The War Years and After, 1915–1920

During the First World War, Mount Lebanon's autonomy was formally abolished and its administration was put under the Interior Ministry in Istanbul, on the one hand, and the military authorities in Damascus, on the other. The modifications introduced by the Interior Ministry did not alter the regular administrative, judicial, and security institutions of the mutasarrifiyya in any fundamental way, while some changes helped streamline the governmental apparatus.^[36] Also, the Lebanese remained exempt from military service.^[37] The severe measures imposed by the military authorities and the overall effect of direct Ottoman rule, however,

sufficed to deepen the appreciation of the Lebanese people for the self-government they had enjoyed under the mutasarrifiyya regime.

The military authorities abolished the Council, banished a number of councillors and senior officials to Anatolia, and appointed new councillors and officials, including the governor, after Ohannes' resignation in 1915. The military command also subjected Mount Lebanon, along with the rest of the region, to wartime requisitions and martial criminal justice. Many people, Muslim and Christian alike, were tried on charges of high treason and executed or imprisoned by military tribunals.^[38] Early in the war, the military authorities even contemplated trying the patriarch because of news that appeared in the French press about his pledge of loyalty to France. The patriarch denied these reports in a letter to the governor, and that was considered sufficient cause to drop the charges against him.^[39] Soon thereafter, the patriarch felt it necessary to apply for a sultanic berât in order to protect himself from martial inquisition and his Church's property from expropriation by military authorities. The berât was issued to him in January 1916.^[40] The Ottoman government finally put an end to the claims of the Maronite Church to exceptional status, but this took place under military rather than civilian authority, and hence under circumstances which carried little weight in the public consciousness. A significant consequence of this development, however, was that whereas the Maronite Church continued to provide services, relief, and guidance to its followers, and secret intelligence to France,^[41] the secular Lebanonists were effectively banned from the political arena and the social scene during the war. Only with the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the area in September 1918 did the pre-war leaders became active again, and the elected councillors resumed their seats and took charge of the government of Mount Lebanon.

The Council remained in charge of the government for about 20 months, with a French commissar appointed by the Allied Forces acting as a governor of sorts. During this period the Council's principal concern was to defend the Mountain's autonomy against actual or potential incursions from the new military overlords of the region. It was also active in ongoing regional and international negotiations, and quarrels, over defining the future of the area. In these activities the Council acted as the official representative of the Lebanese, and it was recognized as such in diplomatic circles insofar as its position coincided with French interests. Otherwise, the French recognized only the Maronite Patriarchate, and along with it the Greek Catholic Church, as the representatives of Lebanon. This situation had important repercussions for church–government relations and

the issue of national identity in Lebanon, as the following summary of events illustrates.

Immediately after the war, the French position in geographical Syria was weak. British troops controlled the entire coastal area and other strategic positions. The Arab nationalist forces controlled the inland area and were preoccupied with laying the foundations of a Syrian–Arab state under Amir Faisal's leadership. The French, who claimed the coastal lands as well as inland Syria, had to rely mainly on diplomatic means to attain their objectives. They hoped to convince Faisal to accept a French mandate over the state he would head. These developments were observed with anxiety in Mount Lebanon. From the Council's point of view, Faisal's program constituted the major threat to the Mountain's interests. Faisal was hesitant to accept even the autonomous regime already existing in the Mountain, let alone the desire of a good many of its leaders for territorial enlargement. The lacks of sufficient agricultural land and of a good port in Mount Lebanon were deemed detrimental to its economy, and hence to autonomy. The addition of the Biqa' and the city of Beirut to Mount Lebanon were the minimal demands. There was also the so-called Kiyan ist position, which argued for a "Greater Lebanon"—that is, a "Lebanon in its historical and natural-geographical boundaries." These boundaries roughly corresponded to those of today's Lebanon. The Kiyan ists were in the majority in the Council.^[42]

The Council, eager to make the Lebanese voice heard in the negotiations over the future of the area, reached a resolution concerning its demands in December 1918, and appointed a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. It demanded the expansion of Mount Lebanon for economic and historical reasons and the acknowledgment of Lebanon's right to independence and self-government within viable territories. It also expressed the desire of Lebanese for a parliamentary democratic regime, with due protection of minority rights, and their willingness to accept "support from the French government" for the cultural and political progress of Lebanon and for "the security it would provide against any infringements upon [Lebanon's] independence."^[43] The delegation, composed of two councillors and five officials and intellectuals, was briefly detained in Alexandria by British authorities, but with the intervention of France it finally reached Paris. In Paris, the French diplomats and the lobby of the Lebanese settled in France convinced the delegation (or at least its main speaker, Daud 'Ammun) to emphasize only the territorial requests and the Lebanese desire for French protection not only in Lebanon but in "Syria" at large. This position served French interests in two ways. It gave cre-

dence to French claims to Syria in the peace talks, and enabled France to use the Lebanese desire for territorial enlargement in the negotiations with Faisal in order to make him agree to a French mandate over his government. This outcome of the Lebanese mission was hardly welcome in the Mountain.^[44]

When Faisal in fact reached a preliminary agreement with France in April 1919, the Administrative Council reacted by declaring Lebanon independent. Speaking "in its capacity as the representative of the people of Lebanon," the Council proclaimed "the political and administrative independence of Lebanon in its historical and [natural] geographical boundaries," and reasserted "the commitment of the Lebanese government to a democratic regime based on [the principles of] liberty, fraternity, and equality, and to the protection of minority rights and religious freedom." The Council also called for French support, but specifically in regard to the coordination of Lebanon's economic relations with neighboring governments.^[45] In an additional decision taken on June 16, the Council granted a mandate to Patriarch Huwayyik to convey Lebanese wishes to the participants of the Peace Conference "on behalf of the government of Lebanon and its Administrative Council."^[46] The Council's position was clear. It would agree to a French mandate so long as Lebanon's self-rule was respected and its territorial demands honored along reasonable lines. The choice of the patriarch as a representative of the government was encouraged by the French.^[47] The Council went along with the suggestion, evidently because the patriarch was as anxious as the councillors to prevent the incorporation of Lebanon into a Syrian federation, and as eager to expand Mount Lebanon's boundaries. He also appeared to share the councillors' ideas of independence and democracy.

The delegation which Huwayyik formed comprised only bishops, all Maronite except for one who was Greek Catholic. The patriarch's formal memorandum to the Peace Conference was true to his mandate in emphasizing the importance of Lebanon's independence. As Zamir puts it, "although Huwayyik requested a French mandate over Lebanon, the memorandum clearly aimed at curbing the ability of the mandatory power to interfere with the independence and sovereignty of the future state." In the numerous interviews and discussions in which the patriarch and the members of his delegation participated during their extended stay in Paris, however, they put the emphasis on the Christianity of Lebanon. They underlined the differences between the Western-oriented Lebanese and the mostly Bedouin and culturally backward "Arabs," and described at length the atrocities inflicted upon Christians during the war for their loyalty to France. The delegation also appealed to France's responsibility

in protecting Christians against Muslims.^[48] This contraposition of Lebanon against the Arabs, and Christianity against Islam, was hardly the standpoint of the majority of councillors, as events were shortly to reveal.

In the autumn of 1919, France and Great Britain finally resolved their differences concerning their interests in the Middle East, and a large French force was dispatched to the area to replace the British in Syria, Lebanon, and Cilicia. General Gouraud, who was known for his devotion to the Catholic Church and his closeness to colonialist circles, commanded the force as the high commissioner of Syria. The Maronite and Greek Catholic communities in general welcomed the French forces. Other communities, however, grew increasingly hostile not only to the French but to whoever was associated with them. The French military authorities repressed unruly action promptly, if not fiercely, and armed their supporters. Nevertheless, the French continued to run into serious difficulties in making themselves popular vis-à-vis the Syrian-Arab nationalists, who controlled the interior.^[49]

In Mount Lebanon itself, the Council took a stance critical of French military rule. In a lengthy resolution reached on 19 November 1919, the Council gave vent to its resentment over the intervention of the French Military Expedition into the administration of Mount Lebanon. The Council reasserted its belief that "genuine support and guidance" from the French government would facilitate progress and reform in Lebanon. But if French presence turned into a rule of "domination and exploitation," this would contradict Lebanese expectations and the promises hitherto made to them by eminent French statesmen. The government system that existed in Mount Lebanon was "under the guarantee of still valid international protocols" and in accord with "native traditions and customs." The Lebanese would like to improve on this system, but they would not willingly agree to abridgement of the self-rule, rights, privileges, and freedoms it provided them. Until arrangements were made for a new order in the area, the French authorities should respect the existing system.

With these general considerations in mind, the councillors listed the practices which disturbed them most. Thus the French supervisors and inspectors, who were supposed to act as advisors and trainers (according to the Council), disregarded the hierarchy of the native government and gave orders directly to district and subdistrict governors. They appointed and dismissed judges on slight accusations and without informing the Council or showing due respect for established procedure in these matters. The French officers showed disrespect to their Lebanese colleagues and interfered in administration of the Lebanese security force. Last but not least, attempts were made to introduce the principle of competition in the

appointment of government employees, without regard to the existing principle of sectarian distribution of government positions, which protected "the rights of the communities." Such practices, the Council held, created confusion in all branches of the government, weakened it in the eyes of the people, dishonored government employees, and revealed a disrespect for native traditions and institutions.^[50] The Council's resolution did not make much of an impact on the French authorities.

The balance of opinion in Paris had shifted toward a military solution to the Syrian problem, as opposed to a negotiated settlement with Faisal. This orientation necessitated consolidation of the French position in the coastal zone before a final showdown with the Syrian-Arab nationalist forces became inevitable. Besides, Gouraud was assured of Patriarch Huwayyik's support. The patriarch was actively involved in the efforts to generate support for the French—not necessarily because his commitment to Lebanon's independence had changed, but rather because his basic conception of Lebanon as a Christian entity affected his priorities. He continued to see Muslim "Syria" as the major impediment to the creation of his Lebanon, and Catholic France as the deliverer of Lebanon. Once France guaranteed the patriarch that Lebanon, however its boundaries were ultimately drawn, would be kept separate from Syria, he stood solidly behind French policy.

The problems of the Lebanese government were obviously of little significance to the patriarch. In fact, as the Syrian-Arab nationalists became visibly better organized and moved toward a national congress to decide their position vis-à-vis the French demands for a mandate over Syria, the patriarch assumed a position above the government to direct Lebanese policy. He sent to Paris a third delegation, which successfully negotiated the boundaries of a "Greater Lebanon." He made statements on behalf of the Lebanese, accepted delegations, and backed the French campaign for gathering signatures for the appointment of a French governor to Lebanon. All along, he was treated and received by French authorities as if he were the head of Lebanon, and of the Lebanese, par excellence.^[51] He was indeed—but of one kind of Lebanon, and one group of Lebanese.

There was another, liberal vision of Lebanon represented by the majority of the councillors. The influence of the ideals of the French Revolution on the representatives of this view is unmistakable, as is their inexperience or naiveté in international power politics. They had evidently hoped to take advantage of the differences between the French and the Syrian-Arab nationalists to create a greater Lebanon after the mutasarrifiyya model. Once they realized their inability to control the French presence and "assistance," they began to seek a reconciliation with the Syrian-Arab na-

tionalists. The nationalists had for some time abandoned their opposition to the notion of an autonomous Lebanon. The Syrian declaration of independence in Damascus, in the congress of 7 March 1920, recognized the right of the Lebanese to preserve their own form of administration "within their pre-war boundaries," on condition that they shun foreign influence.^[52] Both the Church and the Council repudiated the congress's resolution unequivocally.^[53] Upon this, the Syrian government finally recognized not only the right of the Lebanese to complete independence but also the legitimacy of their demands for territorial enlargement, provided they renounce the French mandate. A group of Lebanese councillors, officials, and other leaders agreed to cooperate with the Syrian government, in view of its new position at a time when French efforts to establish direct rule in Mount Lebanon had intensified.^[54]

This group enjoyed the support of the majority of the councillors,^[55] who on 10 June 1920 decided to challenge French rule. Their resolution to this effect emphasized the determination of Lebanese to have "complete and absolute independence," the need for the extension of Mount Lebanon's borders, and "the vital importance for the welfare and security of its people that they live in peace with their neighbors" and with themselves. The resolution then expressed the willingness of the Council to reach an agreement with the Syrian government along these lines, and called on the major powers to recognize the right of the Lebanese people to self-government, which was already guaranteed to them by their existing constitution (the Règlement ). The seven councillors who signed this resolution then left for Damascus with the intention to conclude their agreement with the Syrian government and go to Europe, and to the United States if need be, to present their "just claims" at the Peace Conference and in other official circles.^[56]

The French authorities, however, arrested them on the road to Damascus. An official decree announcing the arrest accused the councillors of "having sold themselves to the Sharifian [Syrian] government and of attempting to sell also the independence of their fatherland to it in renouncing the mandate of France, the eternal protector of Lebanon and Lebanese." The councillors had indeed accepted financial assistance from external sources to cover their travel expenses, but so had the first Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference accepted assistance from the French government itself. Nevertheless, the councillors, and other officials who cooperated with them, were put on trial before a military court on charges of high treason and conspiracy, and were sentenced to deportation and payment of heavy fines.^[57]

With the majority of the councillors out of the way, General Gouraud

dissolved the Council altogether, citing its inability to fulfill its tasks properly, and appointed in its stead a committee composed of members of his choice. Soon after, he sent an ultimatum to Faisal which led to the battle of Maisalun between the French and the Arab-Syrian forces on 24 July 1920, and to the occupation of Syria by the French. Clearly, the final resolution of the Mountain's popularly elected Administrative Council had given the French the opportunity to silence a major source of opposition to their direct rule in Lebanon, and it had also provided them with the pretext they had been looking for since May to implement their decision to bring Syria under the French mandate by force.^[58]

The Church openly rejoiced over the defeat of the Syrian-Arab nationalists. Patriarch Huwayyik and his followers intensified their lobbying in Beirut and in Paris for the creation of as great a Lebanon as possible, with the annexation not only of Beirut and the Biqa', but also of 'Akkar, Saida, Tyre, and Tripoli. They convinced themselves, as well as French public opinion, that these places were inhabited by a largely Christian population. Knowledgeable French officials warned their government in Paris that this was not exactly the case. Nevertheless, with due support from General Gouraud and the French missionaries, the French government finally reached the decision to draw the boundaries of the new Lebanon as desired by the Church party. In August, Prime Minister Millerand announced the decision to the "Lebanese delegation" in Paris, which was in fact Patriarch Huwayyik's delegation, and on 1 September 1920 Gouraud formally proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon in Beirut. In the ceremony held on the occasion, Patriarch Huwayyik was second only to the high commissioner in the protocol and probably the happiest person in Lebanon. The mutasarrifiyya had finally become a state and with significantly larger territories, too. If it was not yet independent, that could be accomplished as well, with due help from France.^[59]

This outcome appears as a victory of the Church over the secular government of Mount Lebanon, as represented by the Administrative Council, and hence a victory of Maronite-Christian Lebanonism over a liberal—but interconfessionalist—Lebanonism. The military rule imposed by the Ottoman State in its last gasp had facilitated the victory. But it was the secular, liberal, and democratic government of France, the model of the councillors, which actually delivered it by putting the patriarch above the temporal leaders of Mount Lebanon virtually throughout the history of the mutasarrifiyya from 1861 to 1920.

This preference suited French interests, and it was also reinforced by the anthropological observation that confessionalism was an innate peculiarity of Lebanese society and polity. Confessionalism was indeed a pow-

erful force, but it interacted with many other forces and peculiarities and at length facilitated the rise of a secular government in Mount Lebanon. Yet the French government, and its allies, ultimately preferred to view and judge Lebanon and Syria through the eyes of the Maronite patriarch. With the weight of mighty world powers behind it, the patriarch's vision became the dominant historiographical paradigm as well. To many a historian, Lebanon appeared (and still appears) to be the Maronite Church's dream come true. The main features of this dream, which are conveniently left vague, were: keeping the communities separate, the Christianity of Lebanon, the moral supremacy of the Maronite Church over the traditions and institutions of the secular government, and the dependence of Lebanon on a major power for its internal and external security.

An alternative vision was represented by the seven councillors condemned as traitors and sent into exile in 1920, and their associates. One of the leaders of this group was Sa'adallah Huwayyik, a veteran politician, the Maronite representative of Batrun in the Council, and the patriarch's own brother. We have seen in earlier chapters the stabilizing effect of the conciliatory position taken by Sa'adallah at critical times in Lebanese politics, and his contributions to the strengthening of the Council. Another leader of the group was Sulaiman Kan'an, also a veteran politician and the Maronite representative of Jazzin in the Council. In a lengthy memorandum Kan'an sent, around December 1921, to the Conference on the Limitation of Armanents in Washington, D.C., he explained in detail the position he and his friends took.

He argued that the Lebanese deserved independence because they were a socially, culturally, and politically developed people, already enjoying extensive self-government. The 1861–64 international treaties, and successive protocols, provided Mount Lebanon with an efficient and effective governmental system that was closest to the Western democratic model in the entire area. The success of this system itself was proof of Mount Lebanon's readiness for full independence, for the mandate "has been designed for people who have not had experience in self-government, not for people who have ruled themselves for centuries and shown their competence and efficiency in so doing." In order to promote her own interests, however, France had imposed an oppressive mandate regime on Lebanon, and thereby she had violated the treaties to which she was a party and the principles to which she had committed herself.

Kan'an attributed the past clashes between the Muslims and the Christians in the Mountain to the oppressive "Turkish" policies in the first half of the nineteenth century. Otherwise, he observed, "religion and sectarianism were never in the past a factor in the government or politics of

Mount Lebanon. The Christians lived in peace and prosperity under Mohammedan Princes for at least 200 years." But, he believed, Christians and Muslims in the area were still perfectly capable of living in peace if they were left to their own devices and the adverse effect of the French mandate rule were eliminated:

We want to live at peace with our neighbors; but we cannot ever hope to do so while there is a foreign power in Syria, for which the majority of the Mohammedans hold the minority Christians responsible. Thus those who come to protect us only arouse against us the enmity of our neighbors. We are indeed safer with them, as the past has proven, without this European protection. . . . [T]he amibition of France to have a naval base in Syria, and to extend her commerce, should not be realized at the expense of a people who have always admired her own political and social ideals at home and who are now being used as a pretext for occupation. How, in the face of this, can we ever live at peace with the Mohammedans of Syria? Let alone, we the minority Christians will be in no need of protection; for the principal cause of our neighbor's hostility against us will be forever removed.^[60]

Kan'an's romantic-nationalistic perspective on Lebanese history concealed from him certain problems facing Lebanese society, and some of the harsh remarks he made in his memorandum about the French mandate rule (and its local associates) were typically exaggerated.^[61] Nevertheless, the main thrust of his views and the stance he and his friends took represent a natural sequel to the activities of the "liberal" councillors and officials since at least the turn of the century and through the interregnum of 1918–20. This group owed its existence to the rise of a secular government structure in Mount Lebanon. They had been instrumental in molding it according to local conditions, and had used it to establish their leadership in the society and enhance their country's autonomy. Along the way, they developed an outlook which became an inseparable aspect of the political culture of the mutasarrifiyya . Kan'an's memorandum was a culminating expression of that outlook.

In this vision,the emphasis is on the independence of Lebanon, and its living in peace with itself and with its neighbors. Reconciliation of the communities, not their contraposition, is the guiding principle in political activity. Religion constitutes the foundation of an individual's cultural identity, but it is subsumed to the political process in public life. A participatory democratic regime that is molded after the West, but blended with local political culture and traditions, is the principal means to maintain internal peace and progress. Neutrality and seeking guarantees from sev-

eral world powers, as opposed to relying on one, are the positions advocated to ensure external security.

The open advocates of this outlook obviously failed to generate much support for their cause against the combined power and influence of France and the Catholic churches in 1920. Even some of their long-time associates rushed to condemn them mercilessly, no doubt out of political shrewdness, or realism.^[62] The vision continued to live in the new Lebanon, however. One can easily recognize it in the Lebanese struggle for independence against France; in the Lebanese National Pact of 1943; in the intellectual activities aiming at "opening up" Lebanese Christian nationalism in post-independence Lebanon;^[63] and last but not least, in the current political efforts to restore peace in Lebanon after its last civil war. In 1920, the weight of a mighty world power had rendered Patriarch Ilias Huwayyik the representative of Lebanon and Councillor Sa'adallah Huwayyik a traitor to Lebanon, or at best an insignificant figure, in the annals of history. In 1992, and in the light of the Church-government struggle in mutasarrifiyya history, it appears that Sa'adallah's outlook was more conducive to the formation of a unitary nation-state than his brother's. This is not surprising. Sa'adallah and his friends were grass-roots politicians operating within an intersectarian structure. Ilias was a diplomat cleric whose state was his church and whose nation was his flock. The Lebanon he inspired could at best be a confederation of theocratic mini-states. It is high time that Lebanon's historiographers pay as close attention to the Sa'adallahs as they do to the Iliases.