Anticipation
By the autumn of 379, the Athenians were making preparations for war with Sparta. Opinions had for some years been divided about how and when, and even if , this war should be fought, in view of the overwhelming advantages in allied strength possessed by Sparta. But because those very advantages were seen by many to be based on heavy-handed and unpopular policies, they were believed to be vulnerable. Among Athenians and the friends of Athens, there was a strong tide of feeling against Sparta in 380/79, as the sentiments of Isokrates' Panegyrikos reveal. Under these circumstances, and despite some deep misgivings among not a few Athenians, the majority of Athenians strongly favored taking action to check the influence of Sparta. With this in mind, in 379, an influential
[6] Lauffer 1959 discusses the identification of this presumed doublet and, in note 1, cites an impressive list of scholars (including Schaefer, Grote, Busolt, Meyer, Stern, Beloch, Momigliano, Glotz, Hampl, and Accame, above, note 2) who have so treated these pas-sages. See the discussion below, with note 71.
[7] This tendency was anticipated by Accame 1941. More recently, the work on this period by Cawkwell (1963, 1973, 1976) has been most influential in this respect. The trend is also reflected in the works of Rice 1975, Gray 1980, and Kallet-Marx 1985. All of these historians, however, have been selective in their endorsement of the testimony of Diodoros, as is demonstrated by their opinions as cited in notes 5 and 6 above. Opposition to this trend is found in Hamilton 1089 and 1901.
circle of executive officers and statesmen prepared a plan of covert action that, when announced, would receive the endorsement of the demos, even though it would very likely mean war with Sparta.[8] The movements of Chabrias provide evidence for these preparations.
After distinguishing himself as a commander of mercenaries in the Corinthian War, since 388 Chabrias had been abroad, at first in Cyprus, where he led a corps of Athenian and mercenary troops in the service of Euagoras of Salamis, an ally of Athens. Since the King's Peace of 386 expressly ceded Cyprus to King Artaxerxes, Chabrias withdrew and accepted command of a mercenary army being raised in Egypt by Hakoris for war against the forces of Artaxerxes, who was attempting to reestablish Persian dominion in Egypt. Chabrias was eminently successful in his command under Hakoris. He devised an elaborate system of fortifications to defend both the overland and maritime approaches to the Nile delta from Palestine. He exercised his command in action, holding off Persian forces led by Pharnabazos, Tithraustes, and Abrokomas for three years (probably 385-383), and he even enlarged Egyptian domains in Palestine with the collapse of the Persian offensive. After having served his patron so ably and, following the death of Hakoris, after seeing the rule of Egypt securely transferred to Nektanebis I late in 379, Chabrias was summoned back to Athens.[9]
In the compressed account of Diodoros, Chabrias was recalled immediately after the Athenians received complaints about him from Pharnabazos. The circumstances belie such a simple account. Pharnabazos' complaint, which carried with it the threat of alienating Artaxerxes, could hardly have been both so tardy and so effective. Why would Pharnabazos wait until 379, after Chabrias had been making headway against Persian forces for more than five years, to represent the king's interests
[8] The assertion made here runs directly counter to the views that have until now prevailed in modern scholarship (note 2 above), in which the Athenians have been regarded as, by and large, content with the Peace of Antalkidas or at least, until the attack of Sphodrias, exceedingly anxious to avoid any breach of the peace. A full substantiation of the opposing view asserted here requires a thorough review of the period 386-379, which is outside the scope of the present work. Accame 1941, 1-26, has adopted this view and has outlined the evidence for it. More recently, the chief points argued by Cawkwell (1973) and Kallet-Marx (1985) have tended to support this interpretation, and it derives further support from the account of events that follows here.
[9] Ghabrias in the Corinthian War: Diodoros 14.92.2; Demosthenes 4.24; scholia to Aristides Panath . 171-72 (Dindorf 3.274-75); Polyainos 3.11.6, 15. Chabrias' service with Euagoras: Xenophon Hell . 5.1.10; Demosthenes 20.76; Nepos 12.2.2. Chabrias as general for Hakoris: Diodoros 15.29.2-4; Demosthenes 20.76; Kienitz 1953, 84-89. Persian campaign of 385-383: lsokrates 4.140; Kienitz 1953, 85. The fortifications of the Nile pre-pared by Chabrias before 379 are described on the occasion of the attack on Egypt led by Pharnabazos and Iphikrates in 373: Diodoros 15.42.1-4. On the connection of Chabrias' departure with the accession of Nektanebis, see appendix III.
before the Athenians? The truth more likely was that Pharnabazos had complained more than once and had received the reply that Chabrias was acting on his own initiative,
When Chabrias emerges in action in the opening campaigns of the Boiotian War, he is the energetic and sagacious commander of mercenaries for the Athenians. When peace was made in 375, one of the factors encouraging the Athenians to make peace was the burdensome cost of maintaining mercenary troops. The circumstantial case is extremely strong, therefore, that Chabrias returned to Athens in 379 in the company of a substantial corps of seasoned mercenary troops and that, although he rose to the rank of an elected general early in the war, he began service on the Kithairon frontier as a commander of mercenary forces. The further, and more important, conclusion to be drawn from these developments in the career of Chabrias is that, by the time the Athenians summoned him and his followers to Athens, the Athenians already foresaw the need for such troops in a war that was soon to break out.[11]