Class Consciousness

Last, but definitely not least, there is the question of class consciousness. How do blue-collar workers see their position in the class structure, with whom do they identify, and whom do they oppose? These questions have always been, and remain, central in the debates over the blue-collar working class. In a recent article dramatically titled "Farewell to the Labor Movement?" Eric Hobsbawm, one of the foremost socialist historians, stressed the question of class consciousness:

It is class consciousness, the condition on which our parties [mass socialist or workers parties] were originally built, that is facing the most serious crisis. The problem is not so much objective de-proletarianization, but is rather the subjective decline of class solidarity. . . . What we find today is not that there is no longer any working class consciousness, but that class consciousness no longer has the power to unite.^[34]

Hobsbawm cites the fact that in 1987 almost 60 percent of British trade union members voted for parties other than the Labor party. Clearly this is comparable to the tendency for blue-collar Americans nowadays to be at least as likely to vote Republican as Democratic in presidential elections.

Much of the debate over class consciousness has revolved around, or at least begun with, the issue of whether blue-collar workers tend to see themselves as "working class" (and therefore more class conscious) or "middle class" (and therefore less class conscious). It is, then, surprising to discover that in 1988, asked if they saw themselves as "working class" or "middle class," 75 percent of American blue-collar workers said working class. Further, this is only a little less than in 1952, when 80 percent of blue-collar workers categorized themselves as working class in response to the same question (see figure 8.21). Indeed, the proportion of blue-collar workers categorizing themselves as working class has never fallen below 64 percent in the period between 1952 and 1988. Clearly a certain kind of working-class identity can coexist with a declining tendency for blue-collar workers to vote for Democratic presidential candidates and to identify with the Democratic party. This suggests a problem with the debate over class consciousness, which, as we have pointed out, has long pervaded the general debate over the blue-collar working class, namely, the tendency to infer from one area of blue-collar life the nature of behaviors and beliefs that prevail in other areas of those lives. In the

8.21
Social Class Identification by Major Occupational Group, 1952–88:
Blue-Collar Workers.

8.22
Social Class Identification by Major Occupational Group, 1952–88:
Upper-White-Collar Workers.

case of class consciousness and class identity, this amounts to assuming that blue-collar workers have a single image of their position in the class structure.

A central theme of this chapter has been that the lives of blue-collar workers revolve around three separate, though related, spheres—life at the workplace (in the mode of production), life outside the workplace (residential, marital, and leisure), and life vis-à-vis the federal government. Indeed, there is reason to think that many American blue-collar workers have three social identities, each relating to one of these spheres. These identities are that of the "working man," (or "working woman" for female blue-collar workers); that of being "middle class" or "lower middle class" or "poor," with reference to life outside the workplace; and that of being part of "the people" or "the American people," with reference to the notion of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the federal government and the related power structure. If these spheres have not emerged clearly in much previous research, it is because the main methods used to study class consciousness have tended to encourage, explicitly or implicitly, only one of these identities.

The analysis that follows is based on David Halle's study of class identity among blue-collar chemical workers in New Jersey. These workers were, in several ways, among the better-off blue collar workers. They were comparatively well paid and unionized; about one-quarter of them were skilled; 69 percent were homeowners. They were all men, reflecting the dominance of men in more desirable blue-collar jobs.

Consider, first, the concept of "the working man." A close reading of formal and informal interviews reported by a variety of researchers suggests that male blue-collar workers in America commonly refer to themselves as "working men," but rarely as "working class." This can be seen in interviews with voters during the 1968 and 1972 presidential election campaigns; in the views working-class residents of a new suburban township expressed about their preferred political candidate; from the comments of a group of skilled workers in Providence, Rhode Island; from comments of a group of white working-class males in an East Coast city; from comments of workers in Milwaukee, Chicago, and Pennsylvania; from comments of auto workers in Detroit; and from comments of Italian construction workers in Brooklyn.^[35] The concept of the "working man" has also been central in the history of the American labor movement. For example, when trade and craft workers before the Civil War founded political parties, they called them "Workingmen's Political Parties," and the Workingman's Advocate was the name of one of the most important newspapers of the nineteenth century.

The concept of the working man, among the chemical workers studied by Halle, has as its central idea the notion that blue-collar work takes

a distinctive form and is productive in a way that the work of other classes is not. This notion has two central components. One involves the features of the job. Being a working man involves one or more of the following clusters of related ideas: (a) physical work ("It's hard physical work," "It's working with your hands"); (b) dangerous or dirty work ("We get our hands dirty"); (c) boring and routine work ("We do the same thing over and again"); (d) factory work (as opposed to office work); (e) closely supervised work ("We have to punch in and out," "We're told what to do").

The other central component of the concept of the "working" man links it to a moral and empirical theory about who really works in America. It implies, in one or more of the following ways, that those who are not working men are not really productive, do not really work. Those who are not "working" (a) literally do not work ("Big business don't work, they just hire people who do," "People on welfare aren't working men, they don't want to work"); (b) perform no productive work ("Teachers aren't teaching the kids anything," White-collar office workers "just sit on their butts all day"); (c) are overpaid ("Doctors earn huge fees," "Lawyers charge whatever they want").

The combination of the "job features" and the "productive labor" aspects of the concept logically entails the idea that only those whose labor involves such job features are productive. As a result, blue-collar work is generally seen as productive. But those whose work lacks many or all such job features, definitely big business and the white-collar sectors in general, are not.

A central point about the concept of the working man is that the term expresses both class and gender consciousness. It expresses class consciousness in implying that blue-collar work is especially productive. But it also implies that blue-collar work is for men (working man ) rather than women, which is a form of gender consciousness. This reflects the history of American labor. In the early stages of industrial growth, women (and children) were the first factory workers, for at that time such jobs were seen as less desirable than agricultural work. As the status and pay of factory and other blue-collar work rose, women were pushed out of almost all except the least desirable jobs. The blue-collar working class is now composed primarily of men, and this is especially true for the better paid and more highly skilled blue-collar jobs.

Among the chemical workers Halle interviewed, the idea that blue-collar work was for men was a form of sexism that most workers were prepared to explicitly support in discussing their own jobs. For example, they would maintain, sometimes in arguments with those of their wives who are feminists, that women cannot be chemical workers because they are too weak to move heavy chemical drums. But such sex stereotyping

of occupations is under increasing attack in the United States. As a result, few workers were prepared to explicitly defend this sort of view for the entire spectrum of blue-collar jobs.

This discussion also raises the question of how female blue-collar workers see their position in the class structure at work. Naturally, they see themselves as working women rather than working men. How they use the concept of the "working woman," and how its meaning compares with the concept of the working man, is a question that scarcely has been investigated.^[36]

The blue-collar workers that Halle interviewed also place themselves in the class structure, in part according to their life away from work rather than on the job. In this second image, they assume a class structure composed of a hierarchy of groups that are distinguished, above all, by income level but also by standard of living and residential situation. Income level, life-style, consumer goods, and neighborhood constitute the material framework of their lives outside work. (It is true that income originates from their employment, but its effect on their lives is outside, where almost all income is spent.) These criteria for determining position in the class structure increase the range of persons with whom workers consider they have common interests (as compared with the concept of the working man). Thus, though most see clear gaps between their situation and those of the upper and lower extremes (for instance, "the rich" and "the poor"), the categories in between are almost all ones to which they consider they do or could belong. As a result, according to this perspective, the class structure has a sizeable middle range that displays some fluidity, permits individual movement, and takes no account of a person's occupation. This reflects the actual ability of workers, in their life outside the factory, to enjoy a certain mobility through their choice of house, neighborhood, possessions, and life-style.

Income level is the most important of the factors underlying this second image of class. Almost everyone has at least a rough idea of the income distribution in America and his place within it. Workers read government statistics in newspapers and magazines on the average income of an American family, and they are aware of estimates of the income level needed to maintain a minimum, a comfortable, and an affluent standard of living. The federal and state income tax systems both entail a picture of the class structure based on income, and most workers follow with keen interest the relation between their weekly earnings and the taxes deducted from their paychecks. Income level is not the only criterion underlying class distinction based on the setting outside work. Lifestyle, material possessions, and the quality of residence and neighborhood are other criteria that people often use.

Most, but not all, workers place themselves in the middle of the hier-

archy (below the "rich" and above the "poor"). But some identify with a category between the poor and the middle class. This view is most common among younger workers. They may have a mortgage, young children, and a spouse who stays at home to look after the children. But for these workers, being middle class implies being able to maintain that life-style without economic pressure. They deem their own situation below that of the middle class because they cannot live such a life-style without a strain—perhaps a serious strain—on their resources. Their income level, material possessions, and life-style make them better off than the poor, but not comfortable or free from major economic worries (as they believe the middle class to be).

The chemical workers studied by Halle were comparatively well paid for blue-collar workers, so it is likely that numerous less well paid blue-collar workers, in thinking of themselves outside the workplace, would classify themselves as below middle class.^[37] The coexistence of these two identities—that of being a "working" man, with reference to life at work, and that of being middle class or less, with reference to life outside the workplace—would explain the large number of blue-collar workers who categorize themselves as "working class" rather than "middle class" in response to a survey question on that topic (see figure 8.21). Some workers categorize themselves as working class because they think of themselves as "working" men. Others place themselves in the working class because they are thinking of their position in the class structure outside work and believe their income level or life-style is not high enough to place them in the middle class. Either way, the forced choice of "working class" or "middle class" conceals the coexistence of two images of position in the class structure.

Almost all the blue-collar chemical workers have what amounts to a third image of their position in the class structure. They routinely use the concepts of "the American people" and "the people" in a populist sense. This concept involves the idea of a clear opposition between the power structure, especially big business and politicians, and the rest of the population. According to this view, "the American people" means all those excluded from the heights of political and economic power. Consider this worker, discussing corruption in politics: "Take Johnson for example. When he entered the White House he had $20,000 and then he bought all those estates with the American people's money."

This populist current is the third major aspect of the class consciousness of these workers. The concept of the working man refers to a position in the system of production. The concept of being middle class or lower middle class refers to a position outside work—to a life-style and standard of living. The concept of the people, or the American people, in the populist sense, refers to the division between all ordinary citizens and those with political and economic power.