Federalism
Federalism has its attractions for many South Africans. Whites who oppose the present government have seen the uses to which a unitary constitution can be put by a stable, ethnically-based party representing a minority of the total population but a majority of the racially defined ruling group. Politically active blacks who hope to achieve a redistribution of power peacefully see in federalism a realistic device that could allay the fears of the dominant
white electorate. Proponents of federation or confederation envisage some kind of institutional linkage of the black homelands with the white-dominated heartland. Such an arrangement would inevitably enhance the potential power of the homelands and provide a broader forum for the political aspirations of blacks. In particular it could define the relations between the various political units more precisely instead of leaving formally independent homelands dependent upon the informal goodwill of a powerful neighbor that no longer rules.
Buthelezi discussed the redistribution of power at the national level as early as 1971. He then proposed a national convention of all races in order to seek a political "modus vivendi." But Vorster rejected the idea, claiming that he did not believe in "umbrella bodies." In a 1973 meeting with the prime minister, Buthelezi made similar suggestions with the same result. During the same month, however, in response to pressure from the United Nations, South Africa agreed to consider establishing a multiracial council for Southwest Africa (Namibia). Buthelezi and prominent Afrikaner nationalists asked why South Africa should not also create a multiracial council.
Early in 1974 Buthelezi reminded an intellectual audience that separate development presented an ideal opportunity for the construction of a federal edifice "in which Black and White fulfillment can be justly reached." According to his scheme separate autonomous black- and white-run states would be linked federally and would cooperate on matters of common concern.[22] "It seems obvious," he said, "that a federal formula of the kind that raises the whole issue of power at the centre should be avoided. . . . It should be possible to establish a common machinery for certain matters without raising the hardy annual of demand for control of a central Parliament. This issue, which bedevils any mutual understanding and mutual confidence, could at least be postponed for several generations. During that time," he continued, "mutual confidence could grow to a point where agreement could be reached at the centre as well." If the Republic were prepared justly to establish constituent independent states (presumably with territory and resources greater than the present homelands) then interracial tensions would be reduced and South Africa could decrease its expenditures on defense. Under this scheme the central federal authority would still control fiscal matters in order to "preserve the essential dynamism of the South African economy." Influx control and pass laws would disappear, but in the heartland blacks would still be "guests." There would be state as well as a common federal
[22] Later Buthelezi addressed the technical problem. "It is true that, legally speaking, States must be in existence before they federate. But my argument is that we were not consulted at the time of union, and we can [make] reparation for this gross omission by looking at the new formula for a future South Africa together, with no party expecting any other to swallow holusbolus what they have dreamed up unilaterally." Quoted in Natal Mercury, 9 May 1974.
citizenship, and each of the states would control its own internal affairs, make its own constitution, and so on.
Except in terms of the economy, external defense, and foreign affairs, Buthelezi envisaged a comparatively weak federal, more a confederal, government. "It should be possible," he concluded, "for Homelands policy to be used as a basis of a formula for the South Africa of the future." But South Africa would have to move quickly and boldly to establish its credibility. Subsequently, Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that federation had been proposed in good faith. "In spite of all that happens to us we still love our country too much to want to see it destroyed."[23] Speaking during the same month, Mangope said that he would welcome the gradual strengthening of federal ties in the economic sphere, in terms of security—federation "would serve as a formidable bulwark against aggression, terrorism, and infiltration"—and in the educational and cultural spheres as well. An educational and cultural federation could promote "higher training standards," especially at the university level, and the "best spirit of good neighbourliness."[24]
Federating the homelands themselves has also appealed to African leaders. Buthelezi and Matanzima have proposed a federation of their territories that could serve as the nucleus for a political association of all of the homelands. Matanzima has even suggested federating with Lesotho and Swaziland. Although not as yet enunciated in any detail, these proposals accurately reflect an awareness by blacks of their relative powerlessness—of their being divided instead of united. Joining the Transkei and KwaZulu, and thus 37 percent of the total de jure population of South Africa, is a rational response to the perceived limits of separated self-government and to the contemplated future constraints placed upon the relations of homelands with other homelands. "It seems, as far as politics are concerned, the majority of White people unite on fundamental issues, although they have different backgrounds and languages. We would be fools if we didn't follow the good example they have set," said Buthelezi. On a platform in Cape Town he and Matanzima both pledged themselves to "black unity."[25]
A federation even of all of the homelands would be an alliance of the weak against the strong. As a legitimating device it would recognize the validity of a single black nation counterposed against the white nation that, despite
[23] Gatsha Buthelezi, "White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity, and the Future of the Homelands," The Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, (Jan. 1974), mimeo. Buthelezi said that he had made most of the same suggestions in writing to Vorster in March 1973 without receiving any reply. The final quotation is from Natal Mercury, 9 May 1974.
[24] Mangope, "Political Future of the Homelands," 7.
[25] Quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 4 April 1972 and 19 Feb. 1973; Die Transvaler, 15 Sept. 1972.
a deep cultural division, rules South Africa. A black federation could also be consistent with the policy of separate development, but it has been South Africa's avowed aim to divide, not unify its blacks. The minister of Bantu administration and development made it clear in 1973 that the homelands would need the cooperation of the Republic if any federal union were attempted prior to independence.[26] In 1974, when the leaders of the homelands backed a federal solution to the race problem of the Republic "within a single economically indivisible country," the prime minister said that blacks could rule their enclaves but whites would continue to rule South Africa.[27] Even so, the central government has not prevented the leaders of the homelands from acting more and more in concert.
Late in 1973 both of these federal notions were explored by eight of the nine homeland leaders (accompanied by a retinue of seventy councillors and advisors) in an unpredecented "summit" meeting at Umtata. They agreed to federate their own states after independence. Matanzima said that they wanted "one black nation and not weak tribal groups divided along ethnic lines." Ntsanwisi, the chief minister of Gazankulu, said that black freedom was of paramount importance. "We must deemphasize all things that separate us and rather emphasize those things which unite us." Buthelezi promoted both a federation of blacks and his pet scheme of federating multiracially. At one point he made a "papal appearance" on a balcony of the Transkei Hotel to give a clenched-fist, black-power salute to the cheering crowds below. Hailed by Matanzima as the "Lion of the East," he told them that "we are doing the same thing as the banned African liberation movements, but we are using different methods. Through this unity, as sure as the moon is in the heavens, we shall liberate ourselves. With power and with God on our side we shall overcome."[28]
Buthelezi's fervor, if not his form of words, was shared by all the black leaders at Umtata. Mangope initially subscribed to the conclusions of the summit. Within a week, however, he had declared that the decision to move toward federation was "shooting at the moon." Federation, he said, would not come about in his lifetime. And he criticized the press for giving too much publicity to Buthelezi.[29]
Mangope had long been cool to the idea of a black superstate. The peoples of the Transkei and KwaZulu are Nguni, speaking mutually intelligible languages. Together they comprise over half of the African population of South Africa, whereas the Tswana comprise only 11 percent of the total.
[26] Botha, quoted in Die Transvaler, 16 Feb. 1973. But see Schlemmer and Muil, "KwaZulu," 132.
[27] The Times, 18 Nov. 1974.
[28] Quoted in The Economist (17 Nov. 1973), 66; The Times, 9 Nov. 1973.
[29] Quoted in Natal Mercury, 19 Nov. 1973.
"Swamping" is a sensitive issue among Tswana, having been raised publicly by Maseloane, and Mangope was subject to some internal pressure on this issue both before and after the summit conference.[30]
As an ethnic nationalist, Mangope naturally fears for the autonomy of the Tswana. "I have been entrusted," he once said, "with the task of serving the Tswana people, and, therefore to do what I regard is in the best interests of Bophuthatswana, and nothing else."[31] Chief Pilane, however, has consistently been in favor of black unity and claims to have raised the issue of federation in 1967. "I was called to Pretoria," he said, "where I was given a tongue lashing by officials of the Department of Bantu Administration . . . [and] warned never ever to think that Africans of this country could work together politically."[32] Mangope is closer to Maseloane than to Pilane on this issue. "Separate development," he has said, "has stimulated the sense of identity of the Tswana people, and I regard that as a positive aspect of separate development. . . . We are completely aware that we will be a minority group in a federation with the governments of larger groups, and we shall not like being in a minority."[33] Both before and after the summit he stated his preference for federal ties to neighboring Botswana, rather than to the other black homelands, a preference that Vorster welcomed in 1975.[34] Nevertheless, throughout 1974 and 1975 he joined Buthelezi, Matanzima, and the others in joint meetings and took part in the formulation of joint approaches to the government of the Republic.[35] Temperamentally and philosophically inclined to go his own way, Mangope has not always done so.
In such discussions federation has at least two meanings: (1) institutionally it is an arrangement linking established governments and, (2) politically it is a synonym for black unity. Although Mangope has sometimes been hostile to federation in the latter sense, he has not been invariably opposed to federation as an institution, provided Tswana interests could be preserved—the classic stance of small and weak states. In 1973 he said that he preferred some kind of multiracial council capable of ironing out difficulties in the practical implementation of separate development prior to any federation. But later he began to favor federation in the form of a redistributive device: "The positive aspects of separate development could be revived if the homelands could form a federation with white South Africa, a federation of real
[30] Mafeking Mail, 29 March 1974.
[31] Quoted in Die Transvaler, 15 Aug. 1972.
[32] Quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 10 Aug. 1972.
[33] Die Transvaler, 19 Nov. 1973.
[34] The Times, 17 Feb. 1975. The Government of Botswana officially wishes no ties to an independent Bophuthatswana.
[35] Mangope, "Political Future of the Homelands," 6.
equality where all were represented in the federal authority."[36] He declined to participate in a multiracial conference on federation held immediately after the summit, but he associated himself with Buthelezi's position in favor of federation in early 1974. When he was attacked in the assembly shortly thereafter for allegedly going beyond his mandate in calling a summit conference, he linked the issues of federation and independence. The conference did not bind the Tswana people, he said, and if Tswana were thinking of independence, leaders would have to think about independence as well as federation. "Even after independence we may have to federate with white South Africa for economic and defence matters."[37]
Mangope's position is complex, and his caution is based partly on a concern for Tswana identity, partly on a temperamental inclination to go his own way, and partly on political pressures within Bophuthatswana. His apparently foot-dragging stance has not reduced his willingness to take common action with other homeland leaders. He played a major role in convening the historic first summit of black leaders; he takes part in formulating joint approaches to the government of the Republic; and he agrees fundamentally with Buthelezi in seeing federalism (however the definition of it fluctuates) as a device for redistributing power and resources. The differences between him and Buthelezi stem ultimately from his perception of himself as the leader of a people who are a minority in a double sense, i.e., as a political minority suffering discrimination in the existing social order and as inevitably a minority in the new society that would follow any major redistribution of power.
It is clear that independence and federation are closely related in the minds of Buthelezi and Mangope. For Buthelezi they tend to be mutually exclusive alternatives, believing as he does both in multiracialism and in the essential unity of South Africa. In a major speech in Soweto to 10,000 Africans in March 1976, he called for an abandonment of separate development and for majority rule.[38] Mangope, on the other hand, has followed the Transkei in opting for independence. In November 1975 he called a special meeting of Tswana chiefs, headmen, and their representatives—not a meeting of his party or his assembly—at which a resolution was passed in favor of independence. Five days later he secured a majority at the annual congress of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party, and ten days later, by a party vote, secured the assent of the assembly.[39] In February 1976 at a meeting of 450
[36] Rand Daily Mail, 15 March, 1 Aug. 1973; The Star, 27, 31 March 1973; interview with Rotberg and Butler, New York, 15 April 1973.
[37] Mafeking Mail, 29 March 1974.
[38] The Times, 14 March 1976.
[39] Survey of Race Relations, 1975, 135.
Tswana in Soweto, he disclosed that he had discussed independence with the government, including compensation for low wages in the past, protection of Tswana in South Africa along the lines accepted by the European Economic Community for each other's nationals, and more land. On the same day, both opposition parties attacked him for supporting independence.[40] For Mangope, federation is a condition to follow independence, if at all. For Buthelezi, independence is to be avoided altogether.