Chapter Three
Civil-Service Reform Under the American Occupation
After its unconditional surrender in World War II, Japan entered a new phase: the first foreign occupation in its history. Nominally an Allied occupation, it was in reality an American show. The seven-year occupation proved to be an epochal turning point in Japanese history, for it helped to lay the groundwork for the democratization of Japanese society and polity alike.
As part of the multifaceted program of political democratization, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) carried out a comprehensive reform of Japan's civil-service system. What were the objectives of the reform? How was it implemented? What problems and difficulties did it encounter? What did it actually accomplish? This chapter will explore these questions, with special attention to the differing perceptions of SCAP and Japanese participants in what Robert E. Ward has called "an experiment in planned political change."[1]
The Backdrop
The Legacy Of Abortive Reforms
The prewar Japanese bureaucracy, which struck American observers as archaic, even abominable, had its share of domestic critics as well. There
[1] Robert E. Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan" in Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan , pp. 477-535.
were a series of proposals for reform, some emanating from the government itself. The first serious proposal for reform came from the Hirota Koki government (March 1936-February 1937), which had been formed in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'éat known as the 26 February incident. Widely viewed as originating in the military, the proposal called for the establishment of a central personnel agency under the direct control of the prime minister and for the expansion of the scope of discretionary appointment. The former was aimed at increasing government efficiency by combating "sectionalism"—the endemic interministerial rivalries—whereas the latter must be viewed against the backdrop of the emasculation of political parties. In as much as the possibility that party politicians might abuse the power of discretionary appointment had been eliminated, there was no longer any compelling reason to restrict the appointment powers of the government.[2]
The first Konoe government (June 1937-January 1939) revived the idea of civil-service reform. In January 1938 it circulated a proposal, drafted by the cabinet legislation bureau, to establish a central personnel agency, increase the scope of discretionary appointment, revise the higher civil-service examination, initiate a program for retraining officials, and abolish security of tenure for officials. Among other things, these measures were aimed at undercutting sectionalism, enabling the government to recruit capable people from a broader base, combating hoka banno (the omnipotence of law graduates), and rejuvenating the bureaucracy. However, the proposal ran into stiff resistance by bureaucrats, particularly those in the powerful Home Ministry. It was eventually watered down to two components: utilizing the existing mechanism of periodic administrative vice-ministers' conferences in lieu of a new personnel agency and setting up a cabinet personnel committee designed to foster personnel exchanges among the various ministries.[3]
The year 1941 saw a proliferation of proposals for civil-service reform: they emanated from such diverse sources as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the newly created government party that replaced all other political parties; the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho); and the Associa-
[2] Ide Yoshinori, Nihon kanryosei to gyosei bunka [Japanese Bureaucracy and Administrative Culture] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), pp. 151-52; Watanabe, "Nihon no komuinsei, p. 131."
[3] Watanabe, "Nihon no komuinsei," p. 131; Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 152-55; Miyake, Gyoseigaku to gyosei kanri, pp. 88-97.
tion for the Study of National Policy (Kokusaku Kenkyukai). The proposal put forth by the Taisei Yokusankai is particularly noteworthy, for it was based on comments elicited from thirty-five leading scholars, journalists, and former officials. Among other things, it advocated (1) the establishment of a cabinet personnel agency (Naikaku Jinji-cho) empowered to unify, coordinate, and control personnel administration in all ministries and agencies; (2) the reclassification and refinement of all government positions along functional lines; (3) the elimination of hoka banno , coupled with the recruitment of promising persons solely on the basis of character and ability; (4) the introduction of an administrative audit system and the clarification of responsibility on the part of officials; (5) the curtailment of frequent reassignments among officials; (6) the replacement of lethargy (koto nakare shugi ) with an active and responsible posture; (7) the training and retraining of officials; (8) the replacement of sectionalism with communication and cooperation among the various ministries and agencies; and (9) the promotion of scientific procedures, efficiency, and speed in public administration.[4]
The Kokusaku Kenkyukai echoed most of the preceding ideas and added a few new ones: the preferential treatment of persons possessing special skills, improved treatment of lower-level officials, and the exchange of personnel between the public and private sectors, the central government and localities, and the center and the periphery (kanmin, chuo-chiho, nai-gaichi no koryu jinji ). Endorsing all of these ideas, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry particularly stressed the importance of reforming the civil-service examinations and expanding the scope of discretionary appointment. The reform of the examinations, in its view, should focus on the elimination of both hoka banno and what it saw as as an overemphasis on knowledge. In sum, there emerged a broad consensus on three key points: (1) the need for change in the basic posture of officials and for the establishment of a new code of behavior for officials, (2) the need for the reform or introduction of various institutional and technical devices, and (3) the importance of setting up a central personnel agency.[5]
These sweeping suggestions, however, produced but meager results. The only thing the second Konoe cabinet (July 1940-July 1941) succeeded in implementing was a limited reform of the higher examina-
[4] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 147-49; Miyake, Gyoseigaku , pp. 98-99.
[5] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 149-50.
tions.[6] Whether what happened can be described as reform is debatable. As analyzed by Spaulding, there were three changes in the examination system, of which the "first two were obviously political: Japanese history was to become a compulsory subject in all three career fields [administrative, judicial, and diplomatic], and there was to be a compulsory oral in constitutional law which would include a 'character' examination." The third change had to do with the abolition of diplomatic examinations as a separate, independent category. This, according to Spaulding, was an "essentially punitive" move against the diplomatic service, which "had long annoyed other ministries with its air of exclusiveness and had antagonized the army by resisting its policies in China."[7]
Instead of being abolished altogether, however, the diplomatic examinations were absorbed into the administrative examinations; moreover, because candidates for the diplomatic service continued to be differentiated from other candidates, what had changed was form, not substance. The effects of the Konoe revisions were further diluted by the suspension of all examinations after 1943, a development that was necessitated by the conscription of university students into military or other war-related services.[8] The compromise solution of the proposal for a cabinet personnel agency, namely, the setting up of an interministerial liaison committee within the Home Ministry, fizzled amidst the confusion of a wartime government in its final throes.[9]
Prelude To Reform In Occupied Japan
The Occupation took the form of indirect rule, hence the Japanese government nominally retained authority to initiate some policy measures. More important, the Japanese government was primarily responsible for implementing all policy directives emanating from SCAP. As it became clear that SCAP's top priority was the democratization of Japan, the leaders of the Japanese government realized that reform of the bureaucracy would be a matter of time. As a self-defensive measure, they tried to anticipate and forestall any SCAP-initiated reform: as early as September 1945 the cabinet legislation bureau was instructed
[6] For details of the reform, see Wada, "Bunkan nin'yo seido no rekishi," III, pp. 10-11.
[7] Spaulding, Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations , p. 175.
[8] Ibid., p. 176.
[9] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , p. 156.
to mobilize all of its resources to study the matter and submit a draft plan.[10]
On 13 November, the Shidehara cabinet approved a plan containing the following features:
First, official nomenclature (kanmei ) shall be streamlined and unified. All the titles bearing the expression kan (literally "official") shall be replaced by one or another of the two titles, jimukan (administrative official) and gikan (technical official).
Second, the distinction between higher officials (kotokan ) and ordinary officials (hanninkan ) shall be abolished. The ranks of chokuninkan, soninkan , and hanninkan shall be replaced by grades 1 through 3 (ikkyu, nikyu , and sankyu ).
Third, there shall be established a unified compensation system that distributes rewards according to length of service and merit, regardless of rank or grade.
Fourth, the frequency of reassignments shall be curtailed. Means of implementing the principle whereby each official serves in one position for a fixed period of time shall be studied.
Fifth, while maintaining the system of appointing officials from among those who have passed competitive examinations, the government shall explore ways of increasing the scope of appointments based on evaluation (senko nin'yo ) and of improving the examination system in the following way: (1) reappraise the subjects in which candidates are examined with a view to identifying the best-qualified candidates for all openings; (2) appoint a substantial number of practitioners from both the public and private sectors as examiners so as to achieve a balance between theory and practice in the examinations; (3) study the possibility of instituting a trainee (or probationary) system in conjunction with the higher examinations.
Sixth, the possibility of providing all new appointees with several months of training both within the government and in the private sector shall be studied. For in-service training, either an institute shall be established or existing academic institutions such as universities shall be utilized.
[10] Ibid., pp. 157-58.
Seventh, the possibility of placing an inspector (kansatsukan ) both in the cabinet and in each ministry shall be studied. It will be his responsibility to monitor performance and study ways of improving employee welfare with a view to increasing efficiency and equity.
Eighth, the possibility of establishing a performance-evaluation system both within the cabinet and in each ministry shall be studied. All officials in grade 2 or below shall be subject to such a system insofar as their promotion, salary increase, and other rewards are concerned.[11]
What was striking about the preceding plan was that the proposed changes were more cosmetic than substantive. The substitution of "grades 1, 2, and 3" for chokuninkan, soninkan , and hanninkan , for example, did not really address the fundamental issue of status hierarchy in the bureaucracy. Nor did the plan contain many ideas that were really new. Nearly all of the ideas had been proposed before. Moreover, most of the items in the plan called for further study rather than immediate action. Finally, there was a conspicuous omission in the plan: nowhere did it mention the idea of setting up a central personnel agency, notwithstanding its prominent place in the wartime proposals for reform. In a word, this episode demonstrated that the Japanese government was either unable or unwilling to initiate meaningful change in the bureaucracy on its own.
Drawing Up The Blueprint For Reform
The Esman Memorandum
It was against this backdrop that the first significant step in the direction of civil-service reform was taken by SCAP. On 30 January, 1946, First Lieutenant Milton J. Esman of the Public Administration Division, Government Section, SCAP General Headquarters, wrote a memorandum for Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section. Esman, who had served on the staff of the United States Civil Service Commission before entering military service, began by noting the power and pivotal position of the bureaucracy in Japanese society.
[11] Ibid., pp. 158-60; Miyake, Gyoseigaku , pp. 110-11.
"Of all the major bulwarks of feudal and totalitarian Japan," he wrote, "only the bureaucracy remains unimpaired. The bureaucracy will definitely outlast the occupation and will play a decisive role of moulding the future of Japan."[12]
What disturbed Esman most was the absence of any sign that the bureaucracy was likely to change its ways "without constant pressure and guidance from this Headquarters." He saw a direct linkage between democracy and bureaucracy: "Modern democratic government requires a democratic and efficient public service. Merely to reform obvious abuses—which has not yet been accomplished will not provide the minimum level of efficiency necessary to democratic administration now that the police are no longer available to perform the operating function of government." Hence, Esman concluded, only "a thoroughgoing democratization and modernization of the civil service" would ensure the survival of a democratic political system in the post-Occupation period. Such a step would necessitate "relentless pressure from this Headquarters" as well as "guidance on the proper techniques to employ."[13]
In addition to the concerns noted above, there was a compelling practical consideration: SCAP feared the possibility that "ideologically hostile bureaucrats would by administrative sabotage nullify Occupation policies or the programs of Japanese political leaders evolved pursuant thereto." SCAP sought to reduce the risk not only by "constant vigilance and surveillance" but also by "the removal of identifiable militarists and ultranationalists from public life." Another countermeasure was the strengthening of countervailing institutions, notably the Diet.[14] Yet SCAP was under no illusion that these measures could effectively curb the entrenched powers of the bureaucrats. In fact, SCAP's purge program that was implemented between 1946 and 1948 hardly touched the bureaucracy. According to Hans H. Baerwald, only "145 members of the senior civil service" were actually removed. All
[12] See the text of Esman's memorandum in the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan (Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly Press, 1968), vol. 2: Appendixes, p. 578. This is a reproduction of a report originally published in 1949 by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
[13] Ibid., In prewar and wartime Japan, the police performed multiple functions: in addition to maintaining law and order, they exercised "thought control," mobilized the populace for various purposes, and served as the bulwark of state power. This is what Esman was referring to when he used the phrase, "now that the police are no longer available to perform the operating functions of government."
[14] Ibid., I, pp. 246-47.
told, 830 out of 42,251 bureaucrats (1.9 percent) who were screened were purged.[15] In short, it was plain that a basic restructuring of Japanese bureaucracy was prerequisite to both the short-term needs and the long-term goals of the Occupation.
Recognizing the need for reform, however, was one thing; undertaking effective measures to fill that need was quite another. As T. J. Pempel shows, there was a considerable gap between American rhetoric and behavior. Not only did civil-service reform receive a relatively low priority from SCAP; both its conception and its implementation were flawed by the "unquestioned search for rationality and efficiency" and by "organizational politics."[16] Let us nonetheless examine the sequence of key events pertaining to civil-service reform in occupied Japan.
Japanese Request For Assistance
Consistent with the tone of the Esman memorandum, which strongly advocated the need for pressure and guidance, SCAP first considered the option of issuing a formal memorandum "directing the Japanese Government to appoint a special commission of experts to draft proposals for basic reform of civil-service system under SCAP guidance pursuant to standards to be set up by SCAP." However, it decided that a more prudent course of action would be to try to induce the Japanese to initiate the necessary action in the direction desired by SCAP. In February 1946 the cabinet legislation bureau submitted to the government section a plan for limited reform of the civil service based on the cabinet decision of November 1945. Included in the proposed plan were a simplification of official nomenclature; the abolition of the ranks of chokuninkan, soninkan , and hanninkan in favor of three numbered grades; a simplification of pay and allowance scales; and some changes in the content of the higher civil-service examination. Acknowledging that the plan would not entail any fundamental changes, the bureau nonetheless "claimed that it represented an initial break in the traditional system and was a forerunner of more basic changes." The government section cleared the plan with reservations: it called the plan
[15] Hans H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 82.
[16] T. J. Pempel, "The Tar Baby Target: 'Reform' of the Japanese Bureaucracy," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 157-87. The quotations are from p. 181.
"a step in the right direction" but insisted that "fundamental reforms" must still occur.[17]
As it became increasingly plain that the strategy of inducing the Japanese government to initiate basic structural reform of its bureaucracy was ineffective, the idea of a more forceful approach was resuscitated. In April 1946, the government section reconsidered the option of issuing a formal SCAP directive on civil-service reform to the Japanese government. There was support for the idea from five other sections of the General Headquarters. The main obstacle to such action was that it would be inconsistent with the "technique of leadership as opposed to direction employed by the Government Section beginning about March 1946." Had an unexpected break not come, however, such a directive would most probably have been issued. On 3 May, a letter signed by Finance Minister Shibusawa Keizo was delivered to the finance division of the economic and scientific section of the SCAP General Headquarters. It requested assistance in the revision of the salary and allowance system of Japanese government personnel in accordance with a position-classification plan and suggested that SCAP invite some experts from the United States to "give advice and make a draft plan for the revision now under consideration."[18]
The immediate response of the finance division was to forward the letter to the government section for appropriate action. The latter's counterpart in the Japanese government was the cabinet legislation bureau, which also had jurisdiction over matters affecting the civil service as a whole. However, in keeping with the tradition of "sectionalism," the Finance Ministry had neither consulted nor notified the bureau of what it was doing. The two government agencies, in short, were on a collision course. A potentially serious conflict was averted, however, when the Japanese cabinet on 14 May reached a compromise: in return for an apology from the finance minister, the director general (chokan ) of the legislation bureau accepted the idea of requesting the visit of an American advisory mission. Accordingly, the cabinet approved and forwarded to SCAP a formal request to that effect in its
[17] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 247-48. The quotation is from p. 247. See also Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 161-62 and 169-70.
[18] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 248 and 259. Although the narrative says on p. 248 that the letter was "personally submitted" by the Finance Minister on 3 May 1946, the text of the letter on p. 579 bears the date 25 Apr. 1946. It is probable that the letter was written and signed on 25 Apr. but not delivered to the SCAP General Headquarters until 3 May.
name. The stage was thus set for the entry of American experts onto the scene.[19]
It should be stressed that there was a considerable gap between Japanese and American perceptions of these moves. The Japanese left no doubt that what was being requested was technical assistance on a specialized subject—a restructuring of their salary and allowance system based on a position-classification plan. The Americans, on the other hand, interpreted the Japanese request as envisaging a comprehensive review of the entire civil-service system. The official history of the Occupation prepared by the government section states: "The Japanese Government was now officially on record as requesting, with complete cabinet accord, the assistance of a mission of American experts to study and draft plans for a fundamental reform of its civil service system ."[20] This is not to suggest that the reform-minded Americans were not aware of the perception gap. In fact, the official SCAP history goes on to note that whereas "the Japanese request was motivated by a desire for higher efficiency and morale, . . . the Occupation's basic aim was democratization."[21]
The Hoover Mission
In November 1946, the United States Personnel Advisory Mission to Japan arrived in Tokyo. It was headed by Blaine Hoover, president of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, and included three other members: Manlio F. DeAngelis, Chief, Program Planning Staff, the United States Civil Service Commission (USCSC); Robert S. Hare, Chief, Field Classification, USCSC; and W. Pierce MacCoy, Director of Personnel, the United States Department of State. Prior to the arrival of the Hoover mission, the Japanese government had set up the Administrative Research Bureau (Gyosei Chosabu) under the jurisdiction of the prime minister, with the understanding that the Bureau would serve as the counterpart to the mission.[22]
[19] Ibid., pp. 248 and 580.
[20] Ibid., p. 248. Emphasis added. For a discussion of Japanese perceptions, see Asai Kiyoshi, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi [Detailed Commentaries on the National Public Service Law, New Edition] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1970), pp. 1-3; Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 174-75.
[21] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 248-49. For an informative discussion of the perception gap and other problems during the Occupation, see Kusayanagi Daizo, Nihon kaitai [The Dissolution of Japan] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1985), pp. 241-53 and passim. The focus of this book is on the SCAP-ordered dissolution of the Home Ministry.
[22] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 249-50; Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , p. 2.
How the two worked together or failed to work together is another interesting story that illustrates the inherent asymmetry of victor and vanquished in an occupied territory. Whereas the official history of the Occupation gives the impression that the two worked closely and harmoniously, a Japanese participant in the process paints a strikingly different picture. According to SCAP's version:
Organized conferences between the Mission and the President and Division Directors of Staff of the Administrative Research Bureau were instituted [on] December 24, 1946. The work of the Mission and the Bureau was integrated and for technical purposes decentralized. Committees under the advisorship of the Mission members and including Division Directors of the Administrative Research Bureau were set up to conduct investigation in designated areas of personnel administration within the Japanese Government. These committees immediately launched their programs.[23]
Asai Kiyoshi, who served as the director of the Public Servants' Division (Komuinbucho) in the bureau at the time, writes, however, that the "organized conferences between the Mission and . . . the Bureau" consisted of two get-togethers during which only idle remarks (zatsudan ) were exchanged, that the nature of collaboration between the two sides was confined to technical matters only, and that no one from the Japanese side had been asked to provide any input into the drafting of a new public-service law then under way.[24] In short, what the Japanese did was not to work with but to work for the Americans.
An important step in the Hoover mission's work was to supervise the Administrative Research Bureau in conducting a "pilot" position-classification survey with multiple aims: to generate data on the relationship between pay and the actual work performed by the various types of government employees, "to develop effective methods of making position classification surveys in the Japanese Government and to try them out," and to train Japanese experts in position classification.[25]
What the pilot survey yielded was not only the first position-classification plan in the history of Japanese public administration but also a wealth of information about the structure and functioning of the Japanese bureaucracy. In general, the new data served to confirm the old impressions about Japanese administration and to reinforce the ethnocentric biases of Western observers: Japanese bureaucracy was found to
[23] SCAP, Political Reorientation , p. 250.
[24] Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , p. 2.
[25] SCAP, Political Reorientation , p. 250.
be "weak" in virtually all areas—recruitment, examination, compensation, employee utilization and evaluation, recreation, retirement, equitable treatment of employees, and even discipline. The only areas in which "Japanese administrators had gained some experience . . . [that] could be utilized in building a modern personnel program" were those of "personal [sic ] training, health and welfare." What concerned the American experts was that, apart from its premodern nature, the Japanese bureaucracy was still dominated by "old-line officials of the predemocratic" era who might impede, even sabotage, programs and policies aimed at the democratization of Japan. The mission concluded that "the legislative enactment of a national public service law" embodying high "standards of merit and equitable treatment in public personnel administration" would help "force out" such people, while simultaneously allowing "the selection and appointment of objectively qualified replacements."[26]
In drafting a national public-service law, the mission sought to be guided by four key criteria: (1) adequacy, (2) simplicity of standards, (3) recognition of the individuality of Japan, and (4) practicality.[27] Whether the actual performance matched the professed goals, however, is open to question. Total exclusion of the Japanese in the drafting process, for example, seriously undercut the mission's ability to implement the last two criteria. Even the first two lost much meaning, because their contents were unilaterally determined by the Americans without a sufficient understanding of Japanese perceptions of what was adequate and simple.
On 24 April 1947, five months after its members set foot in Japan, the mission completed a draft of the proposed law and submitted an interim report to SCAP. The speed with which this was done reflected the mission's sense of urgency in replacing "the feudalistic bureaucracy" with a "modern system of civil service." The report contained three key recommendations:
first, the creation within the Japanese Government of a powerful central personnel agency;
second, action to secure enactment of the proposed national public service law, providing service-wide standards of personnel administration under
[26] Ibid., pp. 250-51. The Americans were not alone in perceiving the threat to democratic reforms posed by the entrenched bureaucrats. For an expression of similar views, see Tsuji, Shinpan Nihon kanryosei no kenkyu , pp. 242-81.
[27] SCAP, Political Reorientation , p. 251.
which a democratically oriented merit service could be established and the efficiency of the service promoted; and
third, the establishment of civil service division in the Government Section to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on programs, policies, and procedures relative to the reform of the personnel system of the Japanese Government.[28]
The civil-service division was established on 1 June 1947, and took over the work of the mission, which was officially terminated on 16 June 1947. The chairman of the mission, Blaine Hoover, however, was appointed as head of the new division, thus ensuring continuity of outlook and a smooth transition. Hoover was concurrently appointed special assistant to the chief of the government section.[29] Meanwhile, on 11 June 1947, the Japanese government learned for the first time of the existence and contents of the draft legislation. Its leaders, including those who had supposedly collaborated in the work of the Hoover mission, were dumbfounded. Some of them used the expression "Yabu o tsutsuite hebi o dashita" ('One pokes at a bush and causes a snake to come out'). That is to say, what the Japanese did was to ask for technical assistance in reforming their pay and allowance system but received instead a comprehensive plan for a fundamental reform of the entire civil-service system. What is more, the plan was in reality a command. Hoover is said to have told Katayama Tetsu, the newly elected Socialist prime minister of Japan, that the draft must be enacted into law "without any revision within a few weeks."[30]
Enacting The National Public-Service Law
Japanese Handling Of The Hoover Draft
So long as the Occupation adhered to the policy of indirect rule, it was the responsibility of the Japanese to turn the draft into a law. Furthermore, if the goal of effecting fundamental reform that would outlast the Occupation was to be attained, it was imperative that the Japanese be persuaded of the intrinsic merits of the draft. Viewed from this perspective, the apparently high-handed manner in which the
[28] Ibid., p. 252.
[29] Ibid., p. 253.
[30] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 183-90; Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , pp. 2-3; Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation," p. 509.
Hoover mission behaved was bound to be counterproductive in the long run. The personality of Blaine Hoover appears to have been a source of difficulty, for he was perceived by the Japanese as arrogant, arbitrary, and insensitive to Japanese needs.
The cabinet legislation bureau and the administrative research bureau worked jointly on the translation of the draft into Japanese, completing the task within a week. The Japanese version laid bare numerous problem areas. For one thing the articles were overly long. In many cases, what would normally require twenty separate articles in a Japanese statute was jammed into a single article. As for its substance, the Japanese were particularly struck by the extensive powers and special status of the proposed National Personnel Authority, the prohibition of strikes by government employees, and the position of the Emperor. After dividing the national public service into the regular government service (ippan shoku ) and the special government service (tokubetsu shoku ), the American draft had listed the Emperor under the latter.[31]
Even though the new constitution of Japan that had just entered into force formally downgraded the Emperor to a mere "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people" (art. 1), the Japanese found it hard to swallow the notion that the Emperor was a tokubetsu shoku employee of the Japanese government, along with the prime minister, ministers of state, vice-ministers, ambassadors, judges, and other high-ranking officials.[32]
The Japanese version of the draft was circulated among all government ministries and agencies, and their views and comments were solicited. On the basis of the latter, the administrative research bureau, in collaboration with the cabinet legislation bureau, prepared a memorandum on "Opinions on the Draft National Public-Service Law." The memorandum, dated 24 June 1947, acknowledged the need for a "fundamental reform of our country's bureaucratic system" so as to enable "national public servants" to become the "servants of the people in a true sense," noted that the draft was designed to fill that need, and stated that the document, on the whole, was an acceptable one. However, it added, there were a number of problems from a technical standpoint as well as from the perspective of the new constitution and
[31] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 190-91.
[32] The constitution was promulgated on 3 Nov. 1946, and entered into force on 3 May 1947. It replaced the Meiji constitution of 1889. See SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 82-118.
other related laws that needed to be ironed out before the draft could be fully accepted. It then enumerated ten points:
1. It is not clear whether the National Personnel Authority will be independent of or subject to the supervision of the prime minister; it will be necessary to make the status of the authority consistent with the constitution that enshrines the basic principles of a parliamentary cabinet system (gi'in naikakusei ).
2. The draft lacks any provisions regarding the status of officials, such as a guarantee against arbitrary dismissal. Even though the gap may be filled by regulations of the authority, the basic principles on this issue should be embodied in the proposed law.
3. The draft states that regulations issued by the authority (Jinji-in kisoku ) shall have the same effect as laws and that its decisions shall be final and not subject to judicial review. This raises questions about the authority's relationship with the Diet and the Supreme Court and ought to be changed.
4. The scope of this law ought to be limited so as to exclude the Emperor, court employees who are not judges, employees of the public prosecutor's office (Kensatsucho), and teachers.
5. The organization and finances of the National Personnel Authority are questionable. It may be advisable to delete the provisions that confer special status on its president and commissioners as well as those dealing with its finances.
6. The significance of promotion examinations remains unclear; it seems unwise to base all promotions on the results of examinations.
7. There is a need to clarify the meaning of the provisions regarding strikes by employees.
8. The provisions dealing with punishments need to be streamlined and made more explicit in accordance with the principle that all crimes and punishments ought to be determined by law (zaikei hotei shugi ).
9. The format of this law should be changed to conform to that of other Japanese laws.
10. There is a view that the draft should be so revised as to make it applicable to local-government employees as well.[33]
[33] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 191-92.
The preceding views were conveyed to the American authorities on 26 June in a document that had been especially drawn up for that purpose. The Japanese argued that stylistic changes were necessary to dispel the impression that the law was of foreign origin. Substantive changes were justified on the ground that, without them, the Japanese government would lack the confidence to submit the draft to the Diet as its own and to argue convincingly and responsibly for its passage. Stressing that it had no objections whatever to the purposes and general principles of the proposed law, the Katayama government appealed for American cooperation in adapting the draft to the realities of Japan.[34]
These were indeed compelling arguments vis-à-vis the Occupation, which officially adhered to the policy of government by leadership rather than by direction and had reiterated the view that the Japanese must be allowed to develop institutions suited to their own needs if the democratic experiment was to succeed. Nonetheless, Hoover told Prime Minister Katayama that since the charge given to him by General MacArthur was to ascertain whether the Japanese government accepted or rejected the draft in its entirety, he lacked the authority to forward a conditional answer. He did, however, intend to report to General MacArthur that the Japanese authorities concurred in the aims and basic ideas of the draft and predicted that discussions with the Japanese would soon begin. Incidentally, Hoover reportedly insisted on dealing only with the prime minister. On 3 July, Hoover asked the Japanese government to submit proposed changes in the form of draft legislation by 7 July. Katayama sought and received an extension of this deadline to 31 July.[35]
On 10 July, Hoover left Japan for the United States on an extended leave, entrusting the task of overseeing the passage of the proposed law to C. P. Marcum, his deputy in the civil-service division. The Japanese, recalling the maxim "oni no inai aida no sentaku" (doing laundry while the devil is away), worked feverishly to produce their own draft legislation incorporating all desired changes, both stylistic and substantive. In a covering letter accompanying the new draft sent to the government section on 31 July, Prime Minister Katayama minimized the importance of proposed changes, saying that they were either stylistic or minor. "Although [the revised draft] may appear to be considerably different from your original draft," he said, "it is not substantially
[34] Ibid., pp. 192-94.
[35] Ibid., p. 194.
different from [your draft] in terms of basic principles." The key changes cited in his letter, nonetheless, were revealing. The power of the National Personnel Authority would be reduced by, inter alia, omitting the provisions dealing with its finances that would have given it a measure of independence in budgetary matters; the authority's power to enact regulations having the effect of law would be reduced; and key provisions dealing with the prohibition of strikes by public servants would be deleted.[36]
Significantly, all of the preceding points remained intact in the final version approved by the government section on 26 August 1947. What is more, when the Japanese authorities failed to resolve a dispute pertaining to a key concept in position classification with Marcum, it resorted to the devious tactic of leaving it in the English version but deleting it in the Japanese version. Needless to say, it was the latter that was submitted to the Diet for approval. The subsequent discovery of this ploy by Hoover led to the temporary abolition of the cabinet legislation bureau.[37]
Up to this point, at the request of SCAP, all the information regarding civil-service reform had been withheld from the public, including members of the Diet. The publication of the draft by the Katayama government on 27 August, three days prior to its formal submission to the Diet, therefore marked its entrance into the public arena. Press reaction was generally favorable. Major dailies endorsed the proposed legislation; they noted that the establishment of the National Personnel Authority and the proposal to use examinations not only for recruitment but also for promotion would help bolster the merit principle, place personnel administration on a scientific basis, and improve efficiency, equity, and objectivity.[38]
The reaction of other groups, on the other hand, was far from favorable. Even the Japan Socialist party, the senior partner in the coalition government of Katayama, voiced reservations in the Diet. The Socialists were concerned that the draft's emphasis on preserving the independence and political neutrality of civil servants and on promoting
[36] Ibid., pp. 194-96.
[37] Ibid., pp. 196-97; Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , p. 3. The disputed concept was "class" in English and shokkyu in Japanese. The two sides could not agree on its precise meaning or importance in position classification. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau was abolished on 15 Feb. 1948, and reestablished on 1 Aug. 1952. Naikaku Seido Hyaktunen-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Naikaku hyakunen no ayumi [The Path of One Hundred Years of the Cabinet] (Tokyo: K. K. Okyo, 1985), pp. 129 and 137.
[38] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , p. 198.
technical efficiency entailed the risk that the supreme goal of democratization might be compromised. The greatest danger, in their view, was not the patronage system but the feudalistic, faction-ridden, and privilege-conscious nature of Japanese bureaucrats. They favored the replacement of the National Personnel Authority with a five-member personnel committee (Jinji Iinkai) and the introduction of a free appointment system (jiyu nin'yo seido ) for officials above a certain level that would rely on the evaluation of candidates by the personnel committee. Such a system would, among other things, open the way for the appointment (that is, lateral entry) of experts from outside the government.[39]
The view that the goal of democratization should take precedence over all others was echoed by the Association for the Study of Public Law (Koho Kenkyukai). The association called for the introduction of an impeachment system for corrupt officials, for further limitation of the authority's rule-making power, for the adjustment of official nomenclature to eliminate undemocratic connotations (for example, the deletion of the suffix kan from titles of public servants), and for the protection of the rights of lower-grade employees to guard against discrimination.[40]
The Coordination Council for Public Service Unions (Zen Kanko Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai or Zenkanko) also found the draft to be weak, even retrogressive, from the standpoint of democratizing the bureaucracy. It was particularly disturbed by what it saw as the denial of fundamental rights of public servants, notably labor-related rights, arguing that such matters as their status, separation, and compensation should not be covered by the proposed law but be subject to labor legislation and contracts. The Zenkanko also favored replacing the National Personnel Authority with a personnel committee, restricting its rule-making power, and expanding the scope of free appointments. It further called for the abolition of educational requirements in civil-service examinations, the guarantee of the freedom of political activity by public servants, and the substitution of a social-security system for a pension system.[41]
[39] Ibid., pp. 199-200.
[40] Ibid., pp. 200-201.
[41] Ibid., pp. 201-2. The phrase "educational requirements" needs to be clarified. Theoretically, "graduates of a middle school or recognized equivalent" could take the higher civil-service examination under the old system by first passing the preliminary examination. "Graduates of a higher school or recognized equivalent," however, were allowed to skip the prelim. In reality, most of the successful candidates had some college education. Spaulding, Imperial Japan , p. 262.
A surprisingly large proportion of these ideas found their way into the national public-service law that was approved by the House of Representatives of the Diet on 15 October and by the House of Councillors the following day. The National Personnel Authority thus gave way to the National Personnel Commission; the term of office for its three members was reduced from six years (renewable up to eighteen years) to four years (renewable up to twelve years); its rule-making powers were further reduced; impeachment was added to the causes for dismissal of public servants; and their political rights, such as the right to stand for an elective office, were recognized.[42]
In sum, it is plain that, from the American standpoint, what was enacted into law by the Japanese Diet in October 1947 was a watered-down version of the original draft. However, it would be too simplistic to view the revisions in the hands of the Japanese as the product of the bureaucracy's scheme to perpetuate its power. The notion of a powerful central personnel agency, although by no means alien to the Japanese, evoked fear and resistance from the Left and the Right alike. The entrenched bureaucrats justifiably saw the danger of the erosion of their power, whereas proponents of democracy feared that the proposed agency might help perpetuate the privileged position of senior bureaucrats. The near-unanimous support for the guarantee of labor and political rights for public servants, moreover, stemmed primarily from the widespread desire for democratization.
The First Revision Of The Law
So long as the Occupation continued and Hoover remained as chief of the civil-service division, however, the Japanese had but a slim chance of getting away with what they had done. Upon returning to his post in November 1947, Hoover was infuriated to learn of the fate of his draft and assigned a top priority to the revision of the law. Simultaneously, he initiated the process of organizing and staffing the Temporary National Personnel Commission and collecting information on the structure, functions, and key personnel of the various ministries and agencies.[43]
A detailed schedule of operations prepared by the civil-service division reflected Hoover's determination to guide the Japanese every
[42] Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 202-03.
[43] Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , p. 4; "Zadankai: Jinji-in no omoide arekore" [Roundtable Discussion: Recollecting Aspects of the National Personnel Authority], Jinji-in geppo 100 (June 1969): 11; SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 253-55.
step of the way toward the goal of implanting a new civil-service system on their soil. However, practical difficulties hampered his task. The official history of the Occupation dealing with civil-service reform, prepared under Hoover's supervision, noted that the need to rely on "remote control," the language barrier, and cabinet reshuffles had contributed to unforeseen delays.[44]
The language barrier appears to have been a major source of difficulty, for the Japanese complained of the low caliber of translators in the SCAP General Headquarters. Most of the translators were nisei (second-generation Japanese born in the United States) who did not understand the legal terminology so prevalent in the vocabulary of Japanese government.[45] Indeed, the ease with which the Japanese succeeded in circumventing the intentions of SCAP with regard to the initial enactment of the national public-service law probably had a great deal to do with the language barrier, which had been turned into an advantage by the Japanese.[46]
These problems notwithstanding, the civil-service division took complete charge of recruiting the staff for the Temporary National Personnel Commission. In January 1948 it devised an open competitive examination, had it translated into Japanese, and supervised its administration. A quarter of about one thousand persons who took the examination were selected and given the first basic-training course, also devised by the civil-service division. Not only was the training material prepared by the Americans, but lectures were delivered by American instructors in English and then translated into Japanese. Members of the first class of this training program, which lasted for five months, were utilized as discussion leaders in the next session, which was shortened to two months. Thereafter, Japanese instructors took over the classes.[47]
[44] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 255-56. The schedule of operations is reproduced on p. 255.
[45] Ashitate Chuzo, "Kohei shinsa no omoide" [Recollections of the Equity Process (i.e., evaluation of complaints concerning adverse action against civil servants)], Jinji-in geppo 274 (Dec. 1973): 18-19.
[46] This episode exemplified the general tendency of Japanese bureaucrats and politicians to engage in subtle subversion of SCAP policy whenever the latter was perceived as threatening. In the words of a perceptive Japanese observer: "Although [Japanese politicians and bureaucrats] permitted themselves no display of open opposition, they attained their ends by undercover resistance of various kinds. Agreeing to the principle of a given reform, they very often succeeded in subtly changing its nature in the course of carrying it out." Masataka Kosaka, 100 Million Japanese: The Postwar Experience (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972), p. 50.
[47] "Zadankai: Jinji-in no omoide arekore," p. 11; Nagahashi Susumu, "Kaisobun: Jinji-in sosetsu no koro" [Reminiscences: the Early Days of the National Personnel Authority], Jinji-in geppo 274(Dec. 1973): 16-17; SCAP, Political Reorientation , p. 257.
Meanwhile, work on the revision of the national public-service law proceeded, and a series of proposed amendments was completed in May 1948. Continuing labor unrest, particularly "strikes and other dispute tactics on the part of organized government employees" underscored the urgency of prompt legislative action. However, "serious differences of opinion . . . developed between the Government Section's Civil Service Division and the Economic and Scientific Section's Labor Division on such questions as scope of coverage of the National Public Service Law, the meaning of collective bargaining as applied to government workers, and the use of strikes or dispute tactics against the government." The impasse was broken by General MacArthur on 6 July; on 22 July he sent a letter to the prime minister of Japan suggesting that the law be revised in accordance with his recommendations.[48]
Given the realities of the Occupation, the MacArthur letter had the force of a command, leaving the prime minister no option but to comply. Addressing the various weaknesses in the existing law, MacArthur laid a special emphasis on the prohibition of strikes by government employees. "No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the public service of Japan or in any instrumentality thereof should resort to strike or engage in delaying or other dispute tactics which tend to impair the efficiency of government operations," he wrote. In his view, "any person, holding such a position, who resorts to such action against the public of Japan thereby betrays the public trust reposed in him and forfeits all rights and privileges accruing to him by virtue of his employment." Recalling that the aim of civil-service reform was to ensure the democratization of Japan, he declared that the "success of this reform is accordingly no less a primary objective of the Occupation than it is a prerequisite to the future well-being of the people of Japan." Finally, he urged the prime minister to undertake "immediately" "a comprehensive revision of the National Public Service Law" along the lines suggested by him, promising all necessary assistance by the SCAP headquarters.[49]
The government of Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi acted with dispatch. Within nine days of receipt of the letter, it promulgated a government ordinance (seirei ) temporarily prohibiting public servants from engaging in collective bargaining, strikes, or delaying or other dispute tactics. The ordinance specifically cited the letter from the
[48] SCAP, Political Reorientation , pp. 258-59.
[49] See the text of the letter in ibid ., vol. II, Appendixes, pp. 581-83.
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as the basis for the prohibition.[50]
Three days earlier, on 28 July, the Japanese government had received from Hoover SCAP's proposed amendments in both English and Japanese. Determined not to repeat the same mistake, Hoover had instructed the Temporary National Personnel Commission to prepare the Japanese translation in utmost secrecy. His apparent calculation that the commission, which would become a major beneficiary of the proposed revisions, would keep the vow of secrecy was off the mark. Asai Kiyoshi, then chairman of the commission, decided that, given the importance of the matter, he was duty-bound to apprise his government of the situation. Prime Minister Ashida, the chief and deputy chief of his secretariat, and a few other cabinet members thus became aware of what was happening. Hoover was reported to have been asked by the Japanese whether his proposals left any room for amendments and to have replied in the negative.[51]
The proposals sent a shock wave through both the Japanese government and, particularly, labor circles. The Ashida government therefore tried very hard to persuade SCAP to accept some amendments. In the end, only minor ones were allowed. On 9 November, a bill to revise the national public-service law was submitted to the Diet, convened especially for that purpose, by the newly formed second Yoshida government. Although the special Diet session proved to be turbulent, with the opposition parties trying to inject other issues, it nonetheless approved the bill in three weeks. Whereas the House of Representatives added a few minor amendments, the House of Councillors failed to do so because of the lack of time. The revised law was promulgated on 3 December 1948 and entered into force on the same day.[52]
Of the 125 articles in the original law, 32 had been extensively revised and 77 partially revised. Fourteen new articles had been added. Hence this represented a major overhaul of the law. Nonetheless, the key changes could be summed up under three headings:
First, the scope of the law was expanded. This was accomplished by shifting certain types of positions from the special government service to the regular government service. Examples of positions so affected
[50] Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen no ayumi [The Path of Twenty Years of Public Personnel Administration] (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1968), p. 37.
[51] Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , pp. 5-6.
[52] Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , pp. 37-38; Ide, Nihon kanryosei , pp. 219-23.
were the director general of the cabinet legislation bureau, the vice-minister of each ministry, the counselor of each ministry, manual laborers, employees of the National Diet, court investigators, and certain personnel of government enterprises. All of these positions came within the purview of the national public-service law.
Second, the powers of the central personnel agency were strengthened. Not only was the name that SCAP had originally recommended, the National Personnel Authority (Jinji-in), restored, but its status was upgraded from that of an external agency (gaikyoku ) of the prime minister's office to a component agency of the cabinet. Its rule-making powers were enhanced: it now monopolized the power to make rules aimed at implementing the standards set in the national public-service law; the erstwhile requirement that all rules must be approved by the prime minister was jettisoned. The authority's financial position was bolstered by the acquisition of the privilege of "double budget": should the cabinet decide to revise the authority's proposed expenditures, it must submit to the Diet both the revision and the original request.
Third, measures to tighten discipline in the public service were introduced. This meant, primarily, that public servants were stripped of the right to strike and to employ delaying and other dispute tactics, were forbidden to run for elective offices or become officers in a political party or any other political organization, and were barred from all political activities other than voting. As a result, the gap between public servants and private-sector employees widened considerably.[53]
The Aftermath
S-1 Examination
The passage of the national public-service law in 1947 and its substantial revision in 1948 helped to establish the basic legal and institutional framework for the modernization and democratization of the Japanese-government bureaucracy. However, SCAP knew all along that a comprehensive civil-service law and a strong central personnel agency would be powerless to overcome the inertia, or, worse yet, the resistance of the old-line bureaucrats. What was needed, therefore, was
[53] Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , pp. 37-39; Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , pp. 6-11.
a mechanism through which to identify and weed out the most unfit and to infuse the bureaucracy with fresh blood. To accomplish this goal, article 9 of the supplementary provisions of the national public-service law required the holding of an examination to fill all administrative positions at the level of section chief and above.[54]
In the course of preparing for the examination, SCAP's Civil Service Division decided that "the examination should have none of the aspects of a purge," even though that "would probably make it difficult to attain the objectives of the examination in full measure." Underlying this decision were two considerations: first, "many of the more recalcitrant and unadaptable officials had [already] been eased out under pressure of the various SCAP sections"; second, it was deemed most important "to preserve the integrity and objectivity of the examination." The civil-service division also decided to make the examination "open and competitive," rather than qualifying. In other words, all incumbents of designated positions would be required to compete with other candidates if they wished to be reappointed. Insofar as designating positions subject to examination was concerned, the key criterion was whether or not their duties were primarily administrative. The positions of administrative vice-minister, bureau chief, division chief, and section chief in the regular administrative agencies were included, in accordance with the law. A total of 2,621 positions were designated as subject to examination, and they were in turn grouped into 60 occupational areas ranging from general administration to police.[55]
Each designated position was not only allocated to an occupational group but also placed in one of four administrative levels. Level 1 encompassed administrative vice-ministers and comparable positions (such as directors general of agencies) and level 4 encompassed section chiefs and their equivalents. The examination was designed to measure four essential characteristics: "(a) administrative aptitude, (b) technical competence, (c) satisfactory character, and (d) physical fitness." Administrative knowledge and aptitude were tested through two procedures. First, each candidate was required to take a written examination
[54] Maynard N. Shirven and Joseph L. Speicher, "Examination of Japan's Upper Bureaucracy," Personnel Administration 14, no, 4 (July 1951): 48-50. When they wrote this article, the authors were on the staff of the SCAP General Headquarters. Shirven was Chief of the Civil Service Division, the Government Section, and Speicher was Chief of the Examinations Branch of the same Division.
[55] Ibid., pp. 50-52.
consisting of "90 multiple-choice items relating to organization, personnel administration, financial management, principles of supervision, interpretation of data, and other facets of the practical work of public administrators." Second, in addition to the written test, a candidate was required to meet "a qualifying standard of practical experience." A candidate for the position of administrative vice-minister, for example, "was required to have served at least one year as a bureau chief or in a position of similar responsibility."[56]
The decision to include a test of technical competence was based on SCAP's perception that "one of the principal weaknesses of the Japanese civil-service system was the preponderance of officials with only legal training and background in positions where technical knowledge was essential." Candidates for positions in 45 of the 60 occupational groups were required to take tests consisting of "80 multiple-choice items constructed from basic reference material and from experience in the occupation." These tests were said to have been "rather elementary in nature." In addition, the candidates had to meet the experience requirement in the occupational area of their choice.[57]
Determination of "satisfactory character" was the responsibility of the National Personnel Authority's bureau of investigation. First, the candidate's own statements relating to his experience, education, and personal history contained in his application were verified. Second, an attempt was made to evaluate his personality traits by obtaining ratings on such qualities as "ability to train subordinates, originality, and planning ability" from at least three persons familiar with the candidate's previous experience. On the basis of these data, each candidate was given an overall score of either pass or fail. The final component of the examination was designed "to eliminate those candidates who were physically unfit for the performance of the duties of the designated positions." Inasmuch as incumbent employees of the national and local governments and other public bodies were subjected to periodic medical examinations, only candidates from outside the government were required to take the physical examination.[58]
Unhappy about the imposed nature of the examination and uncertain about its results, the bureaucrats tried to force its cancellation by postponing the submission of applications until the last minute. The
[56] Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[57] Ibid., p. 53.
[58] Ibid., pp. 54-55.
"war of nerves," however, was won by SCAP, and before the deadline was past "a total of 12,000 applications from 8,076 individuals had been filed for the 2,621 designated positions." After preliminary screening, 7,815 candidates were allowed to take the examination. The administrative aptitude test was given on 15 January 1950, and the technical tests for various occupational groups were given from 20 to 22 January. Because no time limit was imposed and candidates were permitted to smoke and were served hot tea, the examination was dubbed a "paradise examination." It was also called S-1, signifying that it was the first examination for supervisory personnel in postwar Japan.[59]
Did the examination accomplish its purpose? Directly, it helped to eliminate about 21 percent of incumbents. At level 1 (administrative vice-minister), however, the attrition rate was only 12 percent. "Indirectly, it is estimated that an additional 10-20 percent may have been eliminated. For example, when the examination was announced, a number of incumbents either resigned or did not apply for the examination, while others secured transfers to non-designated positions." One reason for the remarkably high rate of retention of incumbents was that they were given preferential treatment: once they passed the examination, they "were likely to be reappointed regardless of their position on the eligibility list"—that is, regardless of their actual scores in the examination.[60]
Unbeknownst to SCAP, the Japanese bureaucrats also resorted to the "self-defensive measure" of asking other qualified candidates to withdraw their names from the eligibility list.[61] So widespread and effective was this practice, in fact, that of the 175 persons who were appointed to levels I and 2 positions following the examination, only one was a "civilian"—that is, a person who had not previously served as a government official.[62] Not surprisingly, the examination served to tarnish the image of SCAP even among those who survived the ordeal. The administrative-aptitude test, for example, was perceived as being too simplistic and of questionable validity. Recalling his experience two decades later, one Japanese participant wrote that senior civil servants
[59] Ibid., p. 55; Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , p. 119. For a detailed analysis of the S-1 examination, see Miyake, Gyoseigaku , pp. 112-28. He provides examples of questions along with correct answers.
[60] Shirven and Speicher, "Examination of Japan's Upper Bureaucracy," pp. 56-57.
[61] Kaneji Hiroshi, "Jinji-in no omoide" [Recollections on the National Personnel Authority] in Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , p. 53.
[62] Hata, Kanryo no kenkyu , p. 106.
taking the test had been appalled by SCAP's low opinion of their ability reflected in the "simpleminded and mechanical" questions in the test.[63]
Post-Occupation Developments, 1952-87
Notwithstanding the lofty goals pursued by the Occupation, its methods of operation were autocratic and frequently high-handed, generating resentments on the part of the Japanese people, particularly those in the bureaucracy and in the Diet. The formal termination of the Occupation in April 1952, therefore, paved the way for a reappraisal of the various reform measures implemented under American tutelage. The sentiment for revision of the national public-service law was quite strong, because it was perceived as an alien imposition not suited to Japanese needs. The National Personnel Authority had become an object of intense resentment, not only because of its unprecedented powers but also because it had served as a tool of SCAP's civil-service division. Proposals for reform, even abolition, of the authority were justified on various grounds.[64]
The government and the ruling party argued that the authority's independence and powers undermined the cabinet-responsible system on which the Japanese government was based. They further pointed to what they described as deleterious effects of the authority's annual recommendations on compensation: the latter allegedly provided fuel for organized labor's spring offensive for wage increases and influenced wage levels in the private sector. The opposition parties and labor organizations, on the other hand, advocated reform of the authority on the ground that it was not fulfilling its original goal of safeguarding the interests of public servants. The main function of the annual recommendations on compensation, they argued, was to legitimize the government's policy of holding wages and salaries to a minimum.
Another consideration that underscored the need for revision of the law was its incompatibility with Convention Number 87 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which the Japanese government was interested in ratifying. The ILO treaty called for a guarantee by its contracting parties of their citizens' right to establish and join
[63] Hayashi Shuzo, "Shiken jigoku iroiro" [Aspects of an Examination Hell], Jinji-in geppo 236 (Oct. 1970): 4. See also "Zadankai: Jinji-in no omoide arekore," p. 13.
[64] Asai, Shinpan kokka komuinho seigi , pp. 15-16. For an account of the resentment the authority faced and how it overcame attempts to emasculate it in the waning days of the Occupation, see Tomioka Shozo, "'Hoittoni keikoku shokan' o sukupu" [Getting a Scoop on the "Whitney Warning Letter"], Kankai [The Official World], July 1986, pp. 188-93.
labor unions, the unions' autonomy, their right to establish and join federations and international organizations, and other labor-related rights.[65]
None of the nine formal proposals for the revision of the national public service law submitted to the Diet between May 1952 and December 1963, however, succeeded in mustering sufficient support. By the time a bill for revision of the law was submitted to the Diet for the tenth time in January 1965 by the first Sato government, a sense of urgency had been added: the powerful labor federation Sohyo (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, or the General Council of Japan Labor Unions) and a union representing locomotive engineers of the national railroads had filed a complaint against the Japanese government with the ILO, and there were signs that other labor unions might follow suit. The ILO had already initiated an investigation into the complaint. Against such a backdrop the Sato government cited the need to amend the provisions in the national public-service law pertaining to the rights of public servants to organize so that Japan might ratify ILO Convention Number 87.
Additionally, the government stressed the need to establish a system of responsibility in public-personnel administration, proposing to set up a new personnel agency within the office of the prime minister. Instead of replacing the National Personnel Authority, however, the new agency, to be called the Bureau of Personnel (Jinji-kyoku), would simply take over some of the functions previously performed by the authority and by the Finance Ministry. Specifically, the bureau would be given jurisdiction over the efficiency, welfare, and service of public servants, their retirement allowances, the compensation of special-service public servants, the coordination of personnel management among the various ministries and agencies, and the collection and analysis of statistical data regarding personnel administration. The bill embodying the preceding proposals was approved by both houses of the Diet on 17 May 1965. On the same day the Diet also passed a bill empowering the government to ratify ILO Convention Number 87.
In sum, the period of "trial" for the National Personnel Authority came to an end in 1965 with its powers only marginally altered.[66] The
[65] Asai, Shinpan komuinho seigi , p. 16; Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , pp. 39-40.
[66] Tsuji Kiyoaki, a distinguished student of Japanese public administration, characterized the thirteen years following the end of the American Occupation as the "period of trial for the National Personnel Authority" (Jinji-in no kuro no jidal ). See "Zadankai: Korekara no jinji gyosei" [Roundtable Discussion: Public Personnel Administration in the Days Ahead], Jinji-in geppo 274(Dec. 1973): 4.
civil-service reform spearheaded by the Occupation thus overcame the first significant challenge to its viability. Although numerous changes were introduced in subsequent years, none can be characterized as major. The more noteworthy changes pertained to (1) civil-service examinations, (2) the expansion of postentry training programs, (3) the introduction of a mandatory retirement system, and (4) reorganization of government agencies.
The civil-service-examination system has undergone change three times in the postoccupation period. Until 1956, higher' civil servants were recruited through the examination to recruit sixth-grade national civil servants (6-kyu shoku kokka komuin saiyo shiken ). But in 1957, in conjunction with the revision of the grade system from a fifteen-grade to an eight-grade system, the sixth-grade civil-service examination was renamed the higher civil-service examination (kokka komuin saiyo jokyu shiken ). The erstwhile fifth-grade civil-service examination became the intermediate civil-service examination (kokka komuin saiyo jukyu shiken ). Along with the lower civil-service examination (kokka komuin saiyo shokyu shiken ), the civil-service-examination system now consisted of three distinct levels.[67]
Then in 1960, the higher civil-service examination was subdivided into types A and B (koshu and otsushu ). Officially, however, this change was characterized as the renaming of the previous higher civil-service examination (HCSE) as the type-B HCSE, accompanied by the introduction of an entirely new examination, the type-A HCSE. The stated rationale for the change was that the new type-A examination would make the civil service more competitive with the private sector, for it would upgrade the initial rank of new employees (from grade 7 to grade 6) and improve their prospects for promotion to managerial positions.[68] As we shall see shortly, however, what really happened was the creation of two distinct classes of higher civil servants: those in the elite track (type-A-examination graduates) and those in the quasi-elite track (type-B-examination graduates).
The latest change in the examination system occurred in 1985, when the type-A HCSE was renamed the type-I civil-service examination (isshu shiken ), the type-B HCSE was abolished, the intermediate examination was, in effect, replaced by the type-II civil-service examination (nishu shiken ), and the lower examination was renamed the
[67] Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei nijunen , p. 136.
[68] Ibid., p. 137.
type-Ill civil-service examination (sanshu shiken ). Officially, however, the type-II examination was described as an entirely new examination rather than a successor to the intermediate examination. It was, in fact, characterized as an upgraded version of the intermediate examination, which in the preceding years had become a vehicle for recruiting not high-school graduates but primarily university graduates. This reflected in part the increase in the number of university graduates in the general population and in part the competitiveness of the higher civil-service examinations. Whether the change will lead to the recruitment of candidates for middle-level management who are better qualified than before, however, remains to be seen.
On the other hand, the educational level of the applicants for the type-II examination in the first two years of its existence was slightly higher than that of applicants for the intermediate examination. Whereas in 1984, the last year in which the intermediate examination was given, only 1 percent of applicants had done some graduate work, the proportion increased to 1.6 in 1985 and to 1.8 in 1986. Among the successful candidates, the increase was more substantial: from 1.8 percent in 1984 to 4.2 percent in 1985 and to 3.8 percent in 1986. So far as university graduates were concerned, however, the picture changed very little. Although the proportion of university graduates increased slightly among all applicants (80.5 percent in 1984, 82.1 percent in 1985, and 81.5 percent in 1986), it remained all but identical among the successful candidates (91.3 percent in 1984, 91.5 percent in 1985, and 91.3 percent in 1986). Overall, the proportion of the applicants with at least some university education increased from 81.5 percent in 1984 to 83.3 percent in 1986, and that of the successful applicants with the same level of educational attainments increased from 93.1 percent in 1984 to 95.1 percent in 1986. There was also notable change in the type of universities attended by successful applicants. The proportion of those who had attended national universities increased from 31.8 percent in 1984 to 38.7 percent in 1986, whereas that of those who had attended private universities decreased from 57.2 percent to 52.2 percent in the same period.[69] Although this may be viewed as an indirect indicator of the greater competitiveness of the type-II examination as compared with that of its predecessor, it also suggests a step backward from the standpoint of making the civil service more democratic.
[69] Jinji-in, Komuin hakusho [White Paper on Civil Servants], 1987 (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1987), p. 36.
Another development related to the civil-service examinations is the gradual lifting of restrictions on women, a development that is plainly conducive to democratization. In 1979 women were allowed for the first time to take entrance examinations to state-run schools that train air-traffic controllers, maritime-security officers, and meteorologists. There were 479 women applicants, of whom 36 were successful.[70] In the following year, women were allowed to take civil-service examinations for "national tax specialists" (kokuzei senmonkan ) and guards in the imperial palace. There were 573 women applicants for the former, of whom 32 were successful, and 91 women applicants for the latter, of whom 2 were successful.[71] Restrictions were further relaxed in 1981, allowing women to become border guards (nyukoku keibikan ) and prison guards (keimukan ). Three women (out of 163 female applicants) passed the examination for the former, and 54 women (out of 466 female applicants) passed the examination for the latter.[72]
Another noteworthy trend is a phenomenal increase in the number and variety of training programs for civil servants. Inasmuch as we shall examine the civil-servants' postentry training at length in chapter 6, it will suffice here to note a few statistics. Whereas in the late 1940s there existed only a dozen or so training programs, in which less than 1 percent of the civil servants participated, by the late 1960s the number of training programs had exceeded 4,100 and nearly 17 percent of the civil servants participated in them. By the late 1970s, nearly one out of every four civil servants was participating in some 6,700 programs. Finally, in the mid-1980s nearly four of every ten civil servants were participating in 9,200 programs. These programs encompassed a wide array of organizations, the entire spectrum of civil servants up to the section-chief level, and the whole gamut of subjects.[73]
In 1985, a mandatory retirement system for civil servants went into effect. With a few exceptions, the retirement age was set at sixty. Civil servants whose duties and responsibilities are deemed to be "special" or who cannot be easily replaced, however, would be allowed to extend their retirement age up to five years. Physicians and dentists were prime examples of such persons.[74] The new system, however, was not
[70] Ibid., 1980, p. 25.
[71] Ibid., 1981, p. 25.
[72] Ibid., 1982, p. 26.
[73] Jinji-in, Nenji hokokusho [Annual Report], 1948-49 through 1986 (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1950-87).
[74] Jinji-in, Komuin hakusho , 1982, pp. 44-47; ibid., 1986, pp. 51-52.
expected to affect the retirement practices of higher civil servants, who retire in their fifties. We shall examine this issue in detail in chapter 8.
Finally, we shall note briefly salient changes in the structure of the executive branch of the Japanese government. To list the most noteworthy of them, we must mention the establishment of the Economic Planning Agency in 1955, the Science and Technology Agency in 1956, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichisho, initially translated as the Ministry of Autonomy) in 1960, the Environment Agency in 1971, the Okinawa Development Agency in 1972, the National Land Agency in 1974, and the Management and Coordination Agency in 1984. In most of these cases, existing organizations were renamed, upgraded, or restructured. To cite two examples, in 1960 the Autonomy Agency (Jichicho) was upgraded to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and in 1984 the Administrative Management Agency was in effect replaced by the Management and Coordination Agency (Somucho), which also assumed some of the functions that had previously been performed by the prime minister's office.[75]
Even though the goal of "administrative reform" (gyosei kaikaku ) has received much attention in the postoccupation period, actual results attained have been meagre. The number of "regular service" national civil servants (ippan shoku kokka komuin ) has ranged from 643,057 in 1955 to 867,172 in 1981. In 1986, it declined to 847,004.[76] Although a significant streamlining of the government structure would require a thoroughgoing reappraisal and a substantial reduction of the powers of the central-government ministries and agencies, the entrenched powers of the bureaucracy have thus far forestalled such an approach, necessitating the adoption of a "uniform reduction method" whereby all ministries and agencies are required to eliminate the same number of bureaus, sections, or other units.[77] A recent example of such an approach is Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru's plan to seek a transfer
[75] Gyosei Kanricho, Gyosei kanri no genjo: Gyosei kaikaku no doko [The Present Condition of Administrative Management: Trends in Administrative Reform] (Tokyo: Okurasho, Insatsukyoku, 1984), pp. 56-57.
[76] For these and related statistics, see Jinji-in, Jinji gyosei sanjunen no ayumi [The Path of Thirty Years of Public Personnel Administration] (Tokyo: Okurasho, In-satsukyoku, 1978), p. 544; idem, Komuin hakusho , 1978 through 1987.
[77] For a critical assessment of this issue, see Yoshinori Ide, "Administrative Reform and Innovation: the Japanese Case," International Social Science Journal 21, no. 1 (1969): 56-67; Naka Mamoru, "Kongetsu no shoten: Nakasone gyokaku no sannenban o sokatsu suru" [Focus of the Month: Summarizing Three and a Half Years of Nakasone's Administrative Reform], Kankai , Aug. 1986, pp. 82-93.
of one unit from each national-government ministry or agency to the local level.[78]
The poor record of the Japanese government in administrative reform should caution against minimizing the results of the Occupation reforms. Let us attempt to assess the latter in an impressionistic way.
An Assessment Of The Occupation Reform
SCAP's program of civil-service reform in Japan was part of its larger program of democratization. Convinced that the democratization of the political system as a whole would be incomplete or even jeopardized without a corresponding change in the government bureaucracy, SCAP pursued the twin goals of modernizing and democratizing the Japanese civil-service system.
The principal instrument of the reform was a comprehensive civil-service law, of which the centerpiece was to be a powerful central personnel agency. Armed with quasi-legislative powers as well as a measure of independence, such an agency would function as the principal guardian of merit principles in the recruitment, promotion, and remuneration of civil servants. The civil-service law would also pave the way for the introduction of a position-classification system for the first time in Japanese history; additionally, by prohibiting strikes and other dispute behavior by civil servants, the law would help ensure both the integrity of government operations and the political neutrality of its personnel.
Paradoxically, however, the lofty objective of democratization was pursued in a patently undemocratic fashion. As the Japanese appeared to be incapable of initiating and implementing any significant reform on their own, SCAP simply imposed its will on them, behaving in a "highly dogmatic and inflexible" manner.[79] Although the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered was bound to be asymmetrical, it nonetheless allowed the Japanese some room for maneuver. This was facilitated by SCAP's policy of indirect rule and the language barrier. The unauthorized revision of the American draft of the national
[78] Asahi shinbun , 5 Dec. 1987. Prime Minister Takeshita did, however, indicate some flexibility, which would allow certain agencies exemption from the proposed reduction.
[79] Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation," p. 509.
public-service law in the legislative stage was a case in point, although it proved to be short-lived.
In the short run, SCAP attained all of its major goals: the enactment of a comprehensive civil-service law, the establishment of a central personnel agency, and the introduction of modern concepts and procedures of public-personnel management. Nonetheless, whether all this would materially change Japan's bureaucratic landscape hinged on how the Japanese themselves would respond to the innovations.
As things turned out, some of the ideas, although enshrined in law, were never implemented, notably position classification and the use of examination in promotions. Nor have the power and influence of the National Personnel Authority turned out to be nearly as great as its American architects had hoped. As will be shown in the following pages, moreover, the old patterns of Japanese bureaucracy—stratification, elitism, legalism, retirement practices, and the like—have proved to be singularly resilient.
Our tentative assessment of this unique experiment—an externally imposed reform inspired by democratic ideals but implemented in an authoritarian fashion—is, then, a mixed one. It was neither a rousing success nor a dismal failure. At a minimum, it accomplished something the Japanese had never been able to do: the establishment of a central personnel agency endowed with a modicum of independence and modest amounts of authority to safeguard the ideals of democracy, equity, and efficiency in public administration.
In comparative terms, what the Americans did in occupied Japan was not actually unique. Efforts to reform the civil-service system were also made in occupied Germany. Even though the two occupations occurred contemporaneously, they differed in a major way: whereas the Allied occupation of Japan was in fact an American show, that of Germany was a joint or, more accurately, a disjointed operation. That may help account for the meagre results of the American and British attempts at civil-service reform in their occupation zones. The reform implemented by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany bore little relationship to the objectives embodied in Military Government Law No. 15, jointly proclaimed by the American and British occupation authorities on 19 February 1949.[80]
[80] For an informative analysis by a former participant in the U.S. occupation of Germany, see Arnold Brecht, "Personnel Management" in Edward H. Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 263-93.
Before we leap to the conclusion that all externally guided reforms of civil-service systems have but slim chances of success, however, we need to note that some of the SCAP-initiated reforms were more successful than others. The modest outcome of the civil-service reform, for example, stands in stark contrast to SCAP's record in other areas, notably the revision of the Japanese constitution, the expansion of the franchise, and land reform. As Ward has demonstrated, the Occupation was most successful when it was able to implement the strategy of creating "new vested interests" by finding a clientele group, activating it, and enacting reform legislation that created new vested interests for the clientele. SCAP's "failure to establish and cultivate a clientele group of adequate size and influence," in his view, may have been "a basic reason" for the "failure" of the civil-service reform.[81]
In other words, it is theoretically possible that SCAP could have attained better results had it made determined efforts to create a structure of vested interests among the Japanese bureaucrats. To be sure, the constraints were formidable indeed: the Japanese bureaucrats' instinct for self-preservation, the perception gap between the Americans and the Japanese, the language barrier, and the myopia and ethnocentrism of some of the key American participants.
Most important, perhaps, was the gap between American rhetoric and behavior. Although SCAP extolled the importance of bureaucratic reform and underscored its pivotal role in Japan's democratization, what it actually sought was not a fundamental reduction of bureaucratic power nor a measurable increase in the external constraints on bureaucrats but the more modest goal of making the bureaucracy efficient and modern. As T. J. Pempel argues, this was perhaps a logical concomitant of dominant traditions in "American administrative practice during the mid-twentieth century," which also included functional fragmentation and "the dominance and penetration of particular government agencies by special interests."[82] Pempel shows that jurisdictional rivalries among not only Japanese government ministries but also their counterpart units in the SCAP General Headquarters, particularly cross-national alliances that resulted therefrom, played a significant role in impeding reform.[83] In sum, even though SCAP accomplished what no Japanese government had managed to do, the accomplishment nonetheless left something to be desired.
[81] Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation," pp. 528-31.
[82] Pempel, "The Tar Baby Target," p. 161.
[83] Ibid., pp. 173-79.