Export Agriculture

When attention shifted from wars and politics to the routines of daily work, the economy showed a great degree of adaptability in taking advantage of the opportunities of the world market, or in minimizing the adverse effects of drops in the international prices of the main export commodities. This was possible due to the greater access of information and improved transportation after the opening of the Panama railroad. Most importantly, as the previous section emphasizes, the change in transportation costs made export production more attractive relative to production for local consumption.

La Gaceta published articles describing the cultivation of different

crops suitable to tropical climates. The virtues of vanilla and cotton were exalted, and coffee was hailed as the crop of the future. Indigo prices had been bad during the 1840s, and the crop had suffered badly from civil unrest and locust plagues. In the 1830s the average price of indigo in the London market was 6s . 8d ., and in the 1840s it had fallen to 4s . 3d .^[29] The situation improved in the following three decades, but the unreliability of indigo had been proven; it was necessary to search for alternatives.

The Cotton Boom

Efforts to export agricultural products were bound to fail until the proper economic conditions were met; more than a vision was necessary for exports to make sense. In 1874 a man named Wilson Jeffreys obtained an exclusive concession to export sugar, maize, beans, rice, and cotton, all free of duty, but as the markets were not there the venture never got off the ground.^[30] Eventually, the concession was withdrawn. In 1849 William Hoit was given a concession to process cotton, but the venture failed.^[31] Without clear market incentives, tax breaks and careful explanations of the cultivation of coffee and cotton were not enough to stimulate the production of these crops on a large scale.

Nonetheless, when the economic stimulus was powerful enough, the economy was quick to respond, as the cotton boom of the 1860s proved. Early experiments with cotton production did not lead anywhere.^[32] In 1858, despite government efforts, the production of cotton was negligible; only Usulután province produced some.^[33] The British had also made efforts to encourage cotton production to supply their textile industry: Manchester industrialists sent ten quintales of cotton seed to make them available to potential producers in El Salvador, and the British consul distributed brochures describing the methods of cultivating the fiber. He also set up machines to process cotton in San Miguel, San Salvador, and Sonsonate.^[34] But that was not enough incentive to abandon indigo and produce cotton on a large scale. E. G. Squier, the former American envoy turned Central American expert, wondered why in a country "in which cotton is not only indigenous, but where it may be produced in its highest perfection and at a minimum of cost, whether of labor or capital," cotton had not become "one of the standard exports." He had a good answer:

[I]t has hitherto been impossible to reach the markets of Europe and the United States, except by the long and expensive route around Cape Horn. And even now the exorbitant freight charges imposed by the Panama Railroad render it impossible to transport so bulky an article across the Isthmus with profit.^[35]

Mr. Squier's interpretation was very sound but became irrelevant when, during the American Civil War, cotton prices soared. Between 1851 and 1859 the average price of cotton in the London market was 58s . 6d. per cwt.; in 1861 it increased to 72s. 5d. , the following year it almost doubled to 141s ., and in 1864 it reached a peak of 255s.^[36] At the same time, the scarcity of cotton had depressed the demand for indigo; since there was less cotton to weave there was less need for dyes, and indigo prices went down. This combination of factors was enough to overcome all obstacles to cotton production, and Salvadoran producers were ready to adapt to the new incentives. Suddenly cotton cultivation became the most attractive venture. Sharing the enthusiasm of the natives, a French traveler thought that "among all the products of the soil cotton is the one that has the most promising future."^[37] Local newspapers were optimistic and carried articles on how to produce cotton, its historical origins, and the relationship between its prices and the American Civil War. This time everybody was paying attention to the message.

Some people abandoned their activities in San Salvador in order to produce the fiber. An advertisment that appeared in El Constitucional illustrates the enthusiasm of the people:

The undersigned has left today to settle in the vicinity of San Silvestre Armenia in the locality known as "La Puerta," where he has a plot of land of no less than 400 tareas to cultivate cotton; if anybody wants to join in the venture he can go to the place mentioned above.^[38]

At the end of 1863 cotton was exported for the first time, and there were reports that 100,000 acres would be sown in 1864. Initially, as the country lacked gins and presses, cotton had to be sent to Nicaragua for processing.^[39] Pretty soon all the necessary implements to process cotton for export were made available by English companies who brought seed and gins.^[40] The interest in cotton cultivation reached every corner of El Salvador. The governor of La Paz province reported that all the farmers in that region were doing their best within their means to produce cotton. Some, like the governor of Sonsonate, worried that the energies devoted to cotton could affect negatively the plantations of coffee and sugar cane. The governor of Santa Ana was cheerful about the prospects of the crop in his province. His colleagues in Chalatenango and San Vincente shared his optimism. The governor of San Salvador worried that a plague of worms could damage the cotton fields in his province.^[41]El Faro published production estimates divided by region (see table 18). Even though the figures are no more than educated guesses, they give an idea of the regional distribution of cotton production. It is not sur-

prising to see that San Miguel province, a key indigo producer, was most interested in cotton. Optimism was high. In October of 1864 El Constitucional estimated that the sales of cotton for that year would amount to 500,000 pesos. By November expectations had doubled, and El Faro estimated that the following year the crop would be worth up to 1 million pesos, more than enough to compensate for the losses in indigo exports.^[42] Official figures, however, show a far more moderate picture. Exports in 1864 amounted to 123,672 pesos and in 1865 were up to 183,719 pesos (5.36 and 7.96 percent of total exports). Cotton figures from different sources, however, are so inconsistent that the only thing that can be said is that they were not insignificant and that the authorities were very excited about the prospects.^[43] The decline of the cotton crop began in 1866, and there is no evidence that it was produced in 1868. When prices declined, El Salvador could not compete with other countries due to "the great expense of cleaning, packing and exporting it."^[44] Moreover, the ecological conditions of Salvadoran coastal areas made cultivation difficult. When cotton was produced in large scale it attracted numerous insects that damaged the crop.^[45] It was necessary to wait until the development of effective insecticides in the twentieth century to resume large-scale cotton production. The balance of the American Civil War seems to have been negative; cotton exports compensated for some of the losses in the indigo market, but total exports did not reach their prewar levels until 1867.

The cotton boom was neither thunderous nor lasting, but it highlighted the transformations that the Salvadoran economy had suffered by the middle of the nineteenth century. Changes in transportation costs had opened the economy to the rest of the world, and a distant war had affected the daily lives of many Salvadorans. In a couple of years it was possible to reallocate resources significantly in response to changes in

world prices. Given the right stimulus, such factors as the sluggishness of the capital market, the problems of "know-how," and the scarcity of labor could be overcome in little time. This will be an important conclusion to bear in mind when interpreting the second, and more lasting, change in the structure of agricultural production that took place in the nineteenth century: the shift from indigo to coffee production.

Indigo

The years of instability of the federation and beyond had done great damage to the country's only significant export product. Low prices in the London market, wars with Nicaragua and Honduras, four coups d'etat, one Indian rebellion, and five British blockades did nothing to promote production during the 1840s. It was a bleak situation. All foreign travelers mention the visible destruction; one of them thought that "improvements cannot be expected till a new race of people inhabit Central America."^[46] His analysis left something to be desired, but it was clear that years of unrest had left great destruction. The timing of its labor requirements made indigo production particularly vulnerable to wars and civil strife. The American envoy E. G. Squier had a clear perception of the problem:

The manufacture of the indigo requires no very difficult or expensive processes; but it must be cut promptly at the proper period, or else it becomes worthless. It is then necessary for the proprietors of estates to have a large and reliable source of labor. The difficulty of obtaining these at such times during political disturbances when laborers seclude themselves as much as possible to escape conscription, has been one of the principal causes of the falling off of the production of this commodity.^[47]

Indigo had to be cut when buds were about to open, at which time the concentration of indigo in its leaves was highest. The yield decreased sharply when wars interfered with the availability of labor and the crop was collected late. Production increased somewhat at the beginning of the 1850s, but the recovery was interrupted when in 1854 the crop was affected by a locust plague at the same time that an earthquake destroyed the city of San Salvador (see tables 19 and 20).^[48] The damage inflicted by both natural phenomena was extensive. Labor was needed for the reconstruction effort, to fight the locusts, and to carry out the normal economic activities. It was an impossible task, half of the crop was destroyed by locusts, and food production also suffered; hunger was widespread.^[49]

The recovery was difficult. After William Walker invaded Nicaragua in 1855 President Campo sent Salvadoran troops to help in the effort

against the "filibuster." The war disrupted trade with Central America and with the rest of the world, and the soldiers who returned from Nicaragua brought with them an epidemic of cholera morbus that weakened the labor force.^[50] By 1861, after a couple of years of relative stability under the strong leadership of General Gerardo Barrios and with high prices in the London market, the recovery was complete. That year the crop was 50 percent higher than in 1849. In 1862 it was even better, surpassing the mark of 2 million pounds, a record crop for the new country. The recovery had been slow and year-to-year fluctuations were great, but many felt that the potential of indigo as an export crop had not been exhausted. It was a short recovery; old enemies had not been forgotten, and in 1863 the country was again at war, this time with Guatemala. Production records were not kept because of the war, but it was estimated that indigo exports decreased substantially.^[51] In fact, 1864 exports were almost half of what they had been in 1862. Moreover, by that time the American Civil War had already depressed prices. The

recovery was slow because the cotton boom used up money, land, tools, and labor which otherwise would have been employed in the production of indigo, and, because more importantly, prices were low. The Civil War eventually ended, and in 1868 indigo production was back to its 1862 levels and grew steadily to an all-time record in 1872. It was a trend too good to last, however: in 1873 a drought cut production in half while prices in the London market dropped.^[52] Another war with Guatemala in 1876 made matters worse.

The international price of indigo had been rising slowly from the late 1840s until 1868, but from then on the trend was negative.^[53] The invention of the first artificial dyes in the 1850s condemned indigo to a slow death. Salvadoran producers missed most of the good years due to wars and earthquakes, but whenever a modicum of stability was achieved, production did increase. Although the high levels of 1872 were never seen again, indigo production fluctuated between 1 and 2 million pounds. With the economic crisis of 1896 and the invention of a close artificial substitute of indigo a rapid decline began. By the end of the century indigo had ceased to be the engine of the economy since its prices had decreased much faster than the amount produced and coffee exports were far more important.

Although political instability and natural disasters greatly affected indigo production, Salvadoran producers were no fatalists. They were acutely aware of the fluctuations of the market and, when possible, were eager to take advantage of them. La Gaceta published a monthly column with information on prices and the general movement of the market in London. It also carried articles on the size of the crop in India and on the prospects of production in the different regions of El Salvador. The governor of San Vicente province described one of the fairs with comments worthy of a contemporary commodities analyst:

[T]here was as much indigo as we had announced and more than the majority of the interested parties believed, for that reason the first indigo that arrived to the market sold at good prices, but when the rest arrived, the price diminished accordingly.^[54]

Producers began worrying about finding ways of improving cultivation and the quality of the processing. Gerardo Barrios, liberal leader, indigo producer, and later president of the Republic, published an article in 1856 giving advice on the best method to process indigo.^[55] In 1858 Doroteo Vasconcelos, indigo producer and former president, wrote to La Gaceta to announce a procedure that he had invented to process indigo more efficiently.^[56] Notwithstanding the advice that such prominent figures shared so selflessly with their compatriots, in 1860 La Gaceta complained that:

In the production of indigo, which up until now is the source of our wealth, we have not abandoned the routine dictated by tradition, we have not taken any steps to improve it, not because it is unnecessary; indigo is made in India cheaper and cleaner, which should have encouraged us to put ours at the same level.

Not knowing the means to substitute manpower nor doing anything about it, we are right to complain about the lack of labor, considering it as an insurmountable obstacle for any enterprise of some magnitude.^[57]

The writer argued that the lack of manpower was no excuse, because an increase in knowledge and the use of machinery could solve the problem. But the optimism of the technology-oriented positivist thinkers of the time was not enough to overcome a new reality: there was another crop that was more profitable. By 1860 it was becoming clear that coffee was a better activity toward which to allocate one's scarce captial. Salvadoran producers were not inherently resistant to innovation or to the use of machinery; they proved it when they produced cotton on a large scale, and when they learned the complexities of coffee production. But they were keenly aware of the constraints of the economy and of the alternatives available to them.

Coffee

El Salvador had produced coffee since colonial times, but never enough even for the local market. Antonio Coelho, the Brazilian who was hired to demonstrate the Lancasterian teaching method in the 1830s, is credited with introducing modern coffee cultivation techniques.^[58] The possibility of exporting this product was not considered until the late 1840s. In 1848 La Gaceta was optimistic about the prospects: "Soon we will be able to export this fruit since there is already a surplus."^[59] In the 1840s coffee production was becoming attractive because indigo prices were at an all-time low. The average price of indigo for the decade was the lowest in the century, and the price in 1848 was the worst of the decade.^[60] Not surprisingly, local producers were anxious to find crops that could replace indigo. There was an example to follow, Costa Rica, a country unsuited for the production of indigo or cochineal, had started producing coffee at the beginning of the independent period, and its accomplishments were already visible. The very first issues of La Gaceta devoted considerable space to articles on the cultivation of coffee and its success in Costa Rica.^[61]

But indigo prices improved during the following decades and, although interest in coffee remained very much alive, indigo was still a viable export. Coffee production grew slowly; the hope of having

enough coffee to export was expressed often by La Gaceta , and exports began at the end of 1855. The government consistently encouraged coffee production. The first legislative decree to promote coffee production, issued in 1847, addressed some of the basic problems raised by political instability: the labor demands of warfare and public service. According to the decree all those who had more than 15,000 coffee trees in production would enjoy a ten-year exemption from the duty of serving as concejales (members of the town council), and their workers would be exempt from military service for the same period; the horses, mules, oxen, and tools used in coffee cultivation would not be sequestered "for public service"; coffee would be tax exempt for seven years; and imports financed with coffee revenues would have a 4-percent reduction in import taxes.^[62] The concessions were not negligible, but they did not address the equally serious problems of shortage of capital, lack of agricultural knowledge, and high transportation costs. By 1857, when coffee exports were already becoming a reality, incentives were increased. For the first time public lands became a policy instrument to encourage production. When the city of Nueva San Salvador was founded after the 1854 earthquake, from six to twenty manzanas of public lands were granted to those who were willing to devote two-thirds of them to coffee cultivation.^[63]

Coffee production presented serious problems. In a country that had for years engaged in traditional agriculture, the introduction of a new crop involving rather complex cultivation techniques was a great challenge. Introducing a new agricultural technology was only part of the problem. Coffee was a perennial that did not produce before three or four years, meaning that producers had also to learn new ways of financing their crop. Engaging in coffee production meant a completely new way of doing things, a new way open only to those who could master it.

First, we will discuss the difficulties involved in financing a plantation. Aspiring coffee planters had to be ready to cover great expenses to plant the trees and then had to have other sources of income to sustain themselves until the operation became profitable. In a country where capital was very scarce and, therefore, interest rates high, where there were no credit institutions, and where memories of the effects of political instability were still vivid, investment in long-term projects was difficult. "[Coffee's] general cultivation" observed von Scherzer "has been prevented by want of confidence in the future." Given the prevailing political uncertainty, no one wanted to have his scarce capital "locked up for three years."^[64] Years of war had not only shaken people's confidence but also used up their funds. The governor of San Vicente thought that his province was not producing more coffee because of "the difficulty of exporting and the lack of funds on the part of the land-

owners who in the past, instead of being protected, were deprived of their property."^[65] There were cries for the creation of a bank for coffee planters along the lines of the Montepío de cosecheros de añil.^[66] This is a good place to remember the contrast with Costa Rica where a more stable environment permitted a much earlier development of credit institutions and, therefore, where coffee cultivation began earlier.

Despite the numerous difficulties, the rewards for engaging in the adventure were considered to be high. In 1857 Consul Foote figured that under adequate conditions, an initial investment of 500,000 pesos could produce net profits of 835,000 pesos after five years.^[67] The consul's estimates may have been optimistic; he estimated interest rates at 5 percent when he himself had reported one year earlier that the real interest rate in commercial transactions was at least 20 percent.^[68] Moreover, his calculations did not take into account another aspect of the cost of credit at the time: the possibility of yet another war with a neighboring country with its destruction, forced loans, and demands for men, a very plausible consideration for Salvadoran producers. His estimates merely show how coffee was beginning to look like a very promising crop. It was not a groundless perception. Some coffee was already cultivated with success and market tests were encouraging. Samples of Salvadoran coffee were sent to Europe where they obtained good prices.^[69]

The growth of coffee production, however, was bound to be slow. Besides the problems of financing the intial investment, coffee planters had to learn new and complex methods of cultivation and processing.^[70] Seeds were planted in May in a nursery, and the delicate seedlings could not be transplanted until the following May. Then, an appropriate setting had to be found for the plantation: coffee grows between 2,500 and 5,000 feet above sea level. Once in its permanent setting the trees had to be nurtured for at least three more years before they yielded a good crop. Coffee trees needed protection from wind and sun, which meant planting large trees to shelter them. After the plantation began to bear fruit it was necessary to clean the ground from five to six times every year. Organic fertilizers were used to increase the yield. When the crop was ready, coffee berries had to be picked by hand. Pickers had to be trained to work rapidly and thoroughly; inexperienced pickers could damage the branches of the trees or drop the berries on the ground. At the end of the day the pickers took the berries to a beneficio , a plant where the berries were processed. In the beneficio the pulp was separated from the beans, which were then spread on a brick courtyard to dry under the sun (coffee is picked at the end of the year during the dry season). The last stage was to clean the dry beans, classify them, and put them in bags. In March and April the harvest was ready for export.

The complexity of the process required substantial financing, the

organization of a large labor force, the coordination of different stages of production, and dealing with the problems of transportation and marketing. Coffee production was a difficult and expensive skill to acquire, and planters had to learn by trial and error. In the early years they made the mistake of not protecting the trees against the sun. At the time it seemed the reasonable thing to do since unprotected trees bore larger crops, up to four pounds per tree; but this practice so debilitated the trees that it took three to four years for them to recuperate their strength. Trees under shade produced a smaller but steadier crop, an average of one pound per year, and insured a longer life to the shrub. By 1885 the practice of cultivating the coffee under shade was being adopted universally by the planters.^[71] Undoubtedly, coffee cultivation required far more complicated managerial skills than indigo. As the cultivation of coffee became more generalized, a division of labor developed and the risks of production were spread among different economic units. By the end of the century there were: nurseries that sold young trees ready for transplantation; large beneficios that processed berries produced by smaller plantations; and coffee exporters with connections in Europe and the United States who took care of marketing and shipment. It became a multidimensional business on which everybody's fate depended.

From Indigo to Coffee

The transition from indigo to coffee was gradual: indigo production remained over a million pounds until the end of the century, even though prices were falling. The introduction of artificial dyes was slow. Up until 1860 the textile industry had little use for artificial dyes. The first aniline, mauveine, was not discovered until 1856. Other anilines were introduced throughout the century, but none of them was a close substitute for indigo; synthetic indigo was not introduced until 1897.^[72] By then coffee was already the main export product of El Salvador. Total coffee exports were growing but not necessarily at the expense of indigo production; much of its was net growth. Coffee production was growing faster than the population whereas indigo declined very slowly. Part of the growth was possible thanks to the introduction of new land into cultivation. The government's active sale of terrenos baldíos and the fact that land prices remained fairly stable support this hypothesis. Moreover, change in transportation costs made production for exports more attractive; resources previously used in food production and other activities were diverted. Still, if more resources were to be devoted to exports, a choice had to be made between coffee and indigo, the only viable exports.

The incentives for shifting from one product to the other were varied.

At the beginning of the process, prices were not the main incentive; between 1848 and 1869 the ratio of coffee to indigo prices in the London market was decreasing. Transportation costs, by contrast, offer a more attractive explanation since they experienced a sharp decline after the opening of the Panama Railroad in 1855. Transportation costs had a greater impact on the profits of coffee since it had a smaller value per unit of volume. A simple calculation can show how this worked. If coffee had been exported via Izabal in 1853, transportation costs would have accounted for 24 percent of its price in London. In 1864, when the Panama route was in full service, transportation costs accounted for 14 percent of its price. That 10-percent difference, together with the savings in interest derived from a shorter trip, undoubtedly made the crop more attractive. A similar calculation for indigo, however, shows that, with the new trade routes, transportation costs for that product decreased from 6.9 to 3.2 percent of its London price.^[73] In the margin, coffee benefited more from the new transportation situation.

Another important consideration for producers had to do with the high risks involved in indigo cultivation. They advanced this as one of the main arguments for cultivating coffee:

The main export crop of El Salvador [indigo] and the most important branch of its industry, has the inconvenience of being an unstable crop and those who devote themselves to it would earn much more money cultivating coffee, sugar and cocoa.^[74]

In 1878 the governor of San Vicente province made the same point saying that indigo was subject to more variables than any other product. Among the culprits, he mentioned both the overabundance and the scarcity of water, the lack of labor, "so frequent when a revolution takes place," and breakdowns in the obrajes as some of the "eventualities."^[75] Even more important was the constant threat of locusts, which had destroyed many crops in the past. Coffee, in contrast, was less sensitive to those problems. In fact, a simple look at coffee export figures shows a much steadier performance than indigo during the second half of the century.

Coffee did not become the main export overnight. Some of the reasons for this slow growth have been suggested above: resources were scarce and there was a limit to what the economy could accomplish. The shift to coffee production has to be viewed in the context of the alternatives available to the local producer. At appropriately outrageous interest rates it would have been possible to find capital to cover the country with coffee trees, but in order to do that all other activities would have had to come to a halt. Coffee was attractive up to a point, but there were other economic activities, such as indigo, food production, and

commerce, that were also profitable. The entrepreneur, then, had to decide between a range of possibilities. When there was a product with a clear advantage, there were businessmen ready to seize the opportunity, as was the case with cotton in the 1860s.

The shift from indigo to coffee brought important changes to the economy. First, the economic geography of the country changed, the center of gravity moving from east to west. The eastern provinces of San Miguel and San Vicente produced almost 60 percent of all the indigo exported in 1858.^[76] The western and central provinces, in comparison, were best suited for the cultivation of coffee. The Lorenzo López census of 1858, which includes only the western provinces, shows that the efforts to cultivate the new crop were general throughout the region. In 1857 Santa Ana province had 439,980 trees in production and 1,400,630 planted but not ready yet to produce.^[77] Ahuachapán had 300,000 trees in production and 600,000 in nursery. Sonsonate had 67,865 trees already in production. Rich and poor, "both the landowner and the proletarian," were trying to produce coffee.^[78]

The increased importance of coffee over indigo was bound to affect the relative importance of ports. Most of the activity moved from the eastern port of La Unión to La Libertad and Acajutla, which were closer to the coffee plantations. About half of the indigo exports and very little coffee were exported from La Unión. In 1857, 52.6 percent of exports were shipped at that port; the percentage declined to 38.6 in 1871 and to 6.06 in 1893.^[79] The shift was permanent. A related development took place in the last two decades of the century: the privatization of ejidos and communal lands, in particular those located in the western provinces. Because this phenomenon is quite complex, chapter 5 will be devoted entirely to a discussion of its implications.

The shift from indigo to coffee had far-reaching social implications. Coffee cultivation was a complex task that demanded great skills, access to a considerable amount of credit, and willingness to take risks in an environment where there were no legislation or market mechanisms to minimize risk. When coffee cultivation began people from all walks of life tried their luck; at the end of the century a coffee elite had been formed. A sort of economic Darwinism emerged. Given a situation where the scarcest factors of production were capital, entrepreneurial talent, and land, every aspect of the coffee economy contributed to increase inequality. In a very imperfect credit market access to credit was extremely difficult unless one was already rich, had excellent connections, was very talented or, better, all of the above. Obtaining credit was just the first step. It was clear that those who had the early advantage of access to credit were in a good position, but even they had to be very able in order to survive for four years while the coffee tree matured, to

learn the complexities of cultivation and processing, and to tackle the problems of marketing. After all, even the rich had rather modest means and training. One of the very few ways of somewhat diminishing the risks involved in coffee cultivation was by gathering as much information as possible on cultivation methods and the markets; again, the ability to acquire and process information was open to very few. In short, true entrepreneurs were needed, and the pool from which those entrepreneurs could conceivably emerge was exceedingly small.

Although entrepreneurial talent is rewarded in almost every economy, the new economic environment in El Salvador had made it far more important than in the past, and the possible rewards were higher than ever. There was little collective experience in dealings with the outside world. During the first half of the century indigo exports had been quite limited, and only a few had developed the skills necessary to do business with the outside. Exchanging indigo for foreign goods once a year at the San Miguel fair was not good enough. Most planters had to learn the complexities of production and marketing through trial and error while a tight credit situation made errors very costly. The accomplishments of the early coffee planters cannot be dismissed; they were true pioneers. However, the economy rewarded lavishly the very able and punished all others. Eventually, as few alternatives to coffee production were left, the early winners were able to keep their advantage well into the twentieth century. As coffee exports gained in importance coffee planters became the coffee elite. An interesting economic event gave way to a radical change in Salvadoran society.