The Reorganization Strategy

States which adopt a reorganization strategy, such as Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, and, in some respects, Zaire, accept their structural dependency on the Western capitalist economy; at the same time, they manifest a predilection for reformist policies that attempt to humanize and rationalize the existing domestic and international orders. As such they fall midway between the poles of accommodation and transformation, seeking the advantages of the former in the uninterrupted inflow of skill, capital, and enterprise from the Western world, and seeking the advantages of the latter in the achievement of self-fulfilling values on rapid Africanization, pan-Africanism, nonalignment, and limited nationalization of foreign-owned industries. Having accomplished rapid economic growth through their association with the West, their leaders wish to avert any rupture in this basic relationship—only to liberalize it. Thus they hope to harness the strengths of the current international order to their immediate benefit, and leave open until later the possibility of more fundamental adjustments.

At the heart of the reorganizational world-view is a high priority on productionist objectives. As Kenya leader Tom Mboya once put the matter, "We offer no apology for empha-

[63] In 1971, Harry Nkumbula, the Opposition leader, called for realism toward the south, arguing that such a policy would save foreign exchange by permitting her to import from the cheapest source. Noting that Zambia was purchasing goods and supplies from the southern African countries anyway, Nkumbula urged an improvement of relations for the sake of Zambia's national interest. Times of Zambia (Ndola), May 15, 1971, p. 1; and Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), June 29, 1971, p. 7.

[64] Times of Zambia (Ndola), November 11, 1970, p. 3.

sizing the crucial importance of economic growth."^[65] It is central to the solution of other pressing problems such as employment, Africanization, income redistribution, agricultural and rural modernization, education reform, and the promotion of small-scale enterprises.^[66] And the results have been most impressive. Kenya's Gross Domestic Product rose from K£ 328 million in 1964 to K£ 554 million in 1972 (a cumulative rate of 6.8 percent measured at constant prices.^[67] In Zambia, the First National Development Plan set a projected growth rate of 11.7 percent per annum for the years 1966 through 1970 and, in spite of curtailments brought on by the Mufulira Mine disaster and the restrictive impact of the 1969 budget, achieved an annual rate of GNP growth of 10.6 percent during the Plan period as a whole.^[68] For the five-year period from 1972 to 1976, Zambia's Second National Development Plan, after discounting the continuation of the fortuitous price boom for copper throughout the period, envisages an annual growth rate of 6.8 percent per annum of GDP.^[69] Nigeria realized a 12 percent growth rate in 1971–72, although it is important to note that petroleum earnings accounted for 5.7 percent, or nearly half.^[70] In other words, the states adopting a reorganizational approach tend to diverge from the accommodationalist and transformationalist states in terms of overall growth performance; this results in greater optimism regarding their ability to develop the capacity to exercise meaningful choice.

As a consequence of their relative success in gaining their immediate economic growth objectives, the reorganizationalist

[65] Tom Mboya, "Sessional Paper No. 10—It Is African and It Is Socialism," East Africa Journal 6 no. 5 (May 1969): 15.

[66] Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization (London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1973), p. 436; and Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974–1978, Part I (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1974), p. 91.

[67] Development Plan 1974–1978, Part I, p. 47.

[68] Republic of Zambia, Second National Development Plan January, 1972–December, 1976 (Lusaka: Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971), p. 2.

[69] Ibid., p. 34.

[70] Suzanne Cronje, "Has Oil Become Nigeria's Crutch?" African Development 6, no. 8 (August 1972), p. 13.

states are highly pragmatic in their approach to economic development questions generally. The Guidelines for Nigeria's Third National Development Plan are quite explicit on this point: "Industrial development planning in Nigeria has been pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. The advantage of this pragmatism is that it implicitly takes into account almost as a matter of routine certain leverages and constraint factors [environmental and resource] which impinge on the choice of goals and strategies."^[71] Being heavily committed to rapid economic growth through private enterprise and close ties with the world economy, these states seek to put the capitalist order to work for their purposes. Such continuing linkages are not without domestic consequences. The indigenous elite must bargain with foreign management and capital to ensure a steady inflow of the factors of production; they must offer the multinational corporations easy access, low taxes, protections from hasty nationalization schemes, extensive opportunity to remit funds, and so forth, or the foreign investor will be tempted to explore opportunities elsewhere. In brief, pragmatism entails an explicit recognition that economic growth remains fundamentally dependent on the maintenance of intimate links with the foreign capitalist system.

In what ways, then, are the reorganizationalist states reformist? The answer, by comparison with the accommodationalists, is largely a matter of degree. Although the reorganizers accept and work within the inherited world capitalist economy, they take greater pains to revise the basis of their relationship than do the accommodators. This may in part be explained by their relatively greater economic dynamism, but the end result is more extensive restrictions on the operations of foreign corporations, increased pressures to Africanize staffs, improved wages and working conditions, enhanced tax revenues, and, in a number of cases, limited nationalizations of the commanding heights of the economies. Despite their profound commitment to productionist goals, these states are inclined to press equity objectives so long as they are fully reconcilable with growth

[71] Federal Republic of Nigeria, Guidelines for the Third National Development Plan 1975–1980 (Lagos: Central Planning Office, 1973), p. 17.

objectives. In 1973, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced specific measures to ensure the replacement of foreigners with Zairean nationals; meanwhile Nigerians began to implement the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 under which a minimum of 40 percent of the shares in a long list of enterprises would have to be transferred to Nigerian citizens before April 1, 1974. The Kenya government, which regards the transfer of economic and social control to citizen hands as "a primary objective," has reduced the number of non-citizens in wage employment from 49,300 in 1967 to 25,800 in 1972.^[72] The Development Plan 1974–1978 comments further on this process of Kenyanization: "Not surprisingly, the public sector is now much more fully Kenyanized at the high- and middle-levels—83 percent compared with 68 percent for the private sector. Five years earlier, these figures were 73 and 53 percent, respectively. While it is recognized that the skills of non-Kenyans will continue to be required for some time, it is the intention of the Government to reduce their number in wage-paid jobs to no more than a handful by 1982."^[73] Thus, in all the reorganizational states, indigenization of posts has moved rapidly. But such a program, desirable as it may be, is not inherently at odds with continuing close ties to international capitalism. Rather, indigenization can be viewed as reconciling the nationalist demand for African opportunity with the continuation of the capitalistic system. It is a reformist policy to the extent that it Africanizes capitalism, rather than moving directly to a socialist program.^[74]

Although all the countries adopting a reorganization strategy agree on the need to equalize the opportunities between the urban and rural areas,, none has been more explicit than Zambia on the need for a redistributive rule of action. "From now on,"

[72] West Africa, December 10, 1973, p. 1719, and April 1, 1974 p. 362; and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette 59, no. 10 (February 28, 1972): A11–21.

[73] Development Plan 1974–1978, pp. 10, 38.

[74] For an analysis of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Indigenisation) Decree of 1972, see Paul Collins, "The State and Dependent Capitalist Development: The Nigerian Experience," a paper presented to the Department of Political Science Seminar, University of Ghana, Legon, February 12, 1976.

contended President Kenneth Kaunda in 1969, "our priority is rural development." Fearing the possibility of "an explosion in the rural areas" should the current imbalance among provinces be allowed to persist, Kaunda urged the adoption of new priorities with respect to interunit economic planning and resource allocation:

Up to now regional development has been the privilege of the line-of-rail provinces. This we can no longer accept for now we have a People's Government. The basis for the creation of a genuine and balanced regional development is the decision to spread economic activity and to give considerably more weight to the development of the under-developed areas within the country.^[75]

This promise to reform the inherited subregional inequalities of the past has actually come to pass slowly. Constrained by dependence on copper and by the world market price for this mineral as well as by such interrelated factors as high production costs, urban drift, rapid population increase, Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, isolation from world markets, heavy transportation expenses, and so forth, it has not been possible for the Kaunda regime to allocate sufficient revenues to overcome stubbornly persistent rural-urban gaps. Even though the 1971 estimates showed the government to be faithful to its redistributive doctrine (see Table 2), actual expenditure patterns have made manifest the fact that reallocative equity is considerably more of a promise than a reality. Not only does the international environment restrict the achievement of economic transformation, but rural development has encountered difficulties with respect to administrative effectiveness and absorptive capacity (in the particular case of the Northern Province, for example, ZK7,149,360 was allotted for development projects under the first development plan but only ZK4,229,700 was actually spent).^[76] Whether, under pressure from rural and urban interests, the Zambian leadership will be able to follow the heavily compromised middle course implied in the reorganization strategy remains an open question.

[75] Rothchild, "Rural-Urban Inequities," p. 228. On the ideology of Humanism, see Kenneth D. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation: Part I (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1968), and Part II (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1974).

[76] Rothchild, "Rural-Urban Inequities," pp. 238–39.

In Ghana, the regime of General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong has taken a strong policy position on righting past imbalances in north-south relations. As in the case of Zambia, the need for a reallocative policy arose from the colonial administration's lack of concern over transforming the north during its period of rule."^[77] In addition to socio-cultural diversities, a number of other factors contributed to the north's general isolation from the centers of "modern" activity: its physical distance from key decision-making centers; its geographical (savannah type) uniqueness; its lack of industrial and commercial contact with Western business interests; its general lack of social amenities; and its tendency to avoid contact with Christian missionaries (with all that this implied for educational development in a formal, Western sense). Typical of hinterland regions elsewhere in Africa, the dominant bureaucracy showed little sense of urgency over the development of agriculture and

[77] For some, this inattention represents a "deliberate policy" on the part of the colonial power, aimed at "keep[ing] the area as a reservoir for the 'reserve army of labor.' " Kwesi Prah, "The Northern Minorities in the Gold Coast and Ghana," Race and Class 16, no. 3 (January 1975): 307. Also see David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism 1850–1928 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 534.

industry, transportation and communications networks, piped water, health facilities, schools, technical colleges and institutions of higher learning, and so forth. The diminutive size of their budgets is in itself a good indication of colonial priorities. Thus in the 1930–31 fiscal year, revenues (mainly fines, fees and rents) amounted to £24,574 and expenditures to £140,132 in the north.^[78]

As part of its "revolutionary" program, the Acheampong regime has given great emphasis to its reallocative objectives. The Charter of the National Redemption Council seeks to transform Ghana into a "just society," based, among other things, upon "equal opportunity for all" and "equitable distribution of our resources."^[79] And subsequent policy statements are in a similar vein, referring specifically to the need to correct existing "inequalities of educational facilities as between regions, and schools"^[80] as well as "to provide social amenities and spread health needs to every part of the country."^[81] And if the appeal of equity and social justice were not sufficient, a policy of reallocation could be viewed as in Ghana's economic interests as well. The development of agriculture in the north, the rice bowl of the country, not only meant national self-sufficiency in this critically important crop but created new possibilities for a diversification of export earnings.

But a country adopting a reorganization strategy finds itself limited in implementing a policy of reallocation among subregions. Despite the logical appeals of reallocative equity, it is constrained from acting in a bold manner by the related pressure of resource scarcity and demands on the part of the relatively privileged. The more advantaged urban centers are loath to see any slowing of their development; not surprisingly, therefore, they continue to claim their fair share of the expendi-

[78] Martin Staniland, The Lions of Dagbon: Political Change in Northern Ghana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 44–45.

[79] (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corp., n.d.), p. 5.

[80] Republic of Ghana. Guidelines for the Five- Year Development Plan 1975–80 (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corp., 1975), p. 27.

[81] Republic of Ghana. Third Year in Office of Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (Accra: Press Secretary to the National Redemption Council, 1975), p. 117.

tures made by governmental authorities. Thus increasing subsidies of petroleum, mainly consumed in the privileged regions, mean less resources remaining for the development of vitally needed feeder roads in northern and upper regions. And as shown in Table 3, the heavy public expenditures on defense, internal and foreign affairs, and fiscal and financial services leaves all too little for investments in agriculture, rural development, and feeder roads, all required in large amounts for the development of the northern parts of the country. These expenditures by function represent a triumph of incrementalism over comprehensive planning. Thus despite all the promises involved in Operation Feed Yourself, the commitment to agriculture remained little affected in the period 1970–1975, and that for rural development and transporation declined significantly. Again the contrast between outputs and outcomes was noticeable.

The reorganization strategy tends to integrate the society by accommodating pluralistic claims, and creates something akin to a "bargaining culture," which places constraints on the application of egalitarian policies.^[82] The problem of revenue allocation in Nigeria is a case in point. Nigeria's independence constitution was a remarkable combination of centralized financial and taxing authority and decentralized administrative responsibility.^[83] The federal government had exclusive power to impose excise duties as well as taxes on imports and exports, corporation profits, and mining rents and royalties. The only subregional taxes of significance were on individual incomes,

[82] See Gabriel A. Almond's foreword to Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. ix. Also see Carl G. Rosberg, "National Identity in African States," African Review 1, no. 1 (March 1971): 85–87; and B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 43.

[83] For a fuller account of revenue allocation and Nigerian federalism, see Donald Rothchild, "African Federations and the Diplomacy of Decolonization," Journal of Developing Areas 4, no. 4 (July 1970): 520–22. Also see John F. Due, Taxation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 127–33; and P. N. C. Okigbo, Nigerian Public Finance (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 50–66.

produce, and motor vehicles, leaving the subregional treasuries dependent on federal grants for two-thirds of their recurrent revenues. The relations between Nigerian governments at and within each level were strained over the states' lack of financial independence and over the allocation of federally collected revenues. It seems likely that future increases in property and personal income taxes as well as increased payments under the distributable pool arrangement would have narrowed the gap between revenues and expenditures. However, federal unwillingness to make major concessions on this question remained evident to the end.^[84]

The refusal of federal officials to allocate any further revenue to the subregions contributed directly to interunit conflicts over both principles and interests. Distribution of federally collected revenues was based on the two principles of derivation and need. Derivation was favored from the inception of genuine federalism in 1954 until the implementation of the Raisman Commission recommendations in 1958. At that time, it was the eastern regional government, not its more affluent partners, which urged the Raisman Commission to support the principle of subregional need. The commission compromised between these two principles, applying derivation to revenues whose source could be estimated with some degree of accuracy, and applying need to the remaining revenues; henceforth the latter were to be allocated by means of a distributable pool arrangement. Subregional attitudes changed with the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the east. From then on, eastern government spokesmen campaigned with increasing vigor to be permitted to retain revenues raised in the area. The government of eastern Nigeria submitted a memorandum on revenue allocation to the 1964 fiscal review commissioner stating that the system of revenue allocation then operating had proved "extremely unreasonable, unfair and inequitable" and

[84] Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Fiscal Review Commission, by K. J. Binns, Commissioner (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1965), p. 11; Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1969), chap. 6; and T. O. Ilugbuhi, "The Future of Government Revenue in Nigeria," Nigerian Opinion 4, no. 4–6 (April–June 1968): 331–33.

that all revenue from royalties and rents on mineral oil should be returned to the unit of origin.^[85] Two years later, at the resumed conference on the Nigerian constitution, the eastern regional government maintained that "the Central Authority shall have no fiscal or taxing powers. All fiscal or taxing powers shall be vested in the Regions."^[86]

Implementing a revenue allocation system based largely on the principle of need rather than derivation has always seemed compelling. The attitudes expressed by the magazine Nigerian Opinion on this issue are widely held:

The main criterion for revenue allocation was the derivation principle which since 1952 has been a constant and endless source of friction. It intensified inter-regional rivalry and antagonism. Most important, resource allocation was not related to needs and the most needy region was invariably also the region that received least under a system of revenue allocation based primarily on derivation.^[87]

Even so, it has proved extremely difficult to put the revenue allocation principle of need into effect in a reorganizational polity such as Nigeria. With the military coups of 1966, the new regime gained an excellent opportunity for decisive action in constitutional matters. It used its new position to create the twelve-state (later nineteen) federal system,^[88] thereby reducing the autonomy of the old subregional governments. However, it did not act swiftly -to make any serious modification in the principle of derivation, as reportedly recommended by the commission under the chairmanship of Chief I. O. Dina in 1968.^[89] 'The result of the federal military government's recon-

[85] Binns, Report of the Fiscal Review Commission, p. 13.

[86] The Ad Hoc Conference on the Nigerian Constitution (Enugu: Government Printer, 1966), p. 85.

[87] Vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1966), p. 20.

[88] In February 1976, General Murtala Muhammed, Nigeria's head of state, announced plans to create seven additional states. Moreover, all nineteen states were to be given new names in order to erase old memories and attachments.

[89] The Dina report, never published, is said to have proposed that the oil-producing regions should derive 10 percent, rather than 50 percent, of royalties and rents. The Dina report's recommendations were subsequently rejected in 1969 by the Nigerian finance commissioners who contended that the Dina commission had "exceeded its powers andignored its terms of reference." Africa Confidential 15, no. 10 (May 17, 1974): 6.

ciliation strategy was a status quo stance at a time when the inequities and inadequacies in interunit allocations continued to worsen. As shown in Table 4, the oil-producing Mid-Western and Rivers states were heavily favored under the revenue allocation system then being administered. But the disparities caused by this formula led to new dissatisfactions in intergovernmental relationships. For example, the New Nigerian, published in the less-advantaged north, observed that the revenue allocation system then in effect "threaten [ed] to create a new imbalance" since "allocation to individual states reveal[ed] wide disparities because the derivation principle puts the 'oil states' at an enhanced advantage."^[90] To some extent these dissatisfactions were dealt with by the military government in 1974 when a new revenue allocation formula was announced; this formula deemphasized the derivation principle by allocating money to state governments, 50 percent on the basis of population and 50 percent on the basis of equality. Such a revision of priorities

[90] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

goes far toward promoting the interests of the non-oilproducing states, and no doubt it will be closely scrutinized by any future Constituent Assembly.

Another important area of pragmatism on the part of those states adopting a reorganization strategy is their policy on the nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy. These states are more inclined to pursue nationalization policies than their critics are prepared to acknowledge. In Zaire, Gecamines, the state corporation, had produced 51 percent and 32 percent of all budgetary resources in 1970 and 1971, respectively;^[91] the following year, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced a further extension of the public domain to include plantations, livestock, and a 50 percent ownership in the remaining mining companies.^[92] Kenya acquired a 51.4 percent shareholding in East African Power and Lighting Co. Ltd., a 50 percent shareholding in the Mombasa Oil Refinery, and a 60 percent shareholding in two new banks formed from the assets of the National and Grindlays Bank in Kenya.^[93] As of April 1, 1973, the Nigerian government acquired a 35 percent equity in Shell-BP and several other oil-producing firms, rising to a majority holding by 1982.^[94] Perhaps the most thoroughgoing program of nationalization among the reorganization polities was carried out by the Zambian government. In the period from 1968 to 1970, President Kaunda announced a sweeping series of economic reforms, which included the partial or total nationalization of such fields as mining, transportation, contracting, insurance, and so forth.^[95] By 1971, the Kaunda

[91] Alan Rake, "Waiting for the Copper Dividends," African Development 7, no. 6 (June 1973): Z5.

[92] West Africa, December 10, 1973, p. 1719.

[93] Rothchild, Racial Bargaining, p. 437.

[94] West Africa, June 18, 1973, p. 818.

[95] Zambia's program of state participation in business activities is outlined in three addresses by Dr. K. D. Kaunda: Republic of Zambia, Zambia's Economic Revolution, Mulungushi, April 19, 1968 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.); Republic of Zambia, Towards Complete Independence, Matero, August 11, 1969 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.); and This Completes Economic Reforms: "Now Zambia Is Ours," Mulungushi, November 10, 1970 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.).

administration had assumed control over eighty major or minor business firms. The costs of compensation involved in taking over the copper mines gives some insight into the fiscal burdens brought on by a restructuring of the economy. The cost of purchasing 51 percent of the shares of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines is K125 million, and the amount of the Roan Consolidated Mines shares comes to K84 million.^[96] Payment is being made from future dividends, covering a twelve-year period in the case of NCCM and an eight-year period for RCM.

Yet the nationalization of major industries in these countries should not be interpreted as a rejection of foreign capital investment. As the background note to Dr. Kaunda's Mulungushi address of 1968 explained, the measures announced in the president's speech fell "far short of nationalisation as conventionally known."^[97] Rather than precluding foreign investment, nationalization, pragmatically applied, may facilitate external participation by removing many of the uncertainties associated with investment in Third World countries. Surely all of the states adopting a reorganization strategy have gone far, some contend too far, in reaching accommodations with international capitalism. A dramatic case in point is the agreement on the nationalization of the Zambian mining industry. In exchange for continued operation of the industry, the mining companies or their local subsidiaries were paid compensation for the value of the shares acquired (through the medium of Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Limited 6% Guaranteed Dollar bonds),^[98] permitted to remain as minority shareholders and, to the extent called on to do so, to contribute from funds not subject to Zambian exchange control a 36 3/4 percent share of the capital finance for the development of existing or new mining ventures, and granted contracts to undertake management, consultancy, and marketing services. Such arrangements for provision of services, set up for a minimum of five years, gave management handsome rewards for minimal risks. In making such concessions to investor demands, the government was

[96] Times of Zambia (Ndola) Business Review, June 25, 1971, p. 2.

[97] Zambia's Economic Revolution, p. V.

[98] In 1973, the Zambian government redeemed the ZIMCO bonds with over ZK114m. Eurodollar and other loans.

emphasizing economic stability at a possible price in reallocative equity.

Finally, in keeping with their reformist posture, the states adopting a reorganization strategy have generally taken strong foreign policy positions on issues of nonalignment and panAfricanism. On questions of colonialism or white racism, there is little to differentiate their policies from those put forth by the states adopting a transformationalist strategy. However, in other areas, perhaps as a consequence of their intimate ties with the world economic system, one can detect a note of caution.

Using Kenya as a prime example of pragmatism in foreign affairs matters, one can start with the words of the former minister of foreign affairs himself to illustrate the country's "low profile" stance.^[99] Thus Dr. Njoroge Mungai asserted: "The Government does not set for itself hastily exaggerated objectives in foreign policy which are unrealistic and incapable of being fulfilled. Political fulmination and adoption of extreme policies which are later abandoned or withdrawn or reversed by force of circumstances is not Kenya Government practice in foreign policy." ^[100] In line with this cautious approach, Mungai outlined the four tenets on which his country's external policy is based: nonalignment; support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; promotion of African unity, independence, and cooperation; and disarmament. Kenya, in other words, does not seek a radical restructuring of the world order, but seeks rather the more limited objectives of advancing her "national interest" through the promotion of trade, economic assistance, foreign investment, links with neighboring countries through the East African Community, and the securing of her territorial integrity. ^[101] To be sure, Kenya did pay a substantive cost when forbidding commercial dealings in South

[99] John J. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy," African Review 3, no. 2 (June 1973): 263. On this, Foreign Minister N. Mungai declared: "Kenya today enjoys a position of international esteem and importance because of the pragmatic policies that have been followed under dynamic leadership. Avoiding emotional reactions to given situations, Kenya has placed the welfare of her people above dogmatic ideologies," Daily Nation (Nairobi), December 12, 1973, p. XVI.

[100] East African Standard (Nairobi), December 13, 1971, p. 6.

[101] On Kenya's role in forging East African Community links, seeDonald Rothchild, Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

African goods as well as exports to the Union in the mid-1960s. Particularly hard hit by this action was the Magadi Soda Company, which had exported one-half of its total sales of soda ash (110,899 tons) to South Africa in the 1962–63 fiscal year. As a result of the boycott, the Magadi plant worked in 1965 at 40 percent of capacity and its African staff was cut from 405 to 240. ^[102] Moreover, Dr. Mungai can validly claim "never [to have] minced words" on such critical issues as Rhodesia, apartheid, Portuguese fascism, Namibia, the sale of arms to South Africa, sovereignty over natural resources, disarmament, and "sea-bed questions." Even so, these are not stances that challenge the basic international order that Kenya seeks to remain a part of; rather, a strong stand on these issues is easily reconciled with (and even furthers) a pragmatic diplomatic policy. Thus on the central question of nonalignment itself, one able observer has commented on the country's decidedly cautious contacts with the Eastern bloc countries. "Although she maintains smooth diplomatic relations with East Europe and the People's Republic of China," declares John J. Okumu, "she has consistently been very reluctant to receive substantial economic or technical assistance from these countries." ^[103] Okumu's conclusion pretty well sums up the basic feature explaining foreign policy pragmatism in all of the reorganization states: "Thus if the general pattern of external private and public capital inflows is in part an indicator of the general ideological preference of Kenya's governing elite, then Western capitalism has a lot to do with its pragmatic orientation to the practice of non-alignment. Kenya's position seems to be that it is possible to be economically aligned but ideologically non-committed on cold-war issues." ^[104]