Preferred Citation: Montgomery, Gayle B., and James W. Johnson One Step from the White House: The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland. Berkeley, Calif:  University of California Press,  c1998 1998. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4k4005jq/


 
24— The Big Switch

24—
The Big Switch

Knowland had been sounding out his associates about leaving the Senate for months. In December 1956, when he was sitting with staff members Paul Manolis and Jim Gleason in the lounge of the United Nations in New York, the talk turned to the 1956 election and other political issues. Casually Knowland asked his two aides, "What would you boys think if I ran for governor instead of senator in 1958?"

Gleason immediately opposed the idea. His position was that Knowland did not need to run for the presidency from the governor's office: his place in the Senate was a good forum. Even if most of the thirty-four presidents had come from the ranks of governor, Gleason argued, such a move was hardly necessary. "I felt his present platform was as good as you get," he later told us. But after the senator left to return to the UN General Assembly, Manolis told Gleason, "He has made up his mind to run for governor."

Soon after, Knowland accidentally announced his plans to leave Washington. On January 7, 1957, he was taping an interview with CBS radio reporter Griffing Bancroft. "We wonder if you are a candidate for the Republican [presidential] nomination in 1960," Bancroft asked. The senator responded, "I would say that was entirely a premature question. We haven't even inaugurated yet for the next four-year term our president that was elected last November and no one has a crystal ball to know what conditions will be four years from now."

Bancroft had finished the interview, but had a few seconds of time remaining, and filled it by asking what he surely thought was a pro forma


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question: "Do you plan to seek reelection to the Senate in 1958?" When Knowland replied, "I do not plan to be a candidate for reelection to the United States Senate in 1958," Bancroft asked the obvious follow-up: "What are your plans, sir?"

"Well, I do not know, except that I do not plan to be a candidate for reelection to the United States Senate."[1]

Bancroft was stunned to hear this, and Knowland instantly turned red, realizing that he had blurted out information he had not intended to make public until much later. Bancroft pressed the Senate minority leader to not make an announcement until after the show, Capitol Cloakroom , ran that night. Knowland agreed, but he soon realized that he had to break his word for one of the few times in his life. He couldn't let his Senate colleagues hear the announcement first on the radio. He telephoned Helen, then called Manolis and Gleason into his office. "Well, boys, I have just announced that I am not going to be a candidate for reelection to the Senate," he told them. He brought the rest of the staff together and informed them of his decision.

He then went first to Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, one of his closest friends. Both party leaders had tears in their eyes when Knowland broke the news. The following day on the Senate floor, Johnson would say, "As a human being, I know of no finer man than the senior Senator from California. Integrity and honor are words which frequently are used with little content. But when they are applied to Bill Knowland, they assume a precise accuracy that cannot be matched by Webster." He added, "In the hill country of Texas, where the Johnsons have lived for more than 100 years, we talk about the kind of people who 'will go to the well' with a man. It is an expression rarely used, and it implies the highest kind of praise. . . . Bill Knowland is that kind of man."[2] After talking to Johnson, Knowland called the national committee members for California, Edward S. Shattuck and Marjorie Benedict, and informed them of his decision. He told a group of Republican senators later in the afternoon, then went to the White House to inform President Eisenhower.

Knowland left the White House and went back to his Senate office for a 5 P.M. press conference that Manolis had scheduled. A large media group knew that the Republican leader had been to see the president and assumed he wanted to brief him on some new policy. He answered their questions about the meeting for about fifteen minutes. Then, as the conference was ending, he said, "Just a minute boys, I have one more item. I announced today that I am not going to seek


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reelection to the Senate after my present term of office ends." Manolis recalls that the press corps almost broke the door down rushing out to file the story.

While the Washington press corps was shocked, the media in Sacramento were stunned. California governor Goodwin Knight was delivering his annual "state of the state" address to a joint session of the legislature when the news spread through the capital. The timing of the announcement may have been accidental, but it destroyed Knight's annual day on page one throughout the state. As he tried to complete the speech, the press already was running out to follow the Knowland story. Before Knight's final lines were read, Republican State Controller Robert Kirkwood was announcing his candidacy for the Senate seat Knowland was vacating. When that news hit, Republican Robert C. McDavid of Altadena, a member of the State Board of Equalization, promptly declared he would run for Kirkwood's seat.

Governor Knight expressed complete amazement when told of Knowland's retirement by reporters just after he concluded his speech, but he declined to speculate that Knowland might challenge him for the governorship. Caught by reporters at the assembly rostrum, the governor did say he had no plans to seek Knowland's Senate seat. Still in shock, Knight said he had talked with Knowland at a luncheon in Los Angeles just three weeks earlier, and the senator made no mention of plans to retire. He obviously was shaken and said he found it hard to understand why Knowland would give up the Senate Republican leadership.[3]

Knowland's explanation to newsmen in Washington was simple. He had personal reasons for returning to private life in California. His wife, Helen, was pressuring him to get out of Washington; she wanted to take her family and go home. In addition, his father, who was nearly eighty-four, was feeling the burden of running the Oakland Tribune . The reasons were logical, but Washington talk immediately began to focus on one question: was Knowland preparing to go back to California to run for governor?

J. R. Knowland told the New York Times that he might have to retire soon and that he would like his two sons, Bill and Russ, to become joint publishers of the Oakland Tribune . "I'm getting along in years," he said. "I've been pretty active so far and am here at the office every day. Then, too, Bill has been in the Senate a long time and he's quite a family man."[4] He said that if the senator had any other plans he didn't know about them. Privately, J.R. was adamantly opposed to his son leaving the Senate to seek the governorship. Emelyn Jewett remembered her grandfather's anger about the senator's decision. "He


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felt Dad was making a dreadful mistake. He told me so personally. He was opposed to my father running for governor—not opposed to him running for governor per se, but at that particular point in time. He felt that Dad was at the pinnacle of his career, that he had a leadership position. [J.R.] did not think [his son] had a chance of being elected in California to the seat of governor."[5]

Senator Knowland's public statements were true. He did have strong personal reasons for returning to California. At the same time, he was not ready to give up the power of politics, and he believed that the governorship was the way to the White House.[6] He assumed that his popularity in California (he was reelected by a seven to one margin in 1952) would carry him into the governor's office in such a landslide that the GOP nomination in 1960 could be his. He also assumed that Knight would keep his promise to run for reelection no matter what Knowland did. By beating a popular sitting governor, Knowland reasoned, he would become the political leader of the nation's fastest-growing state, another key to the White House. The thinking was simple: history indicated that the chances of moving up from the Senate to the White House were slim. Only thirteen of its members had ever become president; most moved up from statehouses. Warren G. Harding alone in the twentieth century had gone from being senator to president.

Knowland further believed that Knight's friendship with California unions would cause him to split the vote with the Democratic candidate, and the Democrats didn't even have a candidate at that point. Attorney General Edmund G. "Pat" Brown probably was the strongest the Democrats could offer, but he showed no early interest in leaving a secure post to seek the governorship. However, Brown's interest in the governorship surely was piqued by Knowland's announcement, which opened the possibility of a real Republican battle.

It certainly put three of the most powerful Republicans in the nation in an odd triangle. Knowland and Knight had united to keep Nixon from taking over the California Republican Party in 1954. Knowland and Nixon had united against Knight to keep Nixon on the Republican national ticket in 1956. Would Nixon and Knight get back together in 1958 to derail Knowland's move on the White House?

Democratic State Chairman Roger Kent of Mann County flatly predicted that Knowland would run for governor and that his action would make it easier for Democrats to regain control of the state. He suggested that Knowland would be easier to beat than Knight; moreover, if Knight and Knowland got in a squeeze, Richard Nixon would inevitably be brought into the battle. Alan Cranston, chairman of the


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California Democratic Council, said Knowland's action set the stage for a "ruthless struggle as a springboard for defeating Vice President Nixon for the presidential nomination in 1960." Nixon himself, ever cagey, was quoted as saying that he hoped Knowland would return to public service in the future: "Bill Knowland's service to his state and nation has been in the highest and best tradition of the United States Senate. I have never known a man who has worked harder or has been more dedicated in his public service."[7] But the public service both Nixon and Knowland sought was in the White House.

Although Knowland had helped Nixon when Knight opposed the vice president's renomination in 1956, relations between the California governor and the senior senator had remained good until Knowland began taking aim on Sacramento. Some California Republicans, fearing an ensuing bloodbath among their political leaders, tried to persuade Knowland to change his mind about leaving the Senate. Under the direction of Harry J. Crawford, a Pasadena lawyer, a group calling itself the Committee for Republican Victory began a letter campaign to California Republicans warning in late spring of the impending war between the senator and the governor. "It is a well-known fact to most Republicans that if Senator Knowland carries out his announced intention not to seek reelection, the probability of his being succeeded by a Democrat is very great," Crawford wrote. "In addition to this result, it is just as probable that if Senator Knowland should enter the race for governor of California, our next governor will not be a Republican."[8]

Knight denied having any part in the group and said he never had met Harry Crawford. Crawford, who backed up Knight's assertion, explained that his twenty-five-member group was made up of Republican doctors, lawyers, and businessmen who had no connections to either of the Republican leaders. He said he did not know Knowland and had not talked with him about the movement. However, independent Republicans were describing Knowland's actions as a "blueprint for disaster" for his party. The phrase was attributed to Knight, although the governor insisted that he had been speaking only about splits in the party in general. Knight also began saying that he considered it likely that Knowland would seek the presidency in 1960 if he were to win the governor's office.

For his part, Knowland said he would do a fact-finding tour through his home state in the summer of 1957, and he continued to visit California throughout the spring. In April, at a $100-a-plate Republican fund-raising event in Hollywood, he spoke not only about national is-


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sues but also about a statewide tour he would make after the congressional adjournment in late summer. When asked if it would be a vacation tour, Knowland answered, "You can't take a vacation when you're campaigning."[9]

Knight knew what Knowland was up to, and he obviously didn't like it. On April 19, the governor said he would be unable to attend two events the following week honoring Knowland. Knight denied he was snubbing the retiring senator, claiming that he had previous engagements that conflicted with the Knowland affairs. At the same time, the governor was meeting with the pro-Nixon group known as the Republican Associates, hoping to swing its members over into his camp despite Nixon's and Knight's dislike for each other.[10]

By mid-1957, Knowland still was not stating his plans, but he certainly was acting like a candidate for governor. He scheduled forty-five speeches in a statewide tour that would begin the last weekend of August and take him from the Oregon border to the edge of Mexico. He remained vague about whether he had made a decision on the governor's race, saying that he didn't want anyone to jump to conclusions. By stalling on an announcement, he prevented Knight from making open attacks. Meanwhile, the rumors and leaks continued—some from within the Knowland camp.

Even his wife, Helen, claimed that her husband had not revealed his plans to her. "But," she said, "I can read the signs." She told a reporter from Newsweek that she had written in a letter to her mother, "I feel as sure that Billy is going to run for governor as I've ever been of anything." She said she handed the letter to her husband to read and mail "if it's all right." He mailed it. Did Bill Knowland want to be president? "I think it's obvious," Helen answered.[11]

In the background of the senator's decision were tense family considerations. Helen Knowland had never liked Washington, D.C., and she was particularly upset about her husband's continuing affair with Ruth Moody. After Blair's death, she wanted nothing more to do with the Moody family. She wanted Bill home, away from Ruth and what she called the Washington "candy shop" of young, attractive women. There were rumors around Washington that she threatened to leave him if he didn't return home. Asked later if the rumor was true, Helen replied simply, "I don't care to comment on that." Frank Mankiewicz, a longtime Democratic Party leader remarked, "It had to be something nonpolitical because there was no political reason in it at all."[12]

As his candidacy both for the governorship and then prospectively


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for the presidency became apparent, Knowland moved more to the right and away from Eisenhower and his vice president, Richard Nixon. He differed with Eisenhower on the budget, foreign aid, and school construction. Even respected columnist Walter Lippman questioned whether it was good for the Senate Republican leader to be so much at odds with the Republican president of the United States.[13] On June 3, 1957, Time magazine stated flatly, "Bill Knowland has no known pangs of conscience. He has always made it abundantly clear that his primary obligation is to the Republican Party, not to Ike. Even so, it is the Republican Party that Knowland may in the end hurt most."

Early in August, the Sacramento Bee reported that Knowland had told fellow California congressmen at an off-the-record breakfast in Washington that he definitely would be a candidate for governor in 1958. Governor Knight had not officially announced his reelection bid, but he had told newsmen he would not run for Knowland's Senate seat. Knowland refused to confirm or deny the Bee report, but he told the Associated Press with a smile, "I did meet with the Congressional delegation and we talked over various matters of interest, but I have no comment."[14] According to Manolis, the senator not only told the California delegation of his plans, but he had to hold the members back from immediately going on record publicly urging Knowland to run for governor.

The following day, the Associated Press quoted Knight as saying, "I can only say that Senator Knowland is a distinguished Californian and until he announces his plans, I have no comment." On August 11, AP Washington reporter Jack Bell predicted not only that Knowland would declare for governor but that he would have Nixon's support.[15] The best Knight could hope for was that Nixon would stay out of the California battle. While Nixon was still seething over Knight's attempt to deny the vice presidency to him in 1956, there was also the problem of both Knowland and Nixon wanting the GOP presidential nomination in 1960: Knowland as governor would be a powerful force in controlling California's delegation to the next Republican convention.

The 1960 presidential nomination was a touchy issue for Knowland. He had to be careful not to lend credence to Knight's claims that he only wanted the governor's office for a stepping-stone to the White House. Knowland's backers started putting out the word that it would be contrary to the senator's sense of public service to win the governor's job and then neglect its duties.

On August 19, 1957, Knight declared his plans to seek reelection and


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issued a direct challenge to Knowland to fight it out for the nomination. Sounding more and more like a gubernatorial candidate, Knowland said on the following day that he had no qualms about challenging Knight for the governorship: "I always have assumed the governor would be a candidate for renomination. There are no changes in my plans that have been previously announced."[16] Those plans included his upcoming speaking tour, and on August 21, 1957, he announced a committee to be in charge of the five-week tour that would end October 8. In the north, Oakland businessman Robert Barkell, San Francisco attorney John Dinkelspiel, and Capitola nursery operator Worth Brown were named to head what was looking like a full-scale campaign for governor. In the south, the representatives were Los Angeles attorney M. Philip Davis, Redlands newspaper publisher William Moore, and Frank Lowe, a retired minister and chairman of the San Diego County Republican Central Committee.

The opening event was before the Commonwealth Club of California, a luncheon group well used to taking senators, governors, presidents, and foreign heads of state in its stride. Knowland's speech was both national and regional. It could have been the opening salvo of a campaign for either governor or president, or both. The next morning he was in the state capital for the Sacramento Host Breakfast in the Hotel Senator. He shared the head table with Governor Knight, who later joined him at the state fair's press-radio-television banquet. Knight was there as the state's chief executive, Knowland in a dual capacity: as the state's senior U.S. senator and as an editor of the Oakland Tribune . The two were cordial, but Knowland criticized Knight for injecting the governor's race into his "nonpolitical" speech that morning at breakfast.

From there, the "fact-finding" trip read like a typical campaign schedule. Redding, Shasta Dam, Red Bluff, and Chico all served as forums in the blistering heat of the upper Sacramento Valley. In Red Bluff, the dusty valley town that was the home of Democratic Congressman Clair Engle, he told the Northern California crowds, "There are grave and important issues in California which must be settled without political considerations or pussyfooting policies." He said he would amplify on those policies in the coming week, adding, "Whoever the shoe may fit, may apply it."[17] Things were going well for the powerful senator, and as if to help him more in his home state, the University of California named him "alumnus of the year" for 1957.

Knowland denied he had a political deal with Vice President Nixon


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to support him against Knight, but he would not say that Nixon would stay out of the California campaigns. He emphasized his long friendship with Nixon and just as pointedly recalled that Knight joined an effort to "dump Nixon" in 1956. "I thought the governor was wrong then," Knowland said, "just as I think he is wrong in his predictions now"—that a bitterly contested Republican primary might split the California GOP and allow the Democrats to take over. The senator had no such concerns. He said in mid-September of 1957 that a primary battle might stimulate GOP interest and lead it to victory in the 1958 general election.

At the same time, he was framing what he termed the two issues of the 1958 campaign—water conservation and what he termed "union democracy." To Knowland, union democracy meant the right to work without union membership. To organized labor, it meant the end of the closed shop and unionism as they saw it.

Throughout his administration, Goodwin Knight had been whip-sawed by sectional jealousies and demands for water. The competing interests had deadlocked the legislature and stalled any possibility of a statewide water program. Knowland interpreted this as ineffectual leadership and Knight's inability to "chart a direct course and keep on it." Specifically, the senator cited his own authorship of federal legislation to allow joint state-federal financing for the San Luis Reservoir to transport Northern California water to huge sections of the western San Joaquin Valley, and he blamed Knight for backing off from the project. The senator said he would propose his own water development plan; it would bring together conflicting views of water surplus and deficits, help control floodwaters, and distribute surplus water to agriculture and urban needs.

Although Knowland tried to focus on the water issues, there were early warning signs that the union concerns might take over his campaign. There would be a right-to-work initiative on the November ballot, and the issue kept surfacing; moreover, Knowland would not back away from it. "No person should have to pay tribute [to a union] before he can have a job," he insisted. He talked of a time when Congress might find it necessary to regulate big unions just as corporations are regulated by antitrust regulations: While he was on his statewide "test the waters" swing, the California Federation of Labor sent a letter out to its membership accusing Knowland of running on an antilabor platform. With prescience, the state AFL group predicted that Knowland's support of right-to-work laws would make labor the dominant issue in


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the 1958 fight for the governor's office. The mailing also reminded its readers that Governor Knight had pledged himself to veto a right-to-work law if it came before him. In contrast, Knowland—despite terming reporters' questions "iffy"—said he would sign such legislation if it were equitable and fair.[18] The statement immediately presented the public with clear and sharp differences between the two powerful Republicans.

Although there was growing opposition from organized labor, Knowland continued to win applause from mostly Republican groups when he stated his belief that every man has a right to employment even if he does not join a union. Although the right-to-work issue was beginning to worry Republican tacticians, Knowland mentioned it in virtually every speech. Asa Call, head of Pacific Mutual and probably one of the most powerful men in the California GOP, tried to warn Knowland. He told him the issue would enrage union members and they would mobilize against him. Knowland stubbornly refused to take the advice.[19] That stubbornness delighted the Knight camp, which happily pointed out to reporters that no one had run an antilabor campaign since Republican Frank F. Merriam lost the governorship in 1938.

Republican National Committeeman Edward S. Shattuck of Los Angeles made no pretense of being objective in the governor's race. He accompanied Knowland on most of his tour through the San Joaquin Valley and stated flatly that in his opinion, Knowland would run a better campaign against Pat Brown than Knight. GOP State Chairman Alfonso Bell remained neutral, although his loyalty was with Knowland. The split began to take its toll on the Republican Party, as many leaders had predicted.

George Milias, president of the California Republican Assembly (CRA), a conservative Republican volunteer group, was a Knight supporter; but his feelings were not shared by the CRA members. When Knowland took a break from his September campaign schedule to attend a CRA meeting in Long Beach, he was met with enthusiasm and acclaim as California's great hope. Nevertheless, there was a movement started by Assemblyman Donald Doyle of Contra Costa County and CRA secretary Frances Larsen to urge Knowland to give up the governor s race and stay in the Senate: both Doyle and Larsen lost their standing among conservatives in the Republican Party as a result. Doyle, who was then vice chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, was never elevated to state chairman, and he did not seek reelection to the state assembly. Knowland, in turn, said that while he had read


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Doyle's letter, he would not be intimidated into staying out of the governor' s race.

Vice President Nixon's cadre also was working the CRA meeting. Senator Knowland again told reporters that there was no political bargain between them: "The vice president and I are very good friends. We see each other every day in Washington, but we have no deal or arrangement involving anything."[20] An article in the Wall Street Journal speculated that Nixon was up to his usual tricks, trying to manipulate the California election to benefit himself. "Vice President Nixon these days is involved in a seemingly strange political play. He is advancing his own White House ambitions by giving a boost to his only Republican rival." The reporter added, "This is neither naivete nor altruism on the part of the vice president. It may be a gamble, but it is one based on a cool calculation of the political realities."[21] By helping Knight, Nixon would have offended California conservatives whom he would need in 1960. But he believed the conservatives alone would not be strong enough to give the presidential nomination to Knowland, even if he were to win the California governorship, so helping the senator might not carry as much risk as it seemed.

There was no shortage of candidates for Knowland's senate seat. In addition to State Controller Robert Kirkwood, San Francisco mayor George Christopher, Congressman Patrick J. Hillings of Los Angeles County, and Lieutenant Governor Harold J. Powers were gearing up for the campaign. On the Democratic side, Congressman Clair Engle of Red Bluff, chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, was the front-runner. State Senator Robert I. McCarthy of San Francisco and Alan Cranston, chairman of the California Democratic Council, also were considering the seat. Attorney General Brown, considered the Democrat's top candidate for governor, endorsed Engle.

Knowland's stand on the right-to-work issue was producing growing concern in organized labor, and he sought to dispel it by insisting that rank-and-file members of the union movement supported his efforts to remedy union abuses. He continued to refer to his stand as "union democracy." At a September 13 press conference in San Diego, he said, "They asked me not to let up. They asked me to carry on the fight for them."[22] But he did not identify either the union members or their organizations.

Knight recognized the senator's vulnerability on the issue and went


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on the attack. At a September 20 press conference in Sacramento, he called Knowland's proposal "a step backward" and declared, "No politician can successfully turn the clock back in labor-management relations any more than he can reverse the trend of our rapidly expanding economy." The governor said so-called right-to-work schemes are misnamed and should be labeled anti-union shop measures.[23] Knowland was furious about Knight's comments. When both met on September 28 in Placerville at ground-breaking ceremonies for the American River Project, they greeted each other grimly, prompting one observer to say, "Icy weather came to the Sierra early today."[24]

Two days later, Knight attacked Knowland openly and by name on a Sacramento television news show, accusing the senator of "violent attacks" on organized labor. The governor said that among California's Republican and Democratic leaders, "Senator Knowland stands all alone in his attack on labor in California," and he pledged to veto any "right-to-work" bill that might come across his desk. Knowland, in turn, was saying that certain union leaders had marked him for "political liquidation" because of his stand on right-to-work, but he stated he would not be intimidated, "if I never hold public office for another day in my life. "[25] In the remainder of his 1957 precampaign swing, Knowland continued to lash out at what he termed labor union racketeers, suggesting that state legislation might be necessary to curb abuses.

On October 3, 1957, U.S. Senator William F. Knowland ended his cat-and-mouse game with the people and declared his formal candidacy for governor of California. At a press conference in Sacramento's historic Hotel Senator, Knowland read his statement to a crowd of reporters, television cameras, and press photographers. At his side were his wife, Helen, and daughter Estelle McKeen.

"Twenty-five years ago, in this city, the capital of my native state, as a young man of 24, I began my public service. I thought it appropriate to return here to Sacramento to announce my decision," he said. "I shall be a candidate for governor of California in 1958. During the course of the coming months, I shall continue to frankly discuss the issues which I believe to be of importance to this state and the nation." He met head-on the question of running against a fellow Republican incumbent: "It is my belief that our citizens welcome the opportunity to nominate and elect their own public officials. The direct primary system has been in effect in California since 1910. I do not agree with those who say it is 'disruptive' or 'catastrophic' to have primary contests."

The senator tried to address the charge that he simply considered


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the governorship a stepping-stone to the White House, pledging that "if nominated and elected, I will devote myself faithfully to the administration of the duties of the office for the term or terms to which I might be elected." But in answer to reporters' questions as to whether that was a "General Sherman type" statement on seeking the White House, Knowland replied, "No one has a crystal ball as to 1960 or 1964."[26] (Civil War hero General William Tecumseh Sherman famously wired the Republican National Convention on June 5, 1884, "If nominated, I will not accept; if elected I will not serve.")[27]

Knight now accelerated his attacks. He accused Knowland of fighting President Eisenhower's programs, forcing the senator to defend his record in Washington and respond that he voted with Eisenhower 93 percent of the time, compared to 69 percent for the average Republican senator.[28] Meanwhile, Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty, said there were no plans for the White House to get involved in the California battle. The day after Knowland's formal announcement, Knight demanded a statement from his opponent that Knowland "doesn't consider California a mere pebble on the road to the White House." He also blamed Knowland for "this intra-party struggle," adding, "If there is damage to the party or to our state, Mr. Knowland must accept full responsibility for that misfortune, as it will be of his own making."[29] That same day, California's junior senator, Thomas H. Kuchel, announced his support for Knowland for governor. The stage was set for a Republican Party donnybrook.

While Knight was expressing his fears that the Republican Party might come apart at the seams, Knowland kept insisting that a vigorous primary would be good for California. He also continued to attack organized labor. He proposed an eight-point program that would

elect union leaders by secret ballot

give union members the right to recall leaders

prevent conspiracies between management and union officials

protect welfare and pension funds

require union representation of all employees who desire membership (protection for minorities)

provide union members with a voice in the conditions, terms, and duration of strikes

prevent arbitrary control over local unions of trustees appointed by national or international unions


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protect union members from excessive union fees, assessments, or arbitrary actions

He even issued a pamphlet called "The Worker and Bill Knowland," which described his new program as a " Bill of Rights" for California employees.

Knowland, however, was far from at ease with workers, even his own volunteer workers. June Stephens, the Alameda County youth chairwoman for Knowland, wryly remembers: "We had a convertible, and one day we took him around the East Bay. Later, I took him to a television station in San Francisco. The next morning, we were having a train ride. Paul Manolis took me over to the senator and said, 'Do you know June Stephens?' and the senator said, 'So nice to meet you.' He didn't even remember me from the day before." In contrast, June Stephens told us, her husband, who was campaigning for Knight, had a very different experience: "Goodie remembered everyone ."

Vernon J. Cristina, a longtime Republican activist who would work with Knowland on the 1964 Goldwater campaign, remembered asking him to talk with some workers in Santa Clara County in 1958. "We told Paul [Manolis], 'Tomorrow morning we're going to start at 5 o'clock.' We were going to go out here to the farmer's market which always was on the agenda, or on the schedule for campaigns, because you met people who normally don't get exposed to politics." Cristina told Manolis, "But look, have him put on a pair of slacks, an open-collared shirt, and either a sport jacket or a sweater. And not that goddamned blue suit he always wears. [We] picked him up about a quarter to five and he was dressed up. We couldn't believe it—blue suit, shirt and tie."[30]

Knowland's campaign style, like his Senate actions, was a mixture of haste and bluster. He barreled through crowds like a fullback going off tackle, smiling and greeting supporters, but not really seeing them. But at any rate, the campaign was on schedule. Republican heavy hitters were lining up behind Knowland, and Knight was being squeezed aside. It became obvious that the Los Angeles Times would endorse Knowland and the Hearst newspapers would support Knight. The congressional delegation was fully in support of Knowland, and polls were beginning to show Knowland leading Knight three to one among Republican voters.

Suddenly, in the first week of November 1957, lightning struck. Governor Knight disappeared. It was rumored that he had the flu. Then it was learned that he had gone to Arizona to reassess his political future.


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He was staying at the estate of Robert S. Stephens in Phoenix, where he declined to answer telephone calls. His wife, Virginia, staff member Newton Stearns, and public relations consultants Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter went with him. Knight told them that Nixon and the Chandlers (publishers of the Los Angeles Times ) had warned him they would cut off his money if he ran for governor, but would support him if he ran for the Senate. Whitaker and Baxter told him bluntly that he could not win the nomination for governor without money and the newspapers.

Knight returned to Sacramento but stayed in seclusion. He was under enormous pressure from the Los Angeles Times to get out of the governor s race. Norman Chandler sent Knight at least three messages urging him to seek the Senate seat instead of the governorship. Nixon, too, continued to work behind the scenes. The vice president called Clinton Mosher, political editor of the San Francisco Examiner , and told him the Knowland-Knight battle was threatening to tear the GOP apart. Nixon said Knight could have the Senate nomination if he wanted it, but that he surely would lose the gubernatorial nomination to Knowland. Mosher, a close friend to both Nixon and Knight, drove to Sacramento and related the vice president's comments to Knight. The governor crumbled and dutifully agreed to run for Knowland's Senate seat. Mosher had his story; Nixon had what he wanted. Knight flew to Washington, met with Eisenhower and Nixon, and then made his formal announcement. Eisenhower commended him on his decision.

"This was the beginning of the Knowland defeat," Paul Manolis now suggests, "because the senator could never shake off the charges that a deal had been made and Knight was forced to switch. Who forced the switch? Who talked Goodie into this? I have no doubt in my mind. It was the Nixon crowd and the Los Angeles Times , pointing out to Goodie the unmistakable signs of defeat that lie ahead for him. This weak man caved in and refused to face the fire of battle." Manolis adds, "The Clint Moshers were joined now by the Brown forces in shouting that the people were deprived of their right to choose, and that the checkbook Republicans had forced Goodie out. And poor Goodie Knight put himself in the position of running for any office, as long as it was a job."

Much later, in 1964, Knight publicly confirmed that there had been a deal and that Nixon had threatened to campaign against him if he didn't step aside for Knowland. "The long series of disasters which Republicans have suffered in California since 1958 can be traced to 'the big switch' in which I was denied financial aid unless I agreed to run


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for senator instead of governor," Knight asserted. When he went to Washington in 1957 to appeal to Eisenhower, the president told him, "I leave those California matters in Dick Nixon's hands."[31] Knowland later agreed that Nixon was largely responsible: "I think probably the vice president played a part in this, because once Knight got out of the governor's race and came into the Senate race it left the question of party leadership really undecided. Because he was still governor while running for [the Senate] whereas if we had had a primary and I had won this would have clarified the situation. It also opened up the false charge that this was a deal" in which the senator had been directly involved. [32]

After the battering he had taken at the hands of his party leaders, Knight and his wife took a two-week vacation in Puerto Rico. They returned November 19 looking tanned and the governor appeared again to be his jovial self.

Knowland, however, had to face talk of a deal. In a speech in Santa Barbara on November 9, he said, "Despite an amazing amount of deliberate misrepresentation and uninformed speculation, the fact of the matter is: I have not participated directly or indirectly in any discussions or communications with the incumbent governor or his representatives before, during or subsequent to his decision to retire from the gubernatorial contest. Nor have I made any private commitment, directly or indirectly, to support any candidate for the United States Senate. I will support the Republican nominee when determined by the voters at the primary next June."[33]

Knight's switch to the Senate race not only upset Knowland's plan to show strength by defeating an incumbent governor, but it also had a domino effect, disrupting other Republican elections and exacerbating the split within the GOP. Especially hard-hit was San Francisco mayor George Christopher, who had declared for the Senate only after extracting a pledge from Knight not to run for that office.

With his plans disrupted, Knowland made a grave tactical error. Whether he was overconfident after his successful late summer and fall foray through California or simply gave in to the urge to return to the comfortable surroundings of the Senate, Knowland did a curious thing in early 1958: he went back to Washington and directed his primary campaign from his Senate office. Unlike his early offensive, when he traveled


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throughout the state, he made only sporadic, short trips back to California during the late winter and spring. He was in the battle of his political life, and he was trying to wage it by long distance.

Knowland also pulled a switch of his own in January. After he and Senator Tom Kuchel had sponsored legislation to provide full federal funding for the Trinity River section of the Central Valley Project, he reversed himself to support a "partnership" deal whereby the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Northern California's largest power supplier, would build the powerhouses and then sell the power at a profit. Pat Brown promptly took the other side of the issue, favoring public development of power on the river. He said he was shocked at Knowland's switch, adding, "I didn't think the senator needed the extra money for his campaign for governor that much."[34]

On April 21, 1958, Knowland took his right-to-work argument directly to organized labor. At a Fresno meeting of the California Congress of Industrial Organizations' Council on Political Education (COPE), he said he understood "how Daniel felt in the lion's den." He spoke for thirty minutes before the unsmiling audience, calling on the AFL-CIO members to support him even if their leaders did not. After the senator left the platform, convention delegates adopted resolutions opposing right-to-work legislation. By a voice vote, they adopted a straight Democratic slate, even forsaking their old friend Goodwin Knight. A motion was made for a dual endorsement of Knight and Democratic senatorial candidate Clair Engle, but it was rejected.

No matter what Knowland did, the primary campaign kept being steered back to the senator's fight with big labor. Pat Brown helped keep the pot boiling by telling California audiences that Knowland really didn't want labor reform, he merely wanted a scapegoat for workers' problems. "Knowland's attitude is, 'Why cure the patient when you can kill him?'"[35]

Brown also continued to hammer at Knowland for using the governor's office as a stepping-stone to the presidency, demanding that the senator say unequivocally whether he planned to serve a four-year term if elected. Knowland kept dodging the question by insisting that he always finished what he started, but he had no crystal ball for the future. Goodwin Knight, who was no help to the senator, even had said at an April speech in Pasadena that he believed Knowland wanted to use the governor's office as a gateway to the White House. Knowland also was forced repeatedly to deny he made a deal with Knight to switch jobs.

In Washington, the press corps watched the California election carefully; there was hardly a writer in the East who did not have some com-


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ment on Knowland. "He is unconquerably tactless, with sort of a genius for saying the wrong thing to the right people at the worst possible time," William S. White wrote in the Washington Star . "Far from kissing the baby, he is more likely to stonily ignore it—or to mistake its parents for quite another couple."[36]

Knowland continued his election fight in the Senate, attaching what he called his "bill of rights for labor" amendments to a broad bill aimed at regulating employee pension and welfare funds. The battle again set him against Eisenhower, who was threatening to veto an omnibus water projects bill that contained 134 flood control, navigation, and beach erosion projects, including several in California.

Attempting to keep the campaign moving back home was Knowland's family, who began a "Women for Knowland" tour through California. Accompanying Helen Knowland were her daughters Emelyn Jewett and Estelle McKeen and her daughter-in-law Dee Knowland. It was a month-long, 5,000-mile tour by bus throughout the state, launched with a May Day luncheon in Los Angeles. They would visit a hundred communities in a tour that included coffee shops, church visits, factory tours, picnics, lunch and dinner dates, and television appearances.

Estelle has mixed memories of the trip. "It was not a big budget thing, it was pretty simple. The logistics were complicated; keeping clothes cleaned and shoes polished. I remember a doughnut fry at Redding or Red Bluff. I recall a potato field in Visalia, where we took off our shoes and stockings and were walking out through the dirt to talk to workers. In San Luis Obispo we had vaqueros with mule-drawn wagons—anything to draw a crowd." The women drew good crowds and strong interest, but they were not the candidate for governor, and the campaign suffered, as Senator Knowland stayed in Washington.

Knowland flew in from Washington for a Mother's Day picnic in Sacramento, and the younger women sang for a crowd of about 300 to the tune of "I've Got Rhythm":

We've got Helen
For our mommy
We've got mommy
Who can ask for anything more?

The answer was obvious. We could ask for "Daddy more." But the candidate for governor left the picnic in Sacramento for a plane to Los Angeles, then flew back to Washington; the June 3 primary was days away. Knowland had spent just fourteen days campaigning in the state in the


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five months before the primary. The primary was a shocking wake-up call to the Knowland campaign. Although he easily won the Republican nomination for governor, with cross-filing in the combined primary Brown had a majority of more than 600,000 votes. Knowland reported spending $546,270, while Brown spent $402,391.

The senator called an emergency strategy meeting of his statewide Republican leaders on June 14 and 15 in San Jose to try to get back on track. On June 12 his state campaign manager, Edward S.Shattuck, who had been scheduled to preside, resigned from the Knowland organization over the disarray of the campaign. That same week, Goodwin Knight broke with the Republican campaign firm Whitaker and Baxter, his managers since his first political race for lieutenant governor in 1946; he apparently blamed them for his poor primary showing. The GOP was in shambles.

At the San Jose meeting, Knowland rejected advice from many of his 200 campaign leaders to back off from his antilabor stand. He told the Republicans he intended to stick by his principles even if that would cost him the governorship. After assuming full responsibility for not having spent more time in the state prior to the election, he left the convention and flew back to Washington without making any substantial changes in his staff. The campaign group continued to be impressed with Knowland's integrity, intelligence, and energy, but they wondered openly about his stubbornness.

Knowland proposed that all Republican candidates for statewide office join forces against the Democrats, the common enemy, and he endorsed all GOP candidates, including Knight. The governor quickly announced he would run an independent campaign in the Senate race. When Knowland announced plans to be in Sacramento on June 28 to address an American Legion convention, Knight called a press conference to say he would be out of town. The governor said he was meeting with some Democratic friends in Los Angeles. The senator countered by changing his plans to arrive in Sacramento a day early, so that he could meet with Knight.

On June 27, the two Republican rivals met for an hour and fifteen minutes in the governor's office; they emerged with no noticeable change in their stances. Afterward, Knight press secretary Tom Bright handed out a statement: "Senator Knowland and Governor Knight held a pleasant hour's talk this afternoon. They discussed questions concerning the campaign and they proposed to continue these talks either by telephone or in person during the days ahead. They have nothing


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further to say regarding their meeting at this time."[37] If Knowland expected Governor Knight to give in to political pressure once again, he was surprised. As London Economist writer William A. Clark put it in an article printed in Frontier , "He had not expected the irrepressible Goodwin J. Knight to be quite so irrepressible."[38]

In a press conference before the meeting, Knowland reiterated his support for Knight and other Republican nominees in the November election, but the governor did not reciprocate. On that same day, Knowland met with two other Republican nominees, Lieutenant Governor Harold J. Powers and Controller Robert C. Kirkwood, but neither agreed to endorse him. (Kirkwood gave up plans to run for the Senate after Knight decided to run, choosing instead to try for reelection.) Both opposed Knowland's right-to-work theme.

The closest Knowland came to admitting he might be on the wrong track was at a Washington press conference on July 10, when he said that if the right-to-work initiative was rejected in November and he won the governorship, he would no longer pursue the issue. In late July, Powers announced he would do whatever he could to keep the proposal from becoming part of the Republican Party platform. Pat Brown immediately accused the Republicans of trying to keep Knowland's major issue out of the GOP's summer convention. Knowland responded that the Democratic candidate and labor bosses were attempting to dictate the actions of the Republican state convention. Knowland supported Powers's move, saying that the matter should be left to the voters and that candidates should be left free to make their own decisions. The GOP delegates breathed a sigh of relief and took no stand on the right-to-work issue.

Senator Knowland's adamant refusal to leave Washington to campaign began to be a matter of widespread concern for Republican leaders. Even though he flew back to California for the August 2 and 3 GOP state convention, he made no campaign appearances. He did challenge Democratic gubernatorial nominee Pat Brown to debate, but Brown responded with derision. Casting Knowland in the role of an underdog, Brown dismissed the call for debate as a "threadbare political device used by every runnerup." He suggested that Knowland might want to debate with Goodwin Knight instead, since they disagreed so strongly on the right to work.[39] Instead of a debate, Brown urged Knowland to join him in a series of public statements presenting their views on water, schools, labor-management relations, and economic problems and giving their personal qualifications.


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Back in Sacramento on August 4, Knowland said he would open his campaign about August 28. He acknowledged the difficult road ahead but expressed confidence that he could win. Then he unleashed a new type of attack on Brown, claiming that as attorney general, the Democratic nominee had allowed eastern and midwestern crime syndicates to move into California.

Republican worries over the direction of the campaign increased, and as Congress closed its session on August 20, President Eisenhower issued a strong endorsement of Knowland. While acknowledging that the two had sometimes been at odds on foreign policy, he urged the California voters to back Knowland for governor. Eisenhower also sent "Personal and Confidential" letters to big Republican fund-raisers throughout the nation, emphasizing, "Knowland must win." The president wrote:

I know that he has been called stubborn, a bit of a lone wolf, and likely to follow his own conclusions and decisions, disregarding the opinions and convictions of able people who would like to be his friends. In other words, he is considered by some to be a bit of a bull in a china shop.

But I feel the following is also true: Bill Knowland is impeccably honest, courageous, studious and serious, and he is physically strong and tireless. Regardless of any blunders that he may or may not have made, these attributes are not to be lightly dismissed.

Eisenhower went on to say, somewhat ruefully, that he had differences with Knowland, adding, "In fact, I think he would be of greater service to the nation, and to the Republican Party and its principles, in the governor's chair in California than he is in the U.S. Senate."[40]

The GOP alarm obviously went all the way to the White House.

Then in late August, Helen Knowland dropped a bombshell. The senator's wife came across a pamphlet written by Joseph Kamp, an eastern muckraker so far to the right that he was considered a fascist by many members of Congress. Kamp, the author of a book titled We Must Abolish the United States (1950), was thought to be anti-Semitic and had gone to jail for contempt of Congress after he refused to identify the backers of his poison-pen writings. Helen, however, either did not know of his reputation or didn't care. She was so enamored with his new pamphlet—Meet the Man Who Plans to Rule America , a virulent piece about Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers-that she distributed about 500 copies to California Republicans. She was planning to mail out thousands of additional copies when the New York Times broke the story about a link between the Knowland campaign and


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Kamp. The Times said financing was being provided for the pamphlets by Donaldson Brown, former vice chairman of the board of General Motors Corporation; Pierre S. du Pont II, a director of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company; and Charles M. White, chairman of the board of Republic Steel Corporation. Helen Knowland told the Times she was not aware of Kamp's background and didn't know he once had been condemned by Senator Knowland's old mentor, the late Senator Robert Taft.[41]

Brown immediately expressed outrage, saying Knowland was "doing business with elements which would not stop at imposing a Fascist dictatorship over the American people."[42] The senator ordered Helen to stop the distribution, but the damage had been done. All of the good she might have accomplished in her bus tour through California was wiped out. And even then, Knowland himself never repudiated the pamphlet outright.

With his Senate business finally behind him, Knowland returned to California and set about defining his candidacy. He held a press conference to declare that the new California administration would have to cut costs, seek additional revenues, and reorganize state agencies. He stopped short of saying he would raise taxes, but he made it clear that the legislature would have to find ways to support any proposals for new expenditures.

By Labor Day, he was back in Oakland declaring that hoodlum elements had infiltrated unions and that labor democracy was needed to allow members to regain control of their organizations. At a rally in downtown Los Angeles, Brown responded to Knowland's attacks, saying, "I oppose the mislabeled right-to-work law as a return to the ugly and destructive law of the economic jungle. I believe in legal or collective bargaining as a basic right of both labor and management."[43] On September 12, Knowland's own campaign manager in Santa Rosa declared himself in opposition to the proposal. Karl F. Stolting, former mayor of Santa Rosa and owner of an electrical firm employing union workers, said he was wholeheartedly for Knowland but opposed the right-to-work initiative.

A new blow to Knowland's campaign came on October 4. At a meeting of United Press International editors in Los Angeles, Goodwin Knight announced officially that he could not support the senator for governor because of his right-to-work views. "It is a rugged and


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hard fight in California," Knowland said when told of Knight's stand. "I personally am supporting the whole Republican ticket regardless of Knight's position in this backyard quarreling."[44] Knowland's campaign later produced a 1953 letter from Knight to a supporter in which the governor wrote, "I agree with you the right-to-work proposal should have been adopted by the legislature," but it didn't take the pressure off.

In mid-October, Vice President Richard Nixon made two trips to California to campaign for the Republican ticket. During an October 15 news conference, he said he saw no serious problem in the Knowland-Knight squabble, although he said he always found it more effective to run with and endorse other Republicans. He pointed out that Governor Earl Warren ran an independent campaign in 1950 while Nixon was running for Senate, and that both Republicans won.

Meanwhile, the rest of the nation was puzzled over all the infighting in California. Just two weeks before the election, the Washington Post and Times-Herald summed it up: "The one sure thing is that all this Republican infighting must be considered as manna by the Democratic candidates for governor and senator."[45]

Almost in desperation, Knowland introduced a new and confusing element into the campaign by connecting a slain Chicago underworld figure with Democratic National Committeeman Paul Ziffren, a Los Angeles attorney. The senator said Ziffren had been associated with Alex Louis Greenberg before Greenberg was murdered. He then suggested that San Francisco hotelier and Democratic fund-raiser Ben Swig had links to frontmen for Chicago gangsters. Swig, one of San Francisco's best-known civic leaders, called the senator's accusations "just another dirty, despicable character vilification." Swig added, "If Mr. Bill Knowland wants to know anything about me, all he has to do is call up Mr. Joseph Knowland, his father."[46]

With only two weeks to go before the November 4 election, political pundits were not writing about whether Bill Knowland would win or lose, but how badly he would be beaten. Some predicted Pat Brown would win the governorship by a million votes. Knowland was tired, and he must have considered how different things would have been if he had been running for his senate seat instead of for governor. He noted in a letter to Lyndon Johnson that he had had no vacation and that "one of these days when the campaign is over and I'm in your part of the world, I would like to drop down and see how you relax on your ranch. "[47]

The senator, still riding his antiunion horse but arguing that rank-and-file members would vote for him, went into the Fontana United


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Steelworkers Union hail on October 23 to tell his side of the story. The 1,000-seat hall had only twelve people in it—a jury commissioner and the prospective jurors he was interviewing. A nearby union office had a sign on it that said, "Offices closed. Attending Pat Brown meetings." Knowland sighed, and said, "It's what I've been saying. They only want to hear one side."[48]

The following day he was in more comfortable surroundings. At the Commonwealth Club of California's regular Friday meeting in San Francisco, he denounced Brown for claiming that Knowland would organize an ultra-right-wing third party if he lost, calling it an "unmitigated lie." He also said for the first time that if he lost the governorship bid, he probably would never seek public office again.

The 1958 campaign made clearly visible Knowland's view of the universe, which placed himself in the center. His decision to shove aside Knight was merely an extension of his belief that whatever was good for him was good for the United States and the world. As with many extremely shy and egocentric people, Knowland turned to himself for counsel, and what he heard was what he then announced as policy. He was not an easy man to advise. Moreover, his actions revealed a deep contradiction. While he presented himself as a man who would do anything for his party, his state, and his nation, he was in fact ripping apart the California Republican Party. Indeed, in the view of many California Republican leaders, he was destroying the GOP's chances for winning in 1958 or being a major factor in the 1960 presidential campaign.

William A. Clark put it bluntly in Frontier magazine in October 1958: "This kind of self-hypnosis—an infatuation with one's own ideas—is a common enough practice among politicians. But there are few who have been able to indulge in it as completely as Senator Knowland because a rude awakening at the polls is so often the result. So far, at least, the Senator has never had such an experience on election day—and on very few other occasions in his life either. As a result, he is known in private life and in public life in which he has risen so high as a man completely wrapped up in himself."[49]

In the final days of the campaign, Bill Knowland was already slipping badly, and then Helen got into trouble again. In a letter to 200 Republican leaders, she referred to Governor Goodwin J. Knight as a man with a "macaroni spine." In an open letter to the senator, the Long Beach Press-Telegram immediately accused Knowland of "a new low in tactics by using his wife, Helen, as a hatchet woman."[50] Knowland refused to apologize for his wife's actions and declared, "She has always been, as any wife should be, of great assistance to me";[51] soon


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afterward, the paper endorsed Brown. From inside the Knowland campaign, however, the story was different. According to Paul Manolis, the senator called Helen and shouted at her, "You've blown this election already!" The whole campaign crew was listening.

On October 30, just five days before the election, Republican William A. Burkett, state superintendent of banks, threw his support to Pat Brown, charging Knowland with destroying the Republican Party in California. He said that he would continue to support Goodwin Knight for Senate, but Knowland's mudslinging and ruthless tactics were causing Republicans to desert the GOP. The same day, the San Francisco Chronicle withdrew its endorsement of Knowland. The newspaper stated: "The Chronicle supported Senator William Knowland in the primary election. Unfortunately, however, we have been unfavorably impressed with his subsequent campaign. We now no longer feel we can unqualifiedly urge his election, and therefore suggest our readers vote for the candidate of their choice." Although the Chronicle made no endorsement, its action against Knowland ended the three-newspaper axis that had dominated California Republican politics for so long. The strongly Republican (but self proclaimed "politically independent") San Francisco Examiner , flagship of the Hearst empire, did endorse Pat Brown.

Just before the election, in the weekend editions, the senator did gain an endorsement, from the Los Angeles Times . "Knowland, who didn't have to enter the fight, is staking his career and the national welfare of the Republican Party on his campaign," the editorial stated. "He will fight to the last bell and we are staying in his corner."[52] The Los Angeles Herald Express also endorsed Knowland the weekend before the election. The Oakland Tribune of course endorsed Knowland, but it endorsed no one for the U.S. Senate.

In a last-ditch effort to halt the campaign's hemorrhaging, Knowland staged a twenty-hour telethon in Southern California to try to reach voters before the November 4 election. He went on the air from Hollywood, with crews relaying questions from passersby in Hollywood, downtown Los Angeles, and Los Angeles International Airport. Actor Randolph Scott and actresses Myrna Loy, Ginger Rogers, and Zasu Pitts dropped in to wish him luck, and two dozen telephone operators took questions from television viewers. Knowland was on screen from 10:30 Friday night until 7 P.M. Saturday, November i. Although the show originated in Southern California, it also was shown on stations in Stockton and Sacramento, covering much of the Sacramento


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and San Joaquin Valleys. For the most part, the campaign was over. Brown held his own, smaller telethon, and the candidates made a few stops on the Monday before election day.

That night in Los Angeles, Knowland took his family and staff to see The Last Hurrah , a sentimental Spencer Tracy film about a boss in a New England town fighting for his political life. Estelle Knowland remembered: "There was an intermission, and at the intermission we went out in the foyer for a breath of air, and who was there—Pat and Bernice Brown."

The family returned to Oakland on Tuesday to await the returns at the Tribune office. From his assistant publisher's desk, the senator kept his own tally of votes as they came in from the precincts. The bad news came early: the first report gave Brown 1,385 votes and Knowland 564. Bill Knowland showed no emotion, calmly greeting family members and friends who dropped by to watch the returns. His eighty-five-year-old father, J. R. Knowland, also sat poker-faced as he watched the numbers roil up for Brown.

The senator chuckled once, when the tiny Sierra hamlet of Pike came in with Knowland, 8, Brown, I. But there was no dramatic narrowing of the margin, just steadily mounting gains for Brown. With the exception of Secretary of State Frank Jordan, the entire Republican slate was going down with Knowland. Less than two hours after the polls closed, Brown declared victory. Knowland wasn't ready to concede. He had been in the election business twenty-six years, and although the early returns were grim, more than 80 percent of the state still hadn't been counted.

While J. R. Knowland stayed at the newspaper, the senator and his family drove across the Bay Bridge to his San Francisco headquarters on lower Market Street. Shortly after they arrived, the senator took one more look at the returns and began writing a congratulatory telegram to Pat Brown. While Jim Gleason screamed for him not to concede, Knowland signaled to Manolis to take the telegram down the street to the Western Union office and send it.

At 10:32 P.M., the senator addressed his crowd of campaign workers and the television cameras. "I have sent my congratulations to the attorney general," he said over the shouts of "No!" from his loyal followers. "He has been given the opportunity and the responsibility to be chief executive of California for the next four years." Reporters crowded around to ask if he would be given a federal post by President Eisenhower. He answered, "Absolutely not," and said his only plans were to


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return to the Tribune and his family. He said he had no further political ambitions.[53]

The senator and his family walked out of the campaign headquarters and went home. There was nothing left to do. The Tribune held back its morning street edition deadline throughout the night, but there was no change. When the full returns came in the following morning, Brown had won by more than a million votes. The right-to-work issue went down with Knowland.


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24— The Big Switch
 

Preferred Citation: Montgomery, Gayle B., and James W. Johnson One Step from the White House: The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland. Berkeley, Calif:  University of California Press,  c1998 1998. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4k4005jq/