1
Fundamentalism or Populism?
How did Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini become an imam? Much like the Holy Prophet Abraham: he carried out God's will, smashed idols, was willing to sacrifice his own son, rose up against tyrants, and led the oppressed against their oppressors.
A parliamentary deputy, Kayhan-e Hava'i, 21 June 1989
Introduction
The slippery label of fundamentalist has been thrown at Khomeini so often that it has stuck — so much so that his own supporters in Iran, finding no equivalent in Persian or Arabic, have proudly coined a new word, bonyadegar, by translating literally the English term "fundamental-ist." This is especially ironic since the same individuals never tire of denouncing their opponents as elteqati (eclectic) and gharbzadeh (contaminated with Western diseases). Despite the widespread use of the label, I would like to argue that the transference of a term invented by early twentieth-century Protestants in North America to a political movement in the contemporary Middle East is not only confusing but also misleading and even downright wrong, for the following reasons.
First, if fundamentalism means the acceptance of one's scriptural text as free of human error, then all Muslim believers would have to be considered fundamentalists, for, after all, it is an essential article of Islam that the Koran is the absolute Word of God. By this definition, all Middle Eastern politicians who have appealed to
Islam would have to be defined as fundamentalist: President Sadat of Egypt, King Hasan of Morocco, Saddam Hosayn of Iraq, Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran, not to mention the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wahhabis, the Iranian Mojahedin, and the Afghan Mojahedin.
Second, if the term implies that the believer can grasp the true meaning of the religion by going directly to the essential text, bypassing the clergy and their scholarship, then few Muslim theologians would qualify — Khomeini certainly would not be among the few. He would be the first to stress the importance of the Shii traditions and clerical scholarship. As a senior member of the Usuli School of Shiism, Khomeini opposed the Akhbari dissenters of the previous centuries, who had argued that believers could understand Islam by relying mainly on the Koran and the Shii imams. Khomeini, on the contrary, insisted that the Koran was too complex for the vast majority and that even Archangel Gabriel, who had brought the Koran to Mohammad, had not been able to understand the "inner meanings" of what he conveyed. Khomeini frequently argued that these "inner layers" could be grasped only by those who were familiar with Arabic, knew the teachings of the Twelve Shii Imams, had studied the ancient and contemporary works of the clerical scholars, and, most nebulous of all, had somehow been endowed with cerfan (gnostic knowledge).[1] Only the most learned clerics who had reached the highest level of mystic consciousness could comprehend the true essence of Islam. In short, the Truth was not accessible to everyone, especially to the layperson.
Third, if fundamentalism means finding inspiration in a Golden Age of early Islam, then of course all believing Muslims would qualify. If it means striving to re-create this Golden Age, Khomeini by no means qualifies. It is true that in his earlier years he implied that Mohammad's Mecca and Imam Ali's caliphate were the models to replicate. But it is also true that in later years he argued that even the Prophet and Imam Ali had not been able to surmount the horrendous problems of their societies.[2] What is more, in the euphoria of revolutionary success, he boasted that the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed all previous Muslim societies, in-
cluding that of the Prophet, in implementing true religion "in all spheres of life, particularly in the material and the spiritual spheres."[3] In short, the Islamic Republic of Iran had supplanted Mohammad's Mecca and Imam Ali's caliphate as the Muslim Golden Age. This claim no doubt raised eyebrows among real fundamentalists.
Fourth, if fundamentalism implies the rejection of the modern nation-state and contemporary state boundaries, then Khomeini does not qualify.[4] Although at times he claimed imperialism had divided the Islamic community (ummat ) into rival states and nations, he both implicitly and explicitly accepted the existence of the territorial nation-state. He increasingly spoke of the Iranian fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot, and the honorable people of Iran. He even disqualified one of his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential elections on the grounds that his father had been born in Afghanistan. The nationalistic language, together with the use of exclusively Shii symbols and imagery, helps explain why the Khomeinists have had limited success in exporting their revolution.
Fifth, if fundamentalism suggests the strict implementation of the laws and institutions found in the basic religious texts, then Khomeini again was no fundamentalist. Many of Khomeini's most rigid laws, including those concerning the veil, are found not in the Koran but in later traditions — some of them with non-Muslim antecedents. Similarly, the whole constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic was modeled less on the early caliphate than on de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. When parliamentary deputies questioned the Islamic precedents of some tax laws, Hojjat al-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of Khomeini's closest disciples and the future president of the Islamic Republic, retorted in exasperation: "Where in Islamic history do you find Parliament, President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet of Ministers? In fact, eighty per cent of what we now do has no precedent in Islamic history."[5] Khomeini's break with tradition is glaringly obvious in a realm close to his own heart — that of Islamic law. Before the revolution, he categorically insisted that the sacred law (sharica ) could be implemented only if the religious judges (fuqaha ) were entirely
free of all state intervention, especially of the cumbersome judicial-review process.[6] After the revolution, however, he found it expedient to retain a centralized judicial structure, including an elaborate review process, both to provide some semblance of uniformity and to retain ultimate control over local judges.[7] In fact, the new constitution guaranteed citizens the right of judicial appeal.
Sixth, if fundamentalism means a dogmatic adherence to tradition and a rejection of modern society, then Khomeini does not qualify. He frequently stressed that Muslims needed to import such essentials as technology, industrial plants, and modern civilization (tamaddon-e jadid). His closest disciples often mocked the "traditionalists" (sunnati) for being "old-fashioned" (kohaniperast). They accused them of obsessing over ritual purity; preventing their daughters from going to school; insisting that young girls should always be veiled, even when no men were present; denouncing such intellectual pursuits as art, music, and chess-playing; and, worst of all, refusing to take advantage of newspapers, electricity, cars, airplanes, telephones, radios, and televisions.[8] In the words of Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Javad Hojjati-Kermani, another Khomeini disciple: "These traditionalists should be labeled reactionary [ertejayi ] for they want us to return to the age of the donkey. What we need is not the worship of the past but a genuine renasans [literal transliteration of the word `Renaissance']."[9] The concepts, not to mention the terminology, make mockery of the Orientalist claim that Khomeinism is merely another recurrence of the old traditionalist "epidemic" that has plagued Islam from its very early days.[10]
Seventh, the term "fundamentalism," because of its origins in early twentieth-century American Protestantism, has distinct conservative political connotations. American fundamentalists, reacting against contemporary "social gospel" preachers, argued that the goal of true religion was not to change society but to "save souls" by preserving the literal interpretation of the Bible — especially on such doctrinal issues as Creation, Judgment Day, and the Virgin Birth. Khomeinism, in contrast, while by no means oblivious to doctrinal matters, is predominantly and primarily concerned with sociopolitical issues — with revolution against the roy-
alist elite, expulsion of the Western imperialists, and mobilization of what it terms the mostazafin (oppressed) against the mostakberin (oppressors). In fact, Khomeini succeeded in gaining power mainly because his public pronouncements carefully avoided esoteric doctrinal issues. Instead, they hammered away at the regime on its most visible political, social, and economic shortcomings.
Finally, the term "fundamentalist" conjures up the image of inflexible orthodoxy, strict adherence to tradition, and rejection of intellectual novelty, especially from outside. In the political arena, however, Khomeini, despite his own denials, was highly flexible, remarkably innovative, and cavalier toward hallowed traditions. He is important precisely because he discarded many Shii concepts and borrowed ideas, words, and slogans from the non-Muslim world. In doing so, he formulated a brand-new Shii interpretation of state and society. The final product has less in common with conventional fundamentalism than with Third World populism, especially in Latin America.
The term "populism" needs some elaboration. By it I mean a movement of the propertied middle class that mobilizes the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rhetoric directed against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment. In mobilizing the "common people," populist movements use charismatic figures and symbols, imagery, and language that have potent value in the mass culture. Populist movements promise to drastically raise the standard of living and make the country fully independent of outside powers. Even more important, in attacking the status quo with radical rhetoric, they intentionally stop short of threatening the petty bourgeoisie and the whole principle of private property. Populist movements, thus, inevitably emphasize the importance, not of economic-social revolution, but of cultural, national, and political reconstruction.
Khomeini's View of the State
Throughout the Middle Ages the Shii clergy, unlike their Sunni counterparts, failed to develop a consistent theory of the state. The Sunnis, recognizing the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs as the
Prophet's legitimate successors, accepted the reigning monarchs as lawful as long as these rulers did not blatantly violate Islamic norms. Had not the Prophet himself said, "My community will never agree on an error"? Had not the Koran commanded, "Obey God, His Prophet, and those among you who have authority"? Had not al-Ghazzali, the prominent medieval philosopher, argued that rulers were appointed by God, that rebellion against them was tantamount to rejection of the Almighty, and that forty years of tyranny were better than one single day of anarchy? Following these leads, the Sunni clergy associated political obedience with religious duty and civil disobedience with religious heresy.
The Shii clergy, however, were ambivalent and divided. They rejected the early dynasties, arguing that the Prophet's true heirs should have been the Twelve Imams. This line began with Ali, the Prophet's first cousin, son-in-law, and, according to the Shii clergy, designated successor, as the imam of the Muslim community. The line went through Ali's son Hosayn, the Third Imam, who rebelled against Yazid, the usurper caliph, and was martyred at the battle of Karbala forty-eight years after the Prophet's death. It ended with the last of their direct male descendants, the Twelfth Imam, also known as the Mahdi (Messiah), the Imam-e Montazar (Expected Leader), and the Sahab-e Zaman (Lord of the Age). He supposedly went into hiding a century after Hosayn's martyrdom but will appear at some future time when the world is rampant with corruption and oppression to prepare the way for Judgment Day.
Although the Shii clergy agreed that only the Hidden Imam had full legitimacy, they differed sharply among themselves regarding the existing states — even Shii ones. Some argued that since all rulers were in essence usurpers, true believers should shun the authorities like the plague. They should decline government positions; avoid Friday prayers, where thanks were invariably offered to the monarch; take disputes to their own legal experts rather than to the state judges; practice taqiyya (dissimulation) when in danger; and pay khoms (religious taxes), not to the government but to their clerical leaders, in their capacity as Nayeb-e Imam (Imam's Deputies).
Others, however, argued that one should grudgingly accept the state. They claimed that bad government was better than no government; that many imams had categorically opposed armed insurrections; and that Imam Ali, in his often quoted Nahj al-Balaghah (Way of eloquence), had warned of the dangers of social chaos. They also pointed out that Jafar Sadeq, the sixth and most scholarly of the imams, had stressed: "If your ruler is bad, ask God to reform him; but if he is good, ask God to prolong his life."
Others wholeheartedly accepted the state — especially after 1501, when the Safavids established a Shii dynasty in Iran. Following the example of Majlisi, the well-known Safavid theologian, they complied with the view that the shahs were "shadows of God on earth," obedience was the divine right of the shahs, political dissent led directly to damnation in the next world, without monarchy there would inevitably be social anarchy, and kings and clerics were complementary pillars of the state, sharing the imam's mantle. In making these arguments, these clerics often quoted not only al-Ghazzali but also the famous Koranic commandment "Obey those among you who have authority." In this form the Shii concept of the state was the mirror image of that of the conservative Sunnis.
It is significant that in all these discussions, which lasted on and off for some eleven centuries, no Shii writer ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state.[11] Most viewed the clergy's main responsibilities, which they referred to as the velayat-e faqih (jurist's guardianship), as being predominantly apolitical. They were to study the law based on the Koran, the Prophet's traditions, and the teachings of the Twelve Imams. They were also to use reason to update these laws; issue pronouncements on new problems; adjudicate in legal disputes; and distribute the khoms contributions to worthy widows, orphans, seminary students, and indigent male descendants of the Prophet. In fact, for most the term velayat-e faqih meant no more than the legal guardianship of the senior clerics over those deemed incapable of looking after their own interests — minors, widows, and the insane.
For a few, velayat-e faqih also meant that the senior clerics had the right to enter the political fray — but only temporarily and when the monarch clearly endangered the whole community. For example, in 1891 Mohammad Hasan Shirazi, one of the first clerics to be generally recognized as a marja c-e taqlid, issued a decree against the government for selling a major tobacco concession to a British entrepreneur. He stressed, however, that he was merely opposed to bad court advisers and that he would withdraw from politics once the hated agreement was canceled. Similarly, in 1906, when the leading clerics participated in the Constitutional Revolution, their aim was neither to overthrow the monarchy nor to establish a theocracy but at most to set up a supervisory committee of senior clerics to ensure that legislation passed by the elected Parliament conformed to the sacred law.
Khomeini began his political career with typical Shii ambiguities. His first political tract, Kashf al-Asrar (1943), denounced the recently deposed Reza Shah for a host of secular sins: for closing down seminaries, expropriating religious endowments, propagating anticlerical sentiments, replacing religious courts with state ones, permitting the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the playing of "sensuous music," forcing men to wear Western-style hats, establishing coeducational schools, and banning the long veil (chador), thereby "forcing women to go naked into the streets."[12] In this early work, however, he explicitly disavowed wanting to overthrow the throne and repeatedly reaffirmed his allegiance to monarchies in general and to "good monarchs" in particular. He argued that the Shii clergy had never opposed the state as such, even when governments had issued anti-Islamic orders, for "bad order was better than no order at all."[13] He emphasized that no cleric had ever claimed the right to rule; that many, including Majlisi, had supported their rulers, participated in government, and encouraged the faithful to pay taxes and cooperate with state authorities. If on rare occasions they had criticized their rulers, it was because they opposed specific monarchs, not the "whole foundation of monarchy." He also reminded his readers that Imam Ali had accepted "even the worst of the early caliphs."[14]
The most Khomeini asked in Kashf al-Asrar was that the monarch respect religion, recruit more clerics into Parliament (maj -
les), and ensure that state laws conformed with the sacred law. The sacred law, he argued, had prescriptions to remedy social ills; and the clergy, particularly the fuqaha, who specialized in the sacred law, were like highly trained doctors with knowledge of how to cure these social maladies.[15] Even though Kashf al-Asrar had limited demands, after the revolution Khomeini's disciples claimed his central ideas were all spelled out in this early tract.[16] However, one would search it in vain to find any discussion of such key subjects as revolution (enqelab), republic (jomhuri), martyrdom (shahdat), the oppressed masses (mostazafin), and even jurist's guardianship (velayat-e faqih).
Khomeini retained traditional attitudes toward the state throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Even in 1963 when he emerged as the most vocal antiregime cleric, he did not call for a revolution or for the overthrow of the monarchy. Rather he castigated the shah for secular and antinational transgressions: becoming an unwitting tool of the "imperialist-Jewish conspiracy"; permitting women to vote in local elections; allowing citizens to take oaths on sacred books other than the Koran; smearing clerics as "black reactionaries"; trampling over the constitutional laws; giving high offices to the Bahais; siding with Israel against the Arabs, thus causing "our Sunni brothers to think that we Shiis are really Jews"; and "capitulating" to the almighty dollar by exempting American military personnel from Iranian laws. "An American cook," he declared, "can now assassinate our religious leaders or run over the shah without having to worry about our laws."[17]
These accusations were made more in the manner of a warning than of a revolutionary threat. Khomeini again reminded his audience that Imam Ali had accepted the caliphs.[18] He expressed "deep sorrow" that the shah continued to mistreat the clergy, whom he described as the "true guardians" of Islam.[19] He stressed that he wanted the young shah to reform so that he would not go the same way as his father, namely, into exile.[20] And even in 1965, after his own deportation, he continued to accept monarchies as legitimate. In one of his few proclamations issued in the mid-1960s, he exhorted Muslim monarchs to work together with Muslim republics against Israel.[21]
Khomeini did not develop a new concept of the state, or of
Figure 1.
Stamp (1981) honoring Jalal al-Ahmad.
Figure 2.
Stamp (1980) honoring Ali Shariati.
society, until the late 1960s. It is not clear what intellectual influences brought about this change. Khomeini himself was reluctant to admit formulating new notions. He was not in the habit of footnoting his works and giving credit where credit was due — especially if the sources were foreign or secular. What is more, in the crucial years of 1965-70, when he was developing these new ideas in his Najaf exile, he was conspicuously silent, rarely giving interviews, sermons, and pronouncements.
We can therefore only speculate as to the origins of his new ideas. One source may have been Shii theologians in Najaf, who were forging new concepts while combating the Communist party, which at the time had many adherents among Iraqi Shiis.[22]
They may have originated from Khomeini's younger Iranian students, more and more of whom were now coming from the lower middle class.[23] They may have been influenced by the famous ex-Tudeh writer Jalal al-Ahmad, whose pamphlet Gharbzadegi (The plague from the West) spearheaded the 1960s search for Islamic roots.[24] In fact, al-Ahmad was the only contemporary writer ever to obtain favorable comments from Khomeini. Even though al-Ahmad is famous for advocating a return to Islam, his works contained a strong Marxist flavor and analyzed society through a class perspective.
The views of other members of the Iranian intelligentsia, especially the Mojahedin, the Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile, and the radical pamphleteer Ali Shariati — all of whom were strongly influenced by contemporary Marxism, especially Castroism and Maoism — may have contributed to Khomeini's transition to political activist.[25] At one point, Khomeini inadvertently recognized the role played by the radical intelligentsia. In criticizing his apolitical colleagues, he declared that it was "disgraceful" that the clergy had remained "asleep" until "awakened" by protesting university students. "We cannot remain silent," he stressed, "until college students force us to carry out our duty."[26] One Khomeini disciple later admitted that the student guerrilla movement "left a deep impression on the Iranian people" and prompted the imam to increase his correspondence with the confederation in order to stem the influence of Marxism.[27]
It should also be noted that Khomeini formulated his new ideas at a time when social tensions within Iran were sharply increasing. Peasants were flooding the shantytowns in the cities. Small businessmen were feeling threatened by wealthy entrepreneurs linked to the central government and by the multinational corporations. "The American capitalists [sarmayehdaran ]," declared Khomeini, "are scheming to take over Iran's natural resources."[28] Even more important, the Pahlavi state, bolstered by oil revenues, was slowly but surely encroaching upon the clerical establishment, especially its seminaries, publishing houses, and landed endowments. "The state," warned one opposition newspaper, "is out to nationalize religion."[29]
If what caused Khomeini to change his views is debatable, the actual changes are not. He broke his long silence in early 1970 with his famous lectures Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami (The jurist's guardianship: Islamic government). In these lectures, he declared in no uncertain terms that Islam was inherently incompatible with all forms of monarchy (saltanat). He argued that monarchy was a "pagan" institution that the "despotic" Umayyads had adopted from the Roman and Sassanid empires. He also argued that the old prophets, particularly Moses, had opposed the pharaohs because they judged their royal titles to be immoral; and that Imam Hosayn had raised the banner of revolt in Karbala because he rejected hereditary kingship on principle. He further argued that monarchies were tantamount to false gods (taqhut), idolatry (shirk), and sowing corruption on earth (fasid-e al-arz). The Prophet Mohammad had declared malek al-muluk (king of kings) to be the most hated of all titles in the eyes of the Almighty — Khomeini interpreted this title to be the equivalent of shah of shahs.
Muslims, Khomeini insisted, have the sacred duty to oppose all monarchies. They must not collaborate with them, have recourse to their institutions, pay for their bureaucracies, or practice dissimulation to protect themselves. On the contrary, they have the duty to rise up (qiyam) against them. Most kings, he added, have been criminals, oppressors, and mass murderers. In later years, he insisted that all monarchs without exception — including Shah Abbas, the famous Shii Safavid king, and Anushirvan, the ancient ruler whom Iranians usually refer to as "the Just" — had been thoroughly unjust.[30]
In denouncing kingship, Khomeini put forth various reasons why the religious judges (fuqaha) had the divine right to rule.[31] He sharply differentiated between the religious judges and other members of the senior clergy who specialized in other subjects, such as theology and history. He interpreted the Koranic commandment "Obey those among you who have authority" to mean that Muslims had to follow their religious judges. The Prophet had handed down to the imams all-encompassing authority — the right to lead and supervise the community as well as to interpret and implement the sacred law. The Twelfth
Imam, by going into hiding, had passed on this all-encompassing authority to the religious judges. Had not Imam Ali ordered "all believers to obey his successors"? Had he not explained that by "successors" he meant "those who transmit my statements and my traditions and teach them to the people"? Had not the Seventh Imam praised the religious judges as "the fortress of Islam"? Had not the Twelfth Imam instructed future generations to obey those who knew his teachings since they were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God's representative among all believers? Had not the Prophet himself declared that knowledge led to paradise and that "men of knowledge" had as much superiority over ordinary mortals as the full moon had over the stars? Had not God created the sacred law to guide the community, the state to implement the sacred law, and the religious judges to understand and implement the sacred law? The religious judges, Khomeini concluded, have the "same authority" as the Prophet and the imams; and the term velayat-e faqih meant jurisdiction over believers, all of whom are in dire need of the sacred law. In other words, disobedience to the religious judges was disobedience to God.
In presenting his Velayat-e Faqih, Khomeini warned listeners that this "true Islam" might sound "strange."[32] After all, false ideas spread over the centuries by a conspiracy of Jews, imperialists, and royalists had taken a heavy toll. Important hadiths had been misinterpreted. The word faqih had been dropped out of important quotations. Government officials had systematically spread the notion that clerics should be seen within seminary confines and not heard in the arena of controversial politics, so much so that the crucial term velayat-e faqih had been distorted to refer only to the clergy's guardianship over widows, orphans, and the mentally incompetent. Despite these obstacles, Khomeini reminded his audience, clerics had risen to the occasion in times of crisis to protect Islam and Iran from imperialism and royal despotism: in the Tobacco Crisis of 1891, in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, in the dark days of Reza Shah, and, of course, in the 1963 June Uprising against Mohammad Reza Shah. In these crises, Khomeini stressed, the clergy as a whole had kept alive "national consciousness" and stood firm as the "fortress of inde-
pendence" against imperialism, secularism, and other "isms" imported from the West.[33]
Khomeini's View of Society
Khomeini's ideas about society developed along parallel lines with his ideas about the state. In his pre-1970 writings, he tended to accept the traditional notions of society as sketched out in Imam Ali's Nahj al-Balaghah, in the teachings of the Shii clergy, and in the "Mirror of Princes" literature produced throughout the centuries. He accepted the conventional paternalistic assumptions that God had created both private property and society; society should be formed of a hierarchy of mutually dependent strata (qeshreha); the poor should accept their lot and not envy the rich; and the rich should thank God, avoid conspicuous consumption, and give generously to the poor. He often stressed that the sacred law protected wealth as a "divine gift" and that the state had the sacred duty to maintain a healthy balance between the social strata.
It is significant that in these early writings he rarely used the word tabaqeh (class) — a term that at the time had strong leftist connotations. He also tended to avoid the word enqelab (revolution) even though he did occasionally call for a qiyam (uprising). For the conventional clergy, enqelab connoted chaos, anarchy, and class hatred. It was synonymous with the world turned upside down.[34]
In his post-1970 writings, however, Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes (tabaqat): the mostazafin (oppressed) against the mostakberin (oppressors); the foqara (poor) against the sarvatmandan (rich); the mellat-e mostazaf (oppressed nation) against the hokumat-e shaytan (Satan's government); the zagheh-neshinha (slum dwellers) against the kakh-neshinha (palace dwellers); the tabaqeh-e payin (lower class) against the tabaqeh-e bala (upper class); and tabaqeh-e mostamdan (needy class) against the tabaqeh-e acyan (aristocratic class). In the past, such imagery would have been used by
secular leftists rather than by clerical leaders. The fact that Khomeini — the country's most successful politician — came to power by openly exploiting class antagonisms should undermine the notion favored by many Western social scientists that class analysis is not applicable to Iran.
The key to Khomeini's transformation can be seen in the way he used the words mostazafin and shahid (martyr). He rarely used the former in his early writings. When he did, it was in the Koranic sense of the "humble" and passive "meek" believers, especially orphans, widows, and the mentally impaired. In the 1970s, however, he used it in almost every single speech and proclamation to depict the angry poor, the "exploited" people, and the "downtrodden masses." After the revolution, he gradually broadened the term to bring in the propertied middle class, which actively supported the new order. Thus by mid-1980, mostazafin was a broad subjective category bearing striking resemblance to the Jacobin sans culottes, Sukarno's Manrhaen commonfolk, Perón's descamisados (coatless ones), and Vargas's trabalhadores (urban workers).
Shahid also went through a similar transformation. In his early works, Khomeini rarely used the term, and when he did, it was usually in the conventional sense of the famous Shii saints who, in obeying God's will, had gone to their deaths. He rarely used it to refer to the average person in the street who had died for the cause. For example, in his 1963-64 proclamations he described those killed in the June Uprising not as shahidha but as bicharehha (unfortunate ones). During the revolution, however, Khomeini constantly lauded anyone killed in the streets as a glorious shahid — as a revolutionary martyr.
In this, as in much of his other rhetoric, Khomeini was following in the footsteps of others. In 1964, the Tudeh party had published a roll book of Communists killed by the Pahlavis, Yadnameh-e Shahidan (Martyrs' memorial).[35] In the late 1960s, the Mojahedin had written a famous pamphlet, Nahzat-e Hosayni (Hosayn's movement), arguing that the early Shii martyrs had taken up arms to overthrow an exploitative regime, like Che Guevara, and had set an example for other revolutionaries
Figure 3.
Poster urging the construction of housing for the poor. Courtesy of the
Hoover Institution.
Figure 4.
Poster of peasants reading a newspaper. Courtesy of the Hoover
Institution.
throughout the world.[36] In the early 1970s, Shariati had given a number of lectures on martyrdom in which he had insisted that true believers had a sacred duty to struggle, and if necessary to make the supreme sacrifice, in order to liberate their country from class oppression and colonial domination.[37] Shariati popularized a nineteenth-century saying, "Every place should be turned into Karbala, every month into Moharram, and every day into Ashura." Khomeini later adopted this as one of his own slogans.[38]
Similarly in the early 1970s, Hojjat al-Islam Nimatollah Salahi-Najafabadi had published in Qom a highly controversial book entitled Shahid-e Javid (The eternal martyr). He argued that Imam Hosayn had taken up arms not because he sought dynastic power, as the Sunnis charged, nor because he was blindly following divine fate, as conventional Shiis claimed, but because he had calculated rationally that he had a good chance of overthrowing the oppressive regime.[39] Martyrdom, thus, was not just a saintly act but a revolutionary sacrifice to overthrow a despotic political order. This was probably the most controversial book written by
a cleric in the decade before the revolution. Hojjat al-Islam Shamsabadi, a conservative cleric in Isfahan, denounced from his pulpit both the author and Ayatollah Hosayn Ali Montazeri, who had written the introduction to the book. Montazeri's supporters responded by murdering Shamsabadi and his family.
It should also be noted that Khomeini's public pronouncements in the 1970s rarely mentioned doctrinal issues, especially his highly controversial concept of velayat-e faqih. Some of his lay allies later complained that this avoidance had been part of a devious clerical scheme to dupe the public.[40] Khomeini's disciples countered that it was the liberals and leftists who had conspired to suppress the book Velayat-e Faqih.[ 41] Whatever the reasons, some of Khomeini's lay advisers, such as Sadeq Qotbzadeh, were ignorant enough of the concept that they were completely bewildered when they heard it for the first time months after the revolution.[42]
While judiciously avoiding doctrinal matters, Khomeini targeted the shah on a host of highly sensitive socioeconomic issues. He accused him of widening the gap between rich and poor; favoring cronies, relatives, senior officials, and other kravatis (tie wearers); wasting oil resources on the ever-expanding army and bureaucracy; setting up assembly plants, not real manufacturing industries; ignoring the countryside in the distribution of essential services, including clinics, schools, electricity, and public baths; failing to give land to the landless peasantry; condemning the working class to a life of poverty, misery, and drudgery; creating huge shantytowns and neglecting low-income housing; bankrupting the bazaars by refusing to protect them from foreign competition and the superrich entrepreneurs; and compounding social problems by failing to combat rising crime, alcoholism, prostitution, and drug addiction.[43]
At the same time, Khomeini continued to denounce the shah for supporting the United States and Israel against the Arab world; trampling political liberties, especially the constitutional laws; making the country increasingly dependent on the West; and using cultural imperialism to undermine Islam and Iran. Islam
was endangered, Khomeini constantly warned, from outside by imperialism and Zionism and from inside by such fifth columnists as monarchists, leftists, and other secularists.
These denunciations freely used highly radical, populist catchphrases, but careful scrutiny of Khomeini's rhetoric shows him to have been remarkably vague on specifics — especially on the question of private property. These catchphrases, including the following, were later adopted as demonstration slogans:[44]
Islam belongs to the oppressed, not to the oppressors.
Islam is for equality and social justice.
Islam represents the slum dwellers, not the palace dwellers.
Islam will eliminate class differences.
We are for Islam, not for capitalism and feudalism.
Islam originates from the masses, not from the rich.
In a truly Islamic society, there will be no shantytowns.
In a truly Islamic society, there will be no landless peasants.
The duty of the clergy is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the rich.
Islam is not the opiate of the masses.
The poor were for the Prophet; the rich were against him.
The poor died for the Islamic Revolution; the rich plotted against it.
The martyrs of the Islamic Revolution were all members of lower classes: peasants, industrial workers, and bazaar merchants and tradesmen.
Oppressed of the world, unite.
The oppressed of the world should create a Party of the Oppressed.
The problems of the East come from the West — especially from American imperialism.
Neither West nor East, but Islam.
The oppressed nations of the world should unite against their imperialist oppressors.
Khomeini reinterpreted early Islamic history to reinforce these populist notions. He argued that contrary to popular tradition, the Prophet had been a humble shepherd, not a successful businessman; Imam Ali had been a penniless water carrier, not a prosperous merchant; and many of the early prophets had been simple laborers who had looked forward to the day when the oppressed would become the oppressors, and the oppressors would become the oppressed. He also argued that most of the Shii clergy, including the grand ayatollahs, had originated from the common people, lived like "humble folk," and died with few worldly possessions.[45]
This populist rhetoric reached a crescendo in 1979. As the old regime was collapsing, Khomeini incorporated into his political vocabulary two words he had hitherto scrupulously avoided: enqelab and jomhuri. He now argued that the Islamic Revolution would pave the way for an Islamic republic, which, in turn, would hasten the establishment of a truly Islamic society. This society, the exact opposite of Pahlavi Iran, would be free of want, hunger, unemployment, slums, inequality, illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, prostitution, drugs, nepotism, corruption, exploitation, foreign domination, and, yes, even bureaucratic red tape. It would be a society based on equality, fraternity, and social justice.
In promising utopia, Khomeini managed to discard two other important tenets of traditional Shiism. For centuries, Shiis had looked back longingly on Mohammad's Mecca and Imam Ali's caliphate as the Golden Age of Islam. Khomeini now declared that revolutionary Iran had already surpassed these early societies and their insoluble problems. For centuries, Shiis had believed that the Mahdi would return when the world was overflowing with injustice and tyranny. Khomeini now argued that the Mahdi would reappear when Muslims had returned to Islam, created a just society, and exported their revolution to other countries.[46] The traditional quietist belief had been turned inside out.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic and Khomeini's Political Testament
Khomeini's populism is revealed in the two most important texts published since the revolution: the Constitution of the Islamic Republic and Khomeini's Matn-e Kamel-e Vasiyatnameh-e Elahi va Siyasi-ye Imam Khomeini (The complete text of Imam Khomeini's divine will and political testament). The constitution was drafted in 1979-80 by an Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan) — most of whom were Khomeini's disciples. The political testament was drawn up in 1983, revised in the mid-1980s, and published immediately after Khomeini's death in June 1989.
The Constitution
At first glance, the text of the constitution with its 175 clauses reads like a cumbersome "fundamentalist" document.[47] It begins with the declaration that the Islamic Republic is based on the "principal faiths" of the justice of God; the existence of one God and submission to His will; the divine message and its fundamental role in all human laws; and the concept of the Resurrection and its "role in human evolution." It also declares that the leadership clauses, especially those stipulating that ultimate authority resides in the senior religious jurists, were to endure until the Mahdi, the Lord of the Age, reappeared on earth. This, however, did not prevent the Assembly of Experts from drastically revamping these clauses ten years later and even introducing a theological exam to keep more radical clerics out of this exclusive club.
A closer look, however, shows that the text of the constitution, not to mention its pretext, subtext, and context, is highly nonfundamentalist. Its central structure was taken straight from the French Fifth Republic, with Montesquieu's separation of powers. It divides the government into the executive, headed by the president, supervising a highly centralized state; the judiciary, with powers to appoint district judges and review their verdicts; and the national Parliament, elected through universal adult suffrage. For years Khomeini had argued that women's suffrage was un-
Islamic. He now argued that to deprive women of the vote was un-Islamic.
Superimposed on this conventional constitution was Khomeini's concept of velayat-e faqih. Khomeini, described as the Supreme Religious Jurist, was given the authority to dismiss the president, appoint the main military commanders, declare war and peace, and name senior clerics to the Guardian Council (Shawra-ye Negahban), whose chief responsibility was to ensure that all laws passed by Parliament conformed to the sacred law. The constitution added that if no supreme religious judge emerged after Khomeini, the leadership would pass to a committee of three or five senior clerics (marajec-e taqlid) to be chosen by the popularly elected Assembly of Experts. Najafabadi, the author of the controversial Shahid-e Javid, argued in a new book entitled Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Salihan (Jurist's guardianship: Worthy government) that this two-stage electoral process would help harmonize the concepts of divine rule and clerical supervision with those of popular sovereignty and majority representation.[48] He also argued that the concept of velayat-e faqih implicitly involved the notion of a "social contract" between the religious judges and the population.
Although Khomeini's death left the country with no obvious successor, the clause stipulating that a committee of senior clerics should take his place was never enacted. Rather, the Assembly of Experts, knowing well that the senior jurists distrusted their version of Islam, quickly amended the constitution. They dropped the marjac -e taqlid requirement so that Khomeini's position could be inherited by Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamenei — a middleranking cleric who was neither a senior religious jurist nor a marjac-e taqlid, nor at the time even a generally accepted ayatollah. This amendment, while revealing the pragmatic nature of Khomeinism, unwittingly undermined the intellectual foundations of Khomeini's velayat-e faqih. After all, in his Velayat-e Faqih Khomeini had argued that only the most senior religious jurists — not just any cleric — had the scholastic expertise and the
educational training to fully comprehend the intricacies of Islamic jurisprudence.
In fact, Khomeini himself, anticipating the succession problem, had begun to modify his velayat-e faqih concept at the very end of his life. In March 1989, three months before his death, he made a major pronouncement categorizing the clergy into two distinct groups: those most knowledgeable about religious scholarship, including the sacred law, and those most knowledgeable about the contemporary world, especially economic, social, and political matters.[49] The latter, he declared, should rule because they were more in touch with the "problems of the day." After two decades of insisting that the religious jurists should rule, he was now arguing that the political clergy should be the ultimate authority. After a lifetime of denouncing secularism as a Western perversion, he was now close to concluding that the affairs of this world were separate from the understanding of the sacred law. The shift reflected the mind of a political pragmatist, not a religious fundamentalist.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic contained much populist rhetoric. It began with the two controversial terms enqelab and jomhuri. It glorified Khomeini not only as the revolution's leader (rahbar), the republic's founder, and the most respected of the religious jurists, but also as an imam, a title Iranian Shiis had traditionally reserved for the revered original Twelve Imams. In fact, some conservative clerics viewed this novel use of the title imam as somewhat blasphemous.[50]
The constitution went on to promise all citizens pensions, social security, unemployment benefits, disability pay, medical services, and free secondary as well as primary school education. It promised to eradicate hoarding, usury, monopolies, unemployment, poverty, and social deprivation; provide interest-free loans; utilize science and technology; and "plan the economy in such a way that all individuals will have the time and opportunity to enhance their moral and social development and participate in the leadership and management of the country." These clauses seem to have escaped the notice of Western journalists who claim that the
Iranian revolution was carried out in the name of rejecting this type of society. In fact, the Iranian constitution has far more to say about economic matters than most Western constitutions. It promises to make Iran fully independent, pay off external loans, cancel foreign concessions, nationalize foreign companies, strive for the total unity of all Muslims, and "help the oppressed of the world struggle against their oppressors."
Despite the radical rhetoric, the constitution undertook to safeguard private property. It pledged to balance the government budget, encourage "home ownership," and respect the predominance of the "private sector" in agriculture, trade, services, and small industries. What is more, it intentionally avoided the term nezam-e tawhidi (monotheistic order), a term that the Mojahedin wanted enshrined in the constitution as the republic's ultimate goal. These full-fledged radicals, as opposed to mere populists, had championed the term and given it connotations similar to the Marxist notion of the "classless society."
Khomeini's Divine Will and Political Testament
Khomeini's thirty-five-page handwritten will is coherently structured, even though it went through major alterations between its composition and its eventual publication.[51] Its prologue hails true Islam as the message of "liberation" and "social justice" not just for Iranians and Muslims but also for the "oppressed people of the world irrespective of nationality and religion." It also claims that the true message of Islam is being constantly distorted by an international conspiracy of Zionists, Communists, Eastern and Western imperialists, Marxists masquerading as Muslims, Western-contaminated liberals, opportunistic clerics, and local tyrants (namely, the Saudis in Arabia, King Hasan of Morocco, King Hosayn of Jordan, and Saddam Hosayn of Iraq).
The text has sections addressed to specific groups: the clergy and the seminaries; the university-educated intelligentsia; the parliamentary deputies; the judiciary; the executive, particularly the cabinet; the armed forces, including the regular army as well as the Revolutionary Guards; the mass media, including the radio-
television network and the daily newspapers; the opposition in exile, especially the Marxist parties; and, last but not least, the bazaars with their shopkeepers, traders, and small businessmen. In each section, he warns of the ever present danger of conspiracies hatched by the superpowers and fifth columnists.
In addressing Parliament, Khomeini stresses that the deputies should continue to come from the "middle class and the deprived population" and not from the ranks of the "capitalists, land-grabbers, and the upper class, who lust in pleasure and know nothing about hunger, poverty, and barefootedness." He reminds the ministers and civil servants that the revolution succeeded because of the active participation of the "deprived classes." He warns that if they lose this support they will follow the Pahlavis into exile.
In addressing the bazaars, he emphasizes that Islam safeguards private property. It encourages private investments in agriculture and industry, provides for a "balanced economy in which the private sector is recognized," and, unlike communism, respects private property for providing "social justice" and turning the "wheels of a healthy economy." He ends his last testament by telling Muslims and the deprived of the world that they should not sit around passively waiting for liberation but should rise up to overthrow the imperialists and their local lackeys — the tyrants, the palace dwellers, and those indulging in conspicuous consumption.
Khomeinism and Populism
Khomeinism, despite its religious dimension, in many ways resembles Latin American populism. This is not surprising, because Pahlavi Iran had much in common with Latin America: an informal rather than formal dependence on the West; an upper class that included a comprador bourgeoisie; an anti-imperialist middle class; an urban working class unorganized by the Left; and a recent influx of rural migrants into urban shantytowns.
Khomeinism, like Latin American populism, was mainly a
middle-class movement that mobilized the masses with radicalsounding rhetoric against the external powers and the entrenched power-holding classes, including the comprador bourgeoisie. In attacking the establishment, however, it was careful to respect private property and avoid concrete proposals that would undermine the petty bourgeoisie. These movements had vague aspirations and no precise programs. Their rhetoric was more important than their programs and blueprints. They used the language of class against the ruling elite, but once the old order was swept aside, they stressed the need for communal solidarity and national unity. They turned out to be more interested in changing cultural and educational institutions than in overthrowing the modes of production and distribution. They were Janus-faced: revolutionary against the old regimes and conservative once the new order was set up. The revolutionary aspect accounted for the initial endorsement from the Left. Religious fundamentalism could never have won this type of support.
Khomeinism, like Latin American populism, claimed to be a return to "native roots" and a means for eradicating "cosmopolitan ideas" and charting a noncapitalist, noncommunist "third way" toward development. In actual fact, however, many of the slogans and key concepts were borrowed from the outside world, especially from Europe. Khomeinism used organizations and plebiscitary politics to mobilize the masses, but at the same time it distrusted any form of political pluralism, liberalism, and grass-roots democracy. Khomeinism developed ambiguous and contradictory attitudes toward the state. On the one hand, it wanted to protect middle-class property. On the other hand, it wanted to strengthen the state by extending its reach throughout society and providing social benefits to the lower classes. Khomeinism, strikingly like other populisms, elevated its leader into a demigod towering above the people and embodying their historical roots, future destiny, and revolutionary martyrs. Despite all the talk about the people, power emanated down from the leader, not up from the masses. Thus the title of imam should be seen not as purely religious but as the Shii-Iranian version of the Latin American El Lider, El Conductor, Jefe Maximo (Chief Boss), and O Paid do Povo (Father of the Poor).