Crisis Diplomacy

The problems confronting Soviet diplomacy were compounded by a wave of anti-Communist sentiment that swept France following the Beijing raid. On 22 April, Albert Sarraut, the minister of the interior, charged the "directors of Muscovite communism" with subversion in Algeria, concluding his public speech praising the virtues of the French Empire with the Gambetta-like battle cry, "Communism, there is the enemy."^[49] The minister of justice, Louis Barthou, then informed the Council of Ministers on 10 May that he would seek to revoke the parliamentary immunity of the leaders of the French Communist Party (PCF) for advocating that French soldiers refuse to participate in military operations in the colonies. (They were incarcerated in July.) A week later, L'Avenir called for reinforcement of the Entente with England and for Anglo-French cooperation against the USSR everywhere in the world, particularly China. Even de Monzie became annoyed with what he regarded as Soviet interference in the internal affairs of France. Whatever popular sympathy for the Soviet regime may have resulted from the ARCOS raid and England's precipitous break in diplomatic relations evaporated with the executions in Moscow. Berthelot told the British chargé that if they continued, French public opinion would demand the severing of relations with Russia.^[50] Normal relations between Russia and Europe and America depended significantly on the West's belief that the USSR was becoming a normal and humane state. The relapse into OGPU terror in the summer of 1927 was a setback in the NKID's campaign to establish that belief. Clearly, the quest for agreements with Europe and America was at risk, and Soviet diplomacy was in an extremely delicate situation.

As a crisis in international relations, the war scare did not escalate beyond this point. The Baldwin government had no intention of organizing a second war of intervention; nor did Chamberlain try to form an overt diplomatic coalition in opposition to the USSR. Paris and Warsaw separated themselves from the events in London and assured the NKID that they would not sever relations with Moscow. Stresemann told the British ambassador that Germany would honor the Treaty of Berlin to the letter, and he assured Chicherin personally, when the two of them met in Baden-Baden, that Germany would not be "dragged into a struggle against the Soviet Union."^[51]

At the League Council meeting in Geneva during the second week of June, the foreign ministers of the five principal Allied powers of the World War (Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan) and of Germany met to discuss the crisis. Chamberlain explained to the others the background of the breach in relations, and he denied that London had any hostile intentions toward the USSR or plans to form the Locarno powers into an anti-Soviet bloc. He asked Stresemann to explain London's peaceful intentions to Chicherin and to caution Moscow in the name of the six powers against escalating the crisis with Poland. Remarkably, Stresemann agreed to do so, thereby putting at risk both Germany's diplomatic neutrality and its relationship with the USSR. However, to have refused Chamberlain's request would have placed him in a difficult tactical position, and he too was indignant over the executions in Moscow. The message was conveyed through diplomatic channels, although the fact that it emanated from a six-power discussion was not. Chicherin accepted it as friendly advice and promised to try to influence his government in the direction of diplomatic moderation, something toward which he was already disposed.^[52]

Within the Politburo, Stalin's hard line was opposed by Rykov, Tomskii, and Kalinin. And it was criticized by Chicherin on his return to Moscow around 15 June following his stay in Europe. At a joint session of the Politburo and Sovnarkom, he reported on his conversations with European leaders and presented his analysis of the situation.^[53] In doing so, he took aim at the policy that had first rendered assistance to the Chinese revolutionaries and British coal miners and had then adopted an aggressive response to the break in relations with England. It was not possible to have two foreign policies, Chicherin insisted—a Comintern policy and a government policy. The activities of the OGPU had made things worse; the shooting of hostages had aroused universal indignation in the West. Although there was no immediate danger of war, the USSR was threatened with diplomatic isolation and an economic blockade that threatened the survival of the regime. The Politburo must decide, he said, between executions and foreign investment, put an end to the terror, reaffirm the precrisis

foreign policy course, and make an effort to reduce the level of conflict with England. Chicherin supplemented his statement by a memorandum that was distributed afterwards and by his threat to resign.

Chicherin occupied a strong position. To have accepted the resignation of the figure most closely associated with the treaties of Rapallo and Berlin would have signaled a sharp devaluation of Soviet relations with Germany, something the USSR could ill afford so soon after the break with England. And Chicherin's recommendations found support among those members of Sovnarkom responsible for economic matters who acknowledged the dangers of an economic blockade. Stalin had to back down. By the end of the month, the Politburo had approved Chicherin's recommendations in a modified form and decided to sustain the previous direction of foreign policy. In July it renounced OGPU executions and repudiated the hard-line, get-tough measures. Led by Stalin, the majority leadership reaffirmed the importance of "peaceful coexistence" and of conventional diplomacy in defense of the security of the USSR.^[54] Despite the alarms sounded regarding the foreign threat, and despite differences within the Politburo over strategy, no one either in the Central Committee majority or in the United Opposition was willing to risk a war or even heightened diplomatic isolation.^[55]

Soviet diplomats reaffirmed Moscow's desire for international cooperation and for agreements with Europe and America. In accordance with the precepts of politika dogovorennost , they used foreign trade to improve political relations. Orders for machinery and other producer goods required by the industrialization drive were increasingly "diverted" from Germany to Britain and the United States. Purchases from the United States were aimed at breaking down long-standing resistance to more favorable political relations with the USSR. In Britain orders were, as one Soviet official explained later, part of a policy "to prevent a worsening of relations through economic concessions."^[56]

Most of all, Moscow went the limit to improve relations with France and to prevent Paris from joining London in an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rapprochement.^[57] Even before the war scare crisis reached its most acute phase, the Quai d'Orsay had predicted that the growing hostility between London and Moscow would force the Russians to make additional concessions in the Franco-Soviet debt-loan-trade negotiations, provided the French delegation stood firm. And it was right. By late June the majority leadership, with its turn away from the hard-line response to the war scare, began to see a prompt debt settlement with Paris as a way to deny London a partner in a possible anti-Soviet coalition. As the policy was subsequently explained in Pravda , "we buy the possibility of peaceful eco-

nomic relations with one of the capitalist countries in Europe, and France sells us this possibility." An offer to pay the tsarist debt, Izvestiia added, "is one of the most important prerequisites for the postponement of the moment of intervention." Hence Rakovskii addressed a memorandum to de Monzie on 30 June formally requesting that the Franco-Soviet conference be convened in plenary session to consider the Soviet offer The Poincaré government rejected the initiative, however, having no interest in providing Rakovskii with a public forum in which to advertise the value of Soviet concessions. In mid-August, Rakovskii was authorized to propose a Franco-Soviet political treaty to the French government, and again he played the security card in Paris, proposing a Franco-Russian nonaggression pact, exploring the possibility of a similar treaty with Poland, and suggesting a multilateral accord that would include Paris, Moscow, and Warsaw. The policy of "buying off France" culminated on 21 September when Litvinov announced a new set of concessions, adding incentives to Moscow's standing offer of July 1926 (60 million gold francs annually for sixty-two years) and significantly reducing the size of the loan the USSR asked in return.^[58]

Yet the international situation did not improve. The aggressive position taken in early June had damaged the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy, as did mounting speculation within and among the foreign services of Europe that there would soon be a change of leadership in Moscow. Most of all, Franco-Soviet relations deteriorated sharply beginning in late August with a strident anti-Soviet campaign in the French press. Even the moderate Le Temps called upon the government to adopt an anti-Communist policy and to break off relations with Moscow. Much of the attack was directed at Rakovskii himself and demanded his recall to Moscow. The polpred was a leading member of the United Opposition, and he had signed the "Statement of the Thirteen" calling for workers and soldiers in capitalist countries to contribute to the defeat of "their own" governments in the event of a war with the USSR.^[59] The Council of Ministers was divided. Poincaré favored a break in relations; Herriot and Painlevé were opposed. Briand was willing to consider the "Statement of the Thirteen" a matter of intraparty struggle, as had Mussolini in the instance of Kamenev, who was polpred in Rome at the time and who also signed the statement. Poincaré insisted on Rakovskii's recall, apparently intending thereby to scuttle the debt-loan-security negotiations. Briand countered by declaring Rakovskii persona non grata in mid-October, thereby forcing his recall to Moscow but keeping Franco-Soviet relations intact.^[60]

Relations with Germany also worsened as the possibilities for further loan guarantees from the German government dimmed.^[61] German indus-

trialists complained to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin about the negative effects of the war scare crisis on the investment climate in the USSR and about the restrictions imposed on foreign enterprise by bureaucratic centralization in Russia and the government monopoly on foreign trade. Above all, they accused Moscow of using trade for political influence and of "diverting" machinery orders from Germany to the United States, Britain, and France. German-Soviet relations were affected most detrimentally and profoundly when, in a speech before the Reichstag on 24 June, Stresemann made public the warning he had conveyed to Moscow on behalf of the six powers at Geneva. Despite repeated efforts, Stresemann had never succeeded in justifying his Westorientierung to the NKID, and now, at what Moscow regarded as a most dangerous moment in its foreign relations, Berlin was compromising the neutrality on which Soviet security counted by defending Poland on behalf of a group of powers including England, and doing so with great publicity. Fears that Germany was drifting further westward diplomatically, leaving the USSR alone to face a hostile coalition, were magnified. Chicherin informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that "forcing Poland back to its ethnographical borders" was compromised as a goal of the Soviet-German relationship. And his relationship with the Politburo, he complained, was now jeopardized.^[62]

At the end of July the Revolutionary Military Council renewed its request for a full acceleration of the collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Unszlicht again traveled to Berlin. There he informed German generals and diplomats that the USSR expected to be attacked by Poland and Romania within months, and he revived the proposal for joint weapons production that he had made initially in the spring of 1926. As they had previously, the Germans showed little interest in rearming Russia. The uncertain international situation of the spring and summer of 1927 dictated to Berlin a policy of marking time on military collaboration. Even the Reichswehr minister, Otto Gessler, did not favor any extension of collaboration with the Red Army at a time of international crisis. Together, the German Reichswehr and the Foreign Ministry rejected the proposal.^[63]

However, Stresemann did reassure Moscow. In mid-August he authorized Brockdorff-Rantzau to transmit to the NKID his final and formal approval of the establishment of the tank base at Kazan that had been agreed upon in March 1926. This was an action of considerable political significance. The German Foreign Ministry had previously been highly circumspect about involving any sector of the German government other than the Reichswehr Ministry directly in the covert military collaboration with the USSR—thereby allowing Stresemann to maintain "plausible deniability" in any discussions with his colleagues of Locarno, Chamberlain

and Briand. Now Stresemann was implicated. The approval signaled an upswing in the level of Soviet-German military collaboration within the limits prescribed by the German side.^[64] The exchange of officers at annual maneuvers continued. And Soviet officers now went through extended general staff training with the Reichswehr, studying German methods of training, organization, mobilization, and supply.^[65]