Four
Pamphlet Readers and the Public

To the people of Poitou, greetings. Let it be known that it is today more than ever necessary to oppose with arms in hand the secret intrigues of the Prince and his confederates, traitors to the King and to their country, who are working for the return of those we have banished. . . . It is widely known that M. de Saluert, Councillor in the court of Parlement, since his return from Paris, has loudly and publicly spoken against the King and his town, and in favor of the banished, and that he tried to suborn several good men. . . . He tried to have a pamphlet against the King printed, and spoke to the printer Mesnier to this end.
—FROM A PLACARD POSTED ABOUT THE TOWN OF POITIERS, DECEMBER 1614

What kind of readership did political pamphlets enjoy in the early seventeenth century? Except for references to pamphlets here and there in the correspondence of political elites, there is little direct evidence about the reading public. Readers undoubtedly existed: our analysis of production and distribution shows that both Parisians and provincial towndwellers were an important audience for the several hundred thousand pamphlets circulating in France during the 1614-1616 crisis. But is it possible to develop a more precise picture of the reading public? Does it make sense to begin by trying to group readers into their respective "orders"—clergy, nobility, and the Third Estate? How important were regional affiliations? What other variables helped to define specific groups of readers?

Some preliminary remarks about seventeenth-century French literacy are in order. The earliest useful data on literacy for France as a whole are for 1690. A survey of signatures on marriage documents suggests that at that time fewer than 25 percent of French males and about 10 percent of French females had benefited from some basic schooling.^[1] It is reasonable to assume that literacy rates were about the same for the early dec-

[1] . Furet and Ozouf, Lire et écrire , 1:8. The French language has no synonym for literacy . The nearest equivalent is alphabétisation , i.e., the most basic level of skill in reading and writing. The 1690 figures are based on a study by a nineteenth-century inspector of public education, Maggiolo, who found that just under 25 percent of French males and about 10 percent of French females could sign their names, indicating at least a rudimentary knowledge of reading and writing. There is much that is problematic about such data, and the many subsequent studies that have been done in France. See Graff, Legacies of Literacy , 108-221.

ades of the seventeenth century.^[2] Although low compared with present-day standards, a male literacy rate of around 20 percent would be substantial in an overwhelmingly agrarian and peasant society. If we accept Pierre Goubert's generalization that France was more than 95 percent rural and about 80 percent of its population was made up of peasants at this time, then these figures suggest not only that literacy rates among urban dwellers were quite high but also that a sizable percentage of the rural population was basically literate.^[3] The most basic reading skills, however, did not provide a person with access to the world of print. A reader of simple religious or practical texts might well be incapable of reading learned theological or political debate. Such a conclusion is consistent with what we know about the levels of literacy and the function of books and printing in the French Reformation.^[4]

There can be little doubt that in the seventeenth century the primary reading public consisted of educated urban elites.^[5] This is confirmed by the account books of Nicolas, the Grenoblois book dealer whose business Martin and his collaborators have analyzed.^[6] Among the 504 identifiable purchasers of books in mid-seventeenth-century Grenoble, more than half were government officials, and the town's legal professionals were the most numerous book buyers of all. The next largest group, about one-fifth of the reading public, consisted of ecclesiastics. Another tenth were lesser provincial nobles, and yet another tenth were simple bourgeois.^[7]

Information about the social status of pamphlet readers is also available from Nicolas's account books. During the years of the Fronde, Nicolas sold a fair number of mazarinades .^[8] When he sold these pamphlets on

[2] . For an overview of the general pattern of education in the seventeenth century see Chartier, Compère, and Julia, L'Education en France . Catholic reformers placed considerable emphasis on primary education in the seventeenth century, just as the Protestant reformers had in the sixteenth, but this probably did not effect a dramatic increase in the level of education. As Huppert has emphasized, the municipal collège was an extremely popular institution in the sixteenth century; see his Public Schools in Renaissance France .

[3] . Goubert, Ancien Regime , 43-44, for population figures.

[4] . Cf. Chartier, "Publishing Strategies," in Cultural Uses of Print , 163-178. See also Davis, "Printing and the People," 189-226; and Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion .

[5] . Remarkably few Latin-language pamphlets were published during the 1614-1617 conflicts—perhaps 1 percent of the total—even though in 1600 as many as one-fourth of all major publications coming from Paris were still in Latin (mostly religious books or scholarly works in fields such as law), Martin, Livres , 1:76.

[6] . Martin et al., Registres du libraire Nicolas .

[7] . Ibid., 1:137-265.

[8] . Ibid., 1:96-97.

credit, he noted the name of the purchaser. Although an analysis of these names does not provide a totally accurate portrait of the purchasers of mazarindes (since Nicolas presumably sold to other clients in cash transactions as well), it is nevertheless enlightening. About two-thirds of the purchasers were legal professionals, and more than half were officials in the sovereign courts.^[9] Nobles account for 12 percent of Nicolas's list, clergymen for 7, while merchants and artisans for 5 percent. The upper and upper-middle classes, apparently, were important consumers of pamphlet literature. The high percentage of officials from the sovereign courts among purchasers of pamphlets is particularly noteworthy because these men accounted for less than a third of Nicolas's clientele.^[10]

Looking at the public from a different angle, we can ascertain the popularity of certain pamphlets by the number of editions that were reprinted. Some pamphlets were printed in more than fifteen editions.^[11] The printing of five or six editions, three or four of which came from Paris, was not at all unusual. Multiple printings were, at least in part, the result of popular demand. Original and official editions may have been paid for by sponsors, but a large proportion of subsequent editions (especially pirated ones) must have been printed to be sold at a profit to customers. Moreover, L'Estoile tells us that pamphlets were often purchased, read, and resold.^[12] In this way, an edition of one thousand pamphlets could easily find its way into the hands of many more than a thousand readers.

Although clearly the primary audience, the literate public was not the sole consumer of pamphlet literature. The content of printed material was passed along second- and thirdhand, through sermons, town meetings, and everyday conversations in the marketplace. Rather than thinking of print as a novelty that replaced the traditional oral channels of communication, we should think of it as interwoven with everyday discourse. Official publications were read aloud by town criers, and the content of pamphlets must have also been passed along in oral readings. In a politically charged urban atmosphere, the contents of a newly arrived, sensational pamphlet probably reached a broad cross-section of the population very quickly. The contents of pamphlets certainly reached a larger and socially more diverse audience than the book-buying public.

[9] . See Chartier's analysis of these data in "Pamphlets et gazettes," 1:413-423.

[10] . Ibid. The officers constituted 30 percent of Nicolas's known clientele (138 out of 460 persons) and 58 percent of the known purchasers of mazarinades (48 out of 83).

[11] . Duccini, "Regard sur la littérature pamphlétaire," 328.

[12] . L'Estoile, Journal , ed. Lefevre and Martin, 1:331-332.

Local Politicization and the Issues

The combination of oral and written dissemination of propaganda is illustrated by the transmission of important political news early in the 1614-1617 campaigns. In the case of most major urban centers outside Paris, the first suggestions of political trouble were contained in handwritten royal letters from the capital, delivered by courier. The court's first set of letters to the provinces went out in mid-February, a few weeks after the forces of the rebels had gathered in Mézières. The letters arrived, for example, on 13 February in Poitiers, on 17 February in Angers, on 22 February in Dijon, and on 20 February in Bordeaux.^[13] The Crown appears to have been able to circulate prejudicial information about Condé's enterprise several weeks before pamphlets from either side began to appear. The earliest mention of Condé's first pamphlet in such correspondence is in a letter from the queen mother dated 24 February to Cardinal de Sourdis.^[14] The first bit of evidence that Condé's pamphlet was in general circulation is the mention of its appearance in Poitiers on 8 March.^[15]

When letters from the Crown arrived in a provincial city, a number of things happened. Most important, they were generally read aloud at a special meeting of the town council or, in some cases, a much larger assembly. The town council then proceeded to order the posting of guards (or additional guards) at the city gates.^[16] Prelates who were strong allies of the queen mother took it upon themselves to give or order spe-

[13] . See the references to municipal deliberations below and for Bordaux in Inventaire Sommaire (see sec. II of the Bibliography), 4:221-22. In Bordeaux the lieutenant governor was a close ally of the administration and had already ordered special guards on 13 February "en vue d'une surprise du prince de Condé," well before the order arrived from Paris in the official correspondence.

[14] . Ms. fr. 6379, f. 181.

[15] . Délibérations de l'Hôtel de Ville of Poitiers, 8 March 1614.

[16] . The deliberations of the Chambre de la Ville of Dijon and the Hostel et Maison de la Ville of Angers are instructive. When the municipal governments received the queen mother's letter (characterizing Condé's departure from the court and requesting political assistance), a special meeting of the city council was convoked in Dijon on 22 February, first to hear Marie's letter of 13 February read by the clerk, then to give the bearer of the letter a chance to make more detailed explanations, and finally to hear the advice of local notables, including a representative of the governor; Archives Municipales du Dijon, B 251, ff. 178-181. Similar meetings took place in Angers on 17 February, Archives Municipales d'Angers, BB 60, ff. 97-100; in Bordeaux on 20 and 22 February (see n. 13 above); and in Agen on 24 February, Archives Communales conserved in the Archives Departementales, Lot-et-Garonne (Agen), BB 42, ff. 129-130. At the Angers meeting, the baron de Sainte-Suzanne, governor of the town, presented a letter from his father, governor of the province, saying that all the towns on the Loire River had posted guards and that it would be appropriate to do so in Angers as well "for the service of the King and the preservation of the town."

cial services dedicated to the health and safety of the king and his mother. The initiatives of Cardinal de Sourdis, archbishop of Bordeaux, were probably typical. De Sourdis appended political speeches to his sermons that were greeted with cheers of "Vive le Roi, Vive la Reine, vive le Cardinal."^[17] The queen mother and her advisers were grateful for these orations; a letter from Secretary of State Pontchartrain thanked the cardinal on behalf of the queen mother for "the public exhortations" and for the "handbills urging prayers to God for the health of their Majesties."^[18] No doubt many other clergymen engaged in the same kind of activity.^[19]

Many local officials clearly saw it as their duty to publicize the news of Condé's "movements" and the potential for trouble in their own localities. Publicity was a major purpose of the larger town council meetings convoked to hear the February 1614 letters from the queen mother. The propagandistic function of these ad hoc municipal meetings is underscored by the attendance of local military governors, community representatives, and other persons not usually present at such gatherings. In Angers, for example, six Protestants were specially invited to the reading of the regent's letter on 17 February so that the Protestants would not misconstrue any military preparations by the town's militia.^[20]

Both the letter and the oral messages delivered by courier were aimed at consolidating support for the queen mother's administration, even though Condé was not yet characterized in official propaganda as the leader of a "revolt." Villeroy's letters are measured, yet clearly partisan, calls for political discipline and support. The oral messages were more direct and polemical, even provocative. The sieur of Fondrière, who delivered the queen mother's letters to Dijon, spoke at some length about her political intentions.^[21] He said she had done everything in her power to keep Condé and the other princes content but was prepared to proceed with the Spanish marriages and had raised an army of twenty thousand foot soldiers and three thousand horsemen for security. Fondrière denied the "false rumor" that the queen mother wanted her regency to continue for two additional years and defended the administration's foreign policy. The sieur of Fourcquevoller, who delivered the same

[17] . A limited description of de Sourdis's orations can found in Ravenez, Histoire du Cardinal Sourdis , 284ff.

[18] . Letter of 29 February 1614, B.N. Ms. fr. 6379, f. 189.

[19] . Bishops writing to Pontchartrain also appear to have been one of the Crown's primary sources of intelligence about developments in the southwest. See, in addition to the bishop of Poitiers's correspondence mentioned below, other letters to Paris from Sourdis and from the bishop of Luçon (Richelieu), B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 229, 275.

[20] . Archives Municipales d'Angers, BB 60, f. 97.

[21] . Archives Municipales du Dijon, B 251, ff. 179-179 verso.

letter to Angers, added "some words of confidence with which he was charged," in addition to the contents of the queen mother's letter, but the record provides no further details.^[22]

Such emissaries provoked widespread discussion in taverns, at market, and in the normal conversations of business and daily life. Through immediate measures such as the increased security at a city's gates, inhabitants of the suburbs as well as the towns were alerted to the likelihood that something politically important was about to happen. Organizing the town militia to keep watch at the city gates must have been especially significant. Participation in the watch was often demanded of every citizen of the town, and sometimes even of women. Keeping watch, especially at night, was considered a burdensome obligation that people often tried to avoid. City fathers were reluctant to order a watch unless it was absolutely necessary, in part because it caused additional expenses such as purchasing wood to keep fires going at night. The need for the watch at the city gates and the assignment of guard duty provoked discussions among neighbors and arguments with city authorities.

These were the first steps, in early 1614, toward a broad politicization of the French public. Through the actions of local magistrates or through news carried by messengers, the possible revolt of the prince de Condé rapidly entered the consciousness of the public. Even at this early state of the 1614-1617 conflict, political participation was both local and national. People were defending their towns, and defending the town was identical (for many) to supporting the administration of the queen mother against troublemakers—the princes, their henchmen, or others who might try to take advantage of the situation. Preservation of the town "for the service of the king" was a kind of patriotic duty, ultimately linked to maintaining law and order both in the realm and in one's own community.^[23]

Further escalation of the conflict and the identification of national and local issues occurred as pamphlets and local leaders elaborated on the basic issues and introduced new ones. In the context of 1614-1617, further politicization was especially intense in towns that were already deeply divided along politico-religious lines, or towns that had some special relationship with one of the rebel leaders. In these cases, the act of preserving the status quo exposed and exacerbated existing political divisions in the town and sometimes led to a violent struggle for control. In Poitiers, for instance, a very broad cross-section of the public participated in these contests, and printed propaganda was an important source of agitation.

[22] . Archives Municipales d'Angers, BB 60, f. 98 verso.

[23] . De Lestang used the following language in his letter to Paris: "For all that is represented in the letter of my said Lord the Prince [i.e., Condé's manifesto], there are no disturbances in this area, although certain people continue to spread rumors detrimental to the service of the King and the authority of your majesties," B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, f. 54.

The Affair of Poitiers

In most of France the political behavior of the public was characterized throughout 1614-1617 by cooperation with Marie de Médicis's administration. Urban elites generally and royal officials in particular rallied early and decisively in support of the government. The most important exceptions to this rule were towns with strong ties to Condé or one of his confederates through a governorship, and towns under the control of Protestants. Poitiers was one of the former.^[24] The loyalties of the military governor of Poitiers, the duc de Roannes, vacillated. Two of Condé's partisans, the marquis de Bonnivet and the marquis de Rochefort, were among the more prominent nobles of the region. The struggle for control of Poitiers began as soon as Condé launched his challenge in February 1614. The queen mother and her advisers watched events very closely and wrote several letters to the town warning the citizens not to involve themselves in political conspiracies and intrigues (pratiques et menées ), to live harmoniously together (vous maintenir tous ensemble en bonne union et amitié ), and to guard the city gates carefully in order that "no one enter whoever he be, if followed by anyone other than his usual companions, on whatever pretext, unless he carries a passport or an express order from the King."^[25]

The struggle for control of Poitiers is of particular interest here for three reasons. First, there is considerable evidence about the involvement of ordinary citizens in the struggle. Second, it displays interesting ideological configurations that appear closely tied to the printed propaganda then in circulation. Finally, it is a microcosm of the much broader struggle for control of France. Poitiers, like any major town, would be a major asset to either political coalition. This was particularly true because the region was heavily populated by Protestants, and many local antagonisms remained from the religious wars. Early in the 1614 struggle, the militancy of the bishop of Poitiers became a central issue. He was accused of practicing Holy League politics and of trying to build his own "royal throne in Poitiers.^[26] Like other prelates in the region, the bishop was a strong partisan of Marie de Médicis's administration, and he worked

[24] . The story about to unfold was reconstructed from printed pamphlets, documents in B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, and the Délibérations de l'Hôtel de Ville of Poitiers, Bibliothèque Municipales (Register) 68. See also the careful study by Ouvré, "Essay sur l'histoire de la ville de Poitiers," 365-528, based largely on sources available in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Poitiers.

[25] . Délibérations de l'Hôtel de Ville of Poitiers, Bibliothèque Municipales (Register) 68, f. 201, 206-207, and 213-215 (several such letters were copied into the register).

[26] . The phrase Throsne de la Roiauté qu'il imagine de former à Poitiers appears in Condé's letter to the queen of 11 July, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, 223. This was one of several letters that Condé sent to Paris, the first of which are dated 26 and 27 July. The letter of 25 June (e.g., to Jeannin, B.N. Ms. fr. 3799) is reproduced almost word for word in the pamphlet entitled Lettre de Monsieur le Prince envoyée à La Royne (1614).

very hard to ensure that Condé's faction, tinged with Protestantism, did not gain a foothold in the province or the town.^[27]

Politicization occurred along lines of a traditional Poitevin rivalry—the militant Catholics on one side, the moderates (or politiques ) on the other. The existing rivalry between bishop and other local notables—particularly the mayor and the town's royal (military) governor—helped to consolidate these divisions. The bishop, Henri-Louis Chasteigner de la Rocheposay, was an intelligent, energetic, and well-educated prelate from an ancient and wealthy family among the local nobility. He liked and understood political power. He was also a Catholic reformer and an ardent papist. The governor, Louis Gouffier, duc de Roannes, was the ambitious and quarrelsome head of another important local family.^[28] A political pragmatist, he was tolerated by the municipal government and local Protestants. The mayor, Nicolas de Sainte-Marthe, and his family were decidedly politique . They had also been members of the municipal oligarchy for years and resented the bishop's intrusive power.

These tensions were aggravated by the broader military and religious situation in the Province of Poitou. The duc de Sully, Henry IV's famous Protestant minister of finance (now retired), was still the royal governor of the province. The lieutenant-governor, the marquis de Rochefort, was a favorite of the prince de Condé and an officer in his household.^[29] Sully never openly supported Condé nor raised any troops for the rebels in the 1614-1617 conflict. At the same time, he was critical of the queen mother's administration and encouraged the Protestants to remain independent of either coalition, while quietly agitating behind the scenes and urging military preparedness.^[30] In such circumstances, all sides could legitimately fear a change in the balance of power in the City of Poitiers and the surrounding province.

These rivalries were transformed overnight into an overt struggle for control of Poitiers by the arrival in March of Condé's pamphlet. On 8 March a messenger arrived from Rochefort on behalf of Condé carrying a printed copy of Condé's February manifesto and a handwritten letter addressed to the mayor and the city council.^[31] In an effort to dissociate himself from any conspiracy, the mayor immediately convoked a special meeting of the municipal leadership in order to receive and interrogate

[27] . Formon, "Henri-Louis Chasteigner de la Rocheposay," 165-231.

[28] . Beauchet-Filleau et al., Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Familles de Poitou , 4:255-257.

[29] . Aumale, Histoire des Princes de Condé , 1:21 (see sec. II of Bibliography).

[30] . Sully's position is evident from his letters to Villeroy, Bibliothèque de l'Institute de France, Ms. Godefroy 268, ff. 44 and 57.

[31] . Délibérations de l'Hôtel de Ville, Poitiers, Bibliothèque Municipales (Register) 68, f. 220.

the courier. When the blatantly partisan content of the message became apparent, the mayor quickly tried to sever all ties to the pamphlet and to Condé. He made a public show of sending the letter and the pamphlet to the queen mother and her advisers in an effort or demonstrate his loyalty.

Condé's pamphlet was probably not immediately reprinted and disseminated about the city, but it nonetheless played a crucial role in the ensuing political struggle. The pamphlet's very existence may have been as politically important as its content. It was a clear indication of Condé's hostile political stance and his probable tactics. To the progovernment faction it meant that Condé was a rebel and was trying to win over the town. The contents of the pamphlet, like the contents of the queen mother's letters, were made known first to the political elite of the town and then to the general public. It had passed through a number of hands on its way to Poitiers, including those of Condé's noble allies in the region. Moreover, Marie's partisans were not necessarily trying to keep the pamphlet secret; some saw it as incriminating evidence of the rebels' real intentions.

The appearance of the pamphlet did a great deal to undermine the political position of the moderate party. The bishop began publicly to portray the mayor and his friends as agents of Condé, intent on opening the town gates to the prince and his unruly soldiers. The bishop's interpretation of events was convincing, and his credibility among the townspeople grew. Within a few weeks of the arrival of Condé's pamphlet-carrying messenger, the inhabitants of Poitiers had split decisively into two opposing camps, one hostile toward the prince de Condé and loyal to the bishop, the other antagonistic toward the bishop, but not necessarily supporters of Condé. Eager to break the bishop's hold over the town, however, they were probably willing to use Condé toward this end.

The bishop's effort to politicize Poitiers gained strength in April and May. By early May at the latest, it became clear that Condé's party had gained a foothold in the province. The bishop wrote to Paris on 3 and 17 May claiming the marquis de Bonnivet had raised several hundred troops in the countryside around Poitiers, strongly recommending that the court try to purchase the marquis's loyalty with a military commission.^[32] The bishop claimed that Bonnivet's company had gained such strength and caused such destruction in the countryside around Poitiers that food was becoming expensive and the citizens of Poitiers were up in arms. Bonnivet's actions were clearly allied with Condé's enterprise, he asserted, which further polarized the city.

The conflict was also escalating at the national level. Both sides raised

[32] . The bishop's letters of 3 and 17 May 1614, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 102, 131.

armies but then agreed to a treaty signed on 15 May at Sainte-Ménehould. This agreement called for the cessation of hostilities and disarmament on both sides. As many supporters of the administration feared, however, Condé used the peace as a chance to further undermine the government and to build his political faction. Condé moved his headquarters to Amboise (just east of Tours), where he occupied a fortified chateau the queen mother had given him as a sign of her good faith. In return, Condé tried to use his friends' influence in the region to strengthen his party and to enlist Protestant support for his cause. The timing of this move was very important because deputies to the Estates General (scheduled to meet in the fall) would be elected in the late summer and fall; of course, Condé hoped to secure the election of deputies favorable to his cause. The queen mother's supporters in the region, including the bishop of Poitiers, were aware of this strategy and worked hard to defeat it.

By mid-June the people of Poitiers were intensely involved in the struggle over their town. At least one citizen was killed; another was wounded. The bishop took control from the governor and the mayor, and the queen mother sent a special commissioner to restore order. But later in the year the militant Catholics defiantly banished several leaders of the opposition.

One of the Crown's political tactics, orchestrated by the bishop, was to sponsor a loyal mayoral candidate in the municipal elections on 27 June. Removing the incumbent mayor (Sainte-Marthe) would weaken the position of his party of moderate notables—a party consisting of Saint Clair (procureur du roi in the local sovereign court), the mayor's uncle (a local tresorier ), Roannes (the governor), and La Charoulière (second in command of the municipal guard after the mayor). Condé learned of the plan, and on 19 June, just a few days before the mayoral election, he sent two of "his gentlemen" and their lackeys to Poitiers with a letter addressed to the city fathers, informing them of his "sincere intentions" to serve the queen mother, to which he added "some complaints about the Bishop" who had spoken of him "in an undignified manner."^[33] This delegation (including a local gentleman named La Trye) was attacked in the streets of Poitiers by henchmen of the bishop's party. According to Condé, the attackers cried to La Trye, "You are carrying letters from your Prince against our reverend Bishop. You die."^[34] At this signal armed men attacked the two messengers. La Trye was wounded by several bullets and his lackey was killed on the spot. La Trye was taken to the mayor's house to recuperate from his wounds, and Blanchardière (the

[33] . Condé's letter to the queen on 25 June, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, f. 163.

[34] . Ibid.

other gentleman) was allowed to return to Condé with news of the attack. The lackey's body was left in the street until the next day—a powerful symbol about who controlled the town.

The people of Poitiers reacted sharply to news of the violence. Some were outraged, but many more celebrated a "victory" on behalf of the town and the bishop. The mayor had been powerless to impose his authority. The level of political activity reached an even higher pitch when news reached the town days later of Condé's decision to personally rescue La Trye.^[35] Lookouts were put in the church steeple, chains were stretched across the streets (to stop horses), and barricades were erected. Although the mayor was legally captain of the bourgeois militia, the members of the militia were more responsive to the bishop. When Condé arrived (23 June), the city's militia and the gates were in the hands of the bishop's followers.

According to his own account, Condé had separated himself from the greater part of his armed followers and headed for Poitiers with "only fifteen horsemen" after learning of the "assassination" of his men. Condé was determined to enter the town to inform himself more fully of the incident and, no doubt, to try to loosen the bishop's hold over the inhabitants. Five hundred yards from the gate, he met a messenger, Beaulieu de Persac, who claimed to have direct orders from the queen mother that the inhabitants of Poitiers had been commanded by their majesties to obey the bishop. Condé was not to enter the town unless the bishop saw fit. Ignoring this, Condé approached the closed and fortified gate and asked to be admitted. He was refused. He then asked to speak to someone in authority and was addressed from the ramparts with great insolence by an excitable fellow named Berland. Berland replied that the refusal was the decision of ten thousand armed men within the town who would die rather than allow him entry and that if the prince would not leave peacefully, he would be shot at.^[36] Condé retired from the city gates deeply humiliated and lodged himself and his troops nearby at Chatellerault in order to plan his revenge.

Two days later, on 25 June, the military governor, Roannes, arrived from Paris. Concerned about both his authority generally and the municipal elections, he tried to impose his own control over the town with miserable results. Again, the bishop's ability to control the bourgeois militia was crucial, although he caused a scandal by wearing battle armor

[35] . Report of Special Commissioner Le Masuyer to the court, 28 June 1614, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 193-194.

[36] . Berland's words are characterized by Condé as "infinies insolences." Cf. Richelieu, Mémoires , 1:292.

and carrying a pike around town.^[37] By the end of the day, the inhabitants of the town had more or less imprisoned Roannes in the bishop's residence, where he spent the night. According to Roannes, a sergeant in the militia came to see him that night as a spokesman for some of the townspeople and addressed him in the following fashion. "My Lord, I come on behalf of 2000 men of this town who are very disturbed by what has happened to you. They offer you their protection, knowing well that you are a good servant of the King, and their governor. Nevertheless, they desire that you submit to the authority of the Bishop."^[38]

The next morning Roannes was escorted outside the city gates by a deputation of the bishop's supporters. And on the following day, 27 June, Brilhac de Nouzieres, a supporter of the bishop and a lieutenant criminel , was elected mayor. Poitiers was now completely in the hands of the bishop and his party. Condé's allies had lost the election and were soon afterward driven from the city.

The prince was furious, and he wrote several letters to the queen mother complaining of the grave offenses that the bishop and the town had committed against him. It was, after all, peacetime, yet the bishop had tried to have one of his messengers assassinated, had armed a town against him, sounded the tocsin at his approach, and engineered his public humiliation at the gates of the city. Condé demanded that the bishop be punished and his henchmen turned over to the courts. He also demanded he be allowed personally to take revenge on the sieur de Saint George (a relative of the bishop). He would "die a thousand deaths before enduring such an affront" to his dignity without taking revenge.^[39] The Crown responded by explaining that before deciding how to handle the affair, the queen mother wanted to hear the report of a special commissioner, M. Masuyer, a maître des requêtes who was immediately dispatched to Poitiers and who would begin sending the results of his investigations to Paris on 28 June.

The role of the political propaganda and of the common citizens of Poitiers in all of this is visible at numerous points in the record. Particularly telling is the evidence in the letters to the Crown from Roannes and from Masuyer, although one must take account of the latter's wish to smooth over some difficulties by exonerating the bishop on the one hand, and Roannes's wish to stress the "insubordination" of the bishop

[37] . Apologie pour messire Henry-Louys Chastaigner de La Rochepozay (1615) is a 267-page polemic attributed to the young Jean Du Vergier de Hauranne, a protégé and admirer of the bishop with a famous career ahead of him as the abbé de St.-Cyran.

[38] . Proces Verbal de la revolte faicte (1614), 14. Roannes wrote letters to Pontchartrain and the queen on 29 June, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 165-167 verso, complaining of the bishop's activities. Later he wrote a long proces verbal describing the events of 25 June; B.N. Ms. Colbert, 12, ff. 256-26 verso, published almost word for word in pamphlet just cited.

[39] . Condé's letter of 25 June to Jeannin, cited in n. 26.

on the other. The governor and the commissioner depicted the involvement of the townspeople in different fashions, but both attested to the intensity of this involvement.

Masuyer's letters contain a plausible interpretation of the towndwellers' fear of Condé and his agents.^[40] Masuyer reported that before the refusal at the gate, the people of Poitiers had been greatly disturbed by the prince's meeting since the peace had been formalized with the duc de Vendôme (who had recently taken over the fortified town of Vannes in defiance of the Crown) and the duc de Rohan, a leading Protestant. Few in Poitiers believed the political maneuvering had really subsided, and many feared there was a conspiracy to place the town under Condé's command. If the mayor and his friends were not part of the conspiracy, they were, at least, rather lax in opposing it. In contrast, the bishop was seen to be a valiant defender of Poitiers's interests, and the people had great confidence in him. They interpreted Condé's attempt to enter Poitiers as an effort to take it over, especially in view of the injury to La Trye and Condé's entourage of Bonnivet and others. Much of this thinking was undoubtedly shaped by the bishop and his agents, but it was nevertheless authentic public opinion.

In the course of his investigation, Masuyer found some disturbing evidence of popular political attitudes. Many citizens of Poitiers had clearly felt the Crown had not supported them strongly enough in their stand against Condé. One individual confessed to having had dreams of assassinating the king. Masuyer tried to mitigate the implications of this utterance by stressing that the man was mentally disturbed and the son of an epileptic.^[41] He was obviously worried, though, and took especial note of one man who professed, during the excitement surrounding Condé's attempted entry into Poitiers, that "there are still a dozen in Poitiers who would happily do what Ravaillac [assassin of Henry IV] did."^[42] These accounts demonstrate a certain political consciousness. It may have been a distorted and highly emotional version of the elites'

[40] . Masuyer sent at least twenty-one dispatches to the court (extant in B.N. Ms. Clair. 364) from the time of his arrival in late June 1614 until he was thrown out of the town in December.

[41] . Masuyer's accounts of these particular investigations are in B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 319-319 verso. In his letter to the queen mother, Masuyer observed that "he was of a melancholy humor, a hypochondriac, and the son of a father who was epileptic. He had a habit of swearing and blaspheming, and his usual oath was to give himself to the devil." And this was only a partial list of the young man's problems. In the letter to Secretary of State Pontchartrain, Masuyer explains that the fellow was a lackey to one of the gentlemen in the service of the bishop of Poitiers and his relative, the sieur de La Rocheposay.

[42] . Ibid., 321-321 verso. In the postscript, Masuyer reports to Pontchartrain on the progress of two cases, one concerning an individual "qui durant ces esmotions de Poictiers dict ces mots parlant de contentions des grands, qu'il y avoit encores une douzine dans Poictiers qui feroint bien Ravaillac. Il est funest que ce siècle produise tant de monstres."

political consciousness, but it was a vision of "national" politics that clearly helped the bishop to take control of Poitiers.

The role of pamphlets in spreading political consciousness and in influencing specific events is difficult to determine. Following the brief appearance of Condé's pamphlet in early March, diplomatic sources do not mention any pamphlets circulating in Poitiers. A printing establishment was active in the town, but nothing can be attributed to it with much certainty until late in the summer.^[43] Without question, pamphlets and placards eventually played a role. Following Condé's attempt to enter the town, there was an explosion of pamphlet literature dealing with the affair of Poitiers. Letters from Condé and Roannes to the Crown about the affair were reproduced as pamphlets.^[44] Proadministration responses quickly followed. Supporters of the regent published several of her letters, including one describing the affair of Poitiers to Monsieur de Roquelaure, lieutenant-governor of Guyenne.^[45] One of Masuyer's dispatches to Paris was also published.^[46] In addition, a more polemical literature soon surrounded the affair, most of which favored the queen mother.^[47] Some of this literature was intended for local audiences and printed by local printers.^[48]

One pamphlet clearly aimed at a popular audience was La Carabinade du mangeur de bonnes gens: A messieurs de Poictiers .^[49] References to the lives of simple people abound in this satirical piece, poorly printed on cheap paper. It scolds the citizens of Poitiers for having selfishly tried to protect their chickens from the ravages of the rebels and for not having allowed themselves to be led about by the nose like animals. Then, in a shift from satire to invective, Condé is the real monster (the "mangeur de bonnes gens") and Berland, the rabble-rouser who insulted Condé, is a

[43] . There were probably two printers working in Poitiers—Julian Thoreau and Antoine Mesnier. The first piece concerning this affair attributable to either of them was probably published later in the summer of 1614, when the royal family arrived—La rejouissance de Poitiers .

[44] . Condé, Lettre de Monsieur le Prince envoyée à La Royne (1614, exists in four editions) and Justice que monseigneur le prince demande (1614). Proces Verbal (1614, exists in two editions).

[45] . Lettre de la Royne à monsieur de Roquelaure (1614).

[46] . Lettres du sieur de Mazuyer (1614).

[47] . Remerciment au roy par les habitans de la ville de Poictiers (1614); Libre Discours sur les mouvemens derniers de la France et particulièement de Poictou (1614).

[48] . In addition to Carabinade , local printers also published Accueil au roy par Gabriel Bien-Venue (1614), a less-creative piece in the same popular genre. Later, when the king and queen actually arrived in Poitiers, many pamphlets were produced celebrating their visit. Several pieces of official correspondence cited in this chapter were later published as pamphlets in Bordeaux by Millanges. For the generally high level of printing activity in this region at this time, see Desgraves, "Aspects des controverses," 153-187.

[49] . B.N. Lb36.316.

"valiant champion" who helped Poitiers escape from a terrible siege. The bishop's probity is praised through an insinuation that he might have given up a cardinal's hat by having been such an uncompromising defender of the town. The principal purpose of the pamphlet was to reinforce people's fear of the rebel princes and to encourage disdain for their politics in the precarious months following Condé's humiliation. Comparing the discipline of the king's forces with the disorder of Condé's, the pamphleteer exclaimed that "a single regiment of the King's guards" would "destroy like plaster everything" that the rebels "could put in the field in ten years."

An even more direct appeal to the citizens of Poitiers was printed later in the year (December) and posted on doors throughout the city. This placard (from which the epigraph for this chapter was taken) was so vehement and so reminiscent of Holy League politics that some Catholics accused their enemies of having printed it in an effort to discredit them.^[50] The partisan rhetoric surely echoes the vicious language flung about the streets of Poitiers. The placard even named several citizens still present in the town who could not be trusted and against whom the loyal citizens had to protect themselves. It spoke in nearly hysterical tones of their efforts to render the prince master of the town and, in so doing, to place it under Huguenot rule. For this reason, the citizens were urged to enforce the banishments and to endorse further banishments, if necessary, in order to preserve a town "on which depends the health of the Pope and of the King, and the conservation of the state religion, for which to die would be an honor to the faithful Catholic servants of the king."^[51]

Pamphlets and pamphlet-inspired rhetoric surrounded the struggle for control of Poitiers. The appearance of Condé's February manifesto was especially important and greatly aggravated political tensions. These pamphlets confirm the view that mobilization of support in the struggle for control of the town involved concrete choices. These were both issue-motivated, e.g., religion, and pragmatically motivated, e.g., local political power. The personality of the bishop and his general support for the queen mother and her policies were also clearly issues on which such

[50] . Two handwritten copies of the text of this placard exist, both described as "affiche seditieuse des habitans de Poitiers mise aux princippalles portes lors que le Roy y envoya M. Mangot pour restablir les principaux de la ville qu'ilz avoient chassez, le mois de decembre 1614"; B.N. Ms. fr. 3653, ff. 44-55, and B.N. Ms. Colbert 17, ff. 188-188 verso. The placard was entitled "De l'Ordonnance et arrets de quatorze cens fidelles de cette ville hardiment resolue de mourir pour la manutantion de la foy catholique, apostholique et Romaine et service du Roy Louis XIII."

[51] . Ibid.

choices were based. The bishop represented a militantly proadministration stance, to which the mayor and his friends were opposed. Many of the townspeople, however, clearly approved. Moreover, as the "seditious" placard makes particularly evident, the loyalty of Poitiers was seen by many as an important factor in the broader struggle for control of France's destiny.

The Poitiers affair also shows how many of the inhabitants of Poitiers and the surrounding countryside participated in the defense of their town against Condé. Popular anxiety ran high, and the bishop was not reluctant to exploit it for his own purposes. He contributed a great deal to this intense politicization by providing knowledge about Condé's activities in the area, by challenging the mayor and the governor, and by emphasizing the military danger to the town. It also seems likely that the bishop encouraged the townspeople to interpret the conflict in religious terms.

The bishop tried to represent himself to the Crown as keeping the town out of Condé's hands and maintaining law and order in a difficult situation. In July, when news arrived from Paris that the bishop would be forced to remove himself from the town, he wrote back saying that people were so disturbed and "carried to such extremities" that he would have "feared a revolution" if M. Frazelière's arrival with some reassuring news from court had not calmed them down.^[52] The bishop explained, in as diplomatic a way as possible, that people felt "abandoned" by the royal government in their efforts to protect themselves from the rebel prince and had expected more help from the Crown.

In spite of the somewhat different gloss he would impose on these events, Roannes's letter confirms this picture of general agitation in Poitiers.^[53] Although Roannes tried to portray a law-abiding townspeople being excited to "sedition" against him by their bishop, he could not conceal the extent of public involvement in the preparations against Condé. At several points he encountered great crowds of the bishop's supporters. Although he saw it as "disobedience," he confirmed that the people were mobilized to protect themselves. The streets of the town were barricaded and chained, and bands of armed citizens roamed the streets. There was an intense struggle for control of the militia, in which all levels of command, from sergeant to captain, were involved. He also confirmed the extensive polarization of the elite.

Despite the heavy influence of religious rhetoric, the structure of the

[52] . Poitiers to Pontchartrain, 7 and 10 July 1614, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 211 and 220.

[53] . Roannes's letters to Pontchartrain and the queen on 29 June, B.N. Ms. Clair. 364, ff. 165-167 verso, complaining of the activities of the bishop, and B.N. Ms. Colbert, 12, ff. 256-260 verso. These letters provide abundant evidence of religious zealotry and popular sedition, which Roannes is eager to attribute to the bishop's fanaticism.

struggle and the composition of the two factions suggest that neither religion nor socioeconomic interests alone were enough to determine the political choices of Poitivins in 1614. Both factions were composed of an assortment of municipal officials, royal officials, and local gentlemen, all Catholic, with the possible exception of Bonnivet and some of his gang. Local political ties, more than anything else, appear to have been the decisive factor, but those bonds were impregnated with ideology. The bishop's close relations with Paris and his militant Catholicism went hand in hand. The sympathy of the mayor, Sainte-Marthe, and his group for Condé reflected a desire to be more independent of both the bishop and the Crown. Within this general framework, there was also a great deal of room for local issues to be related to the national political struggle.

In Paris, the "conservation" of Poitiers was interpreted by Villeroy as an important but narrow victory. He argued long and hard in the regency councils that the king and his mother should follow through with a visit to the region in an extended tour that would consolidate support for the administration on the eve of the elections for the Estates General.^[54] Over the objections of the chancellor and Concini, who thought such a trip too dangerous, the king and queen mother made the journey in July and August. The court visited Orléans, Blois, Tours, Poitiers, Angers, and Nantes. Royal entries and elaborate ceremonies were staged in each of these places with great success.^[55] By the end of the tour, the king and queen regent were able to return confidently to Paris to prepare for the celebration of the king's majority and the opening of the Estates General.

The queen mother and her supporters thus won a decisive victory in the public arena early in the 16 14-1617 struggles. The following chapter will explore some reasons for this. Not only was the Crown able to produce more pamphlets than the opposition during these years, but it also produced better pamphlets that skillfully blended popular ways of looking at politics with a more convincing interpretation of the facts. Much more so than the rebels, the government was able to link its program with a broadly appealing rhetoric of law and order.

[54] . Richelieu reports that Villeroy and Jeannin had to argue strenuously against Concini and Chancellor Brûlart de Sillery to convince the queen mother to take this trip; see his Mémoires , 1:293. Hayden, "Deputies and Qualités ," 507-524, discusses briefly the regency's considerable effort (of which this tour was a part) to secure the election of loyal deputies to the Estates, see esp. pp. 517-519.

[55] . The registers of the hôtel de ville of Angers show the town going to great trouble and expense to welcome the court appropriately. A mock naval battle was staged on the Loire; see Archives Municipales, Anger, BB 61, ff. 22 ff. By all accounts the tour was a great success, and people turned out in great numbers to cheer the young Louis XIII. A series of pamphlets described the ceremonies in several towns; see Bourgeois and André, Sources de l'histoire de France , 4:21-22.