Order in the Church
Contarini's Christianity was profound and personal. As a young man he had experienced uncertainty, dryness of heart, and listlessness while in quest of a vocation that would be pleasing to God. As a mature man he had acquired inner certainty, yet his religion does not strike the reader of his works and letters as static. For him, being a Christian meant commitment. He accepted the visible church as founded by God, with the pope as his vicar who ruled over a hierarchical structure that embraced all men. There is no trace of the conciliarist model of church government in Contarini's writings; his mention of the Council of Constance is so cursory that from it no reader could realize the importance of its decrees.[72] But acceptance of the church's hierarchical government did not preclude criticism of its shortcomings. His ideal of the church made him chafe all the more at the toleration of abuses, and he championed reform with conviction. Contarini combined great loyalty to the institutional church and its doctrines, including the Eucharist as defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, the Petrine supremacy, and the conventional teaching on the seven sacraments, with an undogmatic spirit of freedom and openness. Just as he was eclectic in philosophy, he demonstrated a willingness to take seriously the views of others in religious matters and give them full consideration. This attitude, so intimately a part of his personality, nevertheless remained incomprehensible to many who knew him, and eventually it became suspect.
Apart from the letters to Giustiniani and Querini, the earliest evidence for Contarini's interest in church reform is found in a short note he wrote on Savonarola. Giustiniani, having been consulted by Pope Leo X in connection with the reexamination of the friar's case,[73] asked Contarini for his opinion.[74] In his reply of 18 September 1516
[72] "... Celebrata fuit synodus Constantiensis tempore magni schismatis: quo tres Pontifices erant Benedictus, Gregorius et Joannes vigesimus tertius. Opera Sigismondi Imperatoris, qui multum laboris, et industriae impendit, ut schisma illud tolleretur, fuit coacta synodus Constantiae ... electus fuit Martinus Columna vir egregius, et pius. Post Constantiense consilium, ut seruaretur Decretum de congregatione conciliorum, indictum fuit concilium, quod fuit Basileae coactum" (Conciliorum magis illustrium summa , in Opera , 563).
[73] Felix Gilbert, "Contarini on Savonarola: An Unknown Document of 1516," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 59 ( 1968): 145-46.
[74] For the text, see ibid., 147-49.
Contarini wrote that he had been reading Savonarola's works, including sermons preached after the friar's excommunication. The fact that Savonarola did not obey the pope was for Contarini insufficient reason to declare him a heretic, for "the vicar of God used the power given to him against God and charity; ... therefore he did not have to be obeyed."[75] Another accusation against Savonarola was that he had declared himself a prophet. Again, Contarini defends the friar by arguing that it is not contrary to faith to think that prophets could still arise in the church: "To enter a definitive judgment in this matter seems to me very presumptuous and dangerous. I say the same about the interpretation of Scripture according to his prophecies. I know that renewal of the church [is necessary], not because of prophecies but because natural and divine reason tell me so.... Divine reason also tells me that sometimes God must order his church, which is to be fervently desired by all Christians."[76]
Despite his sympathy with Savonarola's call for reform, Contarini ends his letter by submitting himself in all respects to the decision of the church. Though he freely asserts that no vicar might use the power committed to him for purposes contrary to those which that power was intended to serve, he balances this declaration by accepting the need for church discipline. It is telling of Contarini's way of thinking that he could admire both the visions of Savonarola and later the methodical spirituality of Ignatius of Loyola, with its emphasis on the necessity of "sentire cum ecclesia," or thinking with the church.[77] For Contarini, membership in the church entailed subjection to legitimate papal authority. He felt free to speak against its arbitrary exercise precisely because he accepted the principles on which it was founded. But Contarini's declaration of submission to the ecclesiastical authorities in this particular instance could also be explained at least in part by his realization that he was unfamiliar with the technical arguments used by the friar's opponents. His diffident handling of the Savonarola case points to a real weakness in his academic preparation for his later career in state and church: a lack of familiarity with civil and canon law.[78]
[75] Ibid., 149.
[76] Ibid., 149.
[77] A. Suquía, "Las reglas para sentir con la iglesia en la vida y en las obras del cardenal Gaspar Contarini (1483-1542)," Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu 25 (1956): 380-95.
[78] Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 120-25, discusses Contarini's letter fully and gives useful bibliographic information. She mentions Contarini's "insufficiente preparazione teologica e canonistica" (124, 178); nevertheless he appreciated the importance of legal education for the bishop; see Opera , 411.
Here, knowledge of the latter might have sharpened his argumentation considerably and given him a better grasp of the legal issues involved.
In the following year, 1517, Contarini wrote one of his best-known treatises, De officio viri boni ac probi episcopi ,[79] the first part of which describes the formation of the ideal bishop, and the second his exercise of the office entrusted to him.[80] It has received thorough examination by Gigliola Fragnito.[81] She points out that the work owes much to the example of Pietro Barozzi, bishop of Padua from 1487 to 1507, whom Contarini knew, as well as to the ideas of his friends Giustiniani and Querini, and possibly also to Contarini's reading of Savonarola's sermons during the summer of 1516.[82]
The immediate occasion for the composition of De officio episcopi was the accession of the teenaged Pietro Lippomano to the bishopric of Bergamo as successor to his uncle, in flagrant contravention of canon law, which established a minimum age of thirty for bishops.[83] Contarini makes no allusion to the bishop-designate's youth or the law that was flouted in this treatise intended for Lippomano's guidance. Indeed, the work eludes neat categorization, although it is generally ranged among Contarini's theological writings.[84] It includes philosophical reflections, discussion of moral issues, ideas on education and psychology, criticism of prevailing practices, even specific suggestions for the bishop's everyday life down to such details as his meals, the kinds of music he should listen to, and the kinds of books he should read.[85] The treatise lacks the theological and legal dimensions of other works in the "mirror of the bishop" literature. A portrait reflecting Contarini's own wishes and preferences, it does not touch on theoretical issues of episcopal power, its nature, or origin. Neither does it dwell on concrete matters of diocesan administration, about which its young lay author probably knew little. But it is more than the work of "a
[79] Opera , 401-31.
[80] Silvio Tramontin, "Il 'De officio episcopi' di Gaspare Contarini," Studia Patavina 12 (1965): 295, thinks the work is divided into three distinct parts discussing the virtues of the bishop, his duties, and the bishop's day.
[81] Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 75-189.
[82] Ibid., 126-33. For Barozzi as model, see also Hubert Jedin, "Das Bischofsideal der katholischen Reformation: eine Studie über die Bischofsspiegel vornehmlich des 16. Jahrhunderts," in Kirche des Glaubens 2:86.
[83] Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 179n.386.
[84] GC , 283.
[85] For a detailed summary of the contents, see Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 138-75; and GC, 283-96.
sensitive observer,"[86] since its main ideas are rooted in Contarini's own religious experience and foreshadow his later, more fully elaborated views.
The author of an otherwise thoughtful study finds the first book of the treatise "academic in the worst sense, unoriginal and uninspiring. It was most surely the concrete programme of action enunciated in the second book that gave the treatise its reputation."[87] Yet it is the first book that reveals significant aspects of Contarini's way of thinking. As was his custom, he opens the treatise with general considerations, in this case of the nature of the two societies to which men belong, the secular and the ecclesiastical. It soon becomes obvious that Contarini takes a hierarchical view of both. Just as the ruler by virtue of his position in the body politic enforces order in that realm, so the bishop must be responsible for order in the church on the diocesan level. The two societies, however, do not exist side by side; the ecclesiastical is superior to the secular because its charge is the transmission of the Christian message and instruction in Christian living, responsibilities that confer on the bishop greater dignity than the secular ruler possesses.[88] By virtue of his office the bishop has a special position: he "is between the divine spirits and the human race" and must participate in both the angelic and the human nature.[89] Contarini's extravagant exaltation of the bishop follows from his conviction that the moral and religious foundation of the Christian people is a higher endeavor than the task of secular government, because their eternal salvation depends on their acceptance and understanding of the Christian message. In keeping with his own preferences, he stresses repeatedly that the best instruction is through the bishop's good example, not through the rules and regulations he might make. As he himself had learned from "living books," as he called his friends, so the bishop's flock would learn from seeing in his behavior the way to conduct themselves as good Christians.
Given these premises, it is understandable that Contarini designs an ideal education for the formation of the youth who is to rise above the level of ordinary men by his position as bishop in the church. To be sure, the rather dry listing that follows of what such a man must know and what virtues he must possess is heavily indebted to Aristotle's
[86] Jedin, "Bischofsideal," 86.
[87] Oliver Logan, "The Ideal Bishop and the Venetian Patriciate: c. 1430-c. 1630," Journal of Ecclesiastical History , 29 (1978): 429.
[88] Opera , 402.
[89] Ibid., 403.
Ethics . Nevertheless, the choice of virtues that the bishop needs is Contarini's own: amiability and kindness, fortitude, magnanimity, simplicity of living, humility, justice, and prudence, in addition to the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.[90] The stress on justice and especially on prudence gives Contarini's treatise an unmistakably Venetian character. If it is true that "the Venetian political temperament was characterized by compromise, consensus, conciliation, and expediency,"[91] then Contarini was arch-Venetian. He prized all the virtues but gave pride of place to prudence, that peculiarly Venetian virtue[92] without which a man in a responsible position could not be effective, whether in church or state. Contarini here assigns many of the same specifically Venetian virtues associated with secular rule to the man in charge of the fundamental unit of church administration, the diocese.
His ideal bishop has the quality that Contarini himself thought basic to the government of men in a Christian society: moral probity. Thus the bishop's education centers on the formation of a morally principled good man rather than on the perfect gentleman. The study of moral theology and philosophy is the best preparation for the future bishop, not the pursuit of worldly wisdom, poetry, or eloquence. Here again we find distrust of eloquence in itself, disjoined from nobler, higher purposes. We have found this distrust in the letters to Trifon Gabriele a dozen years earlier; it no doubt goes back to the period of Contarini's close association with Giustiniani and Querini, who were so convinced of the perils inherent in secular learning that they recommended to Pope Leo X that priests be instructed in Latin only to the extent necessary for understanding the Scriptures.[93] Giustiniani and Querini's Libellus might have been the basis for the decree of the Fifth Lateran Council of 19 December 1513. Felix Gilbert has argued persuasively that this decree not only condemns philosophical debates about the immortality of the soul, but also testifies to a profound suspicion of the secular tendencies in humanistic studies.[94]
[90] Ibid., 405-10. I do not agree with A. D. Wright's summary of the purpose of this treatise, that the "central and characterisic concern of Contarini" was "to encourage an underage boy, of the patrician elite, not so much in the practical duties of the episcopal office as in the private pursuit of God-fearing but unsuperstitious virtue" (Review of Gasparo Contarini , by Gigliola Fragnito, Journal of Modern History 63 [1991]: 405).
[91] Robert Finlay, "Politics and Family in Renaissance Venice: The Election of Doge Andrea Gritti," Studi veneziani , n.s., 2 (1978): 107.
[92] See the fine observations on prudence as "an aspect of the Venetian collective sensibility" by Cervelli, Machiavelli , 321.
[93] For a discussion of their views, see Gilbert, "Cristianesimo," 984-85.
[94] Ibid., 978.
Contarini's sympathy with his two friends' view appears clearly in his treatment of the bishop's education, where he expressed reservations regarding the effects of a humanist education on the moral development of the young.[95] He never condemned humanistic studies as sweepingly as his two friends did.[96] Like them, he was sensitive to basic tensions between secular learning and Christian principles;[97] yet he was also well aware that such tensions had been a constant in the life of the church. In his sensible, balanced way Contarini issued no blanket condemnations of humanist education but sought to limit its potentially harmful effects. This is why twenty years later he agreed to the recommendation that the reading of Erasmus's Colloquies be forbidden in the grammar schools, since they "contain many things inciting uneducated minds to impiety."[98] What was forbidden to boys, however, he thought useful to adults. It is certain that he himself had read some Erasmus, though there is no evidence that he ever had personal contact with the great Dutch humanist.[99]
Several other themes in De officio episcopi are especially useful in illuminating Contarini's conception of order. He posits a close cooperation between secular and ecclesiastical authorities. The ideal bishop would supervise carefully the applicants for admission to holy orders, making sure that the church never served as an asylum for criminals; he would respect the state and its laws and not shield guilty clerics, who should be committed to the secular jurisdiction save in exceptional cases wherein he personally would act as judge.[100] Here Contarini incorporates into his ideal diocese the same relation to secular authority that characterized Venice. A reflection of Venetian practice is his
[95] Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 129-32. See also Opera , 426.
[96] For Giustiniani and Querini's views, see the references in Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 130.
[97] For arguments for a particular sensitivity to these issues in the generation to which Contarini belonged, see Cessi, "Paolinismo preluterano," 18-19.
[98] In the "Consilium de emendanda ecclesia," Concilium Tridentinum: diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum nova collectio , ed. Societas Goerresiana (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 1901-38), 12:141 (hereafter cited as CT ); translated in Elisabeth G. Gleason, Reform Thought in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 96. Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 138n.266, suggests that Contarini may have had to compromise on this point with Carafa and Aleandro.
[99] See Contarini's references to his familiarity with Erasmus's "De libero arbitrio" in the "Confutatio articulorum ... Lutheranorum," Gegenreformatorische Schriften, 7 . For Contarini's possible indirect contact with Erasmus, see Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 137. For the larger question of Erasmus's influence on Italian contemporaries, see Silvana Seidel Menchi, Erasmo in Italia, 1520-1580 (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1987).
[100] Opera , 422, 426.
recommendation that the secular government be called upon, where necessary, to end disorders in nunneries and root out the terrible conditions prevailing in many of them. In his view, the state should concern itself also with heresy, for heresy, like civil crime, endangered both societies and undermined the foundations of all government.[101] Contarini did not diverge from contemporary thinking on the nature and danger of heresy; in fact, he repeated the stock arguments against it. Just how conventional his view was can be seen by comparing it with the somewhat later work of Mino Celsi, for example. Celsi introduced new and original elements into the debate about heresy by arguing that heretics cannot be treated as criminals since the necessary condition for any crime is the will to commit it. Heretics, however, were misguided and impaired, and therefore, like mentally ill persons, they had no consciousness of wrongdoing.[102]
Another personal note in Contarini's tract is the fervent expression of a desire for reform of the church. Although his denunciation of absentee bishops at the end of Book I adds no new dimension to the topos of the shepherd who abandoned his flock to the hireling, its passionate tone is reminiscent of Protestant attacks on abuses in the Catholic church.[103] Contarini's misgivings about excesses in devotion to the saints led him to recommend that the bishop teach his people to love God above all and to impress on them that without God the saints are nothing. These recommendations were later censured by ecclesiastical authorities; though printed editions of the treatise contained passages on this topic, they were greatly toned down in comparison with the manuscript original, where Contarini's indignation at the laxity and abuses on the diocesan level had been expressed forcefully, even vehemently.[104]
It has been pointed out that Contarini failed to mention such obvious and proven means of reform in a diocese as episcopal visitations and diocesan synods.[105] One explanation for the omission may be his lack of knowledge of diocesan administration at the time he wrote the treatise. A more important reason for the neglect of these practical steps is likely to be Contarini's focus on the individual: reform in De
[101] Ibid., 425; and Gilbert, "Religion and Politics," 110.
[102] Mino Celsi, In haereticis coërcendis quatenus progredi liceat , ed. Peter G. Bietenholz, Corpus Reformatorum Italicorum (Naples: Prismi Editrice/Chicago: Newberry Library, 1982), 346.
[103] Opera , 413.
[104] Fragnito, "Cultura umanistica," 77-79, 187-89.
[105] Ibid., 180.
officio episcopi has no collective or communal dimension. Contarini's moral radicalism is uncluttered by institutional and legal asides. He was convinced that the bishop's example was of fundamental importance for a diocese; the bishop would bring about change not so much by laws and regulations as by what he himself was. There is, of course, an appealing simplicity about such an approach. But Contarini's design of the ideal bishop was not simpleminded. His treatise affirmed in yet another mode what he had experienced and interiorized—that change of heart in the individual was the necessary first step toward reform of the church. Good men were "living books" impelling others to learn from them. In the last analysis Contarini's good bishop touches men's emotions and will rather than their intellect, moving them to the love of God and charity toward their neighbors and kindling in them the desire to lead Christian lives based on the precepts of the Gospels.
The weakness of Contarini's treatise lies in the absence of a thorough and precise examination of the nature and limits of the bishop's power in the church, its theoretical underpinnings, and a clear sense of how he could initiate or advance institutional reform. Its strength is in the vision of a church whose order depends on the observance of the gospel precepts by its shepherds, the bishops. Contarini's ideal has just enough concrete touches to prevent his bishop from becoming a cardboard figure and to bring him into the realm of the thinkable and desirable, if not always the possible. By the perfection of his virtues the bishop was to be a potent critic of those who in actuality fell far short of the obligations of their office. In that sense one can agree with Dirt-rich that De officio episcopi was Contarini's "first reformatory deed."[106]
Contarini's first exclusively theological work, of great significance for the understanding of his thought, is the Confutatio articulorum seu quaestionum Lutheranorum , written between 1530 and 1535 (probably closer to the earlier date).[107] In it he summarizes and comments on sixteen of the twenty-eight articles of the Augsburg Confession for the benefit of an unnamed correspondent. The treatise is notable for the serious consideration Contarini gives to Philip Melanchthon's accommodating formulations of basic Protestant teaching, quite unlike the
[106] GC , 296
[107] The edition in Opera , 564-80, is superseded by that in Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 1-22. For a German translation, preceded by a useful introduction, see Jedin, Kardinal Contarini als Kontroverstheologe . For the most plausible dating, see Rückert, Theologische Entwicklung , 6n.2.
later Catholic theologians who rejected the document for the very reason that it toned down differences with Catholic doctrine.[108]
Contarini's interest in Luther and the German religious situation was of long standing. During his embassies to the Spanish and papal courts he was well informed of events in Germany. His brother-in-law Matteo Dandolo, Venetian ambassador to the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, may have given him a copy of the Augsburg Confession.[109] That Contarini mulled over its articles can be seen in the fact that he rearranged their order so as to give them a tighter structure than the original document did. Articles on which there existed actual or potential agreement were omitted, such as that on God (art. 1), the Son of God (art. 2), baptism (art. 9), or the Second Coming of Christ (art. 17). He thought it appropriate to begin with the fourth article of the Augsburg Confession because it deals with justification by faith, the subject "on which Luther chiefly dwells." Contarini follows St. Thomas closely in considering the infusion of divine grace as the formal cause of justification, which he calls a spiritual rebirth that allows man to participate in divine nature.[110] He also accepts the Thomist proposition that although the justified continue thereafter to entertain an inclination to sin, this inclination is not itself culpable in God's eyes but is rather a punishment for past sins.[111] The first step toward justification is the dispositio , man's acceptance of the infusion of grace given freely by God. Contarini defines this disposition as "credulitas qua in Deum tendimus,"[112] and thus a dynamic, living, active faith rather than passive assent. In this specific sense the beginning of justification is by faith alone. But by its very nature this faith brings forth good works, since it is united to love in a single harmonious whole. Because of this intimate connection it is possible to say that "for that reason and in that sense man is justified by works, not only by faith. Not that we
[108] Jedin, Kardinal Contarini als Kontroverstheologe , 11.
[109] Dittrich, GC , 305, thinks that Contarini relied on detailed reports by others rather than on the text of the Confession . Neither Hünermann (Introduction to Contarini, Gegenreformatische Schriften , xii, n. 2) nor Jedin (Kardinal Contarini als Kontroverstheologe , 10-11) commits himself on the question of whether Contarini worked from the actual text. I agree with Rückert, Theologische Entwicklung , 30n.1, that Contarini was unlikely to write an entire work about a text he had not read, especially since he makes specific references to details of the Augsburg Confession and is obviously familiar with many of its arguments.
[110] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 2.
[111] Rückert, Theologische Entwicklung , 19.
[112] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 3.
merit justification by our works (that idea has been rejected above), but because a faith that remains without works is not that faith by which we strive toward God and through which we are disposed to receive grace; it is therefore dead, as St. James says."[113] We find here no hint of Contarini's later theory of double justification, but rather a marked dependence on St. Thomas and a characteristically sensible approach to Lutheran paradoxes, which led him to deemphasize the reformer's ideas of concupiscence and preserve the importance of both faith and works.
The further examination of their relation logically follows as Contarini looks at article 20. He agrees with the Lutheran idea that good works are necessary to "destroy the body of sin which we have inherited from Adam" and to purify the soul. But he argues against the assertion that good works are of no avail in gaining for us eternal life. His main point is that because good works after justification are done by God's grace they have their origin in his being, in which men participate through divine goodness and generosity, and for this reason they do merit for us eternal life and happiness.[114] The careful scholar Harms Rückert noticed Contarini's divergence here from St. Thomas but was at a loss to understand it. He tentatively attributed it to the effect of Reformation ideas about faith and works upon Contarini's independent thought. In the last analysis, however, Rückert thought Contarini incapable of formulating these ideas clearly, for he did not reach definite conclusions.[115] But Rückert wrote before Contarini's letters to Querini and Giustiniani were discovered, and thus could not know how deeply personal this whole issue was for him. Contarini was no systematic theologian; his own experience of justification and closeness to God is at the root of his idea that man participates in the divine nature and that God's grace brings forth good works in us. His personal conviction is the key to understanding what otherwise seems an idiosyncratic view that neither agrees with Luther nor depends clearly on St. Thomas.
In his treatment of original sin Contarini went out of his way to minimize difficulties, but in fact he misinterpreted the Lutheran position. Twice in a few lines he appeals to "those among the Lutherans who are more reasonable"—presumably meaning Melanchthon and other moderates who were willing to enter into discussion with Cath-
[113] Ibid.; cf. James 21:7.
[114] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 4.
[115] Rückert, Theologische Entwicklung , 32.
olics.[116] After summarizing articles 2 and 4, Contarini suggests some improvement in wording and interpretation that would make Lutheran teaching about the necessity of the law acceptable. By correcting the definition of original sin, Contarini makes it essentially Thomistic in spirit if not in words, calling it "carentia gratiae et iustitiae Dei" (privation of God's grace and justice).[117] Significantly, he does not come to terms with the Lutheran concept of concupiscence in all its rigor, and his version of it cannot be reconciled even with the "soft" expression of the Augsburg Confession, let alone with Luther's words.
Willingness to accept what to him seemed right and well expressed in Protestant thought characterizes Contarini's brief discussion of free will. He states that he has not read Luther's De servo arbitrio , which he knows only from Erasmus's De libero arbitrio and from what he has heard from others.[118] His arguments are directed against what he takes to be the Lutheran position that God is the cause of our good as well as our bad works, and concludes that man can fall into perdition by his own power but cannot be saved without the grace of God, which, however, he can choose to accept or reject. Seeking to agree with as much of the Protestant position as possible, he accepts what Luther has said "in a beautiful and excellent way," that we must have recourse to grace in order to do good and that we cannot be justified through the Mosaic law.[119] This discussion, though, is quite unsatisfactory, leaving no doubt that he was unfamiliar with the logic of Luther's views on the bondage of the will. Contarini's irenic temperament made him seek to reconcile God's overwhelming grace with man's freedom of the will, yet he does not manage to do so in any convincing way.
The last major article of faith that Contarini singles out for discussion deals with the sacrament of penance. Again he interprets the Lutheran position in less than its full austerity, an easy enough error given the brevity of article 11 and the broadly general nature of article 25 of the Augsburg Confession. In principle he finds acceptable the Protestant position that only those serious sins that oppress the conscience
[116] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 5. Contarini here writes of "illis ex Lutheranis qui melius sentiunt."
[117] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 6. Cf. Summa theologiae I II , qu. 82, art. 1. Contarini simplified the Thomistic definition and came close to that of Cochlaeus: "Carentia seu privatio originalis iustitiae, quam Adam protoplastus lapsu suo perdidit" (Hugo Laemmer, Die vortridentinisch-katholische Theologie des Reformationszeitalters [Berlin, 1858], 107).
[118] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 7.
[119] Ibid., 10.
should be confessed. Nevertheless, he prefers to see the old practices retained for the sake of simple Christians who frequently find it impossible to distinguish serious from venial sin.[120]
Contarini's next four articles deal with disciplinary matters or long-established liturgical practices: the invocation of saints, monastic vows and the celibacy of priests, the mass, and fasting on Fridays and during Lent. Without advancing new ideas, he confirms the old practices, but his tone and spirit differ significantly from the tack taken by such other Catholic controversialists as Johannes Eck.[121] Contarini's sincere attempt to understand the Protestant position notwithstanding his frequent inability to share it stands out, as does his willingness to admit errors and abuses in the Catholic church. Granting that a misunderstood cult of saints can lead to flagrant superstition, Contarini repeats what he wrote in De officio episcopi , that reform in this area is an urgent matter to be undertaken by zealous bishops.[122] Similarly, he makes no excuses for the deplorable conditions in many monasteries and nunneries. While defending monastic vows and celibacy in principle, he calls for energetic reform.[123] He would also do away with another evil of which Lutherans made much: masses said too frequently in private houses without regard to their sacred character.[124] He singles out for treatment the laws of fasting and the widespread misunderstanding of their purpose, even though the Augsburg Confession contains no separate article on them. In themselves these laws do not affect man or his soul, nor are they divinely instituted, yet obedience to them shows obedience to the church and the pope. With this last consideration Contarini returns briefly to the necessity that there be one head and one authority for all Christians. In this he was arguing implicitly against the final article of the Augsburg Confession but avoiding a thorough treatment of papal power and its relation to that of bishops and councils. He contents himself with saying that these questions are still being debated: "Many say many things."[125]
The Confutatio is the first work in which Contarini grapples with the great issues raised by the Protestant reformers. As a theological treatise it is not remarkable, and its minor place in the history of
[120] Ibid., 11.
[121] A comparison of Contarini's Confutatio with Eck's Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutheranos (1526) shows the mildness and willingness of the former to give Lutheran opinions serious consideration. Eck, by contrast, calls Lutherans "haeretici" and polemicizes sharply against them; he devotes chap. 27 to cautioning Catholics not to dispute with them.
[122] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 14.
[123] Ibid., 16.
[124] Ibid., 18.
[125] Ibid., 20.
sixteenth-century religious controversy is justified. Contarini had not read enough of Luther at the time he wrote it to understand clearly the difference separating the reformer's views on such crucial topics as justification, freedom of the will, or authority in the church from his own views. Nor did he know Melanchthon's Apologia , which would have made some of his optimism about the Augsburg Confession impossible. Neither did he make reference to the Confutatio issued on 3 August 1530 by Catholic theologians. The importance of Contarini's treatise, rather, comes from the light it sheds on the future cardinal's mind regarding questions of reform and order in the church.
A striking feature of the Confutatio is its dependence on St. Thomas. In the first five sections there is hardly an idea not derived from Aquinas's Summa , though Contarini abridges and simplifies,[126] presumably in the interest of the unknown addressee and other laymen ignorant of philosophy. Unlike his earlier philosophical treatises, this work is written in nontechnical language. At this stage of his life Contarini was firmly convinced of the validity of Thomistic thought in explaining the mysteries of faith.[127]
Another evident quality of the Confutatio is the desire to be fair to the Lutherans. Contarini does not dig in to defend indiscriminately everything then regarded as forming part of Catholic faith. Equally remarkable is the fact that he writes from the standpoint of a Venetian aristocrat even when he is dealing with critical issues of Reformation theology. Repeatedly we find theological points illustrated by reference to Venetian civic order, so pervasive and self-evidently correct was the political and social world of his patria in Contarini's mind. For example, in discussing original sin he uses the analogy of a foreigner given citizenship and patrician status through the generosity of the
[126] This is repeatedly stressed by Rückert, Theologische Entwicklung , 8, 46. Mark Burrows argues in his paper "Converging Themes in a 'Counter-Reformation' Debate: A Study of the Pastoral Foundations of Contarini's Confutatio articulorum seu quaestionum Lutheranorum and the Confessio Augustana ," presented at the Princeton Theological Seminary in September 1984, that common pastoral concerns underlie both Contarini's and Melanchthon's thought, and that they are united in their antipathy to late medieval nominalism. I would like to thank Mr. Burrows for allowing me to read his paper.
[127] Beccadelli was struck by Contarini's agreement with St. Thomas: "[Contarini] fu studiosissimo d'Aristotile, il quale haveva tutto più di una volta con diligenza visto, et perchè varie sono le vie de gli espositori, fu prima Averroista, la cui dottrina a quel tempo era maestra nelle scuole; di poi parendoli che San Thomaso d'Aquino fosse più reale Dottore, a lui s'applicò, et gran conto ne fece sempre, et maxime nella Theologia" ("Vita," 40). Also: "Nella Theologia ... fu molto dotto, et tenne principalmente la via di San Thomaso, del qual Dottore imitava non solo la dottrina, ma li costumi anchora, et haveva ... tutta la Summa di quel Santo Dottore alla mente" (43).
Senate. This man's posterity would inherit his newly acquired status, but if he were to commit an act against the state not only would he lose that status himself, but so would his descendants, "who, though they may not themselves have transgressed against us, are shoots from a bad plant, from him who committed an offense against us. Let this suffice for describing original sin."[128] Here Contarini's identification with the ruling elite of Venice is complete: it is obvious that "we" who are offended can deprive the offender and his descendants of the status "we" have conferred on them. So we have a wonderfully Venetian touch: the Senate watches over justice in the state just as God watches over justice among mankind.
Venetian thinking appears again in the discussion of the sacrament of penance. Contarini argues against the Lutheran idea that satisfaction for past sins performed after absolution is of no avail by using the example of a murderer's punishment. Like all men, the murderer is subject to the laws of God, nature, and civil society. Therefore, even after his reconciliation with God he is not freed from the sanctions of the state. In Contarini's mind, the state's laws must be upheld without question.[129] Later on, writing about invocation of the saints, he calls the saints "citizens of the city of God" who pray for us, their fellow citizens.[130] For Eck, by contrast, saints are "friends of God who should be asked to intercede for us."[131] In justifying celibacy and arguing that not everyone need be married, Contarini reaches for another interesting parallel from civil society. God's command to increase and multiply, he argues, was given to mankind as a whole rather than to each individual singly. Those who remain celibate for the sake of the kingdom of heaven benefit the community of believers much as do their counterparts in a state threatened by overpopulation, whose decision not to have children benefits the body politic:
Generation is for the good of the [human] species, so that it can endure, as agriculture is good because it gives the food to nourish us. However, it does not follow that any given person has to take it upon himself to beget children. In fact, since man is a political animal and an excessive number of citizens militates against the good of the city, as philosophers agree, so the celibacy of some men contributes not a little to the happiness and goodness of human life.[132]
The church, as the body of all Christians, would be excellently ordered, he maintains, if it became more like a well-governed city or state.
[128] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 6.
[129] Ibid., 12.
[130] Ibid., 13.
[131] Eck, Enchiridion , fol. 56.
[132] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 16.
The Confutatio reveals also Contarini's profound belief in the rationality of men. We have noticed this aspect of his thought in his philosophical writings, but in this tract it is indeed remarkable. Time after time he invokes natural reason as arbiter of theological differences, most notably when considering freedom of the will and arguing against Luther, who, "if we can believe Erasmus, and if I am repeating correctly what I have read, makes God the author of both our good and our bad works. . .. This position of Luther goes so much against natural reason and Scripture that one cannot imagine anything more incongruous. Who in his fight mind would say that God is the author of our bad works? . . . Only a madman can say that God causes our bad works; it goes against natural reason."[133] Contarini makes such arguments again when he discusses good works, satisfaction after forgiveness of sins, and the authority of popes and bishops.[134] At times the appeals to reason as arbiter in theological disputes are simply substitutes for rigorous debate. They mask his impatience with long-drawn-out discussions and the technical language of theology—in which he did not particularly shine—and make him glide rapidly over basic differences between Catholics and Protestants, most notably on original sin.
Older Catholic authors, writing when contrasts between Lutherans and Catholics were more rigorously maintained than they are at present, studied the Confutatio to show Contarini's unexceptionable Catholicism.[135] More recent readers of the treatise are likely to single out his irenic orientation and his willingness to seek common ground between the two confessions, emphasizing similarities rather than differences. His ideal of peaceful solutions to difficulties encouraged him to take too sanguine a view of the Augsburg Confession and see more points of agreement between it and Catholic doctrine than existed in reality. More important for the future was Contarini's erroneous conception of the nature of Luther's attacks on the Roman church: he believed that once disciplinary reforms were effected in the church, the other obstacles to concord would fall away of themselves.
Some of Contarini's convictions on the subject of church reform emerge clearly from the Confutatio . They can be summed up in one phrase: restoration rather than change, let alone revolution. Aware
[133] Ibid., 7.
[134] Ibid., 4, 11, 20.
[135] Dittrich, GC , 308, 310, writes of Contarini's "correct" views concerning Catholic teaching on original sin and good works. Laemmer, Vortridentinisch-katholische Theologie , 137-69, repeatedly seeks to show that Contarini's thought on justification, faith, and works was in agreement with that of Catholic theologians; as also does Friedrich Lauchert, Die italienischen literarischen Gegner Luthers (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 1912), 375.
of the spread of abuses throughout the hierarchy of the church, Contarini distinguished between the ideal and actuality, clinging always to the former. The tightening of discipline everywhere, the doing away with superstitious practices, and the abandonment of luxurious living emerge as prerequisites for any meaningful reform, be it disciplinary or doctrinal.
Ultimately, he said, concord will come not from papal or conciliar decrees but from charity and humility. He interrupts his discussion of article 24 of the Confession (his own eighth section) with this aside:
If only Christians who profess to be followers of Christ and firm believers in him would preserve charity and humility! Christ commends these virtues as superior to all others. Then it would be easy to obviate all controversies. Since we now make a verbal show of love of God and neighbor and of humility of soul, while we are actually puffed up with arrogance and pride and everyone wants to appear wiser than others and not to have accused his neighbor without cause, it has come about that, blinded by pertinacity, we consider nothing more important than to defend our own views and refute those of our adversaries. Let us preserve humility of soul; then it will be easy to settle this controversy![136]
This passionate appeal to the power of love and humility leaves altogether out of account the reality of the situation that prevailed between the two religious groups in Augsburg in 1530. Contarini closed his eyes to the political and economic struggle in which the Catholic princes were involved in Germany and to the defensive stance of the old church in the face of Lutheran attacks. But it is of utmost importance to realize that he did not do this because he was ignorant of the gravity of the situation in Germany or because he was simpleminded. There is remarkable consistency in his thought. When he held the image of the ideal papacy before Clement VII or drew the portrait of the ideal bishop, he appealed to the highest and noblest idea one could entertain of the men in charge of the church. In the Confutatio he again presents an ideal, that of the conceivable outcome of religious controversy if both sides took their professions as Christians seriously. There is a radical, uncompromising strand in Contarini's thought that can easily be missed if it is considered merely utopian. Contarini the critic held up to Catholic theologians and controversialists a mirror when he closed his Confutatio with this vision:
No councils, battles of words, syllogisms, or biblical citations are needed to quiet the unrest of the Lutherans, but good will, love of God and one's neigh-
[136] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 17.
bor, humility of soul in order to do away with avarice, luxury, large households, and courts, and to limit oneself to that which the Gospels prescribe. This is what is needed to overcome the tumults of the Lutherans. Let us not move against them with masses of books, Ciceronian orations, subtle arguments, but with an exemplary life, humble mind, without luxury, only desiring Christ and the good of our neighbor. With these weapons, believe me, not only the Lutherans but also the Turks and Jews could be converted without difficulty. In this the duty of Christian prelates consists, and to this they should direct all their ambition. If they fail to do so, seeking support instead in the favor of princes, in reasons and authorities and masses of books, their efforts will be of no avail. This is my firm conviction.[137]
One brief phrase reveals the heart of his program: limiting oneself to "that which the Gospels prescribe" meant personal, internal reform. As in his earliest extant letters to his friends, so now he sees this sort of self-correction as the beginning of church reform. The systematic weaknesses of his position are balanced by the fervor of his convictions. Reform would begin with an act of the will and proceed to an affective, interior response to the gospel by the individual.
Reflection on proper order in the church led to consideration of the papacy. Of Contarini's three tracts on the power of the pope, one was written while he was a layman: the brief treatise De potestate pontificis quod divinitus sit tradita .[138] The occasion for its composition was a series of debates in the Venetian Senate during the early 1530s regarding forced loans that the Republic intended to levy on ecclesiastical property. Some senators, notably Sebastiano Foscarini, held that it was unnecessary to consult the pope first on such a matter, for he was to be obeyed only "in materia fidei et sacramentorum"—in questions involving faith and the sacraments. As we have seen, however, Contarini's opposing view prevailed, and according to the report of Girolamo Aleandro, then the papal nuncio to Venice, it was Contarini's influence, notwithstanding the views of prominent anti-papal senators who mistrusted the pope as the destroyer of republican government in Florence, that persuaded the Senate to consult the pope before levying the loans.[139] In this context Contarini wrote De potestate pontificis in a single sitting at the request of a friend.
The brief treatise seems intransigent in tone, out of keeping with his statements as ambassador to Clement VII, indeed simply an echo of conservative views concerning the divine institution of the papacy. It
[137] Ibid., 22.
[138] The best text is in ibid., 35-43; also Opera , 581-87.
[139] Gaeta (ed.), Nunziature di Venezia 1:210 (letter 77).
adduces proof from Scripture, reason, and history, without any reference to exegetical work by Protestant theologians, some of whose arguments Contarini certainly knew by that time. He affirms that the keys were given to Peter alone, whose successor possesses the plenitudo potestatis of judging, binding, and loosing, and through whom bishops receive their power. Two other powers were also given by Christ to the pope: to be the supreme shepherd of the Christian flock, and to instruct it in true doctrine, with authority to make the final decision on matters of dogma and faith.[140]
The second line of argument proceeds from a philosophical basis as Contarini states that no human group can be united without a head. Rejecting the Lutheran belief that Christ leads the church without an intermediary, Contarini argues human nature is such that without a visible head chaos would soon ensue.[141] Turning to the history of the early church, he seeks to show that from the beginning the authority of Peter was greater than that of James, and that the see of Rome took precedence over all others. He closes with a paragraph reaffirming the divine institution of papal authority.[142]
Despite first impressions, a careful reading will show the links between this little treatise and the ideas Contarini expressed earlier about the papacy. Above all, he strongly affirms the hierarchy of the church culminating in the pope. He was never to deviate from this position or to entertain other conceptions of church structure and governance. Moreover, he stresses throughout that the fullness of power belongs properly to the pope but that its misuse has grievous consequences for both the church and secular society. Long ago he had written to Querini that the principal cause of temporal and spiritual evils in the church was "lack of religious feeling and the example of the lack of devotion in persons who in past years governed the church of God."[143] Contarini believed that the pope must understand clearly not only the immense power given him by God but also its precise limits and the proper sphere for its exercise if the church was to see meaningful change. These ideas were developed further after he became a cardinal, as we shall see.
Before that time, however, his ideas on order in the church were neither novel nor systematic. He did not envision new possibilities of
[140] Gegenreformatorische Schriften , 40.
[141] Ibid., 41.
[142] Ibid., 42-43.
[143] ". . . Il pocho religioso affecto et exemplo de quelli che ne li passati anni hanno governato la Chiesia di Dio" (Jedin, "Contarini und Camaldoli," 44).
organizing the Christian people or conceive of administrative structures that differed substantially from existing ones he considered adequate. In Contarini's works there is no image of a golden age of the church to which he wanted to return; he knew church history well enough to realize how many practical difficulties and theological disputes had arisen in the past. Instead, his view of order puts first the observance of norms and regulations already enacted by ecclesiastical authorities but no longer properly enforced. In advocating the reaffirmation of existing laws that would ensure good government in the church, Contarini was of course looking backward. Yet his stance was not simply that of a conservative intent on preserving whatever already existed; rather, it was that of an intelligent Christian living in the world who knew that laws alone do not suffice to maintain order throughout the church.
It is precisely for this reason that the figure of the bishop assumes such importance in Contarini's writings. The bishop can become the key to good order on the local level through his moral force and example to the priests and people of his diocese, making the Christian message a living reality to them. But as a good shepherd he also enforces the laws of the church in a reasonable manner. He is the visible link between the spirit of prophecy in the church and the spirit of order, of the fervent, visionary aspect of Christianity and the necessary structures designed to transmit the Christian religion from generation to generation. Contarini was only too aware of how difficult it would be to reform the whole church, and he had no detailed blueprint for change. On the local level, a good and appropriately educated bishop could conceivably bring about a turn for the better. Notwithstanding the seemingly utopian character of Contarini's tract on the office of the bishop, it arguably has its practical side too. After all, its author confined himself to the level of the church where there was most hope for change, rather than tackling the entire hierarchy.
One quite specific Contarinian concept is the need for cooperation between the bishop and the secular authorities. Here the author's Venetian outlook again shows itself. Contarini envisions church and state working harmoniously in their separate spheres for the good of society. Order in the church entails the recognition that there are limits to the competence of ecclesiastical rulers in deciding issues concerning their Christian flock, including deference to the state in such matters as criminal justice. Though Contarini did not use the image of the two swords, he unquestioningly accepted a theory that saw both church
and state as God's agents in bringing about and preserving peace, order, and justice in this world.
Finally, order in the church, in Contarini's view, excluded coercion or violence. That his was not an inquisitorial mentality can be seen from the Confutatio . Unlike Gianpietro Carafa, his future close associate in efforts at reform, Contarini never considered the battle against heretics of prime importance for the church. Christians were to be like the light shining on the mountain, impressing the sinful and the indifferent by their example. Here a side of Contarini emerges that is almost Erasmian: his firm belief in the teachability and rationality of human beings, who will respond to what is good, true, and noble when it is set before them. Again, Contarini should not be interpreted as an impractical dreamer in the conclusion to the Confutatio . Open to persuasion and utterly unfanatical himself, he had no difficulty in imagining men who held different, even antithetical, opinions, without seeing in them adversaries to be extirpated. The strength of his position came from the inner certainty he himself had attained. It made him willing to discuss and debate other views without fear of compromising his own. The ideal ecclesiastical hierarchy in the Confutatio is in reality a projection of Contarini's own ideal. He saw Christians as reasonable persons whose spirit of charity precluded undue attachment to their own opinions; they would be willing to listen even to Lutherans, and to see in them brothers.
Just as he had called on the pope in 1529 to be a father and keeper of peace among nations, so Contarini in his theological works of the early 1530s called on the governors of the Christian people to set them the example of good shepherds. He saw charity and humility, not coercion or sanctions, as the key to a revitalized church.