The Transformation Strategy

In contrast to the strategies of accommodation and reorganization, the transformation strategy has at its essence a commitment to break the inherited pattern of structural dependency and to reconvert the society

[102] Reporter (Nairobi), December 3, 1965, p. 17.

[103] East African Standard (Nairobi), December 13, 1971, p. 6.

[104] Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy," p. 289.

to certain traditional ideas, values, and life-styles. As noted above, the difference between the states using a transformation strategy (Tanzania, Guinea, and Somalia, and newly independent Angola and Mozambique) and the others, however, does not lie in the objective economic and social welfare conditions currently prevailing. For instance, the lack of product diversification and proportion of physicians to the population as a whole in the states tending to use a transformation strategy are not unlike many of the states adopting an accommodation strategy. And in the category of below-average earnings per head Tanzania ($74 per head in 1969) is in a group with such states as Mali ($85), Guinea ($77), Ethiopia ($62), Benin ($71), Upper Volta ($50), Niger ($95), Chad ($78), Rwanda ($45), Burundi ($53), Somalia ($62), Uganda ($96), Malawi ($69), Lesotho ($75), and others.^[105] Thus the states adopting a transformation strategy are unique not in their environmental circumstances but in their determination to end their dependency on the Western-dominated economic system. They abhor the competitiveness and acquisitiveness that they view as inherent in a capitalist life-style and wish to substitute in its stead a "communocratic" tradition, one which emphasizes collective living and social solidarity.^[106] While specifically rejecting such concepts as the class struggle, transformationalist spokesmen find certain Marxist theories attractive precisely because they carry with them a rejection of Western capitalism on the one hand and a collectivist inspiration on the other. As Brian Crozier remarks with respect to Guinea's president, Sékou Touré: "Marxism has contracted an emotional and intellectual marriage within him to a dimly felt awareness of African communal

[105] By contrast the states with above average earnings per head of population shows Senegal ($225); Ivory Coast ($304); Gabon ($550); Congo (Brazzaville) ($201); Zaire ($280); Ghana ($288); Kenya ($127); Sierra Leone ($177); Zambia ($345); and so forth Timothy Curtin, "Africa and The European Common Market," Africa: South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1974), pp. 53–55; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1973), Table 187.

[106] L. Gray Cowan, "Guinea," in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.) African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 193. Also see Sékou Touré, The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, Part I (Conakry: Democratic Party of Guinea, n.d.), p. 51.

traditions."^[107] Sékou Touré, the inspiration leader par excellence, makes extensive use of ideology in an effort to overcome the contaminations of the past and to forge a new Guinean man.

Even though the transformationalist states came to independence with environmental constraints basically similar to those in the other countries (and most particularly the less advantaged ones), they do differ from the more prosperous reorganization-oriented states in certain critical ways. These divergencies help to explain some variances in policy-making styles that would otherwise be difficult to account for. Trade statistics, albeit partial in nature, show Zambia to be more dependent on exports and imports to the nine European Common Market countries than is its neighbor, Tanzania (see Table 5). And because Zambians consider their country to be more dependent and intertwined with the world economy than its more rural and agriculturally based neighbor, they are more cautious in redefining their relationship to the multinational corporations in their midst. In addition, such caution carries with it an implicit acceptance of an element of privilege for the modern sector during the transition toward extensive equalization. Thus Zambia's strategy of reorganization, geared to local needs and conditions, is less drastic in its objectives, costs, and regulations than that assumed in Tanzania. The Zambian doctrine of reorganization has entailed a heavy emphasis on Zambianization and nationalization (total as well as partial) in the industrial sector and on the establishment of small industries and workshops; large-scale expenditure on marketing and storage facilities, feeder roads, and social services; and the encouragement of cooperative societies and credit unions in the rural areas. Yet Zambia's inevitable reliance on the production of copper for export rather than agriculture as the mainstay of

[107] Quoted in Cowan, "Guinea," p. 189. Also see Ali A. Mazrui, "The Soldier, the Socialist, and the Soul of Development: Amin and Nyerere in Comparative Perspective," a paper presented to the Conference on "Dependence and Development in Africa," Ottawa, February 16–18, 1973, pp. 19–22. On President Syaad Barre's assertion of "scientific socialism," see Philippe Decraene, "Somalia Goes It Alone," Manchester Guardian Weekly 112, no. 15 (April 12, 1975): 13.

national revenues tends to make the system reformist rather than revolutionary. By contrast, Tanzania, with lower levels of industralization and urbanization, is less dependent on the Western capitalist world in terms of economic activity. Other environmental factors enabling the Tanzanian leadership to implement, in part at least, a transformation strategy include the unity of the Tanzanian people behind their leaders (attributable largely to the success of the Tanzanian African National Union in mobilizing the people in the struggle against British colonial rule), the country's assured access to world commerce, and its relative insulation from Rhodesian and South African power.

In principle at least, the transformation model involves a complete rejection of exploitative and humiliating links to the capitalist (and once the colonialist) economy. Under current conditions of poverty and national weakness, argues Tanzania's president, Julius K. Nyerere, socialism is the "only rational choice" in the African countries.^[108] "In practice," contends Nyerere, "Third World nations cannot become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle."^[109] Why does capitalism entail a loss of freedom for countries in the Third World? Nyerere answers this

[108] Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 382.

[109] Ibid., p. 381.

query by observing that "Third World capitalism would have no choice except to co-operate with external capitalism, as a very junior partner."^[110] Development through capitalism would mean a reliance on foreign money, skill, and enterprise; decisions would be made externally on such important questions as taxation, plant location, production priorities, and employment opportunities. Countries such as Tanzania would, as a consequence, remain structurally dependent on the former colonial power (or alliance of powers), losing the value of independence in the process. The alternative model of development, socialism, would surmount many of these difficulties by severing its ties with international capitalism.

The vital point is that the basis of socialist organization is the meeting of people's needs, not the making of profit. The decision to devote the nation's resources to the production of one thing rather than another is made in the light of what is needed, not what is most profitable. Furthermore, such decisions are made by the people through their responsible institutions—their own government, their own industrial corporations, their own commercial institutions. They are not made by a small group of capitalists, either local or foreign—and the question of foreign domination through economic ownership is thus excluded.^[111]

Although Nyerere does not deny that an African state adopting a socialist model of development will encounter difficulties along the way, he does deny that any of these problems (exploitative management contracts, inherited structural linkages, dynamism of capitalist initiative and techniques) are inherent for socialism. Socialism, then, is the prime means at the disposal of Third World countries for transforming their societies in an egalitarian, self-reliant, indigenously manned and controlled, and productive direction.

As noted above, Nyerere places a high priority on expanding productivity within a socialist context (the GDP increased by 5 percent in 1972—4 percent in 1971—at constant prices);^[112] however, social welfare and "equity" objectives always receive at least an equal emphasis in his formulation of

[110] Ibid., p. 384.

[111] Ibid., pp. 388–89.

[112] Edwin Mtei, "Third Plan: Call for Increased Investment and Productivity," African Development 7, no. 12 (December 1973): T27.

developmental programs. Thus in contrast with the growth-oriented states, transformationalist Tanzania stresses simultaneous multiple goals: social equality, Ujamaa (familyhood), self-reliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration.^[113] Nyerere is willing, if necessary, to accept a slowing in the rate of economic expansion in order to assure a broad sharing of increased opportunity among the populace at large as well as freedom from the hold that Western capitalism might otherwise exercise. Nyerere maintains that a policy of economic self-reliance produces genuine progress,^[114] not a distorted type of growth which benefits the bourgeosie alone:

Despite our great need for economic development, it is not the only thing our people and our nation need. We do need it. We need it because only when we increase the amount of wealth we produce in Tanzania will there be any chance of the mass of our people living decent lives, free from the threat of hunger, or want of clothing, and free from ignorance, or disease. But we also need other things too. We need to live harmoniously among ourselves; we need to safeguard our society, we need to respect ourselves and deserve the respect of others. These things are equally important.^[115] [Our italics.]

President Nyerere seeks a transformation of the rural areas, the establishment of Ujamaa villages, the de-emphasis of urban privilege and wealth, a complete overhaul of the educational system, and a variety of puritanical measures aimed at eliminating luxury and ostentation. He and his supporters ridicule what they describe as "perverse growth," namely, economic expansion on African soil which benefits international capitalism more than the local economy of the developing state.^[116]

[113] The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969–30th June, 1974, vol. I (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 1.

[114] Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 272.

[115] Ibid., p. 199.

[116] Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development," Journal of Modern African Studies 6, no. 2 (August 1968): 150–51. Also see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Range of Choice" in Michael F. Lofchie (ed.), The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 28–29.

Yet even while rejecting industrial development based essentially on foreign initiative, Tanzanians continue to welcome foreign capital and skills that are willingly contributed toward fulfilling the government's objectives of building a socialist economy. Thus of the total development expenditure of Sh 800 million spent in 1971–72, Sh 330 million (or 41 percent) were foreign in origin.^[117] Not only does the private sector remain of critical importance in such areas as housing and road transport and construction, but foreign private and public shareholding is still evident in a variety of National Development Corporation activities.^[118]

With regard to the goal of securing freedom from external control, a strategy of socialist self-reliance creates a number of foreign policy options. Nyerere's commitment to self-reliance springs in part from his doubts about attracting sufficient foreign resources for rapid industrialization.

Quite apart from the problems of unacceptable political conditions which possible donors have tried to attach to capital assistance, and which have caused us to receive less than we at one time hoped, there are hard facts to be faced about the amount of international aid likely to be available. . . . In terms of goods, aid has decreased—and there is no sign that this trend will suddenly change.

There is no choice for us. We shall be thankful for any outside assistance we receive, but we must not expect it. The only people we can rely upon are ourselves.^[119]

Self-reliance increases foreign policy options by reducing a sense of urgency over foreign aid. A country pursuing such a line of action accepts whatever is offered generously and fits with local needs, but it does not gear its development efforts to the liberality of other countries. In addition, a lack of economic dependency enabled Tanzania to take radical and socialist-oriented stances on foreign policy issues, to champion nonalignment, and to take militant pan-African positions. In 1966, for example, the Tanzanian government broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain over her handling of the Rhodesian

[117] Mtei, "Third Plan," p. T27.

[118] See Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania—The Silent Class Struggle," in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania, vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), pp. 304–30.

[119] Freedom and Socialism, pp. 166–67.

crisis. Tanzania felt it necessary to take an uncompromising position on NIBMAR ("no independence before majority African rule"), because it feared the possibility of a British sellout to the minority European community in Rhodesia. But the severing of relations with the former metropolitan country was not without costs. Although Tanzanians could not make an overall assessment of the economic costs of this action, they did note that the freezing of a loan of £7.5 million had created difficulties in fulfilling the Development Plan. Moreover, the refusal to bow to West German pressures to bar the opening of an East German consulate general's office in Dar es Salaam in 1964 led to a unilateral termination of a West German training and aid agreement. For Nyerere the choice was again clear: "We could either accept dictation from West Germany and continue to receive economic aid until the next time we proposed to do something they did not like, or we could maintain our policies and lose the aid immediately."^[120] The Tanzanians were in a position to select the latter alternative because the strategy of socialist self-reliance had already reduced the costs of external dependence to a low level; self-reliance had expanded policy options by playing down the role of foreign economic participation at the outset.

Of course, each strategy—accommodation, reorganization, and transformation—entails different trade-offs (see Figures 16 and 17, p. 323). Nyerere is keenly aware of the fact that a radical domestic and foreign policy stance inevitably involves costs in terms of external investments, skills, initiative, and markets. Foreign investment declined from a proposed 78 percent during the first five-year plan to a mere 31 percent of the reduced total—a drop largely attributed to Tanzania's then somewhat hesitant moves toward a socialist orientation.^[121] In addition, an emphasis on equity may well incur costs with respect to urban industrialization and rapid economic growth. But the alternative strategies, with their reliance on international capitalist initiative, seem morally repugnant to the transformationalists for reasons of equity, dignity,

[120] Ibid., p. 190.

[121] Phil Raikes, "Tanzania Blazes Its Own Trail," African Development 7, no. 12 (December 1973): T11.

and self-determination. On the other hand, the accommodationalists and the reorganizationalists feel they have no alternative but to maintain close linkages with the external capitalist economy. Nevertheless, whereas the accommodationalists, such as Togo, Botswana, and Burundi, are too weak to bargain meaningfully with the international environment, the states adopting a reorganization strategy can set certain conditions on the relationship. In the larger perspective, to be sure, the reorganizationalists are structurally dependent on international capitalism; even so, they are in a position to modify some of the most irritating and demeaning aspects of their relationship through the enactment of measures of regulation, progressive taxation, and participation (i.e., partial or total nationalization). Being more central to the world economy, and therefore having more capital and skills at their disposal as well as greater access to international markets, the reorganizationalists are at the best vantage point to demand concessions from powerful states as well as transnational actors such as the multinational corporations. But irrespective of these concessions, the exchange remains an unequal one, and the African political system, which preserves its ties with the world capitalistic economy in order to maximize its economic advantages, shapes its choice on a variety of basic internal and external issues to adjust to the demands of international actors. Hence an intimate relationship with international capitalism involves certain intended and unintended consequences which need not be assumed by the states adopting a strategy of socialist self-reliance.