The Tactical Purpose of the Dema Wall
The most striking feature about the Dema wall is the frequency of sally ports along its main sector. These were designed to allow the defenders to make sorties against an enemy before the wall; all open to the right, from the defenders' point of view, allowing them to emerge from behind the wall with their shield-bearing left sides facing the enemy. The frequency of sally ports demonstrates that they were provided in order to allow the defenders the option of sallying out from behind the wall at any convenient point. Sally ports are more numerous where the ground in front of the wall is more nearly level, which is where the wall would have been more vulnerable to attack. If the wall were simply meant to be a preclusive barrier, then this is precisely where openings would have been least desirable. But their greater number in such stretches of the Dema proves that they were designed to facilitate vigorous attacks launched by the defending force to prevent the enemy from attempting to storm the wall itself.[19] These points are well appreciated by Jones, Sackett, and Eliot:
The implication behind the use of sallyports is that attack is the best de-fence; so generous a provision of these features in the Dema implies not merely that this principle was recognized, but that the whole tactical scheme of defence was based on it.[20]
With attack and counterattack being the key to a successful defense of the Dema, it is evident that the defending force had to be an army of some size, not a mere garrison force such as might suffice for the defense of a fort or a city circuit.[21] That army had to be able to engage the enemy frontally in the event of an assault, making use of the fighting platform atop the wall probably only after resistance offered in front of the wall
[19] On the interpretation of the sally ports, see DEMA 168, 177-81. Despite the clear discussion presented in DEMA and summarized by McCredie 1966, 63, the sally ports are sometimes misunderstood. Lawrence 1979, 170, mistakenly states that the sally ports of the Dema "all face uphill" and (338) that the Dema wall was "continuous where it ran on hillsides" but was "interrupted on flat ground by sally-ports." Lawrence, 248, and Winter 1971a, 215, discuss the possibility that the Dema sally ports had doors. Their discussion reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of the fluid tactics required for the defense of the Dema, and they give too little regard to the statement of DEMA 167-68 to the effect that there is no evidence that doors were ever provided.
[20] DEMA 168.
[21] So Dow 1942, 198, 208; DEMA 179-81; McCredie 1966, 64, 96. Gardikas 1920, 71, overestimates both the length of the wall and the size of the force needed to defend it. Dow reckons the minimum size of the force at 4,000 hoplites, a figure that is cited by McCredie. Historical circumstances indicate that the wall was intended to be manned by the force of 5,000 infantrymen mentioned by Diodoros 15.32.2 (see chapter 5).
was broken by the attack. At the same time, the defenders had to be numerous enough to take advantage of the hilly terrain within the pass to harass and strike at the flanks of the advancing enemy. The wall was, in effect, a final line of defense, a barrier designed to prevent the enemy from making a decisive break in the defenders' line. But for the wall not to have been an impediment to defending troops moving back and forth across its line required an exceptional level of skill and discipline on the part of the defending forces. Once again, the observations of Jones, Sackett, and Eliot in this connection are entirely apt:
To base the whole defence so largely on sorties suggests a professional skill on the part of the commander, and training and discipline on the part of the men. The latter would have to sally out in single file, advance in formation or in open order across very rough ground, engage the enemy, break off contact at a word of command, and, possibly under heavy pressure, retire in orderly style one at a rime through the rampart. The operation suggests the battle drill either of a very well-trained levy, or perhaps rather of a professional soldiery.[22]
The advantages of high ground afforded to the defenders within the pass and along the wall, together with the rocky and uneven nature of the ground on all of the hills, suggest that light-armed skirmishing troops, and in particular peltasts armed with javelins, could have been used to considerable advantage in the defense of the Dema.[23] Cavalry would have been nearly useless on the rocky slopes and, in any event, could only have crossed the wall through its few gateways, the sally ports being too narrow for horsemen to use. Hoplites moving in formation would also have been somewhat hampered by the terrain and would certainly have been less agile in their advances and retreats than peltasts. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude, with Jones, Sackett, and Eliot, that the Dema wall must have been designed with peltast tactics in mind.[24] This conclusion accords well with the preliminary conclusions on the date of the wall as determined by the archaeological evidence. It was in the first half of the fourth century that drilled and disciplined
[22] DEMA 180.
[24] DEMA 180.
professional peltasts achieved their most notable successes under Athenian commanders, Iphikrates and Chabrias in particular.[25]
But in recognizing the special advantages of javelin-throwing peltasts in the tactics implied by the design of the Dema, we should not exclude the possibility that hoplites, and perhaps cavalry as well, would have had useful or even necessary roles to play in defending the Dema. The chief advantage of peltasts fighting in broken terrain such as that around the Dema wall was their ability, especially when opposing hoplites, to strike at will and to escape blows through flight. But their reliance on flight as an essential feature of their effectiveness rendered peltasts unsuitable for holding a fixed position, unless the position itself were virtually impregnable. The Dema wall, built as a compromise between defensive strength and tactical mobility, was not an impregnable position in these terms. Even with a strong peltast force operating over the slopes in front of the wall, the contest over whether or not an enemy force would be able to cross the wall might well have depended upon the outcome of hand-to-hand combat, in which case the advantage would turn to hoplite troops. So J. K. Anderson, writing on military techniques of the first half of the fourth century, observes:
The helplessness of Greek heavy infantry when attacked by light-armed troops in broken ground has often been remarked, but if the heavy infantry were not trying to drive the enemy off the hills and occupy them themselves, but merely to pass from one plain to another, they could often fight their way through with their strength substantially intact. Behind them, their enemies were left in the hills, uninjured but unable to do anything more to save their farms and open villages.[26]
Anderson's remarks could well describe the situation in the Aigaleos-Parnes pass. If a hoplite force attempting to cross the pass were itself provided with skirmishing troops such as archers or peltasts, a defending force of peltasts might be neutralized, or at least kept preoccupied by such troops, while the hoplite force advanced on the wall itself. Once at the wall, the defenders would have a considerable advantage by virtue of their position atop the wall, but if they did not have hoplite shields, this advantage would be mitigated in the hand-to-hand fighting against hoplite ranks pressing up against the wall and especially against the vulnerable gateways and sally ports. If the attackers could be supported in
[25] On Iphikrates and Chabrias and their professional peltasts, see Parke 1933, 48-62, 73-83; Best 1969, 85-97, 102-10; Anderson 1970, 121-38; Pritchett 1974, 62-77, 117-25. See further in appendix III on Chabrias.
[26] Anderson 1970, 7. Cf. Adcock 1957, 68-69: "It must be remembered that mountains often defend nothing but themselves."
their assault by light troops firing stones, arrows, or javelins against the defenders, peltast troops alone would probably find it altogether impossible to hold their position even atop the wall, and the hoplite army would be through the barrier and on its way into the plain of Athens.[27]
Taking these possibilities into account, we should acknowledge that hoplite troops must have had an important role in manning the Dema. Anderson has in fact already suggested that this was the case, pointing out that hoplite files could move out through the sally ports and form up in line to support peltasts attacking in advance of them.[28] We can imagine that hoplite ranks drawn up on the high ground in front of the wall would add considerably to the deterrent effect of this entire defensive position.[29] If intimidation were not enough to halt an attack and if engagements in front of the wall should prove or seem futile, the Dema wall itself would become an ally of stone to the hoplite ranks standing atop it, its immovable weight nullifying the strength of the enemy pressing up against it. The irregularities of the terrain in front of the wall make it highly unlikely that the entire length of the wall would come under attack by enemy hoplites in one assault. Assaults would more likely have been attempted only at those points where the wall was most easily approached, which would allow the defenders to concentrate their forces there while subjecting the flanks of the attackers, wherever possible, to counterattack by either hoplites or peltasts.[30]
The vulnerable points of the Dema wall are those where it can be approached over level or near-level ground. There are four such points along its line, and it is worth considering how the vulnerability of each of them might have been offset in the defensive scheme of the Dema.
The easiest approaches to the wall are in the southern and central saddles, where the ascent to the watershed at the center of the pass is nowhere very steep (the approach to the northern saddle, by contrast, involves both a longer and much steeper climb). These are essentially narrow ways, however, bordered by steep slopes for some distance, with little room for troops to form a frontal line in approaching the wall.
[27] The ability of hoplites supported by light infantry to move at will through terrain when opposed only by light infantry and, occasionally, cavalry is amply demonstrated in the march of the Ten Thousand (see Xenophon Anab . 3.3 1-4.8.28 and the discussion of Best 1969, 58-64). See also Anderson 1970, 138, on the value of light-armed support for hoplites assaulting fortifications.
[28] Anderson 1970, 135.
[29] Cf. the deterrent effect of high ground in the positioning of the Argives and their allies before the battle of Mantineia in 418 (Thucydides 5.65) and in the positioning of Athenian and Theban forces confronting Agesilaos in 378 and 377; Diodoros 15.32.3-6, 34.1; Polyainos 2.1.2, 12; Xenophon Hell . 5.4.50 (discussed in detail here in chapter 5 and in Munn 1987).
[30] Cf. DEMA 168, 179-80.
Sallies across the slopes above these saddles, by either hoplite or peltast troops, could turn the flank of a force advancing along the bottoms of these saddles and halt its advance. With the line of the Dema drawn back in the saddles and thrown forward on the hills so as to control the heights immediately above the approaches to the wall in the saddles, this is evidently the most elementary sort of defensive counterattack envisioned by the planners of the wall.[31]
The remaining two level approaches present a different problem. These are level hilltops in front of the wall, both outrunners of the northern hill within the pass, separated from each other by a watercourse. Here, with no higher ground above these level stretches, there would be danger to the defenders of the Dema if the enemy were able to occupy these outrunners of the northern hill, for they would be able to assemble their forces for an assault on the wall over the widest front of near-level ground, where the defenders would have the least advantage of position (except for the advantage afforded by the wall itself) and where the defenders would be unable to assault the flanks of the advancing enemy from higher ground.[32] It would be desirable, therefore, for the defenders of the wall to occupy the tops of these hills first to keep the enemy at a disadvantage on the slopes below.
The northernmost of these outrunners extends for only a few hundred meters in front of the wall, so it would have been comparatively easy for forces along the wall to advance over this ground if the enemy should be seen to be moving in this direction. Across the watercourse to the south of this outrunner is Kalistiri, the principal outrunner of the northern hill, the near-level top of which extends over a kilometer beyond the wall. Here the likelihood was greater that enemy peltasts would be able to ascend the far end of Kalistiri before it was occupied by defending troops. Alternatively, if defenders were on the ridge, they could not be everywhere in strength, and the enemy might be able to force the defenders back by concentrating an attack at some convenient point along the ridge where the defenders were weak.[33] Thereafter, defending troops would be deprived of the advantage of high ground in front of this part of the wall, and the defensive line would probably have to be
[31] Cf. DEMA 156, 165, on the relationship of the wall to the approaches through the saddles, and 168, 179-80, on the importance of sallies for breaking up any assault on the wall.
[32] See DEMA 162-63 on the course of the wall across the northern hill, and 156 on the vulnerability of this part of the wall.
[33] On the operation of capturing strategic high ground, see the advice of Onasandros Strat . 18 (quoted in note 23, above), 10.4 (cf. Plato Laws 830d-831a), 10.22. Detailed descriptions of such operations can be found, e.g., in Xenophon Anab . 3.4.58-49, 4.1.23-2.16, 4.6.6-27, 4.8.9-19; cf. Xenophon Hell . 5.4.14, 59.
drawn back to the wall itself, where the contest would be decided at what was the most vulnerable part of the Dema wall.
Control of this ridge would likely have been determined in a contest between forces of agile, light-armed troops, probably peltasts. But the importance of the ridge for the defense of the wall might have made it desirable for the defenders to use cavalry along its top, either as a force that could move quickly to prevent an enemy ascent or as a reinforcement to peltasts already operating on the ridge, or likely for both of these purposes, since cavalry supported by light infantry was an especially effective form of skirmishing force.[34] These considerations might explain the purpose of the northernmost gateway in the wall and the terraced road running through it, which extends along Kalistiri, a little below its crest, until the ridge descends into the plain below.[35] A road of this sort is precisely what would be needed to allow horses to move quickly along this rocky ridge. Enemy cavalry would almost certainly be unable to climb the steep rocky sides of Kalistiri, so the chief value of cavalry here for the defenders of the wall would be its ability, by moving swiftly along the ridge, to either deter or stem any assault on the ridge by enemy light-armed infantry.
Perhaps, then, provision was made in the plan of the Dema, in the form of the northern gateway and road along Kalistiri, for the limited use of cavalry in maintaining control of this ridge. Cavalry was an important arm of Athenian forces, so it is reasonable to expect that its usefulness was taken into account in planning the defenses of this pass.[36] Cavalry could have been employed to hamper the progress of an invading army moving across the plain of Eleusis, as it was during Archidamos' invasion of 431.[37] In this case, gateways in the central and southern valleys, desirable for civilian traffic, were essential to allow cavalry forces to move from one side of the wall to the other. Likewise, the stretches of roadway on the northern side of Kalistiri, not obviously useful for civilian traffic, might have been specifically intended to allow cavalry to move quickly between the plain of Eleusis and the top of the Kalistiri ridge.
[34] On the value of cavalry supported by light infantry, see Xenophon Hipparch . 5.13, 8.19, 9.7, and Aeneas Tacticus 15.5; cf. the engagements described by Thucydides 2.79.3-7 (Athenian defeat at Spartolos), 7.78.3-6 (Athenian retreat from Syracuse); Diodoros 15.71.6 (Boiotian retreat from Thessaly); Xenophon Hell . 7.5.24-25, and Diodoros 15.85.4-5 (Theban hamippoi at Mantineia).
[35] The road on Kalistiri is shown in map 2 and is discussed by DEMA 162-63, 169.
[36] On the importance of Athenian cavalry for defensive actions in the event of an invasion, see Xenophon Hipparch . 7 and Poroi 4.47. According to Thucydides 7.27.5, during the Dekeleian War Athenian cavalry saw almost continuous action against the enemy in Attica; see also Thucydides 2.19.2, 2.22.2, 3.1.2, 7.28.2; Aristophanes Hipp . 576-97; Xenophon Hipparch . 7.4; Ober 1985b; Spence 1990.
[37] Thucydides 2.19.2.
Cavalry might also have been effective as an auxiliary force behind the wall in stemming the advance of enemy foot soldiers if they should succeed in crossing the wall, especially in the more level ground of the saddles.
The Dema wall, then, was essentially a tactical device built to support an army in the field. The army for which it was designed must have included several thousand hoplites as its core and a sizable force, perhaps numbering in the thousands, of light troops, most likely peltasts, while a few hundred horsemen could have been a valuable force for special supporting actions. The tactics employed by such a force in the defense of a wall of this sort are best exemplified, as has been widely recognized, by the operations of combined Theban and Athenian forces in Boiotia in 378 and 377 defending a fieldwork near Thebes against Peloponnesian forces under the command of Agesilaos.[38] The fieldwork in this case was not of stone but consisted of a wooden palisade and ditch. Rather than blocking a single pass, it was a considerably more extensive work that, according to Xenophon, "encircled the plain and the most valuable parts of the territory" of Thebes. This barrier especially resembled the Dema in that sally ports were built into it at intervals frequent enough to allow the defenders to attack at will from any position behind the wall.[39]
In the campaign of 378, the Theban and Athenian forces, although outnumbered by the army of Agesilaos, were able to discourage him from directly attacking them by virtue of the strength of their fieldwork. Agesilaos was unable to cross the wall wherever he found the defenders ready inside it, and the defenders were even able to deal blows to the forces of Agesilaos at opportune moments without compromising their defensive line. Xenophon describes an incident wherein a number of horsemen and peltasts of the Peloponnesians were struck down by an unexpected cavalry attack launched through the sally ports of the wall. Agesilaos did manage, however, to penetrate this defensive perimeter in both of his campaigns by contriving to deceive the defenders and cross the line at undefended points. Even so, Theban and Athenian forces continued to confront Agesilaos wherever the terrain afforded them advantages that counterbalanced the Peloponnesian superiority in numbers. In the campaign of 378, Chabrias the Athenian won acclaim for his generalship, for the discipline of his men, and for the disdain with which
[38] The Theban palisade has been compared to, and used to explain, the Dema by DEMA 176, 180-81, 183 note 106; McCredie 1966, 96; Anderson 1970, 134-35; Garlan 1973, 156-57; Garlan 1974a, 80-81. The chief description of the Theban palisade is Xenophon Hell . 5.4.38-41. For a full discussion of the Theban fieldwork, see Munn 1987.
[39] Xenophon Hell . 5.4.38, 39; cf. Polyainos 2.1.11, 25. The literary and topographical evidence for the nature and location of the Theban fieldwork is reviewed in Munn 1987.
they stood their ground in the face of a threatened Peloponnesian attack.[40] Such tactics characterized both campaigns, with the result that no decisive battles were fought, but blows were exchanged principally by the skirmishers, peltasts and cavalry, of both armies. These defensive tactics are summarized by Plutarch, who speaks generally of Theban successes against Spartan-led forces in 378-377:
They were not pitched battles, nor were the combatants drawn up in open and regular formation, but they succeeded by making well-judged attacks and by adopting flexible tactics, according to which they might retire and break off the action, or pursue and come to close quarters with the enemy.[41]
The similarity between the tactics of the Theban campaign in which Chabrias was so prominently involved and those implied by the Dema wall is striking, and it is noteworthy that Chabrias is associated, directly and indirectly, with other fieldworks and defensive tactics comparable to those of the Theban campaigns. In 369 Chabrias was in command of an Athenian force that, together with the Spartans, Corinthians, and other allies, attempted to hold a defensive line at the Isthmus against the Thebans under Epameinondas. The line of the allies was reinforced by palisades and ditches extending all the way from Lechaion to Kenchreai. Although sally ports are not explicitly mentioned, it seems likely that they were included in this wall just as they had been in the Theban palisade. Epameinondas, having surveyed the positions of the defenders, began his assault on the line with a surprise attack at dawn against the most easily approachable part of the line, where the Spartan and Pellenean troops were posted. By virtue of this surprise, Epameinondas was able to breach the line of the palisade and force the Spartans to withdraw to a position atop a hill. The Spartans were still capable of hindering the passage of Epameinondas, but they considered themselves ill prepared to continue the fight and accepted a truce allowing Epameinondas to pass on his way into the Peloponnese.[42] Once again, surprise was decisive in enabling an attacker to cross such a defensive fieldwork. Epameinondas further minimized the advantages of the defenders by directing the main thrust of his attack against the section of the line that was most assailable (
[40] On Chabrias' celebrated stand against Agesilaos, see chapter 5 and the discussion in Munn 1987, 117-21.
[42] Xenophon Hell . 7.1.15-17; Diodoros 15.68; Frontinus Strat . 2.5.26; cf. Polyainos 2.3.4, 7, 9.
der Chabrias were evidently positioned elsewhere along the line where the fieldworks must have been drawn across more defensible terrain, and they had little part in the engagement.[44] Later in this campaign, Chabrias did have an opportunity to display his mastery of tactics and terrain when he deployed light-armed troops on high ground just outside of the city of Corinth to repel an assault by Theban hoplites, which resulted in losses for the Thebans and praise for Chabrias.[45]
The tactics of a calculated stand on advantageous terrain fortified with a palisade, evidently provided with regular sally ports, are again exemplified in the battle of Tamynai on Euboia in 348. There Phokion, in command of the Athenian army, arrayed his troops within a palisaded camp on a ridge and bade them wait until, through their inaction, the more numerous enemy force was drawn into an assault on their strong position. Although the engagement began when Ploutarchos, Phokion's ally, lost patience and charged the enemy with his mercenaries, the outcome was as Phokion had planned, for the enemy, repelling Ploutarchos and the force of cavalry that had come to his assistance, advanced to the palisade, where they were themselves put to flight when Phokion's troops emerged from behind the palisade. The rout began with the onset of Phokion's hoplites in formation and was completed as Phokion pressed the attack against the fleeing enemy with a body of picked troops reinforced by the cavalry, which had by now regrouped.[46] Phokion's tactics and his use of the palisaded line closely resemble the examples set by Chabrias, especially in the campaign against Agesilaos at Thebes in 378. It is certainly significant, therefore, that according to Plutarch, Phokion was a protégé of Chabrias and gained his military experience under the command of Chabrias.[47] It seems quite likely that Phokion was an officer under Chabrias in Boiotia in 378 and 377, and possibly at Corinth in 369, and that the lessons of these campaigns were applied by Phokion at Tamynai.[48]
[44] Diodoros 15.68.5 reports that Epameinondas launched attacks against all parts of the defensive line but directed his main assault against the Spartans; Xenophon Hell . 7.1.15-16 names only the Spartans and Pelleneans posted beside them as the object of the Theban attack.
[47] Plutarch Phok . 6.1-7.2; cf. Mor . 791a, 805f.
Temporary fieldworks in the form of palisades and ditches, or made of other materials according to their availability, had long been used by the Greeks to fortify camps and siege lines, but the use of such field-works to reinforce battle lines is not widely attested until the fourth century.[49] The growing sophistication of fieldworks employed as tactical devices is concomitant with the increased professionalism of generals and commanders in the fourth century, who were ready to adopt and adapt new measures to give their forces a tactical advantage whenever possible, especially in defensive situations. The corps of mercenary troops, both hoplites and peltasts, serving under these commanders provided them with the drilled and disciplined cadres essential to the smooth execution of any sophisticated tactical plan.[50] As a consequence of these developments, tactical barriers of this sort became commonplace in theoretical discussions of territorial defense in the middle of the fourth century. So Plato, in his Laws , recommends that young men detailed each year to see to the protection of the countryside should engage in digging ditches and building barriers to make the invasion of the country more difficult for the enemy, and Demosthenes, in his Second Philippic , mentions palisades, walls, and ditches as some of the various innovations devised for the protection of states.[51]
[49] See the temporary fieldworks and barrier walls listed by Lawrence 1979, 160-61, 167. On the form and variety of material used in such fieldworks, see McCredie 1966, 96-99; Garlan 1967, 294 with note 3, and 296; Pritchett 1974, 133-46; Lawrence 1979, 161. The wall at Thermopylai rebuilt by the Greeks facing Xerxes is one of the few early barrier walls the actual use of which is described; it seems to have served as a perimeter wall for the Greek camp, and as a refuge of last resort, since the Greek defenders were always drawn up in front of it (Herodotos 7.176, 208, 223, 225). Cf. the similar use of the walls built by Persian forces near Plataia (Herodotos 9.15, 65, 70) and at Mykale (Herodotos 9.96-102). Tactical fieldworks more nearly like those of the fourth century and later were employed by the Syracusans against the retreating Athenian army in 413 (Thucydides 7.78.5-79.4, 80.6).
[51] Plato Laws 760e, 778e (this last passage is cited and discussed in chapter 1, p. 14 and note 30); Demosthenes 6.23-24.
The Dema wall is certainly a work of this general class, directly comparable to the ditches (
