1. On the concept and operationalization of state strength see Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World; I. William Zartman, “State-Building and the Military in Arab Africa,” pp. 239–57.

2. On the corporatization of society see Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, pp. 170–80.

3. The traditional reading of Syria’s state-building process generally omits the regional situation and preparation for war, focusing instead on the attempts of the Ba‘thist leadership to modernize political and class structures. See in particular Hinnebusch, “State Formation in a Fragmented Society,” pp. 177–97; and Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba‘thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant. Other authors who deal with Syria’s war preparation efforts tend to explain them in the context of a regional power struggle and Israel’s occupation of Syrian lands. See Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. While these views cannot be ignored, I want to emphasize the functionality of an atmosphere of war and war preparation for the particular form of state building Syria experienced under Asad. From a neorealist perspective, the functionality of war preparation for state building is explained in terms of regional power politics and, to cite one insightful example, in terms of a strategic dialogue between the main contenders in the region. Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon. The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue. See also Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking. Less persuasive is the attempt to depict Syria’s efforts to build up military strength as an element of an expansionist tendency driven by a Greater-Syria ideology. See Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. The more realist accounts of Syrian defense and war policies (Evron, Ma’oz) have shown that, unlike in Iraq, for instance, any ideological or revisionist ambitions Syrian leaders might have harbored have not driven them into military adventurism.

4. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel, defines war preparation, in this sense, as “the government’s mobilization of men, money, and material resources for external security” (p. ix). Militarization, according to Michael Brzoska, in “Militarisierung als analytisches Konzept,” refers to a quantitative expansion of the military and security apparatus and the transfer of specifically military values and forms of behavior to basically all sectors of society

5. A prominent example is the preamble of the Charter of the Progressive National Front: “The liberation of the Arab territories occupied after 5 June 1967 is the goal of this stage of the struggle of our nation. It stands in front of all other goals of this stage. In the light of this lofty goal, we have to develop our economic, social, cultural, political, and military plans such as to mobilize all human and material forces and potentials, to organize the national unity of the popular masses, and to strengthen and steadfasten the domestic front.” The charter was published in Al-Thawra, 8 March 1972.

6. Sources differ on these figures, partly due to varying calculations of foreign exchange rates. My figures, therefore, are approximations. Data on military personnel as a percentage of Syria’s population are drawn from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C., various years). Figures on defense expenditures are taken from Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract (Damascus, various years), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Brassey’s, various years).

7. Cf., e.g., Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party (hereafter ASBP), National Command, Nidal Hizb al-Ba‘th al-‘arabi al- ishtiraki (The struggle of the Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party) (Damascus: ASBP, 1978), p. 114.

8. Cf., e.g., President Asad’s speech to the Revolutionary Youth Organization, 8 March 1990, Tishrin, 9 March 1990.

9. Cf., e.g., Hafiz al-Asad’s policy declaration of 16 November 1970, the day he accomplished his takeover, documented in ASBP, Nidal Hizb al-Ba‘th, p. 119; Yusuf Murish, Al-Jabha al-wataniyya al-taqadummiyya wa-l-ta‘addudiyya fi al-Qutr al-‘arabi al-suri (The Progressive National Front and political pluralism in the Syrian Arab region) (Damascus: Dar al-Na‘ama, 1993), pp. 122 ff.

10. On the social fabric of Syria, cf. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, pp. 80–132.

11. These militias and the permanent army reserve add up to about the same number as the standing military force.

12. Cf. Amal Muhammad Mu‘ati, “Al-Tarbiyya wa-l-Taghayyurat al-ijtima‘iyya fi al-Qutr al-‘arabi al-suri” (Education and social change in the Syrian Arab region), Al-Iqtisad, no. 319 (August 1990): 19–28.

13. On spectacles and the regime’s personality cult see Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria.

14. Cf. Picard, “State and Society in the Arab World: Towards a New Role for the Security Services?” p. 261.

15. See Asad’s interview on U.S. television, 1 October 1993, British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), ME/1811, 6 October 1993.

16. See, for instance, Hafiz al-Asad’s speech to trade unionists, 16 November 1986, Al-Ba‘th, 17 November 1986.

17. See Volker Perthes, “Scénarios syriens: Processes de paix, changements internes et relations avec le Liban,” pp. 37–56.

18. The following sections draws largely on my “From War Dividend to Peace Dividend? Syrian Options in a New Regional Environment,” pp. 277–92.

19. See Perthes, “From War Dividend to Peace Dividend?” and “Kriegsdividende und Friedensrisiken: Überlegungen zu Rente und Politik in Syrien,” pp. 413–24.

20. According to Syrian and World Bank data—which, however, cannot in this context be expected to offer more than general indicators—budgeted government expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased from some 23 percent in 1963 to 40–50 percent or more in the 1970s and early 1980s. Due to careful but consequential liberalization efforts since 1985, they decreased again to some 25 percent by the early 1990s. In the same period, the ratio of direct to indirect taxes (i.e., taxes on capital and wages in contrast to levies on consumption, service charges, and customs duties) has changed in favor of direct taxes, which indicates a more intrusive and efficient form of domestic resource extraction. For example, direct taxes accounted for only 28 percent of the 1971 budget but 65 percent of the 1995 budget. See Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1971 (Damascus: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1972), pp. 294–95; and Statistical Abstract 1995 (Damascus: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1996), pp. 440–41. For budgets as a percentage of GDP, see World Bank, World Development Report (Washington: World Bank, various years).

21. Unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the Syrian leadership has never openly stated that the 1973 war had limited objectives, namely to bring movement into the Arab-Israeli stalemate and thereby prepare a political solution, and to boost the domestic and Arab legitimacy of the respective new regime. We can assume however, that Sadat’s and Asad’s motives in leading the war were quite similar—more so than the latter liked to acknowledge.

22. Consider, for instance, that during “Operation Accountability” of July 1993, Israeli forces attacked Syrian positions in the Beqaa, wounding and killing several Syrian soldiers, without provoking more than a verbal condemnation from Damascus. Syrian restraint, while positively acknowledged internationally, was harmful to its standing in Lebanon, where it provided grist for the mills of those who had always claimed that Syrian troops were certainly not in the country to defend it.

23. Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon, p. 192.

24. This is not to suggest that Syria is ruled by a pacific regime, or that Syria could not, in a desperate situation, seek to launch a surprise attack against Israeli positions. In fact, it is impossible to know what strategic options the Syrian leadership discussed for worst-case scenarios, such as strong international pressure and/or internal unrest. Any provocative or aggressive posture likely to start a war, however, would be inconsistent with the practice the Syrian government has been following for the past twenty-five years, and with the strategic doctrine that this practice as well as the Syrian force structure reveal—namely, an orientation toward deterrence and defense. See Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon; Michael J. Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 5 (April 1993): pp. 168–73.

25. See Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 24.

26. According to observers, it is notable, for instance, that the few modern T-80 tanks the Syrian army possess are all in the service of units charged with the protection of the regime, such as the presidential Republican Guard.

27. See Brzoska, “Militarisierung als analytisches Konzept.”

28. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, p. 1:19.

29. See Yezid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance, and Impact, pp. 144 ff.

30. Ibid., p. 145.

31. See Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons.”

32. Syria’s Ministry of Defense actually owns two of the country’s largest companies: the Military Construction Establishment and the Military Housing Establishment. The two companies, both founded under Asad’s rule, in 1972 and 1975, respectively, employ almost 10 percent of all civilian government employees. The majority of their construction and engineering work, however, is civilian in nature or even carried out on behalf of civilian clients.

33. The centrality of a machine tools sector for the buildup of a military-industrial basis has become clearly evident in the Iraqi case. See Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. The failure to establish a strong machine tool industry is a major point of criticism in critical accounts by Syrian academics of their country’s path of industrialization. See in particular Hilan, Al-Thaqafa wa-l-Tanmiya al- iqtisadiyya fi Suriya wa-l-Buldan al-mukhallafa(Culture and economic developments in Syria and the countries left behind).

34. See Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking?

35. Some, even among the regime elite, have a different understanding of things and have accepted that Syria, eventually, needs peace. See Perthes, “Scenarios syriens,” pp. 37–56.

36. See Perthes, Scenarios for Syria: Socio-Economic and Political Choices.

37. See for instance the statements of Hafiz al-Asad and the Syrian chief of staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi, on the occasion of “Army day,” 1 August 1994, in BBC SWB ME/2063, 2 August 1994.

38. Personal communication, Damascus, 1996.

39. This assessment was shared by Israel’s chief negotiator at the Maryland talks. See Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East, pp. 282 ff.

40. See the interview with Syria’s ambassador to Washington, Moualem, “Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations,” pp. 81–94.

41. International agencies expect a peace dividend for the region mainly through three channels: by means of intraregional trade and cooperation in a new Middle East that would integrate Israel; by means of investments from regional and international sources; and through reduced military expenditure and the release of revenues for development purposes. While it is generally doubtful that any substantial reduction of defense expenditure will occur either in Syria or Israel in the short run, the opportunities to attract foreign investment and to benefit from intraregional trade are markedly more limited for Syria than for its neighbors. See Perthes, “From War Dividend to Peace Dividend?”

42. The “despotic power” of a regime denotes the “range of action” that it “is empowered to undertake without . . . negotiations with civil society.” Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” p. 113. World War I is the classic European case. Consider, for instance, the British government’s granting of universal suffrage parallel to the introduction of conscription, or the incorporation by the German government of trade union representatives into the statist system of raw material and production controls.

43. See, for instance, Hilan, “The Effects on Economic Development in Syria of a Just and Long-Lasting Peace,” pp. 74 ff.

44. The disintegration thesis is expressed most prominently by Pipes, “Syrie: L’après-Assad,” pp. 97–110.

45. Picard, “La Syrie et le processus de paix,” pp. 56–69.

46. For a detailed account the best documented work on the Syrian opposition thus far is Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand im ba‘thistischen Syrien.