Chaironeia to Ipsos and Beyond
The battle of Chaironeia marked a significant break in the affairs of Greece. The once-powerful city-states now found themselves under the domination of the kingdom of Macedonia.[1] Indeed, the league of Corinth had voted to wage war against the Persians with Philip, king of the Macedonians, at its head. Philip's murder in the summer of 336 created no fundamental change in this general situation; rather it solidified Alexander's position by allowing him quickly both to discern his possible enemies and to bring them firmly under his control. Indeed, by late summer he was made general by the congress of the Greek states at Corinth and in his father's place led the Greek invasion against Persia.[2] This ascendancy of Macedonia to the leadership of Greece forever changed the political situation and, though most Greeks were naturally unable to see it at the time, made powerful city-states a thing of the past.
In the aftermath of his victory at Chaironeia in 338, Philip treated Athens leniently, perhaps influenced by the intellectual achievements of the Athenians, but more probably out of the realization that Athens still had significant naval power. He refrained from marching on Attica and returned all Athenian prisoners without ransom. In return, the Athenians had to disband their confederacy and make alliance with Philip, thereby recognizing his power. He also agreed to return Oropos to Athenian control but took the Chersonese for Macedonia.[3] Under the circumstances, the
[1] IG II 236 (= Tod, GHI no. 177 = Heisserer 8-16) preserves part of the oath sworn by the cities in their treaty with Philip after Chaironeia. As party to the peace pact and to the league, the Athenians had to agree to furnish ships and cavalry to Philip (Plutarch Phokion 16.4-5).
[2] IG II 329 (= Heisserer 3-26) apparently preserves a small part of Alexander's alliance with Athens and the Greek states that was concluded soon after his accession to power.
[3] Diodoros 16.87; Plutarch Mor . 715c, Phokion 16.4-6; [Demades] 9. On Athens and Oropos, see below 92-93. D. Knoepfler argues that it was not Philip in the year 338, but Alexander in 335, who returned Oropos to Athenian control (in M. Piérart, ed., Aristote et Athènes [Paris 1993] 295-296 and n. 50).
conditions were remarkably mild. Philip did not even station a garrison in Attica, but rather was satisfied to place one in the Kadmeia at Thebes.
Although Demades, the orator, negotiated these terms, the main leaders of Athens after Chaironeia came to be Lykourgos, an expert in finance, and Phokion, general and statesman.[4] They recognized the necessity of accommodating Macedonian wishes.[5] In the first few years after the battle, however, they and the anti-Macedonian faction led by Demosthenes clearly retained some hope of regaining influence for Athens. Many Athenians, Demosthenes among them, relied on the Persians for support. In any event, they set about strengthening the defensive walls of the city.[6] They clearly also perceived that the democracy as they knew it was threatened, for they passed in the spring of 336, just months before Philip was assassinated, a law against anyone's attempting its overthrow.[7] And when
[4] Demades did play an important role and clearly had Lykourgos' confidence. Fordyce Mitchel has shown in a study of IG II 1493 that he served as treasurer of the military fund from 334/3 to 330/29 (TAPA 93 [1962] 219-223) and must, therefore, have cooperated with Lykourgos on Athenian financial matters. They also shared the legislative duties and on three occasions that we know about proposed measures at the same meeting of the assembly, viz. in 334/3 (IG II 335, 405, 414a ), in 332/1 (IG II 346, 346), and 328/7 (IG II 399, 452). On all these see Ch. Habicht, "Zwei athenische Volksbeschlösse aus der Ära Lykurgs, IG II 399 und 452," Chiron 19 (1989) 1-5 and nn. 24, 25. Demades was also a colleague of Lykourgos on a commission to supervise the festival at the Amphiaraion in 329 (IG VII 4254) and at about that same time accompanied him to Delphi as a hierope in charge of the Pythaïs (Fouilles de Delphes III.1 no. 511).
[5] One of the primary tools used by Athenian leaders to bolster their position with Philip (and later with Alexander and his successors) was the granting of public honors to himself and his friends. It is scarcely accidental that Philip, his son Alexander, and his general Antipatros were honored with Athenian citizenship not long after the peace had been concluded following Chaironeia. (For the collected evidence, see Osborne, Naturalization III T68-70.) This policy is spelled out by the orator Archedikos of Lamptrai in lines 3-7 of IG II 402.
[6] Aischines 3.27 gives the date as the twelfth month of the year when Chairondas was archon (338/7). IG II 244, a decree concerning the repair of the fortifications of Piraeus, records part of this activity.
[7] Agora I 6524, published in Hesperia 21 (1952) 355-359 = Schwenk no. 6. The speaker of this decree is not Demosthenes, but Eukrates of Piraeus, another ardent supporter of democracy. His life was demanded by Antipatros after Krannon in 322 (Lucian Demos. Encore . 31). The language of this measure specifies severe penalties for any member of the Areopagos who cooperates with someone attempting to subvert the democracy. The emphasis on the Areopagos is natural, for it was a standing body of senior ex-archons that could be a useful tool for a would-be tyrant. The measure was surely meant to safeguard the democracy and, as such, was probably intended to shield the members of the Areopagos and give them added importance; it is not, I think, an attack on them as a pro-Macedonian element. For a full discussion of this measure and the Areopagos, see R. W. Wallace, The Areopagos Council, to 307 (Baltimore 1989) 179-184. For a different point of view see W. Will, Athen und Alexander (Munich 1983) 28-30.
Philip died, the Athenians, at Demosthenes' instigation, actually passed a decree in honor of Philip's assassin[8] an act of which they quickly repented when Alexander swiftly marched south through Thessaly. They dispatched an embassy to treat with him, which he received kindly.
The Athenians, at least some of them, continued naturally to hope for an escape from their Macedonian hegemon. The next year, when word spread that Alexander had died on his campaign in Illyria, they plotted to free themselves. In particular, Demosthenes, Lykourgos, and other Athenians encouraged the Thebans to rid themselves of the Macedonian garrison on their citadel.[9] They provided arms and money and even voted to send an army. Alexander, however, appeared suddenly before Thebes, razed the city, and demanded that the Athenians turn over to him Demosthenes, Lykourgos, and other anti-Macedonian activists.[10] This was late summer or early autumn of 335 B.C. Demades once again headed an embassy and succeeded in persuading Alexander to drop his demand.[11] Clearly he was able to assure him of complete Athenian acquiescence, even cooperation, with his rule.
How he did this we are not completely sure. Assuredly Alexander was too hardheaded simply to accept promises from those who had shown themselves to be repeatedly untrustworthy; therefore, it must have been at this time that the Athenians formally committed twenty triremes for Alexander's expedition against Persia.[12] They and their crews in essence served as hostages to assure Athenian good behavior.[13] Moreover, after his decisive initial victory over the Persians at Granikos, Alexander lost no time in sending to Athens as a dedication to Athena three hundred panoplies with the following inscription: 
[14] This reminder of his power was surely meant to have special point for his would-be opponents among the Athenians.[15]
[8] Plutarch Demos . 22, Phokion 16.6.
[9] [Demades] 17, Vit. X Orat . 847c, Plutarch Demos . 23.1, Arrian Ahab . 1.7.2-3, Aelian VH 12.57.
[10] Plutarch Phokion 17.1-3, Alex . 11.4-6; Arrian Anab . 1.10.4.
[11] [Demades] 16-20, Plutarch Demos . 23.2-5.
[12] Despite his reported opposition to supplying ships to Alexander (Vit. X Chat . 847c), Demosthenes will have been one of the architects of this arrangement.
[13] This is why they were one of the few Greek naval contingents kept on after Miletos was taken in 334 (Diodoros 17.22.5).
[14] Arrian Anab . 1.16.7, Plutarch Alex . 16.8.
[15] That Alexander came to harbor a grudge against the Athenians and would have dealt with them, had he lived long enough, is suggested by an anecdote reported by Athenaios (12.538b). At an entertainment for the troops at Ekbatana in 324 Gorgos, Alexander's hoplophylax , jestingly offered to supply Alexander "whenever he besieges Athens" with myriad panoplies, catapults, and weapons for the fight. On Gorgos, see Heisserer 169-203.
Once the Athenians agreed to accept Macedonian hegemony, they were able to prosper in the peace which Alexander's control and absence over the next twelve years made possible. The prosperity of Athens under the financial leadership of Lykourgos during these years was perhaps as great as at any time in its history.[16] The source of the revenue was apparently commerce and the silver mines at Laureion, which were actively being worked.[17] Important buildings and cult centers were built or refurbished, principally the Panathenaic stadium and the theater of Dionysos.[18] The inscriptions reveal that the fleet was well maintained,[19] and a new arsenal designed by the architect Philon was completed in Piraeus.[20] Complementing this, the training of young men as soldiers, the ephebeia, gained an active new life.[21] Clearly Lykourgos, Phokion, Demades, and
[16] In 307 the orator Stratokles of Diomeia proposed a fulsome decree honoring Lykourgos for his leadership. This important political document is preserved in Vit. X Orat . 852 and in a fragmentary inscription, IG II 457. On the man and his times, see F. W. Mitchel, Lykourgan Athens : 338-322, Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, 2d series (Cincinnati 1970); J. Engels, "Zur Stellung Lykurgs und zur Aussagekraft seines Militär- und Bauprogramms for die Demokratie vor 322 v. Chr.," Ancient Society 23 (1992) 5-29; and M. Faraguna, Atene nell'età di Alessandro , Atti Acc. Naz. dei Lincei, ser. 9, vol. 2, fasc. 2 (Rome 1992).
[17] On this point see Faraguna, Atene 289-322. For texts of the mining lease inscriptions which date from 367/6 to ca . 300, see Agora XIX nos. P5-16, 18-30, 32-41, 43, 44, 50, 51. R. J. Hopper, in "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C. ," ABSA 48 (1953) 200-254, and "The Laurion Mines: A Reconsideration," ABSA 63 (1968) 293-326, provides the basic discussion of these important texts.
[18] On Lykourgos' building activity, see IG II 457b lines 5-9; Vit. X Orat . 852b. M. Maass, Die Prohedrie des Dionysostheaters in Athen (Munich 1972) 22-32, has shown that the Lykourgan rebuilding of the theater also included the fine thrones for the proedroi . The fragmentary honorary decree at the University of Mississippi published in Hesperia 55 (1986) 177-182 that mentions in line 3 "the skene" may well, as its initial editors, A. J. Heisserer and R. A. Moysey, suggest, be part of the record of this renovation.
[19] IG II 1623-1632; IG II 1627 line 269 lists the number of triremes in 330/29 as 392.
[20] IG II 1668 and 457b line 6. On it see A. L'infert, J. Mausbach, et al., Die Skeuothek des Philon im Piräus (Cologne 1981). Its remains have now been identified (BCH 113 [1989] 589).
[21] Ath. Pol . 42 gives a description of its organization. The spurt of dedications made by the ephebes during the years 334/3 and 333/2 dearly marks in my view when this occurred. There are now eleven texts known from these two years. In addition to the eight collected by Reinmuth (nos. 2-9), we may now add two more of the year 333/2, namely IG II 3105 + 2401 (ABSA 84 [1989] 333-336) and Eleusis inv. no. E1103 (AE , 1988, 19-30). In addition, E W. Mitchel, "The So-Called Earliest Ephebic Inscription," ZPE 19 (1975) 233-243, esp. 240-241, has seen that the first inscription in Reinmuth's collection really belongs to the year of Ktesikles (334/3).
the others sought to keep Athens in a posture to exercise a role in world affairs if the opportunity presented itself.[22]
Alongside the building program, Lykourgos promoted the religious institutions which underlay the life of the city.[23] For example, in addition to rebuilding the theater, he had official city copies made of the plays of the three great tragedians for the dramatic festivals, primarily the Dionysia.[24] We also have a law proposed about the year 336 B.C. to set aside special moneys in a fund to support the annual, or lesser, Panathenaia.[25] Clearly this document reveals a concern to set the annual celebration on a firmer financial footing. We may suspect that it had fallen on hard times. The proposer of the measure is not Lykourgos, but Aristonikos of Marathon,[26] one of his supporters, who was later condemned and executed by the Macedonians, viz. in 322 after the battle of Krannon.[27] In the year 334 Lykourgos himself proposed a long measure for refurbishing the religious sanctuaries of Attica.[28] He probably also authored a law requiring liturgists to make a dedication.[29] His double interests in public finance and the state religion are also evident in accounts from the sanctuary at Eleusis,
[23] IG II 337, a decree proposed by Lykourgos granting the Kitians the right to a piece of land on which to have a shrine of Aphrodite, has generally been taken to be part of this program, but it deals with foreigners and more correctly is seen as evidence of Lykourgos' efforts to encourage the presence of foreign traders in Piraeus (below 114).
[24] Vit. X Orat . 841f.
[25] IG II 334 + = Schwenk no. 17. The concern for regulating festivals and putting them in order financially seems to have been a major goal of the city under Lykourgos. In addition to this text dealing with the Panathenaia, we have fragmentary regulations all dating roughly 330 B.C. for the Dipolieia (Agora I 6421) and for two other festivals that included athletic competitions (Agora 17063 the Amphiaraia? and EM 12896 the Eleusinia?).
[26] PA 2028.
[27] Plutarch Demos . 28, Lucian Demos. Encom . 31.
[28] IG II 333 = Schwenk no. 21. D. Harris, AJA 96 (1992) 637-652, has suggested that the statues on the Acropolis inventoried in IG II 1498-1501A were to be melted down (p. 643) as part of this process. IG II 403, a decree authorizing repair of a statue of Athena Nike, may well belong to this time (I. Mark, TheSanctuary of Athena Nike in Athens , Hesperia Suppl. 26 [1993] 113-114). IG II 310, which is very probably of Lykourgan date and apparently contains regulations governing a sanctuary, should also perhaps be connected with this activity.
[29] IG II 1575A line 2 as restored by D. M. Lewis in Hesperia 37 (1968) 376 n. 22.
where he was closely involved in the details of financing building projects,[30] as well as in providing funds to the religious officials.[31]
The strong example set by Lykourgos of financially supporting and renewing the cults of the city filtered down, it is amply apparent, to the local level, to local organizations and to individuals. We find, for example, the demesmen of Cholargos establishing regulations in 334/3 for the local Thesmophoria,[32] those of Eleusis making financial arrangements in 332/1 so that the sacrifice to Herakles in Akris can be as beautiful as possible,[33] and those in Piraeus seeing in 324/3 to the theater, one of the primary focal points of the civic and religious life of the deme.[34] In general, the comparatively frequent honors granted to persons active in the theater may reflect the heightened emphasis under Lykourgos on the religious festivals.[35] In any case, at Aixone in 326/5 the demesmen honored their victorious choregoi and authorized a sacrifice of thanksgiving.[36] Likewise, the tribe Pandionis in the same year honored its producer.[37] At Acharnai, one of the largest demes, the demesmen passed, most probably during this Lykourgan boom of religious fervor, regulations for financing the construction of altars to Ares and Athena Areia.[38] On a more humble level the orgeones of the Heros Iatros leased a garden in 333/2 to a certain Thrasyboulos, presumably one part of their activities financing the worship.[39] Individuals too are often singled out for their acts of piety. Around the year 330, for example, the deme members of Melite honored Neoptolemos, son of Antikles, of Melite for his activities with regard to the temple of Artemis;[40]
[30] IG II 1672 line 11, 1673 lines 64-65. On the latter, see K. Clinton, "Inscriptions from Eleusis," AE , 1971, 83-113, esp. 104-105. Indeed, there was major building activity at Eleusis under him. The walls were extensively repaired (Kourouniotes, Eleusiniaka 1189-208; IG II 1672 lines 1-75), and the portico of Philon on the west side of the Telesterion was brought to completion (IG II 1670, 1671, 1675).
[31] IG II 1672 lines 302-303. See also on his activities reorganizing cults and finances, M. Faraguna, Atene nell'età di Alessandro , Atti Acc. Naz. dei Lincei, ser. 9, vol. 2, fasc. 2 (Rome 1992) 355-380.
[32] IG II 1184 = Schwenk no. 26.
[33] REG 91 (1978) 289-306 lines 1-17 = Schwenk no. 43.
[34] IG II 1176 = Schwenk no. 76.
[35] The city honored in 332/1 the dramatist Amphis from Andros (IG II 347) and in the same year or the next an actor (IG II 348).
[36] IG II 1198 = Schwenk no. 66.
[37] IG II 1157 = Schwenk no. 65.
[38] Robert, Études épigraphiques et philologiques 293-296.
[39] EM 13051 = Schwenk no. 32.
[40] Agora I 6969, published by J. Threpsiades and E. Vanderpool, "Themistokles' Sanctuary of Artemis Aristoboule," Arch. Delt . 19 (1964) 26-36. P. Amandry ("Thémistocle a Mélité," in Charisterion eis A. K. Orlandon IV [1967-68] 265-279) has raised what appear to be valid reservations about the identification with the temple purportedly founded by Themistokles (Plutarch Mor . 869c-d).
the genos of the Eumolpids at Eleusis also apparently honored this same [Neopto]lemos for beautifying the sanctuary of Plouton;[41] the genos of Krokonidai praised the son of Aristodemos for his careful construction of the shrine of Hestia;[42] and the Teithrasioi lauded the piety of their representatives to the council.[43] These myriad activities suggest widespread local support for the policies of Lykourgos.
Last, but hardly least, Aristotle returned to Athens from Macedonia about 335 and opened his school in the Lyceum. In this endeavor he clearly had, despite his thoroughgoing Macedonian background, Lykourgos' support, for one of the buildings which we know Lykourgos specifically had a hand in building was the gymnasium in the Lyceum.[44] The school flourished, and it was here that many works were produced, including the Athenaion Politeia , a history of the development of the Athenian constitution and description of its organization at the time of Lykourgos. At Oropos there was considerable activity in the sanctuary of the oracle of Amphiaraos which now played a significant role in Athenian religious life. The fountain and waterworks were repaired;[45] more significantly provisions were passed under the supervision of the Atthidographer Phanodemos for improvements to the sanctuary and for a quadrennial festival for Amphiaraos.[46] The first games were held in 329/8 under the supervision of a distinguished board of ten men that included both Lykourgos and Demades.[47] It was, on the whole, a fine time domestically for the city and its people.[48]
However, in the year 331 King Agis of Sparta with the support of the Persians attempted to rally the mainland Greeks for a revolt against the
[41] IG II 1231.
[42] IG II 1229.
[43] EM 13336 = Agora XV no. 45.
[44] IG II 457b lines 7-8; Vit. X Orat . 852b.
[45] IG II 338 (= IG VII 3499 = Schwenk no. 28).
[46] IG VII 4252 (= Schwenk no. 40) and 4253 (= Schwenk no. 41). See now on this festival D. Knoepfler, "Adolf Wilhelm et la pentétèris des Amphiaraia d'Oropos," in Aristote et Athè-nes , ed. M. Piérart (Paris 1993), 279-302.
[47] IG VII 4254 (= Schwenk no. 50); Knoepfler, ibid ., esp. 296-301, persuasively argues that IG VII 414 + SEG 1 no. 126, the victor list of the great Amphiaraia, should be associated with the games of 329/8. See below 92-93.
[48] There were to be sure some problems; a severe shortage of grain, for example, faced much of the Greek world from 330 to 326. See below 30-34.
Macedonians, who were led by Alexander's trusted regent, Antipatros. Agis seems to have persuaded Memnon, Alexander's governor in Thrace, to make a show of opposition coordinated with his own rising in the Peloponnesos with the hope of getting Antipatros to split his forces.[49] Although the Athenian leaders must have been sorely tempted at this juncture to abandon both their promises to Alexander and their hostages, they refrained from joining this revolt.[50] They were not ready for another military confrontation.[51] Still, however prudent their decision may have been, no longer to have the power to lead others, but rather to be forced to sit idle, was a bitter pill.[52] Indeed the necessity to heed the will of another amounted for any Greek city to a kind of slavery. Lykourgos certainly realized that it had come to this, for in the summer of the year 330 B.C. he said of the Athenians who fell at Chaironeia 
.[53] However distasteful the Athenians found it to accept Macedonian domination, accept it they did.[54] At the same time, their failure to support the Spartans in resisting the Macedonians was obvious to everyone, and it clearly created a stir. As a result the anti-Macedonian leaders felt impelled, presumably to recover some ground politically at home, to put on a show of independence, even defiance, towards the Macedonians.
The summer after Agis' defeat, the summer of 330, provided the perfect opportunity. The greater Panathenaia was to take place, and the city, in consequence, will have been crowded with visitors. In June the assembly passed a decree honoring the Thracian Rheboulas, a member of one of
[49] This is the persuasive interpretation of E. Badian, "Agis III," Hermes 95 (1967) 170-192, esp. 179-181. On Memnon's rising, see Diodoros 17.62.4-7.
[50] Aischines 3.165-167, Plutarch Demos. 24.1. On Agis III and his revolt, see Badian, Hermes 95 (1967) 170-192; and Bosworth, Conquest and Empire 198-204, who advocates a slightly different chronology.
[51] R. Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat (Oxford 1993) 207, cogently stresses the presence of the Macedonian garrison at Thebes as a factor that must have played an important role in Athenian thinking at this juncture.
[53] Section 50 of In Leocratem .
the ruling tribes of Thrace that had undoubtedly supported Memnon in his attempt to aid the rebellion of Agis.[55] They thus openly honored—on what pretext the fragmentary nature of the text does not allow us to say—a prominent opponent of Alexander. This public measure was underlined by the permanent copy inscribed on a stone stele; it represented a small, but not completely inconsequential, gesture of independence. In July Lykourgos staged the contests in the new Panathenaic stadium, which was finished just before the games.[56] We may suppose that he intended to showcase the city as a leader among the Greeks. In any case, the forensic display in the Athenian law courts that followed close upon the festival was certainly contrived to accentuate Athens' opposition to Philip and Alexander.
First Lykourgos himself brought an action against a certain Leokrates, who had, according to Lykourgos, deserted his city, his fatherland, and his gods in their hour of direst need after news had come from Chaironeia of the Athenian defeat.[57] Leokrates was a nobody, hardly worth attacking eight years after the fact.[58] Surely, this lawsuit was largely a pretext, a means of giving Lykourgos what he really wanted, namely an opportunity to make a resounding appeal to Athenian patriotism. In doing so, he recalled the valiant stand at Chaironeia and gave a show of courageously exhorting his fellow citizens to oppose the Macedonians.[59] Moreover, can it be accidental that Ktesiphon's proposal to award Demosthenes a crown
[55] IG II 349 = Tod, GHI no. 193 = Schwenk no. 45. The proposer of the decree, Nothippos of Diomeia, is not attested elsewhere, but his son Lysias was secretary of the assembly in the year of Anaxikrates (307/6), the year of freedom from the control of Demetrios of Phaleron. We may surmise that he and his father were probably not strong supporters of the Macedonians.
[56] IG II 351 lines 15-20, II 457b line 7, II 1627 lines 382-384.
[57] This speech, In Leocratem , alone of Lykourgos' works has come down to us whole.
[58] He cannot be certainly identified with any known person; the name is attested in many demes and is quite common in the fourth century B.C. There is then no evidence to substantiate Bosworth's assumption (Conquest and Empire 208) that Leokrates was wealthy.
[59] A decree proposed by Lykourgos in the late spring of 329 honoring Eudemos of Plataia (IG II 351 = Schwenk no. 48) reveals how dear to his heart these ideas remained; to be precise, we can discern in its wording the same emphasis on Athenian efforts to oppose the Macedonians at the time of Chaironeia and just after and on the preparations for the great Panathenaia of summer 330. Lykourgos praises Eudemos specifically for his promise at a previous juncture to contribute for the war should it be needed (lines 11-15) and for his present aid in the construction of the Panathenaia stadium (lines 15-20). The war in question is surely, as Schwenk concludes on pages 237-238, the expected attack by Philip on Athens after Chaironeia.
for his services to the state, particularly his leadership in fortifying the city after Chaironeia, was renewed before the assembly at this same time?[60] This proposal and the challenge to its legality from Aischines likewise gave Demosthenes a platform to speak out. In his ringing speech On the Crown he not only defended himself against Aischines, but reviewed his leadership of Athens against Philip and called upon Athenian patriotism against the Macedonians.
No doubt these speeches broke the spirit of the agreement the Athenian leaders had made with Alexander, but since they dealt primarily with events that happened before Alexander came to power and were delivered in Athenian law courts against Athenians, they constituted no more than provocative puffery that allowed the Athenian leaders to save some face. They did not give grounds for direct Macedonian intervention. Still, the performance was not repeated in Alexander's lifetime, and we may guess that official Macedonian displeasure was made quite clear. These two speeches by Lykourgos and Demosthenes during the summer of 330 B.C. in fact revealed the true impotence of Athens.
Still, as long as Alexander was preoccupied in the East, the Athenians were left on the domestic front pretty much to their own devices. This uneasy alliance began to be openly strained in 324, when Alexander announced through a spokesman at the Olympic games that exiles should be restored to their native cities. The Athenians demurred because this promised to affect adversely their control of the island of Samos.[61] At about the same time Harpalos, Alexander's disaffected treasurer,[62] appeared off Piraeus with thirty ships and a large sum of money to incite revolt against the king. The Athenians did not receive him at first. They had learned long since that it was better not to oppose Alexander openly.[63] Ultimately, how-
[60] It was originally made in 336 and challenged by Aischines. Philip's assassination caused the proposal to be tabled. For the timing of this case and that of Lykourgos against Leokrates, see Aischines 3.252-253.
[61] The strategic position of the island and its good port made it an important trading center. IG II 416b specifically attests that the Athenian traders and cleruchs on the island played an important role in supplying grain to Athens.
[62] For evidence of a strong personal rift between Harpalos and Alexander as early as the year 326, see R. Lane Fox, "Theopompus of Chios and the Greek World," in Chios , ed. J. Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (Oxford 1986), 117-120.
[63] N. G. Ashton, "The Lamian War—A False Start?," Antichthon 17 (1983) 47-61, has suggested that the Harpalos affair interrupted, indeed for the moment blunted, a movement by Athens to mount organized opposition to Alexander. I do not think, however, that the determination to oppose Alexander can have been as strong among the Athenians as Ashton implies. If it had been, if indeed armed opposition had already been decided upon, Harpalos, his money, and troops would have been warmly welcomed, once their real intention had been ascertained. But they were not. Rather the evidence suggests that Alexander was prepared to negotiate with individual cities about the specific problems raised by the exiles decree and to make modifications, as he did in the well-known case of Tegea (Tod, GHI no. 202 = Heisserer 205-229). Surely the Athenian leaders expected to negotiate some type of compromise concerning their cleruchs on Samos. Indeed, when the Athenians on the island failed to obey the decree and began negotiations, some Samian exiles (no doubt in frustration) attempted to press the issue by crossing over from Mykale and trying to force the Athenians out. They were defeated and taken to Athens, where they were condemned, but they were ransomed by Antileon of Chalkis (MDAIA 72 [1957] 157 no. 1A). Ch. Habicht (ibid . 158-163) dated these events to 321, just before Perdikkas' decision in favor of the Samians, but R. M. Errington, "Samos and the Lamian War," Chiron 5 (1975) 50-57, seems correct in dating them to late spring/early summer of 323. If so, the Athenians at this time had still not despaired of trying to negotiate the matter with Alexander. For further arguments against Habicht's late date, see E. Badian, "A Comma in the History of Samos," ZPE 23 (1976) 289-294.
ever, since Harpalos held Athenian citizenship as a result of his aid to the city in the famine of ca . 329 B.C. ,[64] they allowed him into the city, but then seized him and his money, some of which ended up in the pockets of various politicians. Demosthenes and Demades were convicted of receiving bribes and temporarily put out of action.[65] Harpalos himself escaped but was murdered soon afterwards.[66]
When, however, Alexander died on 10 June 323, the Athenians seized the opportunity; they revolted along with a number of other states from northern Greece and fought a war now generally referred to as the Lamian War.[67] For a while they had success against Antipatros, but when reinforcements arrived from Asia Minor in late spring or early summer of the year 322, the tide turned. The primarily Athenian fleet was destroyed near Amorgos,[68] ending Athenian naval power, and later that same summer, when the Greek forces were unable to defeat the combined armies of Krateros and Antipatros at Krannon, all resistance ended. The settlement imposed by Antipatros and Krateros on Athens was not nearly so lenient as those agreed to by Philip and Alexander. They put in place an oligarchy[69] led by Phokion and Demades with a property qualification of 2,000 drach-
[64] Below 31 and n. 6.
[65] On the trials surrounding this affair, see Deinarchos' speeches Against Demosthenes, Against Aristogeiton , and Against Philokles ; and Hypereides 5, Against Demosthenes , esp. cols. 8-9, 24-25.
[66] For studies of the entire affair, see 42 n. 35 below.
[67] On it, see 23-29 below.
[68] Mar. Parium B lines 9-10; Plutarch Demetrios 11.
[69] It is thus characterized by the short-lived "democratic" regime supported by Polyperchon in 318; see IG II448 line 61.
mas, which in essence disenfranchised more than half of the population.[70] They demanded the condemnation of Demosthenes, Hypereides, and other opponents of Macedon.[71] Lastly to see that their will was carried out they lost little time in placing a garrison on the fortress Mounychia in Piraeus. It was installed on 20 Boedromion (ca . mid-September), just six weeks, give or take a day or so, after the battle.[72]
The imposition of the Macedonian garrison and the death of Demosthenes, the most outspoken anti-Macedonian leader, have become benchmark events for many, signalling the end of Athenian democracy.[73] What more accurately they underlined was the end of Athens' pretentions of playing an independent role in international politics. But the power to do this had already been lost in Demosthenes' lifetime—the necessity to accommodate Alexander had effectively muzzled his (and Athens') opposition since late 335 B.C. , more than a dozen years before his death. Nevertheless, the internal workings of the Athenian state, the real indicator of the nature of the government, remained essentially intact and democratic. Indeed, the courts, the assembly, the council, the tribal system, and the selection of officials based on it continued with scarcely any detectable interruptions down to the time of Sulla. Generals were elected annually, and the nine traditional archons played their accustomed roles each year.[74] In short, whatever the leanings of any particular regime, Athenian democracy in its essentials was remarkably resilient. The power of tradition, the impulse to govern 
, or at least to claim to do so, remained dominant.
By reducing drastically the number of citizens, the oligarchy must have been forced to make some changes in the day-to-day running of the state. What actual constitutional changes they made are hard to determine, for there is very little evidence.[75] Lack of eligible candidates must have required them to ease the restriction forbidding someone to serve in the boule more than twice (there is as yet no actually attested example).[76] They made the anagrapheus an important official, apparently placing him
[70] Plutarch, Phokion 28.4, reports that more than 12,000 lost the right to vote.
[71] Plutarch Demos . 28.2.
[72] On the date of the installment, Plutarch Phokion 28.1; and, on the date of the battle (Metageitnion 7), Camillus 19.5.
[73] For example, Plutarch Demos . 3.3-4.
[74] S. V. Tracy, "Athens in 100 B.C. " HSCP 83 (1979) 220-225.
[75] W. S. Ferguson's lively description of the situation (HA 22-26) cannot be sustained from the evidence.
[76] An inscription from Piraeus of the year 320, IG II 380, reveals that the duties of the astynomoi had been given to the agoranomoi (lines 17-18). Whether this applies only to officials who served in Piraeus or more generally, we cannot be certain. This is precisely the type of consolidation of duties that the reduction in citizens eligible to serve may have caused.
in charge of the assembly?[77] At least in one case they rescinded honors and privileges granted to a man who had conspicuously aided Athens against Antipatros.[78] There is also some evidence to suggest that they curtailed, if they did not actually abolish, formal military training for young Athenians.[79]
In addition, the years of the oligarchy saw the loss of the island of Samos and the displacement of at least some, if not all, of the Athenians living there. The determination to retain control of Samos had been one of the chief reasons for Athenian opposition to Alexander's decree about the exiles.[80] In the year 321 Perdikkas ruled definitively in favor of the Samians, and they joyfully returned home after more than a generation of exile from their native island.[81] On Samos there survives much epigraphical evidence attesting to their return.[82] By contrast, almost nothing is heard of the displaced Athenians. Perhaps S. Jaschinski is correct to suggest that most of the cleruchs chose to remain on the island despite the confiscation of half their property and the loss of citizen rights.[83] However, given the strife alluded to in the epigraphical record[84] and the hard feelings natural on both sides resulting from such a change, it seems very improbable. Moreover, a very fragmentary decree from the Athenian Agora, inventory number I 5626, proposed by Demades early in the year 319 B.C. for a certain Nikostratos, may refer to the displaced cleruchs. It has occasioned discussion primarily about its calendar equation,[85] but the reference to women and children in line 14 suggests the possibility that Nikostratos is
[77] On this office and the epigraphical evidence for it, S. Dow, "The Athenian Anagrapheis," HSCP 67 (1963) 37-54.
[78] IG II 448 lines 60-62.
[79] Using the evidence of IG II 1187 F. W. Mitchel argued this persuasively in his article "Derkylos of Hagnous and the Date of I.G ., II , 1187" (Hesperia 33 [1964] 346-348).
[80] Diodoros 18.8.7.
[81] Diodoros 18.18.9; Ch. Habicht, "Samische Volksbeschlüshe der hellenistischen Zeit," MDAIA 72 (1957) 154-155.
[82] Ibid . nos. 1-4, 13, 20-28; for further texts referring to the exile and return, Habicht, "Hellenistische Inschriften aus dem Heraion von Samos," MDAIA 87 (1972) 191-202 nos. 2 and 4; M. Schede, "Aus dem Heraion von Samos," MDAIA 44 (1919) 4-15 nos. 5F-O; and C. Michel, Recueil d'inscriptions grecques I (Paris 1897) nos. 366-369.
[83] Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck des Flucht des Harpalos (Bonn 1981) 135-136.
[84] Habicht, MDAIA 72 (1957) no. 1A; and n. 63 above.
[85] See Hesperia 13 (1944) 234-241 for the initial publication by B. D. Meritt, and SEG 21 no. 306 for subsequent restorations of the opening lines.
being honored for his aid in the resettlement of the cleruchs and their families. Otherwise, all is silence.
Demades re-emerged right after Krannon as author of the proposal to send an embassy to Antipatros with full powers to conclude peace.[86] Not long afterwards he also moved the measure condemning Demosthenes and the other ringleaders of the opposition to the Macedonians.[87] It is not hard to divine his motive; surely he was seeking to nip in the bud any possibility of a direct attack on the city of Athens. In these actions he must have enjoyed the support of his fellow citizens. In any case, he clearly was the leading figure in the assembly once the oligarchy was established; in fact he is known as the proposer of no less than five decrees that date to the years 321-319.[88] Given his prominence, it is disappointing that they are not all well enough preserved to allow us to have a sense of what they were about. Two (IG II2 372, 383b) preserve merely the opening lines, with no indication of the contents of the decree. The others deal with matters of real significance. As has been suggested just above, Agora I 5626 probably deals with the resettlement of the cleruchs from Samos; IG II2 380 concerns the market officials in Piraeus, and IG II2 400 honors a certain Eucharistos for his help with the food supply.
The evidence suggests that Phokion and Demades, the leaders of the oligarchy, whatever their willingness to accomodate the Macedonians, sought the best interests of their city.[89] Indeed, at the time of his execution in 319 Demades was in Macedonia actually negotiating with the seriously ill Antipatros about the removal of the garrison from Mounychia.[90] About five years earlier, moreover, he had joined with the general Leosthenes,
[86] Plutarch Phokion 26.2.
[89] It has been the custom to vilify these two as selling out to the Macedonians: most recently, for example, P. Green, Alexander to Actium (Berkeley 1990) 40-41. For the opposite view, see Mitchel, Lykourgan Athens 15-20; and J. M. Williams, "Demades' Last Years," Ancient World 19 (1989) 27-30.
who was soon to become the hero of the Lamian War, in paying for the outfitting of a trireme.[91]
The oligarchy lasted for three years, from 321 to 319, and fell in the political maneuvering following Antipatros' death. Polyperchon, named Antipatros' successor, seized Athens and pronounced her free.[92] He was soon forced out by Antipatros' son Kassandros, who had kept control of the garrison in Mounychia. This was when Demetrios of Phaleron came to the fore as a negotiator with the Macedonians, not unlike Demades. He successfully negotiated between Kassandros and the Athenians and was put in charge of the city, but saddled with the garrison in Piraeus. Much like Lykourgos and those who guided Athenian affairs from 335 to 323, Demetrios of Phaleron accepted the necessity of leaving foreign affairs to the Macedonians and concentrated on doing his best for Athens in the situation. He moderated the oligarchic tendencies of his predecessors and even claimed to have strengthened the democracy. His ten-year rule, 317-307, was a time of peace and prosperity.[93]
The "liberation" of Athens by Demetrios, the son of Antigonos, in 307 soon revealed the fatal weakness of a city that was in reality powerless, but was attempting to chart its own course. The Athenians immediately voted extravagant honors to "the savior gods" Demetrios and his father, Antigonos the One-eyed.[94] As part of this adulation they increased the traditional number of the tribes of the city from ten to twelve. Not surprisingly, the two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, were placed first in the official order. Though Demetrios had destroyed the fort at Mounychia, he remained in Athens with his fleet and army. The Athenians were clearly dependent on him. But the son of Antigonos had no leisure to remain long,[95] nor could he really when he was absent guarantee the freedom he
[91] IG II 1631 lines 605-606; see below 24 n.14.
[92] Plutarch Phokion 32. The rhetoric of the time can be gauged from lines 55-56, 61-64 of IG II 448. Nearly the same terms are used by Lykourgos (In Leocratem 50) to describe the loss of freedom after Chaironeia. "Oligarchy" and "slavery" have become partisan terms signifying Macedonian control of Athens; while "democracy" and "freedom" are the positive rallying words. Note also the appearance of these catchwords in Stratokles' decree for Lykourgos (Vit. X Orat . 852d). It was passed in 307 just after the overthrow of Demetrios of Phaleron and the Macedonian garrison in Mounychia. Predictably it praises Lykourgos for his vigilance on behalf of the democracy and the freedom of the Athenians.
[93] See 36-51 below for a discussion of Demetrios' rule.
[94] Plutarch Demetrios 10-13; Ch. Habicht, Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte (Munich 1970) 44-48.
[95] Plutarch Demetrios 15-19.
had proclaimed. As soon as he departed, the Athenians became embroiled in a four-year war against Kassandros, which was brought to an end when Demetrios, now called Poliorketes, relieved them.[96] In 302 Demetrios again left Greece to join his father, Antigonos the One-eyed, in Asia Minor for the campaign against Lysimachos and Seleukos. Antigonos' defeat and death at Ipsos in 301 left Kassandros king of Macedon and in control of Greece. Poliorketes was in control of the sea and of several cities.[97] The Athenians easily came to an agreement with Kassandros, who had other affairs to deal with.[98] On Kassandros' death in 297, the son of Antigonos came to Greece and laid siege to Athens, taking it in 295. His ambitions to rule all of Greece soon led him into conflict with Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Seleukos.
Athens in the years after 307 was clearly of no major importance and dependent now on this foreign potentate, now on that.[99] Indeed, she was caught up in what has come to be known as the struggle for succession. The real change that had occurred was in the external situation, namely the emergence of world, or at least regional, powers that left little role for individual cities.
[96] Ibid . 23; Diodoros 20.100.5-6; IG II 498 lines 15-18, 505 lines 30-40; a recently published inscription, Horos 4 (1986) 19-23, refers to Kassandros and his activities at this time. For more on Kassandros during this war, see Ch. Habicht, Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece (Berkeley 1985) 80-82. In addition, the honors granted by the assembly in 303 to the Rhodian physician Pheidias (IG II 483) surely reflect his services during the difficulties of this war.
[97] Plutarch Demetrios 28-31, Diodoros 20.106-121.1. For a recent account of the campaign and battle of Ipsos, Billows, Antigonos 175-185.
[98] Lines 12 to 14 of IG II 641 refer to the delegation sent to deal with Kassandros at this time.
[99] A series of four decrees passed on the same day at the end of the year 304/3, viz. IG II 486, 597 (+ add. p. 662), Hesperia 7 (1938) 297, Horos 4 (1986) 11-18, reveals Athens' subservience. Demetrios Poliorketes has sent envoys and instructions to the Athenians seeking honors, probably in each case citizenship, for his followers. The Athenians duly complied on the motion of Stratokles of Diomeia (below 163). This charade was repeated exactly a year later with at least three decrees (IG II 495, 496 + 507, 497) passed at the same meeting. The first two are citizenship decrees for friends of Demetrios and were proposed in identical language by Stratokles. The third preserves only the opening lines. Agora I 7070 (Osborne, Naturalization no. D62) appears to be yet another citizenship decree proposed by Stratokles at this session (see Osborne, Naturalization II p. 137).