6
The Sharif of Warqala's Jihad, 1850–1866

We are approaching the era foretold in the prophecies when the mahdi will make his appearance and while the natives have a semblance of nearly total tranquillity, they are in the throes of feverish expectation which is exploited by agitators of all sorts. The conviction that [the Algerians] hold of inevitably chasing us from Algeria is for them an article of faith.^[1]

The uprising inspired by the Sharif of Warqala had several matrices: saff quarrels, popular millenarian expectations which peaked at mid-century, the colonial policy of indirect rule with its clumsy, half-hearted co-optation of local elites, and the example of Za'atsha, which paradoxically spurred communities farther south to violent protest. Another related cause was the eruption of bitter struggles within Tuqqurt's ruling elite, the Banu Jallab. Support for Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's jihad by a powerful faction of the Jallab family transformed a localized rebellion into a regional insurrection that eventually ground to an inglorious halt in Tunisia. Thus, events in the antechamber of the Sahara, Tuqqurt, must first be examined.

Tuqqurt: The "Stomach of the Sahara," c. 1750–1830

Tuqqurt, located two hundred kilometers due south of Biskra, is the Wadi Righ's capital. A long, narrow valley situated near sea level, the Wadi Righ is composed of sabkhas, broken by scattered date-palm oases whose groves enclosed over one million trees in 1851. In the past century, the region counted twenty-five small towns and villages with a total population of roughly thirty thousand souls.^[2] Viewed from the northern caravan route, the oasis of Tuqqurt, which the tribes called "the stomach of the Sahara," resembled a broad green curtain; its countless date palms nestled in a bowl-shaped depression surrounded by sand dunes.

Centered in the gardens was the walled city, constructed in a circular pattern reminiscent of medieval Baghdad. In the nineteenth century, Tuqqurt was shielded by a moat; narrow maze-like streets and covered bazaars protected its inhabitants against a merciless sun.^[3] Indeed, the city's

8.
Southeastern Algeria showing the Mzab, Warqala, Tuqqurt, and Suf

architecture betrayed the nature of rule by its Saharan princes. A large market area occupied the inner labyrinth of the desert fortress; above was perched the qasba, the seat of the Banu Jallab and a symbol of their ancient supremacy. The city's dominant religious structure was the great mosque, built by Tunisian architects and regarded as the most remarkable edifice of its kind in the eastern Algerian Sahara. When L. Charles Feraud visited the mosque, its minaret still bore the marks of the 1788 artillery attack by Salah Bey, neither the first nor the last attempt by central powers in the north to take the city.^[4]

Tuqqurt sat on one of the principal southern hajj routes leading from Morocco to the Mashriq. Its written and popular traditions were peopled by numerous saintly figures from the Maghribi "Far West," whose settlement in the Wadi Righ was accompanied by miraculous deeds, political realignments, and new religious establishments. Moreover, the Banu Jallab claimed to be the last descendants of the Marinids, a tribal dynasty that seized the Moroccan state in the mid-thirteenth century. To bolster these claims, the clan patterned their court and ruling system on that of the Moroccan sultans. One borrowed institution was a praetorian guard of black slaves, immune in theory to the temptations of local politics and intrigues.^[5]

While the exact origins of the Banu Jallab remain obscure, they had secured command of Tuqqurt by the early fifteenth century. Their rise to power was accomplished largely with the backing of two pastoral-nomadic tribes, the Awlad Mulat and the Dawadida.^[6] Despite incessant family feuds over succession, the dynasty displayed an astounding longevity, almost without counterpart in this part of North Africa. Its long tenure in office was due to the quid pro quo relationship with nomadic supporters and to a geographical location which allowed the regime to tap into the Saharan trade in gold and slaves with only sporadic interference from central governments until the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, unlike other Saharan or maraboutic dynasties, the Banu Jallab's authority had no religious basis; they ruled exclusively by force majeure. By the beginning of the past century, however, Tuqqurt's prince represented the last piece of a political mosaic engendered by the disintegration of the great Berber empires and states of the late medieval era.^[7]

The Banu Jallab had always represented a kind of litmus test for measuring the Turkish regime's effective hold over the Sahara; the very existence of the desert kingdom made Algeria into a contest state.^[8] From 1552 until the arrival of the French army on the desert's rim, Tuqqurt's rulers (as was true of Warqala and Tammasin) paid tribute only irregularly, if at all, to Algiers. In the early Ottoman period, the Banu Jallab rendered

"gifts," as opposed to taxes, an important political distinction, to the dey. As their economic fortunes plummeted and the Ottoman's political clout swelled in the eighteenth century, Tuqqurt's oligarchy grudgingly agreed to recognize the bey of the Constantine in exchange for the right to trade in markets controlled by the central government. When the tribute promised was not forthcoming, the bey strove to install his protégés, the Banu Ghana, in power over the Wadi Righ; this largely unsuccessful move further complicated the political tug-of-war in the southern Constantine.^[9]

Until they became embroiled in the abortive revolt led by the Sharif of Warqala, the Banu Jallab ran their internal affairs quite in the manner of a Machiavellian city-state. They commanded their own tribal makhzan troops, the Awlad Mulat, who extracted taxes from the sedentary oasis inhabitants and formed a cavalry corps, armed and mounted at the sultans's expense. The Awlad Mulat enjoyed tax exemptions, owned many of the oasis's palm groves and extensive flocks, and constituted a cast of warriornobles. Other pastoral-nomadic groups in the Wadi Righ also laid claim to a large proportion of the means of production, employing khammas to cultivate oasis tracts.^[10]

Since most of the pastoral nomads and local religious notables paid no tribute to the Banu Jallab, fiscal exactions fell heavily upon the cultivators, whether khammas or small family landholders. By the eve of the French conquest, regular impositions, in kind and specie, as well as extraordinary taxes upon the gardens and domestic looms, appear to have increased. While the dearth of scholarship on the Banu Jallab makes speculation hazardous, dwindling revenues from the trans-Saharan trade may have induced the ruling elite to compensate by skimming off more agricultural surplus. To escape growing fiscal oppression, some of the Wadi Righ's cultivators emigrated to the Ziban, the Jarid, and even Tunis, where conditions were more favorable. Another response by villagers residing on the Wadi Righ's northern lip was to recognize the shaykh al-'arab of Biskra, and thus indirectly the bey of the Constantine, as their fiscal master instead of Tuqqurt's princes.^[11]

Despite political semiautonomy, Tuqqurt and its hinterland participated in commercial and social exchanges extending far beyond the valley. Dates grown in the region, while inferior in quality to those of the Jarid, were exported to Biskra's markets. From the Ziban, the Wadi Righ's inhabitants obtained grains bartered for textiles and pastoral products. Female weavers produced a special type of hawli (woolen cloak) for sale in northern markets. Tuqqurt also traded extensively with southern Tunisia via the oases of the Suf. In 1845, General Daumas noted that commercial transactions between the Wadi Righ and the beylik consisted of rifles, pistols, sabers,

and shashiyyas (felt caps)—the Tunisian product par excellence—as well as other items either of Tunisian or Mediterranean provenance. Although small quantities of firearms and gunpowder were produced in Tuqqurt as in the Mzab, most munitions were obtained from Tunisia because of their higher quality.^[12]

Thus, the Wadi Righ historically maintained varying economic and other ties with coastal Algeria, the cities of the Mzab, al-Aghwat, and Tunisia. As was true of much of the trade in this region and period, commercial operations were organized into series of relay traders; while the great caravans might transport merchandise from Morocco or the deep Sahara, exchanges with the Tunisian beylik were generally effected by more modest caravans originating in towns and villages stretching along the route from Tuqqurt to the Suf and the Jarid. Merchants from Tuqqurt, who traded in the beylik, first journeyed to Nafta and then to Tunis under the protection of the beylical mahalla; they returned to the Wadi Righ after July when the tribes were occupied with the harvests or had moved to the Tell for pasturage. Therefore, Tuqqurt, the largest entrepôt of the Wadi Righ, acted as a collection and redistribution center for diverse commodities.^[13]

Underwriting the Banu Jallab's wealth and power was the great winter market held in a vast terrain between the suburb of Nazla and the city walls. In terms of its volume and value, this huge Saharan fair constituted the real fortune for the entire region; its prosperity functioned as a gauge for the dynasty's economic and political well-being. The fair operated only in the winter months, when the climate was sufficiently salubrious to permit large numbers of people to gather. Throughout the rest of the year, especially during the summer heat, fevers caused by stagnant drainage water assailed the populace, carrying off or debilitating those not acclimated. The endemic fevers, called al-wakham (literally, "unhealthy air"), sent many of Tuqqurt's inhabitants to the Suf, where they resided for the summer months; this also explains the close sociopolitical ties between the two regions.^[14]

The winter market attracted merchants, traders, and pastoral nomads as well as rebels and rogues from all over Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the deep Sahara. In 1851, Tuqqurt's fair was described in the following manner:

It is a mobile city [which is] ten times larger than the city of stones. Here are found the Arba'a, Harzaliyya, Awlad Na'il, Suwafa, etc. All of the nomads from the Ziban arrive in caravans of 20 to 100 or 500 camels. The shaykhs [sultans] of Tuqqurt levy a tax of ten sous per camel and duties upon a certain portion of all goods brought to market.^[15]

It was here that Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah was able to provision his forces during several years of opposition to the French army established in

the Ziban—a critical element in the longevity of his jihad. The Banu Jallab's downfall resulted from a particularly vicious round of intraclan strife, in part related to the colonial policy of indirect rule, which drew Tuqqurt and the Wadi Righ into the millenarian solutions offered by the Sharif of Warqala. Until 1849, however, Tuqqurt's sultans adopted a wait-and-see policy not unlike the bet-hedging and fence-sitting positions of the pre-Sahara's leading Rahmaniyya and Tijaniyya notables and secular tribal elites discussed previously.

Saharan Princes and Desert Politics, c. 1830–1850

Like other desert elites, the sultans of Tuqqurt sought to exploit the opportunities offered by the precipitous collapse of the deylical regime. As early as 1833 several of the great Arab warrior chiefs, exasperated by Ahmad Bey's sanguinary conduct, approached French authorities for an alliance against the last bey of the Constantine; among them was 'Ali b. Jallab, who concluded a gentleman's agreement with military officers.^[16] As long as the colonial regime did not tamper with the customary political and economic relations from which the sultans derived their power, the Banu Jallab pledged neutrality if not outright loyalty to France. The infidels were not regarded as terribly bothersome at first, mainly because they were distant from Tuqqurt and their attention was diverted elsewhere. Indeed, French rule appeared as more of a boon than a burden since the army had eliminated the Banu Jallab's bête noire, the Bu 'Ukkaz, from the political stage and elevated Tuqqurt's old ally, the Banu Ghana, to the post of shaykh al-'arab.^[17]

Thus, until the third decade of French rule, the relationship between the sultans of Tuqqurt and the colonial administration remained much as it had been under the Turks. The rulers paid a largely symbolic tribute to France of some fifteen thousand francs which secured the right to trade in colonial-held markets. At the same time, the Banu Jallab flirted surreptitiously with 'Abd al-Qadir after his 1838 victory over the Tijanis of 'Ain Madi made the amir appear, momentarily, as a rising power to be reckoned with.^[18]

In 1844, Sultan 'Ali b. Jallab formally recognized French supremacy, which was interpreted by Tuqqurt's rulers as an implicit pact giving them carte blanche in the Wadi Righ. The sultans used the alliance to try to subjugate their ancient rivals in the nearby oasis of Tammasin, which had always remained outside of Tuqqurt's political orbit. Until the eve of Bu Ziyan's uprising, the Banu Jallab and their tribal allies waged constant warfare against not only Tammasin but also against the oases of the Suf. This brought the usual turmoil and often implicated groups that were theoretically French allies, complicating the situation for the colonial military establishment. After a crushing defeat of Tammasin in 1848, 'Abd

al-Rahman, on Tuqqurt's throne since 1844, agreed for the first time to receive French officials within the walls of his oasis city-state; among the visitors was the head of Biskra's Bureau Arabe. Misreading French intentions, the sultan next sought military assistance in taking the independent oases of the Suf and even traveled to Biskra to personally petition Saint-Germain for support. Received there with all due honors, the sultan left empty-handed and visibly discontented. He was coming to realize that his French benefactors had other schemes for governing the Sahara.^[19]

Tuqqurt's relentless assaults upon Tammasin and the Suf deflected colonial attention away from incipient unrest in Za'atsha in 1848 and early in 1849. Then came Bu Ziyan's self-declared prophecy and the long siege which engrossed the military and colonial bureaucracy. By 1850 the marriage of convenience between the desert princes and French officials showed strains; the "politique des notables" was increasingly bankrupt. The sultan was dismayed by the new administrative order imposed after the Za'atsha revolt, particularly since Tammasin had been removed from Tuqqurt's grasp and handed over to a French indigenous ally who was loathsome to the Banu Jallab. For their part, French officials in Biskra now viewed their erstwhile ally as more of an irritating liability than an asset to the emerging colonial order.

'Abd al-Rahman b. Jallab's political behavior in the aftermath of the 1849 uprising had been unblushingly disloyal. Not only had he welcomed dissident tribes, such as the Salmiyya and the Rahman, to his oasis but he had also allowed them to trade in Tuqqurt's winter market, delaying their submission to France. In Seroka's words, "the market [at Tuqqurt,] as we were to see on so many occasions, dominated the entire politique of the Banu Jallab."^[20] This would remain true throughout the sharif's rebellion.

The sultans of Tuqqurt were never very secure on their thrones since their numerous offspring created a huge pool of potential contenders, and a clear-cut principle of succession did not exist.^[21] In 1851 family quarrels, forever bubbling just below the surface, came to a head. A cadet member of the clan, Sliman (Sulayman) staged a palace coup against his cousin, perhaps because of 'Abd al-Rahman's pro-French stance. Seeing the imminent danger, the incumbent frantically sought to counter Sliman's growing political influence. Sliman and his party then took refuge with Tuqqurt's nemesis, Tammasin, in March 1851, shrewdly making overtures to the French military for assistance. Yet the heat of summer with its murderous fevers discouraged authorities in Biskra from taking action; moreover, it was not yet clear where France's interests lay—with the upstart Sliman or with their beleaguered ally still perched precariously on his throne in the round city.^[22]

Had the situation farther south in Warqala at the time been otherwise, the unfolding conflict would have degenerated into a two-way struggle between competing family factions with the French army ultimately throwing its weight behind the likely victor. A political contest of this sort would have been mainly limited to the region between the Wadi Righ and oases of the Suf. This scenario, however, did not materialize because another movement, mahdist in inspiration, was already gathering force in the oasis of Warqala. Upon hearing about the charismatic figure in Warqala, the parvenu Sliman b. Jallab immediately sent out political feelers to Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. By then the pious stranger from the east had formed a cohort of partisans in Warqala, based largely upon peacemaking activities in the divided oasis and his claims to be the mahdi.

Warqala: Queen of the Desert

The valley of the Wadi Mya lies 160 kilometers to the southwest of Tuqqurt, and stretches some 60 kilometers in length. Enclosing a number of villages and towns, the Wadi Mya's most important city was Warqala, the largest of all Algerian oases. Allied with Warqala was the nearby village of Ruissat; another more distant oasis was N'gusa (N'goussa), a longtime rival and arch foe. In the past century, Warqala probably counted a sedentary population of between three and five thousand people; the surrounding pastoral-nomadic communities numbered about the same.^[23]

Today's Warqala sits at the epicenter of one of the Sahara's richest oil deposits and has been subjected to the social stresses inevitably introduced by high-technology enclave industries. Before the discovery of black gold, the oasis was celebrated by medieval writers, most notably by Ibn Khaldun, for its dominant role in the gold trade linking the Niger Basin with the Mediterranean. Between roughly the eighth and sixteenth centuries, Warqala (the Warjilan of classical Arabic geographers) was among the most prosperous of the mighty desert entrepôt cities, a busy caravan and commercial hub linking the Maghrib with sub-Saharan Africa. It was probably the lure of gold, slaves, and tribute that drew the Turkish army as far south as Warqala in 1552 to effect Tuqqurt's temporary submission to Algiers.

Warqala's relationship with the Turks resembled the arrangement concluded between the Banu Jallab and the deys. By rendering a modest tribute in slaves, a large measure of autonomy was secured. However, the political situation was complicated by the forced entry of the Moroccan Sa'adians into the Wadi Mya in the early seventeenth century. The Moroccans installed a client sultan, chosen from the Allahum (or Alahun) lineage, upon Warqala's throne. Eventually breaking with their Moroccan patrons, the Allahum dynasty retained nominal suzerainty over the oasis until the

mid-nineteenth century. Whenever Ottoman control over the Sahara loosened, the Banu Jallab of Tuqqurt strove to extend their authority over Warqala.^[24]

Long before the French invasion, Warqala had lost much of its former commercial glory to the Mzabi cities, which captured large shares of the diminishing trans-Saharan trade along with some of the Tell-Sahara commerce. And ownership of the Wadi Mya's date-palm gardens, containing an estimated half a million trees in the past century, had passed into the hands of Mzabi merchants as well as the Sha'amba tribal confederacy for whom some sedentary cultivators became khammas.^[25] While Warqala's declining fortunes can mainly be traced to the drying up of—or shifts in—the gold and slave trade, local and regional political quarrels also were at work.^[26] All that need be said regarding the tangled, treacherous flow of politics in Wadi Mya is that, as elsewhere in the Sahara, two warring saffs emerged. And until Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's advent, political alliances tended to coalesce around this binary system.^[27]

Thus, on the eve of French military expansion into the region, the "queen of the desert" had for the most part been dethroned. Her urban population was enmeshed in endless bickering that pitted city factions against one another. Continual strife also broke out between Warqala and her nemesis, the qsar (fortified oasis) of N'gusa, situated twenty-four kilometers to the north. If the Mzabis had become the commercial overlords of the Wadi Mya, its political masters were the pastoral nomads—the Sha'amba, Sa'id 'Atba, and Banu Thur. By the middle of the past century, outsider hegemony over principal trade routes into the valley and over the means of agrarian production within the oases, combined with the saff conflicts, limited the Allahum dynasty's effective power to the walls of their desert stronghold.^[28]

Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah: The Sharif of Warqala

Before it was partially razed by the French army in 1861, the oasis-city of Warqala perched on a limestone terrace that dominated the dense palm groves stretching as far as the eye could see. Surrounded by ramparts, the elliptical qsar was constructed of roughcast stone, its narrow streets covered by vaulted roofing. Viewed from its suburbs, the city had a curious appearance due to the square minaret of the principal mosque "leaning like the tower of Pisa."^[29] By then Warqala lacked the architectural dignity as well as the wealth of her counterpart, Tuqqurt. Nevertheless, it had some attractive features, mainly its remoteness. In its heyday during the medieval period, it had sheltered religious dissidents; its isolation, caused by its fall from grace in the trans-Saharan trade, made Warqala a place of

refuge. Throughout the Ottoman centuries, political figures from the Ziban or Tuqqurt, who had suffered defeat at the hands of local rivals or the central government, habitually found a haven there.^[30]

In the early months of 1851, a pilgrim arrived before the city's walls seeking asylum. Warmly received by Warqala's people, the individual, who was accompanied only by his wife and a servant, soon fashioned a local following through his rigorous asceticism and acts of piety.^[31] In effect, the stranger seized upon the paradigm of the holy person, who represents an exemplar of right conduct and focuses social grievances for which he proposes solutions. Set in motion, the rumor mill portrayed the unknown holy man as blessed with a rare saintliness and destined for extraordinary feats.^[32]

For many North Africans, the timing of the stranger's appearance was replete with meaning. The eighteenth-century desert saint and mystic Sidi al-Aghwati had predicted the redeemer's advent, after several decades of infidel rule, sometime in the 1850s.^[33] And despite defeat, Bu Ziyan's revolt had raised popular millenarian expectations upon which the sharif capitalized. Thus, the third decade of French rule was a period rife with mahdist pretenders in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, in Tunisia. Like Bu Ziyan's movement, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's revolt demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between Saharan sufi elites, such as the Rahmaniyya and the Tijaniyya, and rebellious prophets. However, unlike the hero of Za'atsha, the sharif had originally come from the margins of the rural religious establishment in western Algeria. Because he had served the colonial regime for several years, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah provides another example of protest leaders who were familiar with European ways; his variegated career puts him in the category of "charismatic adventurers."^[34]

Naturally French military officials characterized Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah as belonging to a long line of "maraboutic impostors who, under the pretext of religion, have so often succeeded in attracting a following of unfortunate, superstitious people or bandits desiring nothing but booty."^[35] While there is an element of truth to this, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's real significance lay elsewhere. The grievances of ordinary people as well as the interests, ambitions, and political platforms of desert big men coalesced around him into a series of related movements for which his mahdist claims provided the connective tissue. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Warqala's inhabitants, who formed his primary following, the mystery of the sharif's origins, and his status as a devout hajji and sufi arriving in the oasis from the Mashriq, held forth the possibility that he was the long-awaited one.

Unfortunately for the historian, scarcely more is known of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah than of his apocalyptic predecessor, Bu Ziyan; the sharif's

birth date, family background, and real name remain a matter of dispute.^[36] What is certain is that he had been a faqir (wandering ascetic) from the maraboutic tribe of the Awlad Sidi b. Yusuf, who occupied the territory north of Tilimsan. Prior to 1830, he had been a student at the zawiya of Sidi Ya'qub of the powerful maraboutic tribal confederacy, the Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh. During the early years of 'Abd al-Qadir's jihad in the Oran, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah earned local notoriety through his self-inflicted deprivations and extreme mystical practices at the tomb-shrine of Tilimsan's patron saint, Sidi Abu Madiyan. For several years, the future mahdi engaged in unremitting devotions at the shrine, spending entire nights in prayer and meditation, much like any Maghribi saint in gestation.^[37] And acts of self-denial were very much part of the spiritual armature of the waliy and sufi.

Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah might have ended his days in relative obscurity in the service of Sidi Abu Madiyan had he not been enmeshed in the political turmoil that rent western Algeria in the 1840s. As his reputation for holiness grew, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah caught the attention of both French authorities, then battling the amir, and one of the amir's aghas (local representative), Mulay Shaykh. By 1841 Mulay Shaykh desired to distance himself from 'Abd al-Qadir's faltering movement. Seeking to manipulate the faqir to his own ends, Mulay Shaykh associated himself with the local holy man to appropriate his popular religious following and baraka and thus pose as a contender to the amir. Failing at this, the traitorous agha subsequently concluded an alliance with the French but was later outmaneuvered by Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, whose religious clientele brought him into the political limelight. Named khalifa of Tilimsan in 1842 by General Bugeaud, who sought to counter the amir's authority by promoting another religious leader, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah soon proved an inept military leader and, worse, a decidedly uncooperative French ally.^[38]

After several military debacles which pitted the holy man ineffectively against the amir, Bugeaud decided to rid himself of a political embarrassment. Exiled from the colony, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah was dispatched on a state ship to Alexandria, from whence he set out for the Hijaz sometime in 1845 or 1846 to perform the pilgrimage. While in the Haramayn, he spent three or four years studying at the zawiya of Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi (1787–1859) in Mecca. The founder of the Sanusiyya brotherhood was also from western Algeria and had left the Mashriq to take up residence in al-Bayda (in Cyrenaica), which served as the Sanusi center from 1842 until 1857. By this period, Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi was already lending moral and material support to Algerian opponents of the French colonial regime via the sufi network.^[39]

Once again there is little information on the future mahdi's activities while in the Holy Cities, apart from vague references to his Meccan sojourn in letters addressed to tribal followers in the Sahara sometime after 1851. In these missives, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah stated that for four years he had studied in Egypt and the Hijaz, where he encountered Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi (date unknown) who commanded him to preach jihad in Algeria.^[40] Another source claims that while in the Mashriq he had established relations with Mecca's "Arab elite"; since the leader of the Sanusiyya had returned to the Hijaz in this period, it is not unlikely that the two men met there.^[41] Whether or not he encountered Mustafa b. 'Azzuz, who was also performing the hajj at the same time, is a question worth raising in the light of their later collaboration.

Sometime around 1850, the sharif resurfaced in the Regency of Tripolitania, where he was received with honors by the Ottoman governor, Izzat Pasha. The reasons prompting Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's return to the Maghrib are unknown; his arrival in Tripoli provoked consternation among French officials, who had native spies tracking him there as well as in Tunisia and Algeria. From Tripoli, he journeyed south to Ghadamis, where he befriended the Ottoman mudir (governor) with whom the mahdi later corresponded.^[42] Departing southern Tripolitania, he went to the Tunisian Jarid, where he may have resided at Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's zawiya in Nafta; he then crossed into Algeria to the Suf and Tuqqurt. Feraud maintained that while in the Suf, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah attempted unsuccessfully to mobilize the people against the depredations of the Banu Jallab.^[43] Eventually he reached a zawiya in Warqala's suburbs sometime in the early spring of 1851.

Bearing letters from the Sanusiyya shaykh, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah met an enthusiastic reception from Warqala's leading female saint, Lalla Zuhra, venerated for her piety and gift of divination. Lalla Zuhra later pronounced him to be "the one sent from God," and prophesied a brilliant future for the mysterious guest as "sultan and terror of the Christians."^[44] One of the letters from the Sanusiyya shaykh, which bore his personal seal, read as follows:

Here is a pious man who fears God and who has influence in the Tell, where the most important tribes of the West have recognized him as their leader; he has come, scorning the ephemeral things of this world, avoiding the French, whom he detests, in search of tranquillity and happiness in the midst of palm trees to await better days.^[45]

In addition, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah enjoyed the immediate support of a leading tribal notable from one of the city's warring factions, Shaykh 'Abd

Allah b. Khalid, who provided the stranger with accommodations in his own home. In contrast to Bu Ziyan, the sharif initially encountered little difficulty in convincing a potential constituency of the authenticity of his divinely ordained calling. (It was only later, when the promised victory in battle proved elusive, that his mahdist claims met with growing skepticism.) Thus, from the start of his prophetic mission, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah solicited and received the backing of local religious and secular elites.^[46]

Warqala in this period was a rather modest desert religious center; the oasis boasted two large congregational mosques and a number of zawaya representing turuq from both western and eastern Algeria—the Shaykhiyya, Qadiriyya, Rahmaniyya, and Tijaniyya, to name only the most important. Among the sufi orders there, the Rahmaniyya claimed the second-largest popular following; perhaps as many as one-third of Warqala's population was affiliated in one way or another with the tariqa. The Rahmaniyya presence resulted from missionary activity by both Muhammad b. 'Azzuz and his son Mustafa. As was the case in the Jarid and the Suf by this time, many Rahmaniyya followers called themselves "'Azzuziyya" to signify their special spiritual attachment to the 'Azzuz clan of al-Burj and Nafta. Warqala's sufi orders do not appear to have been divided in this period by the kinds of "maraboutic rivalries" found elsewhere. And the sharif did not court any particular sufi elite or order in his jihad but rather appealed to all for assistance.^[47]

The choice of Warqala as the site for an anticolonial rebellion—if indeed that was Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's original intent—was probably dictated by moral as well as strategic concerns. The desert was considered one of the few places left unsoiled by the infidels, who by 1850 were the undisputed masters of most of northern Algeria, the Berber Kabylia aside. And many North Africans expected the Muslim redeemer to arise from the Sahara. "For them, our presence in Algeria is only a passing affliction, an atonement. They always have their eyes fixed upon the south from whence the mahdi, whose mission is to expel us from Dar al-Islam, will make his appearance."^[48] Moreover, the oasis was situated on several transversal desert routes leading either to the Tunisian Jarid or to Biskra; it could with some difficulty be reached from Ghadamis in southern Tripolitania. At the same time, Warqala had always been just outside the grasp of central governments. The last time a Turkish army had occupied the city was in 1821 and then only briefly. After 1830 the French military left the region to its own devices, being completely absorbed with pacification in the north. With the crumbling of the local Allahum dynasty after 1842, Warqala fell into a state of anarchy, subjected to years of interminable saff quarrels which could be resolved only by someone neutral to these bitter conflicts.^[49] Thus, a resident "outside saint" was needed to restore order.

When French colonial officials finally turned their attention belatedly to the Sahara in 1850, they found that the political vacuum in Warqala had aroused the territorial ambitions of both of its neighbors, the Banu Jallab and the Babiyya clan of the nearby rival oasis of N'gusa. In 1851 the shaykh of N'gusa, al-Hajj b. Babiyya, opted, purely from self-interest, for collusion with the French and was duly appointed to a largely fictitious khalifalik (an administrative post headed by a khalifa or subaltern), encompassing the entire Wadi Mya. This naturally alarmed Warqala's inhabitants as well as other oases and tribal leaders. In fact, the timing of the sharif's public declaration of both his prophecy and jihad was tied to Warqala's refusal to acknowledge the authority of the new French-appointed khalifa, al-Hajj b. Babiyya. Seeking to take command of his as yet unsecured office, the khalifa and his forces mounted several unsuccessful expeditions against the oasis-city and in August 1851 were preparing another military offensive.^[50]

Khalwa and Jihad

Between February and August 1851, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah engaged in a rigorous khalwa (mystical retirement from the world); he spoke but rarely, and he avoided contact with Warqala's populace. As he had earlier done in Tilimsan, he spent day and night in prayer, self-denial, and meditation in an outward expression of interior, mystical hijra. This behavior naturally aroused popular curiosity; people began talking about the stranger, and the rumor mill ran wild. Then in August as another military assault from N'gusa loomed on the horizon, the sharif accepted the vacant post of sultan of Warqala, yielding to the entreaties of the city's notables and masses with seeming reluctance.^[51] His populist election was due to his role as a pious outsider, untainted by association with any single faction, to the backing of local political leaders, and to the blessings of the city's patron saint, Lalla Zuhra.

Nevertheless, indigenous political actors from outside may also have played a part in the sharif's elevation to power. The Mzabis and the chief of the powerful Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh confederation, Sulayman b. Hamza, had both viewed the promotion of N'gusa's shaykh to khalifa status with extreme trepidation. Since one of the sharif's first declared objectives was to rid the Sahara of French native allies, Sidi Hamza initially pushed Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's mahdist claims, viewing with favor his selection as Warqala's sultan.^[52]

The first civic act of the newly elected sultan-saint was to abandon his modest quarters in the house of his host and take up residence in the qasba, a significant move since the citadel was historically a highly charged and visible political space. Eventually the sharif's partisans constructed a palace

for him in Ruissat; it resembled a medieval ribat combining religious, political, military, and administrative functions in a single architectural complex.^[53] His initial program aimed to impose peace upon the Sahara by uniting Warqala's factions, defeating the French-backed khalifa of N'gusa, and driving the Christians from the desert. This plan emerges from the sharif's letter to the governor of Ghadamis written in 1851: "When I arrived in the region of Warqala, it had come to pass that the Muslims were under the rule of the Christians, and their khalifa (al-Hajj b. Babiyya) was there."^[54]

As Bu Ziyan had done two years earlier after his following had reached a certain critical mass, the sharif upped the ante. His letters, designed to mobilize supporters for the jihad, were signed with the name invariably ascribed to the mahdi, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. Whether he actually claimed to be the redeemer, instead of the mahdi's precursor or messenger, is uncertain. In his letters written early in 1852, the sharif refers to his teacher, Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi, as the "master of the hour," an epithet commonly ascribed to the Muslim savior.^[55] However, the nuances of eschatological doctrine were probably inconsequential to his tribal followers, who appear to have firmly believed that he was the one sent from God to deliver them from oppression and institute the realm of justice. Yet, the precise form that the kingdom of God on earth would ultimately assume was viewed differently by the myriad groups, each with its own expectations, converging under his banner.

The mahdi's message was simple and universal in its appeal for sociospiritual regeneration. Algeria had fallen into Christian hands because the Islamic community had strayed from the right path; reform and renewal of the faith were incumbent upon all. It was the sharif who would replace discord with social harmony; the weakness of Warqala's inhabitants vis-à-vis the French was the product of their own divisions. Unified they would "march together like brothers." With God's protection and that of the Prophet, victory was assured, rich booty would be theirs. The true religion would triumph; the humiliation of subservience to unbelievers would end.^[56] At the same time, specific events and deeply felt local grievances undergirded the call to arms. The vaccination campaign, then under way in Algeria due to the devastating cholera epidemic of 1849–1850, was greatly feared; rumor had it that the French were inoculating Muslim children in order to mark them with evil intent. And heaven's wrath with the Muslim Algerians had brought down upon them pestilence, drought, and a plague of locusts as punishment for submission to France.^[57]

Several issues regarding the movement's origins and its organizer's initial intent must be addressed at this juncture. French military writers from the period, some of whom fought against the sharif, were naturally

attracted to conspiracy theories. Many assumed that Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had arrived in the remote oasis with the clearly formulated scheme of launching an anticolonial rebellion throughout the Sahara. Moreover, since the Sanusiyya scare soon overtook the colonial bureaucracy, later writers maintained that the sharif had been entrusted with this mission by the Sanusiyya leader.^[58] Yet, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah may have aimed first at the moral-religious uplifting of the Algerians by exhortations to virtuous conduct, perhaps through the medium of a new sufi tariqa or association with the Sanusiyya. In marked contrast to what Europeans at the time said and wrote about him, Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi had always privileged interior or spiritual jihad. In his numerous writings, the founder of the Sanusiyya advocated nonviolent means for achieving islah (reform, renewal) within Muslim society, urging removal from areas directly under European influence rather than confrontation. And initially the sharif sought to emulate his Sanusiyya master in words and deeds.

Whatever the sharif's motives prior to his election as sultan of Warqala, by late in the summer of 1851 he had moved (or been maneuvered by others) dead center into the vortex of Saharan politics, struggles, and alignments. As his coalition enlarged in size and complexity, rumors about the pious stranger grew accordingly, eventually reaching colonial officials in Biskra.

More Rumors of Revolt

For several months the North African rumor mill had been preoccupied with the stranger from the east. News about the sharif increased in the autumn of 1851 as he and his armed forces went on the offensive, perhaps to certify his mahdihood to any remaining skeptics. The sultan's first militant deed was to demand that the oasis of N'gusa recognize him as ruler, a command met by scornful refusal. The sharif then undertook a spectacular raid against tribal allies of Tuqqurt's Banu Jallab, who were defeated; the proceeds served to enhance his own prestige and that of his cause. Feeling vulnerable in his khalifalik, the leader of the Babiyya clan fled to his French benefactors in Biskra in September. The next month N'gusa's inhabitants rendered homage to the sharif, formally recognizing him as their shaykh. To forestall future unrest, they were forced to relocate to Warqala, where they could be easily controlled.^[59] Emancipated at last from the oppression long suffered at the hands of its nearby foe, the oasis of Warqala became the rebellious capital of a movement enduring for three more years.

These events naturally were eagerly discussed, repeated, and probably embellished as they were told and retold all over Algeria. According to the grapevine version, not only did the sharif govern the Wadi Mya through

popular consensus but also the surrounding tribes, and even the people of the Mzab, had submitted to him. (The submission of the Mzab to Warqala would have represented a decided reversal of prevailing economic and political realities.) At first, the French military dismissed the news as "nothing but an Arab rumor," and thus inherently spurious. Officials in Biskra's Bureau Arabe were distracted in 1851 by events along the Tunisian-Algerian border—the emigration of Nafta's shurafa' to the Suf—and by Bu Baghla's revolt in the northern Constantine. Like Bu Ziyan, the sharif was the subject of endless rumormongering and speculation, the stuff of improvised news. Significantly, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah was associated in oral information circuits and popular thinking with the 1849 uprising. Bu Ziyan's second son, whose body had not been recovered from Za'atsha's detritus, was believed still alive. It was said that he had joined with the sharif, accompanying him on expeditions through the Sahara. Not believing or not wanting to trust this unsettling news, French military authorities were finally convinced of the situation's seriousness by their indigenous allies, who arrived from the desert with reports about the mahdi.^[60]

As the year 1851 drew to a close, the rebels, still based in Warqala but emboldened by initial victories, widened their military objectives to include northern Algeria. Now the declared goal was to march an army to the north, where they would expel the foreigners. In the battle plan, Biskra once again figured prominently as the gateway to the Tell and the seat of French military administration; due to Biskra's strategic location, it would have to be taken next. The sharif sent spies to the oasis of Sidi 'Uqba to assess the Ziban's political climate and its caravan activity and to gather intelligence about French activities. Information was gleaned from as far away as Algiers, probably through barranis living in the capital. By then the rebels believed that Biskra would prove an easy prize since outside military assistance was at hand, according to the rumor mill.^[61]

As in 1849, many people still looked to the bey of Tunis for deliverance. It was said that Ahmad Bey, angered by a French-imposed territorial concession, had collected a large army and was coming forthwith to embrace the sharif's cause. (This particular piece of political gossip writ large has two basic elements which can be traced to verifiable fact. The French had forced the Tunisian government to renounce claims on contested territory, and Ahmad Bey had indeed organized a new European-style army since 1838, although certainly not with any Algerian adventures in mind.)^[62] Moreover, rumor had it that the Ottoman sultan was sending military assistance from Istanbul. Algeria would return to the Ottoman-ruled fold since her coastal cities were without French troops; the Turkish contingent would meet little resistance. This last bit of improvised news

concerning the Sublime Porte would reappear constantly in Algeria throughout the century and in Tunisia during the French occupation of 1881–1882. Finally, in this period, the Sanusiyya's head shaykh entered into the serpentine North African information ducts; Sidi Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi was presumed to be in the Tunisian Nafzawa, massing his followers to aid the sharif's jihad.^[63]

For the historian seeking to reconstruct the rhetorical universe of collective social action and to make sense out of what was dismissed as "nonsense" by colonial observers, these rumors are significant. Indeed the rumors provide virtually the only window into the aspirations of the unlettered supporters of the rebellion. The news linking the sharif to Bu Ziyan's son indicates that Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had convinced many of the authenticity of his calling and had also been assimilated into the pantheon of local folk heroes. In addition, this suggests that the sharif's jihad was regarded as the successor movement to Za'atsha. Conversely the sharif may have consciously tapped into the fund of popular veneration for Za'atsha martyrs to garner added legitimacy for his prophecy and jihad. Moreover, as was true in 1849, rumors played several functions. First, they persuaded the rebellion's constituency that their cause was just, its victory assured, since they were not alone in the struggle; the might of the Tunisian bey and the Ottoman sultan were on their side. Second, the rumors reveal once more what the movement's shock troops believed to be within the realm of possibility. Finally, because both leaders and followers acted upon information fed to them by the rumor mill, improvised news was a powerful force in shaping collective behavior. But rebels need more than rumors to survive, particularly in the parched desert regions.

Markets, Grains, and Political Action in the Sahara

Before Biskra could be taken, however, Tuqqurt, which had pitilessly tyrannized the region, would have to be subdued for use as a base of action. Warqala was too isolated, impoverished, and thinly populated to support a sustained uprising; its location made it vulnerable to economic pressures exerted by cities to the north. The battle for the "stomach of the Sahara" involved as much desert market strategies as the settling of old political accounts by Tuqqurt's ancient enemies. While the Wadi Righ traditionally acquired most of its grains from the Algerian Tell, after the occupation of Biskra in 1844, cereals from the Tunisian beylik, imported from the Jarid via the Suf, became increasingly vital for both Tuqqurt and Warqala. Therefore, control of Tuqqurt would assure grain supplies imported from Tunisia.

By September 1851, the sharif had a multitude of desert forces enrolled under his banner. Contingents from Tammasin, Warqala, and al-Awad as well as tribal groups from the Sha'amba and Larba' confederacies gathered to topple the Banu Jallab and reap the rich prizes promised by their leader. The French sent native troops and supplies of grain from Biskra to Tuqqurt to relieve their terrified ally. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Jallab also begged for European artillery so that the increasingly menacing insurrection would not, in his words, "turn into another Za'atsha." By this time, the family rebel, Sliman b. Jallab, had enlisted the sharif's aid in dislodging his cousin from power. Finally, the nomads were once again moving down from the Tell to the Sahara in September, further complicating the political game. In contrast to Za'atsha, where the French military strove to prevent the transhumant tribes from regaining the desert, colonial officers now pressed the Salmiyya and Rahman to hasten back to the Wadi Righ; there they owned palm gardens and could be counted on to defend Tuqqurt against attack.^[64]

In October the insurgents arrived in Tammasin, whose markets, while not as well stocked as Tuqqurt's, could supply basic provisions demanded by militant action. Ordered by French officers to erect an economic blockade, the hapless sultan, 'Abd al-Rahman, made a genuine effort, for the first time, to close markets in the Wadi Righ to the rebel force. In the Ziban, colonial authorities did the same for French-held markets, measures which made supplies a critical element in the insurrection. Indeed, throughout the sharif's long and wide-ranging movement, access to desperately needed provisions, more than any other material factor, shaped the rebellion's geopolitical trajectory.^[65]

The next month battle was joined before the walls of Tuqqurt. The city, however, was not taken, mainly because the attackers lacked siege craft and were less numerous than the Banu Jallab's forces swelled by French army contingents. Moreover, the commercial blockade of Tammasin, the rebels' base, meant that provisions from elsewhere could reach the oasis only with some difficulty. The clash ended in a stalemate but was interpreted quite differently by the sharif, who declared victory since his troops, though outnumbered, had killed a goodly number of the enemy and the sultan was holed up pitifully in his walled city. Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's supporters chose thus to read the confrontation as divine confirmation of their leader's mahdist pretensions. From this period on, many in the Sahara referred to Warqala's sultan as the mahdi. The Sha'amba constructed a maqam (or shrine) of stones to honor the one sent from God and designate the place sanctified by his presence.^[66]

During this period, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah also turned his attention to the Mzab. If the cities of the Pentapolis could be brought into his

campaign, a vast midsection of the central Sahara would be in revolt. However, the characteristically independent Mzabis declined to open their doors to the rebels in December 1851, although they did allow that if the sharif proved mighty enough to oust the infidels then they would consider joining his cause. Wisely, the sharif did not press the Mzabis further; a siege of their fortified oases would have been futile anyway. Nevertheless, the Mzab's professed neutrality meant that the movement's western flank was free for the moment from danger.^[67]

Soon after came the news that Tuqqurt's ruler was near death; 'Abd al-Rahman finally succumbed in January 1852, and Sliman took over the oasis, welcoming Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah and his forces. If the Banu Jallab's leader depended upon the mahdi for legitimacy, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah needed the desert prince for material support. The sharif even ritually installed Sliman on the throne in a ceremony held two months later, although the new sultan may have espoused the mahdi's cause less from ideological or religious commitment than from economic and political self-interest. Whatever the motivations, their respective fates became intertwined, to Sliman's eventual detriment since he ended his days in exile in Tunis.

Mindful of the threat from the French army poised in Biskra, Sliman attempted to soothe colonial officials in 1852 by disingenuous letters assuring them of undying fealty. This effort encountered skepticism, tinged with resignation. As Seroka observed in the period, French sovereignty in the Sahara was such that France was condemned to "simply endure the faits accomplis of desert politics."^[68] Nevertheless, the French tried, unsuccessfully, to woo Sliman away from his religious patron, the sharif, during the next three years. Moreover, events in Tuqqurt had come to the attention of authorities in Tripolitania, for Sliman received a delegation, seeking to determine the state of affairs in the Algerian Sahara, from either the Ottomans or the Sanusiyya.^[69]

No sooner had he come to power than Sliman b. Jallab immediately made the winter fair available to rebellious tribal groups, a reckless gesture of insubordination to France. Without access to Tuqqurt's vast markets, the sharif's movement might well have collapsed in 1852 since insufficient supplies had brought hardship and dissent to his camp. Now the mahdi's army could use the products of their razzias, mainly flocks, to purchase grains, dates, gunpowder, and firearms from the Suf and Tunisia. But there were some items that even the Suf's intrepid traders could not easily obtain. Thus, Sliman and the sharif both sought across-the-border assistance from the Tunisian bey, requesting that he furnish cannon and soldiers to the rebellion. By then painfully aware of his own vulnerable position

vis-à-vis France, Ahmad Bey prudently rejected the audacious request.^[70] The Tunisian head of state's refusal to get involved deprived the movement of added legitimacy, although it did not extinguish hopes for future succor.

The End of the Rebellion's Algerian Phase, 1852–1854

Prior to moving against Biskra, the sharif sent letters soliciting moral assistance from Rahmaniyya notables residing in the villages of Awlad Jallal and Sidi Khalid in the Zab Qibli. Under the moral ascendancy of local saintly lineages affiliated with the Rahmaniyya, these small oases had tenaciously supported Bu Ziyan's uprising three years earlier. Moreover, the word-of-mouth epic or rumor regarding the coalition between Bu Ziyan's miraculously risen son and the sharif had been disseminated from the Ziban. Due to its military garrison, Biskra was the most firmly under colonial rule; yet expressions of popular unrest surfaced as the rebel forces neared in May 1852. Several of Biskra's inhabitants hired musicians and storytellers to sing the praises of Za'atsha's martyrs in public places, resulting in arrests. And Bureau Arabe officers observed that popular support for Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah was high among the region's tribes and oasis dwellers.^[71]

At last the long-awaited battle between the forces of good and evil occurred in May 1852 in the Zab Qibli, south of Biskra. Never a great strategist in warfare, the sharif and his contingents were beaten back by the better armed, organized, and equipped French army. Moreover, the sharif's forces were fighting in unknown territory; the advantage was clearly on the enemy's side. This was the first encounter between a modern, European contingent and the sharif's coalition, since previous clashes had involved French native allies who fought on terms roughly similar to those of the rebels. As was true in 1849, the match was grievously unequal, mainly because colonial soldiers wielded superior firepower. The sharif and his armed followers were impelled ignominiously into retreat, and Biskra remained in infidel hands; thus the way to the north was blocked. Had Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah been able to carry the day, most likely the rest of the Ziban would have revolted.^[72] Nevertheless, without an initial victory to prove the would-be redeemer's claims to divine guidance, and with the memory of Za'atsha still fresh in the minds of many, the Ziban remained largely quiet during the confrontation. In retrospect, the failed Biskra campaign was the beginning of the end; the real turning point in the insurrection's fortunes transpired late in 1852.

Failing in the southern Constantine, the sharif was compelled to look elsewhere in the Sahara for conquest and booty to keep his tribal followers content. Nasir b. Shuhra, head of the powerful Arba'a confederacy, encouraged the sharif to shift operations to southcentral Algeria. His atten-

tion was drawn to the large, relatively prosperous oasis of al-Aghwat, located some four hundred kilometers south of Algiers.^[73] Since 1844, the oasis had been under a French-appointed ruler, Ahmad b. Salim, whom the Arba'a chieftain sought to overthrow with the mahdi's assistance. Due to popular discontent with the French-allied khalifa, Ahmad b. Salim was forced from office and al-Aghwat's populace opened their doors to the sharif and his followers. However, the rebels remained in control of the strategic oasis, dominating the routes leading to Biskra, the Mzab, and the Oran, for several months only. By then al-Aghwat was deemed critical to Governor-General Randon's future plans for a French Saharan empire stretching deep into the desert. Under Generals Yusuf and Pélissier, the oasis was taken by storm on 2 December 1852, resulting in thousands of casualties on both sides during an "atrocious carnage." It proved to be one of the bloodiest episodes in the conquest period; 2,300 men, women, and children were killed and al-Aghwat's streets ran with blood.^[74] The horrors of the siege, which surpassed even Za'atsha, passed into the collective historical folk memory of the region and were remembered by al-Aghwat's remaining inhabitants in the guise of popular religious dramatic rituals reenacted regularly until the eve of Algeria's independence.^[75]

Prior to the final assault by the French army, both Nasir b. Shuhra and Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah managed through a ruse to escape from al-Aghwat—miraculously so in the minds of their partisans. In January 1853, the sharif retreated to his palace complex in Ruissat, where he was joined by the leader of the Arba'a tribe. As was true of other tribally based mahdist movements, such as those led by Bu Himara and Bu 'Amama in Morocco, the sharif's clientele expanded with victory only to dwindle after defeat.^[76] Had he limited his movement to the Tuqqurt-Suf area, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah could have posed a serious threat to colonial interests in a strategic crossroads region opening onto the eastern Maghrib, Sahara, and the Mashriq. Yet in his relentless quest for support and supplies, he was drawn into other Saharan battles and political programs; this deflected the jihad from its original aim—initiating the realm of justice on earth—and channeled it to more mundane objectives.

From 1853 on, the movement's millenarian core was gradually replaced by a much less stable nucleus of shifting desert coalitions. Campaigns were waged more in the manner of tribal razzias than anything else. By now popular fervor for the mahdi was wearing thin; some began to question the authenticity of his prophetic calling. Significantly in this critical period, the mahdi began increasingly to rely upon sorcery and magic to convince his reluctant partisans of his divinely conferred mission.^[77]

By mid-1853, both the sharif and his comrade in arms, Sliman b. Jallab, faced growing disenchantment from their constituencies in Tuqqurt and

Warqala. As economic conditions deteriorated, many within the Banu Jallab clan began to cast about for other family members to supplant the sultan, whose defiance of the French had brought little else but misery. As long as the caravans could travel safely from the Tunisian Jarid to the Suf and Tuqqurt, militant opposition to France was feasible. However, raids by French military patrols began to impede the caravan trade between the two countries, which in any case could supply the rebels only with foodstuffs if harvests were plentiful in the beylik. In the spring and summer of 1853 grain harvests in the southern Constantine and in parts of Tunisia failed due to drought; a devastating series of epizootic diseases decimated herds and flocks. The oases of Warqala and Tuqqurt begged colonial authorities for permission to trade in well-stocked French-held markets, which nevertheless remained closed to them. Some, however, clung to their faith in the mahdi's cause, perhaps for lack of alternatives. In Tuqqurt, religious notables led processions to the city's sufi zawaya, seeking divine guidance; local holy men consoled the populace with their supernatural visions and dreams, which promised that the French would not take the oasis that year. Their visions proved correct for a time.^[78]

Before internal revolt against the sharif and Sliman reached the boiling point, betrayal from outside dealt the fatal blow to the jihad's Algerian phase. As mentioned above, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had enjoyed the backing of Sidi Hamza, leader of the powerful Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh confederacy, when the movement was in its early stages during 1851.^[79] A fearless tribal warrior as well as a saint, Shaykh Sulayman b. Hamza had been captured by the French military and incarcerated for two years between 1851 and 1853. During his prison years, he appears to have undergone a change of political heart and defected to France, at least momentarily. In return for collaboration, Sidi Hamza was freed and named bash-agha for the western Sahara. His first task was to quell the sharif's uprising, which Sidi Hamza went about with his customary vigor. In November 1853, he arrived in the Wadi Righ with a large army to take on Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, who counted only a handful of stalwart partisans. Soundly defeated at the seat of his power, the sharif managed once again to evade his would-be captors—mirabile dictu—by fleeing to the desolate area between al-Awad and the Jarid. The sharif's palatial headquarters in Ruissat were reduced to rubble, and by the end of 1853 Warqala was added to the growing list of colonial outposts in the Sahara.^[80] Only Tuqqurt and the Suf remained unrepentant and unchastised.

The next year, 1854, witnessed a desperate rearguard action by Sliman b. Jallab and the sharif, by then confined to Tuqqurt, which was still under economic blockade. While some of the Suwafa were still loyal to the

rebellion, many no longer dared to openly lend material support since native troops under Sidi Hamza moved throughout the region. As the cool months of autumn approached, the pastoralists prepared to migrate south from the Tell. This forced the hand of colonial officials in Biskra, who rightly feared that the Salmiyya, the Rahman, and the Awlad Mulat would aid the faltering movement out of economic self-interest.^[81] Soldiers from the Ziban were rushed down, and by December the oasis was encircled by advancing colonial troops. The two rebel leaders decided to depart rather than attempt a last stand, which would have resulted either in a dreadful siege similar to Za'atsha and al-Aghwat or might have brought their murder at the hands of Tuqqurt's thoroughly exasperated and demoralized population. By now Sliman b. Jallab was completely compromised in the eyes of French authorities and destined to follow the sharif's rapidly fading star. Together the two men retreated to the Tijaniyya center in Tammasin, where Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah placed his family under Tijani protection. In the Suf, they were joined by Nasir b. Shuhra with some 450 tents from the Arba'a and other recalcitrant tribal groups. At the end of December the political refugees crossed into the safety of the Tunisian Jarid, where they were welcomed by Shaykh Mustafa b. 'Azzuz of Nafta.^[82]

That month General Desvaux occupied both Tuqqurt and the Suf with relatively little sustained opposition; Tuqqurt's inhabitants were spared the sword and disarmed by the army, rendering up thousands of rifles.^[83] In a ritual ceremony meant to symbolize France's new political order for the Suf, General Desvaux conferred the white burnus of investiture upon the Suf's first qa'id, Sidi 'Ali Bey b. Farhat, whose father had headed the Bu 'Ukkaz saff. At this juncture, the Tijaniyya shaykh of Tammasin, Sidi Muhammad b. al-'Id (1814–1876), arrived in al-Awad. Accompanied by his large retinue and bearing the religious banners of his tariqa, the Tijani leader officially placed himself under France's rule. Shaykh Muhammad also pledged to act as the new French-appointed qa'id's preceptor in fulfilling the duties of office, an offer eagerly accepted by colonial officials, despite some lingering doubts about the behind-the-scenes role of the Tijani shaykh in the sharif's rebellion.^[84] At the same time, 'Ali Bey b. Farhat was instructed by his colonial masters not only to cultivate amiable relations with al-Awad's elders through gifts and offerings but also to treat Tijaniyya notables with due respect for therein lay the key to political quiet along the borders.^[85]

The Mahdi and Saharan Sufi Elites

Thus far we have followed the sharif and his movement in its peregrinations throughout the Algerian Sahara. The part that religious elites played—or declined to play—in the jihad needs to be examined to un-

derscore similarities as well as differences between the 1849 revolt and its successor movement. This examination will render explicit some of the implicit cultural norms governing sufi political behavior. It also explains subsequent postures assumed by religious notables toward colonial regimes both in Algeria and later in Tunisia.

Bu Ziyan and the sharif solicited the religiomoral backing of sufi leaders and local saints to confirm their mahdist pretensions and legitimize their jihads. Because the Za'atsha uprising developed in the Ziban, where the Rahmaniyya tariqa counted numerous followers and prominent sufi centers, the blessings of families like the 'Azzuz were crucial to large-scale mobilization. Nevertheless, several other significant dimensions of religiously based popular protest emerged in 1849. The political responses of Rahmaniyya notables to both the self-declared redeemer's cause and to the growing colonial presence were neither uniform nor monolithic. Tulqa's Rahmaniyya elite eschewed, at least publicly, taking sides, and Shaykh 'Abd al-Hafiz attempted to remain uncommitted as long as possible. As important, neither Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz nor Shaykh Ali b. 'Uthman al-Tulqi could dissuade their clients from joining the rebels. Despite what the colonial sufi vulgate held regarding the blind obedience of tariqa members toward their religious patrons, ordinary people did on occasion follow political paths ostensibly divergent from those of powerful religious leaders. Moreover, intense popular pressure from Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz's tribal clientele in the Awras actually forced the diffident shaykh out of retreat to throw in his lot with Bu Ziyan.

Even prior to making public his mahdist claims, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah sought the spiritual imprimatur of Warqala's local saints, although he also drew upon the tradition of the pious reformer who achieves popular recognition of his message through uncommon forms of devotion. The sharif came to the Wadi Mya in 1851 bearing letters from the head of the Sanusiyya order, then centered in Cyrenaica, which appears to have convinced many of his religious legitimacy. However, the Sanusiyya did not then or later command large numbers of devotees in Warqala. And during the rebellion's prehistory, the oasis's local sufi establishment does not appear to have been instrumental either in promoting collective action or in opposing it. Due to its poverty and isolation—the oasis was not on the hajj route—Warqala boasted no large or regionally powerful zawaya such as those found in Tammasin, Tulqa, or Nafta. Thus, instead of translocal sufi ties, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's following derived more from his personal piety, the backing accorded him by Lalla Zuhra, and the social crises rocking Warqala for which the stranger proposed solutions. Once the conflict widened beyond Warqala's confines, the encouragement of Sidi

Hamza, who wielded both religious and secular authority as head of the Awlad Sidi al-Shaykh confederacy, and that of Nasir b. Shuhra, a leading tribal chieftain, was critical for mobilization.

By employing Tammasin as a base of operation in the fall of 1851, the rebellion moved squarely into territory under the Tijaniyya's moral and socioreligious influence. The tariqa's eastern branch dominated the Wadi Righ's oases from its wealthy sufi complex in Tammasin's suburb, Tamalhat. In addition, another important zawiya existed at Gummar in the Suf, serving as the Tijaniyya headquarters during the summer months when Tuqqurt's climate was unhealthy. In theory, the Tijaniyya leadership of 'Ain Madi in the Oran had embraced the French cause in 1844. Yet in eastern Algeria, Tammasin's Tijaniyya notables had thus far been spared difficult choices regarding public stances toward France since the army had not yet penetrated this part of the Sahara. Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's move to launch his desert jihad from Tammasin brought anticolonial protest to the Tijani's back door, confronting the sufi shaykhs with dilemmas similar to those faced by the Ziban's Rahmaniyya elite in 1849.^[86]

Since Tammasin had long been a rival to Tuqqurt, the sharif actively cultivated popular animosity against the Banu Jallab to enroll the oasis's inhabitants in his movement. Publicly at least, the Tijani shaykh, Sidi Muhammad b. al-'Id attempted to dampen revolutionary ardor by adopting a neutral stance. This was in keeping with his father's earlier position during the 1844 siege of Biskra when Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Isa had cautioned his sufi followers against violent confrontations with the French army. In 1851, however, Tammasin's populace welcomed the sharif to the oasis, provided decisive military assistance in men and arms, and continued to aid Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah throughout the Algerian phase of the rebellion.^[87]

Whether or not Shaykh Muhammad b. al-'Id was playing a double game is open to question. The benefits of loyalty to France were not yet evident—nor were the dangers of sedition—and the self-proclaimed mahdi was, after all, bent upon destroying Tammasin's mortal enemy. Based upon reports from contemporary observers, Shaykh Muhammad b. al-'Id may not have been the pillar of the regime as colonial officers wanted to believe. As the rebel army approached Tammasin in 1851, some sources maintained that the Tijani leader privately viewed their cause with a favorable eye. And the Tijaniyya of Gummar may have even entertained the notion of fleeing the colony for the safety of Tunisia, as Mustafa b. 'Azzuz had earlier done. Two years later, Tissot reported that Tammasin's Tijaniyya center was receiving shipments of gunpowder from merchants connected to Mustafa b. 'Azzuz of Nafta. And during his 1856 visit to Tunis while en route to the Haramayn, Sidi Muhammad b. al-'Id's behavior toward French diplomats in the

Tunisian capital raised troubling doubts about the sufi leader's true feelings toward his colonial mentors.^[88]

When confronted with the risks of collective protest under the mahdi's banner, the Tijaniyya elite of the eastern Sahara opted for the quite pragmatic strategy of bet hedging and fence straddling. In 1851, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's rebellion was but nascent, its outcome uncertain. The intentions of the French were unfathomable since some colonial authorities betrayed a lack of resolve when confronted with desert politics. Therefore, the Tijaniyya's risk-avoidance strategy resembled the stance adopted by some Rahmaniyya notables in 1849. Until Bu Ziyan scored several tangible victories over the French army—signs of Heaven's pleasure—some sufi leaders declined to openly sanction his cause. Some writers explain the Tijaniyya shaykh's political diffidence toward the sharif by positing that he viewed the redeemer as a spiritual competitor rather than a savior from infidel rule, which is to miss the point.^[89] To publicly sanction the mission of an impostor in guise of the mahdi was a morally perilous course of action. Highly visible social intermediaries, such as Sidi Muhammad b. al-'Id, more often than not chose to temporize until both popular pressures and auspicious portents from on high combined to compel them to action.

By 1854 much had changed for the Tijaniyya of Tammasin. The sharif's movement was clearly bankrupt, at least in Algeria. More important, in 1853 Muhammad b. al-'Id had obtained the coveted post of head shaykh of the order's two branches, east and west, something he could not have done without implicit colonial approval. Moreover, the French recognized the Tijaniyya's growing authority in the Sahara by bestowing honorifics and privileges upon their shaykhs. Finally, the old Bu 'Ukkaz saff, for whom the Tijaniyya had always shown a marked preference, were reinstated in power in the Suf under the French-backed qa'id Sidi 'Ali Bey b. Farhat. From 1854 rather than the previous decade, the eastern Algerian Tijaniyya reluctantly realized that their best interests lay—for the moment—with the colonial order. And that order was still distant enough from their desert zawaya to be a tolerable, if unpleasant, reality.^[90] From this period on, the Tijani shaykhs of Tamalhat peddled their influence by acting as brokers for French authorities in both Algeria and Tunisia as seen during the 1864 revolt led by the Tunisian rebel 'Ali b. Ghadhahim.^[91]

As the geographical trajectory of the sharif's rebellion shifted so did its political content and local constituency. Moving north from Tuqqurt and Tammasin to the Ziban in 1852, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's movement reached an area where local religious notables were mainly, although not exclusively, drawn from the Rahmaniyya. As significant, the revolt was now in close proximity to France's mighty desert outpost in Biskra. By then

any lingering political unity among Rahmaniyya notables had ceased, a product of the brutal Za'atsha defeat.

In the mountain fasts of the southern Awras, the shaykh of Sidi Masmudi, Sadiq b. al-Hajj, represented the Rahmaniyya order. During the 1849 uprising, he had mobilized tribal forces to come to Bu Ziyan's defense. By 1850, Shaykh Sadiq b. al-Hajj appeared momentarily resigned to French rule and was officially pardoned for his participation in the Za'atsha affair. Together with his family and clientele, Sidi Sadiq withdrew to the isolation of his zawiya. However, in 1851 he provoked considerable unrest in the Awras by exhorting his followers to perform the hajj en masse to seek pardon for their tepid faith. This may be interpreted as both the result of Za'atsha, which many pious Algerians viewed as a manifestation of divine wrath, and as an omen of things to come. Large numbers of Sidi Sadiq's religious clients left permanently for the Haramayn, a departure that colonial officials were powerless to prevent. Whether the migrations from the Awras were linked to widespread millenarian expectations and the news of the sharif's jihad is uncertain. Seven years later the Rahmaniyya shaykh of Sidi Masmudi instigated his own ill-fated mahdist rebellion, which was quickly quelled. This brought the French army into the heart of the Awras, although the region remained as late as 1954 one of the least touched by colonialism.^[92]

Even after the debacle of 1849, the Rahmaniyya leader of the oasis of Awlad Jallal, Sidi al-Mukhtar, hesitated at first to officially recognize French authority. Because of his popular following and prestige, Shaykh al-Mukhtar was treated deferentially by colonial officers; the next year he came to Biskra to offer his outward submission as other Rahmaniyya notables had done. The shaykh, however, was clearly not reconciled to the new political order in the Ziban. In 1852 he maintained a written correspondence with Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah through the sufi network during the aborted attack upon the Zab Qibli. But once again without a decisive victory by the rebels to buttress the sharif's claims to be the mahdi, Sidi al-Mukhtar could scarcely convince his clients to lend open support to a movement that might have repeated the disastrous lessons of Za'atsha. With the demise of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's movement in 1854, the Rahmaniyya notables of Awlad Jallal retreated into avoidance protest as a means of coping. They eschewed relations with the Europeans as much as possible, assuming a mien of subdued hostility when contact could not be avoided. Shaykh al-Mukhtar's death less than a decade later triggered a bitter dispute over spiritual succession between the defunct saint's progeny and other Rahmaniyya elites. This deflected attention away from external political matters and eventually resulted in the creation of a new, rival

Rahmaniyya center in al-Hamil that steered a rather novel course in the struggle for cultural survival after midcentury.^[93]

Predictably, during the sharif's assault upon the Ziban, Sidi 'Ali b. 'Uthman of Tulqa remained neutral and continued to maintain cordial, if distant, relationships with nearby French officials and their native allies. For the rest of the century, the saints and sufis of Tulqa neither actively sought nor sullenly dodged contact with the foreigners. After 1850 the fortunes of the Tulqa Rahmaniyya complex expanded as numerous students and pilgrims flocked to the oasis to pursue studies in Islamic Law and other religious sciences, the consequence of the closure of rebellious religious establishments elsewhere. The social service and educational activities of the Tulqa zawiya received the sub rosa blessings of the colonial regime due to its leadership's accommodating stance. While Sidi 'Ali agreed to mediate between rebels in the southern Constantine and French officials, he rebuffed offers of official posts or functions out of a desire to remain strictly within the increasingly restricted boundaries of his sociospiritual station. Nevertheless, he was characterized by local officers as "playing a double game." This meant that the Rahmaniyya shaykh was privately less than an enthusiastic supporter of a political system intent upon destroying the cultural foundations of Algerian Muslim society. Sidi 'Ali b. 'Uthman thus chose the path of educational and charitable activities as a means of contending with the unfavorable circumstances in the Ziban. His example was followed by the founder of the al-Hamil Rahmaniyya zawiya, Sidi Muhammad b. Abi al-Qasim. As part of his bet-hedging policy, Sidi 'Ali b. 'Uthman created secondary sufi centers in the Jarid and acquired substantial property in southern Tunisia, a form of insurance, since the future in Algérie Francaise appeared less than bright for Muslim notables.^[94]

After their father's political mishaps of 1849, the two sons of Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz also renounced overtly militant anticolonial resistance. Avoiding the company of native French allies in the Jabal Cherchar, the Rahmaniyya notables of Khanqa Sidi Naji devoted their energies instead to creating small sufi centers in the oases of Negrine and Tamarza, located strategically near the Tunisian borders; the two sons also remained closely linked to the 'Azzuz clan of Nafta. Thus, Shaykh al-Hafnawi, the eldest son, also chose as a mode of survival physical withdrawal to an area spared from colonial interference. Then in 1853, during the sharif's rebellion, another mahdist pretender arose along the frontiers near Tamarza. Professing to be the long-awaited redeemer, 'Umar b. al-Jadid led an ephemeral revolt which failed resoundingly, largely because Sidi al-Hafnawi refused to publicly declare this particular figure as the mahdi. Shaykh al-Hafnawi's objection to sanctioning 'Umar b. al-Jadid, a blacksmith by profession, may have

been the consequence of his behind-the-scenes support for Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah.

Once the sharif moved his base of operations over to the Jarid, Shaykh Mustafa b. 'Azzuz openly embraced the rebellion. Influenced perhaps by his sufi mentor in Nafta, Sidi al-Hafnawi appears to have provided clandestine backing to Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. In April 1855 it was reported: "Sidi al-Hafnawi has traveled to the Nafzawa from time to time and is in correspondence with the sharif of Warqala." Orders were issued for Sidi al-Hafnawi's arrest should he be rash enough to promote the sharif's cause too fervently, which he did not. Between the sharif's demise and the 1881 occupation of Tunisia, Sidi al-Hafnawi avoided political entanglements by dwelling in the seclusion of the small oasis located in the arid foothills of the mountains separating the two countries. There he directed a small Rahmaniyya center and ministered to the villagers' spiritual wants and social needs. France's invasion of Tunisia unsettled the Rahmaniyya shaykh of Tamarza, by then an old man. As the French army moved south in Tunisia to pacify rebellious communities, al-Hafnawi, beset by terrifying visions and dreams, sought to raise up the oasis's inhabitants by appealing to millenarian sentiments and wielding mahdist symbols and rituals.^[95] The aging saint and sufi's revolt was quickly put down.

Relative to their sufi associates in the Rahmaniyya Saharan leadership, the 'Azzuz lineage of al-Burj and Nafta displayed much more diversity in terms of political behavior and response; this was true both during Za'atsha's aftermath and the sharif's rebellion. The greater complexity may be explained by the family tradition of activist sufism, inherited from the previous generation, by intraclan squabbles, and above all by the fact that a key 'Azzuz family member—Mustafa—had earlier chosen hijra as a means of coping with unfavorable political circumstances. The last element rendered engaging in anticolonial resistance less hazardous since there existed an avenue of escape—to the Jarid and Sidi Mustafa's prosperous zawiya—should the political wheel of fortune turn in the wrong direction.

Muhammad b. 'Azzuz, the Rahmaniyya shaykh of Sidi Khalid, fought beside Bu Ziyan and his forces; yet when the movement appeared doomed late in 1849, he escaped from the besieged village and left Algeria for Tunisia, where his brother had already been residing for five years. In the beylik, Muhammad b. 'Azzuz assumed spiritual headship of the Rahmaniyya members in the region of al-Qayrawan. From the scanty evidence available, it seems that he joined his brother in endorsing Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's movement by exhorting the family's clients back in the southern Constantine to jihad through the medium of letters and emissaries, a powerful form of moral persuasion.^[96]

The case of Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's estranged brother, al-Mabruk, who had earlier made an assassination attempt upon Muhammad during a family quarrel, is indeed a bizarre story. Al-Mabruk (died 1890) further alienated the leading Rahmaniyya clans in Tulqa and al-Burj by eloping with the daughter of a locally prestigious lineage related through marriage to Sidi 'Ali b. 'Uthman. Completely out of favor with his family and sufi peers, al-Mabruk took refuge with the Awlad Na'il tribe in the Bu Sa'ada region. There he passed himself off as a muqaddam of the Rahmaniyya until the news of Bu Ziyan's uprising reached him. After fighting with the insurgents in Za'atsha, al-Mabruk also managed to flee prior to the final showdown. From the Ziban, he traveled to al-Aghwat, then under the Frenchallied khalifa, Ahmad b. Salim, and created a small Rahmaniyya zawiya in the oasis. Early in 1852, as the sharif's campaign was raging in the area between Tuqqurt and the Ziban, al-Mabruk b. 'Azzuz submitted a written proposal to French authorities in the Constantine, soliciting an official pardon and the post of khalifa of Warqala. In exchange, he offered to defeat Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, restore peace to the Sahara, and establish French hegemony in the Wadi Mya. Because of his shady reputation and past behavior, French military officials judiciously rejected his offer, also citing as reasons the anticolonial stance of other members of his clan. Undaunted, al-Mabruk on his own initiative enlisted with General Yusuf's native troops to take part in the 1852 siege of al-Aghwat. This apparently convinced French authorities that he could be of some use in imperial schemes. It was al-Mabruk b. 'Azzuz who later as a paid spy furnished the French in Biskra with intelligence about his older brother Mustafa. Among the information furnished by al-Mabruk was a report on Sidi Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's untiring efforts to promote the sharif's movement in the Jarid.^[97]

Thus the earlier saintly quarrels—maraboutic politics—that rent the 'Azzuz of al-Burj during the turbulent 1840s era were paramount in subsequently shaping the political behavior of religious notables. Yet other forces dictated the political behavior of religious notables and desert communities.

Guns, Wheat, and Rebellion: The Suf

The orders incumbent upon 'Ali Bey b. Farhat, as newly appointed qa'id to the Suf, revealed not only colonial apprehensions about politics along the borders but also a growing appreciation of Tunisia's significance to Algerian insurrections. He was instructed to "ceaselessly keep abreast of the activities of Sliman b. Jallab and the sharif" by then safely in the beylik. By gathering news and rumors provided by the Suf's inhabitants, who traveled constantly between southern Tunisia and Algeria, 'Ali Bey was to assess

the collective state of mind of the people. In addition, he was instructed to place spies in the oasis of Nafta, which had already proven instrumental to Algerian resistance.^[98]

Even before he sought refuge in the beylik in December 1854, the sharif had dispatched agents to ports in southern Tunisia; there they acted as brokers between suppliers of arms and gunpowder from Mediterranean sources and the rebellion's supporters. One informant revealed that the sharif was negotiating the clandestine purchase of small cannon and siege craft from a French manufacturer through purveyors residing in Tunisia's coastal cities.^[99] Islamic states on the Mediterranean's African shores had for centuries obtained armaments from various European powers. Yet in this period a significant difference emerged. The booming smuggling economy with its contraband networks permitted nonstate agents access to the instruments of warfare on a scale much larger than ever before. In this the Suf's inhabitants played a vital role as intermediaries due to the region's position astride the east-west trunk line linking the Mediterranean and the Jarid to the southern Constantine and Sahara.

Despite its small population, isolation, and meager resources, the Suf was pivotal to the larger checkerboard of desert politics and commerce for both algeria and Tunisia.^[100] Eight in number, the Suf's oases resembled Berber republics in terms of sociopolitical organization; its villages were divided into two warring camps of four each, according to saff loyalties. Yet when collective commercial interests were at stake, the Suwafa readily put aside, at least temporarily, age-old vendettas to engage in their preferred métier—trade.^[101] The Suf's oases, whose inhabitants also provided indispensable services to caravans as guides and underwriters, acted as a desert pipeline for trade between southeastern Algeria and the sea.^[102]

In addition, the region represented a haven for smugglers, rebels, and outlaws. This remained true even after the French army established nominal authority over the Suf in 1854 by driving the sharif of Warqala's movement over the border into the Jarid. Prior to this, however, the fortunes of the sharif's jihad were largely dictated by fluctuating economic conditions in these oases so close to the permeable borders with Tunisia.

The Suf's stance vis-à-vis France was ordained not by politics or religion but rather by commercial concerns, above all, by the availability of grain. For the region produced no cereals of its own and was forced to rely upon grains grown elsewhere. The incessant search for wheat and trading outlets involved the Suwafa in far-flung networks stretching into the Jarid, Nafzawa, and the Tunisian littoral, and as far south as Ghadamis and Ghat.^[103] After 1844, the Suf's trading enterprises shifted perceptibly to take advantage of rapidly changing market conditions. The traffic in Tunisian

grains, European arms and ammunition, and other items assumed increasing significance in the region's political economy. As one Bureaux Arabes officer remarked during the sharif's rebellion, "the economic interests of the Suwafa are in Tunis and in the markets of the Regency; this is the cause of their continual insubordination [to France]."^[104] Thus, the Suf's peoples were consummate bet hedgers, largely due to the precarious ecological niche they occupied.

By 1852 military authorities in Biskra realized that the Suwafa's commercial activities posed serious political obstacles to colonial hegemony in this part of the Sahara. Such had been the case ever since Biskra's capture eight years earlier. While they had welcomed 'Abd al-Qadir's rebellious khalifa, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Hajj, in al-Awad from 1844 on, the Suwafa had also made friendly overtures to colonial officials to forestall the closure of French-held markets to their merchants. Even as delegations of notables were dispatched periodically to Biskra to assure the Bureau Arabe of everlasting devotion, the Suf's oases were busy selling provisions to France's opponents. The small-time rebel and mahdi, Sharif Ahmad, who attempted to foment an insurrection among the Namamsha of the Awras, looked to the Suwafa for supplies as did Bu Ma'za in the mid-1840s. The colonial riposte—excluding the Suwafa from French-held markets, merely harmed commerce since it further diverted trade away from Algeria and toward Tunisia.^[105]

In retaliation for support of the sharif's uprising, colonial officials closed Biskra's markets to the inhabitants of Warqala and Tuqqurt and declared the passages into the Tell off limits as well. Only the Suf remained to funnel grains, arms, and other commodities necessary for survival. Impelled as much by economic opportunity as ideological commitment, the Suf's merchants sent caravans to the sharif's camp loaded with grains and foodstuffs obtained from the Jarid. In this period the contraband arms traffic between southern Tunisia and eastern Algeria reached one of its peaks. Amply resupplied with the material components of populist protest, provided at a price by the Suf, the rebels again assumed the offensive in the spring of 1852 to take the coveted goal, Biskra. While the oasis remained firmly in French hands, the perfidy of the Suf's inhabitants was not lost on Biskra's military command.^[106]

In 1852 the Suwafa had been caught red-handed once more—abetting the enemy. However, the most compelling element shaping their subsequent political behavior was the repeated failure of Tunisian grain harvests after 1852; with the beylik's supplies dwindling, and deprived of access to the Ziban's markets, the Suwafa were in straitened material circumstances. Forced by 1854 to chose between anticolonial resistance and assured food

supplies, the Suf's people opted for submission to France. A huge war contribution was levied upon al-Awad, the most culpable oasis in the rebellion. Its wealthy inhabitants, prosperous from their myriad commercial dealing, including the arms trade, paid the indemnity in only two days. The solution that Captain Warnier and other Bureau Arabe officers proposed to ensure the Suf's political fealty was to reorient commercial relations away from Tunisia and solely toward the colony's domestic trade networks.^[107]

Yet, until the French occupation of the Jarid in 1881-1882, the Suf eluded effective colonial control, remaining a desert stronghold for religious resistors, bandits, and smugglers. Moreover, its was the Suf's intimate connection with the beylik that drew both the sharif and French colonial authorities into southern Tunisia.

The Tunisian Phase, 1854–1856

Even prior to the terrible disaster at al-Aghwat late in 1852, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had made overtures to religious and secular notables in Tunisia. Responding favorably was Muhammad b. Abi 'Allag, chieftain of the redoubtable Tunisian tribe, the Awlad Ya'qub, who supplied the rebels with horsemen. Local Tunisian officials also helped the movement to endure as long as it did; their motivations were probably based upon Muslim solidarity as well as economic self-interest. When the self-proclaimed mahdi appeared briefly in the Jarid before his 1854 defeat in Algeria, Nafta's qa'id allowed him to purchase grains and sell some of his flocks in the oasis's markets. It was reported that the rebels disposed of considerable sums of money and hundreds of sheep and camels, probably obtained through razzias.

Elites in Tunis viewed the situation quite differently. Fearing French military reprisals, and perhaps unrest among his increasingly disaffected subjects in the south, Ahmad Bey directed General Zarruq to forbid officials in the Jarid from trafficking with Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah and Sliman b. Jallab. Nevertheless, the qa'id of Tuzar, 'Abd Allah b. Sudani, was on friendly terms with the rebels and extended some material assistance. Also sympathetic to their cause was the powerful Wirghimma (Ouerghemma) tribal confederacy of southeastern Tunisia.^[108] Here it can be posited that local shows of support for Algerian agitators—against the wishes of ruling elites in Tunis—may have also been an implicit critique of Ahmad bey's centralizing program, which by the 1850s had created grave discontent.

During his 1853 trip, Tissot carefully noted the political orientation of the region's sedentary peoples and leading tribes toward the sharif's rebellion. The Tunisian tribes of the southwest were then undecided about which course of action to pursue—momentary neutrality or active, militant support for the insurrection. It was the latter option that French colonial

authorities naturally feared most. The mahdi's presence along the frontiers and the emissaries and letters he dispatched to Tunisian political and religious notables inevitably churned up rumors and improvised news. Moreover, the outbreak of the Crimean War, in which Ahmad Bey participated by furnishing the Ottoman sultan with a military contingent, also provided additional grist for the rumor mill. In the beylik it was said that "the day has arrived when the flag of Islam must replace the images [suwar ] of the Christians and Algeria will be delivered forever from the yoke of the infidels."^[109]

A rare insight into how native Tunisians viewed the revolt is provided by al-Hajj al-Lus, a merchant from Sfax who traded frequently with the Suf's inhabitants. Returning to Gabis in April 1854 after a stay in al-Awad, al-Lus spread the news that the sharif had scored a spectacular victory over Algerian tribes allied to France. The rumor spread like wildfire and increased Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's credibility in Tunisia, further fueling millenarian speculations about the arrival of the "Master of the Hour."^[110] Many believed that the insurgents were undertaking another attack upon Biskra as the prelude to driving the French from North Africa. Since it was also rumored that Algeria's coastal cities were wanting in colonial troops, many Tunisians, including al-Hajj al-Lus, were convinced that the Ziban's capital would fall shortly to Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. As our merchant from Sfax put it: "The moment has arrived to return Algeria to her rightful ruler, the Ottoman sultan."^[111] Once again this interpretation of political events, based upon orally transmitted news, was a reflection not only of what ordinary people thought but also of what they believed should occur, given that France's occupation of Algeria violated the moral order of things. This incident also reveals how distant events—war in the Crimea—were integrated into local information networks far from the scene of battle.

Yet a sense of moral righteousness did not suffice; even mahdis needed adequate military technology to win the battle with the forces of darkness. During his commercial operations in al-Awad, al-Hajj al-Lus had met with Sliman b. Jallab to plan for a new phase in the jihad. The Tunisian trader agreed to furnish Sliman with five cannons for Tuqqurt's defense in exchange for specified sums of money. Unaware of Jean Mattei's ties to the French consulate in Tunis, al-Hajj al-Lus contacted the Frenchman in Gabis regarding a collaborative venture. Mattei was asked to use his commercial ties to trading concerns in Marseille to import cannons from France to Sfax through the usual Maltese smuggling channels. In return, Mattei would receive a finder's fee of one thousand Tunisian piasters and Sliman b. Jallab would acquire the desired artillery; we can only speculate about al-Lus's return from the deal had it succeeded. In addition, the Algerian rebel leaders

commissioned al-Hajj al-Lus to dispose of a large cache of defective firearms in Gabis, the product of an earlier contraband arms deal which proved a scam. (Many of the rifles bought previously by the sharif lacked working parts, and the Algerians hoped to recoup losses by reselling the firearms in the Tunisian port.) While al-Hajj al-Lus's negotiations with Mattei never progressed beyond this point, the merchants did unwittingly provide more evidence regarding the trans-Mediterranean arms traffic.^[112]

Tunisia was, therefore, progressively drawn into Algerian upheavals, the outcome of transformations occurring on both sides of the turbulent frontiers which by now encompassed the beylik's southern reaches. Growing discontent with the bey's fiscal exactions, popular resentment of European meddling in the country's internal affairs, and antipathy toward the French in neighboring Algeria were all connected in the collective political consensus. Moreover, Shaykh Mustafa b. 'Azzuz had made this connection explicit for ordinary people in 1851 when he publicly declared that the extraordinary taxes levied that year were due to nefarious French influence upon Ahmad Bey.^[113] In addition, the swelling numbers of Algerian refugees in the beylik, religious solidarity with the beleaguered Muslims of the colony, and long-standing commercial and cultural links between eastern Algeria and Tunisia momentarily created a local political environment favorable to the sharif.

The Saint, the Sharif, and the Sultan

From his zawiya in the Jarid, Sidi Mustafa b. 'Azzuz persevered in encouraging political action across the frontier. More than any other Saharan Rahmaniyya notable of his generation, Sidi Mustafa steadfastly, although cautiously, opposed the colonial regime, in large measure because he now resided in a region where opposition could be undertaken with relative impunity. As seen in the preceding chapter, Shaykh 'Azzuz extended the sheltering mantle of the zawiya's sacred space to political dissidents from his native land. Even as early as the fall of 1851, when the sharif's movement began to crystallize, Sidi Mustafa and his ally, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. al-Hajj, the former shaykh of Sidi 'Uqba, openly sanctioned the mahdi's mission.^[114]

A glimpse of how sufi notables viewed the sharif's rebellion—or how these notables portrayed that rebellion to others—is provided by a letter Mustafa b. 'Azzuz composed in 1851 as Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's forces were poised for the assault upon Tuqqurt. Intercepted by colonial officials in Algeria and later submitted to the Tunisian bey, 'Azzuz's missive was accompanied by official protests regarding the iniquitous intrigues of sufi exiles under Husaynid protection. Writing to another sufi leader, still

residing in southeastern Algeria, Shaykh 'Azzuz sought to dissuade him from fleeing to the beylik:

We, the 'Azzuz, have received your letter. You say that you will come and seek refuge with us, that you can no longer live in the country of the infidels. However, you should know that a military contingent of infidels has arrived near Tunis, and that the bey has gone out to meet them; the bey massacred a great number of French and they are now completely encircled. Turkish soldiers will arrive from Tripoli and the East; Tunis is full of these soldiers who will march against the French. The rule of France is over and now the rule of the descendants of the Prophet [shurafa'] is approaching.

You serve us where you are because before long we will advance with power and force to you. Send us a letter by means of the [sufi] brothers of Gummar and keep us informed of all the news regarding the French infidels. A mahdi has arisen in the West and he will march upon Tuqqurt; the brother of the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir is near al-Kaf. Destroy this letter as soon as you receive it.^[115]

What sorts of information can be teased from this letter, one of the few indigenous sources available from the period of the sharif's rebellion? First, it indicates that even those sufi leaders who had elected to remain in Algeria, for whatever reasons, were far from reconciled to colonial domination and were considering emigration to escape foreign rule. While the identity of the tariqa notable with whom Sidi 'Azzuz was corresponding is not clear, the mention of the village of Gummar in the Suf, the site of an important Tijaniyya zawiya, suggests that Shaykh Mustafa was writing to Sidi Muhammad b. al-'Id. As discussed above, in 1851 the Tijaniyya leadership of the Suf was uncertain about which stance to assume toward both the sharif's jihad and the colonial regime. Thus, Sidi 'Azzuz's letter may have been intended to persuade Shaykh Muhammad b. al-'Id (if indeed he was the intended recipient) to be patient—succor was on the way.

Second, the letter reveals that Sidi Mustafa b. 'Azzuz not only subscribed to popular mahdist expectations, then at their zenith in North Africa, but also that the sufi network served to reinforce those expectations by disseminating them among elites and the humble alike. At the same time, 'Azzuz requested that his sufi peer keep him informed of French activities in Algeria, another indication that the sufi zawaya functioned as information catchments as well as news distributors. The mention of 'Abd al-Qadir's brother suggests that many still looked to the amir's family for leadership, although at this time the amir was a prisoner in France; his

brother was certainly not in al-Kaf. Related to this are the rumors regarding imminent deliverance by the Ottoman sultan and the bey of Tunis, which being contained in a missive from a powerful saint and sufi must have sustained hopes of outside assistance among the Algerian populace. This too is significant. The Algerians viewed the coming struggle against the Europeans as a confrontation necessitating military and ideological sustenance from other Muslim rulers to achieve the final victory.

Nevertheless, the letter raises an additional issue—did Shaykh 'Azzuz create "facts" or events as well as explain and interpret them? The year when the letter was written—1851—was no infidel arimes arriving in Tunis, even less so any military engagements between the Tunisian forces and the French. Quite the contrary, by then Ahmad Bey's modern army, forged largely with France's technological and organizational assistance, had peaked in strength, reaching nearly seventeen thousand men in 1852. Whether the increased military activity in northern Tunisia consequent to the building of the new army was construed by religious notables in the provinces as preparation for delivering the Algerians from colonial oppression is uncertain, but the question needs to be raised. On the other hand, this piece of improvised news may represent the kinds of ideal political behavior that religious notables expected from pious Muslims rulers after the true mahdi had made his appearance. Finally, the letter hints at the sort of social order which both ordinary people and elites anticipated after the redeemer's advent in time. His appearance would establish "rule by the Prophet's descendants"—the restoration of a religiopolitical golden age in which the "reign of God will commence."^[116]

Sidi Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's involvement in the sharif's insurrection naturally did not go unnoticed by those at the pinnacle of the colonial regime. In November 1851, the governor-general of Algeria wrote to the French consul in Tunis concerning the intrigues of "certain individuals in the Jarid who attempt through the dissemination of false news spread about in the Ziban to exhort the people to rebellion. We have acquired proof of Shaykh 'Azzuz's political activities by means of his letters."^[117] Subsequently Ahmad Bey came under heavy diplomatic fire from French officials in both Tunisia and Algeria to halt 'Azzuz's participation in across-the-border revolt. Accordingly in December 1851 the bey dispatched Ahmad Zarruq, the governor of the Jarid, to the Rahmaniyya zawiya in Nafta to inform (and perhaps warn) Sidi Mustafa of French accusations. Despite the immense pressures brought to bear upon the Tunisian ruler, the bey, out of deference for the sufi shaykh, refused to take action against him and, as seen in chapter 5, appears to have shielded 'Azzuz and other Algerian émigrés from French reprisals.^[118]

In the 1851–1855 rebellion, therefore, Shaykh 'Azzuz's role was to undergird Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's claims to mahdihood by allowing the sharif to tap into Sidi Mustafa's own large fund of spiritual legitimacy. Another part played by the Rahmaniyya shaykh was to goad ordinary people to action under the redeemer's banner. Yet the sufi leader preferred to work mainly from behind the scenes to mobilize and sustain collective protest. There is no indication that 'Azzuz returned to Algerian soil nor did he himself lead armed warrior bands, either in the colony or in Tunisia. But then leading a rebellion was something that few sufi shaykhs—Rahmaniyya or otherwise—actually did. That honor was left to the sharif and Sliman b. Jallab with whom Sidi Mustafa corresponded (as evidenced by seizures of letters) prior to their flight into the beylik. After their hijra to the Jarid late in 1854, the Rahmaniyya shaykh continued to lend his great moral and spiritual weight to the jihad.

Upon reaching Tunisia, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah and Sliman b. Jallab set about rebuilding their shattered movement. One of the first things that the former sultan of Tuqqurt did was to contact the new bey of Tunis, Muhammad, who came to the throne in May 1855. Sliman's letters to the Husaynid ruler reveal how the exiles viewed their situation—or at least how they wanted the bey to see their plight.

We have left our territory of Tuqqurt and we came to settle in the Nafzawa under God's protection and yours. We have always been under the tutelage of your throne. This country [Tunisia] is equally ours; we are your children and the father does not abandon his son. We beg you to take care of our interests; . . . the French have expelled the members of our family [from Algeria] without cause.^[119]

Since the Jarid was deemed too close to the Suf, by then under French military occupation, the rebels selected as their Tunisian headquarters the Nafzawa, a no-man's-land of small oases lost in the protective arms of the shatt al-Jarid. From Nafta, directly linked to the Nafzawa by trails, Sidi Mustafa provided material and moral-ideological support, supplying the Algerians with badly needed armaments and provisions. Shaykh 'Azzuz had been involved in the trans-Mediterranean trade in firearms, and particularly in gunpowder, for several years. And the commerce in British gunpowder was brisk in the 1850s since general Algerian demand, the sharif's insurrection, and colonial efforts to impede the traffic had caused contraband prices to skyrocket. The black market price tag for one hundred kilograms of gunpowder had increased 100 percent, from 200 to 400 piasters in the Suf and southern Tunisia.^[120] By 1855, Muhammad b.

Ahmad b. al-Hajj also acted as an arms dealer. He procured weapons and gunpowder from Malta via the port of Jirba, a favored haunt for smugglers since the town's customs officials were decidedly less than vigilant. The munitions were then transported by camel caravan to the Nafzawa, where the sharif was collecting military hardware for yet another attack upon Algeria.^[121]

By June 1855, spies in the pay of France reported that the word-of-mouth news circuits were bristling with rumors about the insurgents. According to one version, the Jarid's people anticipated the arrival of the great shaykh of the Sanusiyya order from Cyrenaica, accompanied this time by a large contingent of Moroccan troops who were making their way to southern Tunisia. Another version held that the Tijaniyya shaykh of Tammasin had sent thousands of religious clients from the Suf across the borders into the Nafzawa to assist the sharif militarily. Yet another said that "the mahdi is now camped in Sahala, some thirty kilometers south of the Nafzawa along with Nasir b. Shuhra, his most devoted ally. The shaykh of Nafta, Mustafa b. 'Azzuz is of great utility to the sharif and his cause."^[122]

While once again the rumors of outside help were collective expressions of wishful thinking—of how things ought to be—there was at least a grain of truth to the news. In preparing for the projected attack, Mustafa b. 'Azzuz chose to play an extensive part in popular mobilization. Addressing a large crowd of followers, he urged them to join the jihad, whose immediate objective was to amass sufficient manpower for a strike upon the Suf-Tuqqurt regions. Wielding redoubtable power over words, underwritten by immense religious prestige, Shaykh Mustafa convinced a number of Tunisian tribesmen to enroll at least temporarily under the sharif's banner.^[123]

The attack planned for that year came to naught, however, for reasons that even a powerful saint and sufi like Sidi Mustafa was powerless to overcome. Due to the hardships of exile, and a nomadic existence devoid of the comforts of sedentary life, the Algerian rebel leaders' enthusiasm for rebellion was waning. Sliman b. Jallab, an aristocratic urban notable by birth and upbringing, soon wearied of camping in the Nafzawa and secretly contacted French officials to request an official pardon. His emissaries to Algiers and Constantine were rebuffed by colonial authorities, whose response was "you have follwed the sharif, whatever you do we will not accept you." At the same time, Sliman wrote to the bey of Tunis begging him "to give us a small area in which to reside in tranquillity because we are city dwellers and can not move from place to place like bedouins."^[124]

The shaykh of Sidi 'Uqba, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. al-Hajj, in theory allied with the sharif, also covertly negotiated with French diplomats in

Tunis for permission to travel to Syria and join the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, by then residing in Damascus. In his letter to Léon Roches, the shaykh wrote: "We are like feathers torn from the wing of Sidi al-Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir." Before his request was granted, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. al-Hajj died of an unknown malady in Nafta at the zawiya of Shaykh 'Azzuz, where he and his family had sought asylum. The sharif himself was engaged in heavy bet hedging mainly because his ignorance of Tunisian tribal politics and saff alignments prevented him from putting together a solid coalition. As elite and popular enthusiasm for Algerian rebellion gradually waned, the mahdi himself made clandestine gestures to French officials; in exchange for being named qa'id of Warqala, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah offered his public submission to France.^[125]

While the rumors of impending revolt were much more enduring than collective protest itself, the disturbing hearsay from southern Tunisia and the border regions finally forced colonial officials into action. Now it was said that the sharif would join forces with the Sanusiyya shaykh heading for the Jarid or, in another variant, coming from Mecca to wage jihad in the beylik. Public opinion also believed that Algerian and Tunisian combatants were massed along the frontiers; once the reconquest had begun, tribal allies of France would defect to the mahdi, clearing the way for the march upon Tuqqurt. There the sharif would be hailed as a savior by the people: "It will be easy to plant the flag of Islam in Algeria, for the hour has come when the cross must bow down before the crescent."^[126]

This more than anything caused General Desvaux, then in the Suf, to deploy mobile columns along the frontiers as a warning of France's resolve to maintain order. The presence of the troops terrorized the Jarid's population; letters were sent to the bey imploring his protection against the "Christian" invasion believed by many to be impending.^[127] This perceived threat eroded popular sympathy for the sharif's movement in southern Tunisia as did generalized economic tribulations. These factors provoked a profound transformation within the sharif's movement. As conditions deteriorated on both sides of the borders, the redemptive banner of the mahdi gave way to tribal razzias and banditry directed against the very constituency which the mahdi hoped to coax into his jihad.

The End: From Mahdi to Bandit

Adverse socioeconomic conjunctures are frequently invoked as contributing or even key factors in the emergence of collective protest. Yet adversity can also act as a brake upon political action, particularly in the unforgiving desert. Deprived of Biskra's markets, the rebels had come to depend upon

Tunisia for arms, gunpowder, and grains. Indeed, the material assistance provided by the Jarid's oases prompted Governor-General Randon to demand that Ahmad Bey prohibit grain sales to Algerian dissidents in 1854 and to intern Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah away from the borders.^[128] By then state restrictions on grain exports were largely unnecessary since the Tunisian harvest had failed once more and domestic demand went unmet. From 1854 on, oasis dwellers and pastoralists in the pre-Sahara were beset by calamities, including diseases that decimated herds and flocks, and torrential fall rains that totally destroyed the date harvest. This in turn upset the wool trade. Native merchants, who had unwisely sold advance promises of wool shipments to European dealers, were unable to meet their obligations and fell increasingly into debt. To compound commercial difficulties, attacks by bandits and tribes increased as conditions worsened, which in turn depressed the caravan trade; merchants, pilgrims, and travelers dared not venture into the south.^[129]

The following years were scarcely more propitious for popular protest either in the beylik or the southern Constantine. In 1855, the sirocco destroyed cereals in the region from Batna to Biskra, and date yields in the Ziban and Wadi Righ proved exceptionally poor the next year. Cholera once again broke out along the borders. As drought and disease ravaged the pre-Sahara, bands of tribesmen from the Arba'a abandoned the sharif and retraced their steps to French-ruled territory.^[130]

Thus, economic afflictions suffered in Tunisia caused the jihad to sputter to an inconclusive end. By 1855, many in southern Tunisia were too preoccupied with subsistence and survival to risk political ventures in Algeria. And any semblance of unity among the Algerian rebels had evaporated as they scrambled to eke out a precarious existence. Nasir b. Shuhra, along with his family and a few loyal tribal members deemed too compromised to return to Algeria, sought refuge with Shaykh Mustafa b. 'Azzuz in Nafta. The oasis's inhabitants, however, viewed them as troublemakers who might draw colonial forces or the bey's army into the Jarid and whose raids upon caravans had disrupted commerce. Hostilities between the exiles and Nafta's populace erupted in May 1856; fighting was averted only when Sidi Mustafa intervened to restore peace. The Rahmaniyya shaykh was called upon to induce the unwelcome guests to leave the Jarid, although Nasir b. Shuhra and his followers continued their raids, upsetting trade in the south for another decade until their capture by the bey's army.^[131]

After taking refuge in Tuzar, where he owned date-palm gardens, the hapless Sliman b. Jallab was forced by the qa'id to travel to Tunis under armed escort in November 1856. Harassed by French officials beyond the

limits of his endurance, Muhammad Bey ordered the former sultan's removal from the politically tempting borders. In a burst of hospitality, Sliman was at first accorded a generous subsidy by the Tunisian ruler. However, the Saharan prince fell upon evil days in the capital, drinking to excess, keeping dubious company, and squandering his beylical pension. Infuriated by his conduct, the bey withdrew financial support for Sliman, who ended his days in abject penury.^[132]

Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah fared somewhat better than his compatriot in arms. In 1856, he too was finally persuaded by the bey to live under house arrest in Tunis. There the sharif remained for two years until he managed to escape from captivity by fleeing to Tripolitania. Disappointed by the lack of revolutionary fervor in that part of the Maghrib, the mahdi spent the next years in ceaseless peregrinations throughout the deep Sahara, the only area remaining outside of French colonial control. Near Ain Salah, he succeeded in building a tribal following among the Tuareg, who abetted him in raids and banditry directed against tribal groups allied with France. In 1861, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah appeared once again in the Warqala region at the head of tribal contingencies drawn from the rebellious Sha'amba. Taken by the French army after a brief skirmish, the sharif was interned in Oran at first, then sent to France for measures of security. However, while confined to the fortress in Perpignan, his health deteriorated to the point that colonial authorities permitted him to return to Algeria to die in 1863.^[133]

For two years (1855–1856), the sharif had proposed a Tunisian solution—men and supplies—for Algerian problems. At first some were willing to associate with his jihad, particularly due to Sidi Mustafa's urging, which coincided with deeply felt millenarian expectations. Nevertheless, unfavorable economic circumstances, the crumbling of the movement's core leadership, and the sharif's unfamiliarity with local political realities caused a steady erosion of popular identification with the jihad. And failure to score a victory worthy of the "Master of the Hour" inevitably raised questions about the mahdi himself. Had Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's program included measures to alleviate distress among the beylik's southern peoples, mainly caused by intolerable state fiscal demands, then perhaps he might have created a stable, sustained popular base of support.

Ironically, the hijra to Tunisia, while providing a political haven, had placed the sharif in a contradictory situation. For if he needed to convince the bey's subjects to support the insurgency, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah could not risk arousing the bey's ire. In turn the Husaynid prince could not affront his vastly more powerful European neighbor, who often served as Tunisia's patron in its dealings with the other Great Powers. As for or-

dinary people in Tunisia, most preferred to speculate and talk endlessly about this particular mahdi rather than fight with him. The redeemer as a legendary folk hero, whose calls to arms might be answered if the time was right, was ultimately overshadowed by the legend itself, or by the rumors constructed around that tradition.

However, the memory of the Sharif of Warqala, like that of Bu Ziyan, remained alive among the Sahara's populations and the people of southern Tunisia. In July 1865 the inhabitants of the recalcitrant port city of Sfax were much preoccupied with the news of a mahdist-led insurrection in Tuqqurt, a completely unfounded rumor connected to the great 1864 uprising in Tunisia and the ensuing central government repression. This suggests that the rebellion of a decade earlier still informed the popular collective memory. During the 1871 Muqrani revolt in the northern Constantine, another mahdist rebel arose in the Algerian Sahara and was accorded an enthusiastic reception in Warqala and Tuqqurt. Muhammad b. Tuni b. Ibrahim, or Bu Shusha (Bou Choucha) as he was called by his cohorts, purported to be the son of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. Such a claim indicates that in the popular mind at least, the social production of revolutionary mahdis, like saints and descendants of the prophets, was believed governed by the genealogical principle. For a brief period, Warqala's inhabitants proclaimed Bu Shusha their sultan in place of the French-appointed shaykh, which was tantamount to a declaration of revolt in the eyes of the colonial regime. General de Lacroix-Vaubois chased the would-be redeemer from the oasis in January 1872. As a punishment and an example to the rest of the desert's peoples, Warqala's residents were heavily fined and part of their city razed.^[134]

Mustafa b. 'Azzuz continued to harbor dissidents from Algeria in his zawiya until the eve of his death in 1866. In 1861 a small-scale uprising erupted in al-Aghwat and moved northward into areas of European settler colonialism. The movement's leader, Tayyib b. Shanduqa, led a handful of rebels in a nighttime attack upon a pied-noir village near Djelfa. After killing several farmers, the group was beaten back by the French military. Shanduqa and his band subsequently fled over the border to seek refuge with Sidi Mustafa in the Jarid. A French-paid native emissary was dispatched to Nafta to search for Shanduqa and, discovering him at the Rahmaniyya center, requested that the saint hand the rebel over to French officials. Sidi 'Azzuz refused to violate the zawiya's traditional role as sanctuary and was upheld by a large throng of Rahmaniyya brothers who gathered in the courtyard to shield their sufi master from vexation. To protect Shanduqa from the French and spare the aging Sidi Mustafa, the Rahmaniyya disciples conducted the Algerian rebels to the camp of Nasir

b. Shuhra, still based in the Nafzawa, where they were accorded protection. In addition to Shanduqa and his band, also present at the Nafta zawiya were other Algerian political figures and an English spy, gathering sub rosa information on French taxation in Algeria for the British government.^[135]

With the demise of the sharif's insurrection, Sidi Mustafa b. 'Azzuz appears to have eschewed active, direct involvement in revolt across the borders. In 1864 he would—paradoxically—work to quell popular discontent in the beylik to shore up the Husaynid regime's crumbling legitimacy. Nevertheless, so closely did 'Azzuz become associated with the sharif's rebellion that seventy-five years later some colonial authorities mistakenly transformed the Rahmaniyya leader into Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah himself. In a letter addressed to the resident-general of Tunisia in 1930, Algeria's governor-general wrote that "in 1851, Mustafa b. 'Azzuz left the Jarid and set about conquering the southern Constantine; he took the name Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah and proclaimed himself the mahdi; he exerted domination over the south [of Algeria] until 1854 at which time he returned to the Jarid."^[136] Thus, even modern colonial bureaucracies were nourished by legends and improvised news in the same way that the political and military activities of these same authorities gave rise to interminable speculation and rumormongering.

Conclusion

Seeking to block the French advance and expel the Europeans, the sharif's movement pushed the turbulent frontier deeper into the Sahara and across the borders into Tunisia. If his early partisans believed they were defending their homeland from the indignities of foreign rule, participation in jihad enhanced French hegemony rather than alleviated it. Paradoxically, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's claims to be a pious stranger from the East had formed the bedrock of his early popular following. Yet the fact that he hailed from the urbanized western Tell, and was thus unfamiliar with desert politics, caused his movement to falter. And military ineptness caused many of his initial promoters to doubt the authenticity of his mahdist credentials and to defect from the rebellion. Once in Tunisia, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's ignorance of the beylik's complex political alignments impeded his ability to reconstruct a lasting tribal following.

Although unfavorable economic conjunctures worked to circumscribe the sharif's jihad, it also failed for lack of sustained support from Saharan sufi notables, who in any case could not overcome the ecological constraints upon political action dictated by the unforgiving desert environment. The diffident, minimal role played by sufi notables, whether Rahmaniyya or Tijaniyya, in the sharif's jihad demonstrates that the political stance of

many desert sufi leaders toward France was largely determined as early as the 1849 revolt. The terrible lessons of Za'atsha were sufficient to discourage large-scale violent confrontations with the colonial regime—at least in the Ziban. Pragmatism and realpolitik—not wild-eyed "fanaticism"—were the operative principles shaping the political behavior of most religious notables.

Even as insurrection gave way to various forms of avoidance protest, other modes of coping came to the foreground. As France's resolve to retain her African department became painfully clear and European settlers poured into Algeria, some Rahmaniyya leaders were parties to informal, implicit pacts. Gradually worked out between local colonial representatives and religious notables, these complex, subtle agreements constituted perhaps the most important consequence of Za'atsha and the sharif's failed jihad. This is seen in the cases of Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Uthman of Tulqa and, above all, the Rahmaniyya zawiya of al-Hamil, which by the century's end overshadowed all other Rahmaniyya establishments in Algeria and Tunisia. Sidi Muhammad b. Abi al-Qasim's chosen course of action combined a special kind of religious and social activism with political retreat and compromise. And apparent withdrawal more than anything shielded part of Algeria's cultural patrimony from the devastating force of triumphant settler colonialism.