15
From Revolutionary Cadres to Bureaucratic Technocrats

This study is based on the simple premise that the less institutionalized a political system, the more likely political elites will bring the ideology, experiences, and outlook of the social classes from which they came into the political process.^[1] This assumption is particularly true of the new socialist China that emerged after the disintegration of the traditional order and prolonged warlordism. As Tang Tsou noted, political elites played a most critical role in the reintegration of China as a political community, leaving their mark on political, economic, and social organizations.^[2] Even after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, revolutionary momentum and incessant inner elite conflicts over ideology, policy, and power hindered institutionalization and routinization, allowing the political elites' idiosyncrasies to affect the political process.

Although originally recruited largely from poor peasants with a low level of education for the specific task of fighting guerrilla wars, the former revolutionaries became the ruling elite in 1949 and thereafter dominated the Chinese political process for almost three decades. Only since 1982 have the revolutionary cadres been gradually replaced by bureaucratic technocrats. Selected from among the best-educated segment of the population, the new Chinese leaders have their academic training mainly in engineering and production-related fields and their career backgrounds in

[1] The correlations between elite type and policy outcome in more stable Western democratic political systems are weak. For instance, see Moshe M. Czudnowski, ed., Does Who Governs Matter: Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982); Moshe M. Czudnowski, ed., Political Elites and Social Changes: Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983).

[2] Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 5.

specialist positions at functional organizations. Now in the 1990s, they face the challenging task of reforming the totally discredited old system. Just as the Maoist system reflected the old revolutionaries' experiences, goals, and understanding of China's needs, the newly emerging system will reflect the bureaucratic technocrats' training, work experience, and ideological outlook.

The Maoist System

Chinese politics during the Mao era largely reflected the former revolutionaries' rural orientation. As the founders of a new regime, the former revolutionaries continued to recruit officials from lower social classes, using political loyalty rather than ability as the main criterion. Since the structure of the party-state that gradually evolved granted maximum discretionary power to leading cadres, the political elites continued to bring their views to Chinese politics, thereby enabling the CCP to sustain the revolutionary momentum for a long time after its successful political revolution. In turn, the regime's primary task—socialist revolution—reinforced its cadre policy of emphasizing class background, its leadership method of mass mobilization, and its commitment to revolutionary change. In other words, the Maoist version of socialism reflected the system of cadre recruitment and promotion adopted during and after the revolution, and the cadres so recruited further bolstered the Maoist version of socialism. In retrospect, it seems an extreme historical irony that Mao's very success in mobilizing poor peasants to capture political power turned out to be a major obstacle in shifting the CCP's focus from revolution to nation building and economic development after 1949.

Revolutionary Cadres

The upper echelons of China's leaders during the Mao era started their careers as guerrilla fighters during the anti-Japanese war and the Chinese civil war. Recruited largely from poor peasants and hired laborers, they were high in revolutionary potential but their level of education was too low for them to understand the functional requirements of industrialized society. With nothing to protect in the existing society and much to gain from a revolution, they

created a new political structure and continued to pursue radical social revolution even after 1949.

The former revolutionaries continued the practice of recruiting cadres from among political activists on the basis of their political reliability. Each political movement, such as land reform, collectivization, the antirightist campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Socialist Education Movement, and the CR, produced activists who eventually joined the party and became cadres. Despite their low level of education, they gradually moved up the bureaucratic hierarchy, becoming the leading cadres at all levels of the bureaucracy.

The personnel-management system during the Mao era reinforced the image of officials as heroic revolutionary cadres. After 1949 political loyalty (virtue) gained increasing importance, whereas the relative weight of achievement and expertise (ability) declined to such an extent that Susan Shirk called the system a virtuocracy.^[3] Political loyalty, frequently inferred from class background, was first defined in terms of party membership; but as the party ranks swelled with new recruits from the most disadvantaged social groups, the criterion changed to support for Mao's thought. Although applicable to every Chinese—except those with undesirable family backgrounds—such a criterion tended to be subjective, allowing the evaluators wide discretionary power and encouraging "faked" activism.

The party-state not only jealously guarded its prerogative over the personnel management of cadres but also exercised that authority in a highly centralized fashion without developing any meaningful classification scheme for the gigantic cadre corps. Authority over personnel was exercised by superior organs two levels above a cadre. Party committees and organizational departments managed all the cadre corps, using political criteria. The personnel dossier system allowed the superior organizations to control cadres under their jurisdiction, further reducing the cadres' job mobility and the effective use of scarce human resources, as well as contributing to a unit's ownership of cadres. The politicization of the cadre-management criteria made cadres fear the contents of

[3] Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategy in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

their dossiers, while those with access to the dossiers gained enormous leverage over the other cadres.

The Maoist personnel-management system could not, however, prevent senior political leaders from abusing their authority for private gains. Instead, the highly politicized and centralized personnel-management system, together with the life tenure system, provided individual political leaders with ample room to develop personal power bases.^[4] The only effective control that this system could achieve was to prevent intellectuals from going into politically influential positions.

Although founded by the best-educated group, the CCP developed a bias against the educated sector of the Chinese population for several reasons. First, in the 1950s most intellectuals came from the exploiting classes and tended to develop their own views, independent of the official orthodoxy. Second, having been symbol manipulators themselves, high-ranking cadres tended to view intellectuals as ideologues and propagandists rather than technocratic specialists. Third, CCP leaders, including Mao, felt that they knew best about China's conditions and its course for the future. The party's success in capturing political power reinforced its leaders' self-confidence and led them to overlook the intellectuals' potential contributions to the new society. Fourth, even when the regime recognized that intellectuals possessed expertise necessary to the regime's goal, it wanted to use their knowledge without having to tolerate their political views. The party, therefore, compared intellectuals to peacocks—which frequently change color—suggesting that the party should control them firmly but not too tightly, lest they suffocate, and not too loosely, lest they fly away.^[5] Consequently, only intellectuals willing to espouse the official orthodoxy were allowed to flourish, whereas intellectuals critical of the regime were suppressed without mercy. Most specialists stayed in functional positions without any political influence in the bureaucracy and worked under the leadership of revolutionary cadres who were without any professional knowledge, as exempli-

[4] In traditional China, the imperial court controlled personnel matters, but allowed local officials (which it had appointed) a substantial discretionary power in policy areas. As the Qing court lost its vitality, powerful officials frequently used their authority to develop personal power bases by placing their own followers in strategically important positions within the official bureaucracy. This process eventually led to the warlordism.

[5] From an interview in Beijing in 1988.

fied by Mao's slogan that "outsiders [nonspecialists] lead insiders [specialists]."

Although Mao was personally responsible for this anti-intellectual attitude, it also reflected the opinion of most revolutionary cadres, who were resisting the pragmatic leaders' attempts to focus on economic development. During the land reforms of 1947, poor peasant cadres in some party organizations spontaneously took over leadership from intellectual cadres. During the Hundred Flowers campaign, some intellectuals questioned the party's cadre line, which favored certain class backgrounds and political loyalty; the top political leaders mobilized newly recruited peasant party members and cadres to suppress the challengers, purging almost 10 percent of all the intellectuals.

To make matters worse, the regime neglected to provide on-the-job training to the revolutionary cadres. The cadre educational program that had begun immediately after the revolution came to an end with the Great Leap Forward. As a result, many old cadres could boast of their long seniority and their wide range of work experience, but they tended to remain generalists rather than develop a speciality.

In contrast, Eastern European Communist leaders selectively coopted a new generation of specialists and then gradually relinquished political power to them while trying to maintain a balance between the Leninist tradition and the goal of economic development. Even Stalin cultivated members of "the proletarian technical intelligentsia" in the 1930s and promoted them to political positions vacated by his purges.^[6] By failing to co-opt its intellectuals, China refuted the general assumption that all revolutionary Leninist regimes go through the same stages of transformation, consolidation, and adaptation or inclusion.^[7] Instead, the CCP attempted to consolidate its own political structure, first through social transformation and then through adaptation. Consequently,

[6] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1932," Journal of Contemporary History , January 1974, 33–52; Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939," Slavic Review 38(3) (September 1979): 376–402.

[7] Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 3–42; Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," World Politics 27(1) (October 1975): 69–78.

the Chinese political process during the Mao era displayed cycles of radicalization and deradicalization, while moving in a more radical direction.^[8]

Structure of the Party-State and Revolutionary Cadres

The party-state structure that gradually evolved in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the founders' experiences, including "their own pre-1949 experience in conducting revolutionary struggle and administering 'liberated areas.'"^[9] Other factors such as "the theoretical Leninist model of 'democratic centralism,' the post-Leninist model of Soviet society," and "China's centuries-old tradition of authoritarianism, elitism, ideological orthodoxy, and bureaucratic administration" also helped shape the organizational structure of the PRC.^[10] These factors were, however, filtered through the founders' rural orientation, which stressed subsistence and self-sufficiency, moralized politics, distrusted exchange through a market mechanism, and knew little about the functional prerequisites of modern society.

The scope of the activities directly regulated by the Maoist party-state was all-inclusive.^[11] In the name of the socialist revolution and transformation, the party-state gradually expanded its control over not only coercive instruments but also all economic and human resources, including the goods and services that the Chinese people needed in their daily lives.^[12] As the party-state took over the

[8] For the policy cycles, see G. William Skinner and Edwin Winckler, "Compliance Succession in China: A Cyclical Theory," in A. Etzioni, ed., A Sociological Reader on Complex Organization (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961); Edward Winckler, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Reply," China Quarterly , no.68, December 1976, 734–50.

[9] A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 427. For an attempt to explain the post-1949 policy in terms of the preceding revolutionary experiences, see Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[10] Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power , 427.

[11] For a characterization of the Maoist system and its transformation by 1982, see Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972–82," Problems of Communism , September–October 1982, 1–19.

[12] For the evolution of the powerful party-state in China, see Tang Tsou, "Reflections on the Formation and Foundation of the Communist Party-State in China," in his Cultural Revolution , 259–334.

functions traditionally performed by social organizations and individuals, personal autonomy shrank and dependency on the state increased. The socialist transformation resulted in a state command economy, in which the party-state controlled all aspects of economic activities "from planning and financing to the circulation of a product and the allocation of labor" (jihua shang dabao dalan, caizhengshang tongshou tongzhi, liutongshang tongguo tongxiao, lao-dongshang tongbao tongpei ).^[13] The elimination of the labor market and the introduction of the centralized allocation system enabled the party-state to control all social mobility. Since the party-state rejected exchange relations as a mode of social interaction on the grounds that they were capitalistic, power and authority relations—as controlled by the party-state—permeated every aspect of interaction.^[14]

Despite the party-state's comprehensive jurisdiction, structural differentiation was minimal during the Mao era, largely because of Mao's concern that functional specialization would foster a new social stratification. The rural population was organized into communes—multifunctional organizations that performed political, administrative, social, and economic tasks—thereby strengthening the traditional cellular boundaries of each village community.^[15] Even economic enterprises and universities were encouraged to be self-sufficient in meeting the needs of their members. Instead of encouraging specialization and professionalization, the regime urged individuals to perform multiple tasks just as the old revolutionaries had during the guerrilla war era.

The party's "monistic leadership" reduced structural differentiation further. Although initially introduced in 1942 as "a means of resolving the lack of coordination between the various organizations of the party, government, and military that were scattered all over the guerrilla base areas," party committees came to dominate every organization, whether political, economic, or

[13] Shehui Kexue Yanjiu , no. 2, 1983, 35–42.

[14] Whether the state used its capability for the people's benefit is irrelevant because power is a "structural phenomenon" of dependency. For this view of power, see Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power and Organization (Boston: Pitman, 1981).

[15] Vivian Shue, The Reach of the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Helen Siu, Agents and Victims in South China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

otherwise.^[16] The party core group (dangzu ) system—originally introduced in government ministries as a temporary measure in 1949 when a large number of government leaders were nonparty members—continued to dominate government decision-making bodies until recently. Moreover, after 1957 the party moved to manage the business of the functional organs directly with the slogan "the party leads everything in the seven areas of work: agriculture, industry, commerce, education, military matters, politics, and party affairs." In response to the increasing power of party committees and secretaries, the boundary blurred between the party on the one hand and state organs and social organizations on the other, and the party-state's accountability to society declined.^[17]

In addition, the official ideology, although not fully internalized by cadres, operated as a structure in the Althusserian sense by limiting the policy choices of the political elite.^[18] Mao's "politics in command" exemplified the uniform imposition of the official ideology on all sectors of the party-state and society. The Maoist version of socialism—which attached paramount importance to distribution rather than production and stressed egalitarianism over efficiency in order to provide minimum material needs for all Chinese—took precedence in decision making in all functional fields.

The renewed emphasis on class struggle revitalized discrimination against such former exploiting classes as landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists—despite the fact that their political influence was so meager that Mao called them "fleas in Buddha's palm." The antirightist campaign produced still another category to be excluded from the political process, the "rightists." The CR added "powerholders taking the capitalist road" and the "stinking ninth category" of intellectuals to the list of enemies.^[19] Nevertheless, despite an official emphasis on the class nature of the party-state, the regime's policies did not further the interests of the working class. Although the cadres were largely drawn from this class,

[16] Xinhua Wenzhi , no. 11, 1987, 1–5; Zhongguo Shehui Kexue , June 1987, 3–22.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970).

[19] The nine categories include landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, renegades, enemy agents, and capitalist roaders.

they obviously failed to act as its representatives. Their class "situation" was probably stronger than their ties to the class in which they originated.^[20]

The increase in the magnitude of political activities, without accompanying structural differentiation and functional specialization, resulted in enormous discretionary powers for the leading cadres of each unit. The absence of a market exchange and the low level of functional interdependence meant that horizontal coordination and communication between two units had to be conducted through the top leaders of each unit or through a higher echelon with jurisdiction over the two units. Since each unit was organized to be self-sufficient, providing most if not all the services needed for its members, the leading cadres had authority over a wide range of matters directly affecting even the daily lives of its members.

Despite the emphasis given to the mass line, no institutional mechanism existed to check cadres' abuses of authority. Complaints about leading cadres tended to end up on their target's desks because there was no investigation system independent of the party committees. The masses' lack of a normal channel by which to criticize cadres accounted for many of the violent attacks on political leaders during the Socialist Education Movement and the CR.

Although revolutionary cadres had enormous discretionary power, they were not allowed to represent any particular social group or class. As revolutionaries and as administrators, politicians, and bureaucrats,^[21] they were expected to play conflicting roles. The cadres were hierarchically organized with grades, official positions, and salaries, all specified by rules and regulations. They were subject to the personnel decisions of their superiors. The Leninist priniciple of democratic centralism created a pseudo-military command structure with authority flowing from the Politburo down to the secretary of each party cell. As agents of the state, the cadres were expected to carry out every policy faithfully

[20] Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist Class," in Robin Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science (London: Collin and Sons, 1972).

[21] For the distinction between the politician and the bureaucrat, see Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

regardless of its popularity with the masses or its conformity to the perceived interests of the masses. As revolutionaries, they were expectecd to represent working class interests through the mass line, but the top leaders largely predetermined what those interests were, ignoring input from the lower levels.

As politicians, the cadres were required to energize the policy-making process by mobilizing and inspiring the masses through propaganda, education, and personal example. But unlike politicians in Western democracies, they were not allowed to represent sectarian interests or work as arbitrators of conflicting sectarian interests. Cadres were instructed to investigate the concrete conditions of China's reality, but the findings of these investigations were not allowed to affect the general policy direction that the top leaders had adopted using ideological criteria. To perform the conflicting roles of revolutionaries and bureaucrats the cadres needed the support of the masses, but they were not allowed to represent the interests of the units they led.^[22] Consequently, the Chinese bureaucratic system was a strange mixture, very different from Max Weber's ideal type. It was organized hierarchically with full-time cadres, but it lacked the characteristics of impersonality, technical expertise, and political neutrality.

The effective operation of the Maoist system depended mainly on the cadres' ideological commitment. Therefore, Mao subjected the cadres to constant ideological campaigns, refusing to grant any legitimacy to their personal interests. His approach did not work, however, because his expectations were too high. As the campaigns were repeated, the process became ritualized. According to the Maoists' ideal vision, cadres were supposed to forfeit their personal interests to the higher cause of the revolution, but in reality they frequently resorted to what Andrew Walder calls "principled particularism" in order to protect their personal interests and neutralize conflicting pressures.^[23]

Although failing to forsake their personal interests, the revolutionary cadres generally acted as the state's agents. In many cases,

[22] For different views on whether the basic-level cadres could protect the local interests from the state, see Shue, The Reach of the State , and Siu, Agents and Victims in South China .

[23] Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).

as the first in their family to obtain an official position with prestige and a regular salary, the cadres owed the party-state not only their job but also their power, income, and status. As the beneficiaries of the new order, they were eager to defend it, doing whatever the party told them as long as the commands were transmitted through the organizational channel. In addition, some of them genuinely believed in the party.^[24] Whatever their motivation, they found an accord with Mao's version of and his approach to building socialism because of their own successful experience in mobilizing the masses for such specific tasks as fighting guerrilla wars and promoting land reform or collectivization. They could appreciate the Maoist method of evaluating cadres in terms of political rather than achievement-oriented criteria. To the revolutionary cadres, dedication to cause, obedience, diligence, conscientiousness, and intention were more important than ability, efficiency, innovation, and actual results.^[25]

The revolutionary cadres' blind subscription to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism produced the unintended consequence of blending policy debates with the struggle for power. Since the principle assumes that there is only one correct policy for the party, dissenting views cannot remain as alternative policy options. Moreover, because losing a policy debate was equated with being ideologically incorrect, policy debates frequently ended with political purges. Conversely, once an official policy was adopted, it became extremely difficult to adjust or change the policy without victimizing the cadres who had benefited from, supported, and earnestly carried it out. It is an extreme irony that the Leninist principle, which was originally devised to achieve a unity of leadership, produced the unintended consequence of encouraging factionalism.

The structure of the cadre corps and the Maoist system reinforced some of the more rigid and maladaptive features of China's two-thousand-year-old tradition of feudal bureaucratism. Despite the Maoist radicals' antibureaucratic rhetoric, the concentration of decision-making authority in the party-state and the absence of social forces counterbalancing the bureaucracy intensified the tradi-

[24] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 12, 1983, 32–39.

[25] Weidingkao , July 1986, 25–28.

tional pattern of a centralized ruling elite monopolizing power. And the rigid hierarchical structure of the party-state and the cadre grade system produced a stratification within the cadre corps, thus reinforcing the elitist tradition. The party-state's total domination of civil society left a career in the bureaucracy as the only channel for social mobility, further intensifying competition for the limited number of cadre positions that commanded not only political power but also economic resources and social prestige.

Traditional views persisted among leaders who were supposed to act as guardians of collective interests and to set an example by forfeiting private interests. The idea that political leaders could improve themselves by self-cultivation continued in the practice of criticism and self-criticism. The traditional view that the moral force of doctrinal orthodoxy legitimized power justified the use of coercion to impose the official ideology. The life tenure system allowed cadres to privatize their offices, blurring the boundary between the authority derived from an office and the power of the cadre as a person, thus fostering further the paternal exercise of power.^[26]

The Impetus for Change

The Maoist system had problems because of its rigidity and over-concentration of power. The expansion of the party-state's control over human activities and the elimination of resistance from civil society did not end social conflicts and tensions. Instead, it turned them into an inner-party struggle.^[27] The ideal was the replacement of an impersonal and erratic market mechanism with political authority that would make rational decisions, but in reality the command economy, which had only a "strong thumb [and] no fingers," enhanced the power of the well-entrenched cadre corps.^[28] Mao's attempt to moralize cadres' power through ideological education politicized morality and ethics rather than humanizing

[26] For this point, see Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration," World Politics , 1979, 195–227.

[27] For this point, see James Townsend, "Intra-Party Conflict in China: Disintegration of an Established Party System," in Huntington and Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society , 284–310.

[28] Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

power relations, adding further ideological legitimacy to the cadres' domination. Paradoxically, his effort to resolve these intrinsic dilemmas by mobilizing the masses in the CR strengthened the party-state's domination.

The CR symbolized the profound crisis within the first generation of revolutionaries over the issue of revolution versus economic development and the concomitant issue of cadre recruitment.^[29] Bureaucratic modernizers such as Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai wanted to improve the overall quality of the cadre corps by coopting intellectuals from undesirable classes into the power structure. They also tried to develop functionally specialized organs and to secularize the official ideology. Mao viewed the co-optation of intellectuals as a betrayal of the Chinese revolution at the expense of disadvantaged social groups. Worried over the possibility that the cadre corps might emerge as a new ruling class, he insisted that officials continue to act as selfless heroic revolutionaries, willing to submit themselves to the masses. Political considerations also entered the complex political maneuvering and countermaneuvering at the top level. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, some of Mao's former colleagues questioned the validity of his approach to economic development, and his popularity within the bureaucracy declined.

When Mao removed the party's control over society and allowed the masses to mobilize freely, all the social conflict that the powerful party-state had managed to suppress erupted and threw China into chaos. Although the official targets of the CR were the "powerholders taking capitalist roads," the factionalized mass organizations targeted all "powerholders." With the purge of a large number of leading cadres who, in effect, symbolized formal authority, the entire authority structure of the party-state collapsed.

When the mass mobilization phase of the CR ended in 1968, the basic cleavages within the elite ran between the situational groups produced by the preceding two years of mass mobilization: the initiators, the beneficiaries, the survivors, and the victims of the

[29] For the issues over which the old revolutionaries split, see Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," in Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution , 67–94.

CR. These four groups, each with its own distinctive support base, held disparate views on the CR and its policy agenda. As a military man, Lin Biao's power base was limited to a few select military officers. The Gang of Four resorted to the revolutionary method of mobilizing discontented social groups against the establishment. It recruited and promoted young CR rebels into the bureaucracy in order to strengthen its own power base while resisting the rehabilitation of the purged cadres. In contrast, the beneficiaries approved of some rehabilitation but resisted the return of Deng Xiaoping. The survivors advocated large-scale rehabilitation. The maneuvers and countermaneuvers, coalitions, and conflicts of these four groups ended with the victory of the rehabilitated cadre corps after Mao's death.

The impetus of reform can thus be traced back to the senior leaders' personal experience of humiliation, imprisonment, and purges. As victims of the very system they had, until 1966, helped to create, they now saw its flaws. And when forced to live with peasants and labor with workers, they witnessed the prevalent poverty—an experience that changed their perception of China's reality and the masses' desires. Moreover, by the time the rehabilitated cadres regained political power, they realized that the system's legitimacy was so weak in the eyes of the Chinese people that drastic measures had to be taken to restore popular confidence in the CCP. Consequently, the former-victim-now-rehabilitated cadres became born-again reformers.

Once reinstated in leading positions, the veteran cadres shifted the party's major task from revolution to economic development—a goal that required sweeping reforms of the system. However, the existing cadres were ill equipped for the new task; they were "too old, too poorly educated, and too ossified in their thinking." The only way to improve the quality of the corps was to promote the educated to leadership positions, which required two preparations: improving the political status of educated people and creating vacancies for them to move into.

By the time the CR officially ended, with the purge of the Gang of Four, the powerless Chinese intellectuals had been thoroughly persecuted and abused. At one point, the Gang of Four—called petty intellectuals by their adversaries—rounded up the professors of Beijing's universities and subjected them to a test on Mao's

thought and other ideological questions. Many of the professors failed that test, and the radicals used their poor performance as evidence of their "parasite nature."^[30] Many scientific research institutions were disbanded and their staffs were sent to the countryside to reform themselves. Subsequently, "those specializing in rocketry were assigned to be custodians, remote control specialists were turned into butchers, those trained in computer science were employed in distilleries, entomologists were engaged in industrial design, mathematicians and foreign language specialists became fuel sellers or bakers."^[31]

After 1978 the regime attempted to improve the political standing of the intellectuals. Publicly conceding that modernization was impossible without knowledge, the regime for the first time cited the possession of technical knowledge rather than the ability to manipulate symbols as the intellectual's most salient characteristic.^[32] For instance, Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the 1958 antirightist campaign, publicly declared that since engineers and technicians participated directly in the creation of surplus value, they were "a part of the working class."^[33]

The regime conducted a comprehensive nationwide survey of scientific and technical personnel so that it could effectively utilize these scarce human resources.^[34] It also took steps to improve the intellectuals' working and living conditions. First, it assigned scientific and technical persons to appropriate positions when their jobs did not match their speciality.^[35] Second, it resolved the problems of about 720,000 couples living separately.^[36] Third, Hu Yaobang, the director of the organization department, initiated measures to rehabilitate intellectuals victimized in the CR.^[37] Fourth, the regime took several actions to raise the income of some intellectual groups, giving special attention to intellectuals' hous-

[30] Zhonggong Dangshi Jiaoxue Cankao Ziliao: Wenhua Dageming Shiqi (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xueyuan, 1983), vol. 4, no. 4, 284.

[31] Ming Bao , 15 May 1978.

[32] Jiaodang Cankao (Anhui), 15 May 1983.

[33] Wuhan Daxue Xuebao , no. 2, 1985, 63–66.

[34] Daily Report , 26 June 1978, Ell; Hebei Xuekan , no. 1, 1985, 1.

[35] Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Sichuan), 21 July 1985.

[36] Renmin Ribao , 3 November 1980.

[37] In some cultural units, intellectuals, specialists, and experts constituted 60 percent of all purged in the CR. Jiaoxue Cankao (Hebei Construction Institute), no. 203.

ing difficulties. Fifth, in order to boost morale and raise professional prestige, the regime created professional titles for specialists. Sixth, for the sake of utilizing scarce resources effectively, the regime gradually relaxed its "unified recruitment and unified allocation" while legalizing a limited labor market for specialists.^[38]

In order to clear the way for a new cadre corps, the regime developed a special retirement system (lixiu ), which allowed old cadres to retire with all their perquisites intact. Consequently, the majority of the senior political leaders—those who had joined the revolution as guerrilla fighters, founded the new regime, created the huge bureaucratic machine and occupied its leading positions, sustained the revolutionary momentum, experienced the purges as "powerholders taking the capitalist road," and regained power as rehabilitated cadres—finally retired. The regime proceeded to promote a new breed of cadres, who were "better educated, younger, professionally competent, and revolutionized," while purging the former CR rebels-turned-cadres as representative of the "three types of people." Thanks to the pragmatic and incremental strategy of changing the cadre corps step by step, level by level, and group by group, a new generation of bureaucratic technocrats finally replaced the revolutionary cadres as China's political elite.

Bureaucratic Technocrats as New Leaders

China's new leaders belong by and large to the postliberation generation, which came of age in the new socialist China—a group known as the third generation (after the first generation, which joined the revolution before the Long March, and the second generation, which participated in the anti-Japanese war).

Selected from the best-educated segment of the Chinese population, most of China's new leaders studied natural sciences in college and worked as specialists in production-related fields in bureaucratized organizations. Thus, the new leaders are not "critical intellectuals" who, by virtue of their knowledge of tradition, values, norms, or ideology, tend to act as critics of the existing system. With their career backgrounds as engineers and specialists

[38] Liaowang , 21 January 1985.

trained in hard science—possessing narrowly defined technical knowledge related mainly to a formal rationality that helps to choose the best means once the basic goals of the society are agreed on—the new leaders will likely see their mission as improving and perfecting the existing system.^[39] The technocrats' political proclivity may have helped them rise to the top political positions. Or the selection of bureaucratic technocrats as China's new leaders may simply reflect China's shortage of trained experts in the soft sciences and its concern with production outputs.

Although we cannot assume that the bureaucratic technocrats form a homogeneous group with a shared ideology and policy preferences, they are on the whole quite different from the revolutionary cadres in many aspects.

First of all, the criteria used in selecting the bureaucratic technocrats are different. At the lower level some were selected by election, contract for a limited term, examination, and other methods. The revolutionary cadres owed their position to their ideological reliability, whereas the bureaucratic technocrats are promoted on the basis of their "ability," usually inferred from such objective and universal criteria as age, educational level, and professional competence. The rise of bureaucratic technocrats, therefore, marks a sharp departure from the Maoist practice of stressing "virtue."

Even though political qualification was used in selecting the new leaders, its contents have changed. During the Mao era, it included such ideological criteria as an understanding of Marxism-Leninism, a dedication to the mass line, and a willingness to sacrifice one's private interests. Now political qualification refers to one's dedication to the "socialist principle," which is broadly interpreted in turn to include any principle that "brings good fortune to the people, develops productivity, or contributes to socialist business."^[40]

The universal, achievement-oriented criteria, however, are not uniformly applied to every qualified candidate; personal connections also operate, thereby resulting in "unprincipled universalism," in contrast to what Andrew Walder calls the "principled

[39] Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

[40] Qunzong , 13 February 1985.

particularism" of the Mao era. Because of the particularistic application of universal criteria, some social groups benefited from the reform while others lost.

Second, available data (although scarce) indicate that, like their counterparts in Western Europe, the bureaucratic technocrats are less committed to any political ideology—whether a broadly defined socialism or Mao Zedong's discredited thought—than the disappearing revolutionary cadres. Some veteran revolutionaries, therefore, openly fear that the new leaders' understanding of "the basic principles of Marxism" and "the good party tradition and work style" is so limited that they will not "use the Marxist perspective to solve present problems." Moreover, free from "the party's fine tradition of the Yanan period," they are more susceptible to new ideas and foreign trends. If the bureaucratic technocrats have any common ideology, it is the simple pragmatism necessary to get the job done.^[41] To them, socialist ideology is not a dogma but something to be interpreted flexibly for an economic goal.

Third, the revolutionary cadres and the bureaucratic technocrats differ over the range of policy alternatives considered feasible. Although an ideologically inspired policy option was a real alternative for the revolutionary cadres, it may not be so for the bureaucratic technocrats, whose primary concern is China's immediate problems. The technocrats prefer a structured and orderly environment and technical, piecemeal solutions rather than comprehensive political solutions dictated by ideological goals. Criteria for judging policy options are also different. The revolutionary cadres tended to view policy options as morally right and wrong, ideologically correct and incorrect, whereas the bureaucratic technocrats, less concerned with abstract ideals, look at technical and administrative feasibility in making a final choice. They evaluate even political decisions in terms of actual outcome rather than ideological value. In developing a range of policy options, each of which carries only different costs, benefits, and feasibilities, this way of thinking inclines the bureaucratic technocrats toward compromise and bargaining.

Fourth, on the whole the bureaucratic technocrats are more supportive of reform than the retiring revolutionary cadres were.

[41] Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 380.

Many of them served in technical positions without influence, watching uneducated political leaders make arbitrary decisions and use bureaucratic rules to constrain their own professional work. Some were condemned as "bourgeois experts." Even those from the lowest class of preliberation China have diminished gratitude to the party because of their experiences with past political turmoil.

Fifth, having been promoted rapidly from low-level technical positions scattered all over China, the new political leaders, with the probable exception of those who studied in the Soviet Union, do not enjoy the close and extensive informal ties that the revolutionary cadres developed during their prolonged careers. The lack of such informal ties—which helped the senior political leaders to run the bureaucracy smoothly despite its departmentalism and lack of horizontal channels of communication—may compel the new leaders to rely more on formal procedural rules when making decisions and thereby facilitate the institutionalization of the Chinese political process. Then again, weak personal ties might turn out to be a decisive liability that prevents these leaders from reaching any compromise and leads instead to division and stalemate. A particularly obvious weakness is their lack of close ties with the military as an institution.

Last, having spent most of their careers as part of the technical staff in functionally specialized organizations, even bureaucratic technocrats who have reached the top political positions have accumulated very little experience in the overall political apparatus, which includes administration, propaganda, and mass works. Thus, a question crucial to China's future politics is whether bureaucratic technocrats at the top will see themselves as bureaucratic administrators or politicians.^[42]

[42] The separation is bound to take place, although the differences between the two are beginning to fade elsewhere, even in places like Western Europe that have traditionally kept the roles distinct. The bureaucrat generally acts as an equilibrator by taking ideologically centrist positions, mediating interests, and minimizing conflicts, whereas the politician acts as an energizer by mobilizing the support of social forces. Articulating the broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, politicians tend to be passionate, partisan, idealistic, and innovative, whereas "the bureaucrat approaches a policy question with a predisposition toward harmony; he is prepared to compromise in order to promote unity and cohesion within the organization and to broaden its external appeal." John P. Roche and Stephen Sachs, "The Bureaucrat and the Enthusiasts," Western Political Quarterly , 1955, quoted in Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians , 257.

There is not enough empirical evidence to render a definitive judgment on how the new leaders' specialized technical knowledge will help them acquire political wisdom and insight. The existing literature points in two different directions. One school suggests that the technocrats will bring their professional perspective to the role of politician by "treating the ideological argument with condescending indifference, [while] upholding the conviction that social problems are susceptible to technical solutions."^[43] The other believes that the complex roles required of politicians will change the technocrats' behavior in political positions, forcing them to take partisan and politically motivated postures. Data available in China, although scarce, indicate that those who have reached the highest positions of the Chinese bureaucracy—for instance, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng—will act more like coordinators, conciliators, and managers than like politicians representing the interests of the various social groups, developing long-term visions, and manipulating symbols to rally popular support.

Although on the whole quite different from the revolutionary cadres, the bureaucratic technocrats do not form a homogeneous group with a shared ideology and policy preferences. Since the process of selecting future leaders has involved nepotism and corruption, it is fair to assume that different groups within the new leadership owe their rise to senior leaders with different policy preferences. They have also worked in different fields, and they are divided by a generation gap too wide to make shared attitudes the basis for unity. The older technocrats, many of whom have studied in the Soviet Union, tend to be more conservative than the younger ones.

How will the bureaucratic technocrats resolve their internal differences? Will they be able to use compromise, bargaining, and negotiation—which presuppose a more tolerant attitude toward dissent—to iron out differences without resorting to the methods used by the revolutionary cadres? Direct evidence is unavailable. But one can infer from their overall traits—including a minimal commitment to a well-defined ideology, a lack of personal net-

[43] Stephen Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 46, cited in Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 380.

works, and a perception of themselves primarily as administrators—that China's new leaders will be more prone to bargain and compromise. There are additional reasons for this cautious optimism. Given their political style and the rapidity of their rise in the past few years, it is very unlikely that any bureaucratic technocrat—including Jiang Zemin, whom Deng Xiaoping designated as his successor—will come to exert as much "real power and influence" (shiquan ) as Mao or Deng did. With no paramount leader, the policy-making process may result in division, stalemate, and immobility. But it is more likely that the bureaucratic technocrats will feel compelled to develop a collective style of leadership and formal procedural rules in making decisions—the very steps needed for political institutionalization. Any decision made this way will likely be less innovative and less revolutionary than one made by a dictator. But such a decision-making process will less frequently result in power struggles, purges, and counter-purges.

Even though the bureaucratic technocrats' preferences on specific policy issues are not yet known, the replacement of revolutionary cadres by bureaucratic technocrats signifies an end to the revolutionary era in modern China, an era characterized by the classes from which members of the political elite were recruited, their personal experiences, and their career backgrounds. The revolutionary cadres differed from the traditional political elite, whose dual interests made it a buffer between the state and society. Recruited mainly from the landlords and wealthy families, members of the traditional elite felt the need to defend their social and economic interests from state encroachment. As scholar-officials who received appointments from the imperial court after passing the civil service examination, they also represented the state's authority. As the term "gentry-scholar-officials" implies, wealth, knowledge, and power converged in their hands, ensuring perhaps the longevity of the traditional system. In contrast, in socialist China knowledge was separated from power; the Maoist political elite possessed only political power (with which they controlled wealth) but not knowledge.

China is now returning to the time-honored practice of selecting its political leaders from the best educated in the population, a practice that had ended with the abolition of the civil service ex-

aminations in 1905. Future historians may well view the revolutionary era as a temporary aberration in the long Chinese tradition of choosing members of the political elite from the best-educated group. Now bureaucratic technocrats—who have a better understanding of and better qualifications to deal with such prerequisites of industrialized society as functional specialization, the coordination of parts, rational decision making, and problem solving—have replaced the revolutionary cadres. However, it is an altogether different question whether the new leaders have the ability and the political acumen to lead China through the multitude of contradictions created by the reforms of the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

Difficulties of Reform and the Tiananmen Incident

What makes reforming any socialist system difficult is that its various parts—including its political, economic, and social systems—are so tightly integrated that changing any one requires simultaneous changes in the others. For instance, the state command economy presupposes the existence of a Leninist Party which, as the agent of the working class, will supervise the operation of the state machinery. The Chinese leaders tried to circumvent this difficulty by adopting a gradual, step-by-step reform strategy. They started with reforms of the economic rather than the political system—whereas the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe started with political reforms—the rural rather than the urban economy, and, within the economic arena, industrial management rather than the price system. Such a strategy, which did not require a master plan at the beginning, proved effective in preventing potential opposition forces from coalescing. But the strategy's ultimate success depends largely on the success of each stage of reform.

By 1988 the incremental approach in China encountered serious challenges because of the mixed results of the steps taken so far. Over the previous ten years, reforms had raised the living standards of most Chinese steadily, but the population's expectations were outstripping the system's capabilities. The overheated economy produced superinflation, undermining stable prices and employment opportunities, the only advantages that the Maoist system offered equally to all social groups. The dual price structure

introduced as a transition to price reform aggravated official corruption, thereby weakening the regime's legitimacy further. And by not separating political from economic authority, the decentralization of the decision-making authority resulted in a fragmented bureaucracy, allowing lower-level units to use political authority for their own economic gain and to act as "independent kingdoms." At the same time, the reforms had opened the political process sufficiently to allow newly rising social groups to air their demands.

These immediate challenges forced the Chinese leaders to confront the more fundamental but unresolved questions that they had hoped to avoid by adopting the incremental reform strategy: How far should the economy be free of political control? How should state planning be combined with market control, and what is the optimal combination? How can the Leninist Party deal with the social forces liberated by the reforms and maintain its political hegemony while leading China toward economic development? In the final analysis all these questions can be reduced to the question of how to separate politics from economics.^[44]

On this essential question, one can identify four major schools of thought, located along the ideological spectrum represented by the influential political leaders. The first school regards political reform as a prerequisite for further economic reform. In accord with what Andrew Nathan calls the "functional benefit of democracy," it insists that only political democratization can resolve China's pressing problems by regulating political conflicts, strengthening the regime's legitimacy, and improving the quality of the bureaucracy.^[45] This view draws support from critical intellectuals and college students.^[46] Among the top leadership, Hu Yaobang has stressed the importance of a democratic atmosphere in inner party life as well as in politics in general, while indicating that Marxism-Leninism has become outdated or irrelevant to China's present-day problems.

The second school, represented by Zhao Ziyang, gives priority

[44] Ziliao Yuekan , no. 4, 1988, 3–11.

[45] Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

[46] Su Shaozhi, "The Problems of the Political Reform in China," China Information 3(3) (1988): 32–37.

to continuing economic reforms, including price reform, an elimination of the dual price system, and further marketization. Although Zhao Ziyang has never explicitly advocated privatizing the ownership system, he was apparently willing to accept eventual and inevitable privatization.^[47] In the political arena this school subscribes to the idea of "new authoritarianism"—the ideas developed by Zhao's young brain trusters on the basis of the Four Asian Dragons' experiences. The "new authoritarianism" differs from the notion of "the people's democratic dictatorship." The former envisions the necessary political leadership as coming from the intellectuals and experts, whereas the latter stresses the political leadership of the working class. The first is devoid of any commitment to socialist ideology, whereas the second presupposes its acceptance.^[48] Zhao Ziyang reportedly not only prohibited the official ideology from interfering with economic reforms but also "went so far as to say that he himself did not really know what the socialist road was."^[49] To Zhao, official corruption has nothing to do with spiritual pollution and therefore should be considered the price that China has to pay in the transitional period.

The third school is represented by Deng Xiaoping, who is pragmatic in economic policies but authoritarian on political issues. As implied by his remark "whether it is a white or a black cat does not matter; any cat that catches mice is a good cat," Deng Xiaoping is willing to try either state planning or marketization—whichever works. He supported Zhao's economic reforms by expanding the meaning of the "socialist road" to include any method that brought prosperity to the Chinese people. He is, however, not committed to marketization to the extent of accepting the risks of inflation, unemployment, and budget and trade deficits. Nor is Deng committed to the separation of politics and economics to the extent of excluding the central government's administrative control over the economy.^[50]

In the political arena Deng Xiaoping regards party leadership as a precondition for a stable and strong central authority and is un-

[47] Daily Report , 6 July 1989, 21.

[48] As a result, the new authoritarianism is condemned as elitist. See Chengming , March 1989, 55–56; Chengming , April 1989, 42–46.

[49] Daily Report , 25 August 1989, 7.

[50] For his instructions on these three points, see ibid., 21 April 1989, 33–35.

willing to allow social forces to interfere with what he considers the party's internal affairs.^[51] More committed to Leninist principles than to Marxist ideals, Deng tends to see the official ideology as the means of achieving leadership unity. In fact, as his approach to cadre reform demonstrates, he has operated as an organization man, relying on hierarchical authority rather than ideological legitimacy to control the lower levels. Although he has been flexible in defining the four principles when necessary, Deng has also tolerated conservative ideologues such as Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, self-appointed guardians of correct socialist ideology and spokesmen for the workers, peasants, and the former revolutionary cadres.

The fourth group is led by Chen Yun, who rejects the Maoist method of mobilizing the masses for economic development while continuing to believe that China should preserve at least the basic structure of state planning in order to maintain an equilibrium between—for instance—government revenues and expenditure, agriculture and industry, exports and imports, and the supply of and demand for major commodities.^[52] He acknowledges the utility of the market mechanism, but only as a supplement to a planned economy. Thus, to Chen economic reform should seek to improve the mechanism of state planning—his analogy is expanding the cage to give the bird more space instead of allowing it to fly at will. According to this school, the excessive marketization under Zhao Ziyang led to a structural imbalance, which in turn resulted in a high rate of inflation. Chen Yun has not elaborated on his view of political authority, but the very idea of the state-planned economy with a large portion of the means of production collectively owned implies that political authority should possess a certain revolutionary quality. Moreover, as a senior revolutionary cadre, he tends to emphasize the moral integrity of the political leaders; for this reason he has been very popular among older cadres as an incorruptible elder politician.

Although the bureaucratic technocrats are more supportive of reform than the retiring revolutionary cadres were, they are not

[51] A probable exception was his support for the 1978 democratic movement in order to weaken his political adversary Hua Guofeng.

[52] Harry Harding, Chinese Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

democrats politically. Because of their training, they are averse to uncertainty and the slow process of decision making, the inevitable consequences of political democratization.^[53] Because they are primarily concerned with "doing," not "dreaming," and because "by definition, the status quo is 'do-able,' " the bureaucratic technocrats tend to show more tolerance for the shortcomings of the existing system than critical intellectuals do.^[54] In addition, as the products of the new China the bureaucratic technocrats have benefited from the existing political system.

The bureaucratic technocrats' preference for economic policy seems to vary according to previous career experience and current official position. Those with career backgrounds in the state-planning apparatus may share Chen Yun's concern over the possible loss of state control over the economy. Those in managerial positions at the factory level may prefer Zhao Ziyang's approach. Among party secretaries of local governments Deng Xiaoping's economical pragmatism and political Leninism may be popular. Among the three highest-level bureaucratic technocrats, it is believed that Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan, who actively pursued economic reforms as the top leaders of major municipalities but took a hard-line approach to the student demonstrations, are less doctrinaire than Li Peng.

Nonetheless, all the bureaucratic technocrats share one common interest: their personal and career interests are tied to a program of economic development. The raison d'être for their promotion was economic development. They cannot base their legitimacy on the claim of representing the working class, as the revolutionary cadres did, and they will not be able to maintain their elite status unless they deliver the promised economic benefits to the Chinese people. Without continuing the reforms, they cannot lead China to economic development. It thus seems very likely that the departure of the senior revolutionary leaders will free the bureaucratic technocrats to seek increased levels of production rather than equal distribution and efficiency rather than social justice.

By 1988 China's worsening economic condition added another

[53] Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals .

[54] Richard Rose, "Political Status of Higher Civil Servants," quoted in Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians , 257.

element to the already-existing policy dispute. After heated debate in a series of meetings, the regime decided to deal with the rampant inflation by strengthening central authority over economic matters and using administrative authority to tighten financial control. This policy shift signaled defeat for the reformers headed by Zhao Ziyang. At that time it was widely feared among Chinese and outside observers that further reforms were stalled and Zhao Ziyang would be eventually eased out.

It was at this moment of political uncertainty in the spring of 1989 that Chinese students initiated a protest movement—an almost unavoidable turn of events, given the social, economic, and political problems that China had experienced in the ten years of reform. In turn, the student demonstrations further deepened the already-existing cleavage among the top leaders. Li Peng, supported by the old cadres, insisted on harsh measures from the beginning, whereas Zhao Ziyang pursued a more flexible and conciliatory policy. Li Peng did not want to make concessions to the students because they would have amounted to conceding the correctness of Zhao's policy position. After an unsuccessful plea to the hard-liners to moderate their course, Zhao took his position to the public, hinting that he had no free hand in dealing with the crisis.^[55] This revelation made Zhao Ziyang, who had been considered largely responsible for the inflation and corruption, an overnight hero in the eyes of student demonstrators. To the hard-liners, Zhao's activities constituted a betrayal, an open challenge to the basic principle of the Leninist Party. Understandably, the basic-level cadres were confused and furious: "Zhao Ziyang plays the good guy at the top while we play the bad guys at the grass roots."^[56]

Why did Zhao Ziyang insist on moderation in dealing with the student demonstrators even at the risk of invoking the old leaders' resentment? Zhao might have concluded that increasing pressure from old comrades would force Deng Xiaoping to make him a

[55] Li Peng sarcastically said to him: "The students are all against you. They want to arrest those 'official speculators' to arrest your sons." Daily Report , 12 May 1989, 22–23.

[56] He did so first in his May Fourth speech to the representatives of the Asian Development Bank and later in his 19 May speech to the students in Tiananmen Square. He told Mikhail Gorbachev on 17 May that "an important decision of the first session of the 13th CPC CC" was to refer "all important matters" to Deng Xiaoping. Daily Report , 6 July 1989, 26.

scapegoat for the policy failures, for which Deng himself was as much responsible as Zhao, and that his—Zhao's—fall would seal the fate of the entire reform movement.^[57] Or Zhao might have thought that by capitalizing on the students' demands, he could strike back at the adversaries conspiring to remove him and turn back the clock on reform.^[58] Zhao might have calculated that he would be better off, at least in the future, if he took the issue to the public, even at the risk of breaking the Leninist principle.

The leadership split prevented the regime from taking coherent and consistent measures with regard to the student protest. As the stalemate between the regime and the students continued, the protest expanded to draw the support of other Beijing social groups, allowing many different grievances to converge.^[59] Not only some government employees but also many party members openly showed sympathy for the student movement, "quite a number of them" acting as leaders of the protest and others publicly stating their withdrawal from the party.^[60]

Among the social groups, the private entrepreneurs and individual business households that had benefited most from the reforms supported Zhao and the students most enthusiastically.^[61] Unfortunately, this group has yet to develop the strength to be an independent political force, and it lacks sufficient common interests with the workers and peasants to form a broad coalition. Probably the workers and peasants have resented the high income of private entrepreneurs and individual business households, believing that the gain was obtained at their expense.^[62]

Some individual workers showed sympathy for the students, particularly after Li Peng's unpopular decision to declare martial law. But it seems that they never participated in the demonstra-

[57] Although Deng Xiaoping was initially inclined to protect Zhao, the pressure from the old cadres was too heavy particularly after the Tiananmen incident.

[58] Daily Report , 8 May 1989, 19.

[59] A survey of 865 residents conducted by students in six districts of Beijing in early May indicated that 51 percent of them expressed "strong support" for the student movement, 44.5 percent expressed sympathy, and only 1.1 percent said they were opposed.

[60] Daily Report , 28 July 1989, 19.

[61] Ibid., 18 August 1989.

[62] For the workers' role in the demonstration, see Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs , no. 24, July 1990, 1–21.

tions in any organized fashion.^[63] Although the workers resented the official corruption and inflation, they apparently had few interests in common with the students and intellectuals, who acted as a self-proclaimed social elite. Neither the "new authoritarianism" nor the manager-responsibility system offered many benefits to workers. This lack of sympathy might be the reason that Li Ruihuan in Tianjin and Jiang Zemin in Shanghai could mobilize workers to control the student demonstrations.

The educated sectors of the population were more supportive of the student movement, even at great risk to personal safety. Although no conclusive evidence is available, it is very likely that among the educated, younger persons were more sympathetic while older persons were more cautious because they remembered the CCP's past practice of retaliating against dissidents. Another factor determining the degree of support was the type of work unit. People employed in the media and in research institutes with more direct contact with the students were more supportive of the student protest. As for the students themselves, those trained in humanities and social sciences tended to become more involved than those majoring in natural sciences.^[64] When the regime retaliated against the student movement by curtailing the number of freshmen at Beijing University, departments such as International Politics, Sociology, History, and Philosophy were not allowed to admit any freshmen in the 1989–90 academic year.

During the 1989 student movement, some of the bureaucratic technocrats might have felt sympathy with the demands for democracy, particularly at the initial stage of the movement; but all the available evidence indicates that they did not actively participate in the mass demonstrations or support Zhao Ziyang. For instance, after the June incident, Jiang Zemin praised "the scientists and technicians [for having] given a good account of themselves."^[65] Song Jian, state councillor and minister of the State Science and Technology Commission, declared that "the great majority of scientists and technicians have lived up to the expecta-

[63] Daily Report , 22 May 1989, 81.

[64] For instance, even among the twenty-one leaders of the movement, fourteen majored in humanities and social sciences and seven were identified as majoring in natural sciences. Ibid., 13 July 1989, 20.

[65] Ibid., 29 August 1989, 33.

tions of the party" and proved themselves "a completely reliable force of the party and people."^[66]

However, the brutal killing of innocent students by the PLA made it impossible for even bureaucratic technocrats who preferred strong government action to end the chaos to defend the specific measures taken and the ensuing political repression. At the same time, the scope and intensity of discontent among the Chinese population must have surprised many bureaucratic technocrats; if so, the experience will discourage them from initiating any bold economic measures whose long-term political consequences they cannot estimate. At the moment, the bureaucratic technocrats seem to be keeping a low profile, waiting for the hardline old revolutionaries to finally pass away.

Despite the 4 June tragedy, the bureaucratic technocrats have continued to replace the revolutionary cadres, thereby assuming most of the leading positions in the Chinese bureaucracy from the central to the lowest level. Among the members of the standing committee of the Politburo, for instance, Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, and Li Ruihuan are bureaucratic technocrats. Although the old revolutionary leaders could still exert an undue amount of political power in late 1986 when Hu Yaobang was removed and in 1989 during the student demonstrations, they will fade away within a few years. Soon the core of the highest leadership will not be a senior leader from the preceding generation—like Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang—but Jiang Zemin, who belongs to the same generation.^[67]

By using naked force the regime managed to suppress the protest movement and restore a semblance of order, but now the bureaucratic technocrats face almost impossible tasks: to consolidate their power base while regaining the people's confidence and to reimpose socialist ideology while continuing economic reforms and the open door policy, at a time when many Chinese feel that the regime has lost its mandate to rule China. The only way for the regime to regain some of its legitimacy is to produce tangible economic development.

However, the official policy following the Tiananmen Square incident—which the remaining old revolutionaries continue to

[66] Ibid., 12 July 1989, 29.

[67] Renmin Ribao , 13 November 1989.

dictate to the bureaucratic technocrats—is not promising. The regime has recentralized economic authority, adopted a tight monetary policy, and initiated a campaign to "improve economic order and rectify the economic environment." Instead of price reform, which even liberal economists believe could not be carried out because of superinflation, the regime intends to perfect contract systems. In general, state planning has regained control of the economy and the idea of privatizing the ownership system is officially condemned.^[68] Although these actions have been publicized as temporary measures designed to "deepen the reform," many liberal economists worry publicly that "reform is marking time [and] no reform means no future."^[69]

Politically, the regime has reverted to repressive measures. It is attempting to strengthen the CCP by restoring the party core group in the government ministries and bolstering the party secretary's authority in businesses. The effort to separate the party from the government has been reversed; the current official position is that the party and the government organizations will not have separate organizational structures but merely separate functions.^[70]

Attributing the student demonstrations to Zhao's neglect of ideology, the regime has tightened its control. Ideological orthodoxy is now emphasized; the regime vows to develop "socialism with Chinese character," frequently mentioning class struggle and warning against the dangers of the "peaceful evolution of socialism." Li Peng even plans to assign one political cadre with a professional job title to every hundred workers and staff members.^[71] College students are required to study "ideals, discipline, and ethics, as well as Marxist-Leninist theories," and to be "steeled" in rural areas or factories before assuming cadre positions.^[72] In personnel management, the practice of emphasizing skill and ability is criticized. For instance, Li Peng promises to pay more attention to political ideology, practical experience, and leadership skills.^[73]

The current policy of slowing economic reform and reimposing

[68] Daily Report , 13 September 1989, 37.

[69] Ibid., 7 September 1989, 29.

[70] Ibid., 28 August 1989, 16.

[71] Ibid., 21 July 1989, 8.

[72] Ibid., 14 September 1989, 15.

[73] Ibid., 7 September 1989, 29.

repressive political control may deal with the immediate problems of inflation and social unrest, but it will not resolve China's basic problems. Particularly unworkable are present efforts to control the party and ordinary Chinese by ideological education. Ideological education proved ineffective during the thirty years of Mao's rule. The regime tried the same approach during the three years of the party rectification campaign, but failed again. The social changes that China has experienced in the past ten years are too great for such an archaic method to work: the Chinese people's expectations are too high, cynicism is too deep, the society too complex and diversified, the regime's legitimacy too low, and the official ideology too incoherent and too irrelevant for China's mounting problems. Most important, as Renmin Ribao publicly concedes, a reassertion of ideological orthodoxy clashes with the regime's avowed policy of reform and international cooperation.^[74] Zhao Ziyang's tolerance of ideological liberalization was not due to his personal preference but rather to the requirements of economic development. "Ideological confusion" in China has not arisen from a neglect of ideology; rather, it reflects the very social values that the regime has tried to promote for the sake of economic development.^[75] Moreover, the present coalition of bureaucratic technocrats and such old ideologues as Deng Liqun and Ho Jingzhi, who are greatly resented by the critical intellectuals, is unstable and will not last long.

In the past ten years, the CCP has undergone subtle but irreversible changes. In order to lead China to economic development, the party found it necessary to raise the educational level of its members by co-opting the intellectuals.^[76] The party changed its recruitment policy: to join, a senior high school education was required for workers and junior high school for peasants. Although the party members' task was redefined to help others get rich, they preferred to enrich themselves first. As official corruption spread, the gap between official ideology and actual policy widened, and

[74] Ibid., 22 September 1989, 12.

[75] Ibid., 22 August 1989, 11.

[76] There are two different methods of co-optation. The first brings specialists into the framework of the party. The second shares power by granting them the status of consultants. Both attempts are being used in China. For the two methods, see Philip Selznick, "Cooperation: A Mechanism and Organizational Stability," in Robert K. Merton, ed., Reader in Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1967), 135–39.

the Chinese were swept away by a fever of getting rich. The Leninist Party's claim to a legitimacy based on socialist values lost moral ground in the eyes of many Chinese. Critics see the party as a privileged group that uses socialism simply to defend its privileged position. An indication of the party's demoralization and disarray is the massive support that the student democratic movement enjoyed in Beijing, where eight out of every hundred citizens are party members.^[77] Even the effort to investigate members' behavior during the protest demonstration has encountered difficulties, as the basic-level party leaders protect those who showed sympathy to the movement by "turning big problems into small problems and small problems into no problems at all." It will be impossible for the bureaucratic technocrats to rebuild the party—with its 47 million members—as a coherent revolutionary force dedicated to socialism.

There are some reasons to believe that the present hard-line policy is a defensive and temporary measure taken in response to what the top leaders perceived as a serious threat to the survival of the regime rather than an indication of a total reversal of the reform policy. For instance, the regime's current defense of socialism stresses China's unique socioeconomic and political conditions rather than its inherent and universal virtue. The planned civil service system continues to be experimented with in selected areas, even though it is obviously in conflict with the renewed emphasis on political qualifications.

Uncertain Future

If the policies adopted after the massacre have been temporary measures intended to prevent the collapse of the regime, what kind of political system will the bureaucratic technocrats create when they are completely free from the interference of the old revolutionary cadres? Is a pluralistic democratization or a return to the Maoist system likely? Any speculation on these questions should take into account such mutually reinforcing factors as China's economic performance in the coming years, the distribution of the costs and benefits of reform among social groups, Deng Xiaoping's longev-

[77] See table 53.

ity, and the sweeping and dramatic changes taking place in other socialist countries.

Impossible as it may be to foresee China's immediate future, one can create several scenarios by drawing on insights from the past; the inevitable historical trend toward ideological secularization, functional specialization, and reviving societal strength; and the prerequisites of economic development.

It is unlikely that China will return to the Maoist system, as that system was the product of several accidental factors that no longer exist.^[78] The social forces unleashed by ten years of reform are too strong to accept a return to Maoist practice; the social structure, functional differentiation, and regional differences are too great. Moreover, the bureaucratic technocrats, particularly the younger generation who have gone through the CR, are too sophisticated to subscribe to Mao's values of a simple life, hard work, self-sufficiency, and economic development by human labor. Even if these values continue to dictate policy choice, the bureaucratic technocrats will be less willing than the peasant cadres were to blindly carry out policies made by the top leaders. The technocrats will be more inclined to use their own expertise and judgment rather than the structural legitimacy of the party organization to evaluate a policy's validity. Even Deng Xiaoping warned against returning to this old way: "China cannot possibly return again to the previous closed era."^[79]

Nor is there much chance that China will evolve gradually into a group of autonomous regional governments like the ones that existed during the warlord period of the 1920s, even though the present situation appears explosive because of the widespread discontent, defiance of the intellectuals, and intensifying economic conflicts between the central government and the localities and among the regions. If the military splits, regional rivalry will be compounded and China may face a real danger of disintegration. The possibility of such a scenario is minimal, however, because the provincial authorities have shown little ability to collaborate with one another. Moreover, the long tradition of a unitary government,

[78] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

[79] Daily Report , 17 July 1989, 16.

bitter memories of warlordism, and the military's inability to run the economy without support from the technocrats and the population at large further reduces the chance of such an outcome.

Another possible scenario is a total democratic revolution and total economic reform by peaceful means. As noted, even before the Tiananmen incident, college students and some critical intellectuals argued that democratization of the regime would enable China to carry out economic reforms including price reform and, eventually, privatization of ownership. Paradoxically, the tragic events of Tiananmen Square and the events in Eastern Europe have probably reduced the possibility of such a change in the short run. But how the memory of the government's brutality will work out in the long term is uncertain. The Tiananmen incident may herald a democratic revolution just as the Russian Bloody Sunday in 1905 heralded the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.

At the moment, a democratic revolution led by social forces outside the system—such as the Democratic Front of China organized by exiled critical intellectuals and students overseas—is also implausible, although not impossible. No revolution will succeed in China without the support of the workers and peasants; but with the democratic forces in exile already prone to fight among themselves to control the movement and the best course of action, the chances of their coalescing with the workers and peasants appear very slim. On the whole, the social forces pushing for democratization are too weak and still too dependent on the party-state economically. Before political democratization is possible, China may have to develop economically, so that more differentiated social groups and classes can possess not only functional autonomy but also their own economic resources independent of the state. At the moment, the main obstacle to such a development is the work unit (danwei ) system. Although the regime recognizes that the unit ownership system has "refeudalized" China, efforts to change the organizing principle of society have not yet made much progress. The only way to change the work unit system is to introduce a market principle.

In addition, some economic reforms appear to be mutually exclusive with political democratization. For instance, one may argue that price reforms preclude political democracy. In socialist countries, where shortages of goods are normal phenomena, free price

setting inevitably leads to inflation. If price reform is combined with a privatization of ownership, it will lead to the bankruptcy of many inefficient enterprises and an increase in the unemployment rate. Ownership reform may be incompatible with political democracy in the socialist countries where the working class is accustomed to egalitarian distribution and a guarantee of minimum subsistence.

Many scholars argue that three steps are necessary for the political democratization of an authoritarian regime. The first step involves a fragmentation of the political elite, because "political democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than prior unity and consensus [among the political elite]." The second requires one group to go outside the ruling circle and mobilize the masses for its political cause. During the third, the political elite agrees on an institutional arrangement by which policy will be determined.^[80] Agreement on procedural rules for decision making increases the uncertainty about which policies will be adopted. At present China seems to have reached the stage where leaders at the top level can articulate the interests of their constituencies but cannot mobilize their constituent groups in order to bring pressure on colleagues in the policy-making process. Zhao Ziyang attempted such a mobilization during the demonstrations, and he failed.

Moreover, the propensity of bureaucratic technocrats is not toward democratization; memories are vivid of Mao's mobilization of the masses against his adversaries during the CR. More impressed by the cases of Japan before World War II and of contemporary Taiwan and South Korea, where authoritarian regimes led their nations to successful economic growth—which in turn produced social groups and a middle class capable of leading the process of political democratization—the bureaucratic technocrats will probably argue that at present China lacks the conditions for political democratization.^[81]

Yet another possible scenario is that the bureaucratic techno-

[80] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3:47–63.

[81] Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 41(4) (July 1989): 471–99.

crats will carry out economic reforms culminating in a market economy, while limiting political changes to a bare minimum, thereby producing "political authoritarianism" and "social pluralism" in Scalapino's phrases.^[82] This is, in fact, what Zhao Ziyang originally advocated. According to this view, China needs a strong and powerful political authority in order to create the preconditions for a market economy and to overcome the resistance of the Chinese people, who "are neither prepared to give up the advantages of socialism, nor willing to take the risk entailing the market mechanism, while wanting to preserve the benefits gained under the old system."^[83]

There are several reasons that China may move in this direction. First, the elitism of the bureaucratic technocrats supports the belief that only an authoritarian regime staffed with efficient bureaucratic administrators will be able to push economic reform step by step toward marketization while dealing effectively with all the problems arising in the process. Second, when the next major leadership change occurs—probably after the power struggles that will follow Deng Xiaoping's death—the winners will be more liberal bureaucratic technocrats than the leaders they replace, and they will have a better understanding of the democratic aspirations of the Chinese population and the importance of a market economy. Third, whether or not Zhao Ziyang returns to power, it is likely that some of the victims of last year's purge will be rehabilitated.

Finally, as the bureaucratic technocrats learn how to use macroeconomic leverage and improve their ability to control the economy in times of crisis, they will be more willing to introduce market mechanisms and reduce the scope of the economic activities that the party-state regulates. Li Ruihuan's defense of the present policy of recentralization, subtly different from Chen Yun's analogy of the bird cage, hints at the possibility of moving in this direction. "What we are trying to do is fly a kite, not set it free. When we are flying a kite, it is still controlled by our hand. We can have many ways to control it. Our controlling ability is expressed by how far and how flexibly we can fly it."^[84]

[82] Robert Scalapino, "Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs , 1989/90, 89–115.

[83] Daily Report , 7 September 1989, 21.

[84] Ibid., 20 September 1989, 7.

The only crucial obstacle against China's moving in this direction is socialist ideology, but the regime has several options. The first—and it is very unlikely—is to replace Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought with another ideology. The second is to "refunctionalize" the official ideology by incorporating "numerous elements, concepts, and categories" from modern social theories.^[85] The third is to separate "the goal culture" from "the transfer culture" (or "pure ideology" from "practical ideology," in Franz Schurmann's terms) by remaining committed to socialism as defined by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought but modifying the means to achieve socialist goals in light of the specific Chinese needs and conditions.^[86] The fourth is to deideologize the entire political process. This option is very unlikely, given the crucial integrative role that official ideology has traditionally played in governing the massive Chinese population. The most likely option is the third, which would diminish the ideology's coherence. Eventually it would approximate what Juan Linz calls a "mentality," a "way of thinking, attitude, or psychic disposition" that is vague and formless enough to enable diverse elite groups to work together while retaining the loyalty of the masses.^[87]

China will not be able to separate the party from the government unless it changes its economic system. Under the present arrangement, the state is unaccountable to the people even though it directly manages the means of production, which are theoretically owned by all the people. Because the power of the state is potentially so great, the party must maintain a tight control over it. For instance, because the present work unit system gives too much power to individual factory managers, it provides a reason for the party to interfere with the managers' authority while claiming to represent the workers.

Only when the state frees itself from the practical difficulties it faces as the owner of the means of production will it be able to limit its main functions to balancing the conflicting interests of social

[85] Peter Ludz, Changing Party Elites in East Germany (Boston: MIT Press, 1972).

[86] Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

[87] Juan Linz, "Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975) 3:175–357.

groups, guaranteeing the minimum economic well-being of all social groups, and developing a long-term economic plan and an effective macroeconomic leverage. The state should be changed, in Janos Kornai's words, from a "maximum state" to a "medium" one by retaining responsibility for only (1) active macropolicies for stabilization, full employment, and balanced economic relations with the outside world; (2) activities to combat adverse externalities and ensure an appropriate supply of public goods; and (3) a redistribution of income to provide social justice and support the poor and weak.^[88] Once the state's role in the economy is reduced, the CCP can serve as the intermediary between civil society and the state, thereby resolving its dilemma of how to separate itself from the state and still maintain its political hegemony. Some Chinese scholars have already argued that the party's role should be to aggregate civil society's diverse demands and forward them to the state as "guidance inputs" (zhidaoxhing ) for the state to use in making authoritative decisions for the civil society.^[89]

If the party wishes to maintain its politically dominant position, it will eventually have to drop its claim to be a class-based party in order to accommodate diverse interests and rising social forces. Gramsci's theory is pertinent here.^[90] Gramsci distinguishes between "transformism hegemony" and "expansive hegemony." In the former, the party neutralizes hostile social groups and prevents the development of specific demands by articulating their interests, thereby producing a "passive consensus."^[91] The latter involves "the creation of an active and direct consensus as a result of the party's willingness to adopt the interests of the popular classes as if they are the party's own, thereby producing a genuine 'national will.' "^[92] According to Gramsci, the second type of hegemony leads to the creation of a "collective will," which fuses and synthesizes all partisan interests. At present, the CCP, by actively promoting a united-front policy, demonstrates its interest in creat-

[88] Janos Kornai, "Individual Freedom and Reform of the Socialist Economy," European Economic Review , 32, 1988, 233–67.

[89] Nie Gaomin, Li Yizhou, and Wang Zhongtian, eds., Dangzheng Fenkai Lilun Tantao (Beijing: Chunqiu Chubanshe, 1988).

[90] Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Gramsci and Marxism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 168–204.

[91] Ibid., 182.

[92] Ibid., 183.

ing an expansive hegemony as a means of ensuring its own political survival and its own dominant role in modernizing China.

Marketization and economic development will entail a further structural differentiation of political, social, and economic institutions. The viability and efficiency of a complex society with a multitude of functionally specialized organizations depends on the society's capacity for integration.^[93] In the case of China the mixed nature of the Chinese economic system—neither totally controlled by state planners nor operating in a perfectly free market—intensifies the need for coordination. The bureaucratic technocrats in party positions can fulfill this need by coordinating specialized organizations staffed by "experts" and resolving the conflicting interests of diverse social groups, becoming what Jowitt calls "political managers."^[94] Many Chinese leaders have already suggested that party cadres will even play the role of coordinators "among the various parts of the power organs of the state, and economic organizations, and the cultural organizations," as well as among the managers, the labor unions, the Communist Youth League, and the workers' congresses.^[95] This type of broadly defined coordination will require the political managers to be more receptive to the wishes of various groups and to rely on their own ability to manipulate needs and symbols. It seems that the new generation of cadres, with its technical background, is better prepared than the former revolutionary cadres for this type of mixed political and technical coordination.^[96]

The concept of the political manager also presupposes a more democratized party, which would allow its leaders to air differing views on policy agendas and options. Despite the temporary setback following the massacre on 4 June, the political elite will become more pluralistic as its members are drawn from diverse social groups on the basis of their career backgrounds and skills. In fact, it has already become increasingly acceptable for political leaders to

[93] Lindblom, Politics and Markets .

[94] Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes."

[95] Zhao Ziyang, for instance, stresses the party's coordinating roles. Renmin Ribao , 26 November 1987; Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo Yanjiu , no. 10, 1985, 12–14; Zhonggong Hunanshengwi Dangxiao Dangjian Yanjiushi, ed., Zhizhengdangde Lingdao Wenti Gailun (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1986), 59–60.

[96] Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy , 380.

bring the partisan interests of social groups into the policy-making process and draw support from different segments of the bureaucracy. If this trend continues, it will combine with the bureaucratic technocrats' pragmatic orientation and inclination toward compromise to gradually change the basic rules of the Leninist Party. The party may become like the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, with various factions that hold slightly disparate policy preferences but work together within a broad ideological consensus. The CCP will reach this stage when the opinion groups now existing within it are allowed to develop. It is more likely that China will move in this direction than that it will develop a genuine multiparty system. And even if the party does not go quite this far, there is no doubt that having learned the limits of political power in transforming society, it is now more permeable to social influences than in any previous period.

A broad historical review of the Chinese revolution reveals a paradox. An elitist revolutionary party staffed and supported by poor peasants carried out the Communist revolution in China, where the Marxian preconditions for a socialist revolution did not exist. After capturing political power, party leaders set up a powerful party-state, which ruthlessly attempted to carry out a socialist revolution. After socializing the means of production, the party-state used its political authority to manage the economy and rejected exchange relations as a means of organizing even economic activities. The justification for this approach lay in Marx's view that economics and politics are inextricably interrelated and that exchange relations, which use the medium of money, distort genuine human relations.^[97]

Marxism as originally formulated contains humanistic elements. Karl Marx, who lived at the early stage of capitalism, resented the commercialization of human relations and dominance of money and capital over humanity. He therefore urged that human relations not be mediated by capital and money, which tend to exploit human labor. But both the Soviet Union's and China's efforts to construct a society without exchange relations through money and capital failed completely. Their attempts to regulate social relations

[97] For Marx's criticism of capital, see T. B. Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

resulted in societies dominated by political power, and exploitation by political power turned out to be more ruthless than exploitation by capital. Moreover, their state-planned economies proved ineffective for economic development.

China now recognizes the dysfunctional consequences of applying a political approach to all human problems. It is therefore extremely unlikely that the country will return to the Maoist approach of regulating almost all human activities through power and authoritative relations. Instead, it is now trying to make up for lost time by reducing political authority in the economic arena and expanding the range of human activities regulated by exchange relations. But finding the right mix of authority and exchange relations will not be easy, for in China the Maoist version of socialism has reinforced a long-standing bureaucratic tradition.