Preferred Citation: Lim, Richard. Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1995 1995. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0f59n6vv/


 
Two Disputation, Dialectic, and Competition Among Platonist Philosophers

Aedesius and His Circle

Following Iamblichus' death and the trial and execution of his prize student Sopater for treason, Aedesius of Cappadocia (d. 352-55) took over

[102] Philostratus, Vita Apollonii 1.17.

[103] See Dillon, "Iamblichus of Chalcis," 873.

[104] See Hadot, "Philosophie, dialectique, rhétorique dans l'antiquité," 143.


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the masters diatribe and circle of student-companions.[105] Aedesius established himself in Pergamum, where his students engaged in competitive disputations (inline image) either philosophical or rhetorical in nature.[106] He observed with dissatisfaction his students' arrogance, and strongly discouraged the putting on of airs[107] —interesting advice from a man whom Eunapius described as one of the more contentious of Iamblichus' pupils.[108]

Regarded as part of the Iamblichan diadoche , Aedesius was courted by the young prince Julian, who desired to study with him.[109] An incident that arose from Julian's attempt to become Aedesius' student is highly instructive about the diffused rivalry among Aedesius' disciples.

Because Maximus of Ephesus and Priscus, Aedesius' foremost pupils, were not in Asia Minor at the time, the old philosopher entrusted the education of the prince to Eusebius of Myndus and Chrysanthius. Eusebius was a younger pupil of Aedesius who excelled in the dialectical art and who—according to Eunapius, who no doubt heard the story from Chrysanthius, his erstwhile teacher and informant—regarded Maximus' emphasis on theurgy to be mere theatricality unworthy of a true philosopher. Eusebius privately scorned Maximus' conjurer's tricks, yet in deference to a more advanced fellow student, he never revealed his profound reservations while Maximus was present (inline image). At those times, according to Eunapius, Eusebius

used to avoid precise and exact divisions of a disputation and dialectical devices and subtleties (inline imageinline image); though when Maximus was not there (inline image) he would shine out like a bright star.[110]

[106] Eunapius, VS 481.

[107] Eunapius, VS 481-82.

[108] Eunapius, VS 458-59.

[109] For Julian's own ideas about what the Platonist succession meant, see his Oratio 7.222B (Wright, ed., 2:116-17).


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When Eusebius disagreed with Maximus' theurgic practices, he was, knowingly or unknowingly, also competing with this elder student of Aedesius for legitimacy and authority within the philosophical circle. Thus he invariably concluded his discourses by advising his hearers to shun the deceptions of magic, sorcery, and wonder workers and to instead pursue the study of dialectic, which alone enabled one to grasp true reality (inline image).

Asked by Julian to clarify his veiled polemic, Eusebius openly aired his differences with Maximus. He referred to the latter as an elder and more variously accomplished (inline image) prodigy who had somehow "gone off the deep end." Maximus was someone who, during a spell of political favor; was said to have impressed the ordinary people of Constantinople as a walking oracle who bedecked himself in rich silken robes instead of the philosopher's humble garb.[111] The philosopher manqué had lost more than his outward seemliness; he had abandoned the security of rational philosophical demonstration (inline imageinline image) in favor of what Eusebius described as madness (inline image).[112] Once, Eusebius explained, Maximus even invited his younger fellow students to a seance at the temple of Hecate, where he offered proof of his superior power by summoning the presence of divine spirits. For Eusebius, Maximus' theatrical exhibition was precisely the sort of sham that philosophical demonstration should unmask. He passed on the following advice to Julian: "You must not marvel at any of these things [Maximus' miracles], even as I marvel not, but rather believe that the thing of the highest importance is that purification of the soul which is attained by reason (inline image)."[113]

His words fell on deaf ears. Learning of Maximus' reputation, Julian judged Eusebius not to be the "true philosopher" he had been seeking and turned to the theurgist with a Parthian shot: "inline image

[111] Eunapius, VS 477.

[112] Maximus of Ephesus had composed a commentary on Aristotle's Categories , known to us from Simplicius, In Categorias 1.15.

[113] VS 475 (Wright, ed., 434-35). One may argue that this episode signals Julian's rejection of the Platonic tradition represented by Plotinus and Porphyry in favor of the theurgical tradition represented by Iamblichus and Maximus. Such a preference would also explain why the future emperor refused to accept the tutelage of Aetius, an accomplished Christian "dialectician-philosopher" (see Chapter 4) whom his brother Gallus Caesar admired. According to Philostorgius, Hist. eccl . 3.27, and the disputed Ep . 82 from Gallus to Julian (Wright, ed., 3:288-91), Gallus sent Aetius to Julian's side in 351 in the hope that Aetius would steer the prince away from his interest in traditional polytheism. In this view, Julian's refusal to be influenced by Aetius was triggered as much by the latter's Christian views as by his emphasis on syllogisms: for Julian, Aetius had no more access to the true, elevated knowledge of the divine than had Eusebius of Myndus.


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inline image."[114] By Commenting that he was leaving Eusebius to his learned tomes, Julian tapped into an ancient reservoir of ambivalence toward book knowledge. Julian preferred to receive his knowledge through a personal intermediary. Though he had read Aristotle's logical treatises, he preferred to style himself the pupil of Priscus, who had sent him the works and who thereby, in Julian's view, initiated him into that branch of knowledge.[115]

Julian confessed to Priscus that he found Aristotle's logic easier to grasp than Plato's.[116] In general, philosophical dialectic had the dubious advantage of being easily learned. Even the proverbial old woman was supposed to command a rudimentary knowledge of logic.[117] In some measure, philosophers' objection to sophists and their art derived from the fact that rhetoric was thought to be a techne that could be mastered by dint of hard work (inline image). Iamblichus believed that a student could rapidly master the art of discourse (inline image) to become a rival to his teacher;[118] such mastery was a cheap virtue that could be appropriated by repetition and practice: "inline imageinline image."[119] This sentiment revealed a deep-seated prejudice against achievement through hard work that persists today in written evaluations of student performance; the adjective "diligent," now as then, euphemistically hints at a slight deficiency in intellectual or philosophical capacity.[120] For instance, Porphyry may well have been putting down his fellow student Amelius when he commented on the latter's diligence in compiling voluminous lecture notes.


Two Disputation, Dialectic, and Competition Among Platonist Philosophers
 

Preferred Citation: Lim, Richard. Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1995 1995. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0f59n6vv/