3
The Second Eristic Display

It has become fashionable to assert that the six "sophisms" of this episode mark a significant "advance" in the dialogue because, "more important than the first two," they produce results that are "much more serious from a philosophical point of view."^[1] For, as it is argued, since "the Eleatic logic which is at the bottom of the majority of fallacies in this present scene is inextricably tied to a metaphysics which denies becoming," Plato has "to expose these arguments" before he can "provide a satisfactory basis for the theory of Forms."^[2] Now these assertions, while they are not wholly off the mark, are likely to distort Plato's intention at the very beginning of this episode. For though it is not inconceivable that Euthydemus and his brother are indeed a grotesque caricature of Parmenides and Zeno (and thus the Euthydemus presents, in part, a withering parody of Eleatic formalism), such polemical considerations, however important they may be for the history of Greek philosophy, reside in the distant background and should not blind us to Plato's more immediate objectives. In fact, in order to appreciate that distant past at something like its real value, we must first examine with some thoroughness those very problems which continue to challenge Plato as he constructs the second eristic display, the subject matter for this, our third chapter.

First of all, Plato must continue to dramatize his antithesis to the genuine philosopher by filling out his comic antitype with dramatic completeness. Clearly, this concern is a literary restraint that forces him to advance the action of his dialogue, but we have yet to determine the direction of that advance. Strictly speaking, it is not accurate to say that the brothers as character types develop within the context of the dialogue; at any rate, they do not develop in the way Kleinias and Ktesippus do. Rather, their characterization, like that of Socrates, does not undergo change but is as it were filled out; accordingly, both Socrates and the brothers remain throughout the dialogue those fixed

poles under the influence of which the two young men, Kleinias and Ktesippus, do advance and change. We have already dealt extensively with Kleinias' advance under the guiding influences of both eristic and dialectic, and we shall complete his character portrayal in the next chapter. But for the present we must continue to follow the course of the dialogue itself, and so now we shift our emphasis to Ktesippus in order to concentrate upon how he reacts to his first encounter with eristic. Socrates, too, continues to be center stage, for on two occasions he is forced to break his silence and enter directly into this eristic universe of discourse, first in order to curb the mounting hostility between Ktesippus and the brothers (285 A 2) and then to counter the young man's defeat by turning the tables on the brothers themselves (286 B 7). Like the first two episodes, this third one is both a self-contained unit of dramatic action and a single part in a much larger unity that projects beyond itself by initiating the first critical moment or stage in the eristification process of Ktesippus. Although Plato does not complete this process until more than halfway through the fifth and final episode, we can at this point reveal the principle that he will use to effect this conversion: with no little subtlety and artistic finesse, Plato will gradually shape Ktesippus' character into a likeness of the eristic masters themselves.^[3]

Moreover, fused with the artistic restraints that continue to limit Plato's choices is the philosophical motive that governs the two remaining eristic sections. To be sure, beneath the surface structure of the dramatic action Plato is examining views that have filtered down from giants like Parmenides and Protagoras. But more important to an understanding of the Euthydemus , these views are "now" in the verbal repertoire of contemporary philosophers, who are unacquainted with the convictions that motivated their predecessors. As representatives of this "new" type of philosophical experience, Plato has presented for our inspection Euthydemus and his brother, who have contracted an extreme philosophical disorder that has caused them to lose all orientation toward the Good. Without that standard or measure, then, the brothers just drift to and fro on the fides of the Euripus, supremely confident that they alone have intuited the truth, that nothing is secure in words or things.^[4] So when Plato portrays the elder of the two sophists initiating the action of the second eristic by shifting abruptly from problems of learning and knowing to those of being and becoming, he is in fact offering a quite concrete picture of a

disputant who has jumbled up our universe of discourse by dragging epistemological and metaphysical difficulties into a protreptic discourse where they do not belong. Neither canvassing the goods of our ethical life nor establishing hypotheses to test and ultimately to account for those goods, Dionysodorus just differs over terms in the language game of eristic sport.^[5] So, to put the matter precisely, Plato does not allow the brothers to advance philosophical issues at all. Instead, he pictures them criss-crossing, seemingly at random, back and forth across the disparate fields of philosophical inquiry (and increasingly so, especially as the dramatic action of the fifth episode advances) without any concern for proper philosophical method. What remains constant in their argumentation (and this is the crucial point) is the operation of a single methodological principle: the conversion of any interlocutor's responses to logic in order to extract from them the means for refutation .^[6]

In the first chapter we concentrated upon this principle and demonstrated certain paradigmatic features of its operation. We showed how the brothers injected the topic of learning into the debate, finessed Kleinias into theses on both its subjects and objects, and then concluded their performance by demonstrating that this topic could generate theses either horns of which eventually led to contradictions. In the six eristic arguments of this section the brothers continue to employ their method, but they dispense with the illusion of offering two genuine alternatives in their inescapable questions; for one of the two possibilities is obviously counterintuitive or contrary to what any reasonable person would believe. Here their strategy is simply to grant the seemingly stronger argument to their opponents and then, through nothing more than a display of their argumentative powers, to contradict and ultimately to refute those positions which have come to appeal to common sense. This aspect or movement of eristic wisdom will continue to roll on until the very act of contradiction itself becomes the battleground for eristic sport. But the apparent triumph of Dionysodorus on this topic will have the very real effect of ushering in a still deeper and more penetrating level of complexity. Indeed, it is at this crucial juncture that Socrates first confronts the brothers directly; for the first time, that is, the two poles, dialectic and eristic, begin to contend with each other in earnest. In the pursuit of our analysis of the Euthydemus , we shall continue to trace the movements of this

episode, beginning at the beginning and following the path of the as it unfolds.

On Becoming Wise (D3) (285 B 4-D 8)

Tell me, Socrates and you others, who claim that you want this young man to become wise , are you playing when you say this, or do you truly desire it and are you serious ?
     (283 B 4-7)

By beginning (D3) with an inescapable question that incorporates the antithesis between play and seriousness already introduced by Socrates at 278 C, Dionysodorus at once demonstrates his omnivorous appetite for digesting any content that comes his way. It is immediately evident that he is here not presenting two real options. Aware that Socrates has repeatedly stressed his serious commitment to Kleinias' welfare, Dionysodorus can easily anticipate which of the two disjuncts Socrates will affirm. Moreover, certain as he is of the thesis his opponents will accept, the sophist is also immediately aware of his eristic challenge. He must demonstrate a sense in which Socrates and the others are playing when they wish Kleinias to become wise; that is, he must discover how to swing his adversaries back to the other side of this dilemma. Socrates, on the other hand, is open and in fact must be open to the possibility that Dionysodorus is asking for real information; the brothers could have taken his protreptic appeal playfully, when in fact he intended it seriously; and this possibility could explain why they acted as they did in the first eristic.^[7] So, to eliminate any further misunderstanding on his position, Socrates vows never to deny that he wants Kleinias to become wise. But he soon discovers that this vow, rather than clarifying his stance, has the effect of making him the target of Dionysodorus' next attack:

What then is your claim? he said. Do you want him to become wise ?

Yes indeed.

And now

, he said, is Kleinias wise or not (

)?

He says not yet; he is not a boaster, I added.

But you want him to become wise

, he said, and not to be ignorant

?

We agreed.

Therefore, who he h not, you want him to become, and who he is now

, no longer to be

.

When I heard that, I was disturbed

.
     (283 C 5-D 4)

In the first eristic display the subjects of learning were frozen at two extremes, and there existed no process by which learners could bridge the gap between ignorance and wisdom through coming to know objects of knowledge. In (D3) Dionysodorus introduces that notion of process for the first time, only to use it for his next refutation. To begin the argument, he asks Socrates to affirm a clear and unambigous statement of the thesis that he has vowed never to deny.^[8] If, then, there is no possible confusion on what Socrates wants Kleinias to become, still the sophist asks: "And now , is Kleinias wise or not?" To this question Dionysodorus can anticipate the answer "not wise," for Socrates has repeatedly said that he wants Kleinias to become wise, and, in fact, to become wise was the goal of his protreptic. Furthermore, even to affirm this question, as Socrates indicates, would be the mark of a boaster. So why does the sophist even bother to ask this question? At this point strategic considerations prevail. With Ms second question Dionysodorus has not only anchored both the boy and the argument to the present moment ; he has also managed quite unobtrusively to slip the verb to be into his line of questioning. Hating thus established the context to his liking, Dionysodorus can begin to counter what Socrates wants Kleinias to become.

Moreover, if we attend to this second question from Socrates' point of view, we can see that the sophist has actually presented his opponent with a real problem. Socrates is aware that this "now" introduced by Dionysodorus captures something ambivalent about Kleinias' immediate condition; it expresses the tension that pervades the boy's existence. At the present moment Kleinias is m part wise and m part ignorant, but "now" fortunately, after the success of the protreptic, he is at least on a trajectory toward wisdom. "Now he has the target within his sight, but he has "not yet" attained the end Mere mortals, in fact, cannot ruby attain the wisdom that has just been articulated by Socrates, for it exists as the goal or terminus for our reorientation. All

of this, however, is of no interest to Dionysodorus. The sophist has hypostatized this "now" into a linguistic entity that he can manipulated like any other counter in a game of refutation. In fact, he has turned it into an absolute fixed point from which, as we shall see, any change will necessarily entail deadly ramifications. In his third question Dionysodorus alters the expressions "wise" and "not wise" to "wise" and "ignorant," and here perhaps it may appear that he again plans to juggle these two terms. But the dichotomy between "wise" and "ignorant" is not the lever that will overturn the thesis. Rather, at this point Dionysodorus' primary strategy is simply to position the linguistic item not to be at the very end of its colon where it can effectively balance its contrasting term to become. And we should not be surprised by Socrates' ready agreement to this question; insofar as it is possible, he wants Kleinias to become wise and not to be ignorant. But the sophist's next move requires the reader to exercise extreme caution.

Momentarily delaying his fourth question, Dionysodorus reformulates the third into a statement that swallows up the predicates "wise" and "ignorant" into relative clauses, a move that creates considerable ambiguity. For it is now unclear whether these two clauses modify the subjects or continue to perform the role of predicates. Assisting this move, crucial to the outcome of the refutation, is a trick first noticed by Gifford: (who) has here replaced (what kind), thereby disguising the fact that the clauses are properly the predicates of the verbs.^[9] Complementing this syntactic ambiguity is the related problem of whether in turn the two infinitives to be and to become () now stand absolutely or link subjects to predicates. And to complicate matters still further, Dionysodorus has expanded his expression "not to be" into "no longer to be ," thereby adding a temporal indicator that can oppose the fixed point established by "now."^[10] For our purpose, we should direct special attention to the second half of Dionysodorus' statement: "You want him . . . who [he] is now, no longer to be ." Here the verb to be ( and ) can carry two senses: (1) to be (ignorant) and (2) to be (simply). Hence the sentence can be translated: "You want him, who is now (ignorant), no longer to be (ignorant)" or "You want him, who is now (simply exists), no longer to be (simply to exist)." At this critical moment it is impossible to determine with certainty which sense of the verb to be is operative, since Dionysodorus is still in the

process of shifting from the first to the second meaning, a task that is not completed until his next question.

But significantly, with his remark "When I heard that, I was disturbed," Socrates distances himself from Kleinias' partisans. To understand his reaction, we need to pay particularly close attention to the context; for those who translate by "I was thrown into confusion" may be in danger of misinterpreting the subtlety of this crucial transition. One might assume that if Socrates were not confused but fully conscious of the fallacy employed in (D3), he would intervene and analyze equivocal the same way he earlier analyzed ; the fact that he doesn't move to solve the fallacy could then be construed as evidence for Platonic confusion on the several senses of being. But Socrates' behavior becomes intelligible if we regard his earlier solution to the problem of learning as the paradigm for a type of analysis. In fact, it became the permanent model for equivocation, after Aristotle anchored its form in his logical treatise (Sophistici Elenchi 4.165 B 30-34). Had Plato wanted to do so, he could have had Socrates disambiguate (D3) as well, though of course this mere possibility doesn't mean that this or any other solution would be equally satisfying to all; but he could do it.^[11] Here in the context of the Euthydemus , however, it suits Plato's immediate purpose to hint indirectly at the source of the problem by picturing Socrates' disturbance at the very moment when Dionysodorus is beginning to swing the argument back to the other side of the disjunct, and then to withdraw him from the debate altogether. After all, Plato need not repeat his method of solution, since he has already illustrated it effectively. Besides, he now intends to develop Ktesippus' role in the debate; and for that he must remove Socrates from the stage. But in the immediate context of (D3), Socrates becomes disturbed the instant he hears Dionysodorus scramble both the syntax and the terms of the sentence, because he believes he has just reached an unambiguous understanding with him on the importance of their protreptic enterprise. He thus anticipates a serious exhortation from the sophist and not more wordplay. But now Dionysodorus seizes upon the opportunity provided by this subtle break in the flow of the argument to deliver the coup de grâce :

Taking advantage of my condition, he grabbed hold of the conversation and said: Then am I to understand that, since you want him who now is no longer to be, you want him, presumably, to per-

ish ? And yet, how valuable would such men be, as friends and lovers, who would be so eager for their beloved to perish utterly!
     (283 D 4-8)

In several limbs of this argument Dionysodorus has introduced a form of the verb to be . Now, in his fourth and final question, we see the eristic purpose behind these and other moves. With no little argumentative finesse he smoothly and deliberately slips in the qualifier "presumably," in order to prolong, ever so slightly, the introduction of the capping term to perish , which then suddenly and unambiguously illuminates the intended meaning behind "no longer to be." For at this moment he completes the radical shift from ethics to physics, from the verb to be and its use with the ethical predicates "wise" and "ignorant," to a term that signals the annihilation or nonexistence of a physical body. In a comic context such a radical shift in fields would trigger the laughter of the audience; but here, in the arena of the protreptic, it once again prevents the discourse from attaining the ethical seriousness that Socrates has all along hoped to reach.

Dionysodorus does not finish with an emphatic announcement of his opponents' defeat.^[12] He does not remind Socrates of his vow never to deny what he had affirmed, nor does he state what is by now obvious, that Socrates and the others must have been playing when they wanted Kleinias to become wise. For he has his gaze fixed on an achievement that far transcends such minor accomplishments. Generalizing about the value of such men, as friends and lovers, who want their favorite to perish, Dionysodorus implies that the partisans of Kleinias want his destruction, an implication with devastating consequences. For he has thereby succeeded in implying that the goal of Socrates' protreptic, to become wise , together with its stirring exhortation, to strive to be as wise as possible , is not only impossible, but even if possible, undesirable, since any attempt to attain wisdom must entail the destruction of the subject who undergoes change.^[13] And so with this astounding argument Dionysodorus has miraculously wiped out the constructive work of Socrates' protreptic and thus cleared the way for eristic play to roll on.^[14]

Before turning to the next phase of this sport, we can benefit appreciably by recalling the substance of several important remarks from the first chapter. When we analyze (D3), it should be incumbent upon us to remember that this sophism cannot be adequately ac-

counted for by simply isolating two senses of the verb to be , the existential and the predicative, or even by exposing the trick of having "who" stand for "what sort." Onomastic and syntactic ambiguity, secundum quid , in fact the entire Aristotelian apparatus for treating fallacies, can isolate only one feature of the numerous difficulties that this dialogue presents for our close scrutiny. More broadly, in each eristic argument Plato has combined a host of well-orchestrated terms, philosophical themes, and artistic motives that not only unify antecedent action and assume their own proper place in the totality, but also continue to initiate the subsequent movements of the dialogue. Indeed, the brilliance of Plato's Euthydemus can be marred and disfigured, if we persist in crowding the fullness of each eristic argument into some minor portion of the whole.

On the Impossibility of Falsehood (E4 and E5) (283 E 1-284 C 8)

Leaping beyond Dionysodorus' general remark on the value of those who wish for the destruction of their beloved, Ktesippus interprets this conclusion to apply directly to himself. Righteously indignant, he calls down just retribution upon the head of this foreigner who has impiously insinuated a false accusation into his relationship with Kleinias.^[15] To the facts of that relationship he has special access, and he knows personally that he does not want his favorite to perish. Even the vague suggestion that he does, far from being the punch line to a philosophical joke of some merit, is to him an impious utterance that demands a retraction. In contrast, the brothers are in no position whatever to know how the relationship really holds between the two young lovers. Yet the elder of the two sophists, by exercising nothing more than his verbal power, has driven a wedge through that relationship and has momentarily cast doubt upon Ktesippus' passionate attachment to his love object.^[16] Dionysodorus has committed the crime, and Ktesippus has launched the indictment.

The two arguments (E4) and (E5), which Euthydemus now uses to defend the false accusation of his brother, take the form of a general defense of the impossibility of falsehood.^[17] We have already outlined in some detail (supra pp. 43-45) how Euthydemus enticed Ktesippus into advocating the positive thesis, that falsehood is real.^[18] So now let us concentrate on how Euthydemus, too, abruptly shifts and jumbles

up the field of discourse for his eristic purpose. Even a cursory glance at the texts of the Attic orators will prove that the trigger, to accuse falsely, is a common forensic term. In forensic disputes, questions of truth and falsity, intentional deception, misrepresentation of facts, false accusations, and the like are everyday matters, as is obvious to anyone who observes courtroom behavior. It is in this clearly defined, legalistic way that Ktesippus has indicted Dionysodorus for asserting a false accusation. But now Euthydemus abstracts the trigger from its duly constituted environment and converts it into the key item of a philosophical thesis that impugns, not the possibility of a false accusation, but the possibility of falsehood in general.^[19] This shift from a forensic to a philosophical context proves decisive for advancing the dramatic action, for now Ktesippus, like Kleinias earlier, falls unawares into an eristic trap, and so the game continues.^[20]

In his first move to attack the thesis Euthydemus induces Ktesippus to agree that falsehood, if it occurs, occurs in "speaking something ." Now the obviousness of this move may not seem significant; truth and falsity are, of course, conditions of language. But in the expression "speaking something," Euthydemus has slipped into the argument two crucial elements for his refutation: both the notion of speaking and the object or subject matter that is spoken of.^[21] The activity of speaking is important because it provides the linkage for his next three questions. But with each query he submits a different term for the object of speech; and we can easily follow his ruse. After passing from Ktesippus' remark "falsely accusing such a thing " to speaking "something ," Euthydemus shifts to speaking "it " and then to speaking "that ," and finally to speaking "that which is ."^[22] Add the fact that what a speaker speaks is both separate and distinct , and we can see how tightly the sophist is forming the connection between word and object, between speaking and what is spoken of.

When Ktesippus answers affirmatively to this final question, "Then does he who speaks that , speak that which is ?" Euthydemus moves in for the climax. Concluding now, not in the form of a question, but with a summary statement,^[23] he just asserts that he who speaks what is and things which are speaks the truth. Here, too, the sophist has pulled off this hoax by subtly manipulating the verb to be . Just as Dionysodorus shifted from the predicative to the existential sense of in (D3), Euthydemus has now

slid from the factual to the veridical sense, and, exploiting the logical connection between fact and truth embedded in the Greek verb , he has concluded that anyone who speaks things which are speaks the truth.^[24] Then, before Ktesippus can respond, he completes this piece of legerdemain by capping the general conclusion concretely: "And so, if Dionysodorus speaks things which are, he speaks the truth and says nothing false against you." Having thus led his opponent astray by each minute step in the questioning chain, Euthydemus has momentarily pulled the chair out from under Ktesippus, whose apparent fall, we may suppose, triggered no small laughter on the part of the eristic clique.

But knowing that Dionysodorus has spoken falsely about his love for Kleinias, Ktesippus returns to the immediate context and claims: "Yes, Euthydemus, but he who says this does not speak things which are ." He thus accepts the general form of Euthydemus' conclusion (if A, then B), but contradicts its particular application (but not A, therefore not B). In denying the correspondence, then, between Dionysodorus' words and that to which they refer , Ktesippus has successfully avoided defeat; but he has yet to escape from the clutches of Euthydemus, who now attacks him with the next argument, (E5):

Then Euthydemus said: But isn't it the case that things which are not

are not

?

They are not.

Then doesn't it follow that things which are not are existing nowhere

?

Nowhere.

Then regarding these things, things which are not, is there anyway someone, anyone at all, could perform

an act so as to make

things which are nowhere actually exist?

Not in my opinion, said Ktesippus.
     (284 B 3-8)

Ktesippus has agreed to the general notion that to speak things which are is to speak the truth, but he has denied that Dionysodorus spoke things which are. Now Euthydemus goes one step further and attempts to prove that merely to speak is to speak things which are. Shifting radically from veridical claims to propositions based in the Parmenidean disjunction between being and not-being (a slippery

move, but transparent in Greek because he negates the attributive participle with generalizing ), Euthydemus attacks Ktesippus with two questions that are immediately striking for their abstractness: he asks whether things which are not (1) are not and (2) are existing nowhere.^[25] Here the language unmistakably suggests that the sophist is now dredging the philosophical graveyard for those unutterable and unthinkable items along the path that Parmenides bade us not to follow. For his part, Ktesippus gives the required answers to both questions so that Euthydemus can slide to a third. Introducing the notions of performance and making , he asks whether anyone "could perform an act so as to make things which are nowhere actually exist."^[26] When Ktesippus offers up his third straight denial, Euthydemus has established all the preliminaries he needs for constructing his refutation.

What about our rhetoricians, whenever they speak

before the people

, aren't they performing

?

Yes of course they are performing, he said.

Well then, if they perform, do they also make

?

Yes.

Then is speaking

both to perform and to make

?

He agreed.

Then, he said, no one speaks things which are not (

), for in speaking he would at that moment make something. And you have admitted that no one can make that which is not (

)—and so according to your own argument no one speaks falsely

, but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks the truth and things which are

.
     (284 B 8-C 6)

Shifting to a concrete case of speaking, Euthydemus counters the "nowhere" of his earlier question by submitting a locus before the people. For performers of speech acts, he offers rhetoricians, those members of the polis who are perhaps most notorious for false speaking. But his focus here is on the simple act of performance . Once Ktesippus agrees that those who speak before the people do in fact perform, Euthydemus draws out another implication in speech acts; those who speak are also makers or producers of speech. From here he goes on to force Ktesippus to agree that to speak is both to perform and to make—a necessary conclusion, especially given that the artic-

ular infinitive indicates prima facie that an activity, performed and produced, is under observation. With Ktesippus' agreement to this point, Euthydemus has all he needs to round off (E5). Things which are not cannot be spoken, since the mere act of speaking is to perform and hence to make or to produce linguistic facts (). And Ktesippus has agreed, as Euthydemus reminds him, that "no one can make that which is not" into something which actually exists. Then, linking the attempt to speak "things which are not" to "false speaking," Euthydemus concludes that "no one speaks falsely," as if this were the necessary outcome of Ktesippus' own argument.^[27] Finally, applying this conclusion to the particular case, Euthydemus "proves" that his brother need not strive to speak things which are, but merely speak, and then abracadabra: Dionysodorus is not only acquitted of false speaking; he has also spoken what is true and real.

Again granting the argument's general validity but denying its particular application, Ktesippus responds directly to the point at issue: "Yes indeed, Euthydemus, that is, in a sense he speaks things which are , yet he does not, of course, speak how they really hold ." Ktesippus is willing to grant that in a sense—in fact in the sense just outlined by Euthydemus—Dionysodorus speaks things which are. His verbal utterances do of course exist in that they are spoken words, performed and made by a speaker. But the mere act of speaking does not guarantee that the sophist has spoken how the facts really hold.^[28] For Ktesippus can argue that, since Dionysodorus has failed to utter speech () that pictures or corresponds to the true state of affairs (), his words are simply false. By calling them false, however, he would not mean, as Euthydemus has tried to suggest, that Dionysodorus' remarks are absolutely nonexistent. Ktesippus need not be suggesting that the sophist has made the absurd attempt to utter the unutterable "things which are not." Falsehoods can have a quasi-existence at least in the sense that they are other than or different from truly articulated states of affairs. Even though in standard Greek idiom the real and the true are often conjoined, this union need not hold in every particular case of speaking, especially since in (E4) and (E5) Euthydemus has intentionally distorted language in order to make a blatantly false accusation appear to be a true statement of the facts. Once again, then, Ktesippus has warded off defeat when he appeared to be on the very brink of refutation.

At this point one might have the vague feeling that Euthydemus is guilty of a self-contradictory attempt to refute Ktesippus' opinion on the real reality of falsehood by demonstrating, of all things, that it is a false opinion. At any rate, after five disputes we can clearly isolate one feature of eristic arguments, namely their susceptibility to suffer what they dish out. For example, were the general conclusions of (E4) and (E5) really sound, then Ktesippus could pull the chair out from under Euthydemus by arguing that he too spoke the truth and things which are when he indicted Dionysodorus for an impious falsehood; and he will complete such argumentative reversals later in his aristeia (298 B 4-300 D 9). But at this early stage of his eristification, Ktesippus is still too passionately attached to the content of the discourse to see such contradictory implications.

As for the brothers, if we can resist the natural urge to hold them in contempt, we can gain a new appreciation for what they are trying to accomplish. In particular, we should marvel at how skillfully Euthydemus has disguised the fact that he was all along providing a defense of his brother's action. In (E4) he gave us no clue that he was even disputing about a past event until he suddenly sprang his brother's name and finished with "he says nothing false against you." Similarly, in (E5), only after he concluded generally that no one speaks falsely and then alluded to the particular case of his brother, did it become apparent that Euthydemus was again seeking to dear Dionysodorus from Ktesippus' indictment. Clearly, then, it has been the brothers' strategy from the beginning to maneuver Ktesippus into the stronger position and to make him the champion of truth and right. Consequently, if he should prove unable to defend this naturally superior position against these various acts of subterfuge, then his defeat would seem to reflect his own lack of verbal skill, a deficiency for which he himself may be held responsible. Correspondingly, if the brothers should demonstrate that their weaker arguments can defeat the stronger, then they would produce a stunning example of their superior verbal skill. After suffering several such defeats, Ktesippus is supposed to conclude that he must at any price acquire eristic, that powerful instrument for ensuring success in all forms of argument. In this sense, then, it can be said that the brothers are producing an advertisement for their eristic wisdom which is designed to persuade potential customers to take the first step toward virtue as they conceive it. But what is the real nature of virtue in this context? It

can be nothing more than excellence in the art of controversy, a kind of verbal knack that corresponds to the true method of dialectic in much the same way as popular rhetoric does to genuine philosophy.^[29]

On Speaking Badly of the Bad (D6) (284 C 9-285 A 1)

Ktesippus has successfully blocked Euthydemus' line of attack, but at the same time he has provided another trigger for the next dispute. Seizing upon (a notoriously ambiguous word in Greek) and the verb , Dionysodorus asks: "What do you mean , Ktesippus, are there individuals who speak things, how they hold ( )?" To consider "how things hold" may lead one to examine in what sense or way things exist. In fact, Dionysodorus' question "what do you mean" reveals that he must first establish how things hold with Ktesippus, that is, establish the truth content of his discourse before he can anchor him to a position.^[30] If the sophist seriously intended to examine "how things hold," he might open up the possibility of establishing degrees, or at least differences, in the reality of things and language. If he and Ktesippus were to continue to establish such distinctions, the exclusive antinomies between true and false, real and unreal, even the intentional obfuscation in words and their referents—the now familiar tricks of the brothers—would have to give way. But having no intention of allowing such an inquiry to take place, Dionysodorus moves quickly to entice his adversary into affirming that there do in fact exist individuals who speak how things hold. And Ktesippus, who is still angry about the falsehood concerning his relationship with Kleinias, not only agrees to this, but also adds significantly that those who do so are good men and truth-tellers, a clear reference to the way in which the sophist himself should speak about things. But this additional qualification contributes more to the controversy than Ktesippus had intended. For now Dionysodorus has all he needs to launch the next attack:

What about this? he said. Do good things hold well

, and bad things hold badly

?

He agreed.

And do you agree that good men speak how things hold (

)?

I agree.

Therefore

, he said, good men speak badly (

) of bad things

, Ktesippus, if they speak how they hold

.
     (284 D 2-7)

In his first question Dionysodorus toys with the verb hold and its use with the adverbs well and badly, a Greek idiom that translates into English as the verb to be with its predicate. So the sophist is asking, in effect, whether good things are good and bad things are bad . To this obvious tautology Ktesippus readily assents. But schooled as we have been by (D3), we should note that Dionysodorus has cleverly positioned "badly" at the end of its colon, already suggesting that he intends to twist this item for his refutation. As yet unaware of any trick, however, Ktesippus affirms not only this question, but also the next, when Dionysodorus asks him whether good men speak how things hold. Now the sophist has his opponent right where he wants him. With his inference (indicated by ), Dionysodorus swings the adverb "badly" from its use with "hold" to its use with "speak," where it now translates "good men speak badly." With this simple move, then, he equivocates on two senses of : to speak critically and to speak poorly .^[31] Thus, it is his strategy to reduce Ktesippus to absurdity by forcing him to accept the unacceptable conclusion that good men speak badly—that is, they are poor speakers—because they are required to speak of bad things, how they are. But quick to see through this trick, Ktesippus immediately closes for a counterattack. Acknowledging a particular case in which good men do indeed speak badly, namely when they "criticize" bad men, he quite unambiguously cautions Dionysodorus about the possibility that good men may speak "badly" of him. Here, in this brilliant display of his own talent for verbal controversy, Ktesippus applies the pivotal expression of the argument, "speaking badly," to the sophist himself and thereby points out yet another aspect of the falsehood problem: intentional falsehoods, such as those employed by Dionysodorus and his brother, involve the stigma of moral censure whenever they are detected.

Quickly rallying to his brother's defense (as indeed he must or else risk losing the argument), Euthydemus contributes to the badinage by reworking the old sophistic trick of confounding the seriousness of

one's opponent by ridicule.^[32] Ktesippus has emphatically expressed his serious commitment to the debate by the personal nature of his reply. Euthydemus now mocks that seriousness by playfully extending the equivocal formula "speaking badly of the bad" to "speaking mightily of the mighty" and "hotly of the hot ." In this way he not only averts his brother's defeat but also makes Ktesippus' acceptance of the formula appear absurd. But Ktesippus counters this trick by using the sophist's final words as a trigger for another display of his ingenuity. Converting the expression "hotly of the hot" into its opposite, "coldly of the cold ," he accurately criticizes the sophist-pair for the frigidity of their discourse and character.^[33] The brothers are now in trouble and they know it. So, taking Ktesippus' remark as if it applied personally to himself, Dionysodorus emphatically denounces him for indulging in verbal abuse . And it would, of course, be undignified for eristic masters like Euthydemus and his brother to respond to abuse!

We have come full circle. Ktesippus entered the repartee by reproaching Dionysodorus for uttering a false accusation, a charge that Euthydemus attempted to refute. Dionysodorus has just launched a charge of his own against Ktesippus who, in turn, must move quickly to defend himself. Now regardless of how inappropriate it is for Dionysodorus to indict another for abuse, still we must acknowledge that he has here taught us something about eristic: any form of play, and especially the play of eristic dueling, can easily degenerate into an unfriendly form of competition. Consequently, every eristic worth his salt must have a way to parry all such hostile counterattacks. So, by indicting Ktesippus on the forensic commonplace that an aggressive young man, when fired by anger, is likely to abuse his elders, Dionysodorus has shown how he can give his indictment, if not truth, at least plausibility in this context.^[34] But apart from the excesses of Ktesippus' character that have established the likelihood of Dionysodorus' charge of abuse, we can also see that the young man possesses outstanding philosophical qualities as well. In three successive arguments he has demonstrated his skill at controversy, the quickness of his intelligence, and his ability to hit upon important qualifications at the core of the falsehood problem. Even in his abuse, and in his claim to esteem Dionysodorus and to warn him as a comrade, Ktesippus has shown how firmly he is committed to facts, to people, and to

truth-telling, especially where his relationship with Kleinias is concerned. But now, at the close of (D6), he is reduced to defending himself, laboring to distinguish that abuse with which he is charged from what he fancies he is actually doing, attempting to admonish and to persuade Dionysodorus not to assert so rudely that he wishes Kleinias to perish. And how do things hold with the brothers? For the most part, they have emerged from this round of controversy unscathed.

Interlude (285 A 2-D 6)

In the first episode the brothers contradicted and refuted Kleinias in a stunning advertisement for their wisdom. Now, in another exhibition, after guiding Ktesippus through three eristic disputes, they have finally reached an impasse. At this crucial juncture Socrates intervenes and in fact must intervene to prevent a further disintegration of the conversation.^[35] He begins by playing with Ktesippus, coaxing him to accept what the foreigners have to say and not to differ over a mere word .^[36] Then, illustrating this advice by himself equivocating on the offending term, Socrates reinterprets "perish" to mean the removal of undesirable moral qualities and thus successfully counters Dionysodorus' earlier shift in the context by transferring this key concept from physics back to ethics. Next, recalling the original boast of the brothers, that they possess the power to make a man good, Socrates continues to redirect Ktesippus away from a debate about mere words to an inquiry into the reality of moral transformation.^[37] Finally, he closes by generously offering to become Dionysodorus' interlocutor, thereby himself risking whatever else the sophist may conjure up.^[38] Here, then, Socrates has provided much-needed refreshment. He has seemingly put the discourse back on track and even offered hope that he may join with Dionysodorus in a serious discussion.

But the direct confrontation between eristic and dialectic is not forthcoming. Ktesippus is not about to give up his role in the controversy. Still upset by the charge of abuse, he begins to justify his behavior by insisting that he is not angry (though of course we know he is),^[39] but simply contradicting what in his opinion Dionysodorus speaks falsely. Then he urges the sophist "not to call contradiction ( ) abuse; for abuse is something different" (285 D 4-6). Here Ktesippus has uncovered a significant problem.

Abuse and contradiction can be near synonyms, and what is contradiction to one person can easily be abuse to another.^[40] What is needed at this point to prevent misunderstanding and so save the discussion is a clear statement of the intentions of the speakers. Thus Ktesippus is quite right to begin by distinguishing between these two words. But no sooner does he utter the word contradiction than he finds himself embroiled in another controversy. For undaunted as ever, Dionysodorus leaps upon the trigger word and releases the inescapable question: "Do you, Ktesippus, he said, make arguments () on the assumption that contradiction is real ( )?"^[41]

Before turning to the dispute itself, we can profit by noting how Dionysodorus succeeds in continuing the game of eristic controversy. Like the expression accuse falsely, the trigger word contradiction is at home in a forensic environment. In fact, the noun frequently means a trial at which one party is expected to deny or to gainsay the accusations of the other. It is in this sense, then, that Ktesippus has just "contradicted" Dionysodorus. In fact, a close look at his actual language shows how carefully Ktesippus has restricted the entire context of his response; he says: "I am not angry, but just contradicting in reference to what in my judgment he speaks falsely in reference to me " (285 D 3-4).^[42] But now, directing his attack against the word , Dionysodorus shifts the context from the sphere of forensic debate to that of philosophical controversy, and then moves to entice Ktesippus into defending the intuitively superior position.^[43]

Finally, in order to observe the unity of this episode, we must remember that the contradiction over Kleinias stands behind the action of this episode. Ktesippus wants him to become wise and not to be ignorant. Dionysodorus, on the other hand, has argued that Ktesippus wants him to be destroyed. They have disputed over the same state of affairs to such a degree that both have leveled charges against each other. Now here, where a contradiction has emerged over Kleinias, where neither disputant has said the same thing, but both have spoken differently on the same topic, Dionysodorus injects into the debate an argument designed to disprove what in reality is going on at the very moment.^[44] The contradiction over Kleinias (serious for Ktesippus, playful for Dionysodorus) has culminated in a dispute about the very principle of contradiction itself. And so eristic play rolls on.

On the Impossibility of Contradiction (D7) (285 D 7-286 B 6)

That the brothers are completely at variance with the obvious facts of reality is a problem that certainly does not disturb them. This discrepancy between the real and the apparent, which they themselves have engendered, continues to promote the very existence of their activity. At the very least, it guarantees opposition which allows them to trick opponents into advocating theses which they can attack. With Kleinias and Ktesippus, all the two sophists did was contradict and attempt to produce refutations. Now, by denying the very possibility of what they have done, Dionysodorus may seem to have undermined their former accomplishments. But more precisely he has finally and unambiguously revealed that formerly they only appeared to contradict and to produce refutations, whereas in reality they have merely sought to display their eristical powers.^[45]

In this present dispute it would be inaccurate to say that Dionysodorus entices his opponent into advocating the positive thesis, for Ktesippus aggressively and emphatically embraces the possibility of contradiction. He even asks whether the sophist will himself affirm the negative thesis, that contradiction is impossible (285 E 1-2). But rather than take the bait, Dionysodorus taunts the young man with his inability to demonstrate that a contradiction has ever taken place between two interlocutors. For his part, Ktesippus does not miss the opportunity to offer himself as someone who can demonstrate the reality of contradiction by himself contradicting Dionysodorus. So Dionysodorus, taking him up on this boast, issues the challenge: "Am I to understand that you could uphold an account of this ()?" When Ktesippus affirms his willingness to do just that, both parties in the dispute (and not just the sophists) are privy to each other's intentions for the first time. Ktesippus is consciously attempting to uphold a thesis against the questioning of an attacker, and the goal of this dispute is to win. But before Dionysodorus moves to the argument proper, he tests his opponent with two preliminary questions (285 E9-286 A 3): he asks whether there are that correspond to things which are, and whether each particular that so corresponds states "how" or "that" a thing is, a point that, Dionysodorus reminds Ktesippus, has already been proved.^[46] Not seeing how an assent to these two questions can render contradiction impos-

sible, Ktesippus agrees.^[47] The verbal assault itself is a clever parody of an argument that seeks to defeat an opponent's thesis by appearing to exhaust all possible conditions under which it can hold:

(1) Would we contradict

, he said, if we should both speak an account of the same thing (

), or in such a case wouldn't we obviously say the same things

?

He went along.
     (286 A 4-7)

In this first question Dionysodorus presents a set of conditions under which we do not contradict. If both speakers should speak the same account of the same thing, then to be sure there would be no contradiction. They would both speak one and the same account and thus would attain agreement. But obviously this sense of agreement turns on what Ktesippus has granted to Dionysodorus: that a single corresponds to each thing. When, however, two speakers should reach this kind of agreement, an agreement in the strictest possible sense, they would quite literally use the same words, thereby creating the picture of talking machines that just mimic each other (cf. 298 D 1-6). But needless to say, inasmuch as eristic is an adversarial form of argumentation from its very inception, it cannot attain significant agreement in this or any other sense.

(2) Or, when neither of us speaks an account of a thing, he said, at that time would we contradict, or under these circumstances would neither of us even mention the thing at all?

On this point too he agreed.
     (286 A 7-B 3)

After toying with the notion of strict sameness in language, Dionysodorus now flips the attack to the other side of the dilemma and proposes a case in which neither speaker speaks an account of the thing. Under these conditions there can be no contradiction, for neither of the two would even mention the object about which they might contradict each other. Contradiction requires at the very least that one person speak (/ dicere ) against (/ contra ) another. But in this instance both interlocutors are so far from speaking against each other as not even to speak. Here Dionysodorus has again articulated

something that is true and simple. Silence cannot possibly generate verbal contradiction.^[48] Yet here too we see the joke that is being played on eristic. As an adversarial form of questioning eristic cannot allow itself to be silenced. In fact, in eristic controversy, silence betokens defeat.

(3) Well then, whenever I speak an account of a thing, and you speak an account of some other thing, at that time do we contradict, or do I speak about the thing, and you don't speak at all, and how could he who doesn't speak contradict a speaker ?
     (286 B 3-6)

By bouncing the argument back and forth between the poles of strict sameness and difference, Dionysodorus has eliminated two ways that contradiction can occur. Now, in his third and final move, he cunningly seeks to discover contradiction between the extremes. Positing a case in which both of them speak, but each speaks a different account of two different things, Dionysodorus asks: "at that time do we contradict?" But not waiting for a response, he goes on to explain in the form of a question why in fact they do not contradict. Characterizing the case thus imagined as one in which he speaks about his topic but Ktesippus doesn't "speak at all" [about it], Dionysodorus concludes rhetorically: "And how could a nonspeaker contradict a speaker?" In the end, then, Dionysodorus' sojourn into the middle between extremes describes a situation in which one person speaks and the other does not. And here, too, there is no contradiction.

Contradiction requires at the very least both sameness and difference. It requires that two different speakers perform the same act of speaking, but in different words about the same topic. By juggling several senses of sameness and difference, Dionysodorus has created the illusion that contradiction is impossible, and this too when it is clear to all that both Dionysodorus and Ktesippus have been engaged for some time in a heated and abusive contradiction over Kleinias. Furthermore, it should be obvious that in speaking against the possibility of contradiction Dionysodorus is in fact refuted the moment he meets a stubborn opponent who does not allow himself to be silenced; for the opposition itself is all the proof necessary for the continued possibility of contradiction.^[49] But Ktesippus, not aware that a simple yet obstinate denial to Dionysodorus' final question again proves the real-

ity of contradiction, suffers the one thing he cannot afford to suffer in an eristic dispute. He is reduced to silence, to a nonspeaker (). So once again eristic play rolls on, and the question naturally arises, can these two verbal machines be made to stop? Enter Socrates.

The Refuters Refuted (286 B 7-288 A 7)

Ktesippus' defeat hastens the return of Socrates, who immediately identifies this argument as a fossil buried in the graveyard of philosophy before the time of Protagoras.^[50] Aware of its anatreptic power to refute others, he also claims that the refutes itself, the truth of which he anticipates learning from Dionysodorus. To begin his inquiry, he moves to establish that (D7), the argument that the sophist has used to reject the possibility of contradiction, is a mere corollary to the falsehood topic; he asks: "Are you saying that false speech is impossible? For this is the meaning of your argument, isn't it? Either a speaker speaks the truth or doesn't speak? [Dionysodorus] agreed" (286 C 6-9). Here, we must not underestimate the importance of the sophist's agreement. With just this first question Socrates has uncovered a position that Dionysodorus wants to support.^[51] In effect, Socrates has maneuvered him into arguing that a speaker speaks the truth, or simply does not speak. A nonspeaker may perhaps make "noise," as is the case when someone beats a bronze pot, but all that are are true.^[52] In fact, they must all be positive ; for in a , no one can even say "how" or "that" a thing is not ().^[53] It is this eristic stance toward the unreality of negative statements that Socrates now proceeds to parody in his cross-questioning by eliciting from Dionysodorus a string of "is not" implications that are tied to the falsehood topic (286 D 1-10); they are, in due order, the impossibility of opining falsely , of false opinion , of ignorance , and of ignorant individuals . Any on one of these problems could have provided the locus for (D7). The fact that they have not, and that, instead, the impossibility of contradiction rose to prominence, furnishes additional evidence—were additional evidence still needed—that eristic is not driven by the wheel of logical necessity, but by accident. The immediate cause of (D7) is simply the trigger word contradiction , and by having Ktesippus innocently release it and Dionysodorus

eagerly pounce upon it, Plato confirms that (D7) is only a paradigm or model dispute likely to arise during the course of an eristic debate when experts in contentious argument, oblivious to proper philosophical method, just drift back and forth between the beginnings and ends of argument.

To cap his line of questioning, Socrates cannot resist injecting into the debate a disjunctive question that seeks to discover whether the sophist is playful or serious:

Are you just arguing for the sake of argument, Dionysodorus, in order to state a paradox, or truly in your opinion is no one ignorant?^[54]

Well, it's up to you to refute the position, he said.
     (286 D 11-E 1)

Socrates wants to know whether Dionysodorus is willing to commit himself to the seemingly outlandish position that no individual is ignorant,^[55] or is he simply arguing theses, indulging as it were in philosophical sport. But this apparently reasonable question turns out to be powerless to disturb the sophist's universe of discourse. For what continues to safeguard the possibility of this eristic activity, and in particular what allows Dionysodorus to challenge Socrates on this very topic, is the entire epideictic context that permits eristics to argue merely for the sake of argument.^[56] This context not only sanctions but even assists in constructing a linguistic environment in which the participants can contradict each other without themselves being committed to the truth content of their own words.^[57] It ensures that conventional politeness will govern the behavior of the speakers, and it even permits Dionysodorus to call a foul when Ktesippus threatens to shatter that politeness with moral censure. But to the dismay of Socrates, this context can also prevent the discussion from attaining the ethical seriousness that is characteristic of true protreptic debate. In fact, in eristic controversy lack of commitment to the truth and the absence of ethical seriousness can actually aid the debaters by creating that much-needed distance from the subject matter that allows them to concentrate on the mechanics of their argumentative style and on the overall grace of their performance. And here we arrive at an important observation: for Plato, philosophy can degenerate into its antithesis whenever the interlocutors in a philosophical discussion begin to

argue merely for the sake of argument , that is, whenever they turn philosophy into play, into an epideictic activity designed merely to produce an exhibition of their argumentative powers.^[58]

What is more, as Socrates continues to discover, even to suggest that the brothers are indulging in argument for the sake of argument is an improper comment on argumentative procedures and provokes an immediate and caustic challenge from Dionysodorus: "Well, it's up to you to refute the position."^[59] So Socrates takes up the challenge and presses harder: "And is refutation possible, according to your argument, if no one speaks falsely?" Even the eristic elenchus itself, as Socrates is now suggesting, advances on the ground that false speaking is possible, and so it too must assume that there exists a class of entitles, real in some sense, that falsely attempt to assert what is not.^[60] Dionysodorus is now in trouble, and his brother comes to the rescue. Refutation is impossible , Euthydemus admits, and therefore Dionysodorus did not just now bid what is impossible; for how could anyone bid what is not (286 E 4-7)? Finally, Socrates has had enough. He must confess that he simply cannot understand and so fix in his mind these "wise " and "well-established " positions.^[61] But their arguments do hold together well enough for him to see one more implication of the falsehood topic. So, gathering together the results of his cross-questioning (286 D 1-10), he asks: "If it is impossible to speak falsely, to opine falsely, and to be ignorant, then must it also follow that it is impossible to err in action" (287 A 1-3)? When Dionysodorus smugly accepts this consequence as well, Socrates can at last advance his version of the inescapable question:

Now here finally, I said, is my clownish question. If we do not fall into error either when we act or when we speak or when we think, if this is so, then, in the name of Zeus, of what have you come here to teach? Or didn't you boast just now to impart virtue best of men to anyone who is willing to learn?
     (287 A 6-B 1)

The final "is not" implication of the falsehood , the impossibility of error, as Socrates is just now hastening to point out, undermines any claim on the part of the brothers to teach virtue because it eliminates the need for any science of ethics. If we do not err in thought, speech, and action, then the sophists are without both subjects and subject matter to teach.^[62] So Socrates' clownish question is in

reality inescapable, if, indeed, the brothers will grant that any questions, save their own of course, can be inescapable.^[63] Instruction in virtue, then, the field that offers the two foreigners a legitimate excuse for being in Athens, and in particular for mixing with young men in the wrestling facility, has now been so devalued as not to be the field of inquiry at all, but simply one on the same level as others, valuable only insofar as it can offer topics for eristic sport. In other words, for eristic all propositions, even ethical ones, are of equal value or, still worse, are of no value at all unless they can be converted into weapons for verbal combat.

But the full impact of Socrates' inescapable question does not strike its target. Instead of answering, Dionysodorus brushes aside his former boast to impart virtue and launches into a polemic of his own. Treating Socrates as if he were some obtuse late learner, Dionysodorus chastises him in the form of a question by asking whether he has become such an old Kronos that he now passes time recollecting what was said at first , but "cannot cope with what is being said at the present moment ." The sudden appearance here of this slam at anamnesis, rolling so cavalierly off Dionysodorus' tongue, should provoke laughter from those who can marvel at the hilarious way in which Plato is spoofing on his own teaching. But apart from the playfulness of this passage, we must note that in any form of cross-questioning, and especially in eristic dueling, where consistency in reasoning is not required, someone is likely to say: "Doesn't what you say now contradict what you said before?"^[64] Prepared for this type of objection, Dionysodorus has just now illustrated how an eristical dodge can ward off the consistency requirement for argument. But what would happen if these two sophists should be allowed to parry all such objections in this manner, and Socrates, on the other hand, should be powerless to recall earlier claims and contrast them to what is now being said? Does this mean that eristic and its two-headed representative are indeed unstoppable? Not necessarily; but we can now see that Socrates' clownish yet inescapable question is unable to penetrate the bombast of this sophist, once he has gained dominance over the universe of discourse. For that penetration Socrates will have to destroy eristic in a far more dramatic and devastating fashion.

In his haste to escape from Socrates' elenchus, Dionysodorus has left another opening for attack. Using his ability to discern (near) syn-

onyms, Socrates asks the sophist what sense the phrase , "cannot cope," can possibly have , if not the unacceptable "cannot refute." Cornered again, Dionysodorus immediately intuits his task: he must regain control of the line of questioning without having to answer his opponent. So, resorting to yet another dodge, he grasps for a trigger in order to wrestle away the role of questioner from Socrates and then issues the eristic demand to answer. But now the falseness of eristic diplomacy cannot be more transparent. For at last Socrates challenges him directly by asking on what principle he chooses to answer or not to answer, if, indeed, he does so on any principle, save the recognition, of course, that in this particular case an answer guarantees defeat. Out of options and desperate, Dionysodorus responds with another insult backed by commands, making it clear that he is going to force Socrates, in accordance with no principle, to become the respondent for his next attack. Caught in the jaws of necessity , Socrates invites Dionysodorus to take command of the .

On Whether Phrases Have Sense (D8) (287 D 7-E 4)

Is it by virtue of being alive

that things which have sense sense

or can lifeless things

sense?

Things which are alive.

Then do you know, he said, any phrase

that is alive

?

No indeed I do not.

Then why did you ask me just now

what sense my phrase had

?

Why else, I said, than because I erred through my stupidity (

), or did I not err but speak correctly, when I said that phrases have sense?
     (287 D 7-E 4)

Earlier, at 287 C 1, Socrates used to cap and in so doing shifted from something like "what are you saying " to "what sense does this phrase have. " In that context he was referring to the sense or meaning of the sophist's expression "cannot cope" with the argument; and there he was suggesting that it might be just a synonym for "cannot refute." But now, under pressure from Socrates' elenchus, Diony-

sodorus has been forced to search for a trigger word and generate an inescapable question. Seizing upon to form the substantive "things which have sense ," he begins the sortie by asking whether they "sense " by virtue of being alive or can lifeless things sense. In this context, "things which have sense" quite naturally refers to living creatures ; accordingly, the equivocal must shift from the "sense" of a phrase to the "sense" of sentient beings. In short, with just his first question the sophist has perverted "meaning" and "signification," not to mention the activity of soul, for his combative purpose.^[65]

But Socrates continues to play his role in the game and affirms the obviously correct alternative that things which have sense are alive. With his second question Dionysodorus returns to the place from which he drew , snatches up another item, , and then attacks his opponent by asking whether he knows "any phrase that is alive? And here too Socrates gives the obviously correct answer, that he knows no such phrase. To conclude, Dionysodorus links "the phrase" with the now incompatible "sense" and asks rhetorically how Socrates could ever be so foolish as to ask "just now what sense his phrase had." Arguing, therefore, that a phrase, since it is lifeless , cannot possibly have any "sense," Dionysodorus has apparently created the illusion that by persistently returning to the topic of refutation Socrates has all along been trying to raise, quite literally, a dead issue. Finally, the sophist applies one more brilliant stroke of eristic subterfuge. At 287 A 9, Socrates referred to the fact that the brothers had "just now " claimed to impart virtue. But Dionysodorus caused that claim to appear to have been said at first , and then proceeded to rebuke Socrates for his inability to cope with the immediate argument . Now, at the close of (D8), he cleverly slips into his final question the temporal indicator "just now," fancying that he has thereby illustrated to perfection the eristic demand to cope with what is being said at the present moment. To all appearances, then, Dionysodorus has slipped from Socrates' grasp and produced a knock-down argument.

At this critical moment in the second eristic Socrates initiates the wiliest counterattack yet witnessed in the Euthydemus . Just as the expert in the pancration hedges from his position in order to upset the balance of an overly aggressive adversary and thus gain leverage for a fall, so too Socrates appears to lose an argument in order to win the

argument and counters Dionysodorus' quibble on with a devastating takedown. The sophist committed a tactical error when he finished (D8) with a question rather than a statement of victory. For unlike Ktesippus, Socrates is not silenced but is more than willing to respond and even to offer the reason for his folly: "I erred through my stupidity, or did I not err but speak correctly, when I said that phrases have sense?" When Socrates pinpoints the source of his mistake in stupidity, there is more in his response than self-depreciation. Earlier Dionysodorus not only denied the existence of ignorance and of ignorant individuals, but also challenged Socrates to refute him on this very point (286 E 1). Now, casting himself in the role of an ignoramus, and submitting ignorance as the cause of his incorrect speech, Socrates gladly admits to his error. But he also offers another possibility: "Or did I not err but speak correctly, when I said that phrases have sense?" On this possibility he was correct from the beginning. So finally Socrates has the sophist right where he wants him and, accordingly, releases the inescapable question:

What is it going to be? Are you saying that I'm wrong or not? For if I didn't make a mistake, you will not refute me for all your wisdom, nor are you coping with this argument. But if I was wrong, then not even so are you speaking correctly when you allege that error is impossible. And I'm not addressing these remarks to what you said a year ago.
     (287 E 4-288 A 2)

Zeno had supplied eristic sophistry with one of its chief weapons, the reductio ad absurdum , which refutes an opponent's position by asserting that it involves a dilemma, either horn of which leads to a contradiction. The brothers have already made ample use of this procedure earlier against the young Kleinias; and so it is only fitting that Socrates now turns this tactical weapon back upon them. To pin Dionysodorus to a position, he uses the alternative question to determine whether an error was committed, a question that appeals to the simple fact of error. As the bare Eleatic dilemma must indicate, either' an error was committed or it was not committed , and if it was, then it was an error of false speech, ruled out of existence as early as (E4). With this move, then, Socrates has firmly and finally anchored the sophist. Either answer to Socrates' disjunctive question involves Dionysodorus in a defeat, for, unlike the dichotomies of the

brothers, this one is real. If Socrates erred, then the error is complete and absolute. If not, then it is nonexistent. Here there is no middle ground, no degrees of erring, no tertium quid . If the first horn of the dilemma holds, that is, if Socrates did not err, then Dionysodorus will not refute him in (D8), the final outcome of which has yet to be decided; and for good measure, Socrates reminds him that he cannot cope with this argument. But if the other horn proves true, if Socrates did err, then the sophist speaks falsely when he alleges that error is impossible. Whichever way Dionysodorus answers, he will be refuted.^[66] Finally, Socrates caps this real refutation by pointing out that he has overcome the defect of his clownish question. He is now speaking directly to the point at issue and not to some remarks recollected from a year ago. But immediately upon pinning his opponent to the mat, Socrates is most circumspect not to make the defeat personal. It is the itself, he insists, that has been wrestled to the ground and remains right where he left it. In addition to its anatreptic power to known down others, the falsehood topic possesses an inherent weakness of its own that causes it to collapse and suffer defeat as an unwilling victim, the truth of which, as he predicted (286 C 5-6), he has learned from Dionysodorus himself; and not even the art of eristic, in spite of its precision in argument , has invented the means for overcoming this defect.^[67] The brothers have suffered a humiliating loss, as the main piece of their wisdom, the falsehood topic, has collapsed, and one might even suppose that they could not muster enough cheek to reappear after such a debacle. But the comic impulse of this dialogue will allow them, like a two-headed jack-in-the-box, to pop up again, unperturbed by their defeat and ready for the fifth and final episode.

Conclusion

Until this very moment when both error and truth are finally and unambiguously revealed, the brothers in an anatreptic frenzy have used arguments as weapons for knocking down others, as if they were pulling chairs out from under unsuspecting victims. Now the itself has become the instrument of their own destruction, and here, more than anywhere else, we catch a glimpse of Plato manipulating the strings of his two marionettes in order to assure us of the order behind eristic disorder. For what on the philosophical level is a stunning

example of an inescapable refutation is also a perfect illustration of a perennial feature of all comic action: comic inversion.^[68] Just as the comic playwright presents, for example, a robber robbed or a mugger mugged, so too Plato has presented the refuters refuted, and thus he unites both a philosophical and comic theme for a stunning conclusion to this third episode. But here, as elsewhere, when his satiric wit becomes most manifest, Plato undercuts the playful intention of his work by adding a disconcerting element. For when Socrates does not understate his position the way he did with his clownish question but assures the brothers that beyond doubt this refutation is both inescapable and directed immediately to the point at issue, he also succeeds in rousing Ktesippus from his silence. And this impulsive young man, though himself not yet able to refute the eristic-pair but fully capable of seeing the finality with which they have been crushed in argument, now seizes upon the opportunity to direct some cheerful words of abuse against these two foreign mountebanks.^[69] The specter of abuse , lurking just beneath the surface of the work ever since Ktesippus entered the fray, has now become a real threat, and Socrates must move quickly to soothe him before eristic play does indeed become serious.^[70]

The reader should no longer have a vague feeling that eristic is a self-contradictory method, susceptible to suffering what it dishes out. After Euthydemus and his brother have spoken falsely, opined falsely, displayed their ignorance, deliberately misrepresented the facts, and erred in thought, speech, and action, we can see how much Plato is telling us about what is not philosophical method and who are not philosophers. By portraying the brothers shifting radically from problems of learning and knowing to those of being and becoming, leaping gracelessly from truth claims to metaphysical propositions about being and nonbeing, punning inappropriately on ambiguous terms, dodging questions, forcing responses, and contradicting—in short, by portraying all the numerous antics of the brother-pair—Plato has demonstrated with extreme bluntness certain unmistakable characteristics that are designed to stigmatize a technique of argumentation that is diametrically opposed to his own.^[71] Linked to these philosophical themes are the dramatic symbols of the work, which have by now taken definite shape. Socrates is the teacher and protector of youth, the possessor and user of the protreptic method, one and serious like philosophy itself. Opposing him are the brothers,

fakirs and corruptors of youth, possessors and users of a negative, self-destructive elenchus by which they turn philosophy into a playful, epideictic activity. Clearly identified as the chorus leaders of the ignorant, the brothers now appear to be just as dissuasive as their arguments, whereas Socrates not only can persuade us to turn toward wisdom but is beginning to appear, insofar as it is possible, to be the wise man himself. Through the mere interplay of its dramatic symbols, then, the Euthydemus has helped to clarify the real nature of philosophical activity by revealing what we are to pursue and what to avoid.