On Family Relationships (D11) (297 D 3-298 B 3)

In the transition from the mythic exemplum to the inescapable question, we again observe that vast gulf between the two techniques of argument. Indulging in that freedom and leisure of the true philosopher to range in all regions of discourse, Socrates has just distanced himself from the immediacy of combat through an imaginary flight of fancy that consciously employed language that did not mean what it said. But his small-minded adversary, intent upon the mere ipsa verba , has clasped in his various jaws four items from Socrates' tale (Iolaus, Heracles, nephew, and "mine," converting it to "yours") and now returns to the attack with that persistent and tyrannical demand to answer:^[64]

Now that you have sung this aria, said Dionysodorus, answer. Was Iolaus any more Heracles' nephew than yours?
     (297 D 3-5)

Ridiculous on the face of it, this disjunctive question anticipates the obviously correct answer: "Heracles'." Yet Socrates goes on to add to this response, "mine in no way whatsoever," and thereby eliminates the possibility of a tertium quid ;^[65] for in this case his family history proves decisive: "My brother Patrocles," Socrates says, "was not his fa-

ther." So to the attack again, Dionysodorus asks: "Is Patrocles yours?"^[66] Unable to answer this question without a qualification, Socrates notes that Patrocles is his by the same mother , but not by the same father ;^[67] that is, Patrocles is qualifiedly his by virtue of the fact that they share the same mother. Then, thrilled by this response, as if he suddenly had his opponent in the jaws of some necessity, Dionysodorus immediately snaps: "Therefore, he is your brother and is not your brother."^[68] But with like quickness, Socrates repeats the sense in which he is not his brother: "Not by the same father"; that is, Patrocles is qualifiedly not his by virtue of the fact that they have different fathers. Then, undisturbed, Socrates continues to unfold more details of his family tree, still responding to the sophist as if he were seeking real information: "Chaeredemus was his [Patrocles'] father, and Sophroniscus mine." Recovering from his temporary setback, Dionysodorus now tries to operate on the two fathers by asking: "Is Chaeredemus different from a father ?"^[69] But Socrates instantly qualifies: "[Different] from my [father]"; that is, Chaeredemus is qualifiedly not a father by virtue of the fact that he is a different father from Sophroniscus. Cut off again, Dionysodorus must retreat.

Thus far we have observed the Crab creep up, now here, now there, trying desperately to secure a position from which to launch his attack. But Socrates has successfully warded off each sally by qualifying his answers. So, forced to alter his strategy, Dionysodorus now places a disjunctive question that may at first appear to contain a non sequitur:

Was Chaeredemus a father, though different from a father, or are you the same as a stone?
     (298 A 2-3)

To philosophers engaged in real discourse the second limb of this question is not an apparent, but a true non sequitur. But in eristic discourse it performs a genuine function by providing Dionysodorus with the opportunity to balance "different from" with "same as" and eventually to wring an unqualified sense of "is not" out of the equivocal . For an obvious reason Socrates doesn't respond to the first limb; he has already admitted that Chaeredemus is both a father and different from his father. So, responding only to the second, he counters the strict sense of sameness, which has him be identical to a

stone, by voicing his fear that under the influence of this sophist he may soon appear to be as dull and stupid as a stone.^[70] But still he admits, in all truthfulness, that he is not the same as a stone. Shifting from sameness to difference, Dionysodorus renews the attack: "Then are you different from a stone?" Again, Socrates replies truthfully: "Of course [I'm] different ." Finally, then, Dionysodorus has snared his victim, for he has at last forced Socrates to use in the unqualified sense of absolutely "is not" a stone. From here Plato allows this clown of his own devising to carry out a satiric version of (eristic) epagoge against Socrates himself. First, he supports the conclusion he wants with two parallel cases (298 A 6-9):

Socrates is different from a stone; therefore, he is not (a stone).

Socrates is different from gold; therefore, he is not (gold).

Dionysodorus then submits the third and crucial case:

Chaeredemus is different from a father; therefore, he is not (a father).

In this final instance, should not mean "different from" in the unqualified sense of "is not" a father, but simply "another" father, who is different from the father Sophroniscus; after all, the gentlemen are two different fathers. But by putting his final exemplum alongside the other two, Dionysodorus has created the illusion that all three cases are parallel, thus inducing Socrates to respond: "Apparently, he is not a father."^[71] Then, incapable of resisting the opportunity to add another reason why Chaeredemus is not a father, Euthydemus remarks: "Yes, obviously, for if Chaeredemus is a father, then the situation is reversed; Sophroniscus, since he is different from a father, is not a father and so you, Socrates, are unfathered ()."^[72] To the rudeness of this reductio ad absurdum —hilarious if it were delivered on the comic stage—Socrates does not respond, thereby creating a vacuum so that Ktesippus, that distorted image of the helper, can now come to the aid of the .