PART FOUR—
MAMACHI IN PERSPECTIVE

Chapter XIII—
Order Amidst Rapid Social Change

Having examined Mamachi families in some detail, we may now be able to understand how certain features found in Mamachi contributed to the amazing success of Japan in the modernizing process.

Although the contemporary Japanese social structure is in many ways different from the social structures of Europe and America, it is not simply a holdover from traditional patterns. The closed and legalized class system of the Tokugawa period has become an open class system. A predominantly rural nation has, in the last few decades, changed to an urban nation in which less than one-fourth of the male population earn their living from farming, fishing, and forestry. The landowner-tenant relationship has been weakened or destroyed by land reform.^[1] The ie is being replaced by the nuclear family. In the city, small firms have been giving way to large organizations and government bureaus, and the old paternalism is fast weakening.

In spite of all this change, the picture that emerges from this study of Mamachi, as of other studies of Japanese society, presents a relatively orderly and controlled life. This is particularly striking when compared to the massive disorganization in Europe and America during the industrial revolution and to the revolutionary disruptions in the Chinese family.^[2] Although Japanese themselves have been conscious of the strains of adjusting to rapid change, they have not experienced the massive social disorganization so characteristic of many Western cities and of developing countries during the rapid

[1] For a fuller description of the changes in rural Japan see Tadashi Fukutake, Man and Society in Japan , Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1962.

[2] Cf. Marion J. Levy, Family Revolution in Modern China , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949.

migrations to the cities. The divorce rate in the United States is now five times as high as in 1885, but in Japan it is one-third as high as in 1885.^[3] Although the crime rate has gone up slightly, it has not risen sharply enough to indicate any process of widespread disorganization.^[4] The process of migration to the cities has been amazingly steady,^[5] and the amount of job-changing has been relatively moderate. Unquestionably such rapid change has caused considerable strain in every Japanese individual and group, yet the disruption has remained within bounds, and a high degree of social order has been maintained throughout the transition to a modern society. It is important to consider features of Japanese social structure which have helped to maintain order at the time of the transition to urban industrial society and at the present time when the society has already achieved a high level of modernization.

The Transitional Order

In other studies, a number of features of Japanese society have already been shown to be important for the ease of Japan's modernization: a high degree of common national culture on the eve of modernization, political unity and stability, the high valuation placed on hard work and productivity, and the planning and organization of the Meiji leaders. Other features have emerged from the present study which are important to consider in the light of their contribution to this orderly process.

The Kinship System

The Japanese stem-family system, whereby one son received the inheritance and continued living with his parents while other sons went elsewhere, facilitated a smooth transition from rural to urban society. The Japanese family lines have had a continuity over generations which perhaps is unsurpassed by any other country. Even under European feudalism, land worked by a family without an heir might revert to the crown to be reassigned, but in Japan the

[3] Cf. Takeyoshi Kawashima and Kurt Steiner, "Modernization and Divorce Rate Trends in Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change , 1960, 9:213–239.

[4] This evidence is analyzed in detail in the forthcoming work by De Vos and Mizushima.

[5] Cf. Irene Taeuber, "Family, Migration and Industrialization in Japan," American Sociological Review , 1951, 16:149–157.

family would itself adopt an heir. Because the family line remained in a single household, it provided a stable unit for village organization. Not only did the kinship system lend stability to rural organization, but it permitted independence for the family which moved to the city.

The movement of second and third sons to the city made it possible for the family to avoid the dissipation of family wealth through multiple inheritance that occurred, for example, in China. It also avoided the confusion that many Chinese families experienced deciding how much each son would receive. The ie system required that the parents select a single heir, and since they made this decision while the children were fairly young, they avoided the prolonged adolescence and the tension of the Irish family where the heir was selected at a much later stage. The fact that parents and village elders were instrumental in placing the young children in the city reinforced the authority of the older generation and prevented uncontrolled movement of young people to the city whenever they might feel dissatisfied with their elders' decisions.

The sons who moved to the city knew that they would not receive any inheritance from their parents, and that they would be accepted back into the rural areas only temporarily in time of emergency. The young sons going to the urban areas therefore were fully committed to finding long-term work. They were willing to undergo long apprenticeships and to acquire skills useful at a later stage of life. Again this is in contrast to the migration in many countries where the migrating sons hoped to acquire money quickly and then return to their original home. Even if such migrants remained in the city indefinitely, they seldom had the perseverance to acquire the skills that would compare with the young Japanese migrant.

The younger sons who moved to the city essentially were free of family traditions. The care of elderly parents and the preservation of family property and traditions were left to the elder son who remained at the farm. The younger son came to the city at a time of life when he was able to learn new urban patterns, and there was no strong kinship or provincial association in the city which interfered with his rapid adaptation. Even close supervision from paternalistic employers in the city usually did not interfere with the essential autonomy of the nuclear family of parents and children.

The Group Control of Mobility

Although there has been considerable mobility in Japan in the past century, it has been a movement from one tightly-knit group to another through prescribed channels. This control over mobility has depended in large part on the fact that the labor supply consistently has exceeded the number of positions available.^[6] Yet, with the exception of the period of the world depression in the 1930's, there has been a steady expansion of employment opportunities. As a result, people have felt optimistic enough about getting some kind of work in the city to be willing to exert themselves to obtain these limited opportunities. This has taken the form of laying careful groundwork in placing the second or third son who migrated to the city. The constant labor surplus has also permitted employers to take great care in hiring. Because groups have remained fairly tightly-knit, firms have been reluctant to take in people who are not properly sponsored. The widespread requirement of personal introductions has made it possible for local community leaders to maintain control over the emigration to the city. A person from the rural areas who has wanted a job in the city has had to go through channels in his local community in order to get a proper placement in the city.

Even in the cities today, although the crucial factor in gaining admittance to a good school or a large enterprise is the score on the entrance examination, introductions are also desirable. This insures that the child has the proper sponsorship of his family, his community, and his previous school and serves as a powerful sanction for an individual to avoid incurring the disapproval of his own group. Since the person who manages the introduction is in the position of a guarantor for the behavior of the person he introduces, he ordinarily introduces only young people whose families have shown proper allegiance in their original community. Who is hired and under what conditions still depends on market conditions relating to the individual's competence and the labor supply even though carefully controlled by one's original and new groups.

[6] Indeed, many characteristics of Japanese social structure seem to follow from the surplus of labor: the fact that large organizations have more men than can efficiently be used, that women have no work, that well-to-do boys do not take part-time work in vacations for fear of taking jobs from poorer boys, and that the desire to gain security in place of work is so strong.

Although firmly attached to the new group once a person moves, his original group remains his refuge in times of difficulty. If, for example, a boy is discharged by an employer or if the employer goes out of business and is unable to offer support, the boy must then turn back to his family and to the person who originally helped him find the job in order to obtain a new situation. If a girl has marital difficulties, she must go back to her original family for assistance in finding a new livelihood. Until recently, the same pattern held true even for an older woman who had trouble in marriage or for an older man who had trouble in his work. If the parents who had originally been responsible for making the placement had died, then the person who inherited the family headship would assume the same responsibility. Today, with such group responsibility somewhat diminished, the passing of years and the death of the person who made the placement may mark an effective end of the attachment to the previous group. However, immediately after the war, many people returning from overseas made claims for help on families from whom they had been separated for a generation or two, and, weakened as the claims were with the passage of time, help was often grudgingly given.

Hence, a person must remain on good terms with the group from which he originally came, even after he has been placed elsewhere. To burn one's bridges destroys security in case of difficulty in the new group. To some extent the person sent back to his original group is always regarded as a yakkaimono (a dependent and a nuisance), but as long as he has maintained good relationships with his group and has performed diligently in the group in which he was placed, every effort will be made to provide him with new opportunities and to give him proper care in the meantime.

To maintain good relationships with one's previous group one must also perform well in one's present group. If a girl goes back to her parental home as a result of marital difficulties, her family wants to know if she has done everything possible to make the marriage a success. To some extent, she is always regarded as responsible for marital difficulties, but if the evidence shows she really tried her best, the family and go-betweens will make every effort to find her a new opportunity. Hence, she wants to have her family's approval when she first marries so they will share the re-

sponsibility in case of difficulty. Furthermore, she keeps her family informed of the problems to make sure they will be willing to help her in an emergency. Ordinarily, she will not consider divorce or separation unless she has her family's support or at least some assurance that they will help out. Hence, even to leave her present group requires evidence that she has done everything possible to make it a success. The same is true for the young man in relation to his place of employment.

A good relationship with one's sponsors can also be a help in improving one's present situation. Even in the so-called "paternalistic" small shops and plants many employers have exploited the workers. But if the worker had been placed by an influential go-between or if the family of the worker had power and influence, he could rely upon their intervention to improve conditions. Similarly, if a girl were mistreated in marriage, her original family and go-between could bring pressure to bear to insure better treatment. The large firm or government office offers such good working conditions and job security that there is little likelihood that an employee will have to call on the family for assistance, but his original family remains his secondary security system. For the man employed in a small firm the possibility of returning to his original group remains an important consideration, as it does for a girl in her marriage.

The group control over mobility and the mechanism of returning to one's previous group in case of difficulties has contributed to the stability of the social order not only because the movement itself is orderly, but because it has reinforced the power of the group in controlling its members. It insures that a group will neither be ruined nor drastically altered by unexpected departures, and the system of returning through channels insures that a person who has failed in work or marriage may still be integrated into a tightly-knit group.

Group Control of Alienation and Change

At least until very recently, the basic cleavages in Japanese society have not been between the different social strata within a given group but between one group and another. The relationships among group members have generally been sufficiently close and humane, and the possibilities for the lower strata to shift their allegiance to

another group have been so limited, that class solidarity going beyond a given group has been relatively weak. The cleavages within the rural village generally have been between one kin group and another or between two prominent families with their respective followers or between several landlords with their respective tenants. In intervillage relationships, instead of poor people in one village uniting with poor people of another village, all residents of one village have generally united to compete with other villages. Workers in a company have a strong attachment to their firm, and even today unions which link workers across company lines are weak.^[7] It is precisely this pattern that has led so many Japanese social scientists to criticize their own society as feudalistic. But this feudalistic loyalty has also functioned to prevent cleavages between social classes and between age groups. Even those who complain about elders or upper class generally remain loyal to their own superiors.

Ordinarily Japanese have not been motivated to change their status radically but to rise within the confines of certain groups or through arrangements made by other members of their group.^[8] People ordinarily have not seriously considered giving up their way of life for another. Merchants, for example, have not aspired to give up business for another way of life, nor have artisans aspired to give up their crafts.^[9] Even though within the last decade large numbers of farmers have turned over the farming to their wives and children while they work in nearby factories or shops, a family with a plot of land rarely expects to leave the farm.

Although Japanese have not been motivated to effect a radical change in their personal status, they have been very much motivated to effect changes within their group. They have been willing and eager to take on new techniques and develop new organizational

[7] Solomon B. Levine, Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1958.

[8] In comparing work that Herbert Hyman did in the United States with Japanese data, Baker finds that even today lower-class Japanese are less likely to have as high aspirations in their society as lower-class Americans do in their society. Wendell Dean Baker, A Study of Selected Aspects of Japanese Social Stratification, doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1956.

[9] Marion Levy has compared these factors in Japanese development with the different situation in China. "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1954, 2:161–197.

practices which would improve their group's position relative to other groups. Many of the early pressures for modernization and rationalization came from members of an ie or of a firm who were trying to improve their competitive position.^[10]

For the same reason, groups also desired to take in competent employees. A business family which was to adopt a son or son-in-law regarded the competence of the young man to carry on the business as one of the most important considerations for selection. Because the owner of the small enterprise expected to be in business indefinitely and was concerned with the future of the enterprise, he was ordinarily willing to take in able young people, provide them with training, and give them opportunities to use their talent. In any field the able employee was a recognizable asset and was treated accordingly.

The paternalistic link between a tenant and the landlord or the worker and his employer have generally contained the alienation of the worker.^[11] Even after World War I when many tenants and employees were beginning to have a sense of alienation against their superiors,^[12] much of it was expressed simply in the form of protesting for better conditions within a given organization. Just when alienation was becoming most severe, the seriousness of the disputes was minimized by the spirit of virulent nationalism which served to unite worker and capitalist in the same effort. Later radical societal changes, especially in the rural areas, were kept in bounds by the control of the Allied Occupation.

As a result of the willingness of groups to make changes in the interest of the group, the containment of alienation by paternalistic patterns and later by nationalistic sentiments, and the introduction of major changes under tight organizational control, it has been possible to have major changes in the society without destroying the power of the local groups. The rural community and the urban business enterprise have remained sufficiently strong to absorb the changes and keep them within bounds. However painful the process

[10] This point has been developed in some detail in an as yet unpublished manuscript by Kazuo Noda.

[11] Cf. John C. Pelzel, Social Stratification in Japanese Urban Economic Life, doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1949.

[12] Cf. George O. Totten, "Labor and Agrarian Disputes in Japan Following World War I," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1960, 9:187–212.

of change within groups, massive disorganization and anomie have not developed. Changes have been mediated by group consensus so that the basic social units have remained relatively solid in a time of radical changes in internal organization.

Child-Rearing, Personality, and Values

Child-rearing and certain characteristics of personality structure have lent support to the orderly process of change. The child-training techniques make the individual dependent on the group. Even in modern urban society, the concept of expelling a member from a family (kandoo suru ) or from a village (mura hachibu ) continue to evoke strong sentiments, and members are motivated to remain in good standing in their own group. The individual is typically group-dependent and is cautious in departing from the wishes of the group; even in moving to a new group he prefers the formality of o-zen date (literally, that the table be all set), whereby all arrangements are made previously and he is invited to move in. The value system which stresses the individual's loyalty to the group has given full support to the fundamental allegiance of the individual to the group and has tended to reinforce the ability of groups to control the process of change.

The Nature of the New Order

Until recently, social order within a group was maintained primarily by the paternalistic relationship between employer and employee, sponsor and sponsored, benefactor and recipient. With rapid social change and the concentration of power in large organizations, these small units are no longer capable of controlling the rewards and providing the security they once did. Although this pattern of relationship continues to provide some order in the local community, in the urban area it has receded in importance and is being replaced by a new pattern centering on the large organization.

The new order, made possible by the large bureaucratic organization, is most striking among the new middle class. Because of its size, the large organization has had to develop standardized methods of recruitment, salary, promotion, and distribution of auxiliary benefits to the workers. This new order has been subject to rationalizing processes which have made it radically different from

the old paternalistic order. The section chief in the large organization has none of the independence in imposing arbitrary patterns upon his underlings that the old middle-class boss had in his narrow social microcosm.

Yet the rationalizing process in large Japanese enterprises has not resulted in the same patterns of social organization that one finds, for example, in the United States. The basic mode of integration of the man into the economic order is not through his occupational specialty, but through his firm. His commitment to the firm is ordinarily more basic and longer lasting than to any occupational specialty. The individual's security and his sense of identity derive from membership in a particular firm or government bureau. If a man is asked what work he does, he is likely to reply not by giving his occupation but by giving the name of his firm. Within the firm, an individual will be given the necessary training or retraining that the firm considers to its best interests. Employees are not committed to any occupational procedures which would interfere with the practices of the firm, and the firm is able to change them to new positions and provide new training as new technological and organizational procedures require. Just as in the United States men often remain in the same organization, so in Japan people often remain in the same occupational specialization, but, in a conflict, in Japan the deeper commitment is to the firm or government bureau.

The rationality of the Japanese firm derives not so much from specific set procedures and social roles as from the subordination of all to the goals of the group. The members of the firm are highly motivated to take any steps for the group to achieve its goals.^[13] The firm cannot ordinarily discharge members for inefficiency and must occasionally make decisions on the basis of personal rather than technical considerations, and considerable energy must be expended in keeping members happy and soothing tensions. Yet the entrance examinations insure that employees have at least a minimum level of competence, the informal system within the firm provides a flexibility for the person of ability to affect policy and its imple-

[13] Takeshi Ishida has cogently argued that Japanese rationality is a rationality of means rather than ends and that a group's ends are ordinarily never brought into serious question. Takeshi Ishida, "The Pattern of Japanese Political Modernization." Paper presented to the Association for Asian Studies, March 1963.

mentation regardless of his position, and the firm is not troubled by the problems of heavy labor turnover. Low mobility between firms makes the process of introducing changes from outside somewhat more difficult, but it permits a higher degree of integration of changes in the firm. Furthermore, the early retirement age means that new blood will be entering the company rapidly and that control passes more quickly to younger people who are less influenced by traditional practices. How long the low mobility between firms and the primary commitment to the firm rather than to occupational specialty will continue is an open question. While these practices are being challenged in areas of labor shortage or where a high degree of technical skill is required, they remain firmly institutionalized for most salary men.

The life of the modern Japanese family with a husband in the new bureaucratic organization has changed greatly from Japanese family life of an earlier era but it remains different from the common patterns in the United States and many European countries. The unique features of the salary-man family discussed in the body of this work (the insulation of the family from the firm, the lack of participation of husbands in household tasks, the narrow range of the wife's social participation and her very close relationship with the children) show no signs of radical change.

The salary man has not surmounted all difficulties. The room for independent free movement apart from the wishes of the group is considerably less than in most Western countries, the amount a person must give up to group unity much greater, and the amount of group solidarity required to maintain such sacrifices much greater than the solidarity existing in most Western organizations. Many salary men whose ambitions are frustrated within the firm or who are not accepted by the dominant company cliques are likely to develop a sense of apathy and may complain bitterly to friends or identify with the unfortunate self-sacrificing heroes in movies, novels, and short stories.^[14] Despite these frustrations, however, the salary man is basically pleased with his way of life. Although the salary man's wife may feel that she sacrifices herself and has a more

[14] Professor Howard Hibbett informs me that the themes of modern novels, stories, and movies are filled with such unfortunate situations, and that the life of the salary men portrayed in fictional form is filled with frustrations.

difficult life than her husband, the world outside her own narrow sphere is so stiff and the inside of her world so relaxed and so subject to her control, that she prefers to stay at home cultivating the wifely arts and caring for the children.

The Diffusion of the New Order

The contrasts between the salary man and other groups in Japan have been drawn sharply in this study in order to highlight the pattern of the salary man. The contrasts may have been drawn overly sharp because there is considerable variation among salary men, and even more because the patterns described have already spread beyond the confines of the group of the salary men.

With the managerial revolution, most of the Japanese elite have now been incorporated into large organizations, and their pattern of life has become essentially that of high-level salary men.^[15] The great industrial, business, and political leaders increasingly arise from the ranks of the large organizations. They are not placed in high position merely by having influential family and friends. Even the "well born" who rise to high positions have been subjected to competition with boys of lower standing, especially during the period of entrance examinations.^[16] They follow the same pattern of regular hours, regular pay, regular vacation. Although they have higher standards of consumption and participate more actively in political and community life than the average salary man, they do not have the independence in action that the independent entrepreneur had. Their activities, like those of lower-level salary men, are subject to their groups' consensus about the interests of the firm.

With the proletarization of industrial workers into large organization, their lives have become increasingly similar to those of salary men. Their salaries are much higher than those of industrial workers

[15] In his work on Japanese executives, Kazuo Noda has called these men "super salary men." Cf. Kazuo Noda, Nihon no Juuyaku (Big Business Executives). Tokyo: Diamond Sha, 1960.

[16] Although a much higher percentage of Japanese elite come from families of higher social status than would be expected on the basis of statistical probability, university training (which depends on success in entrance examinations) is even more crucial for entrance into the elite than in the United States. Cf. Hiroshi Mannari, "Nihon no Keieisha no Shakai-teki Seikaku" (The Social Characteristics of Japanese Business Leaders), Shakaigaku Hyooron, 1961, 12:7–19.

in smaller enterprises, and, in contrast to what one might have expected from Marxian theory, there is not only little revolutionary spirit among such workers, but there is a very high degree of satisfaction of being able to work in their present organization.^[17] In their consumption patterns, in their political attitudes, in the patterning of leisure time and work time, they are similar to the lower-level salary men, and even their salaries are not too different.^[18] The regularity of salary and the rationalization of various procedures within the firm have had the same effects on the factory worker as they had on the salary man.

Finally, because the pattern of the salary man has achieved such prominence and because it has become a symbol of the desirable life, it has an important effect even on those who are not part of large organizations. The way of life of the salary man dominates the mass media, the popular stories, the "how to" books. The advertising and the standard package for the consumer are probably geared more to the level of the salary man than to any other group. The educational system is dominated by the spirit of the salary man, and anyone who hopes to advance beyond the junior-high-school level must take entrance examinations whose tone is set by those who aspire to be salary men. The independence of the salary-man's wife from the cares of earning a living and her opportunity to devote herself to her children without the interference of a mother-in-law are becoming a powerful model for wives of farmers and small shopkeepers. Small business associations have been clamoring for government help so they could provide the same welfare benefits provided by the larger organizations. Many rural co-operatives and mutual-benefit organizations of professionals attempt to provide a salary-man kind of security to their members. In some rural communities, farmers now turn over their income to the co-operative,

[17] Survey data on this problem are presented by Kenichi Tominaga, "Nihon no Keiei to Nihon no Shakai" (Industrial Organization and Social Structure in Japan), Shakaigaku Hyooron , 1961, 12:30–45.

[18] Survey data on this problem are presented by the Group for the study of Japanese Social Structure (Nihon Shakai Koozoo Choosa Kai), in Howaito Karaa no Ishiki Koozoo (The Structure of White-Collar Ideology), Tokyo: March 1962. In analyzing their questionnaire data, these authors also note the striking similarity between lower-level salary men and workers in large factories.

draw it out in the form of "sarari" (salary) and proudly claim that they are just like salary men.^[19] As in Western countries, the powerful influence of the middle class does not mean that society will be completely homogenized and that individual and group differences will disappear. It does mean that the new order of the salary man is not only a way of life for people in large organizations, but a model affecting the life of others. For the rest of society the salary man mediates the direct impact of Westernization and industrialization by offering a model of life which is modest enough to be within the range of realistic hopes and modern enough to be worthy of their highest aspirations.

[19] For this information I am indebted to Dr. David Plath, an anthropologist who did his field work in Nagano prefecture.