Elements of Continuity from the Inheritance
In order to understand the dimensions and purpose of Gorbachev's foreign policy, we must at this point briefly stress some of the elements that characterized the Soviet regime.
To take into account the uniqueness and peculiarities of Leninist regimes, Kenneth Jowitt developed a conceptual approach based on Max Weber's writings concerning types of legitimate domination.[11] This approach is particularly useful for understanding several of the fundamental features of these regimes, which show remarkable similarities irrespective of such radically different cultural contexts as those of Russia and China, for instance.
According to Max Weber, history has produced three broad types of domination or power: a "traditional" domination "resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them";[12] a more modern form of domination, termed " rational-legal," "resting on an belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands"; and a "charismatic" domination, which rests on support for an individual because of his or her "heroic," "exceptional," or "extraordinary character," and a capacity to produce "miracles," whatever the nature of those may be. For Weber and others inspired by his thinking, this last concept has an important, and often unexpected, heuristic value for explaining revolutionary phenomena through the ages and, quite simply, for understanding "political innovation."[13] We might add that by its very nature, charismatic power abhors legal rules and frameworks, economic calculations, or "routine."
To be clear, these three types of power did not, for Weber, grow out of each other, nor was there any particular or necessary order of succession of the three throughout history. All three were conceived as
[11] Jowitt's first important work on this approach was The Leninist Response to National Dependency (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), which he later developed broadly and which exercised an important influence on the study of Communist regimes in the United States. That text was reprinted recently in a collection of essays developing those same concepts: Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
[12] Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, 3 vols., ed. Günter Rothet and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 215.
[13] Julien Freund, "Le charisme selon Max Weber," Social Compass 23 (4), 1976, pp. 383–396.
"ideal types," as he points out: "The forms of domination occurring in historical reality constitute combinations, mixtures, adaptations or modifications of these 'pure' types."[14] Charismatic domination, in particular, is prone over time to a "routinization," that is to say, to an evolution toward one of the two other broad ideal types.
According to Jowitt, Leninist regimes constitute a historically new form of charismatic domination. Their uniqueness lies in the fact that they integrate, in a situation of permanent conflict and tension with them, potent modernizing imperatives and important elements of rational-legal domination, which they seek to be transcending. This explains jowitt's deliberate use of the contradictory term "charismatic-impersonal" power to describe these regimes. It is the Party which is the agent of charismatic power and the bearers of the "heroic" enterprise, producing "miracles," even if the regime is often dominated by one individual who shares in the charismatic glow. In order to accomplish its "exceptional" mission, the Party calls for combat and sacrifice (specific characteristics of charismatic power), but also practices the cult of scientific and economic progress and calls for empirical research, organization, and rigorous, carefully regulated discipline. It is within these conflicting imperatives that we begin to appreciate the particular configurations which shaped the dynamic and evolution of Leninist regimes. For instance, these imperatives explain one characteristic trait of the regimes, which is the combination of optimism and unbridled idealism on the one hand, with cold, calculating, often even cynical realism and pragmatism on the other.
According to Weber, charismatic domination is "specifically foreign to the economy." It may, therefore, at first glance seem contradictory for Jowitt to classify Leninist regimes as modes of charismatic domination, while simultaneously affirming that economic development is one of their fundamental preoccupations. But this is precisely what illuminates their approach to economic development. It was conceived and organized as a heroic enterprise, outside of the calculations and rules of "ordinary" economics. We need only recall the way in which the collectivization of agriculture and the five-year plans under Stalin, the "Great Leap Forward" in China, or the "Grand Zafra" in Cuba were conceived and carried out, and the "miracles" they promised. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the same approach is revealed in his Virgin Lands scheme, which intended to solve the agricultural sector's problems; and in the 1961 program for "large-scale construction of Communism," which
[14] Weber, Economy and Society, p. 954.
promised that Soviet living standards would surpass those of the U.S. in the 1980s. This approach accounts for the propensity to gigantism in industrial enterprises and the common negligence of light industry and commercial networks, which were deemed less likely to rapidly produce "grandiose" and mobilizing results. In short, it explains the tendency for Leninist regimes to give primacy to politics, even in economic matters .
All of the above considerations are aimed at developing a better understanding of the genetic code of Gorbachev's pattern of behavior (and that of his entourage), while stressing that they are clearly not mere repetitions of past experiences.
Given the banalization or "routinization" which, according to Weber, eventually beset charismatic domination, the longevity of the Soviet regime—or rather its capacity to retain various attributes of this type—may seem surprising. The regime did not, however, escape banalization. As Jowitt points out, Leninist parties need an environment of struggle in order to preserve their cohesion as charismatic organizations.[15] Brezhnev's era, however, was marked by the absence, on the domestic level, of combat and "exceptional" tasks. The regime experienced its greatest slide toward a "neo-traditional" form of power. This characterization points to the regime's efforts to preserve Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and its "rites" in the functioning of the economy, the political apparatus, and public life as if these were an unalterable inheritance—despite their growing incapacity to deal with the problems facing the economy and society.[16] The Party had simply become the sum of its members' interests. Without a doubt, only its successes in the international sphere could sustain and legitimize the exceptional character of the regime's "mission."
Mikhail Gorbachev and his team did not simply intend to reconnect with the "heroic" origins of the Soviet regime and the October Revolution in order to bring the USSR out of the era of "stagnation" (zastoi, as they termed it). They did, of course, constantly repeat that intention,
[15] Kenneth Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," Soviet Studies, 3, July 1983, pp. 275–297; reedited and reprinted in Jowitt, New World Disorder, p. 126.
[16] For an original and stimulating analysis that builds on the approaches of Weber and Jowitt in order to explain, in a remarkably innovative way, the great milestones of the development and application of Marxism, from Marx to Gorbachev, see Stephen E. Hanson, "Gorbachev: The Last True Leninist Believer," in Daniel Chirot, ed., The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), pp. 74–99.
and not only to defend against or mislead Communist conservatives. They wanted to invigorate the Soviet economy by putting it on a new basis, hence restoring the USSR's international competitiveness. Symptomatically, however, that effort rapidly became a vast political struggle, calling for the mobilization of the entire society. Politics became the key instrument for bringing about economic reforms . Gorbachev's own comments on this subject are particularly poignant: "Politics is without a doubt the most important aspect of any revolutionary process, and that is equally true of perestroika . This is why we are giving priority to political measures, to a broad and authentic democratization,... and to the active participation of the masses in the management of the nation's affairs."[17]
It should be noted, however, that the search for political solutions to economic problems, while typical, was not an obligatory outcome dictated by the nature of the Soviet regime. China, which was emerging not from a period of stagnation but rather from the latest version of the voluntaristic Cultural Revolution, pursued economic reform in a purely pragmatic fashion, first allowing peasants to take back their land. Its leaders did not embark on any large social mobilization and had no pretense of beginning a new revolution or developing a new, more "socialist" socialism than that which preceded it. In the Chinese case, one could term this a "modernist banalization" of the regime, which certainly threatens its integrity. Several economists in the USSR favored a similar pragmatic approach, but a consideration of whether such an effort could have succeeded in the Soviet Union, as in China, lies outside the scope of this book.
The fact is that Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to put in place a totally new model of socialism, building on a realistic assessment of the vicissitudes that had beset previous experiences. Conscious of the "command economy's" impasse, he planned to borrow mechanisms from the market economy in order to create a mixed economy in which the state (or socialist) sector would remain dominant but would be reinvigorated by the presence of the private and cooperative sectors and by new rules of interaction. This was the meaning of the reforms introduced in 1987. Gorbachev, like the Italian Communist Party in the 1970s and early 1980s, was looking for a "third way."[18] He remained deeply convinced
[17] Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: Vues neuves sur notre pays et le monde (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), p. 71.
[18] See Socialismo Reale e Terza Via (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1982).
of the October Revolution's founding principles and of their exceptional virtues. This is reflected in his statement that, "Socialism has proven that it possesses, as a societal system, immense potential for resolving the most complicated problems encountered in social progress. We are convinced that it has the ability to perfect itself, that its possibilities will offer us many more revelations ."[19]
Various expressions used by Soviet leaders in this period would undoubtedly have put a smile on Max Weber's face. Commenting, for example, on Gorbachev's continued faith in being able to save the Union, even after the August 1991 coup attempt, his spokesman of the time, Andrei Grachev, wrote: "He had become so good at convincing the rest of the world of his ability to perform political miracles that perhaps he eventually believed it himself."[20]
If perestroika as an ideology and an "heroic project" was typically Leninist in its impulse and general style, its objectives and several of its methods were at variance with fundamental features of the Soviet regime. In retrospect, the most remarkable of these discontinuities was the refusal to use violence, which characterized perestroika from beginning to end. One could, of course, invoke the bloody repressions in Lithuania and Latvia in early 1991. Given the magnitude of what was at stake, however, these incidents were so minor that they actually tend to confirm my point. Even Western democracies are more willing to resort to violence to preserve their territorial integrity or existence. The refusal by Gorbachev and his entourage to use violence and repression are so striking that they reveal a fundamental option of an ideological character. It was so strong that even the putschists of August 1991 (emerging from among the right wing of his associates) did not dare open fire in order to prevail. Given Gorbachev's frequent declarations that he would not hesitate to use force if necessary, it must be noted that it is only in retrospect that the absence of violence became so remarkable. Gorbachev's declarations remained only political weapons.
Another fundamental break with Soviet tradition, related to the one outlined above, concerns democratization and the role of the Party. Certainly the term "democratization," as a slogan, had long been present in Soviet rhetoric, and that is why it took some time for the process to be taken seriously, not only abroad, but also in the USSR itself. Without
[19] Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 123; emphasis added.
[20] Andrei Grachev, L'histoire vraie de la fin de l'URSS (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 1992), p. 11; emphasis added.
renouncing the leading role of the Party, Gorbachev began to speak of political pluralism for the Soviet Union in 1987. Only slowly and confusingly did the importance of this ambiguous, if not contradictory, concept become clear. Through this process, he began to redefine the Party's exclusive place and role in the state, the economy, and society. To do this, he allowed various independent groups to appear on each of those levels, while simultaneously trying to maintain the Party's position as political arbitrator. Gorbachev was convinced that socialist culture had sufficiently permeated Soviet society to allow such changes to take place without calling into question the ability of a thoroughly reformed Party to keep a central position in the system.
In their search for a new model of socialist pluralism, the new leaders of the CPSU and their circle of intellectuals were engaging themselves in a process of social-democratization, more or less without being conscious thereof.[21] While there had been previous efforts in this direction within the world Communist movement, their scale and consequences were far less important. Indeed, the Italian Communist Party had undergone a tortuous, difficult, and divisive social-democratic mutation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, searching for a "third way" between the Soviet model and social democracy.[22] We will come back later to this comparison with the Italian Communist Party's experience and its kinship with Gorbachev's enterprise. In the Soviet case, the "heroic" character which enveloped the quest for a new utopia was undoubtedly an indispensable condition for the implementation of the process of mutation which, of course, had begun to germinate among different Soviet intellectual circles[23] well before Gorbachev's accession to power. I have termed Gorbachev's project a new utopia, in its global dimension—in fact, precisely because of that dimension. As will be shown, several of
[21] It may suffice to cite just one recent, and particularly revealing, testimonial. In the present context, numerous Russian intellectuals have found it opportune to portray themselves as "always" having been democrats unable to come out of the closet before. Georgii Arbatov, one of the chief practitioners of both the ideology and practice of perestroika, has no such pretense. In his 1993 memoirs, he writes: "In the spring of 1985, I was a Communist, with doubts and disappointments, but still a convinced Communist.... I still have not lost my faith in the core of a socialist ideal that is much closer to the social-democratic variant than to the Bolshevik one." Georgii Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life In Soviet Politics (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 352, 358.
[22] See Jacques Lévesque, Italian Communists versus the Soviet Union: The PCI Charts a New Foreign Policy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1987), pp. 27–42.
[23] On the ideological and political origins of Soviet innovations under Gorbachev, see Allen Lynch, Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989).
its elements often rested on a very realistic analysis of international issues and interests.