Making Royal Supervision More Effective
If they were to make village assemblies a more efficient tool of administrative control, royal administrators also had to be able to punish village officers who were party to intrigues. For the intendant to supervise effectively, it was imperative that village officers not bend to pressure from powerful groups or individuals in the community.[57] In the 1760s, to make village syndics more responsive to the king and less responsive to village cliques, intendants began reviewing village accounts and rigorously prosecuting syndics for any abuse found during their tenure.
In 1767, suspecting that the syndics of Mont-St. Jean had been "too interested in the party of the strongest," the subdelegate requested a review of that community's fiscal records for the past twenty years. He recommended this measure because "this community has been governed for a long time by two or three of the richest inhabitants whose collusion was based not on the needs of public administration but instead on private interests. Fear or dependence made them masters of the vote; they had syndics named at their will." To demonstrate to the syndics of Mont-St. Jean the dangers of placing the interests of "the party of the strongest" above those of the community, the subdelegate threatened to hold syndics personally liable for all injustices in the distribution of that community's public charges committed during the previous twenty years. These syndics would not only be held financially responsible for all fiscal abuses during their respective terms of office but would also be "deprived of their rights as citizens." The subdelegate was persuaded that in the future, Mont-St. Jean's syndics would make greater efforts to "seek the means to bring relief to the miserable."[58]
Communal records after 1760 provide numerous examples of prosecutions of village syndics by intendants for irregularities in the management of their communities' financial obligations.
[57] As noted earlier, one of the reasons for Colbert's mistrust of elected village officials was that they were too easily influenced by wealthy members of the community, too involved in networks of patronage and dependence to act for the good of all.
[58] AD, C-1652, Mont-Saint Jean, June 1767: Letter from Subdelegate Merle to the intendant. Procès-verbal includes correspondence between the intendant and Subdelegate Merle.
Sieur Desgrey of Faye-Billot claimed that as syndic he was "ruined in his fortune and his estate . . . [and that] his furniture and goods [were] confiscated."[59] Because of this increased supervision by the intendant, the office of syndic may have become less attractive to the village's wealthy inhabitants.[60]
This increased surveillance of syndics might account to some extent for the growing pressures in favor of Councils of Notables. As supervision became more rigorous, wealthy individuals were finding the personal risks of service to be exceptionally high. In 1783 Bernard Carée, a leading inhabitant of Remilly-sur-Tille, refused to accept the position of village échevin, to which he had been elected. Carée presented the following explanation to the intendant:
The échevin of this village is charged with all the affairs of this community and must maintain the interests of the said community like his very own, given that he is obligated to render account of them without any indemnity. Consequently, because the échevins of this community are often interrupted in their work and initiative and spend a great number of days in supporting the interests of this community, during which time most inhabitants are at work and never have this responsibility, which is very costly and time-consuming for the person who has it, and because in this community there are only a dozen or so inhabitants who can and who are trusted to exercise this charge, in spite of the fact that this community is composed of sixty hearths, it is often the same ones who are obliged to exercise this charge, and because the suppliant, who performed the duties of échevin in the year 1772, was just forced to swear in before the local judge to perform the same function for the year 1784, without the community wishing to take any account of all the days that it is necessary to spend in order to support [communal] interests, which
[59] AD, C-518, 1760. Desgrey attempted to sue the village to recover his losses. He claimed that most of the abuses for which he was prosecuted "fut commis pendant l'exercice de mes prédécesseurs." M. Desgrey had a four-page précis printed, in which he presented his case against the community: Précis à Monseigneur l'Intendant de Bourgogne pour le Sieur Desgrey, Bachelier en Médecine, demeurant au Fays-Billot, province de Bourgogne, contre les habitans dudit lieu (Paris, 1760). See also AD, C-578: the intendant approved Echirey's request to sue its tax assessor.
[60] AD, C-1609, Montot, 1760. The administrative correspondence does not provide the best basis for generalizations about the declining attractiveness of village positions. It would be necessary to examine village assembly délibérations in conjunction with village tax records to determine whether these officials tended to be drawn more frequently from the wealthier peasantry after 1760. Unfortunately, few village archives are complete enough to allow the making of such an inquiry. One subdelegate wrote to the intendant, Amelot, in 1788 that "échevins are chosen only from the most distinguished inhabitants."
becomes too costly for the suppliant, who is appealing with trust to your authority.
My Lord, given that no one else must neglect his enterprise and lose his work to do good for the community, if it please you monseigneur, that when the suppliant renders his accounts before your subdelegate in the presence of the principal inhabitants, the community will be obligated to recognize the days that he spends, the price of which he will not be taxed, that by your decree, the suppliant hopes that the present document will be approved and then communicated to the said community, and then justice will be done.[61]
It seems reasonable to assume that wealthy inhabitants may have become more resentful about assuming (or at least more reluctant to assume) the post of village tax collector or syndic . That resentment may help explain why these inhabitants continued to push for the creation of Councils of Notables. They may have felt they had every right to hold a governing position in the village. Since they were doing all the work and bearing the most onerous responsibilities, why should they not set village policy? Several notables of the village of Fontaine-Française advanced another argument in favor of such councils. They claimed that in electing a syndic,
one usually chooses from among the notables—it is a necessary procedure because of the intelligence demanded for the administration of offices and the security necessary to maintain the communal patrimony. Therefore three-quarters of the time, one of the more substantial farmers is chosen syndic . But it is necessary that people of that condition pursue their farming, which is essential to society and to the good of the state. However, as syndic, the farmer must leave his precious occupation as often as the affairs of the community demand.[62]
[61] AD, C-575, 27 Nov. 1783: Petition from Bernard Carée, inhabitant of Remilly-sur-Tille, to the intendant.
[62] AD, C-1250, Fontaine-Française, 1774: Petition. Since the wealthy in-habitants would inevitably be held responsible for a community's failure to meet its financial obligations, an important incentive for these individuals to become a village syndic or tax collector was to prevent illiterate, insolvent inhabitants from occupying the post. But despite this incentive, many villagers complained that elected officials were too ignorant to perform their functions effectively. One subdelegate reported that it was rare for the village to elect "those among them who are capable of doing the job." The inhabitants, he remarked, elected as officials "only the most muddleheaded [les gens les plus brouillons ] because they do not know how to dominate the others [ne sçavent pas en imposer aux Autres ]."
As the solution to this problem, they suggested creation of a Council of Notables so that the work would be divided among a committee of substantial farmers.
Communal legal cases were one area in which the intendant's efforts to supervise village affairs and to arbitrate disputes were critical. The intendant wanted to prevent one faction in the village from initiating costly legal proceedings in the name of the community. Lawsuits against seigneurs, which were becoming increasingly common in the eighteenth century, were a primary concern,[63] for such suits could leave communities with massive debts. Villages instituted numerous suits against other villages, against townspeople, and against the lord's fermier . In 1782 the Estates of Burgundy reported that in the previous year, the intendant had approved the prosecution of four hundred community court cases involving claims totaling 400,000 livres. The court costs alone were 72,058 livres. The estates estimated that communities had, on average, lost nine out of ten cases.[64] In short, a large portion of the villages' collective income was being consumed by legal expenses.
As communal revenues grew during the eighteenth century, communities became more litigious than ever, and this resulted in a serious drain on their revenues. As early as 1683, the crown had decreed that "no person or persons can begin legal proceedings or make any deputation in the name of the community without first obtaining the consent of all inhabitants in a general assembly, confirmed and authorized by the intendant." Any individuals (maires, échevins, syndics, jurats, consuls ) undertaking legal proceedings in the community's name but lacking proper authorization would be responsible in their "own and private names for the costs of the said legal proceedings without hope of appeal under any pretext at all and for the damages and interests of the said communities." Judges would be responsible for the community's costs for judgments rendered in cases that had been taken to court without the written consent of a majority in
[63] See Pierre de Saint-Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne du nord au dernier siècle de l'Ancien Regime (Dijon, 1960), p. 139.
[64] AD, C-3519/44: Mémoire from the Estates of Burgundy, "Autorisation de plaider clans les affaires des communautés des habitans," pp. 6–7.
the village assembly. All court actions instituted by the village without the intendant's written permission would be terminated and the decisions annulled.
The edict of 1683 was not issued to prevent communities from exercising their right to go to court. Such legislation would have been arbitrary even by seventeenth-century standards, especially since communities had had this right since the Middle Ages. Rather, the legislation was aimed at preventing abuse by community officers. The monarchy's awareness of the problem is clearly stated in the preamble of the edict:
We are informed that, contrary to a disposition so advantageous to communities, maires, échevins, syndics, and the others who are charged with the administration of the affairs of the said communities, abusing their power, involve them every day, under different pretexts, without observing the formalities required by the said edicts, declarations, and arrêts, in legal proceedings that consume them in costs and that always go against the said communities because they are undertaken without legitimate basis.[65]
Far from always limiting communities' recourse to the courts of law, the monarchy was careful to guarantee access to them. In the eighteenth century, it issued numerous decrees confirming the intendant's right to approve any effort by a community to institute a court action.[66] In 1779 a subdelegate explained that the administration's vigilance was necessary only so that "factious, embittered, or stubborn people do not plead in the name of the community and against its will, and that is why a délibération containing the general will is required."[67] Before being granted approval of its request to go to court, a community had to obtain a written endorsement from a qualified lawyer stating that its claims were well founded. The subdelegate further explained that "in order that communities do not blindly involve themselves in expensive legal proceedings, . . . the wise practice was introduced of requiring a lawyer's opinion certifying that the inhabitants' claim was well founded [bien fondé ]."[68]
[65] AN, H-140; or BM, Fonds Saverot, vol. 47, no. 9.
[66] The edict was reinforced by two déclarations du roy (2 Aug. 1687 and 29 Oct. 1703), and by an arrêt du conseil of 8 Aug. 1713 (AD, C-3331).
[67] AD, C-1813, Massigny-les-Viteaux, 1779.
[68] Ibid. The subdelegate was explaining why the intendant's authorization was necessary before the community could plead in court. He cited as well a déclaration du roy of 29 Oct. 1703 and an arrêt du conseil of 8 Aug. 1713, both of which specified that the intendant's authorization was necessary before a community could initiate legal proceedings.
But once a community had received such certification, the intendant could do nothing beyond confirming that the délibération stating the community's intent to sue represented the general will of the community.
When the community of Saulx-le-Duc requested permission to sue its seigneur, the intendant wrote to the subdelegate: "Even though the right of the inhabitants appears well established by the consultation of M. ———, we believe that the community of Saulx-le-Duc should not be allowed to entangle itself in such considerable legal proceedings without first being assured of the will of the community. We propose, consequently, to order a general assembly." The intendant asked the subdelegate to conduct "in the accustomed manner an assembly of the said community which all inhabitants [meaning the heads of households] without legitimate excuse will be required to attend, to give their opinion, each separately, without confusion or uproar, [and] to declare which side they intend to take."[69] Such rigorous examinations had become standard procedure. Having each inhabitant explain the position he was taking was deemed the best way to verify that a claim represented the interests of the entire community. The Councils of Notables would have led to the closed, oligarchic government that royal administrators were trying to prevent by insisting that communal business be handled in open assemblies of the entire community. This concern emerges clearly from the intendant's objections to requests for the formation of Councils of Notables.
In 1774 the intendant received a petition from the wealthy inhabitants of Fontaine-Française requesting permission to create a Council of Notables composed of "twelve of the most enlightened among them." The community members reminded the intendant that "this practice [meeting in Councils of Notables] was followed earlier" at Fontaine-Française. Asserting that assemblies "are always tumultuous, often fruitless," they enu-
[69] AD, C-1286, Saulx-le-Duc, 1777: Ordinance of the intendant, "Débat avec le seigneur engagiste pour la banalité du moulin de Tarsul."
merated their reasons for requesting the suppression of village assemblies in favor of a Council of Notables:
1. The community, with 260 households, is too large. There are many affairs that require frequent assemblies. The assemblies are so large that it is almost always impossible to come to an agreement on the contentions that concern the community and from which result cabals.
2. Assemblies are called on a moment's notice.
3. Rarely more than 30 inhabitants attend a single meeting. These 20 to 30 inhabitants pass a délibération for certification of which they pay 3 livres, and three days later they must convoke another assembly on the same subject resulting in another délibération no better than the first. Then a third, contrary délibération is passed two days later, making necessary a fourth délibération and added expenses. The secretary never forgets his employees and records a délibération even when only 15 or 20 inhabitants are present. These délibérations thus become extremely expensive.
4. We are obliged to assemble during the work week, and all the inhabitants, being at their work, are obliged to leave it and waste their time.
5. The syndic authorizes repairs or orders public works costing 800 livres, but according to the opinion of good workers it was work worth only 400 livres. The community is not informed of such abuses until after completion of the work.
6. The syndic and other village officials are almost always people who have no knowledge of business.[70]
But the intendant rejected the request, and his rejection reveals some of the theoretical presumptions that underlay the administration's preference for general assemblies over Councils of Notables. The intendant wrote that creation of a Council of Notables would "render these individuals absolute masters of the business. . . . This is so well known that previous intendants have rejected completely all requests of the same nature presented up to now." He preferred that communal business be settled in general assemblies, because at these meetings "one can watch a community more closely." For these reasons he decided that "it is better to continue to utilize general assemblies, and to take the
[70] AD, C-1250, 17 April 1770. Includes notes of Subdelegate Charpy. The petition by the community's wealthy inhabitants was supported by the seigneur, M. de la Julien, in his letter to the intendant dated 17 April 1770, apparently written by the same individual who wrote the petition. The seigneur reiterated the reasons given by these inhabitants and, interestingly, used the same language.
necessary precautions so that everything proceeds in an orderly fashion."[71] In refusing a petition from the inhabitants of Lux to create a Council of Notables in 1771, the intendant explained that such a council "would lead to abuses, and it is more regular that business be taken directly to a general assembly that all inhabitants will be required to attend."[72] In another refusal eleven years later, the intendant noted that the wisdom of his predecessors had taught him that "we would see great abuse result if the business of the community were not treated with the knowledge of all the inhabitants."[73] In 1789 the intendant rejected the request of the village of Lamarche for establishment of a Council of Notables, citing his recent decisions as the basis for this one: "Every time that similar requests have been presented by a village community, they have been rejected, notably by Saucherance, the village neighboring Lamarche. This one should thus also be rejected, and all inhabitants should be enjoined to appear in the assemblies in the future as was recently decreed for the community of Faye-Billot."[74]
During the last twenty years of the Old Regime, the Burgundian intendant issued numerous ordinances for particular villages requiring inhabitants' full participation and setting fines for absences. These ordinances were issued in response to petitions for creation of Councils of Notables, following notification of abuse, or poor attendance. In one, the intendant specified the following formula for full participation: "We order all the inhabitants of the community who are not prevented by legitimate cause to attend the assemblies, which will be called by the échevin, to give their opinions, each separately, without confusion or tumult."[75]
[71] Ibid., 23 Feb. 1774: Procès-verbal, includes request from Syndic Boudot, comments from the intendant, and letters from Subdelegate Perrenet dated 21 Oct. 1774 and 19 Oct. 1774.
[72] AD, C-1259, Lux, 12 April 1771: Procès-verbal with notes from Subdelegate Charpy.
[73] Ibid., Feb. 1782.
[74] AD, C-786, 12 March 1789: Request from the community with intendant's comments recorded on margin of page. Another copy of the community's request with intendant's comments on back of page is dated March 1789. See also Subdelegate Suremain's report of January 1789.
[75] Similar ordinances were issued for the villages of Fontaine-les-Sèches in 1761 (AD, C-1361); Lux in 1768 (AD, C-1259); Etalante in 1777, 1778 (AD, C-1088), and 1780 (AD, C-1123); Chenceaux in 1781 and 1785 (AD, C-1178); Genlis and Uchey in 1784 (AD, C-533); Chatillon in 1785 (AD, C-1123); Chivres in 1786 (AD, C-1468); Longchamp in 1787 (AD, C-773); and Echirey (AD, C-578).
In the late eighteenth century, wealthy inhabitants even began to claim that their interests were identical with those of the community. At Gigny in 1781, a group of wealthy inhabitants describing themselves as propriétaires forains (landowners who lived on the outskirts of the village) and claiming the support of their seigneur appealed to the seigneurial court to overturn a decision of the village assembly, assented to by twenty-two of the village's thirty-three inhabitants, to deny the sheep belonging to the forains access to the communal pasture. The forains, who were the community's most highly taxed members, insisted that the assembly's sole motive for excluding their sheep was its animosity toward them.[76] This animosity, as the landowners explained it, resulted from the ruling that they had obtained earlier requiring the community to divide two-thirds of the timber annually cut from the communal woods according to each individual's tax assessment.[77] Naturally, the highly taxed landowners stood to benefit most from this ruling, which went against the tradition of dividing all such timber equally among all members of the community. The larger landowners, evidently hurt by the new decision, contended that their "sheep were necessary because the soil in this region benefits most from their manure" and maintained that they were calling upon superior authority "out of a spirit of public interest." In contrast to their own public spirit, "the multitude is all too often swayed by partisan spirit to the extent that they [the multitude] are ready to sacrifice their proper interests to satisfy the animosity that moves them." Asking the court to repeal the assembly's délibérations, the larger landowners wrote that "the opinion of the multitude—almost always blinded by partisan spirit—must cede to individual votes when those votes are dictated by reflection and by motives of public utility; one must be, therefore, even more receptive to the claims of the seigneur and land-
[76] Those voting with the assembly's majority felt that there was not enough pasture for both cattle and sheep. They wanted to eliminate the pasturing of sheep on the commons since their cattle would have been difficult to feed other-wise. The wealthy inhabitants, by contrast, had private reserves of fodder for their plow animals and cattle and wanted to use the communal pasture for their large herds of sheep.
[77] The issue of distributing communal wood will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
owners, especially since they are the ones most interested in the progress of agriculture." In conclusion, the landowners compared their request, "founded on calculation and reflection," with that of the multitude, "blind and without reflection, victims of caprice and the spirit of partisanship."[78]
This case is exceptional in that there are few similar examples of even the better-off peasants claiming to be aligned in court cases with their lord. Nevertheless, it is evidence of a growing tendency for the well-to-do peasants to resent having to abide by decisions taken by the village assembly. Grievances such as those aired at Gigny often led leading inhabitants to petition the intendant for permission to create Councils of Notables. The Gigny case also indicates the emergence of a new conception of the general will and community participation. The earlier tradition of egalitarian participation in community affairs did not level social or economic distinctions between inhabitants. Rather, implicit in this tradition was the recognition of inequalities. The goal of community decision making had been to identify general interests in spite of differences in the inhabitants' wealth and education. What changed in the late eighteenth century was that the wealthy inhabitants, basing their argument on the concept of enlightened self-interest, began to insist that their own interests were those of the entire community. They argued that by promoting and increasing agricultural output, they advanced the long-term interests of the whole community. The logic that had formerly been the basis for defending egalitarian participation—that full participation was the best way to define the general will—had thus been declared invalid.