Riots in England

English grain riots were rarely motivated by acute shortage; rather, they focused on the principle of grain export. For example, the years between 1730 and 1750 were characterized by an exceptional run of favorable seasons and good harvests, yet crowd action against export was common during this period.^[14] Exporters and grain in transit were the most common targets. To deter the attacks, legislation was enacted in 1737 that imposed severe penalties—hard labor, public whipping, and transportation—on those who opposed the purchase or shipment of grain. In the 1740s, when actual shortages led to rioting in many parts of England, Parliament still refused to tamper with the legislation encouraging export and instead enforced legislation dating from 1552 against forestalling, engrossing, and regrating. A complete account of English rioting has yet to be completed, but the contributors to An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain, edited by Andrew Charlesworth, provide considerable evidence on the distribution of the riots and the different forms of action taken. Between 1660 and 1737, there were 56 recorded food protests, 84 in 1740 alone; there were over 140 in thirty different counties during the crisis of 1756–1757 and over 170 during 1766. Whereas authorities could do little to prevent nonviolent intimidation of grain suppliers or spontaneous attacks on grain convoys, sustained rioting often resulted in the calling in of troops. The response of municipal authorities tended to be brutal, especially when local mayors were involved in the grain trade.^[15] In May 1728, the mayor of Falmouth demanded two detachments of troops from a man-of-war in Falmouth harbor after receiving word of a threatened attack on exports. In the Midland food riots of 1756, magistrates promptly tried and hanged two ringleaders. Military force was later used to quell rioting that continued into Derby and Nottingham.^[16] During the riots of 1766, seven men

[14] T. H. Baker, Records of the Seasons: Prices of Agricultural Produce and Phenomena Observed in the British Isles (London, 1883), 187.

[15] A comparison of French and English local officials, especially mayors, however useful, is not possible with the evidence available at this time.

[16] Jeremy Caple, "North Midlands: August and September 1756," in Charlesworth, ed., Atlas of Rural Protest, 112.

were executed and fifty-seven others were convicted of felonies.^[17] John Bohstedt has reported that between 1790 and 1810, roughly 6 percent of the grain riots resulted in fatalities, as "one or more rioters were killed in 37 of 617 riots."^[18] Depending on the military was a far-from-ideal solution: there were only twelve peacetime regiments available for the task. The troops placed an extra burden on the food supply and occasionally became active in the rioting.^[19] Despite the frequency and national scope of the British rioting, it had little effect on national grain policies. Authorities in England might invoke old statutes against market abuse, provide additional poor relief, temporarily suspend exports (usually too late to prevent dearth), and occasionally offer grain at subsidized prices. Dealers might make informal concessions to crowds to avoid confrontations. Unlike in France, however, national and regional export restrictions were never established, and neither was the sale of grain confined to publicly supervised marketplaces in England. English merchants did not need licenses for internal trade. The militia was never sent to large farms to compel the release of grain stocks.^[20] It seems that rioters in England were more likely to be severely punished than rioters in France (taxation populaire was not tolerated in England), and, despite the greater availability of troops in France, military force was used less frequently against rioters there.^[21]

[17] "Where frequent large-scale disturbances overmatched the abilities of the magistrates the government sent in troops" (Dale Williams, in Charlesworth, ed., Atlas of Rural Protest, 88).

[18] See Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, 230. "In the various food disturbances [between 1700 and 1800] ... several food rioters were killed by authorities and a number executed" (Stevenson, " 'Moral Economy' of the English Crowd," 235).

[19] John Stevenson, "Food Riots in England, 1792–1818," in Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History, 1790–1920, ed. R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), 47–48; Charlesworth, ed., Atlas of Rural Protest, 100.

[20] E. P. Thompson emphasizes that magistrates were often reluctant to impose severe penalties on protesters, and courts could invoke old rules that limited the action of middlemen. However, these magistrates had little influence on public policy, which was dictated by Parliament and enforced by the justices of the peace. Unlike the magistrates, these creators and enforcers of policy did not usually concern themselves with upholding ancient legal traditions that protected consumers. We must distinguish between legal treatment meted out by judicial officials and the formation of policies that suited consumer goals. Thompson also emphasizes the chilling effect that the threat of riots or the memory of past riots would have on the behavior of traders. Again this misses the essential point, which is, which groups determine the formation and implementation of public policy?

[21] Troops were used to quell the massive, nationwide riots of 1775. Hundreds of protesters were arrested, and there were two public executions in the capital. See Rudé, Crowd in History, 28–30. Except for the years 1725, 1752, and 1775, troop action does not seem to have been common in France. In England, by contrast, "disturbances over the country as a whole ... were in most instances easily suppressed by military forces" (David Ormrod, English Grain Exports and the Structure of Agrarian Capitalism, 1700–1760 [Hull: Hull University Press, 1985], 89).