13
The Personnel Dossier System

Personnel management (renshi guanli ) deals with a wide range of specific tasks such as recruitment, training, appointment, assessment, promotion, transfer, demotion, dismissal, and retirement, in addition to wage and fringe benefit questions. Decisions have to be made and implemented on these issues for each individual cadre; then they are entered into a personnel dossier, a file of written materials on an individual that the regime keeps on every cadre, every party member, and every Communist Youth League member.^[1]

Prior to the CR

Keeping written records is, as Max Weber argued, one of the basic traits of any bureaucracy; all governments normally maintain files on employees. However, the most striking aspect of the Chinese personnel dossier system is the comprehensive scope and political nature of information stored in each file. Cadres have only one personnel dossier, which includes all information on them, although sometimes the regime maintains two versions of a dossier; one is the original (zhengben ), which contains all relevant

[1] "Dossier" in a broad sense refers to a file containing systematically collected materials on any subject. The types of dossiers often referred to by the Chinese news media are personnel, historical, scientific, and enemy dossiers. Different units maintain and control each type of dossier. Access to and secrecy surrounding them varies from one dossier to another. However, when used in cross-checking, dossiers provide the regime with a very powerful control mechanism. It maintains some kind of personnel dossier on everyone except peasants. For English sources on the dossier system, see A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 49–50; Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders," China Quarterly , vol. 102, June 1985, 203–33.

material, and the other is a partial duplicate (fuben ), which has only a summary of the materials.^[2]

Obsessed with the cadres' political loyalty, the party-state during Mao's era insisted that

[We] have to examine whether or not one has unlimited loyalty to the party and people and one's political and historical records, ideology, personality, and attitude toward study. [We] have to examine them regularly. Only when we have made a detailed examination of each cadre's political history, political conditions, political quality, ideology, work style, work performance, and ability in a systematic way, can we systematically understand cadres, correctly recruit, and use them.^[3]

During Mao's era the personnel dossier system performed two important functions for the regime. First, it formed the foundation for managing cadres. Through the documentary materials in the dossiers the leadership were able to make rational decisions on recruitment, promotion, assignment, transfer, and so on for each cadre. In this sense, the personnel dossier system constitutes an indispensable part of the broader personnel management system in China. For this purpose, each cadre dossier contains information on: (1) organizational relations—records of party or CYL life, (2) administrative relations—materials on career background, present positions, and educational background, and (3) supply relations—salary grade and other fringe benefits.

Second, the personnel dossier system enabled the regime to maintain tight political control over the cadres.^[4] For this purpose, any information even only tangentially pertinent for checking cadres' loyalty to the regime, to the party, or to any particular faction in power at a given moment was collected. Each of the many campaigns that the regime has carried out since 1949 has generated huge amounts of information for dossiers: the 1941 party rectification yielded a large amount of material that eventually formed the

[2] The level directly above a cadre keeps the original, the cadre's unit, the simplified version. In the past, material in a dossier was not limited to reports about job performance. Wang Faxiong, Renshi Dangan Guanli Gailun (Hubei: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 31.

[3] Guangming Ribao , 14 November 1957.

[4] Ibid.

basis of personnel dossiers; the land reform, about landlords; the Three Antis and Five Antis, facts about people working in commerce and finance; and the antirightist campaign, data on intellectuals. The regime carried out in 1956 the first nationwide investigation of each cadre's file, cross-checking contents against the information provided by the masses and from files seized from the Nationalist Party.

The importance of the personnel dossier system for each cadre cannot be overemphasized. Whether one was recruited, promoted, or demoted, whether one entered college or went abroad for study, whether one survived a political campaign, who would be chosen as a target in a particular political movement—the outcome of all these largely rested on the contents of one's dossier.

Because personnel dossiers are so all-inclusive, they can work to the advantage or disadvantage of each cadre, depending on the information they contain and the users' intentions. The dossier may offer the regime a solid basis for selecting cadres according to the criteria emphasized at a given moment, or it may offer an excuse to persecute anyone the regime may choose to. In 1957, during liberalization, many intellectuals charged that "the party has two record books; one record is a good one, the other is a bad one; when you are needed, the good record is used; when you are a problem to the party, the bad record is used."^[5] The regime did not deny that the dossiers can be two-edged.

Although the cadres have always been concerned about the personnel dossier system, they did not dare to criticize it publicly. Only when political control was relaxed did the system become a focal point of criticism. During the Hundred Flowers campaign, many intellectuals condemned the dossier as "a registrar for life and death," "secret document bags," "benefactor roster" (enming an ), and "ammunition cartridge" (secret reports prepared through dubious channels).^[6] Intellectuals believed that "nobody can be completely liberated [fanshen ] unless the dossier system is abolished."^[7]

The party may have inherited the dossier system from the Soviet

[5] Renmin Ribao , 27 July 1957; Wenhui Bao , 27 October 1957.

[6] Changjiang Ribao , 22 August 1957.

[7] Wenhui Bao , 27 October 1957.

Union, for it has as long a history as the party itself.^[8] However, specific norms for the personnel dossier in terms of format and handling gradually evolved. The first national conference held in 1956 apparently systematized the varying practices and laid down standard procedures for collecting, arranging, and putting materials into the dossiers and maintaining and utilizing them. In the ten years up to the CR, the system was expanded further with the enactment of more specific rules oncadres' dossiers.^[9]

Personnel dossiers are state secrets.^[10] Any mention of them in the media has been general and ambiguous, often only indicating their existence. When someone dies, the regime keeps the dossier for another five years at least, then transfers it to the government dossier bureau.^[11] No individual is supposed to have access to his own or a relative's dossier, and those who work with dossiers are forbidden to reveal their contents. When critics of the regime demanded public access topersonnel dossiers, the regime gave three reasons for their being kept secret. First, an individual's privacy must be protected from other individuals (but not from the state). Second, dossiers include facts that have been verified as well as suspicions, rumors, and other pieces of potentially damaging, but unconfirmed, information that should certainly not be made public. Third, a dossier's confidentiality prevents unnecessary disharmony among the people.^[12]

contents

Each personnel dossier includes official forms, documents, and materials. Most are ones that each individual has provided, and the rest is either evidence collected or opinions rendered by the organization.^[13] The most frequently included forms are one's Summary Career History (jianli piao ), Promotion to Cadre (for newly appointed ones), Cadre Registration (when assigned to a new

[8] A director of the dossier bureau of the State Council started his career as a code operator in 1927. Renmin Ribao , 7 January 1980.

[9] Wang, Renshi Dangan , 75.

[10] Zhengming , no. 3, 1980, 74.

[11] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Yanjiushi, ed., Dangde Zhuzi Gongzuo Wenda (Beijing: Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1984).

[12] Guangxi Ribao , 10 August 1975.

[13] Ibid.

unit), and Application for Party Membership. Supporting materials also appear. The formats of these documents vary, although they all have columns for certain specific kinds of information.^[14]

The contents of most of these forms overlap. As is the case with those distributed by most bureaucracies, spaces are provided for such data as name, age, sex, birthplace, family origin, dates of employment, cultural level, and party membership. Party members must describe when, where, and by whose recommendation they first joined the party, also explaining whether or not the spouse is a party member and what position he or she holds.^[15] A closely detailed explanation can be provided, if necessary. In addition, each cadre must give an account of the economic conditions of their families, in detail, before and after liberation. They also have to specify their family background (jiating chusheng ), for until recently this was regarded as the most crucial factor in personnel management. All classifications are based on what a cadre's father did between 1946 and 1949 (or, for veteran cadres, on when they participated in the revolution). Those who were adopted are required to write the occupations of their legal parents rather than that of the natural parents, although the natural parents' background is also taken into consideration. The justification for this rule is that family upbringing directly influences one's political attitudes.

For family background, the regime provides detailed categories based on economic as well as political criteria for all Chinese except ethnic minorities.^[16] Though the detailed official categories may be thorough, they are not sufficient to cover China's complex reality. Moreover, there has always been a strong incentive to make one's family background look as good as possible. Even Zhang Chunqiao's description of his father changed from "small staff" to "middle peasant," "handicraft worker," and "medical doctor" in different forms.^[17] Detailed explanations of one's family background may be included on the form or they may assume the freer style of autobiography. In addition to writing about their families, each

[14] "Central Document, No. 10, 1977," Zhonggong Yanjiu 14(7–8) (July–August 1980):80, 165, 172, 163.

[15] Ibid., 80, 165, 172, 163.

[16] For further details on the categories, see Richard Klaus, Class Conflict in Chinese Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[17] "Central Document, No. 10, 1977," 167–69.

cadre must also write about their own status, based on what they have done since becoming economically independent.

After the section about family background and personal status, most forms require people to list their "key family members." There are detailed regulations on who constitutes a key family member. Both parents and children are regarded as key family members, whether or not one is living with his parents. But if a woman is married, her parents are relegated to mere "key social relations," and her parents-in-law are considered the key family members.

People must also write about their key social relations. Close friends, classmates, colleagues, and relatives who are not key family members are in this category, whose definition is hazy compared with that of key family members. A cadre has great latitude about whom he lists; but if he leaves someone out—particularly someone who has once been politically active—the organization may question him if suspicion arises.

Most official forms also include specific questions about whether a person or a family member has ever been arrested, jailed, or executed by the CCP. If so, the person filling out the form is unlikely to go far in the party. More information is required about the one who was arrested, jailed, or executed. Did he ever "join a reactionary organization or reactionary military and surreptitious religious organization? What position did he hold? Present relations? Any references?"^[18] Last, theform asks for a brief statement about the compiler's career background, including academic training. Each school attended and each place of employment must be given with references and addresses.

After filling out all the official forms, one must write a detailed autobiography (zizhuan ), which covers the writer's life from the age of seven on, in particular, focusing on such politically relevant activities as demonstrations, publications, and any association memberships. The autobiography is expected to reveal how its author's thought has developed, but it must also include all political relationships. Discussion of friends is not needed except in a political context.^[19]

[18] Ibid., 164.

[19] For an example of autobiography, see Guancha Zhe , January 1980, and Zhongguo Chingnien Bao , 9 February 1980.

The finished autobiography is scrutinized by the small group to which the person belongs as well as by the party committee. If satisfied with the content, the committee will include the autobiography in the dossier. However, everyone is required constantly to supplement his autobiography. For example, if something of political significance happens to a key family member or if a sister emigrates, then this change should be reflected in the personnel dossier. A supplement to the existing dossier may be ordered by the organization when a minor mistake is discovered or when an individual volunteers information out of a guilty conscience.^[20] All these materials are arranged in the order specified by the guidelines of the central organizational department.^[21] Only the department has the authority to put materials into the dossier; individuals cannot collect materials or demand that the department put any particular piece of information into their dossier.^[22]

Maintenance

Although in the past, ultimate authority over personnel matters lay with the party committee, the actual management of the files was handled by the organizational department of the party and the personnel bureau of the government. Staff members working in both organs were usually party members, and quite often they held positions in both organs concurrently.^[23] A party secretary or standing committee member normally supervised personnel work. When the party committee was small, one deputy secretary was in charge of personnel management. Thus, unlike a personnel unit in an American organization, which is considered a staff department, both the party's organizational department and the government's personnel bureau have substantial influence over personnel matters. Consequently, the personnel bureau draws sharp criticism whenever there is any political relaxation.

Following the principle of managing the cadres in a "unified, level-by-level, and field-by-field" fashion (see chapter 14), the party committees at the various levels keep the dossiers on the cadres

[20] Wenhui Bao , 27 October 1957.

[21] Wang, Renshi Dangan , 133–38.

[22] For instance, testimony by other people certifying one's starting date of revolutionary work is not allowed in the dossier. Ibid., 10.

[23] Barnett, Cadres , 46–65.

over whom they have personnel authority. Generally speaking, the party unit at one level has authority over the dossiers of the high-ranking cadres belonging to the next lower unit. Thus, the dossiers of the highest provincial and municipal leaders are kept in the organizational department of the Central Committee. The provincial organizational departments manage the dossiers of the cadres over whom the provincial authority has jurisdiction. The county party committee is the lowest unit that is allowed to maintain personnel dossiers.^[24] This elaborate division of jurisdiction within the hierarchy is designed to prevent any cadre from keeping his dossier under his own jurisdiction, while making it easy for those who make personnel decisions to have access to the information.

Although it is unclear how authority is divided between the party's organizational departments and the government's personnel bureau, it seems that the division of power between the two depends on the cadre's rank. The organizational department of the Guangdong provincial party committee maintains dossiers for leading cadres (above grade 12) of all organs directly under the provincial government. The personnel bureau of the provincial government keeps dossiers for middle-echelon cadres—those between grades 12 and 18 (between division chief and section chief)—of all the organs directly under the province. According to one informant, the personnel bureau of Guangdong provincial government maintained about 5,000 dossiers at the time of the CR. The cadres below grade 19 have their dossiers kept in the personnel section or the organizational department of the bureau level. The same principle may apply to the units below the provincial level.

At each unit, except probably in small enterprises, dossiers are kept in a specially designated dossier room. One person is accountable for approximately every 1,000 dossiers. To be allowed to work with dossiers, a person receives close scrutiny of his political reliability and party spirit.^[25]

On the dossier's outer envelope are written the person's name, dossier number, sex, unit, birthplace, date of birth, family background, individual status, date of first engaging in revolutionary

[24] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Yanjiushi, ed., Dangde Zhuzi , 279.

[25] Wang, Renshi Dangan , 57–62, 110–32.

work, status, position, and address. Each dossier is given a serial number, the first two digits specifying the field to which one belongs, and the other digits assigned by seniority. Files are organized according to serial number. In order to facilitate retrieval, each personnel department maintains a directory arranged according to the number of strokes in the last name. In addition to normal updating of dossiers, custodians are required to check the serial numbers once every six months and to index them annually.^[26]

Before the CR, there was a well-established set of rules to access dossiers, and these rules have recently been reinstated.^[27] Two people must carry out any investigation of a political problem in the personnel dossier. In order to have access to the dossier for cadres above section chief, both of the investigators have to be party members, and at least one must be of a higher rank. If the cadre being investigated is below section chief, one investigator can be a nonparty member, although this is very rare. When a party committee wishes to check a dossier held by another unit, it has to write a letter of introduction for its investigators. The letter specifies the investigators' ranks and positions and whose file they are authorized to see. After registering with the persons in charge of the dossier, the investigators leave the letter, which is later added to the dossier. Questions raised about the contents of a dossier are also put into it.

Investigators are allowed to see dossiers of those specified by the letter only in the designated dossier room. No mechanical duplication of a dossier is allowed except for a simplified version of the dossier. When part of a dossier is copied, it is verbatim; no summarizing or paraphrasing is allowed. The person in charge of the dossier must authenticate every page copied and the entire package.

Control over copied materials is strict because they can enter the dossiers of others as supporting evidence. To ensure proper control, the regime authorized each unit maintaining dossiers to set up more detailed regulations.^[28] As for lending dossiers, "as a rule, a dossier cannot be checked out. But under special circumstances, it can be lent with approval [of the party committee]. However, lend-

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., 32–34.

[28] Ibid., 33, 43.

ing should follow strict registration, and those borrowed should be returned within the due date."^[29]

A personnel dossier always follows a person when he is transferred. In the early 1950s the transferred cadre could carry his own dossier in a sealed envelope. This practice allowed many people to change the contents in order to secure a better job. Thereafter, all dossiers were required to be sent out only through "confidential transportation," and now only cadres in organizational departments above the county level may carry them.

Investigation and Assessment

The two most important functions of the party committee were the investigation of the contents of a dossier (shencha ) and the assessment (jianding ) of a cadre's performance in both work and politics. Three occasions precipitate an investigation. First, anything questionable in the autobiography requires further investigation. Second, the reexamination of a cadre's dossiers occurs when the organization receives accusation letters (jiancha xin ). Before the CR, this kind of letter would not automatically have initiated a full-scale investigation unless the charge was serious and the letter was signed by the sender. However, during the CR, any suggestion of wrongdoing, either in an anonymous letter or in an oral accusation, frequently brought about an investigation. The present leadership is ambivalent toward an anonymous letter; on one hand, it admits that fear of reprisals leads people not to sign letters, but, on the other, it warns that malicious people often use the method to lay "false charges."^[30]

The third occasion for investigation is a political campaign. Then, the personnel bureau or organizational department examines dossiers carefully, selecting ones with problems and reporting them to the party committee,^[31] which decides whether a cadre's problem is serious enough to make him a target. The same method was used in the last party rectification campaign of 1984–86, which intended to punish former radicals for what they did almost twenty years before.

[29] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Yanjiushi, ed., Dangde Zhuzi , 281.

[30] Dangde Shenghuo , no. 8, 1983, 37; no. 8, 1984, 10.

[31] Qingdao Ribao , 14 September 1957.

To find falsification, investigators look for inconsistencies, particularly in the many versions of a cadre's autobiography. Any inconsistency is cause for investigators to suspect that a cadre has deliberately falsified his dossier. Discrepancies are entered in the dossier and dealt with during the next political campaign.

If a case requires further evidence, the party committee may decide to send out its own investigation team. In this case, the regulations stipulate that at least two people (sometimes three if they need to travel a long distance) must be dispatched together. Otherwise, any evidence collected is inadmissible. The investigators, who are usually selected from personnel agencies, ensure the reliability of information collected from witnesses.^[32]

After returning to their respective units, the investigators write their reports, including corroborating testimony from witnesses, and submit them to the party committee. If the discrepancy between the new findings and what is reported in the personnel dossier is not serious, the committee will not make a case immediately, but the entry noting the discrepancy remains. In the next campaign, the party committee will try to verify the materials again.

During the CR, the Red Guards nominally followed the same procedure, quite often using the pretext of investigation for sightseeing trips. Due to an emphasis on "class struggle," suspicion on such trivial matters as class background resulted in sending out numerous investigation teams. As one observer argued, China must have wasted enormous amounts of money and energy on these trips. Moreover, most of the investigators merely collected evidence to support already-formulated conclusions.^[33]

Apart from investigations, the party committee regularly assesses a cadre's work competence and political performance. The assessment can be made: (1) at the end of each year, (2) when the cadre is transferred to a new unit, or (3) at the end of each political movement. During Mao's era, the assessment focused on and emphasized political qualifications rather than functional work competency.^[34]

Standard procedure for making an assessment requires, first,

[32] For a documentary example of this kind of evidence, see "Central Document, No. 10, 1977."

[33] Zhengming , no. 9, 1983, 55–56.

[34] Wenhui Bao , 10 August 1957.

that each individual write his own assessment, detailing salient points and focusing on his own political performance and attitudes, strengths and weaknesses, achievements and mistakes. Second, the self-evaluation is read and discussed in a small group, which consists of colleagues who know one another very well.^[35] Third, on the basis of the self-evaluation and the small group's report, the party committee writes an evaluation that is added to the dossier. Sometimes the evaluation has to be approved by an upper-level party committee. Assessment materials make up a large portion of the dossier.

Those being evaluated have a pretty good idea of the contents of the assessment. They know what they have written and what suggestions were made in the small group discussion. Cadres sometimes have access to the summaries of assessments made by the organizations. They were required to sign their names on the organizational assessment, and they have the right to reserve opinion on that portion with which they disagree. The assessment becomes effective only when the units and those evaluated sign together.^[36] Despite this rule, many cadres complain that "party organizational assessment about cadres is surrounded by mystery."^[37] During the CR many units stopped making assessments, and in places where they continued, coercion replaced objectivity. Recent regulations have revived the old practice of requiring the signature of the person being assessed.

Administrative control over the personnel dossier was well institutionalized in pre-CR China. The dossiers were strictly regulated, and there were at least well-established administrative practices, if not uniform rules, regarding the types and processing of information that went into the dossiers. These guidelines also applied to the maintenance and investigation of dossiers, as well as to rendering organizational judgments on the contents and on each individual cadre's performance. Thus, the dossier provided the party with accurate information on each cadre, enabling it to carry out recruitment and promotion in an orderly and justifiable way.

[35] For a detailed description of the small group operation, see Martin Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).

[36] Renmin Ribao , 10 August 1957.

[37] Wenhui Bao , 27 October 1957.

The pre-CR personnel management practice, however, had several serious weaknesses, which subsequent politics magnified. First, there was no external mechanism to stop the party from abusing its authority in the area of personnel management. Whatever restraints there were, they were internal ones, whose effectiveness depended on goodwill. For instance, each cadre was granted the right to appeal to the upper echelon of the bureaucracy. But this right was generally ineffective in guaranteeing a fair review opportunity for the cadre because, as many Red Guard newspapers asserted, the upper echelon of the bureaucracy frequently showed more sympathy to the lower level than to an individual cadre.

Second, the heavy reliance on personal testimony—in contrast to the Western judicial practice of attaching importance to material evidence—and the lack of strict rules with regard to the admissibility of evidence and its interpretation offered even more room for abuse. The Chinese practice of interviewing those who knew the investigated person and using their testimony in written form as evidence reflected in part the cultural tradition and in part technical backwardness in dealing with material evidence. The effectiveness of this practice as an investigation method largely depended on an assumed mutual trust and a consensus on what was right and wrong among the people involved in the process. When the CR shattered the consensus on fundamental values, the practice degenerated to producing a large number of false charges and framed-up cases.

Third, the Chinese emphasis on "confession," which was epitomized in the official slogan, "lenience to those confessing, but harsh punishment to those refusing," contained a seed of abuse and excess. The notion that people would honestly confess their mistakes also indicated the utter lack of philosophical distinction between public and private domains, a distinction that led in the United States to the Fifth Amendment, granting the individual the right to refuse self-incrimination. As was the case with witness testimony, confession can work as an effective mechanism for justice only when all the participants share common criteria for right and wrong. When the official criteria changed during the CR, coercion, torture, and other types of physical punishment were widely used to force the purged to "confess" their crimes or to

write accusations against others. A family member, relative, or other acquaintance was subject to the same abuse.^[38]

Fourth, the principle of double jeopardy has never been firmly established in China. Even a case over which the party committee had rendered a final conclusion could be reopened when new evidence—reliable or not—became available. Many people were persecuted several times for the same reason.^[39] As a result, there has been enormous pressure for reversals of past decisions and for the rehabilitation of victims, particularly when policies have changed with new leadership. By discrediting the organizational legitimacy of the party, the CR gave rise to demands to reverse previous decisions. One group of political leaders at the top level could then utilize such demands for their own political gain. As a result, the Chinese people are justifiably worried that if any drastic policy change occurs, what is regarded as virtue today—in Chinese a "red-color dossier"—will turn out to be a liability—a "black-color dossier."

Impact of the CR

From the beginning of the CR, the personnel dossier was the focus of attention, although no one publicly challenged the system per se. When Mao pressured the party into launching the CR, it sent out work teams to school campuses. Largely composed of cadres from outside the campus, the work teams examined the dossiers of each cadre and student and then classified them into rightist, middle roader, or leftist. When the work teams themselves came under public attack for having diverted the main targets from the party leaders to the masses, Mao ordered the materials collected by the work teams (generally known as "black materials") to be burned. However, some work teams hid materials among the personnel dossiers and other confidential party materials for future use. This offered the Red Guards an excuse to seize personnel dossiers under the pretext of searching for "black materials."

As the dossier rooms became less inviolable to the Red Guards,

[38] Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Sichuan), no. 10, 1983, 20–23; Ming Bao , 21 August 1981; Guangming Ribao , 8 January 1979.

[39] For instance, see Zhonggong Gongchandang Lishi Jiangyi , 3d ed. (Jilin: Jilin Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), 2:182.

party leaders improvised various methods to protect the dossiers. In Guangdong, Zhao Ziyang, then the first provincial party secretary, moved all the dossiers under his jurisdiction to the Guangdong military command. The military kept the Red Guards at bay all through the CR by insisting that personnel dossiers were military secrets. At Zhongshan University, the party committee moved its dossiers to the school library, which was closed to students. However, Red Guards raided the library, seizing and destroying some of the dossiers.^[40] Personnel dossiers for high-level cadres (those above section chief) survived intact, but the dossiers for lower-level cadres sustained some damage.^[41]

In February 1967, the center ordered that mass organizations should not raid or seize personnel dossiers, that seizure of power in dossier rooms should be carried out exclusively by the rooms' original personnel, and that people unsuitable for the work should be transferred according to regular procedures (which required upper-level approval). Realizing the danger of seizing dossiers but suspicious that other factions might obtain access to them, warring factions in many units negotiated to seal the dossier rooms. Denied access to official personnel dossiers, the Red Guards began to build up their own by collecting materials and carrying out investigations.

The mass organization's inability to look at official dossiers, however, put them at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis PLA representatives. The latter often used their privilege of having access to dossiers in order to promote partisan political interests by supporting cadres of their choice, while rejecting cadres supported by the mass organizations. By contrast, the mass organizations had to rely on their own less reliable materials or on the opinions of the PLA representatives for the selection of "revolutionary cadres." In some cases PLA representatives allowed the mass representatives to look into cadres' dossiers in order to promote consensus, although that was a clear violation of pre-CR practice. Once the revolutionary committee was formally established, it assumed jurisdiction over dossiers.

[40] Hai Feng, An Account of the Cultural Revolution in the Canton Area (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971).

[41] Dangde Shenghuo (Tianjin), no. 18, 1980.

When the CR began "purifying class ranks" in 1968, the main thrust of the mass movement was turned against "hidden class enemies"—those who were suspected of having falsified their class backgrounds and of covering up their past ties with the KMT. The witch-hunt atmosphere was so intense that every Chinese, including the top leaders, became obsessed with the dossiers. Even Zhou Enlai was accused of once having surrendered to the Nationalists, and his case was not closed until Mao personally intervened.^[42]

Radical leaders had their share of blemishes; Jiang Qing worried about the materials concerning her starlet life in the 1930s; Zhang Chunqiao had to protect his wife, who had once been captured by the Japanese, in addition to accounting for his past ties with the Nationalist secret organization Fuxing She ; Yao Wenyuan had to cover up the fact that his father was labeled a rightist in 1957.^[43]

According to its critics, the Gang of Four used every conceivable means to destroy any materials detrimental to themselves, while collecting, distorting, and manufacturing evidence to incriminate their political opponents. They are accused of having used deception, coercion, and torture for their purposes. Subjected to their abuse were not only the persons suspected, but their relatives, colleagues, subordinates, casual acquaintances, and even innocent bystanders who had any knowledge either of the Gang of Four's past or that of their political enemies. For instance, a librarian at Shanghai University discovered by accident some materials on Jiang Qing's 1930 career in the stacks; because of this, he languished in jail.^[44] Even the Red Guards, who accidentally discovered more background on the Gang of Four, were persecuted for having "collected black materials against the central leaders." The story of how Yao Wenyuan handled the "black materials" reveals the radicals' obsession with them. When Yao received materials on Zhang Chunqiao in a sealed envelope, he wrote: "Contents are not opened and are not known. Ask for instructions from Comrade Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen. Handle according to party regulations." But Yao kept the materials in his house for almost

[42] Dangshi Yanjiu , no. 1, 1980, 14.

[43] Renmin Ribao , 6 July 1977.

[44] "Central Document, No. 10, 1977."

seven years until his arrest. It appears that at that time the only rule governing politics was that one needed materials to purge others. But there were absolutely no rules about how to determine the materials' reliability or how one obtained them. As a result, "materials" could have an explosive effect, regardless of their reliability.

In brief, the series of continuous political campaigns after 1966 largely destroyed the normal administrative procedures of personnel management. Regular authority and procedures for decision making on personnel matters were abandoned. The rule that only party members could have access to dossiers was completely discarded, as many nonparty member rebels were promoted to positions that allowed for handling the dossiers. As a result of the simplification of the administrative structure, the sections in charge of the personnel dossiers were abolished. When the establishment of proper criteria for recruitment, promotion, appointment, and purging became the major focus of contention among the various political factions, materials in the dossier proved to be irrelevant. The scale of personnel changes during the same period was also gigantic. About 18 million new party members were recruited during the CR, whereas about 2.9 million people were purged. About 2 million workers, soldiers, and peasants were promoted to cadre positions while retaining their previous occupation status, the practice known as using peasants as cadres (yinong daigan ) and using workers as cadres (yigong daigan ).^[45] For instance, workers who were promoted to revolutionary committees continued to keep their former grade. As a result, the positions they actually occupied and their grades (which determine salary) did not match.

Were all of these changes recorded in the personnel dossiers? Where were the materials of self-criticism and the records of being accused and investigated kept? What happened to the huge amount of materials collected by the mass organizations? There is not enough information to answer these questions systematically. Fragmented information allows for a few general observations.

Although no specific regulation was issued by the center, the materials collected by the mass organizations were kept separately from personnel dossiers in order to be checked for reliability later.

[45] Renshi Guanli (Beijing: Beijingshi Renshiju, 1985).

However, it is also very likely that many unauthorized materials entered the dossier.^[46]

In the ten years of calamity, when right and wrong were reversed, the cadres' personnel dossiers, which were not perfect, were further destroyed. Merit became a liability, mistakes became merits, and facts were reversed. Many false materials entered the cadres' dossiers. . . . So much unnecessary and false information entered the cadres' dossiers.^[47]

Moreover, any decision rendered by the organization through the organizational process was entered in the dossier, even if it was reversed later. The verdict made by the Ninth Central Committee on Liu Shaoqi probably was in his dossier. Also, numerous self-criticisms made by the highest leaders—for instance, Deng Xiaoping—were probably included in their dossiers.

A more serious problem was the accumulation of unsettled cases. Even after the reconstruction of the party organization, the party committees at the various levels were unwilling or unable to render organizational conclusions on many cases, largely due to the unreliability of the collected materials, the absurdity of charges made, and the lack of guidance from the center during the chaotic ten years of the CR. The personnel dossier system was in disarray when the Gang of Four was ousted.

Reform

Immediately after the Gang of Four's fall, the regime tried to restore the pre-CR practice. First, party committees at various levels regained their exclusive authority over personnel matters. Then, the regime issued several regulations about dossiers, for example, "Regulations on Cadre Dossier Work," "Methods of Handling Cadre Dossiers," and "Regulations for Personnel Working on the Dossier System." Even though the contents of the rules are not known, the section dealing with dossiers in "Questions and Answers on the Party's Organizational Work" reveals that these new regulations are quite similar to what had existed before the CR.^[48] They intended to tighten organizational control over dossiers

[46] Daily Report , 21 October 1981, 1.

[47] Zhibu Shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 18, 1985, 24.

[48] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Yanjiushi, ed., Dangde Zhuzi , 276–80.

rather than protect the individual's rights by specifying rules with regard to collecting materials, investigating their reliability, placing them in the dossier, and arranging them in a certain order. For instance, now only materials "approved by the organization" can enter the personnel dossier. Any materials needed for evaluating cadres can enter the dossier if they are approved by the organization. Such materials as records of speeches or results of opinion polls and reports, that the organization has not yet examined, can be kept separately in the personnel departments. Moreover, the regime has organized nationwide conferences on personnel dossiers and endeavored to give specialized training to all people dealing with dossiers.^[49]

In addition, reforms initiated since Mao's death have had direct consequences for personnel management. As noted, the emphasis in recruitment and promotion has shifted from political reliability to ability, particularly technical and professional competency, and largely measured in terms of formal education. The removal of class designations such as counterrevolutionary, rightist, and landlord has made class origin and past political activities less relevant to personnel management. On the whole, documentation of actual performance rather than past performance is now more heavily weighed in personnel decisions. Some measures have been taken to protect individual rights in the state constitution, the party constitution, and the party rules and regulations. The new rules grant individuals the right to "put forward their statements, appeals, accusations, and defense at party meetings or to party organizations at a higher level, right up to the party committee." Also, party members have access to any decision made by the party organization on "appraisals, verdicts, and punishments."^[50] The new criminal code considers it a punishable crime to make false charges or accusations.

The second national conference on cadres' dossiers held in 1982 decided to check every dossier, updating the contents to make them accurately reflect the personnel changes after the CR, and, most important, to "cleanse" personnel dossiers by destroying all materials collected since the CR. The Shanghai organizational de-

[49] Wang, Renshi Dangan , 43.

[50] "Guiding Principle for Inner Party Life," Beijing Review , 7 September 1980.

partment assigned ten cadres to straighten out the personnel dossiers.^[51] Despite these efforts, some cadres are still complaining about the inaccuracy of the information stored in their dossiers.

Even after four years since 1980, still some of the cadre dossiers are not yet cleansed. . . . Still some problems exist with the dossier work. For example, some dossier materials reflect only good news not the bad news, or they reflect the bad news, while failing to report the good news. Most information in the dossier reflects the situation at a given moment, their contents are old, failing to reflect the entire history of a cadre, his work achievements and real conditions.^[52]

To rehabilitate victims of the CR and former rightists completely, the regime issued an official certificate of rehabilitation or removed rightist labels. In order to prove the regime's sincerity, on some occasions the party committee has shown the concerned individual the materials to be removed from the personnel dossier and then destroyed them. However, wondering whether or not all incriminating materials have been removed, some individuals have demanded to see the entire contents of their dossiers. The party committee, of course, will not allow that. The cadres' apprehensions appear to be justified because the policy of cleansing the dossier is not categorical. On the contrary, official policy specifies types of materials to remain in the dossier. They are "materials accurately reflecting historical reality and useful for understanding cadres," "materials related to the investigation, reinvestigation, and rehabilitation of a person's historical problems," and "the organization's conclusion and its supporting material." Understandably, this makes some Chinese nervous about what is left in the dossier.

Moreover, the removal of rightist, counterrevolutionary, capitalist, or other class enemy labels does not mean erasing past records. Most official forms used for cadres still include columns for family background and individual status, and in filling the class origin column, each individual is required to report his former class labels—no one is allowed to change his family background or individual status without approval of the organizations—and to add

[51] Zhibu Shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 18, 1985, 1–18.

[52] Daily Report , 28 September 1981, P1.

his present occupation.^[53] This is the case with the children of the former exploiting class. In other words, the regime has not yet stopped soliciting information on class background but simply promises that it will not be used as a criterion for personnel management. Thus, this practice, plus keeping the traits of past political decisions, makes concerned individuals uneasy about the possibility that when the political wind changes, their records can be used against them.

In fact, it seems that the regime continues to rely on information stored in dossiers whenever the necessity to check a cadre's political reliability arises. For instance, whether or not one is "revolutionized" is largely determined on the basis of materials in the dossier. The investigation of the "three types of people" relied heavily on materials stored in dossiers. In addition, new materials are constantly being generated for dossiers.^[54] For instance, every decision made in the party rectification of 1983–86 entered the dossiers—including delayed and denied registration. The sentence that one has made "comparatively serious mistakes during the CR" can enter one's dossier.

As the scope of reform in other fields expands, the existing dossier system poses some serious problems. For instance, the system comes in conflict with the current policy of utilizing China's limited resources of technical cadres efficiently by making it easier to transfer them across administrative boundaries and by allowing individuals to seek employment and transfer on their own initiative. At present, no organization will accept anyone without first going through his or her dossier. However, unless one is officially transferred, it is extremely difficult to persuade a unit to send a dossier to the new unit.^[55] Anyone who controls the personnel dossier of a particular cadre actually controls the cadre. When several units compete for a particular person, the unit that has access to his dossier can have the person because the other competitors cannot make a decision on him or her without looking at the dossier.

To sum up, the regime has not yet fundamentally changed the

[53] Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhuzhibu Yanjiushi, ed., Dangde Zhuzi , 287. But other sources indicate that after June 1979 one can write his present occupation in the column (geren chengfen). Dangde Shenghou (Tianjin), no. 20, 1980, 9.

[54] Zhibu Shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 13, 1985, 26.

[55] Zhengming , no. 9, 1983, 55.

practice of collecting detailed information on each cadre and storing it in a personnel dossier, although a serious effort is made to check the potential abuse of materials. When some Chinese demanded the abolition of the dossier system on the ground that "since the basic goal of the regime has changed, there is no need for the dossier system," the official view insisted that "on the contrary, when the party's main task changed, the personnel dossier became more important, and its utility increased."^[56] Nonetheless, it seems that decentralization of personnel decision-making power and transferring it to the government personnel bureau are changing the administrative practice of managing dossiers. When the civil service system is thoroughly implemented, the personnel bureau of the government will manage all personnel dossiers for functional civil servants, leaving only the dossiers of political civil servants with the party's organizational departments. Instead of abolishing the personnel dossier system, the regime seems to intend to strengthen administrative control over files and to use them more rationally (e.g., entering examination scores). Consequently, a cynical Hong Kong observer asks: "China is economically and politically the most backward; but it has the most advanced personnel dossier system in the world. Is it a blessing or a curse for the Chinese?"^[57]

There is absolutely no sign to indicate that the regime is concerned about possible infringements of individual rights through the dossier system. The utter lack of concern with individual privacy was again revealed when Qien Xuesen, a renowned Chinese scientist, suggested a few years ago that the Chinese computerize their personnel dossier system. The ostensive objective was to make the personnel management system rational, enabling the government to select easily the best qualified persons for the most suitable jobs.

By using combinations of centralized but grade-by-grade management, we can simultaneously evaluate a thousand, ten thousand persons, and we can select the best-qualified people from several tens of millions of personnel dossiers. The old method of checking personnel dossiers one by one cannot do that. Already there is a

[56] Wang, Renshi Dangan , 44.

[57] Zhengming , no. 9, 1983, 55–56.

system of examining dossiers by computer and even dossier investigation can be automated. A computer can work several thousand times faster than man. Once the criteria for selection are set up, a computer can automatically select the most suitable persons. Since the dossiers are recorded on magnetic tape, they can be supplemented: work condition, masses' and leaders' opinions of a person, and his health record can enter the dossiers through the regular process.^[58]

Given the present level of science and technology in China, it would be extremely difficult to develop a comprehensive system of classifying and coding all the necessary information on personnel management of cadres in the foreseeable future. However, in some units computerization of dossiers has started. It is chilling even to think of a computer that contains all conceivable physiological, biological, medical, and psychological information on every one of the millions of Chinese people.

[58] "Engineering in the Socialist Manpower Field," Hong Qi , no. 2, 1982. Also for computerizing personnel dossiers, see Wang, Renshi Dangan , 184–85.