The Tunisian Phase, 1854–1856

Even prior to the terrible disaster at al-Aghwat late in 1852, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had made overtures to religious and secular notables in Tunisia. Responding favorably was Muhammad b. Abi 'Allag, chieftain of the redoubtable Tunisian tribe, the Awlad Ya'qub, who supplied the rebels with horsemen. Local Tunisian officials also helped the movement to endure as long as it did; their motivations were probably based upon Muslim solidarity as well as economic self-interest. When the self-proclaimed mahdi appeared briefly in the Jarid before his 1854 defeat in Algeria, Nafta's qa'id allowed him to purchase grains and sell some of his flocks in the oasis's markets. It was reported that the rebels disposed of considerable sums of money and hundreds of sheep and camels, probably obtained through razzias.

Elites in Tunis viewed the situation quite differently. Fearing French military reprisals, and perhaps unrest among his increasingly disaffected subjects in the south, Ahmad Bey directed General Zarruq to forbid officials in the Jarid from trafficking with Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah and Sliman b. Jallab. Nevertheless, the qa'id of Tuzar, 'Abd Allah b. Sudani, was on friendly terms with the rebels and extended some material assistance. Also sympathetic to their cause was the powerful Wirghimma (Ouerghemma) tribal confederacy of southeastern Tunisia.^[108] Here it can be posited that local shows of support for Algerian agitators—against the wishes of ruling elites in Tunis—may have also been an implicit critique of Ahmad bey's centralizing program, which by the 1850s had created grave discontent.

During his 1853 trip, Tissot carefully noted the political orientation of the region's sedentary peoples and leading tribes toward the sharif's rebellion. The Tunisian tribes of the southwest were then undecided about which course of action to pursue—momentary neutrality or active, militant support for the insurrection. It was the latter option that French colonial

authorities naturally feared most. The mahdi's presence along the frontiers and the emissaries and letters he dispatched to Tunisian political and religious notables inevitably churned up rumors and improvised news. Moreover, the outbreak of the Crimean War, in which Ahmad Bey participated by furnishing the Ottoman sultan with a military contingent, also provided additional grist for the rumor mill. In the beylik it was said that "the day has arrived when the flag of Islam must replace the images [suwar ] of the Christians and Algeria will be delivered forever from the yoke of the infidels."^[109]

A rare insight into how native Tunisians viewed the revolt is provided by al-Hajj al-Lus, a merchant from Sfax who traded frequently with the Suf's inhabitants. Returning to Gabis in April 1854 after a stay in al-Awad, al-Lus spread the news that the sharif had scored a spectacular victory over Algerian tribes allied to France. The rumor spread like wildfire and increased Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's credibility in Tunisia, further fueling millenarian speculations about the arrival of the "Master of the Hour."^[110] Many believed that the insurgents were undertaking another attack upon Biskra as the prelude to driving the French from North Africa. Since it was also rumored that Algeria's coastal cities were wanting in colonial troops, many Tunisians, including al-Hajj al-Lus, were convinced that the Ziban's capital would fall shortly to Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. As our merchant from Sfax put it: "The moment has arrived to return Algeria to her rightful ruler, the Ottoman sultan."^[111] Once again this interpretation of political events, based upon orally transmitted news, was a reflection not only of what ordinary people thought but also of what they believed should occur, given that France's occupation of Algeria violated the moral order of things. This incident also reveals how distant events—war in the Crimea—were integrated into local information networks far from the scene of battle.

Yet a sense of moral righteousness did not suffice; even mahdis needed adequate military technology to win the battle with the forces of darkness. During his commercial operations in al-Awad, al-Hajj al-Lus had met with Sliman b. Jallab to plan for a new phase in the jihad. The Tunisian trader agreed to furnish Sliman with five cannons for Tuqqurt's defense in exchange for specified sums of money. Unaware of Jean Mattei's ties to the French consulate in Tunis, al-Hajj al-Lus contacted the Frenchman in Gabis regarding a collaborative venture. Mattei was asked to use his commercial ties to trading concerns in Marseille to import cannons from France to Sfax through the usual Maltese smuggling channels. In return, Mattei would receive a finder's fee of one thousand Tunisian piasters and Sliman b. Jallab would acquire the desired artillery; we can only speculate about al-Lus's return from the deal had it succeeded. In addition, the Algerian rebel leaders

commissioned al-Hajj al-Lus to dispose of a large cache of defective firearms in Gabis, the product of an earlier contraband arms deal which proved a scam. (Many of the rifles bought previously by the sharif lacked working parts, and the Algerians hoped to recoup losses by reselling the firearms in the Tunisian port.) While al-Hajj al-Lus's negotiations with Mattei never progressed beyond this point, the merchants did unwittingly provide more evidence regarding the trans-Mediterranean arms traffic.^[112]

Tunisia was, therefore, progressively drawn into Algerian upheavals, the outcome of transformations occurring on both sides of the turbulent frontiers which by now encompassed the beylik's southern reaches. Growing discontent with the bey's fiscal exactions, popular resentment of European meddling in the country's internal affairs, and antipathy toward the French in neighboring Algeria were all connected in the collective political consensus. Moreover, Shaykh Mustafa b. 'Azzuz had made this connection explicit for ordinary people in 1851 when he publicly declared that the extraordinary taxes levied that year were due to nefarious French influence upon Ahmad Bey.^[113] In addition, the swelling numbers of Algerian refugees in the beylik, religious solidarity with the beleaguered Muslims of the colony, and long-standing commercial and cultural links between eastern Algeria and Tunisia momentarily created a local political environment favorable to the sharif.