A Secret Is Discovered
Getúlio Vargas's four-year term was scheduled to end in 1938. Those who wished to replace him as the presidential campaign began in 1937 included Armando de Oliveira Sales of the newly created Constitutionalist Party and Jose Américo de Almeida, considered by most to be the candidate that Vargas supported. In midyear the Integralist Plínio Salgado also entered the fray, and soon violence and radical pronouncements led many to wonder if a unity candidate might be found if elections were postponed.[90] This sentiment was encouraged by a group of authoritarian nationalists that included Army Chief of Staff Góis Monteiro, Minister of War Eurico Dutra, pro-Nazi police chief Filinto Mailer, and Francisco Campos, the chief ideologue of nondemocratic rule.[91] The national mood was exploited by Vargas, who seemed intent on remaining in power by simultaneously encouraging the Integralists while playing up the specter of communism.[92]
Latent anti-Semitism was one of the keys toward justifying the movement to authoritarianism. In late September 1937, the "Cohen Plan," an Integralist forgery that alleged plans for a violent Communist overthrow of the government that specifically included the burning of churches, was "discovered."[93] The plan, which was widely accepted by
the press as legitimate, was authored by Olympio Mourão Filho, a captain in the Brazilian Army and head of the AIB's propaganda section, and then passed on to General Góis Monteiro.[94] Both the title—"The Cohen Plan"—and the means by which it was arrived at suggest a linkage of Judaism and communism. According to Olympio Mourão Filho, he originally signed the document with the name of the Hungarian communist Bela Kun as a joke. Later, "I remembered that one of our leaders always referred to Kun as Cohen [so I] crossed out the surname Kun and wrote Cohen."[95] The forgery, when released, thus appeared to be authored by the nonexistent Cohen, presumably a Jew.
The fictitious "Cohen Plan" was made public on September 29 when War Minister Dutra urgently requested a renewal of previous national emergency decrees on the Hora do Brasil radio program broadcast throughout the country. The request was overwhelmingly approved by Congress, and an executive decree suspended many of the personal rights granted by the 1934 constitution. A public campaign against communism began as everyone from reactionary military officers to high church officials began seeing red. Among the groups most satisfied with the changes were the Integralists, whose close ties to Francisco Campos led them to believe they would be important components in any new government. In early November Plínio Salgado marched thousands of Integralists in front of the presidential palace, where they were reviewed by Vargas and his anti-Semitic confidant General Newton Cavalcanti, one of Salgado's most powerful military allies.[96]
By the end of the first week of November all the parts were in place to create a new regime. The false "Cohen Plan" gave the state a means of squashing dissent simply by labeling it "communist." On November 8 the only moderate left in Vargas's cabinet, Justice Minister Macedo Soares, resigned; his place was taken by Francisco Campos, who had already written a new corporatist constitution. That constitution had received the approval of the entire Vargas cabinet with the exception of the minister of agriculture, Odilón Braga, who was immediately replaced. Early in the morning of November 10 the anticipated autogolpe took place as the cavalry surrounded the presidential palace and copies of the constitution were distributed. The Estado Novo, with Vargas as its head, had been created.
Less than a month after the coup, on December 2, Vargas banned all political parties from operating in Brazil.[97] On that same day the maritime police were ordered to enforce Circular 1,127 in such a way that no Jews would be allowed into Brazil for any reason, even if they pos-
sessed legitimately issued visas.[98] This gave port authorities, under the direction of Filinto Müller, new power, and Jewish tourists and businesspeople were immediately denied entry.[99] When minor Brazilian officials admitted the circular's existence to annoyed shipping companies whose passengers were not allowed to disembark, this information was passed on to the passengers. They, in turn, began to complain to their congresspeople and members of parliament, spreading knowledge of the circular's existence into more public spheres.
Both governments acted rapidly on the complaints from American and British Jewish travelers—and voters. U.S. diplomats in Rio were incensed when they discovered that Jews who were U.S. citizens were to be admitted to Brazil only with special permission from the minister of labor. David Kamisar's case was typical. An importer of Brazilian products to the United States, a U.S. citizen, and, according to the U.S. diplomat in charge of the case, a "member of the Jewish race," Kamisar often visited Brazil. In December 1937 he was, much to his shock, denied entrance. Kamisar's son and partner, a U.S. citizen legally resident in Brazil, tried to persuade immigration officers to admit his father but was "advised specifically that the immigration service had received oral instructions to prevent the entrance of Jews."[100] Only after obtaining a release from the minister of labor through a personal connection was David Kamisar's entry permitted. In December, the U.S. embassy dealt with six cases of American Jews denied entrance on the basis of their religion. Each was resolved only after the consul general issued a letter to the Department of Colonization stating the people in question would not overstay their visas.[101]
At first U.S. and British concerns about Circular 1,127 were related to tourists and businesspeople, and a confidential report written by Consul General William C. Burdett, titled "Anti-Semitic Influence in Brazilian Immigration Service," ignored the fact that the orders would also keep Jewish refugees out of Brazil.[102] This focus, however, would soon change as it became clear that Brazil, which the United States hoped would accept Jewish refugees and relieve pressure on the United States and England, was refusing to do so. U.S. and British protests now tied the refugee issue to complaints about how their citizens were treated in this "new phase which is distinctly prejudicial [not only] against Jewish immigrants from Europe but to temporary visitors of the Jewish religion from the United States as well."[103] Robert M. Scotten, counselor for the American embassy, was sent to speak with the ambassador to the United States, Aranha, in Brazil at the time, to "point out
that during the tourist season, which is about to commence, a fairly large percentage of visitors from the United States are liable to be Jews. I urged the Brazilian Government to make sure that any American citizens whose travel documents are in order should be permitted to land without hindrance. . . . I pointed out that a continuance of the anti-Jewish policy on the part of the Brazilian Government could not fail to have a deplorable effect upon public opinion in the United States."[104] The discussion distressed the ambassador, who feared that the denial of entry to American Jews provided "a favorable argument to the campaign that Brazil is linked to Germany, something we are fighting here [in the United States]."[105]
Scotten's meeting with Aranha produced two different results. The first was a formal admission that Jewish immigration was "in general undesirable."[106] Second, it confirmed to Aranha, "an ardent champion of the special relationship" between Brazil and the United States, that the refugee issue could be used to improve relations between the two nations.[107] Informally meeting with U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Aranha agreed that "it is a grave mistake to continue anti-Jewish activities here . . . [and promised to] talk to President Vargas along those lines."[108] He then promised that temporary visitors would no longer be hindered and that the Brazilian consul general in London would be given permission "to use his discretion in granting tourist visas to British subjects of the Jewish race."[109] Aranha also vowed that "immigration authorities shall in the future place no hindrance of any kind in the way of tourists arriving in Brazil, irrespective of race or religion."[110]
Aranha's pledge did not improve the situation immediately: the following week four American citizens were detained and permitted to enter only after a letter was dispatched from the U.S. embassy. Of all the members of a British tour group wishing to spend a week on Copacabana Beach, only five—the Jewish members—were denied visas.[111] Montague Meyer, a British citizen traveling for health reasons, had his four-day visa refused by the Brazilian consul general in London. His nurse, whose surname was Brown, was given her visa on the spot. Meyer, whose "family has been in England for at least one and a half centuries" and who was a member of the Church of England, complained that the consul general had "come to the conclusion that my surname being 'Meyer' he assumes that I am a Jew and/or a Communist and am likely to be of some danger to the Government of Brazil."[112] His complaint led Sir Hugh Gurney, British ambassador in Rio, to take up the case. Gurney was told that "general instructions had been issued
to Brazilian consular officers to refuse visas for Jews [since] they were regarded as an undesirable element and that the Brazilian Government wished to avoid the creation of a Jewish Question in the country."[113] Of course the Jewish Question already existed, and the Brazilian government had responded in a resounding way with Circular 1,127.
By the end of January 1938, things had changed. Brazilian immigration authorities were no longer making apparent efforts "to segregate any [American] Jewish passengers or to prevent the disembarkations of persons of that race [sic]."[114] Jewish travelers with legitimate business interests now entered with ease, although the government continued to deny permanent visas to Jews. International pressure had worked to prevent the most extreme reading of Circular 1,127.