Islam, Populism, and Electoral Politics: The 1988 Provincial Elections

I left Cotabato City in September 1986, and returned in January 1988 to observe the political campaigns for the provincial and municipal elections held in February. A number of important political events occurred in the intervening fifteen months, two of which deserve mention.

By January 1987, the MILF saw its interests directly threatened by two moves of the national government. The first involved a number of provisions in an article of the draft constitution to be voted on in early February 1987. The provisions concerned the formation of an autonomous region for "Muslim Mindanao." They stated that the proposed autonomous region would only become effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a special plebiscite called for that

purpose, thus ensuring that only provinces and cities voting favorably would be included in the autonomous region. In an "Official Declaration" in late December 1986, the MILF announced its rejection of the relevant article of the draft constitution because its provisions were not in keeping with the "true spirit of the Tripoli Agreement" and would not result in a "meaningful and genuine autonomy as envisioned in the duly-signed accord" (Mindanao Cross , December 20, 1986).

Second, the Aquino administration signaled that it had decided to resume formal negotiations with the MNLF, implicitly recognizing Misuari's group as the sole legitimate representative of the separatist movement. President Aquino had met personally with Nur Misuari in Sulu in September and, by early January, government representatives and MNLF negotiators were convening in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Governor Candao noted, in a January 3 newspaper report, that the MILF had been "driven to the corner" by its exclusion from the talks and by persistent government disregard of its proposals for a dialogue (Mindanao Cross , January 3, 1987). When the Jeddah negotiations produced a cease-fire agreement, Hadji Murad, the MILF chief of staff, warned of trouble should the Aquino government continue to deny the MILF the dialogue it had been asking for peacefully.

The following week, a few days before a scheduled trip by President Aquino to Cotabato, the MILF attacked, striking government targets in Cotabato City and other parts of Central Mindanao. Mortar shells fell in sections of the city and rebels burned the provincial capital building in Maganoy. Elsewhere in the region, power lines were cut, bridges burned, and police and army garrisons attacked. Twenty-five persons were reported killed in the fighting. President Aquino called an emergency cabinet meeting but decided not to cancel her trip to Mindanao. In Cotabato she met with Hadji Murad, and her chief negotiator arranged a temporary cease-fire with the MILE The editor of the local newspaper remarked later in an interview with me that there would almost certainly have been more destruction in the city from the MILF attacks had not Zacaria Candao been in position as acting governor.

The Islamic Party of the Philippines

A second notable political event—one more consequential in the long term—was the formation of a new political party, the Islamic Party of the Philippines (IPP). Despite its expansive title it was a provincial

party without formal ties to a national party apparatus or, for that matter, to any Islamic organizations in other parts of the Muslim South. The Islamic Party of the Philippines was organized in early 1987 at a meeting of the ulama of Cotabato called by Zacaria Candao. The published "program of government" of the IPP included the establishment of a meaningful autonomy in the "Bangsamoro Homeland," the eradication of "all forms of evil in the government and society," and the equitable distribution of wealth by preventing the "concentration of wealth in a privileged few hands." The program also contained a statement of belief that "Islam offers a complete basis for the solution of all human problems including socio-economic ones" (Mindanao Cross , April 11, 1987). Lanang Ali, the secretary-general of the party, was also legal counsel for the MILF, having succeeded Candao in that position.

Elections for the new Philippine Congress—the first opportunity to elect political representatives since the establishment of the new government—were held in May of 1987. The IPP contested the congressional elections and surprised the traditional Muslim elite when the politically unknown non-datu candidate they put forward for the congressional district that included Cotabato City outpolled a number of established datu politicians to place a close second behind the winning candidate. The winner, Datu Michael Mastura, was a member of the traditional core nobility and a nationally known figure who ran as the Aquino administration's candidate. A political moderate who had held various government positions throughout the armed rebellion, he had just concluded an assignment for the new administration as chairman of a presidential task force to examine the question of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao. He was well-known by most of the residents of Cotabato City—both Muslims and Christians—and well regarded by many of them. Nevertheless, he narrowly escaped defeat by a young political novice fielded by the IPP.

The strong showing of the IPP prompted the major datu families—including some who had been bitter enemies—to unite to an unprecedented degree to defeat Candao and the IPP in the January 1988 provincial elections. All concerned realized that the stakes were especially high. The overwhelmingly Muslim population of Maguindanao Province guaranteed that the province would be included in any Muslim autonomous region. Control of an autonomous province would depend on electoral support, so incumbents were sure to have an advantage. The political benefits that would accrue to the winner of the

1988 gubernatorial election provided a powerful inducement for cooperation within both the datu elite and counterelite coalitions. The threat to traditional elite interests represented by the IPP also caused Candao to lose many of the datu allies he had gained during his rise to political prominence in early 1986—including the Mastura family. The contest for the governorship set Candao, the appointed governor and administration (as well as IPP) candidate against Datu Simeon Datumanong, member of a prominent datu family, former governor, and onetime political mentor of Zacaria Candao. In at least three of its features, the 1988 electoral campaign for governor of Maguindanao Province was without precedent in Cotabato. It was the first electoral struggle between two clearly distinguished and ideologically opposed Muslim elite groups for the leadership of the province. Also, for the first time ever, Islamic discourse figured prominently in political appeals made to voters. As a consequence, religious disputes, such as that about the proper role of the ulama, were finally contested in public political debates. And third, because of the new national political atmosphere and the loss of exclusive control of the province by the datu elite, it was, in all likelihood, the most genuinely democratic election ever conducted in Muslim Cotabato.^[10]

Islamic Arguments in the Radio Campaign

Both electoral campaigns relied on radio speeches in Magindanaon as a primary means to present their views. Campo Muslim residents listened to many of those speeches with great interest. In addition to Candao himself and the members of his slate, the IPP campaign utilized two types of radio commentators: ustadzes and holders of traditional aristocratic titles. The traditional commentators for the IPP were acquired to balance the use of the same sort of commentators by the datu coalition. Traditional commentators for both candidates were holders of long-defunct hereditary offices of the Cotabato sultanates. They were authorities on taritib, the protocol governing relations within the aristocracy and among the traditional estates. They survived as dignitaries, old men with neither power nor real authority and a good deal less public influence than the ulama. They were, however, able to provide traditional legitimation as official spokesmen for the old ways. The traditional commentators for the datu coalition recited in detail the bloodlines of Datumanong and his slate. Those employed by the IPP, although not endorsing the leadership of the ulama, praised

Candao and referred to him as "datu"—a term that, as I have noted, he never used for himself.

While the ustadz commentators on the da'wah radio program emphasized that Candao was the choice of the ulama because he served the people, much of their radio time was spent responding to the sharp attacks of the datu coalition. The IPP was repeatedly criticized for injecting Islam into electoral politics—a practice their opponents characterized as Shi'a-inspired heterodoxy.^[11] Congressman Mastura, campaigning actively against the candidate endorsed by his own party, most cogently presented the objections of the datu coalition when he stated in his radio speech:

It is a Shi'a principle that the ulama participate directly in government. IPP, do not use Islam for politics. This is a Shi'a policy. In Iran, the ulama want to be political leaders. I am not suggesting that in Islam the ulama cannot participate in politics. However, if the ulama comprise the political leadership, there will be no one to preach. The ustadzes have no need to be elected. They already have positions. They are already persons of authority because they have much knowledge . . . We do not want to create ayatollahs or mullahs here in the Philippines. If we did, we would be diverting from the Sunna [the divinely inspired precedents of the Prophet] related by Imam Shafii [the founder of the school of Sunni law predominant throughout Southeast Asia]. We must follow the straight path.^[12]

An ustadz commentator offered the IPP response to those who, like Congressman Mastura, criticized the participation of the ulama in politics: "The right people to hold all political positions are people who fear God. Ulama participation in politics should not be criticized because such activity is their duty—to encourage those who do good, and discourage those who do evil. We have to determine who destroys us, who destroys Islam. We must determine who are our enemies. The principal duty of a Muslim is to correct mistakes, not by force but by one's words, one's heart." The ustadz also reminded voters that the IPP was a party of the many aligned against the advantaged few: "If you are weak by yourself, create an organization. Bring weak people together to resist a single powerful person who is doing wrong. We the weak people have grouped together to become strong. That is why we will vote for Candao because he represents the organization of the weak." The ustadz radio commentators also counterattacked by labeling Simeon Datumanong a "kafir" (unbeliever) because of his position as the Marcos-appointed governor of the province during the fiercest

fighting of the Bangsamoro Rebellion (conveniently overlooking the fact that Zacaria Candao succeeded Datumanong in the same position). Datumanong was often pressured into quite defensive attitudes when responding to these accusations, as illustrated by these excerpts from one of his radio speeches:

People have asked why, if I was with the government for twenty years, I could not achieve freedom for our people. I don't know what they mean by this statement, but if "freedom" means independence, I could not achieve that with my small government position. I am only an ordinary person. I did not have the authority to seek independence . . . My opponent has accused me of being a kafir and charges that I was the mastermind of military operations here during the rebellion. But I think if you know me you cannot believe those statements. In regard to my being a kafir: how can that be? I've been to Mecca, I pray, I fast, I give zakat. God knows what I am. Concerning the [military] operations, I did not order them. I had no authority. During that time, if there was an operation, I helped the evacuees. We provided medicine. We could not stop the operations. That was the character of the time. Do not blame me. It was a time of war. By blaming me you offend God.

The datu coalition attempted to deflect attention from Datumanong's long history of cooperation with the martial law regime by pointing to the potentially harmful consequences of Candao's close connections to the IPP and the MILE Congressman Mastura and his brother Tocao, a municipal mayor, led the radio offensive:

Candao and his party [the IPP] know nothing about government management. These people do not know how to govern. They have joined the government to destroy it. This is because of their desire for revolution. However, the "bomb" will fall on us . . . If we choose a strong man [referring to Simeon Datumanong], he could find the means for reconciliation [with the MILF]. But if we choose a leader whose mind is only on one side, and not on the welfare of all of the people [i.e., Zacaria Candao], then we cannot find peace in our region.

A few days ago [Candao] spoke in Darapanan [an MILF "liberated area"], and he told the people that those who support Simeon Datumanong don't know what revolution is about. He said that revolution is different from governing. If that is his opinion of revolution, then he should not be in the government because revolution is opposed to the government. If you are in government, and work for revolution, you can be charged with treason and shot by a firing squad . . . I warn the people of my municipality [literally: my relatives] do not join the IPP poll-watchers because there will probably be picture-taking [by the military] of IPP poll-watchers to identify MILF cadres. If this happens to you, you should not blame me. I have already helped many people out of jail. You will have done it to yourself—I am not threatening you.

Zacaria Candao responded succinctly to these accusations and admonitions when, in one of his radio addresses, he spoke obliquely of the affinity between the program of the IPP and the earlier goal of Ustadz Salamat to reform Muslim leadership: "If only those who were leaders twenty years ago had addressed the problems that were created in the previous twenty years, the Muslim people would have achieved real freedom. If they had led with the true governance of Islam, the struggles of the last twenty years would not have been necessary. But because they neglected those problems and abandoned the struggle, the young generation moved forward. Now the old politicians are scheming in order to recover the leadership again." He also replied pointedly to those who had referred to him as a misguided or disingenuous revolutionary:

Regarding those who say that if I am a revolutionary I should stay in the jungle: they say this because they do not understand what is meant by revolution. It is true that we do not see the problems the same way. They do not know what it means to change our society. Revolutionaries do not just fight in the forest or use firearms. There are many ways to achieve our goals. It can also be done by speaking—telling the truth. If all a person knows is to work with the government to minimize the suffering of the people and help achieve change, this too could further our cause. A truly brave man confronts his enemy face to face—mind to mind. But my opponents think revolution only means to hide from one's enemy. When they met the enemy [referring to Ferdinand Marcos] they did not confront him, they became his friend. That is something I could not do.

It was evident from listening to the radio campaign—itself unexampled in Cotabato politics—that Simeon Datumanong and the commentators who spoke for him were uncomfortable with the new electioneering style, one that required direct and extended appeals to a mass audience. Their discomfort with the new approach, and their tendency to revert to the political style of old, were evident in some of their speeches, as in this excerpt from one of Datumanong's:

We [i.e., Datumanong and his slate] know how to govern, how to deal with people. We are all winners because all the datus, all the strong families, all the liders [political brokers] are helping us. It is most obvious that the datus are helping us, especially the two congressmen [Datu Michael Mastura and Datu Guiamid Matalam, the son of Datu Udtug]. In regard to the ulama, they are helping us but are not doing so publicly because their support is in their hearts only. In our party are the most upright people. We believe in God. Even those powerful families who were fighting before are united behind me: the Masturas, the Sinsuats,

the Matalams. Because of that, after I am elected we will be able to develop peace and order.

Look at the former friends of Candao—individuals such as Guiamid Matalam, Michael Mastura, Rajamuda sa Magindanao [a traditional titleholder and acting Sultan of Magindanao], Didagan Dilangalen [all members of the traditional nobility]—and many of his own relatives. All have left him [literally: stopped going to him]. Why did they do that? If he were a good politician, his allies and relatives would not abandon him.

The radio speeches made it apparent that the definition of a "good politician" was itself a topic of contention in the new Muslim electoral politics of Cotabato.

Islamic Populism and Cultural Pluralism

The populist Islamic appeals of Candao and the IPP were as alien to the datu elite as they were threatening. Attempts by datu commentators to counter the IPP appeal in public speeches were often confused and occasionally counterproductive. The populism of Candao's IPP campaign—emphasizing justice for disadvantaged Muslims and "revolutionary" social change—echoed the Islamic messages advanced by the ulama in Friday sermons since early in the decade, as well as the public pronouncements of the MILE But Candao's populist appeal was not delimited by the ulama's program for Islamic renewal. In fact, IPP campaign rallies were often surprisingly pluralistic as well as popular events.

The plural and popular character of the IPP appeal was demonstrated in Governor Candao's final campaign rally. The rally for his opponent, Simeon Datumanong, took place in the central plaza, a location that remained associated with traditional, establishment politics. Candao held his rally on the waterfront at the main riverside pier in the Muslim quarter of the city. Candao sat in a chair on a hastily constructed wooden stage flanked by Ustadz Yahiya and Ustadz Pasigan, his former comrades on the MILF cease-fire committee and the cofounders, with him, of the IPP. Also seated on the podium were two members of the core Magindanaon nobility—one of them a radio commentator for Candao. At one point a young ustadz took the stage with a group of young female madrasah students dressed in Middle East-influenced gowns and head coverings and led them in a pledge to support to the death Candao and the IPP. They were followed shortly after by a young man and woman, both dressed in blue jeans and T-shirts, who sang popular American songs to entertain the crowd.

The sometimes glaring juxtapositions on the waterfront stage illustrate the complex composition of Candao's electoral appeal. Not only had Candao declined the use of the title "datu" for himself, he had stated (in an interview with me) in the heady early days of his ascension to office in 1986 that he saw "no place for traditional titles or leaders." Why then did he utilize datu commentators in his 1988 campaign, and why were traditional dignitaries seated with him on stage at the rally? While these Magindanaon aristocrats reminded voters of Candao's aristocratic bloodlines, that does not seem to have been the main purpose of their inclusion in his electoral campaign. As illustrated in the pointed radio exchanges of the campaign, the ideological battle lines between the datu coalition and the IPP were very sharply drawn, and Candao had little to gain by diluting his message merely to call attention to the noble blood that flowed in his veins. Candao's primary purpose in including traditional commentators was more likely a circuitously populist one. Authorities on taritib (aristocratic protocol) such as those who endorsed Candao were spokesmen for (and embodiments of) all of Magindanaon tradition, not just the formal observances of the high nobility but also the familiar rituals, beliefs, and practices embraced by ordinary Muslims. The presence of traditional cultural authorities (in the persons of the aristocratic dignitaries) thus balanced that of the ustadzes, those who had called for the elimination of many identity-affirming traditional practices. As part of his popular appeal to voters, Candao wanted to signal ordinary Muslims that a vote for him would not be a vote to abolish all of local tradition but only its autocratic and abusive elements.

Equally incongruous was the cultural disjunction between the Islamic intensity of the madrasah students and the pop music fervor of the T-shirted couple that followed them to the stage. The ulama had long before made clear their disapproval of young Muslim men and women performing together on stage and singing about erotic love. Even so, the two most prominent ustadzes in Cotabato (as well as the female madrasah students) were among the audience for this performance. Nor was this the first such entertainment at a public appearance by Zacaria Candao. On one previous occasion he and his audience were entertained by a "Muslim fashion show" in which young Muslim women demonstrated various ways to wear the malong, a long tube skirt. At another event, a modern, and very sensual, version of a "traditional" Muslim dance was performed by a young woman. These two entertainments, unlike the rather straightforward Western

entertainment at the waterfront rally, were forms of invented tradition. They presented generically "Muslim" versions of fashion shows and folk dance performances popular among Christian Filipinos. They were aspects of an ethnicized Philippine Muslim identity and tended to be organized and performed by members of the Westernizing Muslim elite, composed of the wealthiest and (usually) the most self-consciously aristocratic families. They were self-regarding artistic endeavors in a way that the dayunday—a genuinely popular entertainment—was not.

What all these artistic performances held in common was their potential for entertaining large Muslim audiences, and that clearly was the reason for their inclusion at mass political meetings even though the messages such entertainments sent seemed to contradict the teachings of the ulama. Zacaria Candao pragmatically included such entertainments (as another type of political resource) to draw large numbers of Muslim voters to his rallies and hold their attention. His need to provide Western (or Westernized) amusements in addition to Islamic presentations reveals something about the limited success of the Islamic renewal efforts of the ulama in the previous eight years.

The campaign message of Zacaria Candao and the Islamic Party of the Philippines was without precedent in Cotabato. Its proposal for a new politics based on ideal Islamic principles had broad appeal. One datu candidate in the provincial elections complained that he had lost even the votes of his relatives because of the attraction of the IPP. At the same time, the message presented in IPP electioneering differed from that offered by the ustadzes when they began to teach openly eight years earlier. The IPP appeal was less concerned with the purification of religious practice and the rejection of Western culture. Its radio messages utilized traditional as well as Islamic appeals, and its campaign rallies included traditional spokesmen and Western entertainments. This relaxation of some of the strictures of the Islamic renewal program represented a shift from a religious concern with Islamic purism to a political emphasis on Islamic-related populism. The IPP portrayed itself as the organization of the weak rather than the righteous, and it stressed Islamic entitlements rather than Islamic obligations. It offered a populist message—an inclusive and alternative Muslim nationalist appeal that emphasized ethical leadership and egalitarianism. That more eclectic message evidently appealed to Cotabato voters, who elected Zacaria Candao to the governor's office by a two-to-one margin.