Chapter Five
Soviet Scenarios for Eastern Europe's Future at the Beginning of 1989

On the eve of the historic year 1989, no one, be it in the West, Moscow, or Eastern Europe, foresaw the collapse of the region's socialist regimes in the months that were to follow.^[1] In fact, the element of surprise is part of what made that year so memorable.

In two countries, however, the situation evolved much more quickly than elsewhere, under the pressure of political forces beyond Communist Party control, and it contained important elements of uncertainty. Not by coincidence, it was in Poland and Hungary that precisely the most reformist policies, supported by Moscow, favored such an evolution. Hence, the most crucial tests for the future of the reform process began to take shape there. In Poland, talks finally opened in Warsaw on February 6, 1989, between representatives of the Polish government and of the opposition, grouped around Solidarity, in the framework of the so-called Roundtable discussions which had been anticipated for several months. The principle of legalizing the independent trade union had

[1] In the autumn of 1988, one particularly astute observer and analyst of Eastern Europe, Timothy Garton Ash, who was in touch with opposition circles, characterized the situation in these countries by using the term "Ottomanization." He wrote: "By Ottomanization, I mean that there is a certain analogy here with the decline of the Ottoman Empire: in both cases, we have witnessed a slow, long process of decadence marked by a disorganized, fragmented and discontinuous emancipation, both of the different states with respect to the center of the empire, and, within each country, of the society from the State." He saw in it "a very long-term historic process—a process, the outcome of which is, most definitely, practically impossible to imagine, since most empires have, up to now, fallen in the course of war ..." (Timothy Garton Ash, La chaudière: Europe centrale, 1980–1990 (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), pp. 263, 265–266.

already been accepted. In Hungary, in a climate of feverish social activity, groups had been allowed to form as part of a limited pluralism authorized by the regime. These groups were now transforming themselves into de facto political parties, with growing demands; the Communist Party had accepted the principle of a multiparty system, but its modalities and the rules of the game were not yet determined.

In this context, Aleksandr Yakovlev, in his capacity as the president of the Central Committee's new International Affairs Commission, sought to better inform the Party leadership by ordering the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System to prepare an important report. The report was to examine the political situation in the whole of Eastern Europe, as well as in each particular country, with an evaluation of possible developments and their implications for the USSR.^[2] After having obtained the results of this report, Yakovlev ordered similar documents to be prepared by the Central Committee's International Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the KGB, and organized a meeting between the authors of the four reports to compare and discuss their conclusions.

It goes without saying that these reports, which have never been published, are extremely revelatory. This author was able to obtain copies of the first three. They showcase the variety of opinions and estimations which existed within the reformist camp and help us overcome the simplistic representation of a clear-cut cleavage between two homogeneous camps. More importantly, however, they give us an invaluable indication of several parameters within which were situated Soviet leaders' expectations, attitudes, and behavior toward the historic events that took place in the following months. The reports also provide a partial response to a question frequently asked, namely about the quality of information on Eastern Europe at the Soviet leadership's disposal during this crucial period.

A Relatively Noncomplacent Approach

The report of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System could be qualified, in the context of early 1989, as radically reformist. It strove to be realistic, without illusions. Even if it obviously did not foresee the rapid, domino-like collapse which was to ensue, it was the least optimistic about the chances of success of a renovated socialism, or the

[2] Marina Pavlovna Sil'vanskaia, a senior researcher, was put in charge of preparing the report for the institute.

most realistic about its hidden traps. It noted, in several countries, the "beginning of the disaggregation of the socio-political system, without excluding possible cataclysms"; it further noted that, therefore, the difficult conditions which "accompanied the passage to a new model of socialism might lead to the drowning of the socialist idea."^[3]

The report fully put into perspective the depth of the traps which East European reformers had to face. It illustrated, for example, that while it was popular pressure and demands which were pushing the regimes toward reforms, the very existence of these frustrations prevented the introduction of reforms that would necessarily impose sacrifices on the population, risking increased discontent. The need to sacrifice the interests of the traditional sectors of the working class reinforced opposition to reforms from the right wing of the respective ruling parties. At the same time, reformist leaders found it very difficult to find a new social base for themselves. On this question, the analysis brought out a fundamental difference between the USSR and Poland and Hungary, which had largely contributed to the success of perestroika in the Soviet Union to date. In the two latter cases, it said, "the opposition gathers the entire intellectual potential of the country."^[4]

It was in Poland that the report foresaw the greatest danger of a "social rupture" and explosion. Despite this danger and the difficulties enumerated above—or rather precisely because of them—the report's author believed that the leading parties should continue to advance along the path of reforms, and notably form coalitions, making necessary concessions. They were reproached for not yet having "succeeded in seizing the initiative" due to a "lack of clarity about the perspectives of the transformation and a lack of vision of contemporary socialism."

If the analysis of the general situation in Eastern Europe was non-complacent and rather pessimistic (which was quite typical for reformist analyses that, in the case of the USSR itself, tended to dramatize the situation in order to better support the necessity for reforms), the examination of each country on its own allowed for some hypotheses about more optimistic solutions. Each country was subject to the presentation of different scenarios, which were termed "favorable" or "unfavorable," and "pessimistic" or "optimistic."

In the case of Poland, the "most favorable" scenario envisaged the success of the Roundtable, the emergence of a mixed economy, true

[3] Peremeny v vostochnoi Evrope i ikh vliiane na SSSR (The Changes in East Europe and Their Influence on the USSR) . Report of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, February 1989, p. 1.

[4] Ibid., p. 7.

political pluralism, and the opposition's participation in governance. The worst-case scenario was a breakdown of negotiations due notably to obstruction by Party conservatives and an escalation of social conflict, leading therefore, "most probably in the spring of 1989," to the establishment of a second state of emergency, similar to the one in 1981. In that case, the author invoked the specter of "an Afghanistan in Europe."^[5] One must point out, to the credit of the author, that she noted: "even the development of the most favorable scenario does not guarantee, in the long term, the preservation of the socialist choice."^[6]

As for Hungary, across a plethora of scenarios that did not exclude an anarchical situation, the perspectives were more optimistic. In this regard, the "capacity of a reformed Party to keep the initiative" and the "step-by-step" introduction of a parliamentary system were expected. One could thus anticipate the "development of a social structure in the direction of the socialist ideal, but in a social-democratic form." It should be noted that, for the report's author, social democracy had become fully compatible with the socialist ideal. This was, in any case, the predominant view at the time within the institute which produced the report.

Not surprisingly, the states with more conservative regimes were the subject of less detailed analyses, given that the political situation there was less fluid and tumultuous. For Czechoslovakia, the prognosis was rather optimistic, albeit guarded. The author envisaged the possibility of a Jakes initiative to get rid of the more conservative elements in the Party leadership and to undertake "practical measures along the path of renewing socialism and toward broad democratization," with the help of Prime Minister Adamec (who had replaced Strugal). This is precisely the hope which Gorbachev was expressing at the same time to the leader of the Italian Communist Party, in the conversation cited in chapter 4. The author stated, however, that this scenario was unlikely, at least in the absence of Soviet pressure.^[7] In contrast, she believed it to be "very likely, in the course of coming events, that the position of new forces in the country's political arena, such as the Socialist Perestroika Club headed by known figures of the Prague Spring who have kept to their socialist positions, will be reinforced." That group, she claimed, could

[5] Ibid., pp. 9–12.

[6] Emphasis added to indicate the nuance within the author's pessimism.

[7] The word "pressure" was doubtlessly taboo, as the author preferred to mention "prudent and skillful influence [vliianie ]" (ibid., p. 17).

count on an important reservoir of supporters, which she estimated to number between 500,000 and 750,000.

The analysis of the Romanian case is quite interesting as it seems to be based on privileged information about the goings-on in various Romanian political circles. The report stated that, in fact, "changes in the leadership are taking place, thanks to which, once Ceausescu is replaced, sensible politicians will be able to put into practice radical reform ideas and a renovation of socialism." Rather curiously, it stated that "favorable premises" for a "dynamic restructuring and a modernization of the economy" under conditions of marketization and freeing up of economic initiatives were already present in Romania. The author estimated that Ceausescu could use the economic flexibility which the rapid (and socially costly) repayment of Romania's foreign debt had given him to increasingly satisfy the consumer needs of the population and to reduce social tensions. This hypothesis, the author continued, was rather unlikely to happen, and hence she argued that there was a fairly high probability of social unrest occurring in Romania. In such a case, "the absence of an organized opposition in Romania" and "growing discontent, not only at the popular level, but even among the leadership" meant that "changes from above" were very likely, the report concluded.^[8]

As for the smallest and least important member of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria, the report outlined the gradual erosion of the Party's authority, in a context where "the alternative forces" were still weak. While recognizing that the leadership had introduced economic reform plans, it underscored that nothing concrete had been done to make them work effectively and that not much could be expected on that level in the immediate future. Even if the report noted that there were forces in the leadership capable of introducing an "authentic renovation" after the departure of Todor Zhivkov, it went on to state that his legacy would be "profound." In short, here, too, the situation was becoming urgent.

Apart from Ceausescu, it was the GDR's leaders that came in for the harshest criticism in the report. They were described as "dogmatic" and "sectarian," imposing on their society a "heavy-handed control through the apparatus of repression." The author stated—and, on this point, events were to prove her wrong—that, even if a nonconformist movement existed in East Germany, there were no adequate forces "to

[8] Ibid., pp. 17, 18.

exercise significant pressure from below or to destabilize the situation." She did, however, argue that there were forces within the Party apparatus capable of elaborating "a constructive program of changes." Those elements had not yet stepped forward because they "have not received sufficient proof that the process of change in the Soviet Union is irreversible." The report's message to the Soviet leadership on this count could not have been any clearer. In a very important passage, the report emphasized that the forces of change "understand that profound reforms in the GDR cannot remain a purely domestic affair" and could not take place except in tandem with a modification of inter-German relations. Consequently, if the USSR wanted "a perestroika in the GDR," it would have to be prepared to revise its policy in the heart of Europe. In that context, it ought to propose "objectives, such as the creation of a neutral German state on a confederal basis." In the context of early 1989, the author made the very bold suggestion of a new slogan: "one state, two systems." Further into the report, however, the author situated this scenario in a fairly distant future, arguing that it depended on the construction of the "common European home"; she also mentioned, as an alternative equally desirable to German neutrality, the preservation of the eastern part of a confederated German state within the Warsaw Pact, while the western part would remain in NATO.

In conformity with the views outlined above, the report recommended a far less tolerant Soviet policy toward the conservative socialist states. It claimed that the status quo in these countries which formed a majority in the Warsaw Pact, was harmful to reforms in Poland, Hungary, and even the Soviet Union itself, notably by hindering the development of economic relations on a new basis, and even contributed to the recent decline in trade among these states. It also warned of the "internationalization" of the conservative forces, which were mutually supporting each other and reinforcing their international contacts. The report furthermore suggested more open support for reformers in the four states where they did not hold power, and the recalling of conservative Soviet ambassadors and diplomatic personnel serving in Eastern Europe, arguing that they had been tacitly encouraging the East European conservatives' resistance.

Even more than the individual predictions elaborated for each state, it was the scenario envisaged for Eastern Europe's overall evolution by the Bogomolov institute report that was interesting and revealing, as was the behavior it recommended the Soviet authorities follow.

The report considered an important, albeit not total, slide by Eastern Europe "into the economic and political orbit of the Western world" as being inevitable. The Soviet Union, it argued, ought to accommodate such a "neo-Finlandization" of the region and even profit from it. It should be emphasized that the author was giving the term "Finlandization" a specific meaning, and distinguished it from its traditional meaning and from the actual situation in Finland, noting two fundamental differences. First, the countries of Eastern Europe, unlike neutral Finland, would remain allies of the USSR. The report envisaged that all of these countries would voluntarily remain in the Warsaw Pact. Second, even if one of the Communist Parties were to lose power, Soviet political influence in the country and the region would remain much greater than in Finland. Here again, it should be stressed that the report considered the loss of power by one or another Communist Party to be a worst-case scenario, and certainly not a broad movement. In this regard, the report's ideal model was a return to the formula that had existed in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948: coalitions in which the Communist Parties would have varying influence, but always a dominant role, in the context of a mixed economy. At that time, even if Eastern Europe was already closer to the USSR, it was still an intermediary zone between East and West. The report argued that the USSR need not fear a downsizing of the East European Communist Parties' power, even their "social-democratization," since, after all, that would only be slightly different from the new socialism the Soviet Union itself was seeking.

In absolutely typical fashion, the author stated that "the Soviet Union's optimum reaction to the process in Eastern Europe" was to "participate actively in it in order to keep a certain control over it and to assure its predictability" and its "self-limitation." The report argued that "the terrain favorable to nationalist and anti-Soviet forces will be reduced ... to the extent that the political movement will be seen as a result of our conscious decision rather than of the pressure of hostile forces." It came to this remarkable conclusion: "Therefore, it will be 'a revolution from above' which will prevent a 'revolution from below'."^[9] To facilitate the "self-limitation" of the movement, it recommended that the USSR develop contacts with the forces of the "constructive

[9] Ibid., pp. 27, 25.

opposition." This term was understood to mean, quite simply, any forces willing to negotiate with the existing governments.

In short, the report urged the USSR itself to organize and preside over the inevitable erosion of its influence in Eastern Europe, in order to better preserve a significant measure of that influence. Such Soviet behavior would also give the USSR a number of benefits in foreign policy. The acceptance of an "intermediary position" for these countries would "reinforce Western Europe's interest in supporting the economic and political stability of Eastern Europe and stimulate the disarmament process." As such, it would contribute to "partially overcoming the legacy of Yalta and the division of the world" and to "the gradual formation of a more united Europe."

The report saw the countries of Eastern Europe becoming "a common sphere of influence for the Soviet Union and the European Economic Community," due to their expected political evolution and their foreign economic relations. Consequently, it predicted that certain of these states could, even in the fairly near future, become associated with the EEC, "acting as precursors in the process of East-West integration."

This general view of affairs, it must be underlined, went much further than Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were prepared to go at the time, and especially on the last point. They envisaged East-West economic integration on the basis of greater relative equality. To achieve this, Eastern Europe was to accompany the USSR in the process, not to precede it (at the risk of leaving it aside). The Bogomolov institute's scenario therefore rested on a more pessimistic assessment of the influence the Soviet Union could preserve in Eastern Europe; it also practically acted as if CMEA were already buried, not mentioning it once throughout the report. It tried to be more realistic about the consequences of the growing decoupling the USSR's military might from its economic strength. As we have seen, the report gave better chances to the Soviet ability to preserve its political influence, considering the Warsaw Pact's survival to be guaranteed. It did not, however, foresee that, having absolutely renounced any use of military force, a serious divergence would emerge between the Soviet military presence and its political influence. But who would have believed, at the beginning of 1989, in East or West, that so much military might could lose so much political influence so rapidly?

The Moderating Role of the United States

There is an essential element upon which the author of the Bogomolov institute's report counted to ensure some measure of stability in the

changing geopolitical configuration envisaged for Eastern Europe. That element was the expected role and actions of the Western powers, particularly the United States. It is important to examine Soviet expectations on this count in greater detail, as they strongly influenced the Soviet leadership's behavior in the months that followed.

The report asserted that perestroika in the USSR and its implementation of "new thinking" had progressed far enough that "constructive" American politicians had an interest in protecting the process. This meant an altered state of affairs on several levels. The United States would not only have progressively less reasons to exploit Soviet and East European difficulties. It would also have an interest in impeding the explosion of a crisis that could endanger this vital movement of perestroika and "new thinking" and introduce an important element of "unpredictability" into the favorable evolution of the international system.

This expectation was far from being based on an illusion, resting instead on specific facts. In mid-January 1989, some days before the inauguration of George Bush, Henry Kissinger had come to Moscow, carrying a letter of good intentions from the new president to Mikhail Gorbachev. In his talks with Soviet leaders, and notably with Yakovlev and Gorbachev himself, Kissinger told them of a project of understanding on Eastern Europe which he had proposed to Bush on December 18, 1988.^[10] He also expressed his opinion to Yakovlev that the fluidity that was beginning to characterize the situation in Eastern Europe posed threats for the USSR and the United States. Among these threats he cited the centrifugal forces that might increase in Eastern Europe and the possibility of a resurgent German nationalism, which could push West Germany to try to exploit, for its own purposes, the differences between the Soviet Union and the GDR. As a result, Kissinger suggested that high-level negotiations take place in order to reach a series of detailed accords (some of them formal, others informal) under which the USSR would undertake to not oppose the liberalization of Eastern Europe and to specify the limits of what it was willing to do to defend its interests in the region. In exchange, the United States would agree to not do anything to accelerate the changes, to use its influence to prevent such an acceleration, and to respect Soviet security interests.^[11] Yakovlev, who saw in this proposal Kissinger's propensity to seek a management of an international equilibrium through concerted actions by the great powers,

[10] See M. R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 13.

[11] Ibid., pp. 14–15.

declared that the USSR was ready to enter into such discussions. Gorbachev was also receptive, but more cautious, apparently believing that Kissinger was sounding him out to see what the Soviet Union was willing to abandon in Eastern Europe.^[12] Gorbachev's preoccupation at the time, and in the weeks that followed, was to obtain a response to his arms reduction proposal from the new administration—a response that was, incidentally, quite slow in coming.

Even if Kissinger's idea was well received in Moscow, and by Bush and some of his advisers, no formal proposals were ever developed. A New York Times article of March 28, 1989 revealed that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was preparing to take up Kissinger's project of negotiations; the article provoked negative reactions in the United States and in Europe. The idea was denounced as a new Yalta that would again be played out on the backs of the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless, even if there was no formal accord, various signals coming from Washington and Bush's behavior during his visit to Eastern Europe in the summer of 1989 (to which we shall return) confirmed the Soviet leaders' belief that a tacit agreement, along the general lines sketched out by Kissinger's proposal, did exist between the United States and the Soviet Union.^[13]

For the Soviet leadership, therefore, its support for—plus the progress of—reforms in Eastern Europe could bring several mutually reinforcing benefits. It would favor an amelioration of relations with Washington and advance the development of a "common European home." Better relations with the United States would also help to ensure that the development of a new European order would take place through a relatively controlled process. It should not be surprising, given these expectations, that by 1989 the Soviet leaders had definitively accepted the idea that the United States had an important place and role to play in the "common European home."

As we shall see, if there was an illusion on the part of the Soviet leadership, it was not with respect to President Bush's preferences concerning Eastern Europe but about his capacity to exercise decisive influence in the region. The two superpowers would, in fact, both prove remarkably impotent in the events which were to sweep Eastern Europe in the last months of 1989.

[12] Ibid., p. 15.

[13] All of the high Soviet officials with whom I spoke believed that a tacit agreement existed.

The Central Committee: A Less Permissive Approach

If the Bogomolov institute's report can be described as radically reformist in the context of early 1989, then the report presented to Yakovlev by the Central Committee's International Department could be termed "cautiously reformist," perhaps "mildly conservative," or more simply, centrist. It reflected fairly closely the positions which the department's director, Valentin Fallin, had taken and would continue to hold.

First of all, while recognizing that Eastern Europe was in the midst of a difficult period, this report was clearly more confident than the Bogomolov institute's scenarios about the future of socialism in the region and about the Parties' chances of staying on top of the changes which were looming. In this connection, it gave its assessment that "it is not appropriate to exaggerate the danger that one or another socialist state could simply switch to the capitalist road "^[14] because "the roots of socialism have penetrated too deeply." It asserted that such a rupture would lead to chaos and immense misery, and that even the capitalist countries would not encourage it, so as not to be obliged to assume the enormous costs that their support would entail. From this perspective, the consequences of a certain power sharing, which was considered inevitable and even beneficial in the Hungarian and Polish cases, seemed fairly limited.

The report partook in perestroika 's "initiativist" ideology. Of the three broad scenarios for the region's evolution that it foresaw, the first and most favorable grew out of this ideology. It contemplated "a societal movement, directed by the Parties in power, toward democratization and a new form of socialism." This did "not exclude certain important concessions on the question of power" or the necessity of coming to terms with "the growing importance of self-government" and "the participation of the constructive opposition in the administration of society, with the possibility of one of these forces being transformed into a rival for power."

The second scenario analyzed a "gun-to-the-head" evolution, where the regimes, faced with "mini-crises," would make concessions to avoid the worst outcome. The report saw this mode of action, frequently practiced in the past, as being very disadvantageous, since it would only

[14] Emphasis present in the original text of the report, entitled K strategii otnoshenii s evropeiskimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami (Towards a Strategy for Relations with European Socialist States ), pp. 11–12.

reinforce "the lack of confidence in the Party and the opposition's pretensions" and favor "a gradual societal evolution toward exiting the socialist framework." The author did not, incidentally, specify what he believed to be necessary for staying in the socialist framework. Implicitly, the preservation of a dominant, or at least pivotal, role for the Party seems to have been considered a necessary condition. Nowhere was an evolution toward social democracy mentioned as a positive alternative.

The third general scenario, considered the worst possible outcome from the Soviet standpoint, was immobilism on the part of the Parties in power, followed by social upheaval and repression.

The Central Committee's report contained very interesting and important policy recommendations for the USSR. First of all, the author deemed it necessary to recall Eastern Europe's importance for the Soviet Union. Perhaps basing his comments on complaints from Grosz and several others, he stated at the outset that "our friends have the impression we are abandoning them" and that relations with Europe's socialist states should absolutely "keep their priority nature for us."^[15] In a rather prophetic manner, the report affirmed that "our domestic stability and our influence in world affairs depend in great measure " on these states.^[16] It went on to remind its readers that Eastern Europe had, in the past, served as a "safety shield" for the "center of socialism," and that, even though international conditions had changed, they continued to partially exercise that role.

Countering an opinion that was doubtlessly gaining ground in Soviet political circles, the Central Committee report declared that "the stereotype according to which these countries are parasites living off of us must be decisively rejected." It further claimed, "despite petit-bourgeois conceptions," that trade between the USSR and other CMEA states was of great importance for the Soviet Union. The report cited a whole series of figures to demonstrate trade with CMEA countries was financially advantageous for the USSR.^[17] It also pointed out that the Soviet Union itself was largely responsible for delaying the reform of CMEA and that it had only managed to establish 1 percent of its trade with Eastern Europe on the basis of direct links between enterprises. Success in reforming CMEA therefore depended to a great degree on the USSR's ability to

[15] Ibid., pp. 1, 6.

[16] Emphasis in the original text.

[17] Among the numerous examples cited, it claimed that every ton of wheat imported by the USSR from the world market cost it between 1.45 and 1.5 tons of oil (sold for hard currency), compared to one ton of oil for the same quantity of wheat imported from the CMEA (pp. 8–9).

more forcefully implement economic change at home. In a veiled reference to the unilateral reduction of Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe in the preceding months, the report insisted that the USSR needed to "remain a credible economic partner," if only to avoid causing additional problems for its reformist allies. Specifically, it demanded that the respective ministries respect their obligations and that oil deliveries be reestablished at the levels indicated in the Five-Year Plan.

Believing the economic integration of Europe as a whole to be inevitable and positive, the Central Committee report underscored the importance of "a rigorous fulfillment of obligations." This would enable integration to "take place in a balanced, coordinated fashion and in association with a reinforcement of the integrative process among socialist states themselves ."^[18] We can clearly see the difference here between this report and the approach of the Bogomolov institute's account.

On an even more fundamental question, the report recommended "the joint elaboration of a new vision of socialism and capitalism," in order to establish "the limits of their interaction and interpenetration." This touches on a fundamental point. The author was asking for a more precise definition of the content of "reformed socialism," and what would be permissible and inadmissible in this regard. Evidently, there was no consensus on this point within the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, the question was the subject of continuous debates. On the other, for radical reformers, and notably for someone like Yakovlev, the quest for a new model of socialism was to be an open-ended process of research and experimentation which could not be entirely predetermined. Yegor Ligachev saw a great danger in this position, and Gorbachev himself, according to one of his principal advisers, "did not have a clear vision,"^[19] and the limits he envisaged changed over time.

In accordance with the above recommendation, the report asked that "an inventory of our reactions" be prepared in case of "possible complications" or "abrupt changes" in the political orientation of the allied states. While it very explicitly excluded the use of force for the same reasons invoked by the reformists, it added a point which was totally absent in the Bogomolov institute's report. It stated that, even though the USSR was correct in affirming "the principle that freedom of choice is universal," it should, however, at the same time "maintain a certain indeterminacy with respect to concrete actions we might take in response to a

[18] Emphasis added.

[19] See Anatolii S. Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym: po dnevnikovym zapisiam (Six Years with Gorbachev: From Journal Notes) (Moscow: Progress Kul'tura, 1993), p. 294.

given upheaval." This indeterminacy was deemed necessary in order "not to encourage anti-socialist forces to put the bases of socialism to the test in any given country."^[20]

Simultaneously, the author reaffirmed that it was necessary to continue "dissipating the conservative regimes' expectations" about the role of an ultimate protector which the USSR might play for them. Furthermore, he suggested the Soviet Union take advantage of perestroika to reduce "the stereotypes about conservatism in Moscow" held in Eastern Europe and to "actively search for contacts with all those forces which could lay claim to power." The author believed that good relations between the USSR and these forces, as well as their participation in power sharing, would have a moderating effect on them, while simultaneously helping to solve the accumulated problems. In simple terms, one can say that the report recommended giving the opposition forces a "carrot," while also counting on the memory of the "big stick," which should not be eradicated altogether.

A nuance to this last part must immediately be pointed out. The report, which was somewhat ambiguous on this issue, also expressed a desire that the memory of previous Soviet actions be attenuated. To this end, the author recommended an important reform of the Warsaw Pact, so it would cease appearing to be an instrument of Soviet trusteeship and interference, possibly harming the credibility of reformist Communists. He therefore proposed a real "internationalization" of the Warsaw Pact's military mechanism, which had previously had the drawback of "being like a Soviet General Command, beside which the presence of other members is only a formality." The report also recommended that the reform take place on a more egalitarian basis and proposed the creation of joint forces without the participation of the Red Army. It also argued for a continued reduction of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe through the framework of East-West negotiations; it even envisaged a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the two states which had already been subject to Soviet interventions. Such a withdrawal could also bring political dividends in broader East-West relations. The report did, however, also recommend that Soviet forces be replaced by a joint force made up of other members of the alliance.

Contrary to the Bogomolov institute's report, the Central Committee account recommended patience with the conservative regimes. In this

[20] Ibid., p. 17; emphasis added.

regard, the recommendation is in contradiction to an earlier passage which considered immobilism to be a dangerous scenario. In the specific country analyses, the report indicated that Czechoslovakia's "1968 syndrome" was preventing the regime from orienting itself clearly toward democratization. At the same time, it observed that the regime was favorably disposed to embarking upon economic reform "while leaving changes in the area of democratization for later" and that Czechoslovakia's high standard of living would still play "a stabilizing role."

In the case of East Germany, the author interpreted its leaders' negative attitude toward perestroika as "objectively founded" on the fact that "the GDR came into being on an ideological and class basis, not one of nationality." He, too, believed that democratization could raise the problem of redefining relations between the two Germanys. Yet, the report did not make any particular recommendations concerning this sensitive subject.

The Foreign Ministry: A Botched Report

Despite a few contradictory elements, the reports by the Central Committee and Bogomolov's institute presented structured and relatively coherent views of the Soviet Union's interests in the future Eastern Europe. It is at this level that they are interesting, regardless of their prognoses' relation to reality. The report sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del —MID) is very disappointing in this respect. The report's lack of coherence, both in terms of analyses and recommendations, is striking. Therefore, its importance lies elsewhere. Far shorter than the two other reports, and obviously written by a poorly prepared and supervised official, it reflects the fact that Eastern Europe was a low priority for Shevardnadze's ministry.^[21] Occasionally borrowing elements of the conservative discourse and others from the camp of the radical reformers, the report does not, however, represent an articulate centrist position. Instead, it reflects the ideological and political confusion which had taken hold of numerous Party and state officials. Many of them sought to pay lip service to the new slogans of perestroika and "new thinking" in foreign policy without succeeding in truly integrating these concepts; their manner of perceiving things

[21] While the Bogomolov institute's account was thirty pages in length, the MID's report totalled a mere ten pages.

remained marked by traditional approaches, resulting in contradictory statements.

In 1989, both radical reformers and conservatives dramatized the political situation in the Soviet Union and East Germany for purposes that were obviously very different, but using language that was sometimes similar. For the former, the purpose was to bring out clearly the urgency of the changes they were proposing. For the latter, the point was to emphasize the threat to the preservation of socialism resulting from the volatile situations.

The MID report was marked by a pronounced alarmist tone, in line with the second view above. It stated, for example, that "by gaining access to parliamentary and government institutions, the opposition can, either fully or partially, eject the Communist and Workers' Parties from power."^[22] It added that "taking into account the mobilization of forces alien to socialism, this could have the gravest possible political consequences." At the same time, the report strangely took up one of the popular perestroika slogans of the time, stating that "the tendency toward political pluralism is becoming universal," without illustrating the benefits which East European Parties could derive from the process. The West's moderation was presented as being purely tactical and "its long-standing goals" were said to remain the same as before.

In the final analysis, was this report not more realistic than the other two, reflecting in its own way the impasse in which the East European regimes found themselves, regardless of what they endeavored to do? On the one hand, the report claimed that the policies of the four conservative countries were "in contradiction with the general tendency of the international community toward democratization" and that "their inevitable movement toward an authentic renewal of socialism, when it does come, will be accompanied [due to their tardiness] by profound political and social reverberations."^[23] On the other hand, it only saw risks in the opposite approach taken by the Polish and Hungarian leaders.

If one is tempted to see this as an exercise in realism, the same cannot be said of the report's recommendations to the Soviet leadership. The first and "most important" of these was "not to permit the erosion of socialism in Eastern Europe and to keep all of the countries in the region

[22] The MID report, dated 24 February 1989, was entitled Politicheskie protsessy v evropeiskikh sotsialisticheskikh stranakh i predlozheniia o nashikhp prakticheskikh shagakh s uchetom skladyvaiushcheisia v nikh situatsii (The Political Process in the European Socialist States and Propositions Concerning Our Practical Measures toward the Situation Developing There ), p. 3.

[23] Ibid., p. 4.

on the road to socialism." But how to achieve this, especially given that the MID author, too, explicitly and under all circumstances, rejected the use of force on the part of the USSR? On that point, the consensus among the three authors reflected a broader consensus in the Soviet leadership. Even Ligachev was, by now, in agreement.^[24] It was on the question of whether stating it publicly was opportune that no consensus existed. The MID report, just like the one issued by the Central Committee, favored preserving an "indeterminacy concerning the possible role of our armed forces." At the same time, and in complete contradiction to the above, the author recommended that in the case of a use of force by any of the East European regimes, the USSR ought to refuse its support "for repressive actions which contradict international norms in the sphere of human rights." This reflects the fact that the international image of the USSR on this issue had become an important preoccupation of Shevardnadze's ministry.

In general, the MID report's recommendations were closer to those of the Central Committee than those of Bogomolov's institute, even if far less coherent.

What remains now is to show how all of these recommendations, expectations, and scenarios were able to influence the Soviet leaders' behavior and their understanding of the events which ensued.

[24] See Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).