Heidegger's Nazism

In practice, the discussion of Heidegger in the literature has often constituted a major hindrance to an appreciation of the extent and significance of his Nazism. The obstacles that specifically impede a comprehension of Heidegger's Nazism are of three kinds: those due to Heidegger's largely successful effort to manipulate the discussion of his writings through the presentation of an "official" view of his Nazism and its relation to his thought; those due to the affirmation and development of what I am calling the official view as a specialized aspect of the enormous Heidegger secondary literature; and finally those which are not strictly philosophical at all. Heidegger's own understanding of his Nazism is displayed in an article written in 1945, in the famous Spiegel interview, and in hints scattered throughout his later texts. Heidegger's closest followers have developed Heidegger's own view of the matter in the course of the lengthy, often intense debate that continues to oppose Heidegger's critics and, defenders on the theme of Heidegger's political views. The concern by some to defend Heidegger's person and thought at all costs has in practice led to further impediments to a grasp of his Nazism that are not always of a strictly philosophical nature, including simple problems of securing appropriate access to the texts.

What we can call "the facts" about Heidegger's Nazism have been known at least in part since the end of the Second World War. They are still not fully known since despite strenuous efforts by a small group of writers, most prominently Schneeberger, Ott, and Farias, efforts are

under way to protect Heidegger, or his reputation, by hindering the release of factual material known to exist, above all in Marbach, where the Heidegger Archives are still closed to scholars.^[26]

We can begin with that part of the factual material which is not in dispute and which is accepted by all observers. From a factual perspective, we know at least the following: Heidegger initially took up a position at Marburg, and when Husserl retired, Heidegger assumed his chair at the University of Freiburg. In 1933, Heidegger was elected to the post of rector of the University of Freiburg by his colleagues and became a member of the Nazi party. In the spring of that year, on the occasion of taking his position as rector, he gave the rectoral address (Rektoratsrede ). In 1934 he resigned his position as rector and returned to teaching. After the Second World War, he was interrogated by the Allies and, mainly on the recommendation of Karl Jaspers, prevented from resuming his position in the university, although he was not formally charged with any war crimes. He was later permitted to resume teaching. He continued to write and occasionally to teach until the end of his life. Although he was often asked about the rectoral period, he avoided explicit comment except for two occasions: a posthumously published article, written in 1945; and an interview in 1966 with a popular weekly magazine, Der Spiegel which, on his explicit request, was published only ten years later when he died.

If this were all there were to say, Heidegger's Nazism would not be interesting, certainly not more than faintly so, above all not philosophically interesting. There were many, including a distressing number of philosophers, those strange masters of blindness and insight, who had a brief relation to Nazism for a variety of reasons. Heidegger's relation was, however, different from other such encounters, in fact in some ways unprecedented. Let us now provide a partial enumeration of some of these differences. An obvious factor is the fact that Heidegger stands absolutely alone among the major thinkers of this century as a voluntary adherent of Nazism.^[27] If there were no other reason, then the fact that Heidegger was the only important philosopher to become a Nazi is worthy of consideration.

But this is not the only factor, since although Heidegger refused to comment publicly on his Nazism, his writings contain a series of cryptic hints concerning this episode. In his usual ambiguous style, Heidegger indicates that he confronted National Socialism in his writings and left it behind him, something Heideggerians like to stress.^[28] Heidegger implies that he has come to grips with Nazism in several texts, including the account of the turning (Kehre ) in his thought in the "Letter on Humanism"^[29] and the remark in the Spiegel interview that his initial course on Hölderlin and his courses on Nietzsche were a confrontation (Ausei-

nandersetzung ) with National Socialism.^[30] I believe that Heidegger's version of his Nazism is overly indulgent, tendentious, and misleading. In my view, Heidegger's presentation of his Nazism as essentially meaningless occludes, or conceals, its deep significance for the understanding and evaluation of his view of Being. I hold that the study of the texts themselves presents a rather different view of the matter less favorable to Heidegger and in fact damaging to his thought.

One impediment to a comprehension of Heidegger's Nazism is the misleading series of hints about it in Heidegger's texts, hints that taken together constitute his own "official" view of the situation. In Heidegger's wake, a certain number of his followers have presented a version of events which at most denies, at least minimizes, and in any case further distorts Heidegger's Nazism as well as its relation to his thought. The result has been an effort, extending now over several decades, to construe Heidegger's turn to National Socialism in a way that is not harmful, or at least no more than minimally harmful, to the philosopher. Writers engaged in this task include some of his most important French students, but a number of others, all of whom follow Heidegger's own lead in an effort at what—in language more familiar from the political realm, but appropriate here, since the aim is clearly political—can charitably be called damage control.^[31]

A strong statement tending to call in question the life and thought of a major thinker requires strong evidence. One factor is Heidegger's scandalous refusal to comment on his Nazism during his lifetime over a period of more than forty years. Then there is Heidegger's infamous stress on the supposedly misunderstood essence of National Socialism in a work republished in 1953.^[32] Further, there is the exchange of letters with Herbert Marcuse, in which Heidegger seemed to justify Nazism, as well as the comparison, in an unpublished lecture on technology, between the Nazi extermination of the Jews and agricultural technology.^[33]

Attention to these and other passages in his writings suggests that Heidegger did not engage in a confrontation with National Socialism; on the contrary, he sought to conceal the nature of his original and continued interest in Nazism. His writings, then, call in question his own publicly stated view of the matter and suggest that the "official" view, due to Heidegger and propagated by his disciples, is incomplete, inaccurate, or both. This suggestion is further supported by the role of the Heidegger family in controlling access to his Nachlass . Germany, until recently West Germany, has long maintained exceedingly strict restrictions on unauthorized publication. It is, then, relevant to note that the Heidegger family has consistently refused publication of a number of important documents concerning Heidegger's Nazism and restricted access to Heidegger's unpublished work.^[34] This restriction even extends to the publica-

tion of Heidegger's collected works, now under way. The collected works of a major thinker usually, perhaps even always, contain the extant correspondence. In Heidegger's case, his correspondence would almost certainly provide important evidence for an evaluation of his Nazism, especially through the publication of his correspondence as rector of the University of Freiburg. It is, hence, significant that the edition of his collected works now in preparation, in a clear departure from the practice for the writings of a major thinker, will omit his letters.

The aim of this chapter has been to identify some of the obstacles impeding responsible study of Heidegger's Nazism. It is not meant as, and cannot take the place of, a detailed discussion of the texts themselves. This chapter has shown that the scrutiny of Heidegger's Nazism presents formidable obstacles due to the peculiar nature of his thought, as well as the efforts consistently deployed by himself, certain students, and even his family, to prevent an accurate understanding of his Nazism from emerging and to propagate an interpretation that is more charitable to Heidegger than to the truth. We can add to this complex situation the fact that more than forty-five years after the end of the Second World War many, including a number of Heidegger's disciples, are less than eager to engage in a dispassionate analysis of a difficult period, in which they were personally involved, and to which their relationship remains ambiguous. There is, hence, reason to believe that after some four decades of discussion beginning in the 1940s we still do not fully comprehend the nature of Heidegger's Nazism nor understand its relation to his philosophical thought. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to an elucidation and interpretation of Heidegger's Nazism and an evaluation of its significance for his philosophy, even for philosophy in a wider sense.