Financial Consequences of Unification

On the financial side, the promised economies never came to pass. Indeed, just as opponents had argued, unification resulted in decreased revenues, for of the four school districts involved, only Richmond had a substantial industrial tax base with which to support its schools.^[4] The other three districts had all been classified by the state as "low wealth" districts,^[*] and, as such, had been receiving substantial state aid at the time of the unification election. Once unified, Richmond's industrial and commercial wealth put the new district well above the low wealth category, and all

[*] A low wealth district is defined as one that has less than three-fourths of the state's average assessed valuation per pupil. For example, the average assessed valuation in the state in 1969 was $13,198. Therefore, a low wealth district in that year would have had $9,972 or less in assessed valuation per student.

[*] It is one of the ironic inequities of school financing that middle-class suburban districts with relatively high per-capita income often fall into the low wealth classification because they lack industrial tax bases that would boost their assessed valuation, while the urban areas, with their heavier industrial tax bases, fail to qualify despite enormous demands made upon a city's tax dollar. Thus, for example, in 1968/1969 suburban Mt. Diablo Unified School District, a low wealth district, had a state income per average daily attendance (ADA) of $332, compared to Richmond's income per ADA of $252. The state's contribution to Mt. Diablo's general fund in that year was 49.8 percent; to Richmond's it was only 34.1 percent. This sort of imbalance in the distribution of state school funds is the target of court suits in several states, including California.

extra state aid ceased. The slim financial incentives offered for unification were more than offset by this loss. An informant who was then a member of the Richmond Elementary School Board, and an articulate advocate of unification, commented sadly on the financial outcome: "We were led astray by our professional experts. We really believed what we were told about the economy of the unified district."

In addition, the unification law requires that a newly unified school district's tax rate must produce revenue equal to, but not more than, the income derived from the tax rates of the component districts. Under this formula the tax rate for the new district came to $3.14, a figure that represented a tax decrease of $.61 for Sheldon and $.36 each for Pinole and San Pablo. Only Richmond suffered an increase of $.14. Richmond's wealth, which had been adequate to support the original, smaller district, was now spread very thin.

From the point of view of the state, unification had accomplished its economic purpose; the state was relieved of its financial obligations to three poor school districts. From the point of view of the local taxpayers, they were betrayed. The experts had promised economies, but had not said for whom. Now the people were expected to pick up a much larger proportion of the cost of running their schools from property taxes. Whatever joy might have existed in the Sheldon, Pinole, and San Pablo school districts because of their tax decreases was short-lived.

At the first business meeting of the new RUSD school board March 24, 1965, the superintendent of schools called the new board's attention to the major financial problems facing the district. Teachers had requested a substantial salary increase, and rising costs had made the maintenance of extant educational programs impossible at the existing income levels. Ironically, the special programs that the

poorer districts had been able to afford because of the additional state aid they had received — music, language, enrichment, recreation, and the like — were among the first to be threatened with extinction.

Reluctantly, the new school board agreed to place a proposal for an increase in the tax rate before the electorate on June 29, 1965. This request for increased taxing prerogatives was soundly defeated in an election in which only about 16 percent (12,655) of the eligible voters cast ballots.^[*] From this distance it is difficult to identify the causes of that defeat with certainty, but since one of the major selling points of unification had been economy, it is reasonable to speculate that those who bothered to vote were telling the new district that they expected that promise to be fulfilled.

Disappointed, but fearful of another rebuke, the board declined to make another attempt to increase the tax rate, arguing that even if the voters were to approve an increase after July 1 (the start of the district's fiscal year), it would not solve current problems because, according to law, no tax increase in a school district could become effective after the start of a fiscal year. Hence, if on July 15, 1965 the voters of a district agreed to increase their taxes, the increase could not be levied by the school board until July 1, 1966. For the next three years the board hedged on placing another tax rate increase proposal before the voters. Discussions about financial problems occur repeatedly in the minutes of board meetings, seeming always to culminate at the "wrong time" in the fiscal year.^[5]

Meanwhile, educational programs were being curtailed; by 1969 summer sessions were sharply reduced, and there was talk of eliminating them entirely.^[6] Special pro-

[*] Until the busing issue arose, elections pertaining to school matters, whether for school board trustees or for tax increases or bonds, stirred the voters very little; turnout was always very small.

grams not paid for totally by state or federal funds were eliminated, for example, Operation Headstart and school health programs. Class sizes crept up; maintenance standards slipped so far that by 1968 teachers, administrators, and the public agreed that they were endangering the health and safety of children. Teachers complained continually about a lack of books and supplies, and salaries failed to keep pace with those in comparable districts.^[7] By the 1968/1969 school year salary schedules in the RUSD ranked twenty-fourth among twenty-five of the largest Bay Area school districts, having fallen from $527 above the Bay Area average in 1956/1957 to $243 below that average ten years later.^[8] The school board and administration blamed the community for their failure to support their schools with their dollars; their opponents insisted that the district's plight was primarily due to the incompetence of those in control.