14
The Party's Changing Role in Personnel Management

All Leninist parties maintain their authority over cadres in order to control not only the vast bureaucracy but also access to elite status. The CCP regards its monopoly of personnel management as "the basic source of authority that our party needs to fulfill its political mission at each historical stage, [and that] renders the organizational guarantee for the successful completion of a new democratic revolution, a socialist revolution, and a socialist construction."^[1]

The party-state vigorously defends its monopoly over personnel, reacting violently whenever social forces challenge this prerogative. During the Hundred Flowers campaign the intellectuals' demand to share authority over cadres prompted the top leaders to initiate the antirightist campaign. Similarly, it was only when Polish workers called for abolition of the nomenklatura system that the military stepped in to repress the Solidarity movement.^[2]

The phrase "the party manages the cadres" justifies the CCP's monopoly. "State cadres are the party's cadres, and all cadres should be managed according to the party's direction and policies and the principle of unified management." More specifically, the principle implies that the party has the exclusive right to set up the "line, direction, and policies" relating to personnel management, no one can challenge the party's prerogative, and no regional variation can be tolerated. All cadres, whether party members or nonmembers, administrative or technical, are to carry out the party's line and program under the CCP's leadership. Furthermore, the principle also states that only party organs at the various levels

[1] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renshi Zhidu Gaiyao (Beijing: Beijing Dafue Chubanshe, 1985), 7.

[2] Takayuki Ito, "Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland" (unpublished paper).

can select, assign, and utilize cadres. However, the principle does not tell how the party should exercise its authority.

Past Practice

From its foundation to 1949, the CCP directly managed all cadres under a principle of "unified management" without sharing its prerogative with any other government agency.^[3] At each level, party committees made all major decisions on personnel matters while the party's organizational departments handled all administrative aspects of cadre management. Moreover, the system was highly centralized, with upper-level party committees making most decisions on cadres employed at the lower levels. This centralized system was suitable to the revolutionary war period when the size of the cadre corps was small and the CCP was engaged in a desperate struggle with the KMT.

When China started its first five-year plan in 1953, the regime modified its management of cadres to fit the tasks of economic development and socialist construction. As the cadre corps grew and the types of work they were required to perform multiplied, it became more difficult for the organizational departments to manage all the cadres, much less develop a long-term plan for cultivating specialized cadres.^[4] Therefore, the CCP decided in 1953 to manage cadres "department by department and level by level" (fenbu and fenji ) under the unified management of party committees and organizational departments. All cadres were grouped into ten functional categories (xitong ): (1) culture and education, (2) agriculture, forestry, and water conservation, (3) united front, (4) party and government organs, (5) industry, planning, labor, and statistics, (6) finance, economics, commerce, banking, and grain and supply cooperatives, (7) transportation, telecommunications, and postal service, (8) public security, civil affairs, judiciary, court, and procuratorate, (9) foreign relations, foreign trade, and overseas Chinese, and (10) mass organizations such as labor unions, the CYL, and women's associations.^[5] The various functional depart-

[3] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 7.

[4] Ibid., 7–8.

[5] Wang Jianxin, Yang Shugui, Jin Guoliang, and Yan Zhuanyu, eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun (Liaoning: Liaoning Dafue Chubanshe, 1984), 44; Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 417–18.

ments, established under the Party committees, managed the cadres working in their fields.

Level-by-level (fenji ) management meant that each level managed the cadres of its subordinate units down to two or three levels below. The center was responsible for ministers, vice ministers, directors, and deputy directors of the central government and party organs, as well as for leading cadres of provinces and districts. Provincial party committees were in charge of their own middle-level cadres and leading cadres of districts (diqu ), the municipality, and the county. District party committees handled leading cadres of the county and village (xiang ), in addition to their own middle-level cadres (heads of division and sections). County committees looked after their own middle-level (section and team) cadres and the leadership group of village, town (zhen ), and hamlet (cun ).^[6]

Paralleling the party's organizational departments were personnel bureaus, set up in the government, enterprises, and business units to "assist" (xiezhu ) the organizational departments.^[7] Generally speaking, the personnel bureaus managed low-ranking cadres and workers or took care of the administrative work of personnel management, whereas the organizational departments worked as the administrative arm of party committees. Compared with previous practice, the new system was reportedly more suitable for "investigating, observing, and understanding more deeply the political quality and functional competency of the cadres . . . thus helping to fulfill the first five-year plan successfully."^[8]

In order to implement the state constitution, all cadres appointed by the central government or the State Council were screened by the organizational departments before any formal announcement. The cadres to be elected by the state or party organs had to report to the proper authorities before the election.^[9]

By 1955, the center completed the lists of cadres (nomenklatura ) whom it directly managed. The lists included "all cadres assuming nationally important positions."^[10] The appointment or transfer of any cadre on the list had to be approved (pizhun ) by the center,

[6] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 8.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Wang et al., eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun , 44.

[9] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin, 156–63.

[10] Ibid., 143.

which also instructed the local committees and their functional departments to prepare lists of cadres under their jurisdiction, using the principle of "managing fewer and managing better" and considering the importance of the post rather than the incumbent.^[11] The lists included a brief description of the major responsibilities of each post. Thereafter, every year the organizational department must update the list.

For conflicting jurisdictional claims over units under the dual leadership of the central functional department and the local party committee, the center urged the involved parties to negotiate through the management offices—for example, the organizational departments—rather than through responsible persons.

Whenever a new question arose with regard to jurisdiction, the regime ruled on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in March 1953 the center placed the leaders of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and the Chinese Writers' Association under the propaganda department. The higher learning institutes were placed under the various central party departments according to the functional areas of the schools; thus, agricultural and forestry colleges fell under the jurisdiction of the central agricultural work department, and cadres of nationality institutes were given to the united front department.^[12]

Thus, the pre-CR personnel management system took into consideration to only a small degree the type of unit the cadres belonged to (fengong ) or the level in the bureaucratic hierarchy they occupied (fenceng ). The system lacked any notion of classifying the cadres according to the type of work they performed (fenlei ). Although such terms as "party, state, and mass organization cadres," "business cadres," and "enterprise cadres" (classified according to the type of organ where the cadres were employed), or "political cadres," "administrative cadres," and "specialist cadres" (classified according to the type of work the cadre performed) were used, these categories had no practical ramifications for managing the cadres. The party committees managed all cadres, using uniform criteria for different types of cadres.

How to classify the cadres according to the type of work they

[11] Ibid., 144.

[12] Ibid., 419–21.

did, how to manage different categories of cadres using different criteria, and how to distribute personnel authority among the different state organs—for example, the party, government, and enterprise—were questions that were never raised until the 1982–87 reforms.

Nonetheless, a modus operandi for making decisions on personnel matters evolved from 1953 to the CR, nominally involving four parallel hierarchies—that is, decision-making and executive organs of the party and state—although the party had the final say.^[13] The system was not designed as a master plan; rather specific regulations dealing with concrete problems were accumulated, thus producing the general structure of the system.

The chaotic CR, however, destroyed whatever regulations and rules that existed at the time and abolished the personnel bureaus in the government units. As may be inferred from table 38, about 6.4 million joined the cadre ranks without going through formal procedures.

Initial Adjustments

After the fall of the Gang of Four, the regime restored the pre-CR system whereby each party committee managed the cadres two levels below it. It reissued cadre lists to be managed by the center.^[14] In addition, the regime clarified the issue of jurisdiction over enterprise and business cadres: the central organizational department would manage leading cadres of the enterprises directly under the center in coordination with the party core group (dangzu ) of the relevant government ministries.^[15] Management of middle-echelon cadres in the enterprises was generally assigned to the enterprise and business unit party committees. For enterprises

[13] Wang et al., eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun , 54–56.

[14] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 147.

[15] The party core group was set up right after 1949 in all government agencies when many administrative heads were nonparty members. Existing separately from the party committee at the same level, it was appointed directly by the higher party committee to which it was accountable. Xinhua Wenzhai , no. 11, 1978, 1–6; Zhongguo Shehui Kexue , no. 6, 1987, 3–22. Consisting of three to five persons and a group secretary, the party core group maintains the list of people over which they have authority. John Burn, "China's Nomenklatura System," Problems of Communism , September–October 1987, 36–51.

subject to dual jurisdictions—the central party department and the local party committee—"the higher-level party committee will be in charge, and the lower-level party committee will help with observation, examination, training, education, and investigation." With regard to appointment, promotion, transfer, reward and punishment, the lower-level committees could make only suggestions.^[16]

With regard to the division of work between the party's functional departments and its organizational departments, the regime instructed each provincial authority to decide in a way that would uphold the principle of "unified management," while making the system flexible by allowing each functional department to manage cadres in its own field.^[17]

Soon the two-level management by the superior party committee proved to be too highly centralized to work effectively. The regime gradually decentralized the personnel authority by transferring some cadres from central to local jurisdictions. In 3 February 1979 the organizational department authorized nine central organs to manage their own deputy heads. On 24 December 1980 a notice issued by the central organizational department transferred to provincial authorities the jurisdiction over district party secretaries, directors of provincial bureaus, and responsible persons of some enterprise and business units. Provincial party committees were required simply to notify the center of their decisions.^[18] The same notice divided the cadres on the center's lists into two categories. Category A included only the leading cadres of the center and provinces.^[19] All those not listed in category A belonged to category B. When appointing or dismissing members of category A, the party functional departments or the party core groups in the government ministries and the other relevant organs first had to seek the opinion of "the central leaders or vice prime ministers in charge of the units" and include their opinions in the report submitted to the central organizational department. For cadres under

[16] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 148.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] According to John Burn, this category included about 5,000 of the most senior people throughout the country. For a sample of the list, see Burn, "China's Nomenklatura System."

dual leadership, the dominant unit would first seek the opinion of the other side and then report both opinions to the center.

For the posts included in category A but whose incumbents were selected through election, the list of candidates had to be reported with the information specified in the "Form for Reporting Cadre Appointment and Dismissal" to the center for examination before an election. The results of the election also had to be reported to the center for approval. Cadres on the B list were transferred to provincial authorities, who reported their decisions to the center for record keeping.^[20] Thus, cadres on the B list were in fact transferred to provincial jurisdictions.

Any appointment or dismissal of cadres, which required the State Council's approval, had first to be forwarded to the party center. After reviewing the request, the organizational department notified the ministry of labor and personnel of its decision. Only then would the case be submitted to the State Council to formalize the changes according to the regulation. For provincial leaders, whose appointment and dismissal required approval of the local People's Congress, the relevant authority—that is, the provincial organizational departments—first had to consult with the standing committee of the local People's Congress and then report to the central organizational department or to the State Council. These complicated rules were designed to keep personnel authority in the party organs while following constitutional and other legal formalities.

For cadres belonging to category B, each provincial and municipal party committee as well as the various central party organs, the various ministries, and the various people's organizations had to make nominations in written form, explaining in detail the reason for the appointment or dismissal to the center.

The "Regulation Regarding Reform of the Cadre Management System," adopted on 5 October 1983, finally formalized the scope of cadre management by party committees at the various levels. According to this regulation the center managed only "the first-class leadership" of the provincial organs. It also managed ministers, vice ministers, members of the party faction in government ministries, and directors and deputy directors of bureau-level

[20] Chao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 149.

organs. Control over the rest of the cadres was given to provincial authorities.^[21] On 14 July 1984 the organizational department issued more instructions in order to clarify the previous decisions and to solve the problems arising in the process of implementing the decisions. Thereafter, provincial and prefectural party committees prepared the list of cadres they controlled while others were sent down one level below.

The new system is called "managing according to ranks and having each echelon responsible" (fenji quanli, cengceng fuze ). This system decentralized the personnel management authority to a certain extent. Each level manages the one directly below it, instead of two levels below. The organizational department issued a "Notice Regarding the Revised Cadre Post List Under the Center's Authority," which retained only one-third of the cadres on the previous list. The rest were transferred to a lower level. Each state organ reprepared the list for which it was responsible. The new lists, according to an official claim, enable each central ministry and local party committee more effectively to "supervise, check, and discover the talents" for the positions for which they are responsible. The party committees survey personnel changes in the positions listed under their jurisdiction twice a year and report them to the organizational department.

However, overlapping claims on cadres continue, particularly among government ministries, which exercise functional leadership (yewu lingdao ) over their subordinate enterprise and business units scattered nationwide, and local party committees, which have "leadership relations" with the same units. The functional leadership is often called "line" (tiaotiao ), and the leadership that the local party committee exercises over the enterprise and business units is known as "area" (kuaikuai ). The division of work in the area of personnel management between tiaotiao and kuaikuai is particularly unclear and gives rise to situations where both pass the buck and both check each other.

Generally, there are three types of arrangements for the claims of the tiaotiao and kuaikuai . The first type is dominated by the central ministries: their party core groups are responsible for appointments, transfers, examinations, investigations, assess-

[21] Huaqiao Ribao , 14 July 1987, 1.

ments, promotions, and dismissals. Local party committees assist the work of the various central departments, assuming major responsibility only for the political, ideological, and functional education of the cadres.^[22] The local party committees also supervise the administrative side of personnel management as well as such party functions as convening party conferences, electing party committees, and examining (shencha ) candidates for committee membership.

The second type is dominated by local party committees: they are mainly responsible for personnel management, whereas the upper organs provide functional leadership and make suggestions only on personnel matters. The third type involves the conflicting claims between local party committees and enterprise and business units under the local authority. For this case the involved parties are supposed to divide their work through negotiation and bargaining.

In addition to the limited decentralization of personnel authority along the party hierarchy, the regime also tried to rationalize the methods of managing personnel matters.

Recruitment

All cadres in China are "appointed" (renming ) by superior organs (shangji ), and this method has not changed in any meaningful way, despite the frequent misuse of authority by leading cadres.^[23] Instead, the regime has endeavored to improve its operation by emphasizing careful screening by the organizational departments and collective decision making by party committees. Officially, any important decision about cadres should involve "democratic nomination, consultation with a wide range of opinions, selection of candidates with care, investigation by organizational departments, collective discussion by party committees, reports to upper echelons, rechecking by organizational departments, and final approval by party committees one level higher."^[24] In addition, the

[22] Wang et al., eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun , pp. 48–49; Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 422–23.

[23] Shehui Kexue Pinglun , 5 September 1985.

[24] Renmin Ribao , 2 February 1986.

regime has experimented with several other methods to improve the effectiveness of the appointment system.

One remedy is to make appointments only after soliciting recommendations from the masses and after careful organizational investigation (kaocha ).^[25] The regime now encourages the masses, low-ranking cadres, and retired cadres to recommend qualified persons for specific, cadre positions. Even if fully utilized, this method will not change the appointment system; it only broadens the pool of candidates from which party committees will make final selections. So far it seems that only retired cadres effectively use their "right to recommend" to influence the final selection for their benefit.^[26]

Another remedy is a kind of election, primarily used to select administrative heads for small enterprises and business units. For instance, Guangdong province reportedly used an "election" to select the managers of the Jianmen Beverage Factory and the Friendship Store of Shenzhen, as well as the department heads of the Central-South Institute.^[27] Viewed as a means of "finding competent persons" rather than of electing representatives, the "election" resembles an opinion poll because the outcome must be approved by a proper party committee. Despite its experimental nature, some old cadres are openly critical of elections on the grounds that they aggravate factionalism, and "talent [rencai ] will not necessarily get the most votes."^[28] It is, therefore, very unlikely that "elections" will become an important mode of selecting cadres.

For recruiting specialist cadres, some units use an "invitation system," in which each hiring unit and individual applicant bargain, negotiate, and make a contract that contains specific terms on tenure, remuneration, and type of work to be done.^[29] The regime tolerates a limited labor market for specialist cadres because of the need to utilize scarce manpower effectively and to allow peripheral regions and rural areas to attract much-needed specialists. To criti-

[25] Ibid., 12 October 1982.

[26] Ibid., 7 August 1985.

[27] Guangzhou Yanjiu , no. 3, 1985, 41–42.

[28] Renmin Ribao , 21 March 1985.

[29] Guangdongsheng Renshiju, ed., Shenzhen Ganbu Renshi Zhidu Gaige (Beijing: Laoding Renshi Chubanshe, 1984).

cism that the system undermines state planning and brings back the "capitalist labor market," proponents respond by stressing that specialists, once hired, become "co-owners" of the means of production and that the system induces specialists to improve their knowledge and to raise their productivity. By offering attractive terms, Guansu province managed to draw about 8,800 specialists from outside the province, and a poor county in Henan province invited about 700 outside technical personnel.^[30]

In July 1984, the center designated three provinces, two municipalities, and three scientific organizations to experiment with the invitation system (pingren ).^[31] Shaanxi province reportedly used this method to select the leading cadres of six provincial organs.^[32] The invitation method is widely used for choosing village and township-level cadres.^[33] Hubei province reportedly recruited 15,000 people for leadership positions at that level.^[34]

In some places, an examination is used to recruit people for low-level functionary positions in such sectors as banking, taxes, industry, commerce, prison work, and legal fields.^[35] Initially, tests were administered to only a fixed number of candidates designated by the recruiters, but the regime promises to change the method to "open invitation, self-application, firmly upholding test results, evaluation of virtue, intelligence and physical conditions, and selection of the best." The city of Shenyang has used the "open invitation and test" method to appoint leading cadres of its science and technology commission, measurement bureau, and tourist corporation.^[36] By 1987, Zhejiang province reportedly recruited 13,900 people through the examination system.^[37] Seventy-five percent of the newly recruited or promoted were from units other than where they assumed leadership positions.^[38]

[30] Jiaoyanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 1 February 1986; Guowuyuan Bangongding Diaocha Yanjiushi, ed., Zongguo Xingzheng Guanlixue Chutan (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 1984), 55–81.

[31] Renmin Ribao , 29 March 1985.

[32] Shaanxi Ribao , 6 February 1985.

[33] Altogether about 60,000 were invited. Renmin Ribao , 15 October 1984.

[34] Ibid., 1 June 1985; Chiangjiang Ribao , 1 June 1985; 23 June 1985.

[35] Renmin Ribao , 8 November 1980.

[36] Jianzhou Shiyuan Xuebao , 10 April 1985; Liaowang , no. 39, 1984, 5.

[37] Beijing Review , 31 August 1987, 8.

[38] For instance, a local school teacher of economics became the head of Ningpo city's price bureau. Ibid.

Evaluation

The merit-based personnel management system requires impartial and rigorous appraisal of performance, the system which many Chinese scholars believe to be the key to solving the problems of the "iron rice bowl [and] eating from a big pot." The regular assessment that the CR had ended has been restored by the regime and is now conducted once every two years.^[39]

However, the criteria and procedures for assessing performance have not yet been systematized or standardized. Currently, cadres are assessed in four areas: virtue, ability, diligence, and achievement. The meaning of these four terms is ambiguous, and the effort to clarify them produces only more numerous subcategories and indicators. For instance, one Chinese writer divides virtue into four subsets: personality, moral and ethical standards, professional ethics, and political attitude. Each of these subcategories is further divided into three indicators. As a result, the evaluation of virtue requires the examination of twelve indicators.^[40] Similarly, ability, diligence, and achievement are divided into several dozen indicators. When more than fifty indicators are graded in terms of four categories—excellent, fine, fair, and poor—the evaluation becomes too complicated and confusing.^[41] Shanghai reportedly developed forty standards with which to evaluate each cadre, and the scores on each criterion obtained by surveying superiors, subordinates, and colleagues were coded and stored in a computer.^[42]

These multiple categories allow an inordinate amount of discretionary power to evaluators.^[43] Therefore, leading cadres frequently rely on simple criteria such as age, education, and their impression of the candidate. Despite an official emphasis on "pioneering spirit," cadres with such spirit often offend the powerful and "cannot stay on the job for a long time," but "those with ordinary ability can manage very well." The best way for the Chinese bureaucracy to manage is to take a cautious middle position on every issue: "Swimming at the upper end of the stream receives punishment,

[39] Cao Zhi, ed., Zhonghua Renmin , 174.

[40] Wang et al., eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun , 189.

[41] The "Provisional Regulations of the Civil Servant" prescribes the same procedure for evaluation. Liaowang , 17 June 1985, 26–27.

[42] Renmin Ribao , 19 September 1984.

[43] Wang et al., eds., Ganbu Guanli Gailun , 187–94.

swimming at the lower end of the stream maintains the present position, and swimming in the middle is blessed."

As part of a planned civil service system, the regime experimented with a new evaluation system in three different units. One was a year-end assessment of political cadres in Zhejiang in 1987, and it plans to test the same method in eighteen provinces and municipalities in 1988. A guideline issued on 8 July 1987 for assessing county-level cadres followed the existing personnel management procedure. The authority to assess the county secretary and magistrate is in the hands of a special committee organized by the district-level party secretary or administrative heads.^[44] For a year-end assessment of administrative cadres, the regime plans to test a new method in Huangbu district and the commerce bureau of Shanghai. Also, some central government ministries are slated to experiment with the new evaluation method.^[45] The "Provisional Regulations of the Civil Servant" specifies that any evaluation of cadres of division (chu ) level or above should include the opinion of the masses as collected through an "opinion poll."

Responsibility System

Since Deng Xiaoping's speech in March 1983, which stressed the need to specify tasks, people, quantity, quality, and time needed to complete every project, the center has issued a series of directives and organized numerous conferences to exchange experiences to establish a system for defining responsibilities.^[46] By 1984, about 20 percent of the provincial organs and about 50 percent of the district- and municipal-level organs in twenty-three provinces had allegedly established some kind of responsibility system.^[47] By 1987 about 93 percent of districts and municipalities and 94 percent of county governments had established some kind of responsibility system.^[48]

Understandably, defining the authority, responsibility, and task for each of 27 million cadres is a mammoth undertaking in China

[44] Zhuzhi Renshixue Yanjiu , no. 2, 1988, 36–38.

[45] Renmin Ribao , 11 December 1987.

[46] Lilun Zhanxian (Anhui), 15 January 1984, 13; Sichuan Ribao , 14 March 1984.

[47] Lilun Zhanxian , 5 January 1984, 4–5.

[48] Zhongguo Renshi Guanli , no. 9, 1987, 20.

where even systematic and effective tables of organization are nonexistent. Instead of issuing general guidelines on how to set up the responsibility system, the center encourages each unit to develop its own system on the basis of its concrete conditions. Most systems reported in the newspapers include one or another attempt to delineate authority, responsibility, and the main task for each office and post, thus tying performance to some kind of reward-and-punishment scheme. Liaoyuan municipality divided its entire workload into "routine work and important work," assigning twenty points for the first and eighty points for the latter. One county categorized its entire workload into three types: specific tasks assigned by the county party committees, the task of developing spiritual civilization, and the objective of improving work style. Fulfillment of the first task deserves sixty points, and the completion of either of the other two is worth forty points.^[49]

Broadly speaking, there are four types of responsibility systems. For leading cadres whose job involves many different kinds of work, "position, responsibility, and tasks" are taken into account during assessment.^[50] Jiangyan district of Wuhan municipality, with 2,800 cadres in sixty-three units, has reportedly defined the responsibility, authority, and task for each unit and each individual. Now, each cadre keeps his "work record" which is used as a basis for assessment.^[51]

The method of contracting out specific tasks with a fixed number of people, a deadline, and points to earn is used for the leading cadres of rural areas. "Managers and other cadres of enterprises sign contracts on such specific economic indicators as production value, profit, quality, and sales, etc., and when all these targets are met, they are rewarded."^[52] This responsibility system based on contracting out for technology is used for technical persons in functional fields and basic research units.

It remains to be seen whether a written job description for each position will improve the efficiency of the Chinese bureaucracy. Although this practice marks a sharp break from the Maoist practice of stressing internal remedies based on ideological incentives,

[49] Xin Changzheng , no. 9, 1984, 30–32.

[50] Shehui Kexue Yuan (Liaoning), no. 33, 1984, 5.

[51] Renmin Ribao , 11 November 1984.

[52] Gongren Ribao , 6 June 1981.

it seems very unlikely that the regime's present one-sided emphasis on external remedies, based on quantifiable achievement records, will work. Moreover, the responsibility system can produce the desired results only when it is combined with a rational incentive system that links performance to promotion and salary increments.

To summarize, the regime initially tried to rationalize the personnel management system by first strengthening the authority of higher levels and then decentralizing, while restoring the party committee's authority over personnel matters. But all these attempts were made in a piecemeal fashion with the knowledge that the party would directly manage all cadres. Consequently, the personnel management authority still remains too centralized and very rigid—"recruiting persons are separated from managing persons and managing persons from managing affairs." It continues to be a "closed-door system": each tiaotiao and kuaikuai sets up its own system, and any horizontal coordination between the two is extremely difficult. The system, however, cannot be rationalized without resolving the broader question of how to separate the party from the government and other functional units.

Separating the Party from the Government

In post-Mao China, virtually all Chinese leaders have agreed that the past practice wherein party committees directly managed administrative and economic work should be changed. In fact, the regime has already corrected for the excess of Mao's era. The Maoist practice of having one person concurrently holding leading positions in the party and the government has come to an end.^[53] Many functional departments of the party and its core groups in government organs were abolished. The offices of such government heads as minister, governor, and magistrate have been substantially strengthened: they are less dependent on party committees at the same level, and their capacity to develop rational policy has been substantially enhanced with the increase of specialists among their staff and the establishment of numerous research

[53] Renmin Ribao , 26 November 1987.

offices. Within the state the People's Congress system has been restored, and the court system apparently enjoys more independence now than at any other time in its history.

With regard to the party committee's functions at the lower level, numerous articles published in the official media suggest the following tasks: (1) supervising the implementation of the party line and policy, (2) leading ideological and political work, (3) managing the party's internal affairs, (4) making decisions on "important matters," and (5) managing the personnel matters of cadres.^[54]

First, no one disagrees with the idea that ideological work belongs under the party committee's jurisdiction, but whether the committee should limit its work to ideological work or not is open to debate. This is especially true when the significance and relevance of this work to other functional tasks is diminishing as the regime subordinates politics to economic development, while failing either to define the meaning of "socialism" or to develop a coherent official ideology.

Limiting the party's main task to its own internal work, such as managing and educating its members, is not problematic. But a persistent question is whether the CCP, a Leninist ruling party committed to a one-party dictatorship, can afford to restrict its activities to such a narrowly defined range.

The problem with the term "important work" (generally defined as "affecting the fate of the entire people") is that it does not specify how and who will determine which matters are important in a specific case.^[55] The highly centralized bureaucratic structure in China does not leave many "important matters" for the county party committees to decide. Thus, it is not surprising that after extensive debate on what constitutes "important matters," a county party secretary and magistrate decided to consider all issues jointly.

Authorizing party committees to supervise government and enterprise units in the implementation of official decisions is not controversial. But it does not resolve the technical questions of what supervision means in concrete terms, how to supervise the operation of government agencies and enterprise units without taking over their tasks, and how much and what kind of power party

[54] Shaanxi Ribao , 26 October 1983.

[55] Hebei Ribao , 21 October 1982.

committees need for supervision. Lower-level party secretaries insist that "without substantial authority, there is no way to supervise and guarantee that work will be done correctly."^[56] Managers are also unhappy with the supervision: "If they trust secretaries and do not trust managers, it is better to make the secretaries managers." When a manager is higher than his secretary in education, there is no reason to supervise.^[57] In addition, the formula raises other complicated questions. For instance, should a party secretary be held responsible for the profit and loss of an enterprise? If the answer is no, does that mean that they are not entitled to a bonus when the enterprise makes a profit?^[58] On the issue of supervising authority, conservatives and reformers split. Reformers reject the idea of giving supervisory authority to party committees because it could constrain the manager responsibility system.^[59]

The official guideline on how to separate the party from the government at the lower level is not only ambiguous but contradictory. While criticizing party committees' involvement in functional work, top party leaders still insist on the principle of "the party leading everything." On one hand, party committees are instructed not to manage economic issues directly. On the other, superior party committees urge lower-level party committees to "spend 70 percent of their time on economic matters."

The issue of separating the party from the government and enterprises requires the redistribution of political power, thus directly touching on the political interests of party secretaries at the middle and lower levels, most of whom were recruited after 1949 from peasant and worker activists and demobilized soldiers. Therefore, party cadres exploit the ambiguity in the official policy in order to resist the official effort to separate.^[60] They often resort to defensive tactics such as foot-dragging and rearguarding. Some old party cadres are more straightforward: "If the first party secretary does not concurrently hold the first position of the government, that

[56] Lilun Yu Shijian (Shenyang), no. 13, 1985, 34–35; Tianjinshi 1984 nian Shehui Kexue Keti Diaoyan Chengguo Xuanbian (Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 11:411–27.

[57] Xuexi Yu Yanjiu , no. 11, 1985, 15–17.

[58] Hubei Caizhengxueyuan Bao , no. 4, 1985, 41–42.

[59] Lilun Tantao , no. 2, 1987, 76.

[60] Zhengzhi Yu Xingzheng Yanjiu , November 1985, 18–32.

means that the party will not have power, and the idea of the party leading everything becomes an empty slogan." Others play on the fear of "dispersionism and independence [of the government] from the party."^[61]

Results in County Governments

Numerous investigation reports prepared by Chinese scholars after their fieldwork at the county level indicate that party committees still dominate administrative organs. Usually, the county party committees and their government counterparts jointly issue orders and convene meetings. County party committees still discuss a wide range of issues from economics to party affairs, spending most of their time on economic issues. Although they are supposed to meet only once a month, they usually meet more frequently. On the other hand, "the management committee" of the magistrates—which is supposed to meet weekly—rarely convenes because "there is not much left for the government to decide, and the management office of the government is redundant."^[62]

In addition, magistrates, who are usually deputy secretaries subordinate to the first party secretary in the party hierarchy, now act more like representatives of the party committee rather than heads of the government unit. The party core group (dangzu ) rather than the directors continue to exercise the real power in county government bureaus. Consequently, "the party secretary presently does the work of the magistrate, and the magistrate does the work of the director of county bureaus."

Party committees continue to dominate not only the executive organs but also the People's Congress and its standing committees, which theoretically are representative organs of the entire people. Leaders of the standing committees (changwei ) of the People's Congress are organized into party cells, which are subordinate to party committees. Most standing committee members are semiretired party cadres. As a result, many Chinese satirize the county standing committee of the People's Congress (which they call "the nurs-

[61] Jiefang Ribao , 30 October 1983.

[62] Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 25 April 1986, 32–39.

ing home") by saying it is "big in three items and empty in one item": its constitutional right is big, the sign board of its office is big, the age of its members is big, but its power is empty.^[63] Party committees, not the People's Congress, prepare economic plans. And if the standing committee rejects the plan, the party committees can overrule it.^[64] Until recently, the party's disciplinary committees investigated government corruption. According to a Chinese expression, "the county party committee writes the scenario, the government performs, the People's Congress watches, the political consultative conference comments, and the disciplinary committee judges."^[65]

The turf fight is particularly fierce over economic issues, which make up 60 percent of government tasks. At the moment, whether or not a county party secretary makes a decision on economic matters largely depends on the personality of the secretaries and managers. Whenever a secretary is capable and enjoys high prestige, even magistrates look to him to make all major decisions. Thus, it seems that appointing able persons to secretaryships, ironically, tends to hinder the separation of the party from the government.

Since there is no separation, the question of how to share personnel management authority is premature. County party committees have not relinquished their prerogative over personnel management. According to an investigation by Chinese scholars, county party committees manage all the important leading cadres of first-class organs (ministries [bu ], commissions [wei ], bureaus [ju ], and villages [xiang ]) and second-class organs (sections [tuan ] and certain enterprises), or they handle all the leading cadres of the first-class organs while allowing the personnel bureau under the magistrates to manage the cadres of the second-class organs. Believing that managing cadres is their most important responsibility, county party committees spend most of their time on personnel matters.^[66] Although its authority over certain government cadres is constitutionally guaranteed, the People's Congress remains a rubber stamp.

[63] Zhengzhi Yu Xingzheng Yanjiu , November 1985, 18–32.

[64] Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 25 April 1986, 32–39.

[65] Makesi Zhuyi Yanjiu , no. 4, 1986, 7.

[66] Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao , 25 April 1986, 32–34.

Results in Enterprises

The situation in enterprise units is much better than on the county administrative level. Despite the strong opposition of party cadres, the manager responsibility system has been gradually implemented in most state-owned factories in the past few years, thereby substantially weakening the party secretaries' power.

However, the manager responsibility system has not yet completely resolved the controversy over personnel management authority, despite bitter complaints from managers that the existing system constitutes the most serious obstacle to the efficient management of enterprises, more serious than the shortage of raw materials.^[67]

Reformers advocate fenggong guanli , that is, authorizing managers to manage administrative cadres, while limiting the party committee's authority regarding party cadres in order to make the managers' authority and responsibility coincide and to enable them to exercise "uniform leadership with regard to production, management, and administrative management."^[68] Viewing the proposal as a serious threat to the party's prerogative over personnel matters, the conservatives raised objections at every stage of the development of the manager responsibility system.

The battle over the issue is fought on three specific questions. The first is to what extent party committees will share personnel authority with managers. The second is the managers' right to "form cabinets." The third concerns jurisdiction over middle-level administrative cadres.

The conservatives do not oppose the idea of giving some personnel authority to managers because they are well aware of the shortcomings of the past, but they still insist on the principle of "the party managing cadres" and have tried to keep as much authority as possible in the party committees. The central organizational department usually sides with the secretaries by reiterating that the party committee is responsible for the "recruitment, alloca-

[67] Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiusuo Conghe Diaochazu, ed., Gaige: Women Mianlin de Diaozhan Yu Xuanzhe (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 1986), 137.

[68] Zhengzhixue Yanjiu Tongxung , no. 4, 1983, 7–13.

tion, evaluation, and supervision of cadres."^[69] Pervasive cadre corruption strengthens the conservatives' position that party committees—as collective decision-making bodies under the tighter supervision of the upper echelons—rather than the one-person manager are more suitable for safeguarding the state's interests and for screening the political quality of cadres, preventing those "lacking loyalty to the revolutionary business" from being promoted.^[70] By contrast, reformers insist that "the party managing cadres" does not mean that party committees manage everything directly; rather it means that under the principle of the party's "unified management," some concrete work can be delegated to government and enterprise units.

Once the regime decided to give managers personnel authority, the next question is to what extent the party committee should be allowed to influence a manager in exercising his authority over personnel matters. The reformers want to prevent the party committee from interfering with the managers' authority, but they cannot state their position in such a blunt way, lest it be construed as an open challenge to the CCP's authority. Instead, they argue that managers should use their authority wisely, paying attention to the opinions of the masses and the party committees. By contrast, conservatives try to guarantee the party committees' influence in personnel matters. One compromise requires managers to consult the "management committee" on personnel matters. Since the committee usually includes members of the party committee, as well as the disciplinary committee and labor unions, both of which are under the party committee, this option allows the secretaries to continue to exert influence over personnel matters. In fact, whenever the party committee objects to the choices made by managers, there is no way for the manager to prevail. The party secretaries still retain veto power.

Pushed by reformers, the regime publicized the idea of allowing managers to "form their own cabinets" for a while. Several differ-

[69] Guojia Jingwei Jiceng Zhengzhi Gongzu Bangongshi, ed., Shixing Changzhang Fuze Zhi Hou Qiye Dangwei Ruhe Gongzhu (Beijing: Jiefang Zhengzhixueyuan Chubanshe, 1985), 37–49. See also Gaige Qiye Lingdao Zhidu Shixing Changzhang Fuzezhi (Beijing: Nengyuan Chubanshe, 1986), 34–42.

[70] Guojia Jingwei Jiceng Zhengzhi Gongzu Bangongshi, ed., Shiping Changzhang , 21–36.

ent methods of "forming cabinets" were practiced between 1984 and 1985. The manager either nominated or appointed deputy managers as well as all heads of administrative positions, who in turn nominated their own deputies and ordinary cadres. Or managers appointed deputy managers, who in turn appointed administrative heads, who selected their own deputies and ordinary staff. Another method required the approval of the organizational department of the upper echelon and the workers' congress of the enterprise to finalize the appointment.^[71]

The procedure for forming a cabinet included the following steps. First, the manager, the party secretary, and the chairman of the relevant labor union discussed the matter in advance and set up the method of forming the cabinet. Second, they formulated the criteria to be used for cadre selection. Third, the manager solicited comments from various sectors, including ordinary workers. Although the party secretary and labor unions were involved in the process, it was the manager who made the final decision. In this sense, the system marked a departure from past practice.

To the conservatives, allowing the manager to form his own cabinet clearly violated the principle of the "party managing cadres" and precipitated factionalism.^[72] Moreover, the practice threatened the personnel authority exercised by the party committee one level higher as specified in the nomenklatura system. Despite the reformers' vigorous defense, which sometimes twisted logic, they apparently lost the battle on this particular issue. The regime finally decided not to use the term "forming a cabinet."^[73] Apparently, the central organizational department believed that the practice of managers choosing their own deputies posed too serious a threat to the entire personnel management system.

Over the third question—the manager's authority over middle-level administrative cadres—the reformers apparently obtained what they wanted.^[74] Whether or not it was due to Zhao's insistence, the regime announced revised regulations, which, among other things, specified the manager's authority over middle-

[71] Jingji Gongzuo Zhe Xuexi Ziliao , 1985, 24, 8–31.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Xuanchuan Shouce (Beijing), July 1985.

[74] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang (Liaoning), 1 June 1986, 30.

echelon cadres, although it allowed the party secretary to make suggestions.^[75]

To summarize, it seems that a compromise has been reached: although they failed to obtain the right to form their own cabinets, managers have the authority to manage middle-level administrative cadres. However, the controversy over personnel authority is likely to continue because party committees are not clearly excluded from managing even middle-level cadres. It is officially recognized that party committees are responsible "for observing cadres, examining the political qualifications of candidates, organizing discussion meetings, and carrying out public opinion polls in order to provide accurate information to managers."^[76] Managers are granted authority over certain cadres, but their authority has to be used in consultation with the party committees: "On the matter of using persons, managers should rely on the party committee, should rely on the masses. . . . Managers should listen to the opinion of the masses, and then decide."^[77] Consequently, many party committees and their organizational departments refuse to transfer personnel authority to managers, who bitterly complain. Despite resistance, the general trend is to weaken party leaders' authority in enterprises. One indication of this trend is the fact that jurisdiction over party committees in enterprises is being transferred from committees of government bureaus (tiaotiao ) to territorial committees, a transfer that helps limit the work of the enterprise party committee to managing party members.^[78]

Planned Civil Service System and its Implications

The Chinese personnel management system was originally copied from the Soviet Union. However, although the USSR has modified its system, China's has remained relatively unchanged.^[79] Because any debate on the system is bound to question the party's lead-

[75] Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Gongbu , no. 1, 30 January 1987, 9–12.

[76] Guojia Jingwei Jiceng Zhengzhi Gongzu Bangongshi, ed., Shixing Changzhang , 47.

[77] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang (Liaoning), 1 June 1986, 30.

[78] Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1988), 43.

[79] Zhengdang Yu Jiandang (Liaoning), no. 3, 1984; 30 June 1984, 1–4.

ership, the public did not demand reform until 1986, when the regime itself publicly recognized the need for structural reforms. To many Chinese, changing the personnel management system was the main goal of political reform: "Whether or not the structural reforms can be carried out and their results consolidated is largely dependent on cadre reforms."^[80] The need to utilize scarce scientific and technical cadres efficiently further justified demands for a change in the Maoist system.

At the Thirteenth Party Congress newly elected General Secretary Zhao Ziyang announced the regime's plan gradually to introduce a civil service system. According to this plan, a mere 4.2 million out of the existing 29 million cadres—only those who were employed in government agencies—will be classified as civil servants.^[81] In other words, cadres employed in both the judicial and the legislative branches of state organs as well as those working in the party, enterprises, and business units will be excluded from the civil service system.

All leading cadres who legally constitute "governments," ranging from the center to county levels, and whose appointments require the approval of a People's Congress will be classified as "political" (zhengwu ) civil servants. Thus, this category will include the premier, state councilors, and ministers of the central government, governors and vice governors, mayors and deputy mayors, magistrates and deputy magistrates, and some bureau directors.^[82] Regarded as "policymakers," political civil servants will be elected for fixed terms as specified in the existing constitution and in the organizational laws of local governments; therefore, they lose "life tenure," although there are no laws limiting the numbers of terms they can serve.

The rest are functional (ye wu ) civil servants, "the implementors of policy," who are further classified as either "administrative" or "specialized technical." Their selection will be made through "open, equal, and competitive" examinations. Candidates for examinations are limited to graduates of "higher educational institutions" who are twenty to thirty years old and who "support the

[80] Zhengzhixue Yanjiu Tongxun , no. 4, 30 December 1983, 4–7.

[81] Renmin Ribao , 31 October 1988.

[82] Tan Jian, ed., Guojia Gongwuyan Shouce (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), 7.

leadership of the CCP [and] love the socialist motherland." Possessing "certain political conditions" is a prerequisite, but many writers insist that party membership is not required. Specialists will be selected from among those possessing certificates demonstrating specialized technical training. All those who pass the examination are required to go through one year of training at the basic level. Only after a successful training period can they become regular civil servants.^[83]

Moreover, these civil servants are to be promoted grade by grade. To assume leading positions, one has to meet additional requirements: section chiefs have to have an educational level higher than senior high school and at least four years of work experience; division chiefs (chuzhang ) need a college or specialized middle school education and seven years of work experience; bureau directors require a college education and ten years' work experience; and ministers need a college education and at least fifteen years of work experience.^[84] In addition, before assuming these positions, civil servants must receive further training at administration institutes that the government is setting up at various levels.

A provisional regulation guarantees job security by ensuring stable working conditions, reasonable pay, and protection from arbitrary dismissal. Besides the standard rights and duties listed in similar laws of other countries, the regulation also stresses the career civil servants' right to "criticize and make suggestions to their leaders" and the duty to "carry out the party's and the state's line, directives, and policies."^[85]

The regime plans first to experiment with such a system in several central government ministries, provinces, and municipalities and then to implement it in all the state organs.^[86] The first step in establishing the system is to classify positions, which will determine the task, responsibility, and pay scale of each cadre. At the moment, the regime estimates that it will take five years for these five units to set up "the frame" of the civil service system and an additional ten years to implement the system nationwide.^[87]

[83] "Temporary Regulation of State Civil Service System."

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] China Daily , 20 July 1988.

[87] Renmin Ribao , 31 October 1988.

This provisional regulation fails to resolve the most crucial obstacle to creating an efficient personnel management system—the party domination over the government. On this question the provisional regulation itself contains many ambiguous and contradictory points. For instance, it does not grant political neutrality, even to career civil servants. On the contrary, they are specifically required to demonstrate a certain level of "socialist consciousness" and to follow the political leadership of the Communist Party.^[88] However, many Chinese scholars argue that although Chinese civil servants are required to be loyal to the party, the regulation protects them from future policy fluctuations resulting from leadership changes or power struggles among the top leaders. Insofar as the career civil servant faithfully carries out any policy directed by the party, he will not be held responsible for its correctness or incorrectness. This will be an improvement over the situation during the CR when many low-level cadres were purged because they had implemented "revisionist policies" handed down to them through legitimate channels of hierarchy.

Another ambiguity in the regulation and official writings concerns the party committee's authority over personnel matters; on the one hand, it will give up its prerogative over cadres, but, on the other hand, it will continue to exert a substantial amount of authority over political civil servants and "important cadres."^[89] According to Zhao Ziyang, "the party center and the local party committee will nominate political civil servants to the People's Congress at various levels and will supervise and manage political civil servants with party membership."^[90]

A particularly troublesome aspect of the regulation is the role of the party's organizational departments. Although core groups in government agencies were abolished, the central organizational department still keeps a party core group in the personnel ministry. Furthermore, it is likely that as long as the party maintains organizational departments along the administrative hierarchy, the turf fighting between the party and the government over even the functional civil servants will continue. If the provisional regulation

[88] Tan Jian, ed., Guojia Gongwuyan Shouce , 10.

[89] Nie Gaowu, Li Yichou, and Wang Zhangtian, eds., Dangzheng Fenkai Lilun Tanlu (Beijing: Chunqiu Chubanshe, 1988), 17.

[90] Su Yudong, ed., Guojia Gongwuyuan Zhidu Jianghua (Beijing: Laodong Renshi Chubanshe, 1988), 13.

is thoroughly implemented, the party organizational departments will have nothing to do except manage their own cadres and the "political civil servants," which altogether would number less than a thousand. The party may claim jurisdiction over party member officials, as indicated by Zhao Ziyang. If so, an interesting question would be whether or not the party's claim would be limited to the "organizational life" of party member officials, while the government manages their "work relations." The party may argue that unless it has authority over employment conditions of party member cadres, it will not be able properly to supervise their "organizational life." To make matters more complicated, each cadre's personnel dossier includes materials on his party membership, as well as his work relations. Unless the dossier is broken down into two parts, each of which is managed by either the party or the government, however, the organizational departments would have an excuse to avoid relinquishing their authority over personnel matters.

Having agreed to share its power over personnel with other appropriate authorities—be they government leaders, managers, or administrative heads of business units—the party is extremely reluctant to give up its influence over cadre management completely. Now, instead of directly managing cadres, the party is helping other appropriate authorities make the right decisions by recommending qualified persons and supervising their handling of personnel matters. This change has taken place at a time when the party is relinquishing direct control over economic resources. Any weakening of the party's control over the economy makes it more difficult to resolve the persistent question of how to change the structure of personnel decision making in such a way that the new system can maintain a balance between two conflicting goals: ensuring the party's control while managing the cadres efficiently, thus making the system flexible but not creating chaos, and preserving a national planning perspective while allowing lower units to be autonomous even in personnel management.

As noted, the result of the official effort to separate the party from the government has so far been rather limited. In structural terms, the regime completely separated the party from the government and other functional units. But the official formula, in which the party "ensures and supervises" the work of administrative heads, has failed to clarify ambiguities in terms of power distribu-

tion. The most important reason is that the party has not yet resolved important theoretical as well as practical questions. The theoretical questions are what role basic-level party committees will assume and how they will justify their continuing existence when the Leninist Party has declared an end to class struggle and has adopted efficiency as the ultimate criterion for evaluating organizational performance. The practical question is how to maintain the Leninist Party's prerogatives while allowing autonomy in government agencies and economic enterprises in order to promote economic development.

A possible option followed by many Eastern European countries is to abolish the party committee system in functional areas. As many liberal reformers argue, these are "unnecessary political organizations detrimental to efficient economic management."^[91] But the Leninist Party in China is not yet ready to do so. The other option is for factory managers to hold concurrently party secretary positions. This seems to be taking place in many enterprises. In some enterprises selected for experimental purposes, managers take charge of even ideological and political works, thereby depriving party secretaries of using their authority over these works to interfere with managers' decisions. This experiment is obviously designed to weaken the party secretaries' power and eventually to abolish the party committee system in economic enterprises.^[92] However, at present in most enterprise and business units, the dual structure of the administrative and functional hierarchy on the one hand and the party hierarchy on the other still exists.

The continuing existence of this dual structure raises another puzzling question: what qualifications and career backgrounds are necessary to be appointed to the party and other administrative positions? Different career experiences and personal backgrounds among party secretaries and managers can aggravate conflicts.^[93] But, at the same time, using the same criteria for selecting party secretaries and administrative heads and managers makes the dual system only redundant without any tangible benefits.

Available data on this question indicate that career differentia-

[91] Guojia Jingwei Jiceng Zhengzhi Gongzu Bangongshi, ed., Shixing Changzhang , 35–36.

[92] Fazhi Ribao , 26 September 1988.

[93] Lilun Tansu , no. 2, 1987, 31–36.

tion between the two positions is narrowing. According to a survey of 900 enterprises conducted by the Institute for the Reform of the Chinese Economic Structure in 1985, when the initial readjustment of the enterprise cadres was completed, managers were found to be slightly younger than their counterparts in party committees. The average age of managers is forty-five, whereas that of secretaries is forty-seven.^[94] As shown in table 56, managers are better educated; indeed, they are the best educated; the second best educated are deputy managers; third deputy secretaries; and least are the secretaries and advisers. These differences are quite small. Since the educational level of cadres is closely correlated with age—the younger are generally better educated—the differences in education between the two groups may reflect age rather than job differences.

Most managers and deputy managers are promoted from technical, functional, or lower-level managerial positions: 85 percent of them have experience in technical, 72 percent in functional, and 71 percent in basic-level managerial work. By contrast, secretaries and deputy secretaries are largely selected from administrative ranks (54 percent) and from among demobilized soliders (71 percent).^[95]

[94] Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiusuo Conghe Diaochazu, ed., Gaige: Women , 270–305.

[95] Ibid.

Despite career differences, there is a powerful trend that may mitigate the conflict between managers and secretaries in the long term; that is, the career backgrounds of party secretaries are changing. Not only has a new type of enterprise cadre emerged, but the desire to obtain professional knowledge is pervasive even among party secretaries. When enterprise leaders were asked about the type of qualifications that enterprise cadres should have, many cited functional over political knowledge. Enterprise leaders were also keenly aware of their own shortcomings, that is, they lacked technical expertise.^[96]

Another mitigating factor for possible conflict between party and administrative cadres is that the actual leadership type is also changing from what the Chinese call the "personality and virtue type" (pingde xing ) to the "ability type" (nengli xing ). As noted in chapter 11, bureaucratic technocrats are replacing revolutionary cadres even in the highest political positions. The official ideology is in disarray as a result of economic reforms. New types of party members are being recruited. The regime has been co-opting experts in decision-making bodies, thus providing tangible incentives for the transformation of party secretaries. Many informants report that able party cadres are eager to move into government positions. The younger generation tends to embrace the values and outlook of the technocrats, not the revolutionary cadres. Thus, it seems that revolutionary cadres cannot find successors like themselves.

Despite many uncertainties, after thirty years of revolutionary turmoil, which entailed the recruitment of cadres on the basis of political qualifications, China has finally come to emphasize ability by recruiting government officials through open and competitive examinations. The fact that the regime is planning to introduce a civil service system indicates its willingness to end the Maoist practice of selecting officials through mass campaigns and on the basis of class backgrounds, and instead to develop rational, efficient, and competent administrative bureaucrats. The term "civil servants" itself implies that government officials are "public servants" who will manage public affairs as the guardian of public interests, whereas the term "cadres" refers to those with certain leadership

[96] Ibid.

abilities necessary to lead the masses in revolutionary struggles for social change. The term "civil servants" also connotes a merit-based recruitment, whereas the cadre's role requires political skills and ideological consciousness. The introduction of a planned civil service system also represents the regime's intention to separate government employees from party cadres, thus ending the previous practice of managing the party and the government cadres together (dangzheng ganbu ) in some manner and allowing the government to manage its employees. In fact, the provisional regulation stipulates that the "personnel ministry and bureau," will manage the civil servants [performing functional works] "according to laws."^[97] The recruitment of government officials through the examination system also rules out the possibility of any input from the populace along the mass line model emphasized during Mao's era.

Apparently, the regime is preparing a separate set of regulations regarding party cadres, enterprise unit cadres, and business unit cadres. Although the contents of these regulations are not known, the planned regulations for party cadres will probably stress election or some other method that allows rank-and-file party members to select their leaders. For the selection of enterprise and business unit cadres, the planned regulations will probably try to blend different methods, such as "appointment, examination, invitation, and election." However, it is extremely unlikely that the regulations will explicitly deny the party any voice in personnel management. As long as the concept of public ownership continues, the party will consider itself justified in retaining some authority over personnel management.

The impact of introducing a civil service system is not limited to the party-state's bureaucracy. As many studies of Western European bureaucracies have demonstrated, a merit-based recruitment of administrative elites tends to offer undue advantage to the middle class.^[98] As the competition for government employment shifts in emphasis to ability, educational institutions will become the springboard for entering official positions. China's new education-

[97] "Temporary Regulation of State Civil Service System."

[98] Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 72–99.

al policy of attaching priority to academic achievement and spending large amounts of the state budget for key schools will accelerate the stratification of educational institutions. Middle-class students have the advantage of entering better high schools and then highly competitive colleges, from which they can land cadre positions.^[99] Actually, middle-class values are more congruent with the role of technocrats than that of revolutionary cadres.

In this way, the state bureaucracy will lose any claim to representing a broad range of social classes, but it can still be responsive to society.^[100] This nondemocratic characteristic will, however, be compensated when the regime steps up its effort to professionalize state employment. The rigorous training of civil servants, the development of an esprit de corps, and a trend toward professionalization will make the administrative elite act more as guardians of the public interest than as representatives of their original middle-class backgrounds.

As the evolution of Western European civil service systems demonstrates, creating an efficient state bureaucracy is the first step toward reducing the patrimonial power of a monarchy. In Prussia, the absolute monarchy created a civil bureaucracy largely staffed by the landed aristocracy. As the bureaucracy gained power and status, joining the civil bureaucracy offered upward mobility for the newly emerging bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, by claiming to represent the public interest, the civil bureaucracy gradually became independent of the monarchy. As the monarchy collapsed, it was replaced by elected politicians, who, on behalf of the people, supervised the administrative bureaucrats, while the administrative structure began resembling Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, one staffed by specialists and neutral to the political process.^[101]

In China, the party-state created a large corps of cadres as a tool for revolutionary change. During Mao's era, the party maintained tight control over this group, preventing them from developing into an administrative instrument. Now, the regime is trying to transform the cadre corps into administrative bureaucrats by granting them more autonomy. In this sense, the introduction of a civil

[99] Ibid., 79–92.

[100] Ibid., 386.

[101] Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

service system—even though at the moment the civil servants' political neutrality is not yet recognized—may be the first step toward separating the party from the administrative hierarchy.

However, such questions as what controls the party will maintain over the administrative bureaucrats and to whom the latter will be held accountable still persist. Since in most non-Communist countries, democratically elected politicians supervise the administrative bureaucrats, one may predict that the party leaders at various levels will act likewise. In other words, the party leaders will become "political managers" and "powerbrokers."