The USSR and the Roundtable Accords
Therefore, it was not until the end of 1988 that the Polish leadership finally reached the conclusion that legalizing Solidarity and institutionalizing its relations with the regime were inevitable and the only way of stemming the continual decline of Poland's economy and social climate.
[4] Some statistics reveal the change. Asked in July 1987, "Do the actions of Lech Walesa and his entourage contribute to the collective well-being?" 18.3 percent answered "No," while 57.8 percent were undecided, according to a fairly reliable opinion poll published in 1988. In August 1988, the same responses were 25.7 percent and 55.2 percent, respectively. In November of the same year, however, following Lech Walesa's famous televised debate with the leader of the official union, the responses were 44.8 percent affirmative, 18.1 percent negative, and 37.2 percent were undecided (according to figures and polls cited by David-Blais, "Les communistes polonais," pp. 55–73).
In this area, the Poles lagged behind the Soviet Union—not, of course, in terms of social pluralism, freedom of expression, or economic policy, but with respect to what Gorbachev and his entourage were willing to accept in Poland.
In July 1988, during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Poland, General Jaruzelski had told him of the possible legalization of Solidarity. Not only did Gorbachev not object, but he showed great interest in the issue and asked that he personally be sent a report on the question.[5] Even signs of Soviet support were openly given thereafter. For example, N. Shishlin, a high official of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, told the French newspaper Le Monde in September 1988 that, from the Soviet point of view, "trade-union pluralism is not a heresy."[6]
Mikhail Gorbachev's support for General Jaruzelski was absolutely decisive. During the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) Central Committee meeting of January 1989, which sanctioned the opening of the Roundtable talks between the government and the opposition and the principle of Solidarity's legalization (which was the only precondition for the talks), Jaruzelski had to face majority opposition. As we have seen, he had to threaten resignation in order to carry the day. If his opponents had received a clear sign of encouragement from the Soviet hierarchy, they doubtlessly would have continued their opposition. Gorbachev ensured that the rule of noninterference, which in this case worked in his favor, was strictly respected on the Soviet side. (Support for the policy initiated by the leader of the Polish party could not be considered interference.) The leaders of the Polish conservatives, who had frequent contacts with Brovikov, the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw (one of those conservative ambassadors the Bogomolov institute recommended recalling), boasted of their support in Moscow during the Central Committee meeting. Called upon by those who believed this to be a "bluff" to name their supporters, the conservatives refused to do so.[7] They knew perfectly well the very close relationship that existed between Jaruzelski and Gorbachev, and it definitely helped the Polish leader to prevail.
The shadow of the Soviet Union and of the "Gorbachev enigma" was constantly looming over the Roundtable talks. In a conversation on the
[5] Interview with Jozef Czyrek, who was a member of the Polish politburo at the time and its official responsible for international affairs, Warsaw, 6 May 1992.
[6] Le Monde, 7 September 1988, cited by Georges Mink, La force ou la raison: histoire sociale et politique de la Pologne, 1980–1989 (Paris: La Découverte, 1989), p. 206.
[7] Interview with Janusz Reykowski, who attended the Central Committee meeting and was the chief Party negotiator at the Roundtable, Warsaw, 8 May 1992.
sidelines of the talks, one of Solidarity's negotiators, Andrzej Stelmachowski, who later became minister of education, asked General Jaruzelski: "What are the limits to the changes the Soviets are willing to accept in Poland?" Jaruzelski reportedly responded: "I don't know myself. Let's find them together."[8] Beyond the shrewdness of Jaruzelski's reply, there was good reason for him not to know, since even in Moscow, as we have seen, no clear policy had been formulated. At the time, both the leaders in Warsaw and Western analysts were convinced that Gorbachev had placed certain limits on how far change could go, both in Eastern Europe and in Soviet domestic politics. It was feared that these limits risked surfacing very suddenly, even if they seemed to be constantly expanding. In that vein, a Polish author wrote at the time that "there would be no Roundtable among Poles if the Russians were not entitled to an 'empty chair' to which they could always invite themselves."[9]
We should be cautious on this point. Even if skepticism about the changes under way in the USSR was certainly too great, and although Gorbachev did not have very clear ideas about the limits of what he was willing to accept, that does not mean that "objective" limits to the tolerance of Soviet power (as a whole) did not exist. They remain difficult to ascertain, even with hindsight and the information now available. The Soviet leaders, without resorting to military force themselves, could have pushed their Polish counterparts to change their policy and even to use solutions involving force.
Although the Russians' chair remained empty, the limits of their tolerance, real or imagined, determined in large measure the orientation and results of the Roundtable negotiations. Above all, questions of foreign policy, such as Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact and the presence of Soviet troops on Polish soil, were entirely excluded from the talks, implicitly being considered nonnegotiable by both sides.
The question of the Party's leading role, which had always been untouchable and was effectively the keystone to the system, was not directly addressed—even if it was, in fact, at the very center of the talks between Solidarity and the government. Knowing full well traditional Soviet sensitivities on this subject, Lech Walesa sought to reassure them. In an interview given to a Soviet magazine (in itself a first) shortly before
[8] Interview with Andrzej Stelmachowski, Warsaw, 7 May 1992. In my interview the next day, 8 May, with General Jaruzelski, he confirmed the accuracy of Stelmachowski's remark.
[9] A. Drawicz, cited by Mink, La force ou la raison, p. 232.
the Roundtable talks opened, he declared that Solidarity wanted "autonomy and independence from the government, and not power. Let us leave power in the hands of the Communists."[10] Such statements helped convince Soviet reformers that the negotiations were effectively exercising a moderating influence on the "constructive opposition." They knew full well, however, that the real question of the day was the reduction of the Party's power. But how far?
On April 7, 1989, the Roundtable accords were signed. With varying degrees of precision, they touched on a broad spectrum of issues. Beyond Solidarity's legalization, they dealt with its access to the media, the principles of economic, administrative and judiciary reform, local government, and the framework and rules for the next national election. For Solidarity, its institutionalization and its freedom of social and political action were the most essential points. The most important element for the government side was Solidarity's agreement to participate in the elections, which would be governed by unique rules. In fact, the elections were to have the most decisive influence over the further course of events.
At first, the government had reason to be very satisfied. Under the new system, Parliament would be bicameral. It was agreed that in the Diet (the more important chamber), the opposition could hold 35 percent of the 460 seats, while the PUWP and its satellite parties would be conceded the other 65 percent. The new body, the Senate, would number 100 members, all of whom were to be elected in perfectly free elections, which practically guaranteed Solidarity and other opposition groups a dominant position in this chamber. It should be noted that the proposal for creating a freely elected Senate came from the government itself, as a reward to Solidarity and to facilitate the overall accords. By the terms of these accords, the Senate had the power to veto laws adopted by the Diet. To force the bill past the Senate, the Diet would have to readopt it with at least a two-thirds majority. Consequently, the Party might have to negotiate with the opposition on some of the government's major programs; this was one of the most politically significant elements of the April accords. The Polish president, who was to have considerable powers (nominating the prime minister, the right to veto certain legislation, the power to dissolve Parliament and even to decree a state of emergency), would be elected by the two houses of Parliament sitting in joint session. Given that the deputies of the Diet were far more numerous, this
[10] "A Flexible Man of Iron," Novoe Vremia (in the English version, New Times ), 7, February 1989, pp. 19–20.
formula ensured General Jaruzelski's election to a six-year term. A two-term limit was put on the presidency.
These measures reflect how the Party's power was to be fairly well protected. In addition, the government expected an election held with Solidarity's participation would reinforce its own legitimacy. In fact, it was a source of embarrassment for the leaders of Solidarity, and it was criticized on this count by its own supporters. The leaders defended themselves by stating that the accords merely represented a step toward democracy and claimed that they had only accepted these election rules for a five-year transitional period.
Soviet reactions to the results of the Roundtable were positive, even enthusiastic. Izvestiia, for example, stated that the accords had "dealt a death knell to the myth that socialism cannot be reformed."[11] The CPSU's theoretical journal, for its part, wrote that the PUWP had succeeded in "reestablishing its leadership in society and reinforcing its leading role in the state" by finding a way out of the crisis in which Poland had become trapped. It saw in the accords the emergence of a new system based "on a parliamentary socialist democracy and on a civil society."[12] While the process was certainly less advanced in the USSR itself, things were evolving in the same direction there, albeit with more genuine initiative from the Party in the Soviet case. In the March 1989 elections for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, new electoral rules had permitted the victory of dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and the unexpected defeat of a significant number of important Party officials. Unlike Poland, however, the opposition was not yet structured and organized.
From the Soviet reformers' point of view, the Roundtable accords represented the ideal model for Poland, and equally served as the most desirable and exemplary model for Eastern Europe in general. On the one hand, aside from the introduction of real institutional pluralism, it permitted the opposition to make an important entry into Parliament and possibly join a coalition government. Therefore, these were steps toward an authentic democratization. On the other hand, even if the Party's power had been limited, it still remained the master of the political game and held all the instruments necessary to stop the process from "spinning out of control." Hence, the Polish model held the promise of a controlled democratization process which would unfold step by step over
[11] Izvestiia, 6 April 1989.
[12] "Novyi etap v zhizni Pol'shi" (A New Stage in the Life of Poland), Kommunist, 7, May 1989, pp. 94–99.
time. If the model could have been maintained and extended to the other East European states, the advantages for the USSR would have been important on various levels. Above all, the democratization it entailed was credible enough that Western countries would feel obliged to support and encourage it, especially with economic assistance. In addition, since the process was not guaranteed to be irreversible at the onset, the incentive or obligation of Western nations to stimulate it would be all the greater. The USSR's tolerance and its participation in an East-West rapprochement that was becoming increasingly tangible and more anchored in the Eastern regimes themselves would have made Soviet calls for disarmament and the construction of a new European order more irresistible and imperative.
The Soviet leaders knew that the process upon which their Polish counterparts were embarking would necessarily have an effect on the other East European states.[13] In that sense, their open and apparently unreserved support of Jaruzelski during and after the Roundtable talks can be seen as a form of pressure or even an indirect offensive against the conservative regimes of the region. We asked General Jaruzelski if he had also seen things in this way. He responded affirmatively, but added that "at the same time, Gorbachev saw things in more positive terms." For the Soviet leader, Jaruzelski commented, the results of the Roundtable "could reassure the other East European leaders by demonstrating that it was possible to cooperate with the opposition forces, without it leading to 'decommunization' or a White Terror."[14] He went on to say that "Gorbachev saw the Polish experience as a laboratory and a useful example, not only for East Europe but also for the USSR itself."
According to Gorbachev's advisers, he became increasingly concerned, as perestroika advanced, about the possible consequences of an East European conservative "front," representing the majority of regimes, which was hostile to his course.[15] But he always sought indirect means of weakening it. To cite but one example: when his advisers urged Gorbachev not to take up Fidel Castro's invitation to visit Cuba, the Soviet leader, in his decision to go, invoked precisely the need not to "broaden the front" of opponents to his policy in the Communist world.
[13] Kommunist, for example, wrote that "the Polish Party's experience carries significance not only for Poland, but also for the other countries ..." (ibid., pp. 94–99).
[14] Interview with General Jaruzelski, 8 May 1992.
[15] See Anatolii S. Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym—po dnevnikovym zapisiam (Six Years with Gorbachev—From Journal Notes ) (Moscow: Progress Kul'tura, 1993), pp. 268–269.
In the same way, his visit to China in May 1989, which sealed Sino-Soviet reconciliation and illustrated China's support for his reformist policies, served to enhance his base of legitimacy among socialist states.[16]