The "Intensification-90" Campaign

In July 1984, First Secretary Lev Zaikov informed the Leningrad regional party committee that he had just been invited by the Central Committee to report on the activities of the Leningrad party organization in planning fundamental economic and social development throughout the Leningrad region for the periods 1985–1990 and 1985–2000.^[73] In preparing his report for the Central Committee, Zaikov continued, he would pay particular attention to the role of technological innovation in increasing productivity throughout the Leningrad region. Indeed, he concluded, automation and computerization would be the foundation of local economic growth for the next two decades. At the same time, the then regional party second secretary and soon-to-be city party committee first secretary, Anatoli Dumachev, informed the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that existing labor shortages in the city dictated that all increases in the production of Leningrad industry over the next three years could take place only through technological innovation. In Dumachev's view, Leningrad managers had no choice but to follow the example set by their American and Japanese counterparts and force extensive automation and innovation.^[74] The available data support this intense concern over labor shortages.^[75]

Zaikov's speeches heralded a new stage in the efforts of Leningrad elites to spur technological innovation. This "Intensification-90" campaign, as it became known because of its goal of automating the Leningrad economy by 1990, quickly gained momentum as Leningrad politicians stressed the program's origins both in the emergence of the scientific-production associations and in the establishment of the academy's Leningrad Scientific Center.^[76] Such proclamations correctly viewed "Intensification-90" as a logical extension of earlier Leningrad innovations. Moreover, local elites identified the city's labor shortages as a driving force behind the innovation campaign.^[77] Soviet cities with less acute shortages could well have been less hospitable to such a massive computerization drive.

However valid these elements of the official position on the program's origins may be, such statements ignore or purposefully obscure differences between this innovation drive and previous campaigns. As we have noted, the development of scientific-production associations and the founding of the academy's Leningrad Scientific Center were both moves that reflected the view of science as the source of most worthwhile innovations. In contrast, the "Intensification-90" campaign focuses first and foremost on the ability of industry to adapt managerial systems to technologies that already exist. This accent in the most recent program falls on the management side of the innovation equation. It is important, therefore, to review precisely what Zaikov and others sought to accomplish with "Intensification-90."

Following Zaikov's report, in August 1984, the Central Committee approved the "Intensification-90" program with the explicit intention of utilizing the Leningrad experience as a prototype for similar efforts elsewhere.^[78] The goal was to involve representatives of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan ), the State Committee on Science and Technology, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and the USSR Academy of Sciences in a joint effort, under the direction of Leningrad party leaders, to reduce manual labor through the automation and computerization of production lines and front offices. Approved with considerable fanfare a few days later by the Leningrad regional party committee, the specific program objectives soon emerged in the local press.^[79]

In interviews published at the time, and in subsequent public appearances, Academician Glebov identified the campaign's goals as computerization of management, production, and design at all levels of the Leningrad economy; the creation of integrated computerized systems rather than the continued accumulation of mismatched components of such systems; a drive for energy conservation; and general support for nuclear power programs.^[80] The initial computerization effort, Glebov repeated, would take place at 336 enterprises representing 99 ministries and institutions and employing more than 660,000 people. Ultimately, by the time of the program's final stages in 1990, Glebov concluded, there would be 5 totally automated plants, 69 automated shops, 152 integrated production complexes, 137 flexible production systems, 187 automated management systems, 232 integral lines of communications, and 160 other mechanized sites.

"Intensification-90" immediately gained the trappings of a major Soviet campaign, as program publicists added all the traditional bells and whistles. Articles appeared almost daily in the Leningrad press for well over a year praising this or that innovation initiative undertaken in connection with "Intensification-90".^[81] More significantly, Leningrad's party chief, Lev Zaikov, began using the opportunities presented by the innovation drive to advance his own political position.

The Emergence of Lev Zaikov

Zaikov's rise to local dominance following Romanov's elevation to the Central Committee's Secretariat had been rather unpredictable. A graduate of the Leningrad Engineering-Economics Institute, Zaikov established his reputation as a dynamic and effective manager, eventually rising to the general directorship of an unspecified (though probably defense-related) scientific-production association by the mid-1970s.^[82] He was appointed chair of the Leningrad city soviet in 1976, and by the end of the decade was serving as a member of the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union.^[83] From the time he began his career as a lathe operator in 1940

until his assumption of the Leningrad regional first secretaryship in 1983, Zaikov apparently held no major Communist Party post. With this general background, his interest in managerial innovation and economic efficiency is hardly surprising. In less than two years, Zaikov had joined Gorbachev's Secretariat in Moscow, where he assumed responsibility for defense industries and later became first secretary of the powerful Moscow party organization. His meteoric rise was facilitated by the successful promotion of the "Intensification-90" campaign in Leningrad and nationally. That promotion also generated economic resources for the city and its leaders to draw on.

Within days of the Central Committee's endorsement of the "Intensification-90" campaign, Zaikov published an article in Pravda stating its goals.^[84] From that point forward, Zaikov's major addresses have stressed the innovation theme.^[85] National publications publicized the program as well.^[86] Finally, Leningrad politicians utilized opportunities afforded to them by various republic and national meetings to praise "Intensification-90."^[87]

Gorbachev Comes to Town

Zaikov, a skilled manager with extensive practical experience, fit the initial mold of the new "Gorbachev Man." This image was strengthened by Gorbachev's visit to Leningrad in May 1985,^[88] which was the new leader's first major foray outside of Moscow following his ascension to power. At first glance, this maneuver appeared to have been aimed at Gorbachev's chief rival of the period, Grigorii Romanov. This interpretation is bolstered by Romanov's own removal from the Politburo in July of that year.

Gorbachev's visit was extensively covered in the Soviet print and electronic media, and included stops at the Svetlana Electronic-Instrument Making Association, the Bolshevichka Sewing Association, Elektrosila, the Leningrad Metallurgical Plant, and the Kalinin Polytechnic Institute.^[89] At each institution, as well as in Gorbachev's focal appearance before a meeting of Leningrad party activists, the new general secretary dwelled on the advances made by the Leningrad economy in the area of technological innovation, particularly under the "Intensification-90" campaign.^[90] In his address to city party activists, Gorbachev reviewed all he had seen during his visit, stressing the positive impact of "Intensification-90" on local economic development. He noted that the Central Committee was pleased by the program's success, observing that the Leningrad party organization always played an important role in the formulation of national socioeconomic policies. The party's leadership endorsed the latest efforts in Leningrad to enhance labor productivity through scientific-technical progress, particularly in

the area of computerization in management. Hence, the "Intensification-90" campaign served as a model to be emulated elsewhere.

Gorbachev's endorsement was followed by Central Committee approval a month later during a plenum that also saw the elevation of Zaikov to the Secretariat.^[91] Shortly after Zaikov's departure from Leningrad to assume his new post in Moscow, his successor as regional party first secretary, Iurii Solov'ev, devoted the preponderance of his initial speech in that post to the "Intensification-90" campaign.^[92] By year's end, the city party first secretary, Anatolii Dumachev, similarly chose to use the "Intensification-90" campaign as the focal point for his report to the twenty-fifth conference of the city party organization.^[93] Meanwhile, local bookstores established special displays of materials relating to the campaign, an exhibit showing off its achievements opened in Moscow, and, at the behest of the Central Committee's Secretariat, the local party organization organized seminars for party leaders and economic managers from around the Soviet Union to learn more about the "Intensification-90" campaign.^[94] Finally, the "Intensification-90" program was incorporated into the 1986 general development plan for the city and region.^[95] Regional party Secretary Pavel Mozhaev and city party committee First Secretary Anatolii Dumachev also reported in December 1985 that the campaign, with its concomitant emphasis on increased economic specialization and centralization, had formed the keystone for the 1986–1990 regional and city five-year plans.^[96] Moreover, Iurii Solov'ev chose to highlight the program upon his elevation to candidate member status on the national party's Politburo.^[97] As with the effort to develop scientific-production associations, Leningrad's "Intensification-90" advanced both the economic resources and the power of the local leaders. By the time of the twenty-seventh party congress in early 1986, the program had once again secured Leningrad's image as a national leader in technological innovation.

Problems Persist

Despite the apparent success of the "Intensification-90" campaign as a vehicle for promoting the political interests of Leningrad leaders, it is worth remembering that the successful adoption of a development strategy at the local and national levels is not the same as that program's successful implementation. By October 1986 both regional party First Secretary Iurii Solov'ev and Central Committee Secretary Lev Zaikov were beginning to sound more cautious in their evaluations of the program's impact.

In response to queries from local party propagandists, Solov'ev observed that innovation programs based on managerial reorganization can have the effect of increasing the bureaucratic apparatus without increasing productivity.^[98] Consequently, he reported that the Leningrad

party organization was disbanding the association managerial structure in food industries in an effort to reduce administrative overhead costs by 20 percent, thereby reversing the policies of the sixties and seventies that had embraced centralization as facilitating innovation. Shortly thereafter, Solov'ev informed the Leningrad regional party committee that the region's critically important machine-construction industry was failing to meet various innovation goals.^[99] The reasons for this failure were complex. At the core, Solov'ev argued, was the resistance of managers to drawing on the latest innovations generated by the scientific community. He concluded by suggesting that the "Intensification-90" campaign was a necessary means for breaking down such resistance. These sentiments were repeated by Solov'ev again just eight months later. In the interim they were echoed by city party First Secretary Anatolii Gerasimov, who in various reports to the city party committee suggested that technological innovation and enhanced labor productivity were proving more difficult goals to obtain than the architects of "Intensification-90" had ever before been willing to acknowledge.^[100]

During an October 1986 speech to voters in Leningrad's Moskovskii election district, Lev Zaikov offered a more comprehensive review of the successes and failures of the "Intensification-90" campaign than did either Solov'ev or Gerasimov before or afterward.^[101] Zaikov began his remarks by observing that Leningrad's political leaders had long been interested in strengthening the ties between science and industry. He proposed that a cardinal restructuring of society was required, and that the future well-being of the Soviet population lay with the economy's ability to perfect the research-development-production cycle. Further managerial reform was necessary to ensure that the Soviet economy's innovative capacity increased.

Zaikov also contended that the Soviet Union's current economic situation demanded varied responses. To begin with, Soviet scientists should work with their colleagues from other socialist countries to improve the industrial innovation process. Workers should also become involved to a greater degree in the factory innovative cycle, while the legal rights of enterprises to act as autonomous units should be expanded. By extensive restructuring of their bureaucracies, municipal agencies should attempt to reduce the bureaucratic drain on local industries. Finally, said Zaikov, the innovation problem must be viewed as, above all, a human problem.

For Zaikov, Leningrad's "Intensification-90" program provided a comprehensive format for action along all these fronts. For this reason, he viewed Leningrad as one of the Soviet Union's leading innovative centers. Despite the failure of local industries to meet all the campaign's goals, Zaikov suggested further, Leningrad was well situated to assist

the entire Soviet economy as it struggled to come to terms with the innovation process.

In reviewing various attempts to enhance Leningrad industry's innovative capacity, we must remember that these programs have only been partially successful, by the standards of the world economy. Although we do not have adequate data to evaluate the efficiency of local industry in comparative terms, on the basis of what we do know, it is difficult to believe that Leningrad's factories could compete openly with those of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. As Zaikov suggested, however, within the context of the Soviet economy the 35-year effort to improve relations between the city's scientific and industrial communities is noteworthy. This core of experience provides one of the single best models in the USSR today for helping national politicians and planners understand how they can develop comprehensive strategies for dealing with the research-development-production cycle. In this last regard, the political significance of the policies discussed in this chapter may be greater than their actual economic impact.

The political impact of strategies to link science and industry transcends the careers of Leningrad politicians. Economic accomplishment has dominated Soviet politics for decades. In its most recent manifestation, the issue of economic performance has become focused on the question of innovation. Soviet reformers and conservatives—as well as Western commentators—increasingly attribute the lackluster economic performance to a perceived inability of the economy to foster innovation. Gorbachev's response to this innovation challenge has been to nurture the development and implementation of market-oriented economic mechanisms. Should these reforms take hold, the argument goes, enterprises will become more responsive to changing needs in their environment, thereby prompting a greater receptivity to innovation.

The Leningrad approach to the innovation question emphasizes centralization of managerial decision-making, rationalization, and streamlining of organizational lines of command so as to force existing institutions to operate more efficiently. Implicitly, the approach advocated by Leningrad politicians from Kozlov through Romanov to Zaikov has offered a counterpoint to the more market-oriented reform efforts of an Aleksei Kosygin during the 1960s and a Mikhail Gorbachev today. Direct research contracts, production associations, scientific-production associations, and even the "Intensification-90" campaign constitute a conservative alternative in that such mechanisms need not undermine the traditional authority of central planners, necessitate a significant redistribution of resources away from traditionally favored heavy ("Group A") industries, or present a direct challenge to the supervisory authority of Communist Party officials over economic management. The Leningrad approach to economic development thus offers

an antimarket perspective that has informed national political discourse throughout the post-Stalin era.