Some Simple but Erroneous Ideas
Obviously both troubling and disturbing, this endemic hegemony of military power is not easy to explain. There is no doubt that it is not the same over space and time. These variations suggest the need for great caution. The interpretation of the tendencies that seem to emerge is very difficult. It would be cruel to recall the number of carefully documented theories and definitive judgments that history has suddenly refuted and destroyed. Thus, an able observer of Latin America could write in
1929 at a time when Argentina was about to enter an era of militarism from which it has not yet emerged: "Today Argentina is one of the most stable and civilized states not only in Latin America but in the world. A revolution there is as improbable as one in England."[1] At the beginning of the 1960s, one of the American experts on the political role of the military in Latin America asserted that, along with Uruguay and Chile, Bolivia was one of the nations in which militarism had been definitively eliminated.[2] In Chile, it is true, the politicians and leaders of Allende's Popular Unity were not only attempting to convince themselves and to flatter the officers when they kept repeating that their military—unlike others—were legalistic and obedient but in that pathetic rhetoric there were elements of both credulousness and manipulation. On this subject nothing is more unreliable than the contemporary, the transient insight, the perception based on current events.
Nevertheless, the persistence of a phenomenon that seemed in its beginnings to be restricted to an area that was culturally homogeneous led to the development of global and nonhistorical explanations. Was there perhaps a type of relationship between the military institutions, power, and civil society that was peculiar to the Iberian world? Was not the very vocabulary of militarism predominantly Spanish? From the time of General Riego to Generalissimo Franco and including the wellnamed "Espadones" (sword-rattlers) in the nineteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula indeed appeared to be a classic locale for pronunciamentos and juntas of officers. The persistence of the phenomenon might therefore be explained as a transplantation from Spain.
The cultural and "essentialist" explanation has sometimes given way to more elaborate versions that, despite their descriptive richness, come dangerously close to tautological popular psychology. In particular, they insist on the normality of authoritarianism in the Latin American political systems with the army most often as its instrument. This lack of capacity for democracy is said to be the result of the juridical tradition, of the heritage of Spanish jurists and theologians since the sixteenth century, and especially of the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, the contemporary of St. Louis in France.[3] This recourse to the "Ibero-Latin tradition"
conceptualized as the "Corporatist Model," "Neo-Falangism," or "Mediterranean Syndicalism" is useful in emphasizing the specificity of sociopolitical forms and mechanisms. But why would the norms of the medieval Iberian city have been more influential on the other side of the Atlantic than those contained in the codes and constitutions of nineteenth-century European and Anglo-Saxon liberalism? Does this not ignore the fact that the same social causes produce similar effects? It is symptomatic of the ignorance or ethnocentrism of "the chosen people"—all the authors involved are Americans—that the non-Iberian component of this world, suddenly baptized as Latin, are in effect conjured away. Why choose Alfonso the Wise rather than Atahualpa or Montezuma? What should we say more specifically about the actors? How much do generals Stroessner, Geisel, Medici, Leigh, and Pinochet owe to Castile? And in the British capital called Buenos Aires, has the population, made up largely of Italians who speak Spanish with a Genoan accent, been any less supportive of military rule for the last fifty years? Is it necessary to raise further doubt by citing the 1980 coup in neighboring Surinam, which speaks Dutch?
In a more historical fashion some authors have tried to explain the frequency of military intervention in the political life of contemporary Latin America by referring to "cultural residues of the nineteenth century civil wars" in that area. Militarism goes back to the collapse of the Spanish colonial state, which produced the centrifugal and anarchic forces of the caudillos . The "decentralized violence" of the wars of independence is said to extend to the coups d'état of today and tomorrow. Today's general staff officers and antiguerrilla special forces are supposed to be the descendants of the local strongmen who were followed by their men at arms. Equating the military caudillos who were amateurs using inflated military titles with career officers leads to confusion. Those improvised warriors were the product of the disorganization of society and the collapse of the state, while the career officer is an organization man who only exists by and for the state.
Furthermore, this view is historically incorrect in a number of countries. There was stability and continuity, at least in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and even in Bolivia, between the period of
turbulence associated with independence and the beginning of the military era in the twentieth century. Civilian rule was sovereign in those countries for several decades after the annihilation of caudillismo . It hardly existed at all in Chile—to say nothing of Brazil, where national independence took place, if not smoothly, at least without societal breakdown and extended conflict. On the contrary, the countries where the phenomenon of caudillismo was most evident earlier have had several decades without military regimes and interventions—Mexico since the 1930s and Venezuela since 1958. All of this suggests that we should look elsewhere for the roots of militarism than to a complex and diverse human "climate."
In the second half of the twentieth century, this interpretation was matched by theories that linked militarism and underdevelopment. The role of the military in the former colonial states of black Africa gave rise to increasing doubts about the cultural explanation. Emphasis was placed on the economic, social, and international implications of American militarism. America was rediscovered in the phenomenon of decolonization and the resulting neocolonial disappointments. We might be ignorant of the mechanisms of military power, but we generally know the principal indicators of underdevelopment. The temptation to make use of quantitative comparisons was great. Studies were devoted to the correlations between indicators of development and the "degree" of military intervention in political life. The devotees of "exact" science viewed political instability as a set of equations. These methods of "contextual" and statistical explanation, often based on statistics that were not comparable, and lacking any historical perspective or theoretical framework, increased our appetite, but did not satisfy our hunger.
It does not seem unreasonable to think that, in less developed countries where social structures are weak and qualified technicians are rare, the professional army will constitute a leadership force; this reservoir of abilities results in an image and a consciousness of competence that opens the door to power. Besides, do not the tensions associated with growth operate against the possibilities of political pluralism? Are not civilian regimes and party struggles almost incompatible with orderly modernization? Is not, therefore, the democracy expressed in
all the constitutions of the continent a luxury belonging to wealthy nations? Without authoritarian government, the capital accumulation necessary for the famous "takeoff" will not take place. The positivists of the end of the last century thought that the turbulent South American republics were naturally incapable of representative government and they called for a "democratic Caesarism," a "necessary strongman" who would be appropriate to the idiosyncrasies of their varied peoples. With their more scientific trappings the theorists of modernization and development are saying the same thing. In this very old and unresolved debate, explanation often becomes justification for existing regimes. Nevertheless, recent history does not support these coherent, but fallacious, arguments. The economic performance of military regimes in Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru in the 1970s hardly supports the military version of modernization, to say nothing of the long reigns of military dictators like Leonidas Trujillo or Alfredo Stroessner who contributed to the underdevelopment of their fiefdoms.
According to the enthusiasts of development, the more complex the social system and the more modern the economy, the fewer the opportunities for the armed forces to engage in political intervention. Reality contradicts this view; the three most advanced societies on the continent have suffered the most violent and tenacious military regimes. Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina are precisely the nations that are most eminently pluralistic and modernized. It is even difficult to classify Argentina—which is European, urbanized, and dominated by the middle class—as an underdeveloped nation. Yet, since 1930 the hegemony of the military has become the norm in that country. The current "executioner-states" (bourreaucraties ) of the Southern Cone do not seem, therefore, to demonstrate any economic backwardness, much less an archaic social structure.
At the end of the 1960s and especially beginning in 1973, new interpretations emerged that linked militarization with the actions of external agents upon Latin American societies. This marked some progress in the analysis, finally taking into account the external orientation of the Latin American economies and their domination by the industrialized countries, especially the United States. The theory also took cognizance of the in-
creasing dependence of the Latin American countries, especially in the formation and functioning of their military institutions. In correctly emphasizing the importance of the training of the Latin American military under North American auspices, and the coordination of military planning by the Pentagon, the specific functioning of the military institutions was finally given its rightful place.
The outrage of civilian analysts at the prospect of these soldiers, with the more or less open blessing of a foreign country, turning upon their own people the arms that were supposed to be used for their defense led to some deceptive simplifications. While the psychological approach had lost its appeal, a conspiracy theory of history, backed by an undifferentiated economism, only provided the illusion of understanding. National elites sometimes adopted this tactic of blaming the tutelary power, thus killing two birds with one stone. With their radical rhetoric they were able to cover over class conflict and even make the military themselves appear innocent, while raising at little cost the banner of anti-imperialism. The "radical chic" of the intellectual elite constituted a third world conformism that refused to be concerned with nuances. The naive or partisan instant expert proceeded to make vast affirmations and happily adopted a deductive approach. Thus the Latin American armies, "programmed" by Washington, the "simple appendages" of the Pentagon, only acted because they were manipulated at the behest of Yankee interests. Finally, these armies became little more than the "political parties of large international capitalism" or, as a Brazilian military man and Marxist historian likes to repeat, "It is not the generals in uniform that count—but General Motors and General Electric . . . they are the most powerful generals." The instrumental conception of military power goes farther. The establishment of military authoritarian regimes is said to respond to the present necessities of world capitalism and the resulting new international division of labor. The present stage of development is described as "requiring" a strong power that will repress social movements, guarantee investments, and accelerate accumulation.
These cosmic economistic interpretations that disregard na-
tional differences and internal mediating factors such as the nature of the military structure—indeed, any sociological analysis—call for several comments. The "business dictatorships" did not arise in Latin America as a result of the so-called internationalization of the domestic market, nor did they emerge from the suggestions of the Trilateral Commission. If the theory asserts once more that foreign investors prefer orderly regimes, this was also true of the dictatorships of the nineteenth century. And we are only stating the obvious. Yet the two countries that are among the most economically dependent, Mexico and Venezuela, have civilian governments and an inactive military, and despite the activities of ITT in Chile, since 1973 the large American industrial firms have avoided the Chile of "the Chicago boys," as well as Uruguay, which welcomes foreign investment, and they have even "disinvested" from Argentina since 1976. It is a strange capitalism that is able to establish regimes at its convenience but cannot make a profit from them.
Although the military influence of the United States is clear and undeniable, its effects are not automatic. It did not prevent the radicalism of the Peruvian colonels around General Juan Velasco Alvarado after 1968 or the revolutionary regime of General Torres in Bolivia. In fact, U.S. influence cuts both ways. Did not U.S. training produce the "best and most able guerrilla leaders in Guatemala, Luis Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa"?[4] As for the quasi-theological explanation that regards the doctrine of "national security" as a decisive influence on the establishment of today's military dictatorships, it seriously overestimates the effect of ideology and of counterrevolutionary rhetoric; this was demonstrated by Franco Spain for forty years, as well as by the war plans that have been drawn up by all the Western countries, including France. That is not to say that the ideological dimension of the regimes in question is unimportant—nor are external military dependence, the actions of the omnipresent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the desire of the United States for long-term control over the armed forces of the continent. However, to argue that the desire to achieve control and penetration have brought about the ability to manipulate events always and everywhere is to ignore crucial dif-
ferences among the actors, their values, and their positions in their respective nations.
The weakness of instrumental conceptions is demonstrated by the shifting positions of their authors, who do not hesitate to attribute the most astonishing versatility to American imperialism. When these theorists observed the military in certain countries giving up power to civilians, and martial regimes gradually or suddenly liberalizing in 1977, where a year earlier they had stigmatized the necessary complementary relationship between large-scale capitalism and military repression, they discovered that "democratic transformations are desired and encouraged by the multinationals and through the direct or indirect domination of the capitalism of the central nations and of their enormous power" or that "the American government and the multinationals are making policy for the year 2000 when domination can no longer be exercised through strong dictatorial regimes that employ unhuman methods." One would have thought that such cold monsters would be immune to such sudden reversals.
This critical review does not exhaust the subject, but it permits us to make our own view clear. We do not believe in historical determinism or in any sort of historical, economic, or geographic fatalism. We are not looking for a single thesis that explains every situation. If we are determined to disprove the grand conceptions of Latin American militarism, it is not to add our own theoretical grain of salt to what is already an ample discussion. We propose, instead, to carry out in this book a realistic empirical examination of military power in all its diversity, taking into account the fact that we are talking about military power and that from the moment it usurps constitutional authority, it cannot be considered a "passive" or a negligible actor.