II—
Two Theories of Revolution

In the summer of 1932, during the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, the Kuomintang forces dealt a serious blow to the O-Yü-Wan (Hupeh–Honan–Anhwei) Soviet. The Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Red Army, which defended this soviet, embarked on what was really the first "Long March." Then in October of 1934, during the Fifth Campaign, the Central Soviet District in southern Kiangsi was overrun. The Central Committee of the CCP, the government, the Red Army, their personnel and dependents fled, with the Kuomintang forces on their heels. This was only the beginning of the worst disaster in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. The Red political power which controlled some 300 hsien (counties) at one time in Kiangsi, Hupeh, Honan, Hunan, Anhwei, and Fukien was almost wholly wiped out.^[1] The revolutionary movement appeared to be on the verge of extinction. The defeat split the Chinese Communist leadership both in China and Moscow and gave rise to serious internal disputes. The disputes concerned the causes behind the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet and a general reorientation in the Party's policy to extricate itself from the critical strait. The dispute extended well into the early phase of the war of resistance against Japan. Out of it evolved the CCP's new strategies which directly contributed to the final victory of the revolution: abandonment of the civil war with the Kuomintang government and the formation of the "Anti-Japanese National United Front."

Hitherto, we have tended to neglect the gravity of the CCP's defeat,

[1] Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no seiji to jinbutsu [Politics and personalities in contemporary China] (Tokyo: Kaizosha^[*] , 1937), p. 306.

the defects of the soviet movement, and the drastic nature of the CCP's about-face. The Long March, for instance, is still thought of primarily as an heroic epic.^[2] But the fact that the heroic nature of the Long March resulted from the harsh circumstances imposed on the CCP by its enemy is overlooked. Above all, we have ignored the fact that the partisan interest of one faction in the CCP was bound up with the fiction that the soviet movement and the Long March could not be faulted.^[3]

In this chapter I will delineate the substance of the strategic dispute in the CCP between 1935 and 1936 that led to the adoption of the new policy. My primary purpose is to show that the end product—the united front line—was an uneasy juxtaposition of two distinct policy lines which clashed with each other.

Let us begin by touching briefly on the O-Yü-Wan Soviet and the Red Fourth Front Army, as the fortunes of this group foreshadowed those of the Central Soviet. The Fourth Encirclement Campaign was directed mainly at the O-Yü-Wan Soviet. According to Chang Kuot'ao, Chiang Kai-shek marshaled a force of 500,000 men, of which 300,000 were used directly for assault.^[4] According to the Kuomintang's estimate, the Red Army forces in the O-Yü-Wan area north of the Yangtze River numbered 80,000.^[5] The campaign began in the spring of 1932 soon after the Shanghai Incident. By the summer, Hsü Hsiangch'ien's forces were dislodged from the central base and fled westward across the Peiping–Hankow railway in search of a new, as yet unknown, base. Some tactical mistakes were made on the Communist side.^[6] But the sheer superiority of the Kuomintang forces in number and fire power created a situation which was irreversible. Thus the Central Committee's O-Yü-Wan Sub-bureau had discussed a plan to evacuate the base prior to the attack.^[7]

Of the several doubts which haunted Chang Kuo-t'ao and other leaders of the Fourth Front Army on the run, two are worthy of note.

[2] Several books have been published on the Long March both in and out of China. They all follow this interpretation. See, for instance, Dick Wilson, Long March (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971).

[3] See, for instance, Mao's speech at Wayaopao in northern Shensi in December, 1935, where he said, "The Long March . . . has proclaimed to the world that . . . Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. . . . " Selected Works , I, 160.

[4] "Wo ti hui-i" [My recollections], Ming Pao , No. 43, July, 1969, p. 93.

[5] Military History Bureau, the Ministry of National Defense, Chiao-fei chan-shih [A History of Military Actions Against The Communist Rebellion During 1930–1945] (Taipei: Lien-ho ch'u-pan-she, 1967), p. 538.

[6] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 43, July, 1969, pp. 93–94.

[7] Ibid. , p. 92.

One was the conditional nature of the peasant mass support for the Red Army. Support depended on the absolute control of an area by the Red Army. When a superior Kuomintang force entered a base, compelling the Red Army forces to take evasive action, the peasants were left behind to shift for themselves. At this point, they began to waver and local resistance to Communist programs increased. Upon reaching northern Szechuan with a considerably weakened force, the Fourth Front Army decided to adopt a program designed to appease potential local opposition. The Fourth Front Army's Program Upon Entering Szechuan was an ad hoc adaptation to current local exigencies.^[8] But it suspended forcible confiscation of the property of the landlords, which amounted to an open challenge to the Party's "sovietization" policy. As Chang Kuo-t'ao put it, "At present it was not the agrarian revolution that had enhanced the forces of the Red Army, but the momentary victories that the Red Army had achieved [which] encouraged a small number of peasants to rise and distribute the land."^[9]

The other doubt stemmed from the difficulties which confronted the Fourth Front Army. The prospect of finding a stable base from which a revolution could be launched appeared very bleak. Chang Kuo-t'ao seems to have felt then that there was a deeper cause for the weakness of the revolution than merely military questions. What then sustained the Red Army's growth up until 1932, and what caused its demise after that?

The Communist regulars were tactically superior to the Kuomintang's provincial units and were on a par with or even surpassed the central forces under certain conditions. Tactical leadership of the Red Army's command in mobile warfare was usually superior. The Red Army's hiking ability gave it unsurpassed mobility in difficult terrain where it usually chose to fight. In or around its own bases, the Red Army monopolized intelligence; it knew the movements of the enemy forces while keeping them in the dark as to its own whereabouts. It almost always fought on its own terms by amassing an overwhelmingly superior force against an individual column of the converging enemy forces at a decisive point. The Red Army could not be defeated by conventional means. To apply unconventional means, the Kuomintang had to marshal an extraordinary number of troops for a prolonged period.

The other major condition for the growth of the Red Army was strategic. This stemmed from the basic structural weakness of the Chi-

[8] Ibid. , No. 45, September, 1969, p. 75; ibid. , No. 46, October, 1969, p. 97.

[9] Ibid. , No. 46, October, 1969, p. 99.

nese polity. Chiang Kai-shek's war against the Communists was part of a larger attempt to establish centralized and unified government by shedding the tradition of warlordism. In his campaigns against the Red Army, he had to draw on regional forces of questionable loyalty. In fact, he frequently pitted such regional units against the Red Army in the hope that one or the other or both would be decimated. The contradiction among the motley Kuomintang forces was usually exploited by the Red Army to breach the encirclement, e.g., during the Fukien Rebellion. The CCP's strategy to establish a regional regime by "winning victory of the revolution first in one or several provinces" presupposed the "semi-feudal" political structure of China. This presupposition was also shared by the Japanese Army's leadership. Japan's aggression into China since 1931 was based on the judgment that it could exploit warlordism to carve out the Chinese territory. Every major Japanese aggression since the Mukden Incident forced the Kuomintang government to break its anti-Communist encirclement. In short, the diversionary effect of exogenous factors had maintained a situation which enabled the Red Army to exercise its tactical superiority to the hilt.^[*]

The strategic situation of China could not be changed overnight. But the Kuomintang government made major tactical innovations for the Fifth Campaign. German advisers led by von Seeckt were credited with a part in it. Instead of trying to confront the Red Army in conventional mobile warfare, the Kuomintang forces adopted the tactic of depriving the Red Army of its soviet base by gradual advance. Innumerable blockhouses were built around the soviet area.^[10] They were interconnected with newly constructed roads. A tight economic blockade was imposed. A small advance at a time was made toward the center, and the area taken was defended by a new blockhouse. Without adequate fire power, the Red Army was nearly powerless against the blockhouses. Chiang Kai-shek carried out the Fifth Campaign with determination. He marshaled a force of 400,000 men, assisted by aircraft and modern artillery.^[11] After the split caused in the Kuomintang forces by the Fukien Rebellion had been patched up in late 1933, the Campaign came to a climax.

[*] The CCP's ability to mobilize the peasant masses has remained constant from 1928 to the present. What remains to be known is whether the Red Army's preponderance was the precondition of peasant mobilization, as Chang Kuo-t' ao suggests.

[10] Estimated to be 3,000 by Hatano, in Gendai Shina , p. 302.

[11] This is the number used directly for assault, according to Snow, Red Star Over China , p. 184. Hollington K. Tong states that 300,000 were used, in Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938), II, 528.

The CCP's leadership shared the view that this fight was a decisive one. The Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee met in January. Mao charged later that the "third 'Left' line of Wang Ming" dominated the Plenum and that incorrect tactics of trying to defend every inch of the soviet base in positional warfare were adopted.^[12] The Internationalists led by Ch'in Pang-hsien had the controlling voice, and Mao's dissenting opinion was brushed aside.

In late April, Kuangch'ang and Chünmenling fell to the Kuomintang forces, and the approach to Juichin, the soviet capital, was opened. By this time victory for the Kuomintang forces was in sight. The CCP leadership must have debated where to go and what to do. Such a discussion might have been under way since the summer of 1932, when the Fourth Front Army was forced to evacuate the O-Yü-Wan Soviet during the Fourth Campaign. When the Fifth Campaign started, some people in P'eng Te-huai's 3rd Army Corps are said to have asked, "When will there be an end to all this?"^[13] On July 15, 1934, the Central Committee and the Central Soviet Government issued a joint "Declaration on the March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the North to Resist Japan."^[14] This was the signal to evacuate the Central Soviet area. It was also likely that internal recrimination had begun as to the cause of the imminent defeat. I presume that Mao took the lead in criticizing the Internationalist leadership for not acting on his tactical advice. In self-defense the Internationalists seemed to have developed a line of argument which amounted to rationalization of the existing policy.

One rather precious specimen is available in a speech made by Wang Ming in Moscow on November 23, 1934,^[15] just as the Kuomintang forces overran the Central Soviet area. He was working in the Comintern as a Chinese delegate. He was thus in close touch with the Party Center in China and presumably privy to the debate that was developing there. His opinion must also be regarded as representative of the Comintern's view at the time.

In this speech Wang Ming clearly identified himself with the incum-

[12] SW , IV, 185. There is some doubt as to how powerless Mao was in the Party's leadership at this time. Dieter Heinzig thinks he was "neither negligible nor dominant," in "The Otto Braun Memoirs and Mao's Rise to Power," The China Quarterly , April–June, 1971, p. 284. But there is little doubt that he was not in command of the Fourth and the Fifth Campaigns.

[13] Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," ibid. , October–December, 1969, p. 25.

[14] Takeuchi Minoru, ed., Mao Tse-tung-chi [Mao Tse-tung collection] (Tokyo: Hokubosha^[*] , 1971), IV, 363–367.

[15] Hsin t'iao-chien yü hsin ts'e-lüeh [New conditions and new tactics] (Moscow: The Soviet Foreign Workers' Publishing House, 1935) (BI).

bent leadership by attempting to explain away the debacle in Kiangsi. He spent a great deal of effort recounting the overwhelming military superiority of the Kuomintang forces used in the "Sixth Encirclement and Suppression"—this was the Comintern's numeration for the "Fifth Encirclement" after the Fukien Incident; the entirely new tactics used by von Seeckt; and the use of heavy aerial and artillery bombardment.^[16] "Because of this," he said, "it was impossible not to have difficulty in quickly destroying the enemy main force, so that it was impossible not to withdraw from certain soviet areas . . . ."^[17] At no point did he engage in a wholesale attack on the strategic aspect of the existing policy. Mistakes were committed but they were tactical. "Does the Red Army have the possibility to win victory over these new policies of the enemy?" he asked himself, and answered affirmatively.^[18] He was insistent that the soviet movement enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the people,^[19] and he emphasized that the area lost to the Kuomintang was compensated for by the newly-opened soviets in the hands of the Red Fourth, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Corps.^[20]

At the same time Wang Ming revealed another element of his position. Without questioning the Party's line as such, he placed the blame for the "mistakes" in Kiangsi mainly on the incorrect handling of the Fukien Incident both by the CCP and the rebels themselves. He was very critical of some elements in the CCP who refused to aid the 19th Route Army on the grounds that "the Red Army should not receive Chiang Kai-shek's blows in place of the 19th Route Army because at that time the 19th Route Army was the object on which Chiang Kaishek was concentrating all of his power . . . . "^[21] Wang Ming professed to believe, on the contrary, that "if a very large revolutionary struggle broke out in the great rear of Chiang Kai-shek's army . . . the plan to encircle the Central Soviet area could have quickly and completely gone bankrupt."^[22] Wang Ming was implying that had a major urban revolt—of the kind represented by the Fukien Rebellion—been properly exploited, Kuomintang pressure could have been diverted. This was consistent with Wang Ming's position which Mao labeled as the "third 'Left' line." It represented his efforts to focus the CCP's activities on the cities within the rural-oriented line of the Party at the time. Wang Ming was to make an abrupt about-face shortly, as will be shown later, but his urban orientation remained unchanged.

The Party Center and the First Front Army rested briefly in a small town in Kweichow Province in January, 1935, and conducted their

[16] Ibid. , pp. 14–16, 112–113.

[17] Ibid. , p. 18.

[18] Ibid. , p. 19.

[19] Ibid. , pp. 43, 87.

[20] Ibid. , pp. 84–85.

[21] Ibid. , p. 64.

[22] Ibid. , p. 20.

own review of the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet. The Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference—made famous because of Mao's rise to power on this occasion—agreed with Wang Ming's review in part but disagreed with it in another. The beginning of the internal dispute concerning the second united front can be traced back to these Resolutions. Whether issues between Mao and Wang Ming were joined on this occasion was not certain. That depended on whether or not the Party Center maintained communication with the Comintern in Moscow.

Chang Kuo-t'ao shows that the Fourth Front Army and the First Front Army maintained constant radio contact with each other. Thus the Tsunyi Resolutions were transmitted to northern Szechuan almost immediately from Kweichow.^[23] From the Tsunyi Conference onward, Mao seems to have monopolized all radio communication with the outside world and kept his opponents in the dark. In particular, he had an interest in censoring the messages from the Comintern since he was beginning to take a line in opposition to it. But radio or other contact between the Party Center and Moscow was not impossible.^[24]

The central thesis of the Tsunyi Resolutions was that the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet was the fault solely of the Internationalist leadership which commanded the Fifth Campaign. Its major import was to defend the soviet movement, the Red Army, and by extension the peasant mass movement on which they were based, as fundamentally correct. The rural strategy of the Sixth Congress was correct and the soviets could have continued to grow but for the purely tactical error of some individuals, according to this view. The Resolutions thus agreed with Wang Ming's November, 1934, review of the Fifth Campaign in not faulting the Party's line of the Sixth Congress.

The Resolutions suggested, in passing, the views of Mao's opponents in China. Ch'in Pang-hsien, an Internationalist and the General-Secretary of the Party until he was replaced at the Tsunyi Conference, was said to have "come to the opportunist conclusion that to defeat the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' was an objective impossibility."^[25] On the contrary, the Resolutions maintained, "the Party of the Central Soviets, in particular . . . has achieved unprecedented successes in mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants to take part in the revolutionary war. The Red Army Expansion Movement aroused

[23] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 48, December, 1969, p. 85.

[24] By July, 1935, there appeared an oblique reference to the dispute in the CCP Center in a Soviet press. Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 53–54. See also pp. 21–23, below.

[25] Mao Tse-tung-chi , IV, 379.

great enthusiasm among the masses . . . . " But, continued the Resolutions, Ch'in Pang-hsien "underestimated" these "favorable conditions for crushing the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression.' " He concluded that "we were unable to crush the 'Encirclement and Suppression' by our own efforts."^[26]

The Resolutions took serious issue with this view and opposed it head on.

It must be pointed out that our work still suffers from serious defects. The Party's leadership in the daily struggle of the broad masses of workers and peasants against the imperialists and Kuomintang had not made any noticeable progress. . . . These defects undoubtedly affected operations against the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' and they became the important cause of our inability to smash the 'Encirclement and Suppression.' But their existence must not be misunderstood as the essential cause for our failure to smash the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression.' Comrade XX [i.e., Ch'in Pang-hsien] has exaggerated the defects in these areas of our work and refused to see or admit the misjudgment on the part of the military leadership and in their basic strategy and tactics. . . . Since our military leadership could not adopt correct strategy and tactics, we were unable to score decisive victory in war in spite of the bravery and skill of the Red Army, the exemplary work in the rear, and the support of the broad masses. This was precisely the essential cause for our inability to defeat the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' in the Central Soviet.^[27]

It followed from this point of view that "the Central Soviet could have been preserved, the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' could have been broken."

It appears that the Internationalist leadership at Tsunyi had an interest in blaming the defeat on the objective circumstances, while Mao, the opposition, had an interest in fixing the blame on the subjective error of those in power. The Internationalists had shifted from blaming the tactical error in the handling of the Fukien Rebellion (as in Wang Ming's Moscow speech) to blaming the objective circumstance. I infer that the CCP leadership at Tsunyi faced two broad alternatives in its post mortem. One was to fault the tactical, subjective judgment of some individuals and uphold the Party's line. The other was to exonerate the incumbent leaders by blaming the objective circumstances. The latter necessarily implied that the validity of the Party's strategies was open to question. But Ch'in Pang-hsien, who took the position, somehow stopped short of pushing this logic to its conclusion.

I must note some peculiar features of the realignment of power that

[26] Ibid. , p. 380.

[27] Ibid. Emphasis original.

took place at Tsunyi. By the standard established in the CCP by then, the disaster in Kiangsi was bound to be followed by a full scale review and stock-taking. Such a review would have taken a very critical look at the role of the incumbent leaders regardless of actual culpability. They would have been retired from command. At the same time, the existing line of the Party should have come under criticism. The incumbent leadership and the existing Party line were in a particularly vulnerable position as the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet almost coincided with the great turn in the Comintern's line. The CCP could have held its Seventh Congress almost simultaneously with the Comintern's Seventh Congress, as was the custom up to then. But nothing of the sort happened. The Tsunyi Resolutions defended the line of the Sixth Congress, and the CCP's Seventh Congress did not convene until 1945. Error in tactical leadership was fixed mainly on a certain "Hua Fu," who was in reality a Comintern agent named Otto Braun.^[28] Chou Enlai, who commanded the Fourth Campaign without much success, retired as the General Political Commissar of the Red Army.^[29] Ch'in Pang-hsien was replaced in the post of the General-Secretary of the Politburo by Chang Wen-t'ien, another Internationalist. Both Chou En-lai and Ch'in Pang-hsien continued in important leadership positions in the Party.

The limited nature of the realignment at Tsunyi has been hitherto explained by the continued power of the Internationalists in the Party and the slim majority Mao could muster on his side at the time. It is my inference, however, that Mao was interested in carefully circumscribing the scope of his criticism against the "third 'Left' line" of Wang Ming. His primary goal was to preserve intact the legitimacy of the rural strategy of the Sixth Congress. The Tsunyi Conference as a "military coup d'état"^[30] accomplished this. At the same time, Mao's account with Wang Ming was not entirely settled.

The next events in the development of the intra-Party dispute were the Party conferences in Moukung and Maoerhkai in western Szechuan. Here the First Front Army and the Fourth Front Army met in June, 1935. Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao clashed with each other on several issues. I will limit my discussion to two of them. Chang Kuot'ao's predicament was similar to that of the Internationalists. He had failed to defend the O-Yü-Wan Soviet; and subsequently, he had abandoned the land confiscation policy on his own initiative. In defending

[28] Chi-hsi Hu, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference," The China Quarterly , July–September, 1970, p. 40.

[29] Ch'en, "Tsunyi Conference," p. 2.

[30] Hu, "Fifth Encirclement," p. 44.

himself against Mao, it was natural for him to question the validity of the "sovietization" policy itself. When he saw the miserable condition of the First Front Army—reduced to 10,000 troops or one-tenth of the original size—he came to the conclusion that the soviet movement and the Long March had failed.^[31] Mao chose to differ and blamed Chang Kuo-t'ao, instead, for breach of Party discipline.

They also differed on the question of where to go. At Moukung, Chang Kuo-t'ao was told of a radio instruction from the Comintern to the Party Center in Juichin in the summer of 1934. According to this instruction, the Red Army was to move closer to the border of Outer Mongolia in case of extreme necessity.^[32] According to Wang Ming's Moscow speech of November, 1934, the CCP had decided to move west-ward because of the presence of Kuomintang forces in north and central China.^[33] If Mao was in touch with the Comintern in Moukung, he let Chang Kuo-t'ao believe otherwise. He simply proposed moving into northern parts of Shensi and Kansu.^[34] Probably influenced by the last Comintern instruction, Chang Kuo-t'ao proposed to build a base where they were (i.e., Szechuan–Kansu border with Sikang as the rear) or to move into Sinkiang. Mao felt that Chang Kuo-t'ao's proposals would take the CCP too far away from the center of China.^[35]

The crucial question here was, What induced Mao to insist that the CCP move into the barren loess region of Shensi? One must remember that the Long March was justified by the "Manifesto to Go Up North to Resist Japan" issued in Mao's name in July, 1934. Did he have some specific scheme in mind? Or was this just another anti-Japanese statement which had been added to the CCP's appeals since 1932? I simply do not know. But war with Japan was shortly to become a vital precondition of Mao's vision of revolution.

It has hitherto been assumed that the Maoerhkai Conference issued the so-called "August First Declaration."^[36] This appeal was very significant because it addressed itself broadly to the intermediate groups

[31] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 49, January, 1970, p. 82. See also his open letter on the occasion of his defection from the CCP, in The Commission for Compiling Documents on the 50th Anniversary of Kuomintang, ed., Kung-fei huo-kuo shih-liao hui-pien [Collection of historical documents on the ruination of the nation by the Communist bandits] (hereinafter cited as Kung-fei huo-kuo ) (Taipei: Central Committee of the Kuomintang, 1961), III, 63.

[32] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 50, February, 1970, p. 85.

[33] Hsin t, iao-chien yü hsin ts'e-lüeh , p. 119.

[34] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 50, February, 1970, p. 85.

[35] Ibid. , p. 87.

[36] Wei k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo kao ch'üan-t'i t'ung-pao shu [Letter to the whole nation for resistance against Japan and national salvation], Kuo-Kung ho-tso k'ang-Jih wen-hsien [Documents of Kuomintang–CCP cooperation] (hereinafter cited as Kuo-Kung ho-tso ) (Hankow: T'ien-ma shu-tien, 1938) (BI), pp. 1–7.

by overcoming the sectarianism which marked the CCP's policy in the civil war period. It has been suspected that the appeal was coordinated with the Comintern's Seventh Congress which had been in session since July 25. Indeed, the content of the August First Declaration shared many points with the major speech delivered by Wang Ming at the Congress on August 7.^[37] Both proposed the formation of a "national defense government" based on a ten-point "common program"; an "anti-Japanese united army" which was to enlist the "Kuomintang army"; and an offer of ceasefire toward any force which was willing to join the "united army." Especially noteworthy was the exact identity of the "common program" proposed in Moscow and China as it varied in content from time to time. There were, however, visible differences between the two: while Wang Ming proposed a "national united front," the term is missing from the Declaration, which moreover left no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek was still the CCP's enemy.

The Comintern's shift to the popular front line did not take place overnight; it was preceded by at least several months of debate. According to Wang Ming,

When the Comintern's Seventh Congress was under preparation, and the basic tactical guideline of the Congress was being debated . . . the Chinese Communist Party carried out a thorough and careful study of tactical problems concerning the anti-imperialist united front under the guidance of the Center. . . .^[38]

Wang Ming states that the August First Declaration was the result of that study. The suspicion that he was the author of the Declaration is strengthened by the fact that Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls neither the united front nor the Declaration being discussed at Maoerhkai.^[39] Did Wang Ming then secure the Party Center's consent before the fact, as he implies, or did he issue the Declaration in the name of the Central Committee on his own initiative as a member of the Comintern's Presidium? Chang Kuo-t'ao takes the latter view.^[40] If Mao did know of the Declaration at the time, he had an interest in keeping Chang Kuo-t'ao ignorant of it for fear that the latter's opposition to the

[37] The speech indicates that at least a part of it was written on July 16. Wang Ming hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Wang Ming ] (Tokyo: Kyuko^[*] shoin, 1970), I, 23.

[38] Hatano Ken'ichi, Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi [History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1936] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1937), pp. 94–95.

[39] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 51, March, 1970, p. 82.

[40] Ibid. Upon Wang Ming's return to China in late 1937, Mao is reported to have acknowledged Wang Ming's authorship of the August First Declaration in a welcome speech. Warren Kuo, "The Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tsetung," Issues and Studies , November, 1968, pp. 35–36.

soviet program might be strengthened. It is impossible to settle these questions with finality. Again, much depends on whether or not Moscow and the Party Center were in touch with each other. There was at least a one-way communication, however. The CCP had dispatched two agents, P'an Han-nien and Hu Yü-chih, to Moscow from Maoerhkai.^[41]

What amounted to a counter-thesis to the Tsunyi Resolutions was articulated in Wang Ming's August 7 speech at the Comintern Congress (July 25–August 20). He pushed to the conclusion the logic implied in Ch'in Pang-hsien's rationalization for the defeat in Kiangsi, and he used it as a premise to call for a drastic reorientation of the Chinese Communist movement. There was clearly an element of "opportunism" in Wang Ming's shift. Echoing Mao's view, Lin Piao stated in 1965 that Wang Ming, the practitioner of the "third 'Left' line," became a "capitulationist" or an advocate of the "second Wang Ming line" of "right opportunism."^[42] At the same time, there was a consistent underlying dimension in Wang Ming's position throughout the Kiangsi and the resistance periods. His tactical change was derivative of that underlying dimension.

The Comintern's shift to the new policy—the popular front with bourgeois democracies in opposition to fascism and reaction—had the Soviet Union's interest primarily in view. The shift came within half a year of the debacle in Kiangsi—a most inopportune moment for Mao, who had committed himself to the defense of the existing Party line. Wang Ming, who had succeeded Li Li-san as Mao's opponent in 1931, took the rostrum to deliver a major speech dealing with the Far East. His speech was formally deferential toward Mao, listing him at the top of the hierarchy of Chinese Communist leaders.^[43] Still, Wang Ming obviously had the backing of the Comintern to criticize "some comrades" in the CCP for their part in the major blunder committed in Kiangsi. Wang Ming, articulate and verbose, fully rose to the occasion.

A lengthy section of the speech, dealing specifically with China, began with a criticism of "a very greatly mistaken viewpoint" of "some people" who think that the "question of anti-imperialist national united front has no longer any meaning" because of the severity of class struggle. Wang Ming averred, on the contrary, that the united

[41] Wang Chien-min, Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao [A draft history of the Chinese Communist Party] (Taipei, 1965), III, 45–46.

[42] Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory," p. 210.

[43] See the laudatory reference to Mao Tse-tung in the speech in Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 25.

front "determines everything."^[44] He suggested the premise for the radical reorientation he was demanding:

When the national crisis is deepening day by day, there is no way of saving the nation except by a total mobilization of our great people. . . . At the same time, for the Communist Party's part, there is no means whatever to mobilize the entire Chinese people . . . except this policy of national united front. . . .^[45]

To be sure, Wang Ming admitted, the CCP had been already "practicing anti-Japanese united front policy." Georgi Dimitrov also took cognizance of this alleged fact.^[46] The reference might have been to the August First Declaration. But Wang Ming insisted that "right up to now the CCP has failed to be truly thorough and to avoid committing mistakes in implementing this policy."^[47] "The first among the causes of these mistakes," he declared, "is that many of our comrades in the past as at the present have not comprehended the new conditions and the new environment which have emerged in recent years in China."^[48] Living in total isolation in the hinterland, he suggested, the Chinese Communists were insensitive to the stirring of public sentiment in the cities.

In this speech, Wang Ming did not mention the Kuomintang as a friend to be enlisted in the united front. However, his several references to the Kuomintang and "the Kuomintang army" were moderate and solicitous, and he maintained that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary tradition was one to which the Communists were heir.^[49] At the same time, he tried to distinguish his position from that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en's mistake, according to Wang, was in "juxtaposing the tactics of national united front with the task of class struggle" and abandoning the class interests of the workers and peasants. The disaster of 1927, he stressed, was "by no means the fault of the tactics of anti-imperialist united front themselves."^[50] Wang Ming was evidently anticipating an attack from the left against himself, and he sought to turn the tables on his potential critics. "Some people think," he said, "that the CCP's participation in the anti-imperialist united front will only weaken the leadership of the proletariat and the struggle for soviet political power. This is completely inaccurate."^[51] He maintained that only the proletarian leadership over the united front could ensure the success of agrarian revolution. In so doing, he implied that his policy was intended to bring about a new alignment in the CCP by shifting away from its excessive reliance on the peasants.

[44] Ibid. , p. 7.

[45] Ibid. , p. 9–10.

[46] Ibid. , p. 63.

[47] Ibid. , p. 11.

[48] Ibid. , p. 13

[49] Ibid. , p. 53.

[50] Ibid. , p. 47.

[51] Ibid. , p. 45.

Wang Ming gave less restrained criticisms of the rural revolution in an essay written in November of 1935 for an internal audience. He lashed out at the impotence of the Red Army:

From the standpoint of actual military strength, we are still unable to win victory over Japanese imperialism and its lackeys. From the standpoint of political trends, a very great part of the people have not yet escaped the influence of other political power. . . . They have not yet defended the soviets.^[52]

Violent confiscation and class struggle promoted by the CCP invited greater and greater reaction. The Chinese soviets came to rely more and more on the Red Army alone to carry on the revolution. The revolution became synonymous with armed struggle.^[53] It did not advance beyond the line of the Red Army's occupation, while it tended to alienate the inhabitants of the cities who were more concerned with foreign menace.

Wang Ming clearly shared the orthodox Marxist bias against the peasantry. As Mao put it later, he underestimated the "peculiar revolutionary character of the peasants."^[54] To Wang, China's peasant masses fell far behind the inhabitants of the cities in their political awareness. Such a consciousness was at best aroused only through the process of the land confiscation struggle. Would they also rise up for purely political purposes, such as defending China against the Japanese? Wang Ming did not deny, of course, that the peasants were an important component of the Chinese revolution.

Nevertheless, a land revolutionary movement can never by itself directly solve the task of an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement. . . . Experiences prove that an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement has much broader motive force than a land revolutionary movement.^[55]

Should not the CCP try more directly and deliberately to harness the political power swelling up spontaneously in the cities? To Wang Ming, simply reacting to the revolts in Chahar and Fukien was not good enough.^[56]

Wang Ming also had an instrumental view of the rural soviets which subsisted by exploiting the "semi-feudal" character of China:

[52] Ibid. , p. 81.

[53] According to Mao, both Li Li-san and Wang Ming slanderously characterized Mao's approach as the "rule of the gun," SW , IV, 195.

[54] Ibid. , p. 192.

[55] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 76.

[56] Hsin t'iao-chien yü hsin ts'e-lüeh , p. 21. He states, "the great armed struggles which broke out among the enemy . . . were by no means all decided by our will."

This environment enabled the revolution to obtain ample opportunity and time to train and accumulate its own forces. . . . In addition, this environment enabled the revolution to obtain a greater possibility to avoid an armed clash . . . which arises prematurely, for which we are unprepared, and which is disadvantageous to the revolution.^[57]

The soviets that grew up in the interstices of the White political power by exploiting the "unevenness" of China's revolution were thus a mere preparation, a refuge from a superior enemy, and a means to some final act which was to take place beyond the borders of the rural soviets themselves. Biding of time in the hinterland was indeed a "protracted struggle." But the final act, a consummation of the revolution, was not. Wang Ming had to make this point with some trepidation, for it was only in 1931 that he had taken Li Li-san to task for making precisely the same point.^[58] At the time of the Fifth Plenum in 1934, furthermore, Wang Ming was instrumental in pronouncing that a "direct revolutionary situation" existed, which led to the do-or-die battle in defense of Kiangsi.^[59] Still, he made it clear that a successful revolution must draw on a sudden political tension created by larger domestic or international events. Such tension would do away with the "unevenness" of the revolution.

I surmise that Mao's ingenuity in rising to power in the wake of the defeat in Kiangsi infuriated Wang Ming. Likewise, Wang Ming's ingenuity in exploiting the same event for his own purpose must have chagrined Mao. Wang Ming's interest was to restore China's revolution to the cities on the wave of anti-Japanese political consciousness. An element of opportunism or "politics" was present on both sides. But we must also see the substantive merits of both cases. As things stood in the summer of 1935, Mao's case from Tsunyi—the peasant revolution can go on provided that it enjoys his leadership—did not carry much weight. At the time, he was nearing northern Shensi, the destination of the grueling march, with a force of a mere 4,000.^[60]

Restoring the CCP to the cities presupposed cooperation with the Kuomintang. "Cooperation" with regional powers such as the Fukien People's Government would not do. Such a "cooperation" or "united

[57] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 79.

[58] At the Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which carried out partial criticism of Li Li-san, Wang Ming charged that Li Li-san was ignorant of the distinction between the terms "high tide" and "objective revolutionary situation." Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), I, 68–69; Ibid. , II, 517–519.

[59] Ibid. , I, 261.

[60] He took the First and the Third Army Corps from Maoerhkai. "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 53, May, 1970, p. 87.

front from below" was a euphemism for inciting mutiny. The urban line of Wang Ming of necessity shifted to united front line, which in turn pointed to the Kuomintang government as the logical partner. In 1936 Wang Ming disclosed that the August First Declaration proposed a ceasefire and anti-Japanese agreements to Chiang Kai-shek.^[61] According to Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en Li-fu reported to him that "through a friend's introduction Chou En-lai had approached Tseng Yang-fu, a Government representative in Hong Kong" in the autumn and winter of 1935 in order to arrange a ceasefire.^[62] Chou is reported to have attached no condition. I conclude that the Comintern had instructed the Party Center to make the proposal.

From this point on, available evidence points to deepening factional differences in the Party. Contradictory orders and proclamations were issued by the CCP in the fall before it unified itself outwardly along the anti-Chiang line at Wayaopao. On October 11, the leaders of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese United Army, which was semi-independent of the CCP at the time, issued a circular telegram proposing a ceasefire and joint resistance to Japan. The large number of addressees included Lin Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-tung.^[63] The Central Committee issued a declaration on November 13, according to Ho Kan-chih, demanding a policy of simultaneous "resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang."^[64] I have no access to this document, but it seems to be identical in substance to the August First Declaration. Yet again on November 28, the CCP issued an "Anti-Japanese national salvation proclamation." There are two versions of this document. One was signed by Mao and Chu Te and was in line with the August 1 and the November 13 declarations.^[65] The other, collected contemporaneously by Hatano Ken'ichi, paralleled the October 11 telegram from the Manchurian leaders.^[66] It, too, began with a large list of addressees, starting with the authors of the October 11 telegram and various warlords. About midway through the list, as if he were an equal among the rest, was "The supreme commander of Nanking, Chiang Chung-cheng." The declaration was signed by several leaders of the Red Army. Chu Te was at the top, listing himself as the supreme commander of the Red Army and the chairman of the Military Commission. Chou En-lai came next as the vice-chairman of the Military Commission. Mao's name was conspicuous by its absence. The simultaneous exis-

[61] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 134, 139.

[62] Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar Strauss and Cudahy, 1957), p. 72.

[63] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , pp. 386–389.

[64] A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 288.

[65] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 9–11.

[66] Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi , pp. 181–184.

tence of contradictory declarations suggests that, since the Maoerhkai conference, some leaders of the CCP supported, while Mao objected to, the idea of proposing a ceasefire to the Kuomintang.

In order to understand Mao's position, it is necessary to assess his interest as a background factor. By the end of 1935, the Communist forces that gathered in the Shensi–Kansu Soviet after the Long March numbered 15,000.^[67] The new home of the Party Center had already been subjected to two encirclement campaigns by the time the Red Army had arrived. Nanking had an upper hand. It was intent on delivering the final blow. Wang Ming's proposal stemmed from the judgment that the Red Army was too weak to continue the civil war. But precisely because it was so decimated, the Kuomintang could not be expected to grant a ceasefire, let alone cooperation. Mao's objection might have been that a ceasefire proposal under the circumstances would only encourage Nanking in its belief that the CCP was desperately weak and suing for peace. The Kuomintang did in fact come to regard the origin of the united front in this manner. Chiang Kaishek's reply to the August First Declaration, the Northern Bureau bitterly complained later, was a stepped-up suppression campaign.^[68] When that happened, I presume, Mao's position was strengthened while Chou En-lai suffered a temporary setback.

The idea of the united front with Chiang Kai-shek must have appeared to Mao to border on fantasy. Nevertheless, if Moscow was serious about bringing the two Chinese parties together again, it could very well have been contemplating an offer of considerable concessions to Nanking. The first united front was engineered by the Comintern on the basis of such a compromise. Mao's efforts since 1927 in building the Red Army and peasant soviets had been to pick up the pieces when that compromise led to a disaster and to safeguard the interest of the revolution against its recurrence. His own power in the CCP rested on the Red Army and the soviets.^[69] But if the CCP refused to abandon its independence in these respects, could the central government be expected to co-exist with it in peace?

Between 1935 and 1936, Mao was in all likelihood apprehensive of Moscow's good faith. The Comintern's call for a popular front signaled a new turn in Moscow's external relations. The Russian national interest was increasingly taking priority over its revolutionary programs represented by the Comintern. In East Asia, Stalin was acutely inter-

[67] Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 176.

[68] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , p. 219.

[69] For an excellent exposition of this point and its partisan implications, see Thornton, Comintern , pp. 103–120.

ested in maintaining neutrality with Japan in order to avoid a twofront conflict with it and Germany. He proposed a neutrality pact to Japan in 1931 and 1932, though Tokyo remained unresponsive until 1940.^[70] His fears were not unfounded. In October, 1935, the German government proposed an anti-Soviet defense alliance to Tokyo. In November of the following year, this was to culminate in the Anti-Comintern Pact. In order to secure the Soviet Union's Far Eastern borders with Manchuria, Stalin wished to strengthen and embolden the Chinese government in its running conflict with Japan. By creating a tension in the rear of the Kuantung Army facing north, this would divert Japan's pressure from the Soviet Union itself. Stalin judged correctly that only the Kuomintang government could put up a meaningful resistance to Japan. The Soviet government took initiatives to improve its relations with Nanking as early as 1931.^[71] Faced with this solicitous diplomacy, Nanking could prevail on Moscow to curtail the revolutionary activities of the Comintern's arm in China. In the fall of 1936, a secret negotiation was started between the two governments to explore the possibilities of an anti-Japanese alliance. Although the result was a rather innocuous nonaggression pact, it included clauses by which Moscow promised to aid Nanking but not to aid the CCP.^[72]

Mao's fear that Moscow and Nanking might arrive at mutual accommodation at the expense of the CCP was probably exacerbated by the fact that Wang Ming was handling united front questions for the Comintern. Wang Ming's utterances indicated that he was critical of the lopsidedly rural orientation of the CCP leadership. Mao probably had good reason to suspect that Wang Ming was using the recent turn of events to his advantage in order to assert his control over the CCP. Wang Ming had taken credit for himself at the Congress by announcing the cessation of the policy of confiscating the property of the rich peasants.^[73] The CCP fell in line four months later.^[74] Wang Ming still upheld the policy of confiscating the landlords' property at this stage.^[75] Nevertheless, he was in a position to benefit from a curtailment of the Maoist machine in the countryside in the name of the united front with the Kuomintang.

[70] War History Office, The Defense Board, Daitoa^[*] senso^[*] kokan^[*] senshi [Publicly recorded history of the Greater East Asian War], Vol. VIII: Daihonei rikugunbu [The Imperial Army General Staff] (hereinafter cited as Imperial Army General Staff ) (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1967), No. 1, pp. 338, 347.

[71] Soviet Russia in China , p. 69.

[72] Lyman Van Slyke, p. 65.

[73] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 97–98.

[74] See the order of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Soviet in Mao Tsetung-chi , V, 13–14.

[75] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 91.

Mao's policies on united front questions from the very outset to the end of the war in 1945 were consistent with those of the civil war days in one respect: under no circumstances should the interests of the Red Army and the territorial bases—whatever they were called under different circumstances—be abridged and his control over them curtailed. He would not agree to the united front with the Kuomintang until he found a specific scheme which made the independence of the CCP compatible with it.

In December, 1935, a Politburo conference was held in Wayaopao. Its Resolution can be regarded for the most part as Mao's answer to Wang Ming. This was an important document as it was one of the more comprehensive statements of Mao's over-all strategy in the war against Japan.^[76] Many of the wartime policies of the CCP, later elaborated into specific programs, could be seen in an inchoate form. As a document which was intended to set Mao off from Wang Ming, it also foreshadowed some of Mao's later indictments of Wang Ming.^[77]

It would be an error to characterize the Wayaopao Resolution as representing any leaning to the right. The idea of "united front" appeared for the first time. It was the Party's policy from then on. At the same time, the Resolution reaffirmed the militant revolutionary line of the Party, not for a distant future but parallel with the united front.

The Resolution was marked distinctly by the sense that China was on the eve of an upheaval. Japan's relentless advances had been generating and damming up an enormous reaction in China. The reaction "grew automatically" or spontaneously. It was the political task of the Party to act on it for its own revolutionary end.

The current political situation has already caused one fundamental change and marked off a new era in the history of the Chinese revolution; it manifests itself in the transformation of China by the Japanese imperialism into a colony, in the preparation and entry of the Chinese revolution into a great revolution of nationwide character, and in the fact that the world is on the eve of revolution and war.^[78]

If Wang Ming's lectures from Moscow were full of circumlocutions, a kind of double talk which insured the social engineers against mistakes in judgment, so was this Resolution. Thus, while affirming the coming of a precipitous and nationwide (i.e., "even") "revolutionary high tide," it also warned against the possibility that the revolution might be "protracted" and "uneven." Mao appeared to be conceding Wang Ming's point without giving up his own.

[76] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 19–40.

[77] See the warning against "closed doorism" which turns Marxism and Stalinism into "dead dogma," Ibid. , p. 36.

[78] Ibid. , p. 19.

As for the enemy of the revolution, the Resolution disagreed with Wang Ming that it was primarily Japanese imperialism. "The main enemy of the moment is the Japanese imperialism and the ringleader of the traitors, Chiang Kai-shek," it stated.^[79] Then it went on,

The Party should call upon all the people who oppose Japan to struggle in protecting their bases. It should call upon these people to oppose the traitors in their attempt to harass the rear of the war against Japan and . . . obstruct the path of the Red Army's march. To join together the civil war in China with national war is the basic principle of the Party in guiding the revolutionary war .^[80]

The last sentence may be regarded as the keynote of this Resolution. Here was the germ of the idea elaborated later that neither the war against the Kuomintang nor against Japan could be waged separately from, and independently of, the other. Hence, the Red Army and the soviets were to brook no opposition to their growth.

The Party affirmed that "the workers and peasants were still the basic motive force of the Chinese revolution."^[81] But the point of the Resolution was to enable growth of the revolution within the framework of the united front against Japan, that is, by exploiting Japan's menace. "The relationship between each class, each political party, and each armed force in the Chinese political life has changed anew and is presently changing."^[82] The new united front would include all those who were opposed to both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. For this purpose, the Party made two concessions to those who were to the right of itself. The Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic was henceforth renamed the Soviet People's Republic.^[83] In addition to the workers and peasants—the "basic motive force" of the revolution—the new republic was to include the vast masses of petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals as "reliable allies."^[84] The Resolution announced a change in the Party's policy toward the rich peasants in line with Wang Ming's proposal.^[85]

Treatment of the landlord class was not specifically dealt with, as though continuation of the standing policy toward it was a matter of course. A section of the national bourgeoisie was definitely in the united front. So were the warlords loosely aligned with Chiang Kaishek and the officers and men of the White army. The Party re-

[79] Ibid. , p. 24.

[80] Ibid. , p. 34. Emphasis added.

[81] Ibid. , p. 25.

[82] Ibid. , p. 24.

[83] Ibid. , p. 29.

[84] Ibid. , p. 25.

[85] Ibid. , p. 30. Henceforward their land was not to be confiscated regardless of whether they tilled it themselves or rented it out. When a village carried out an equal distribution of land, the rich peasants were entitled to the same grade of land as the poor and the middle peasants, though an additional order of the Soviet Government prohibited the participation of the rich peasants in the Red Army and in elections, Ibid. , p. 14.

affirmed its offer of truce on condition that they unite with the Red Army in the struggle against both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. The united front, according to the Resolution, was hence a united front "from below and from above."^[86]

All this, in the Party's jargon, sounded rather bland. Underneath, a heated debate was going on in downright practical terms. When Mao asserted at Wayaopao that simultaneous war and revolution were his goal, he was in effect saying that under certain circumstances the CCP could force the Kuomintang government into a war against its will. Then the CCP could carry on the revolution with impunity. That is to say, the CCP could start a local war with the Japanese Army and force the rest of the nation into a total war, thus creating a "unity" of sorts. Wang Ming was in agreement with Mao that a total war was one thing that was needed. But he seems to have insisted that, unless the CCP curtailed its revolutionary policy, the Kuomintang government would be determined more than ever to adhere to its policy of "unification first." He felt that the Kuomintang's participation was a precondition for a total war. Thus, the issue was whether a war was necessary to create a "unity" (Mao) or whether a unity was a precondition for waging a total war (Wang Ming).

Mao hinted at his formula for combining the revolution and resistance in his interview with Edgar Snow in July, 1936. Mao affirmed that the national united front was the condition for defeating Japan. Then questions and answers followed:

Question: Would the Red Army agree not to move its troops into or against any areas occupied by Kuomintang armies, except with the consent or at the order of the supreme war council?

Answer: Yes. Certainly we will not move our troops into any areas occupied by anti-Japanese armies—nor have we done so for some time past. The Red Army would not utilize any war-time situation in an opportunistic way.^[87]

Mao was thus promising that the Red Army would not move into an area unless it was occupied by the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army would stand between the Red Army and the Kuomintang forces. Later events would show that Mao made this promise in good faith so far as the geographical area of the Red Army's occupation was concerned. Mao went on:

Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese vol-

[86] Ibid. , p. 24.

[87] Red Star Over China , p. 103.

unteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the revolutionary peasantry of all China . . . ^[88]

The volunteer units in Manchuria had been coming under the CCP's direction since 1933. To build such units on an immense scale and operate them behind the advancing Japanese forces—this was how the revolution and resistance were to be combined.

Judging from the CCP's activities in 1936, one can discern two alternatives that Mao had in mind for initiating war. First, the Communist forces could take the initiative and provoke the Japanese forces in north China or Inner Mongolia. Second, the CCP could enlist disgruntled warlord forces in a regional united front to initiate war. In the spring the CCP started working on both plans. One failed, the other nearly succeeded.^[*]

A careful reading of Mao's definition of the "united front from below and above" at Wayaopao suggests that the regional forces only loosely affiliated with Nanking were the upper ceiling among his allies. Mao had in mind such regional power holders at Yen Hsi-shan, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Yang Hu-ch'eng, Li Tsung-jen, and Sung Cheyüan. As soon as the CCP's Center settled in northern Shensi, it started acting directly on all of their forces except perhaps Li Tsungjen's. I will touch briefly on the CCP's dealings with Yen Hsi-shan in Chapter IV. The Northeastern Army of Chang Hsüeh-liang, which had been dislodged from Manchuria by the Japanese and used by Nanking against the Communists in northern Shensi, was the first object of the Red Army's attempt at "distintegration" (wa-chieh ). The effort began typically with an appeal in January to the "officers and men" of the Northeastern Army.^[89] In March a division of this force was surrounded, disarmed, and released unharmed by the Red Army after being given agitation–propagada on the need to unite against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.^[90] After this an effective ceasefire

[*] The Annals of diplomacy are full of examples in which a lesser partner in an alliance drags its major ally into an armed conflict, usually restorationist in aim, against the latter's will. Since the time of the Eisenhower administration, Washington has lived in fear that the governments of South Korea or Taiwan may start a war of reunification. The Arab-Israeli conflict is another instance of such a threat. Note the parallel between the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, the Arab states, and Israel on the one hand and the CCP, the Kuomintang government, and Japan on the other.

[88] Ibid. , p. 105.

[89] Ho Kan-chih, p. 300.

[90] Hsi-an shih-pien chen-hsiang ti chui-shu [A recollection of the truth about the Sian Incident] (no date, no publisher listed) (BI). Chang Kuo-t'ao states that a regiment led by Wang I was won over in January, in "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 53, May, 1970, p. 89.

was maintained between the two sides, apparently with the tacit approval of Chang Hsüeh-liang. Yang Hu-ch'eng was also in touch with the CCP by May.^[91] In June, Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and Li Tsung-jen, the leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques, hard pressed by the "centralization" policy of the Nanking government, revolted in the name of resistance to Japan. The CCP's resolution of June 13 noted that "the Southwestern War is not a pure warlord war but has some significance as a national revolution."^[92]

The Northern Bureau of the CCP was acting more directly on the forces under Sung Che-yüan, a follower of Feng Yü-hsiang, who had been named to head the Hopei–Chahar Political Commission to handle the tense and delicate liaison between Nanking and the Tientsin Garrison Army of Japan. Japanese military police noted with apprehension that Liu Shao-ch'i and the student groups led by him were frequenting some of Sung's forces garrisoned near Peiping.^[93] By July 16, Feng Chih-an's division stationed in Fengt'ai near Lukouchiao (the Marco Polo Bridge) had its first confrontation with the Japanese forces.^[94] This division was in the immediate vicinity of Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, when the fatal incident took place. Japanese observers had noted by then that Sung Che-yüan had lost control of his forces which were fired up with strong anti-Japanese senments.^[95] He was going the way of Chang Hsüeh-liang.

Whether Moscow was informed of the details of the CCP's plans cannot be known. But Wang Ming was apparently concerned. Writing in early 1936, he said "the main weakness [of anti-imperialist united front] is that the bulk of the Kuomintang army is yet to be drawn into this all-people struggle and is to date still under the influence of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government . . . There is friction in the Kuomintang, but the friction has not led to a split in the Kuomintang."^[96] He was pointing out that the intermediate groups in the Kuomintang army could not be won over except from the top down, i.e., with Chiang Kai-shek's support.

By July of 1936, Wang Ming had articulated the terms of cooperation. To reassure the skeptics on the left that the united front he was

[91] Snow, Random Notes , p. 4. This was arranged with Wang Ming's knowledge, but he did not follow through with it.

[92] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , p. 236.

[93] Teradaira Tadasuke, Nihon no higeki: Rokokyo^[*] jiken [Japan's tragedy: the Lukouchiao Incident] (Tokyo: Yomiuri shinbunsha, 1970), pp. 40–41, 46–47.

[94] War History Office, The Defense Board, Daitoa^[*] senso^[*] kokan^[*] senshi , Vol. XVIII: Hokushi no chiansen [Pacification war in north China] (hereinafter cited as Pacification War ) (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1968), No. 1, p. 9.

[95] Nihon no higeki , pp. 353–355.

[96] Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi , p. 139.

proposing was "absolutely not a repetition of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's opportunist mistake," he drew the following distinction for the second united front: "The CCP, the Kuomintang and other organizations to take part in the anti-Japanese national united front will all retain the plenary power to preserve their own ideology, their own political program, and their own organization."^[97] Thus Wang Ming's idea of the "national defense government" was as follows:

What should we do with those governments which exist in China at present? For example, the Chinese Soviet Government, the Nanking Central Government, and those governments which are nominally local governments but in fact disobey the central political power. The Chinese Communists' answer to this problem is: In order to turn the governments already formed into a truly all-China and truly defensible government, political power in the nation must be concentrated in the hands of one central government. We must eliminate the phenomena of disunity in Chinese politics and administration. . . .

But suppose someone asks . . . are the Chinese Communists going to maintain the struggle for the Chinese Soviet Government? The Chinese Communists will answer . . . In principle as in ideology, we firmly believe that only by having the soviet can we save the entire Chinese people and entire mankind; . . . only by having a soviet can a weak and defenseless nation be changed into a strong and defensible nation. . . .^[98]

But in the spring of 1936, Mao was not given to such a devious line of thinking. He must have known from his experiences in Kiangsi that the Kuomintang would grant a de facto ceasefire only under one set of circumstances: a military conflict between China and Japan. So why wait passively for war? Between February and May the Red Army invaded Shansi Province^[99] —quite possibly over objections from Moscow.^[100] On the face of it, it conformed to Mao's basic line in the Wayaopao Resolution. The CCP formally declared its bellicose intention in manifestos. On March 1, it proclaimed,

Whereas Japanese imperialism [commits] outrage in north China, no one stops [it]. Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan, Sung Che-yüan [put on] the appearance of slaves and [bend their] knees in servitude, sycophancy with foreigners having become their nature. Ruination of the whole country is imminent;

[97] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 129.

[98] Ibid. , p. 141.

[99] For the best account of the raid, see Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , pp. 3–55.

[100] A recent Soviet publication blames the raid on Mao's ambition. K. V. Kykyshkin, "The Comintern and Anti-Japanese United Front in China," L. P. Delyusin, et al., eds., Comintern i Vostok [The Comintern and the East] (Moscow, 1969), cited in James P. Harrison, The Long March to Power, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 264.

the Chinese Soviet People's Republic . . . dispatches this army to go east and resist Japan.^[101]

The purpose of the expedition, according to the April manifesto, was to "engage in direct combat with Japan."^[102] It denounced Chiang Kai-shek for sending the central forces to aid Yen Hsi-shan, thus blocking the path of the Red Army's march eastward while using Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng to disturb the Shensi–Kansu Soviet. Hatano Ken'ichi suspected that with the arrival of Mao's and Hsü Hai-tung's forces in the new soviet, food and other supplies were exhausted. The raid looked to him like a foraging.^[103] The Red Army took twenty-seven hsien , roughly one-third of the province, and carried out severe and bloody land confiscation and redistribution. The Red Army had no trouble in routing Yen Hsi-shan's forces in battle after battle. But the nine divisions of the central forces commanded by Ch'en Ch'eng and Shang Chen were a different matter. The Red Army seemed to have been mauled seriously. Liu Chih-tan, who founded the Shensi Soviet, was killed in action. The Red Army retreated across the Yellow River in early May.^[104]

There was nothing which suggested that the CCP was not serious in its declared intention to "engage in direct combat with Japan." If obstructed, the Communists stood to gain a propaganda victory. If unobstructed, the Red Army could have moved into Chahar or eastern Hopei and conducted hit-and-run raids on the Japanese garrisons. That would have created a grave international crisis. The Japanese Army was likely to take a stern retaliatory measure against Nanking, as was the pattern in every incident. The Nanking government might try to win time by assuming responsibility for the act of the "bandits" and by making further concessions. The Umezu-Ho Ying-ch'in and Doihara-Ch'in Te-ch'un Agreements of June 1935, belonged to this class of events.^[105] That would have only inflamed public opinion more and pointed up the vulnerability of Nanking's position. What the Shansi raid demonstrated was that the decision for war or peace still rested in Tokyo and Nanking rather than in Yenan or Moscow at this time and that as long as there was international

[101] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 41.

[102] Ibid. , p. 44.

[103] Hatano, Gendai Shina , pp. 336–337.

[104] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , pp. 5–55.

[105] Anti-Japanese terrorist activities prompted the Japanese government to impose these demands. By these agreements the Kuomintang was forced out of the area north of Paoting in Hopei, including Peiping and Tientsin as well as Chahar Province. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Nihon gaiko^[*] nempyo^[*] narabi ni shuyo^[*] bunsho, 1840–1945 [Chronology of Japan's diplomacy and major documents, 1840–1945] (Tokyo: Hara shobo^[*] , 1965), pp. 293–295.

peace the Kuomintang government was capable of containing Chinese communism.

It seemed that the miserable result of the Shansi raid induced the CCP to propose a ceasefire for a second time. On May 5, Mao and Chu Te, representing the soviet government and the Red Army respectively, issued the Circular telegram on ceasefire and peace negotiation to unite in resistance to Japan to the Military Commission of the Nanking government.^[106] It made no mention of the united front. Outwardly, Mao seemed to concede Wang Ming's point, raised in February, that "it is utterly impossible to fight with Japan without waiting for the completion of the united popular front."^[107] But serious differences remained between them. Ho Kan-chih states that with the ceasefire proposal of May the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" (pi-Chiang k'ang-Jih ) was adopted.^[108]

The CCP's options were not simply for or against the united front with the Kuomintang. The initiative to choose between those options rested in Nanking, and it showed no interest in ceasefire or cooperation at this stage. According to Chiang Kai-shek, Chou En-lai and P'an Han-nien, the latter representing the Comintern, came to Shanghai shortly after May 5 for a peace talk. Conditions laid down by the Kuomintang amounted to a demand for total surrender by the Communists:

1. Abide by the Three People's Principles.

2. Obey Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's orders.

3. Abolish the "Red Army" and integrate it into the National Army.

4. Abrogate the soviets and reorganize them as local governments.^[109]

Thus, even if full scale cooperation in the united front was the CCP's desired goal, a simple pledge of allegiance and show of sincerity on its part would not necessarily lead to that result. It had to maintain a high state of vigilance and military alertness while showing its willingness to cease hostility on a reciprocal basis. Above all, it had to exert public pressure to make the government's stance untenable. Thus the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" could be either an end in itself or a means to attain a fuller cooperation in

[106] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 47–49.

[107] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , p. 146.

[108] Ho Kan-chih, p. 302. Note, however, that on April 25, while the Red Army was still in Shansi, the Central Committee issued a proclamation proposing a "popular front" to the Kuomintang and other groups. Chung-Kung chung-yang wei ch'uang-li ch'üan-kuo k'e-tang k'e-p'ai ti k'ang-Jih jen-min chan-hsien hsüan-yen [Declaration of the CCP Central Committee for establishing anti-Japanese popular front among the nation's parties and groups], cited in Wang Chien-min, Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang , III, 55–56.

[109] Soviet Russia in China , p. 73.

"resist Japan along with Chiang" (lien-Chiang k'ang-Jih ) or "support Chiang to resist Japan" (Yung-Chiang k'ang-Jih ).

The differences between Mao and Wang Ming seem to have been over the kind of pressure to be exerted on the Kuomintang government. It is interesting to note that both the Internationalists and Mao approved of the December Ninth Movement.^[110] But it is doubtful that Mao seriously expected the Kuomintang to grant even a ceasefire unless its hands were forced by a "united front from below." This was indicated by the circular telegram of July 11, The Declaration on behalf of the Departure of the Kwangtung–Kwangsi Forces for North to Resist Japan , signed by Mao and Chu Te.^[111] Addressed to the forces of Li Tsung-jen and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, it was an open encouragement for rebellion in the two provinces in the name of resistance. Predictably, Moscow and Wang Ming were dismayed by this revolt.^[112]

Let us now consider what was behind this residue of sectarianism in Mao. Since the Wayaopao meeting where Mao averred that "the people's republic stands in direct opposition to the jackals of imperialism, the landed gentry and the comprador class," there had been discussion in the CCP as to the class composition of the united front. The Wayaopao Resolution included the rich peasants and the petty bourgeoisie in the united front. It is my inference that the Internationalists considered the Kuomintang to be a party of the national bourgeoisie in order to enlist it in the united front. After all, it was so defined by the CCP before the rupture of the first united front.

A major stumbling block between Mao and Wang Ming seemed to be Mao's insistence that the Kuomintang was also a party of the landlord class. Mao was evidently opposed to abandoning the policy of confiscating and redistributing the property of the landlord class. This was the motive power that energized the revolutionary peasant movement. Without it his machine in the rural areas would be without fuel. On July 22, the Party issued the Directive concerning the Land Policy .^[113] The Directive renewed the standing order to confiscate all land and property of traitors. In addition, as though to clear up the confusion following the relaxation of the policy toward the rich peasants, it reconfirmed the order to confiscate land, grain, houses, and property of the landlord class. What a landlord would be allowed to keep to meet his own needs for sustenance was left to the majority decision of the peasants in the area concerned.

[110] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 210.

[111] Ibid. , pp. 55–58.

[112] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 139; Van Slyke, p. 64.

[113] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 63–65.

Earlier in July, Chang Nai-ch'i and three other well-known leaders of the national salvation movement had published an open letter. They straddled the positions taken by Mao and Wang Ming, though they leaned toward Wang Ming's side. They stated that "if a local authority dispatches an army to resist Japan under the conditions of opposition to the central government, it is bound to fail." But they also said, " . . . resistance against Japan and national salvation is the most urgent enterprise. . . . We can never agree to the policy of resistance which waits for the completion of mobilization of the entire country."^[114] Mao wrote a reply to the four leaders, stating,

[the Red Army] is capable of conducting a lone operation against Japanese imperialists, and it will necessarily unite with all armies and the people of the whole nation in the course of a protracted resistance, thus achieving a victory in a coordinated war. Your opinion that "the final victory is attainable only on the basis of concentrating the energy of the whole nation . . . " is correct. But you are mistaken in holding that "real resistance against Japan cannot be initiated unless the energy of the whole nation is concentrated." It is possible to resist Japan with a partial force.^[115]

The letter by Chang Nai-ch'i, et al., further demanded that the Red Army adopt a lenient policy toward the rich peasants, the landlords, and the merchants in its area of occupation.^[116] In his reply, Mao expressly acknowledged this point. He explained the CCP's new policy toward the rich peasants and merchants but avoided any reference to the landlords.^[117] Exactly one week later, the CCP issued its Directive Concerning the Land Policy . Chang Nai-ch'i wrote again shortly afterward and deplored the Party's decision, saying,

In the letter written to the four of us recently, Mr. Mao Tse-tung made clear that he accepts our political program. . . .

What needs to be pointed out is that their method is still revolutionary. Substantively there is considerable distance between this and the reformist method which we have proposed.

It is impossible for us to demand that the program of the united front in China stipulate confiscation of the landlords' land through the insurrectionary method of the peasants.^[118]

By the middle of 1936 anti-Japanese public sentiment in the cities had reached flood proportions. It was independent of any "outside

[114] "Shen Chün-ju teng t'uan-chi yü-wu ti chi-ke chi-pen t'iao-chien yü tsui-ti yao-ch'iu" [Some basic conditions and minimum demands of Shen Chün-ju, et al., on unity and resistance], Kuo-Kung ho-tso , p. 61.

[115] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1936-nen shi , p. 416.

[116] Kuo-Kung ho-tso , p. 68.

[117] Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi , p. 418.

[118] Ibid. , pp. 434–435. We cannot rule out the possibility that Chang Nai-ch'i had a close connection with Wang Ming.

agitators"; hence it was exerted upon any group that stood in the way of national unity and resistance. Chang Nai-ch'i's letter shows that Mao, no less than Chiang Kai-shek, was under pressure. The CCP's Northern Bureau was evidently very sensitive to the demands of the intellectuals in the Peiping–Tientsin area with whom it was working closely. Shortly after the May Politburo conference, the Bureau advised the Party Center to adopt a policy more in tune with the non-Party masses.^[119]

In February, 1937, the CCP announced in its telegram to the Third Plenum of the Kuomintang's Fourth Central Executive Committee (CEC) that confiscation of the property of the landlord class was to be discontinued as the CCP's concession to the united front.^[120] However, the landlord class was never included in the second united front throughout its entire existence. Mao stated in May of 1937 that the CCP was "prepared to solve the land problem by legislative and other appropriate means."^[121] What was meant by this remark will be shown in subsequent chapters.

The CCP adhered to the policy of initiating a war first to create a "unity" as of the end of July 1936. By August, Wang Ming's line evidently prevailed. On August 25, the Central Committee issued a letter to the Kuomintang and urged it for the first time to join the united front: The CCP conceded that "the key to Kuomintang–Communist cooperation is at present in the hands of your honorable party."^[122] The letter also pledged the CCP to the goal of building a "Democratic Republic."^[123] By this act it renounced the title of "People's Republic" for its government. This made it possible to admit the national borgeoisie into the united front at the Politburo conference in September.^[124] Simultaneously, the CCP began to show restraint. By October 15, the Red Army had been ordered to refrain from initiating any hostile action against the Kuomintang forces, and not to obstruct them in their movement if it was related to actions against the Japanese forces.^[125]

What accounts for this shift must be left to conjecture at present. It is possible that the CCP was influenced marginally by public pressure. In this respect the CCP's contacts with Chang Hsüeh-liang are of some importance. Ishikawa Tadao suggests that Chang was truly a middleman between the Kuomintang and the CCP in the

[119] Hatano Ken'ichi, Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] 1937-nen shi [History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1937] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1938), p. 137.

[120] Selected Works , I, 269.

[121] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 199.

[122] Ibid. , p. 75.

[123] Ibid. , p. 72.

[124] Kung-fei huo-kuo , III, 357.

[125] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 81–82.

political spectrum at the time.^[126] The CCP was negotiating with him by early summer in order to enlist him in a regional united front in the northwest against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan. In the course of this liaison, Chou En-lai was persuaded to move one step closer to Chang Hsüeh-liang. Chang is said to have inquired of Chou how serious the Communists were about resistance to Japan. Upon hearing an affirmative answer, he implored the CCP delegation to accept the "support Chiang to resist Japan" line. Chou En-lai settled for "resist Japan along with Chiang."^[127]

But by September, a much greater force than the left-of-center public opinion was at work to bring the Kuomintang and the CCP together. According to Izvestia , the Sino–Soviet negotiation that led to the non-aggression pact of August, 1937, had been underway "for more than a year" prior to it.^[128] Since Soviet solicitation for rapprochement with China had been long standing, the initiative must have been taken by Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek dates the beginning of pro-Soviet policy from October, when he appointed T. F. Tsiang the new ambassador to Moscow.^[129] As early as September 1, the CCP leadership was apprised of Nanking's move toward an "alliance with Russia."^[130] In view of Japan's nervousness about such an alliance, the Kuomintang must have undertaken the negotiation with full awareness of its repercussion on Japan.

In fact, it seems logical to connect the beginning of the Sino–Soviet negotiation with the visibly stiffened attitude of Nanking toward Japan. In September a series of discussions designed to adjust the Sino–Japanese relations were started between Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Ch'ün and Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe but the discussions made little headway. An unmistakably hard anti-Japanese line came to the fore in Nanking in early November when irregular Mongol forces, masterminded by the Kuantung Army, invaded Suiyüan Province. The Chang–Kawagoe talk deadlocked^[131] while Chiang

[126] Chugoku^[*] kyosanto^[*] shi kenkyu^[*] [A study of Chinese Communist Party history] (Tokyo: Keio^[*] tsushin^[*] , 1962), pp. 230–245.

[127] Ibid. , p. 239. Ishikawa quotes Miao Feng-hsia, Chang's adviser.

[128] Charles B. McLane, p. 86.

[129] Soviet Russia in China , p. 71. However, cultural exchanges with obvious political implications were revived in late 1935 under Sun Fo's leadership. See Chugoku kyosanto 1936-nen shi , pp. 261–270.

[130] Photostatic copy of Chou En-lai's letter to Ch'en Li-fu and Ch'en Kuo-fu, dated September 1, 1936, in this author's possession.

[131] Hata Ikuhiko, Nitchu^[*] senso^[*] shi [History of the Sino–Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kawade shobo^[*] , 1961), pp. 101–104; Association of International Political Studies of Japan, ed., Taiheiyo^[*] senso e no michi [The road to the Pacific War], Vol. III: Nitchu senso [The Sino–Japanese War] (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1962), No. 1, pp. 219–220.

Kai-shek arrived in Taiyuan (Shansi) to direct the successful Chinese operation against the Mongols. In sum, the strong anti-Japanese line in Nanking, the improvement of Sino–Soviet relationship, and the softening of the CCP toward Nanking occurred almost simultaneously.

There is some indication that Mao was on the defensive in the Party in August and September.^[132] Probably considerable differences remained between him and Wang Ming over the means of bringing about the united front, primarily because the Kuomintang's attitude remained unchanged. The practical result of the CCP's August proposal was, therefore, a rather subtle one. By openly recognizing that war of resistance depended on the Kuomintang, the CCP seems to have conceded that Nanking could not be mechanically forced into war by means of local incidents. Rather, it seems, the emphasis shifted to political mobilization of the Kuomintang from within. This probably meant continued encouragement for the splinter groups such as Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng, insofar as they demanded war.

The delicate nature of the CCP's stance—neither supporting the Kuomintang nor opposing it—can be seen in the CCP's resolution of September. It amounted to a tactical revision of the Wayaopao Resolution:

In order to concentrate the strength of the whole nation to resist the invasion of the Japanese bandits . . . we must put together still broader power of the people. . . . To propel the Kuomintang, the Nanking government, and its armed forces to take part in the anti-Japanese war is the necessary condition for carrying out a national, large-scale, and strenuous anti-Japanese armed struggle. But this is absolutely not to neglect stringent criticism of and struggle against all the mistaken policies of the Kuomintang. . . . The Center must point out strongly: in struggle to realize the most extensive anti-Japanese united front the Communist Party must not only wage a strenuous struggle against the public and secret enemies of the united front but also maintain perfect freedom to criticize those pseudo anti-Japanese elements who agree in speech but drag their feet in practice. . . . But the important thing is to use all means and exert all power so as to promote most expeditiously a large-scale, nationwide and true armed struggle against Japan .^[133]

[132] The resolution of the September Politburo conference expressly repudiated two points in the Wayaopao Resolution. See Chungkuo Kung-ch'an-tang kuan-yü k'ang-Jih chiu-wan yün-tung ti hsin-hsing-shih yü min-chu kung-ho-kuo ti chüeh-i [The CCP's decision concerning the new situation in the anti-Japanese salvation movement and the democratic republic], Kuo-Kung ho-tso , p. 46. The Wayaopao Resolution stated that in Party recruitment social background is not the main criterion and that carelessly administering blows on erring cadres should be stopped. Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 38–39.

[133] Kuo-Kung ho-tso , pp. 42–43. Emphasis added. For the full title of the resolution, see above, note 132.

War was the immediate goal. That would force Nanking to seek domestic unity. But the united front would also stiffen its back and induce it to initiate the war. Therefore, it became the twin goals of the CCP to pursue k'ang-Jih ("resistance against Japan") and min-chu ("democracy"), a variation of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. Mao had moved one step closer to Wang Ming. From this point on, the idea of the united front with the Kuomintang as such was no longer an issue between them. Yet the collusion of the Red Army and the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies went on. On December 3, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to push for the last bandit suppression or possibly a peaceful "abolition" of the Red Army.

It is not necessary to go into the details of the Sian Incident here, as my purpose is to outline the different strategies advocated by Mao and Wang Ming. One major cause of the incident, however, needs to be borne in mind: In spite of his already stiff anti-Japanese attitude, Chiang's stand was still "unification first." This meant that the CCP was in need of some decisive leverage. Both Edgar Snow and Chang Kuo-t'ao report that Mao intended to put Chiang on a public trial and eliminate him.^[134] Here was an opportunity beyond anyone's wildest dream. It is not surprising that the thought of destroying Chiang should have crossed Mao's mind. But it is not by any means certain that he actually demanded such a course of action.

It was Mao's highest disideratum to force the Kuomintang into war. Execution of Chiang Kai-shek under the circumstances was likely to place the Nanking government in the hands of Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-ch'in, both pro-Japanese and anti-Communist. Hence, if the CCP could extract a promise of ceasefire from Chiang in captivity, it had all the more reason for working for his release. Still, in view of Mao's opposition to the united front with Chiang in the recent past, the news of the incident must have caused genuine consternation in Moscow. Stalin cabled the CCP on December 13, the day after Chiang's capture, countermanding any scheme to eliminate him.^[135] On the fourteenth, the Soviet press began to condemn the incident categorically as a Japanese plot.^[136] The Kuomintang, too, has scrupulously avoided blaming the Communists ever since.

Chiang Kai-shek did agree to a ceasefire in Sian. What other agreement, if any, was reached is not known. Judging from subsequent

[134] Snow, Random Notes , p. 1; "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 55, July, 1970, p. 86. In plotting to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek, Chang seems to have had in mind a traditional remonstrance. See also Snow, Random Notes , p. 6.

[135] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , no. 55, July, 1970, p. 87.

[136] Charles B. McLane, p. 82.

events, he seems to have agreed to a ceasefire pending further and fuller discussion of the terms of united resistance. He left suddenly with Chang Hsüeh-liang without making any public commitment. The CCP was left with nothing but what Chou En-lai called Chiang's "self-appointed heroism" to make good his promise.^[137] On that rested the CCP's line of domestic unity before resistance. It remained to be seen how the CCP would dodge the Kuomintang's terms of "cooperation" by delaying tactics until war commenced.

In February 1937, the Kuomintang called the Third Plenum of the Fourth CEC to "settle a large number of questions which arose out of the Sian affair."^[138] Mao was apparently buoyed by this event, for it seemed as though public opinion would not permit Chiang to renew the civil war. He professed to believe that "the stage of 'fighting for peace' was over" and that the new task of the Party was "fighting for democracy."^[139] In order to commit Chiang Kai-shek to the united front, Mao was demanding that the CCP increase its public pressure. "However, some comrades argue," Mao complained in May, "that this view of ours is untenable . . . . " What concerned Mao's opponents was the fact that the Japanese government had realized in early 1937 that its policy of confrontation in north China was too risky. "Japan is retreating," said Mao's opponents, "and Nanking is wavering more than ever; the contradiction between the two countries is becoming weaker and the contradiction within the country is growing sharper."^[140] They further maintained that "to put the emphasis on democracy is wrong. . . . The majority of the people want only resistance . . . . "^[141]

In rebuttal, Mao articulated his conception of the relationship between "anti-imperialist" and "anti-feudal" struggle:

As the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one and China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place, changes have occurred in China's international relations and internal class relations. . . .^[142]

Thus Mao conceded the point that Wang Ming had been raising against him. But he continued to clash with his opponents over the question, To what extent should the united front with the Kuomintang be exploited for the CCP's own purposes?

In order to see what was at issue, we must know the content of

[137] "Wo ti hui-i," Ming Pao , No. 56, August, 1970, p. 87.

[138] Hollington K. Tong., II, 491.

[139] Selected Works , I, 285.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid. , p. 288.

[142] Ibid. , p. 263.

"democracy" which Mao was championing. Apparently in response to the Kuomintang's demand for "abrogation" of the soviets, the CCP in August of 1936 proposed the slogan of "Democratic Republic." As far as the soviets were concerned, the new appelation meant no change in substance, according to Ho Kan-chih.^[143] But the slogan did not apply exclusively to the Communist government any longer. It was a goal to be attained across the entire nation in the course of the resistance and within the framework of the united front. Hence, the content of "democracy" to which Mao's opponents took exception was identical in substance with the "Democratic Republic" he was seeking to establish. Many of Mao's comrades are said to have raised questions concerning it.^[144]

"The class character" of the democratic republic," said Mao,

is based on the union of several classes, and in the future it can develop in the direction of non-capitalism. Our democratic republic is to be established under the leadership of the proletariat; and it is to be established in the new international circumstances (the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and on the eve of the world revolution). Therefore, though according to the social conditions it will not in general transcend the bourgeois state character, yet according to the concrete political conditions it ought to be a state based on the union of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. Thus, regarding perspectives, although it still may face toward capitalism, it does have the possibility of robustly turning in the direction of non-capitalism, and the party of the Chinese proletariat should strive hard for the latter prospect.^[145]

Mao fell just short of saying that the Chinese Communists would seek to establish socialism in the course of the war or at the end of it, but he also fell just short of expressly recognizing the current stage as bourgeois–democratic in nature. This formulation foreshadowed the concept of "New Democracy" he was to enunciate in 1940. In the remainder of this book, I will treat further development of Mao's thoughts on this point. But one thing was clear at the stage. For Mao, the task of the CCP was to create a "Democratic Republic." This meant that the CCP would struggle with the Kuomintang for leadership over the united front.^[146]

Fundamentally Mao's position had remained the same since Wayao-

[143] He states that "the two slogans, 'for a people's republic' and 'for a democratic republic,' meant essentially the same thing despite the differences in wording," p. 303.

[144] Selected Works , I, 275.

[145] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 203.

[146] For taking this stand, Mao appears to have been accused of being a Trotskyite. See his defense of the tenuous distinction between the theory of permanent revolution and the "theory of the transition of the revolution," in Mao Tes-tung-chi , V, 214.

pao. He was trying to use the united front as a shield to protect the interest of the revolution during its growth into socialism. Consternation among Mao's opponents was justified. However, it cannot be said that Mao's position on the united front with the Kuomintang was in essence more opportunistic than that of his opponents. His position amounted to a sweepingly logical resolution of the problem which was posed by no other than Wang Ming himself when he proposed the united front. That problem was how to reconcile friendship with hostility; unity with struggle; and revolution with counter-revolution.

If Mao's position was difficult to maintain, so was that of his opponents. Their difficulties stemmed from the fact that neither unity nor struggle alone would suffice to preserve the united front and therewith the CCP. Hence, their consensus on the need for the united front with the Kuomintang did not eliminate internal disagreement. For instance, Wang Ming offered a practical rule for dealing with the Kuomintang. It was intended to minimize the Kuomintang's anxiety and suspicion as to the Communists' intention and to reduce friction in the united front. Speaking of the popular front in Europe as an example in July 1936, he upheld the French slogan, "Everything for the popular front."^[147] To preserve the united front the CCP was to clear its decisions and policies with the Kuomintang government. Unless a prior consent was forthcoming, the CCP was to refrain from acting. While insisting on the CCP's independence, Wang was admitting that the united front would not function without Nanking's support. Mao ridiculed the "French" or the "Spanish method."^[148] The slogan, "everything through the united front," became a slur and a weapon against the Internationalists later.

The process of the development of the united front, especially the resolution of the Sian Incident, was inconclusive in vindicating the correctness of Mao's line or Wang Ming's. Hence, both of them remained convinced of their respective positions. In December 1936, Mao delivered one of the longest lectures of which we have record to the Red Army College in Yennan. Entitled "Strategic Problems in China's Revolutionary War," it was "the result of one great controversy which indicated the views of one line in opposing another and is also useful for the current war against Japan," according to its author.^[149] The lecture reviewed in detail all the battles involved in the five encirclement campaigns in Kiangsi and drew generalizations from

[147] Wang Ming hsüan-chi , I, 148.

[148] Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu [A letter to the comrades of the entire Party] (April 14, 1937), Kuo-Kung ho-tso , p. 98.

[149] Mao Tse-tung-chi , V, 83.

them. It affirmed the major assumption underlying the Tsunyi Resolutions: victory or defeat of the revolution in China depends primarily on armed struggle. This was Mao's message to the officers of the college as well as to his critics. The Fukien Incident, the symbol of the united front, was mentioned just once in passing.^[150]

In July and August of the following year, amid the initial turmoil of the war, two more lectures of higher theoretical abstraction were delivered. Entitled "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" respectively, they were directed against "doctrinarism" and "empiricism" but especially the former. The criticism of "doctrinarism" was but a forerunner of Mao's later criticism of Wang Ming during the Rectification Campaign. The central thesis of "On Contradiction" was the postulate: two aspects of a contradiction are at once in struggle with, and identical with, each other because they transform themselves into each other. It was a theoretical justification of the CCP's double-edged policy toward the Kuomintang in the united front. He drew out the logic which was only hesitantly advanced by Wang Ming earlier. From then on the united front as simultaneous unity and struggle became a maxim for Mao.

I have outlined the internal disputes in the CCP in 1935 and 1936. In the course of the disputes, two distinct strategies of revolution were articulated. One placed its reliance on the forces generated in urban areas, on anti-imperialist struggle, and on cooperation with the party of urban middle class. The other insisted that the Party's line of civil war period was essentially correct. It put its major reliance on peasant revolution and the Red Army. For Mao, the united front with the Kuomintang was but a tactical retreat for carrying the rural revolution forward by legal and public means. The CCP's strategy in the war against Japan was a synthesis of the two. They did not sit well with one another, but neither alone could have sufficed to lead the CCP to its victory.

[150] This is the only reference to the Fukien Incident in all of Mao's Selected Works .