimmen» is: He has locked himself up, or closed himself off, against these voices. (One might also say, he has sich selbst verschlossen [locked up himself] against these voices; thus, he is verschlossen against them, he has become
«unzugänglich [inaccessible] to these voices.») In an old metaphor, having made the decision, the resolute person no longer belongs to the «
» as Parmenides says,[8] to the two-headed mortals, the many, or the «they.» The two-headed crowd, or rather, each Dasein that has been living and continues to live in the mode of the «they» does not have the strength to make a decision. Thus, such a Dasein vacillates between being and non-being; it vacillates between several voices, now listening to this one and now to that. In the architecture and aesthetics during Nazism, Arnold Breker's sculptures were the most obvious incarnations of the resolute person. They call on the viewer to make a decision and to remain entschlossen.
As for its active aspect, Entschlossenheit testifies to strength and steadfastness as well as to the ability to remain closed to, or inaccessible to, the many promptings of the multiple voices here and there. At the same time, however, one has also opened oneself. With the decision one has become inaccessible to the many voices and has opened oneself to one particular voice. One has «sich entschlossen,» that is, opened up, or unlocked, oneself. Be-decken or zu-decken means «to cover (up),» «to shield,» or «to protect,» and ent-decken means «to discover.» Ver-schleiern, or ver-hüllen, means «to veil» or «to disguise,» and ent-schleiern, or ent-hüllen, means «to unveil» or «to reveal.»[9] Thus, the prefix «ent-» often indicates an opening or uncovering. One has «sich entschlossen,» that is, «sich auf geschlossen.» «Auf-geschlossen» is the perfect participle of the composite aufschließen, which consists of the prefix «auf-» and the verb schließen. When one is in the state of Entschlossenheit, one has «sich aufgeschlossen für» (unlocked oneself for, or opened oneself for), one is «geöffnet» (opened for) or «offen für» (open for), or one has opened oneself for something; for example, Christians have opened themselves to grace; those on the political Right of the Weimar Republic had opened themselves to «die Stimme des Volkes» (the voice of the people), to the people, or even to the race. By opening oneself one becomes the receptive vessel into which mysterious entities like grace or race pour, mysterious entities calling for obedience, giving one clear directions, and providing one with the identity, spirit, and life that, consciously or unconsciously, one has lacked until one heard their call. (In fact, in these cases the perfect participles are identical in the active and the passive voice; thus, «ich habe mich entschlossen» is «I have decided/resolved/ unlocked myself»; «Ich bin entschlossen» is «I am resolved,» in the sense of «I have made up my mind,» but it might also be read as «I have been decided upon/resolved upon/unlocked [by someone for something]»; equally, «Ich bin aufgeschlossen» might be read as «I have been unlocked [by someone for something]»; as «Ich bin abgeschlossen» might be read as «I have been locked up/closed [by someone against something]»; in this sense, one might read «Ich bin offen» as «I have been opened/unlocked [by someone for something].») Thus, Heidegger's concept of Entschlossenheit might contain a promise, namely, the promise that one would get rid of the loneliness and isolation of
bourgeois subjectivity and of the necessity to make decisions for oneself, by becoming a passive vessel and member of the community of the people. It was this promise that made the Jugendbewegung (Youth Movement) and other right-wing groups so attractive.[10]
I commented on Heidegger's notions of «Vofiaufen in den Tod» and «Entschlossenheit» because, after an introductory paragraph, it is with an amalgam of these two notions that Heidegger begins his discussion of historicality:
We have defined "resoluteness" {Entschlossenheit} as a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty—a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety. Resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness {vorlaufende Entschlossenheit}. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and to take it over wholly. (BT 434; SZ 382)
As is probably hard to imagine for readers in the United States at the end of this century, with the associations surrounding these sentences Heidegger, right at the beginning of his discussion, in a way sets the tone, creates the atmosphere, or evokes—to use one of his pet terms—the «mood» typical of conservative or fight-wing thinking about history and politics at the time. In addition, the two notions «Vofiaufen in den Tod» and «Entschlossenheit» contain, as it were, in a nutshell the fight-wing understanding of history and the individual's position in it. For reasons that will become clear, in the next sections I turn to the end of Heidegger's argument in section 74 in order then to make my way back to the beginning and into the context of section 74.
From the viewpoint of the resolute person, the two-headed crowds, with all their vacillating, are verschlossen against the call. Due to their inability and pigheadedness they are not able, or are not willing, to open themselves up and to make themselves free for the one voice they should listen to and obey, namely, that of the people. Being verschlossen to the one and real voice, they are, one might say, verfallen to the many voices.[11] From their viewpoint, in turn, the resolute person might look as though he has given up his identity and autonomy, as though, in an extreme formulation, he has sacrificed himself to some «higher» entity. Anyway, as is known, Heidegger assumes that Dasein lives for the most part in the mode of the «they,» that is, as ordinary Dasein. Ordinary Dasein just takes over what parents, peer group, etc., have instilled into it. Heidegger's usage of the terms «ordinary» and «inau-thentic» seems not always to be consistent. As I will justify and elaborate in chapter 2, I use the notions with reference to the situation when the call raises its voice. Prior to the call, all Daseine are ordinary Daseine. Once the call raises its voice, some ordinary Daseine don't listen to the call or try to evade it (BT 318f., 323, 335ff., 443f.; SZ 274, 278, 289ff., 391). These Daseine become inauthentic. Other ordinary Daseine, however, listen to the call (BT
317ff.; SZ 272ff). These Daseine become authentic Daseine. How do they respond to the call? In section 74 Heidegger encapsulates his answer in a short and enigmatic sentence: «Die Wiederholung erwidert vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz» (SZ 386; «Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there,» BT 438). The German verb «erwidern» can have several and even contradictory meanings. Only a careful examination of the context will show what Heidegger meant.[12]