1. Churchill's account of the 1897 uprising was originally published as The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War. This work is most readily available in a collection of Churchill's war reports published under the title of Frontiers and Wars (1962). In addition, see Frederick Woods, ed. (1972) and Churchill's published correspondence, collected by Randolph S. Churchill, ed. (1967).

2. Quoted in R. S. Churchill 1967, 1(2):774.

3. Churchill's correspondence from this period shows his initial disappointment at not being given a formal staff position with General Blood. It is clear in retrospect, however, that Churchill's career was better off for this misfortune, for contrary to usual procedures, General Blood allowed Churchill to wear his uniform on the field of battle while also serving as a reporter. In the former capacity, Churchill was able not only to experience war firsthand, but also to add a battlefield commendation to his resume of accomplishments. In his capacity as a journalist, Churchill was able to gain a wide and influential audience (including such luminaries as the Prince of Wales and the prime minister, Lord Salisbury) that thrilled to the achievements of General Blood's field force and much appreciated Churchill's polemics in praise of imperial power and vigilance.

4. W. S. Churchill 1962, 28.

5. This and other information on Saidullah, “the Mad Fakir,” is taken from a telegraph from the Deputy Commissioner in Peshawar to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, dated August 8, 1897 (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897). Note that the archival references given in this chapter refer to the filing system in place at the archives of the Peshawar Library. The filing system I encountered at the library was dilapidated, and items were frequently out of place or in unmarked files. It should also be noted that the system employed at this facility may differ from those employed at the India Office Library or at the archives in New Delhi.

6. W. S. Churchill 1962, 28–29. For the original dispatches from which the book-length account was drafted, see Woods 1972, 9–10.

7. W. S. Churchill 1962, 29.

8. Woods 1972, 29.

9. W. S. Churchill 1962, 66.

10. Ibid., 29–30.

11. Ibid., 28.

12. Ibid., 30.

13. Woods 1972, 29–30.

14. Ibid., 30.

15. Ibid., 30.

16. Ibid., 10.

17. Weber 1968, 48.

18. Ibid., 48.

19. See “Karama,” in Gibb and Kramer 1974.

20. Weber 1968, 54–61.

21. Letter from Harold Deane, the political agent at Malakand to the secretary of the Foreign Department, Government of India, August 8, 1897, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. R. S. Churchill 1967, 816–21.

26. Ibid., 818.

27. Ibid., 818–19.

28. Most of the biographical information I have uncovered on Saidullah comes from a telegraph sent from the deputy commissioner, Peshawar, to the secretary of the Foreign Department, Government of India, August 8, 1897, and from the diary of the political agent, Khyber Agency. Both in Punjab Civil Secretariat 1897, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897.

29. I discovered very little about Saidullah in the interviews I conducted in the area and in the Peshawar archives. Despite this paucity of material, however, the few bits of evidence collected by British intelligence agents at the time do provide some significant clues as to what sort of person Saidullah might have been. Among these bits of evidence is the information that about twelve years prior to the uprising, Saidullah had abandoned his home and family to live in the shrine of Pir Baba in neighboring Buner.

A few years after this event, he had begun preaching on the need to reform local Islamic customs, but mullas in the area had opposed his efforts and he had been forced to leave the frontier for an extended tour of Central Asia and the Middle East. Rumors picked up and reported by local spies indicated that Saidullah lived in Mecca and Medina for some years before returning home a few months prior to the onset of hostilities in 1897. On his journey back to the frontier, it is claimed that he visited Kabul and was there granted an audience with Amir Abdur Rahman. Following this visit, he is also supposed to have paid his respects to the Mulla of Hadda at his residence in Mohmand, immediately prior to his return home to Swat.

An additional story told of Saidullah has it that during his first absence from home, when he was staying at the shrine of Pir Baba, patrilineal cousins killed his son in a quarrel. According to the British agent who reported this information, “Saidulla called up his son's murderers and told them that he had given up Afghan ways, as well as worldly affairs, and that therefore, instead of avenging his son's death, he forgave them” (Punjab Civil Secretariat 1897, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897). Saidullah's decision—so different from that of Sultan Muhammad Khan in a comparable situation—apparently led to his disgrace and further estrangement from his native society, but it does not seem to have affected his standing as a faqir. To the contrary, people expect the unexpected from a faqir, and they also expect the faqir to devote himself fully to God, even if it means the loss of everything else that matters in life. The fact then that Saidullah refused to be drawn back into an affair of honor meant that his dedication to God was so single-minded that he was even willing to sacrifice his honor to serve Him.

30. R. S. Churchill 1967, 819.

31. Woods 1972, 9–10.

32. R. S. Churchill 1967, 820.

33. Ibid., 818.

34. This letter was captured by the British in 1897 (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, September 1897).

35. Contained in a letter from W. R. H. Merk to the chief secretary, Punjab Civil Secretariat, November 13, 1897 (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

36. To some extent, the repeated appearance of reports indicating a regional conspiracy of anti-British elements represents a tendency on the part of the British to overestimate the cohesiveness of their enemies. Having only a rudimentary understanding of what was going on in the tribal areas, the colonial authorities tended to assume a far more intricate organization than actually existed. Nevertheless, the Mulla had succeeded in cobbling together a widespread regional unity that had a greater degree of coherence than any previous mobilization, with the possible exception of the earlier Ambeyla uprising in 1867 that was led by, among others, the Akhund of Swat.

37. Communications with the Fakir, it was believed, had begun long before the commencement of the uprising when the Fakir had traveled to Mohmand to meet Hadda Sahib on his return from making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Subsequently, a “Kunari sayyid,” who secretly acted as a British agent, reported that the Mulla had been in touch with the Fakir between 18 and 20 July, immediately preceding the attack on Chakdara. Later reports indicate contact between the two on the twelfth of August and again toward the end of that month (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

38. The army, or lashkar, of Hadda Sahib was reported to include Mohmands (of the Musa Khel, Isa Khel, Miro Khel, Bara Khel, Lashkar Khel, Atamar Khel, and Koda Khel branches from the British side of the border; and of the Khwazai and Khuga Khel branches from the Afghan side of the border). In addition, there were smaller numbers of Safis and Shinwaris, along with otherwise unidentified Kunaris, Ningraharis, and ex-soldiers from the Afghan army. The total number of the Mulla's force at the battle of Shabqader was estimated between 3,700 and 14,000. One report indicates that the Mulla's force suffered at least 22 killed and 47 wounded, but it then goes on to note that both of these numbers were probably too low insofar as some of the dead and wounded were carried off by their own family members before they could be counted. Following the Shabqader battle, the Mulla's force was supposed to have been supported by an additional 2,500 men from more distant locations, including Tagao and Laghman. It is quite probable that some of these late arrivals were recruited by deputies of the Mulla, who were based in these areas (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

39. Communication from Major Harold Deane, Political agent (Malakand), August 15, 1897, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897. In large part because they were so difficult to monitor or control, talebs inspired the fury of British administrators probably more than any other class of religious functionary. This anger can be seen in the following statement in a political report published in 1901: “The preaching classes absolutely swarm in this country. Among them, especially among the village Mullahs and Kazis, are men of real religion and good lives, but the majority are mere religious adventurers, who play on the superstition of the people and batten on their alms.

“Worse even than the bigger men are the Talib-ul-ilm (seekers after knowledge). These are men, chiefly young men, who contemplate following the religious profession. They flock to the shrines of this country and attach themselves to some religious leader, ostensibly for religious education. Their number far exceeds those required to fill up vacancies in village mullahships and other ecclesiastic appointments, and they are reduced to seek other means of livelihood. They are at the bottom of all the mischief in the country, the instigators and often the perpetrators of the bulk of the crime. They use their religious status to live free on the people, who are too superstitious to turn them out, even when they destroy the peace of the family circle” (McMahon and Ramsay 1981, 22–23).

40. Punjab Civil Secretariat 1897, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897.

41. Punjab Civil Secretariat 1897, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, September 1897.

42. Ibid.

43. H. W. Mills 1979, 165.

44. The frontier tribes are storied fighters, but their least effective engagements have tended to be those when they have been on the offensive, particularly when their objective has lain across open terrain. Their greatest moments, on the other hand, have generally been when they have been defending territory from outside invasion. This posture allowed them to choose their own moments of counter-attack and, most important of all, to resort to guerrilla tactics: spreading out, attacking from cover, picking off stragglers, harassing lines of retreat, and wearing down the enemy both physically and psychologically.

45. James 1898, 109. An additional problem for the Mulla was the backbiting and intrigues that he had to endure from a number of his fellow religious leaders, who also worried about their own prospects and revenues should the British cease to operate as a major power in the frontier. This was the case, for example, with the Mianguls of Swat, who were the sons and grandsons of the Akhund of Swat. Despite the religious basis of their authority, the Mianguls were well on their way to shedding the mantle of sanctity in order to participate more whole-heartedly in the internecine power struggles that defined politics as usual in the area.

While the Mianguls do not seem to have supported the Mulla very strenuously, they also do not appear to have opposed his movement. The same cannot be said of Hadda Sahib's old rival, the Manki Mulla, who had engaged with him in the debate the year before over the propriety of raising a finger during prayer. Beyond their history of animosity, the Manki Mulla also had another reason to be leery of Hadda Sahib's challenge to British control since he himself had chosen to live within the British dominion rather than outside it, as Hadda Sahib had done. Whatever his reasons, however, at least one British dispatch indicates that he was disdainful of his rival's enterprise: “The Ranizais and Thana people who first joined are followers of the Manki Mullah, not of the Mian Guls, and the Manki Mullah's reply on his own account to the Fakir was `the Malakand is a hill of hornets; I advise you not to touch it,' whereby he has gained much credit amongst the people as a man of foresight” (letter from H. Deane to the secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India. Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

46. Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897.

47. According to Frank Martin, the Amir was greatly distressed by letters he received from the Indian Government, accusing him of secretly aiding the tribal insurgents and threatening to remove him from his throne if he did not openly renounce the uprising. On receipt of one such letter, the Amir read the message “in a public durbar held for the occasion, and to which all leading men were summoned, and after reading it, he accused his people of doing that which brought upon him disgrace at the hands of his ally” (Martin 1907, 110). About the same time, Abdur Rahman granted Martin a private interview, during which he “spoke for several hours on the Afridi rising, and the trouble the border tribes had caused him.” During this meeting, he “seemed particularly bitter against the Haddah moullah, Maulavi Najmudeen Aghondzada, who was the principal instigator of the rising. He said that since he came to the throne, rebellions had been frequent, and though each revolt had been put down with a strong hand (those who know the Amir's methods will understand what his `strong hand' meant), it had not been sufficient to prevent further risings, for his people were not only the most unruly, but the most fanatical of people.” In response to the suggestion that he might openly support a religious leader like the Mulla of Hadda, the Amir explained to Martin that such a course of action would be destructive of his own interests, since “the people once risen and flushed with any little success, would become beyond the control of any man, and there were old scores to be wiped off between the border tribes and the Afghans, so that any rising was a menace to himself. And in addition to this, a rising in one part of the country would undoubtedly lead to similar risings and revolt in other parts, and it was only by his firm ruling and the stringent methods adopted towards those who sought to agitate the people, that the country was kept quiet” (Ibid., 110–11). Such testimony is by no means conclusive, of course. Abdur Rahman probably assumed that the substance of any conversation he might have with Martin would eventually make its way to the British authorities. At the same time, the logic of what he had to say to Martin is also apparent and coincides with other information we have concerning Abdur Rahman, especially his bitter distrust of religious functionaries.

An additional piece of evidence indicating that the Amir went out of his way to discourage participation in the uprising is contained in a letter captured by British agents. Dated October 25, 1897, the letter is from one Qazi Mira Khan of the Adam Khel Afridi to Mulla Sayyid Akbar, an ally of Hadda Sahib and the leader of the Afridi front. In this letter, the Qazi noted that the Amir “advised us not to fight with the British Government, and this was and has been his advice ever since” (India, Army Intelligence Branch, [1908]: 118).

48. According to one British intelligence report dated September 4, 1897, the Amir's commander-in-chief sent Hadda Sahib three mule-loads of cartridges and seven Martini rifles. Not only would such limited supplies have been of negligible importance—especially at that late date—but the fact that they were accompanied by a letter from the Amir ordering the Mulla to halt the assembly of his army until he received further orders from Kabul indicates the Amir's ambivalence about the operation and his desire to be in charge of whatever transpired along the frontier (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

49. In a letter from Abdur Rahman to the Viceroy of India dated November 25, 1897, the Amir states that he has ordered Hadda Sahib either to remove himself from Afghanistan or to proceed at once to Kabul. Upon his appearance in Kabul, the Amir promised to dispatch him at once to Mecca or Medina via Persia. If he failed to follow one of these two paths, the Amir promised to order his troops to arrest the Mulla (Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897).

50. James 1898, 94.

51. On the occasion of his meeting with Martin during the middle of the 1897 uprisings, Amir Abdur Rahman alluded to the curious elusiveness of the Hadda Mulla: “The Amir said that no one knew to what country the Haddah moullah belonged, for he had no known relations, and during Shere Ali's reign the moullah had been allowed to do much as he liked with the people, and raise revolt at his pleasure. He himself, however, had made inquiries, and found out the moullah's mode of procedure, and had arranged to capture him, but the moullah received timely information of his intention, and escaped across the frontier, where he shortly afterwards raised the Shinwari and other tribes against him, and for some months gave considerable trouble, and it was not until four thousand or so had been killed that the tribes were quieted. And this was the man whose actions he was held responsible for [by the British authorities who accused him of aiding the uprising].” The Amir claimed to Martin that the Mulla had sent his agents through eastern Afghanistan to induce his subjects to join the uprising under the pretext that “the Amir had given permission.” Abdur Rahman, Martin reports, “said that of their leaders he had four sheikhs and two maliks, who carried the green jihad flag, in prison in Kabul, and he knew what to do with them, but the other leaders had escaped” (Martin 1907, 111–12).

52. Undated and unsigned letter to the chief secretary, Government of the Punjab, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Foreign/Frontier Files, Proceedings, August 1897.

53. Mills 1979, 161.

54. Ibid., 162.

55. Ibid., 163.

56. Ibid., 163.

57. Ibid., 163.

58. Ibid.,163–64.

59. Ibid., 164.

60. Ibid., 165.

61. Foucault 1979. In the prison environment studied by Foucault, the rationalization of power demanded that all marks of the individual's personal identity be transformed into signs of institutional dominance. In a similar way, dominance on the frontier is exercised by having that which is most intimately linked to tribal culture (in this case the institution and accouterments of female seclusion) appropriated and made part of the political language of the invading power.

62. Al-Bukhari, quoted in Gibb and Kramer 1974, 432 (“Nafila”).

63. See Schimmel 1975, 133; and al-Hujwiri 1980, 226–27. It should also be noted that while I never specifically asked the narrator of this story about the significance of the Mulla's performing nawafil prayers and whether it related to his entering the state of unveiledness, the metaphoric description of miracles as a form of unveiling is a common one among Afghan Sufis and came up a number of times in my interviews, including with the narrator of this story who referred to the capacity of a pir to know what is in someone's heart or mind as the quality of “unveiling the heart” (kashf ul-qolub).

64. The first version of this chapter appeared in 1989 as “Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (4):647–68. After completing that manuscript in 1988, this third version of the Jarobi story came to light in the course of transcribing a number of interviews conducted during a second stint of fieldwork.

65. It should be noted that I elicited this story in my interview with Shahmund by asking him if he had ever heard any stories about the Mulla of Hadda. This very well might account for the emphasis in the story on the Mulla's miracle, and it might also be the case that if I had elicited the story in a different way—for example, in relation to his grandfather's deeds in battle—that the Mulla's role might have been more diminished than it was in the version recorded.