Z

Zhang Bailin, 180 -182, 186

Zhang, Boquan, 55 , 68 , 71 , 72 , 80

Zhang, Chahu, 37 , 39 -42

Zhang Deyi, 56 , 71

Zhang Jian, 192 , 201 -202, 204 , 207 , 333

Zhang, Mianyang, 55 , 70 , 75

Zhang Yueqing, 268 , 274 , 275 -276, 278

Zhang Zhidong, 128 , 201

Zhang Zuolin, 220 , 221 , 227 , 228 , 235

Zhou, Fushi, 27 -28, 35 , 36 -37, 40

Zhou Shunqing, 126 -128, 132

Zhu Rui, 151 , 152 -153, 155

1. Mencius, 117.

2. There were a few exceptions to the principle of open access, namely certain base groups such as actors and entertainers, Guangdong boat people, Jiangnan beggar communities, and Anhui bond servants who were disqualified from the examinations. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 18-19.

3. Weber 1951, 107-108.

4. Balazs, 6.

5. Weber 1951, 13-20; Balazs, 66-78.

6. Hsiao-t'ung Fei 1953, 74.

7. Eberhard 1971, 71-75. Eberhard is unusual in seeing this much continuity in the Chinese elite. Most scholars see a significant shift from an aristocratic to an examination-based elite beginning in the mid-Tang dynasty (618-906); and usually the term "gentry" is reserved for the late imperial elite of the Ming and Qing dynasties.

8. T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, 2. This figure actually includes 1,282 counties (xian ) and 154 departments (zhou ). Because departments were virtually undistinguishable from counties in size and administrative level, we will normally refer only to counties. "County elites" means "county or department elites."

9. This figure was supplied by Robert Forster at the Banff conference. For a general picture of the French state under the ancien régime, see Mousnier, esp. vol. 2.

10. Wittfogel (1953), on the contrary, advanced the idea of a supremely strong Chinese state in his theory of "Oriental despotism" built on Marx's notion of an "Asiatic mode of production." Wittfogel's state based its power on control over waterworks and dominated a fragmented peasant society. Eberhard (1970) directly challenged this exaggeration of state power, pointing out that local leaders took responsibility for much of the water control.

11. T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, 168.

12. Chung-li Chang 1955, 71-141. The distinctions between upper gentry, lower gentry, and commoners have been debated by Chang, Ping-ti Ho and T'ung-tsu Ch'ü. For a summary of views on this issue and of the Chinese terms translated as gentry, see Min Tu-ki, 22-32.

13. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 52.

14. Marsh, 187-188.

15. Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan (Categorized substatutes and regulations of the Ming dynasty), cited in Oyama Masaaki, 130-131. On gentry landownership, see also the articles by Tanaka Masatoshi, Tsurumi Naohiro, and Shigeta Atsushi in Grove and Daniels. Mori Masao (1975-76) provides a quite comprehensive introduction to this literature. For more recent English summaries, see Mori Masao 1980; Grove and Esherick. Skocpol (p. 49) observes that competition between imperial states and landed elites to control peasant labor and surpluses from agriculture and trade occurred in Russia and France as well as China.

16. Shigeta Atsushi, 335-386. Shigeta treats essentially the same problem as English historians of the eighteenth century: how did the ruling gentry class maintain its dominance as a wage economy eroded the personal dependence inherent in more paternalistic relations between masters and manual laborers? (See E. P. Thompson 1974). We shall return to this problem in the concluding chapter.

17. Mori Masao 1980, 35-37, 47; Shigeta Atsushi, 337, 351.

18. Hymes 1986a.

19. Kuhn 1970, quotes from 213, 223.

20. Wakeman 1975a, 4, 8 and passim.

21. Mann 1987.

22. For a classic example, see Kung-chuan Hsiao.

23. Lapidus, 42.

24. Yung-teh Chow, 158-172, 220-225. Cf. Hsiao-t'ung Fei 1953; Hsiao-t'ung Fei and Chang Chih-i.

25. Beattie 1979a, 4.

26. Meskill 1979.

27. Schoppa 1982.

28. Rankin 1986.

29. Among the many collections of articles on capitalist sprouts are Nanjing daxue lishixi, ed. 1981 and 1983. More recent articles stressing the limits of capitalist development and a consolidation of the merchant and gentry classes include Huang Qichen and Ye Xian'en 1987. On some socioeconomic effects of Southeast Asian trade on Fujian and Guangdong, see Lin Xiangrui and Luo Yixing.

30. Naquin and Rawski; Ping-ti Ho 1954.

31. Gates, 241-281.

32. See Weber 1958, 180-195.

33. E. P. Thompson's (1978, 146-150) comments on class in eighteenth-century England would seem to, apply very well to China.

34. Swartz, 6, 8-10. The concept of "arena" is sometimes used interchangeably with "field" in the anthropological literature.

35. Bourdieu 1977, 171-183.

36. For an introduction to recent thinking on these matters in social anthropology, see Ortner, esp. 130, 145; and Vincent 1978 and 1986.

37. Kuhn 1970, 64-87, 102-104, chap. 4.

38. See Skinner 1977c. In a revision of this original scheme, Skinner (1985, 273) split Jiangxi from the Middle Yangzi to form a macroregion in its own right.

39. Detailed accounts of eighteenth-century society in each of Skinner's macro-regions appear in Naquin and Rawski, 138-216. For a theoretical discussion distinguishing economic cores and peripheries, see Schoppa 1982, chap. 1.

40. E.g., 23.6 percent of all jinshi came from the two Lower Yangzi provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu during the Ming and Qing. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 227-228, 246-247.

41 Gu Yanwu, Rizhi lu (1695), 10: 15a, cited in Oyama Masaaki, 103. Tenancy rates were lower in other parts of the Lower Yangzi, but still usually well above 50 percent.

42. For a picture of the Jiangnan elite of the Ming, see Wakeman 1985, 92-126. For the Qing, see Naquin and Rawski, 55-72, 147-158.

43. Wakeman 1985, 99n; Naquin and Rawski, 151; Ebrey 1983 and (for an earlier period) Walton.

44. Rankin 1986, 2-8, 45-46, 61-62.

45. Ibid., 3, 92-135; Mann, 94-120.

44. Rankin 1986, 2-8, 45-46, 61-62.

45. Ibid., 3, 92-135; Mann, 94-120.

46. Rankin 1986, 202-309; Schoppa 1982.

47. The Japanese literature on this process is extensive. See especially Muramatsu Yuji; Suzuki Tomoo. A forthcoming study by Kathryn Bernhardt will soon introduce this subject in English.

48. See Imahori Seiji 1956.

49. The classic works on this area are Freedman 1958 and 1966. On frontier conditions and lineage formation, see Freedman 1966, 162-166; Pasternak, 551-561. On the influence of official Confucian models, see Faure, 142-144, 149-165.

50. Lin Xiangrui, 61-72.

51. Rubie Watson 1985, 90.

52. Freedman 1966, 68-76, 82-85; Faure, 23-26, 111-113, 128-140.

53. Jing Su and Luo Lun, 106-153.

54. E.g., Shan xianzhi , 2:77a-77b.

55. For a discussion of the Shandong gentry, see Esherick 1987, 28-37. Sources for this calculation are indicated in that volume on pp. 347-348, n. 11. Life expectancies for juren are based on Chung-li Chang 1955, 122-125. For a similar calculation for the eighteenth century, see Naquin 1981, 29-32.

56. Philip Huang, 224-233; Esherick 1987, 238, 242.

57. Niida Noboru, et al., eds., 4:506. A communist organizer in Shandong similarly stressed ties of the local elites to the county officials during the war against Japan. Wang Yu-chuan, 87.

58. Perdue 1987, esp. 168-170, 226-227.

59. In twentieth-century Zhejiang local magistrates often pressed innovations in the periphery in contrast to elite leadership in the cores. Schoppa 1982, 102, 132-134, 187.

60. Ibid., 130-131; Yongkang xianzhi , 2:20b, 3:8a-11a.

59. In twentieth-century Zhejiang local magistrates often pressed innovations in the periphery in contrast to elite leadership in the cores. Schoppa 1982, 102, 132-134, 187.

60. Ibid., 130-131; Yongkang xianzhi , 2:20b, 3:8a-11a.

61. For a breakdown of types of frontiers and frontier cycles of development, see Von Glahn, 215-220. See also Rowe 1985, 251-252; and for the eighteenth century, Naquin and Rawski, 199-205, 226-227.

1. Wan Yan, 1:16a-b, 27a, 31b, 35a-36a; Li Yesi, 3:1a, 21a, 33b; Ningbo fuzhi, 17 :49a, 19:26a-27a, 20:62a-b, 29:4b; Hummel, 353-354, 803-804.

2. The political context of gentry hegemony is skillfully analyzed in Shigeta Atsushi, 335-385.

3. On Ningbo and its history, see Davis, 21-31; Shiba Yoshinobu 1977; Tsur. Other details are from Ningbo fuzhi and Yin xianzhi 1788.

4. My principal sources for degrees were Ningbo fuzhi, juan 17 (note that the first two names in the 1565 cohort were Yin natives, though not marked as such); Yin xianzhi I877: juan 23; Yinxian tongzhi , 1:319b-530b; Rankin 1986, 314.

5. Rankin 1986, 7.

6. Mann (1987, 90) has noted that the gazetteer section on filial paragons was where editors might place biographies of merchants, whose occupation did not recommend them for public commendation under any other category: an "umbrella of historical respectability shielding entrepreneurial offspring who stayed home to mind the family store."

7. Ningbo fuzhi , 24: 12a, 24a.

8. Quan Zuwang 1803, 2:4b. The two Sun lineages are listed on 12b-13a, although I have not been able to identify conclusively Sun E with either of them. I am grateful to Mi Chü Wiens of the Library of Congress for providing me with a photocopy of this work.

9. Yin xianzhi 1877, 43:20a, 46b; 44: 12b, 20b.

10. Ibid., 43:40b.

9. Yin xianzhi 1877, 43:20a, 46b; 44: 12b, 20b.

10. Ibid., 43:40b.

11. Yin men are not conspicuous in commercial circles: none of the most prominent Ningbo merchants who were active both at home and in Shanghai in the nineteenth century was a native of Yin. The merchants came from outlying counties like Zhenhai (Jones 1974, 84-85). In such places one finds families simultaneously pursuing banking and business interests and examination degrees; e.g., the Fangs: Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao , 733-734; Zhenhai xian xinzhi beigao , 27: 14b.

12. The one institution that overrode this principle was the yin privilege granting office to first- (and sometimes second-) generation progeny of high officials. Although much restricted from its use in earlier dynasties, the privilege was conferred on members of twenty-three Yin lineages in the Ming (Ningbo fuzhi , 17b: 46a-49a). On the yin privilege in the Song, see Davis, 16-17.

13. Robert Hartwell (1982, 419) has warned against overstating the openness of the elite in the Song, pointing out that elites manipulated the examination system to favor established families.

14. Ai Nanying, 7:26b. Ai (1583-1646) made this remark in an encomium to an acquaintance who was setting off to become registrar of Dinghai wei , a military district on Ningbo's offshore islands in the Zhoushan Archipelago.

15. Pan Guangdan, 94. The translation of the former is from Ping-ti Ho 1962: 166.

16. E.g., Ping-ti He, 1962; Marsh 1961.

17. In a parallel fashion, scholars of early modern Britain have argued that there was a high degree of continuity within the British elite. Membership in the elite changed considerably in certain areas of Britain, but elite families outside the

immediate political and commercial orbit of London tended to survive for many centuries (Holmes, 12, 231). The Civil War, once considered a major catalyst for the emergence of new gentry and the decline of old, may in fact have had only negligible impact: in south Wales three-quarters of the leading gentry families entering the eighteenth century had dominated local political office under the Tudors (Jenkins, 29, 42). High continuity among the greater English gentry into the nineteenth century has been most energetically argued in Stone and Stone. Their methodology and conclusions have been questioned in Spring and Spring, who argue that lower-level gentry pedigrees and marriage mask nouveaux-riches origins.

18. Beattie 1979b, 88; Dennerline 1981, 113; Hymes 1986b, 132, 133.

19. Walton, 36.

20. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 166-167.

21. Ebrey 1986, 41-42.

22. Yin xianzhi 1788, 1: 18a.

23. For the role of the gentry in creating lineage institutions during the Ming, see Brook 1988, 73-75, 78.

24. Early modern European elites by contrast sought to sustain their continuity through a wide range of strategies—law, marriage, entail, bachelor- and spinsterhood, birth control, and careful management of their fortunes. But they lacked the extended kinship ties that made the Chinese lineage, and its status-conscious strategies, possible. For Chinese elites, entail through primogeniture was unavailable and fertility restriction unacceptable. We are grateful to Robert Forster for pointing out this contrast.

25. Shiba Yoshinobu 1977, 434; Tsur, 18-19, 36-37; Cole 1986, 160; Zhang Xingzhou, 237.

26. Yin xianzhi 1788, 29, 31a, from an anthology of local verse by Li Yesi. On the four Song lineages, see Walton for the Lous and Davis for the Shis.

27. Pan Guangdan, 94-110.

28. My reconstruction is based on Quan Zuwang 1814 and the comprehensive lineage tables in Yinxian tongzhi, juan I. On the basis of these sources plus inferences from local writings, I have identified 198 lineages with Ming or Qing holders of the jinshi or juren degree. This survey is not complete because I have been unable to identify roughly one-quarter of Ming-Qing jinshi by lineage. A few surnames were particularly resistant to lineage identification (Chen, Wang, Xu, Ye, Yuan, Zhang, and Zheng).

29. I have excluded the Yingfang Chens and the Haohe Lings, each of whom garnered three jinshi plus several juren and gongsheng degrees, during and immediately after the Taiping Rebellion when degree quotas were eased; also the Geluo Mas, the Dali Wangs, and the Junziying Zhus, whose degrees were acquired within less than sixty years.

30. The data on these families are from Quan Zuwang 183, 8:566, 589, 687; Ningbo fuzhi , 20:46a, 59b, 78a; 24: 33b.

31. Williams 1977, 110.

32. Lu Hsün, 217. I thank Jonathan Lipman for calling my attention to this story.

33. Yin xianzhi 1788, 29:31b-32a.

34. A lack of genealogical data concerning the Zhu surname makes it difficult to

distinguish Zhu lineages. The Zhus in this verse are probably the Madong Zhus, Madong being just south of Jiangshan (the Chens' home village) in the southern part of the county.

35. Wan Yan, 2: 70a. For another reference to the importance of proximity in sustaining gentry friendships see Ningbo fuzhi , 26: 31b.

36. Yin xianzhi 1788, 18: 10b.

37. Ningbo fuzhi , 7a: 260, 30a-b; 7b: 21a; 10: 10b; 35: 36a; Yin xianzhi 1788, 25: 7a; Dinghai xianzhi , 6: 10a (see also 12a, 15b).

38. Ningbo fuzhi , 20: 45a; Yin xianzhi 1788, 27: 39b.

39. Tu Long, 4:14a.

40. Yongshan Lu shi Jingmu Tang zongpu , 3: 2b.

41. Quan Zuwang 1803, 8: 577.

42. Ibid., 8: 600. The Discarded Silk Society also excluded those who collaborated with the new regime. Chai Degeng, 102.

41. Quan Zuwang 1803, 8: 577.

42. Ibid., 8: 600. The Discarded Silk Society also excluded those who collaborated with the new regime. Chai Degeng, 102.

43. Yin xianzhi 1877, 43: 24a; Jiang Xueyong was a Heyi Jiang. For the "Eastern Zhejiang School," see Struve.

44. Concerning the Jiangjing Hui and Huang's relationship with the Dingyuan Wangs, see Elman, 115-117.

45. Wan Yan, 2: 70a; Ningbo fuzhi , 26: 26b; Yin xianzhi 1877, 41: 32b.

46. Kuhn 1970, 215-216; Rankin 1986, 93-97; Min Tu-ki, chaps. 4-5. Kuhn has shown how the mobilization of local militias (tuanlian ) against the Taipings made the power of the local gentry less informal. Gentry in Yin also formed anti-Taiping tuanlian (Yin xianzhi 1877, 44: 33a).

47. Mann, 83. Gentry operation of markets in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Shandong was confined to lower gentry, mainly shengyuan and jiansheng . Yamane Yukio, 558.

48. Yin xianzhi 1788, 29: 27a.

49. Yin xianzhi 1877, 43: 7a.

50. Rankin 1986, 106.

51. Zhou Rong, the leading Ningbo poet of the mid-seventeenth century, offered to take the place of his patron captured by pirates. The pirates accepted, then crippled Zhou to prevent him from escaping, which he later did anyway (Ningbo fuzhi , 26: 26b).

52. Yin xianzhi 1877, 43:9b.

53. Gentry patronage of Buddhist monasteries is treated in Brook (forthcoming). Shiba Yoshinobu (1977, 423) points out that most non-Buddhist urban temples and shrines in Yin were under the patronage of commercial and residential groups rather than the gentry.

54. Ningbo fuzhi , 9: 35b.

55. Yin xianzhi 1788, 2: 4a.

56. Ningbo fuzhi , 35: 28a, 36b; Zhou Daozun, 4: 12b.

57. Ningbo fuzhi , 10: 6b; Yin xianzhi 1877, 23: 23b. Zhaoshen (cemetery benefactures list) could be a typographical error for Zhaojia (degree list).

58. Sasaki Masaya, 185-299; Liu Guangjing, 354-359; Yinxian tongzhi , 1:447b-448a.

59. By the nineteenth century, a lineage possessing one or two lower degrees had little hope of rising into the greater gentry. The term gentry is stretched too far if one includes, for instance, a family in a 1927 genealogy that shows the lineage had acquired no more than one or two shengyuan degrees every few generations since its most recent juren degree in 1489. Yongshang Leigongqiao Wu shi jiapu, juan 3.

60. Liu Guangjing, 359. After the magistrate left Yin for a subsequent posting, local people raised a shrine in his honor. It was also the site of sacrifices in memory of Zhou Xiangqian, whose uprising had prompted the magistrate to deal with the tax inequity.

61. Kobayashi Kazumi (223-224), commenting on the involvement of lower elites in tax resistance, uses Zhou as an example of "rectifying the unfairness of the tax assessment administered by the county magistrate," although he does not mention Zhou's personal interest.

1. Throughout this chapter I follow Ebrey and Watson in using the term "lineage" to refer to a collection of agnates who were both conscious of their common descent and participated in some formal organizational structure on that basis. Although, as we shall see, all lineages discussed here had other organizational attributes as well, for my purposes the existence of a genealogy is itself sufficient demonstration of both collective consciousness and a minimal degree of organization. For my purposes the decision of the group to refer to itself as a "zu " or a "zong " (sometimes translated as "clan") is irrelevant. See Ebrey and Watson, "Introduction," 5-6.

2. See, for example, Beattie 1979b; Odoric Wou, 69-88.

3. Not all European elites practiced primogeniture, to be sure, and even in some regions where primogeniture predominated parents regularly found means to provide for daughters and younger sons, thus partially dividing their estate; see Goody, Thirsk, and Thompson, eds., 1976; Spring, ed., 1977. Nevertheless, it seems clear enough that partible inheritance was a far more general practice among the Chinese than the European elite. For one apparently exceptional area of China, see Rubie Watson's chapter in this volume.

4. The genealogies from adjacent counties are Feng (1946), Gui (1935), Han (1946), Liu (1924), Zhang (1948). The remaining nine, listed under "Abbreviations," are from Hanyang.

5. Except where specified, "Hanyang county" refers to the xian as it was constituted prior to the twentieth century. That is, it incorporates the city of Hankou, which was subsequently detached to become first a "special municipality" and then part of the combined metropolis of Wuhan. It also includes the area north of the Han River, which was detached in 1901 to form Xiakou county.

6. Taga Akigoro 1960; Genealogical Society of Utah, ed., 1983.

7. This section is based on a wide range of evidence, some of which is reported in Rowe 1984 and Rowe 1989.

8. A late nineteenth-century source lists twenty-three important markets (shiji ) in Hanyang county itself; Guangxu Hubei yudi ji , 5:22-23. For an enumeration of the major market towns in the broader Yangzi-Han confluence area as of 1800, see Zhang Xuecheng, 24:23-24. Representative of the burgeoning recent scholarship on lower Yangzi market towns is Fei Xiaotong, et al., vol. 1.

9. For example, Ling (1883), juan 3; Liu (1924), juan 1; Luo (1918), 20: 1.

10. Yao (1923), 15:2; Yao (1930), 2:1; Feng (1946), juan 1; Gui (1935), juan 1; Han (1946), juan 1; Liu (1932), preface, 11; Zhang (1921), 1:9, 12, 22.

11. Ye (1873), 4:25, 32; 15: 7; 16: 1. On the history of the Ye, I am also able to draw upon two manuscript studies produced in the People's Republic based upon locally held family records: Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance, undated, and Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance 1965.

12. For a survey, see Beattie 1979b, chap. 1.

13. For a discussion of this term, which appears throughout our genealogies, see Johnson, 60. Johnson is possibly correct in viewing this term as a reference to a specific social type, but it is clear that it also more generally described a behavioral ideal.

14. Luo (1918), 20:3; Yao (1930), juan 1; Liu (1932), 1:24, 29. Similar stories appear in Feng (1946) and Gui (1935).

15. On the state of the agrarian ecology in this Hubei "interior delta" at the start of the Ming, see Will 1980b, 261-287.

16. Ling (1883), 1:9.

17. Mingay, 106.

18. "Jiahuitang," cited in Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance 1965.

19. Yao (1930), 2: 1. For a case from Shanxi province at least as extreme as the Ye in this regard, see Rawski, 245-273.

20. Yao (1930), 6:6. For examples from western Europe, see Wilson, 145-172; Forster 1980.

21. Yao (1923), 4.1: 11-13.

22. Hanyang xianzhi 1867, juan 16; Yao (1923), 3:2.

23. Ye (1873), 6: 1-15; Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 18:60-61, 20:27; Hummel, ed., 904-905.

24. Ye Fengzhi was a purchased expectant Shaanxi daotai; his brother Mengzhi was expectant Nanjing daotai and domestic customs superintendent at Changsha; Ye Yongzhai was director of the Hubei Salt Bureau. See Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance 1965.

25. Ye descendents' return to direct management of commercial interests coincided with a second boom in store profits, following a Yekaitai employee's discovery of a means to package traditional herbal medicines in the form of Western-style pills. In 1896 three of Ye Mingzhen's grandchildren divided their patrimony: Mengzhi took control of medicine store operations; Xingzhong invested his share in a salt dealership; Fengzhi became a famous restaurateur and entrepreneur in Hankou and Shanghai. Ye (1873); Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance, undated.

26. Zhang (1921), 1:22, 1:23-27.

27. Yao (1923), 16:6.

28. Yao (1923), 14.1:7-8, 15:2-3.

29. Ray Huang, 287-288.

30. Taylor, 23-40.

31. Yao (1932), 14.1:7-11. On the general background of this evolution, see Hoshi Ayao.

32. Yao (1923), 14.1: 41, 15:3.

33. Yao (1923), 14.1:4-6, 32.

34. Yao (1923), 14.1:42-43, 15:2-3.

35. Tawney, 1941. For differing perspectives, see Mingay, 106, and Wilson, 152.

36. Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 18:60-61, 20: 37. The biography of lineage founder Ye Tingfang, for example, cites as the reason for his move to Hanyang his inheritance of some "income-producing property" (chanye ) there, neglecting to specify that this property was a commercial firm at Hankou.

37. Chung-li Chang 1962, 181.

38. Liu (1932), preface: 11-12, and "Shishiji," 15.

39. Luo (1918), juan 4, 5, 15.

40. Yao (1923), 14.1: 7-8, 33, 37-40; Hanyang xianshi , 2:20.

41. Yao (1930), 2:1, 6:1-11.

42. Luo (1918), juan 5.

43. Yao (1923), 14.1:37-40; Luo (1918), 15:58; Liu (1932), preface, 3:29.

44. Han (1946). On the English case, see David Spring 1971, 16-62.

45. Yao (1923), 14.1:6; Yao (1930), 7.3:33; Zhang (1921), 4:1.

46. Fried, 287.

47. Hui-chen Wang Liu 1959a, 84.

48. Baker 1977, 500-501.

49. Rankin 1977; Mote, 103-116.

50. Skinner 1977b, 239-260.

51. Hanyang xianzhi 1818, 7: 21.

52. Yao (1930), 6: 10-11.

53. Ling (1883), juan 3, Luo (1918), juan 5, 11:54, 15:41, 20:34; Zhang (1948), 3:195-196, 7: 188; Liu (1932), juan 1.

54. Liu (1924); Han (1946); Feng (1946).

55. Hankou was founded only in the 1460s, and a recent Chinese study has argued that a peculiarly repressive local administration prevented its significant commercial development until the Qing conquest. See Fan Zhiqing, 156-163.

56. Zelin (1986, 583) has noted a comparable phenomenon in the commercial metropolis of the Upper Yangzi, Chongqing. She writes: "The wealth generated in Chongqing city seems to have had surprisingly little impact on the rural economy of the Baxian hinterland before the 1890s.... The interpenetration of rural and urban elites seems to have been small. This is perhaps explained by the dominance of extraprovincials in Chongqing's export trade." In Chongqing, of course, the opening to Western trade, industrialization, and the national survival movement were all telescoped into a considerably shorter period of time than they were in Hankou; thus, the opening to rural elites in that city probably appeared more suddenly.

57. Sangren 1984.

58. Imahori 1953.

59. Hymes 1986b.

60. Luo (1918), 1: 1-13; Zhang (1948), 1 :55-60.

61. Zhang (1921), 1:9-11. The Zhang described their transcendent lineage as one of "common surname with different branches" (tongxing zhiyi ) and "linked lineages under a single ancestral clan" (hezu zuzong ). In Ebrey and Watson's terminology, the group was a "higher-order lineage."

62. Zhang (1921), 2: 10, 4: 1.

63. Ye (1873), 1:110, 2:1 11, 3:6, 14,4:1.

64. Luo (1918), 1: 1; Zhang (1921), 1: 10.

65. Yao (1923), 15:2-3.

66. Compare Zhang (1921), 1: 12, with the same work, 2: 10. For comparable cases from the Lower Yangzi, see Ueda, esp. 129-138.

67. For example, a Yao man whose ming was Xichong and zi was Shaolung, was listed in the genealogy as Yao Caishi, inasmuch as "cai" was his prescribed generational character.

68. Zhang (1876), juan 1; Yao (1930), juan 4.

69. Liu (1924), juan 1.

70. Ebrey 1986, 40.

71. In the absence of such land, a lineage might meet ritual expenses either by contributions or by regular assessments on member households; see Liu (1932), "Jiagui ji" (lineage rules), 2.

72. Yao (1923), 15:3; Luo (1918), juan 28. In typical fashion, the Luo school was converted in 1918 into a so-called "lineage-founded national modern school" (zuli guomin xuexiao ) .

73. Biography of Yao Guanghan in Hanyang xianshi 1867, 20:8-9.

74. Yao (1930), 5: 1-3; Yao (1923), 15:3; Luo (1918), juan 28; Liu (1924), 16:27.

75. Zhang (1921), 2: 10.

76. All estate lands were rural and located in Hanyang county. There were some thirty tenant households, whose average rent, payable in mixed cash and kind, amounted to less than one tael. About one-third of the tenant households were themselves Yao lineage members. Yao (1930), 5: 3.

77. Yao (1930), 1:3.

78. Luo (1918), juan 5; Liu (1924).

79. Zhang (1948).

80. Curtin, 59-66.

81. Beattie 1979b:93-94, 114-115.

82. Zhang (1951), 2: 10; Liu (1924), juan 1; Yao (1923), 15:2-3.

83. Zhang (1921), 1:10-11.

84. Yao (1923), 15:2-3.

85. Zhang (1951), 1: 10-11. A similar instance from the Lower Yangzi is described in Dennerline 1979-80.

86. Yao (1923), 14.1:7-8, 41-46.

87. For example, Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 20:8-9, 16, 24; Hanyang xianshi , 2:20.

88. Lao Mouji, Ling Yulin, and Yao Yukuei, among others. Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 19:29-32.

89. Wuhan Municipal Commercial Industrial Alliance 1965.

90. Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 20: 9; Hanyang xianshi , 2:14. The strategy of the mercantile Ye for acquiring cultural refinement is illuminating. Upon acquiring a rural estate near the market town of Huanglingji, they established a relationship with a local family named Hu of modest wealth but impeccable scholarly credentials. Thereafter, generations of Hu scholars served as household tutors for Ye children, in both the market town and Hankou.

91. Ye (1873), 16: 1; Yao (1923), 14.1:33; Wang Baoxian, 2: 11-15, 4:26-28.

92. Both Everitt (1966) in discussing the British "county community" and Hymes in discussing the "localist strategy" among Chinese elite lineages make their cases largely on the basis of marriage alliances among local elite families. Jerry Dennerline (1986), too, has spoken of the "community of affines" as a key element in local elite community. That Hanyang elite lineages similarly engaged in a pattern of systematic intermarriage is not unlikely, but our sources do not provide adequate data to draw meaningful conclusions on this subject.

93. For example, Liu (1932), preface; Ling (1883), juan 3; Yao (1923), 14-1:4, 39, 16:6. For a graphic example from another province of the xiang as horizon of collective action, see Winston Hsieh 1974.

94. Generalizing from local studies of Fujian, Fu Yiling has over many years developed an argument that elites, acting through lineage organizations at the xiang level, perpetuated local particularisms and exercised almost total domination over local society. Although my sources do not suggest anything like the level of severe exploitation implied in Fu's model, several factors he identifies as crucial to xiangzu hegemony—such as major roles in land reclamation and water conservancy projects—had clear parallels in Hanyang. See, for example, Fu Yiling 1982. For a summary and critique of Fu's ideas, see Mori Masao 1985.

95. Guangxu Hubei yudi ji , 5: 23.

96. Hanyang xian xiangtu 1933.

97. Hanyang xianzhi 1867, 20: 32.

98. Perdue 1986, 170, 173; Dennerline 1986, 177, 181-182; Beattie 1979b, 26-27.

99. Cited in Cannadine, 30.

100. Everitt, 70-72.

1. Yan Ruyi, 10:7.

2. This extreme administrative bifurcation was implemented in 1730. Fushun xianzhi , 1: 7b. However, the Gongjing saltyard appears to have been under independent administration from time to time during earlier dynasties as well.

3. Qiao Fu, 2.

4. Ibid., 205.

3. Qiao Fu, 2.

4. Ibid., 205.

5. Jiang Xiangcheng and Luo Xiaoyuan, 108, 125.

6. Luo Xiaoyuan 1984, 63-64. Qiao Fu (187) claims that the best sing-song girls were leaving Chongqing for Fu-Rong because business was better there.

7. In his chapter on Ziliujing's "gentry" (shishen ), Qiao Fu (185) makes this explicit: "There is no distinction made between merchants and gentry at Ziliujing. There are many illustrious gentry, too numerous to name them all. Today I will just name a few representative ones." A list of the most powerful merchants of his day follows. The gazetteers of Fushun and Rongxian label powerful members of the salt-yard elite as changshen or "yard gentry."

8. Zigongshi dang anguan, 22-23. Special thanks to Douglas Rankin for clarifying this process.

9. Ran Guangrong; and Zhang Xuejun 1984, 1-3. For a discussion of the technological breakthrough embodied in the "lofty pipe" wells, see Paul Smith (57-58) and Liu Chunyuan.

10. Ran Guangrong and Zhang Xuejun 1981, 541.

11. Brine wells dug to between 1,200 and 1,300 Chinese feet were known as "yellow-brine" wells and produced brine with a salinity of approximately 13 percent. The shallowest "black-brine" wells, at least 1,600 feet deep, could run as much as 2,800 feet. These wells produced brine that was 18 percent salt. Li Rong, 230-231; Xu Dixin amd Wu Chengming, eds., 591. For a detailed discussion of technological improvements in the salt industry during the Qing period, see Ran Guangrong and Zhang Xuejun 1984; 53-78; Sichuan yanfaxhi, juan 2 and 3.

12. Entenmann, 59.

13. G. William Skinner has estimated that Sichuan's population grew from at the most 3 million in 1673 to 28.5 million in 1853 because of both natural increase and large-scale immigration, primarily from Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong. Skinner 1987, 62-66.

14. Zhou Xun, juan 1.

15. Jian-Le was a combined appellation for the neighboring Jianwei and Leshan yards. Increased yin quotas in more productive areas and legalized transfer of yin quotas belonging to other yards (zengyin gaipei ) were originally introduced in response

to the drying up of northern Sichuan wells. Yan Ruyi, 13. By the end of the nineteenth century Fu-Rong was producing more than 58 percent of Sichuan's total official quota of salt. Figures given to Alexander Hosie by the Sichuan salt commissioner placed taxed salt from Fu-Rong at 137, 100,000 kilograms a year as compared to 234,743, 610 kilograms for the province as a whole. Estimates of smuggled salt range from 10 percent to 50 percent of the legal total. Hosie, 181-182.

16. Fu-Rong appears to have been the main beneficiary of the opening of the Huguang market, although smaller salt yards, some of which had been threatened with closure during the early nineteenth century, were able to reopen and serve domestic Sichuan needs. Lu Zijian, 80. By the 1860s, production in Fu-Rong had expanded to such an extent that both Huguang and many domestic markets switched to purchase of its salt.

17. According to Li Rong's Ziliujing ji , several hundred families were prominent in the salt business in the late Qing. Li Rong, 234.

18. A popular ditty in Fu-Rong during the Qing went, "If you're not named Wang, if you're not named Li, then old man, I'm not afraid of thee." Qiao Fu, 186.

19. According to Entenmann (161), 94 percent of lineages that emigrated to Sichuan during the Ming came from Huguang, and two-thirds of these came from Macheng.

20. Fushun Ziliujing Zhenzhushan Wangshi Baoshan ci sixiu jiapu, juan 1.

21. Lishi jiapu, juan 1.

22. Li Zilin et al. 1962, 145-146.

23. Lishi zupu, juan 4. This state of affairs is implied in the biographical section of the Qianlong genealogy: the Lis rebuild their home and drill new wells on land that had previously belonged to someone else. In at least one instance, the return of the original landlord forced the family to relocate and begin drilling anew. Lishi zupu, juan 9.

24. Very little information exists on the Yans. A number of surviving funerary inscriptions describe the founder of the lineage hall, Yan Changying, and his brother as experts in locating brine deposits and drilling on what may have been their own land. Song Lanxi, 36-37. For the Hus, see Hu Shaoquan, 49-51

25. According to a former manager at the Gongjing yard, Hu Yuanhe was the only Gongjing salt merchant to own and operate wells without partners. Ji Runqing, 187.

26. Lai Minqin et al., 39. Luo Xiaoyuan, one of the great twentieth-century salt magnates, used this method to develop furnaces. A tael was approximately one ounce of silver.

27. Hu Shaoquan, 50.

28. For a detailed discussion of partnership contracts at Fu-Rong, see Zelin 1988.

29. Wang Shouji, juan xia .

30. The text of the stele is quoted in Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, eds., 603. Yah Ruyi, juan 10: 13.

31. Zhang Xiaomei, ed., 4:50, 52. See also Tian Maode 56-72, and Ouyang Yuemou et al., 146-155.

32. Some individual contributions were over 3,000 taels. See the stele corn-

memorating these repairs, now in the Zigong museum of the history of the salt industry housed in the old guild hall. Cited in Ling Yaolun, 80.

33. Ran Guangrong and Zhang Xuejun 1980, 31.

34. There is little evidence of how profits were used. The 1937 edition of the Santai xianzhi (juan 12) notes that both pawnshops in the district were opened by Shaanxi merchants in 1697 and that "they took high interest. Every year the amount they sent back to Shaanxi was unlimited." There is also some evidence that they invested in land in the province.

35. Qingchao xuwenxian tongkao , 37: 9.

36. Shu Wencheng et al., 39-40. The date of this strike is not given, but from internal evidence it must have been sometime in the 1850s.

37. In tracing the history of various districts within the Fu-Rong yard, Huang Ziqing and Nie Wufang (251-257) have identified numerous wells established by Shaanxi merchant investment. See also Ling Yaolun, 81.

38. Huang Zhiqing and Nie Wufang, 256.

39. This discussion is based largely on information in Luo Xiaoyuan 1963.7 and 1963.8 passim.

40. Well-drilling partnerships based on the lease of land to individual and group investors was common by this time. The earliest surviving limited tenure lease of a well site in Fu-Rong is dated 1779. Zigongshi dang'anguan, ed., 309-310. For a detailed study of the evolution of brine-well partnerships and the gradual reduction in the power of the landlord in these arrangements, see Zelin 1988.

41. According to a memoir of this lineage's history, these wells produced no more than several tens of dan a day each. (A dan was approximately 50 kilograms.) Li Zilin et al. 1962, 147.

42, Ibid., 147-148.

41. According to a memoir of this lineage's history, these wells produced no more than several tens of dan a day each. (A dan was approximately 50 kilograms.) Li Zilin et al. 1962, 147.

42, Ibid., 147-148.

43. For salt sales, see Sichuan yanfazhi , cited in Lu Zijian, 78. For salt-cotton trade, see Luo Xiaoyuar. 1963, 7: 167.

44. Lu Zijian, 77.

45. The role of the Taiping Rebellion in altering the nexus of commerical power in China's main economic centers deserves far more attention than it has received. One of the best treatments of this issue is found in Rowe 1984, 78, 118-120.

46. Sichuan guanyun yan'an leipian , 34:21, cited in Lu Zijian, 79.

47. For an excellent discussion of the role of much older lineage trusts in the establishment of elite dominance, see Rubie Watson's essay in this volume. William Rowe's essay in this volume provides a counterexample of merchant lineage trusts whose interests continued to be linked to traditional goals and whose properties were limited and largely restricted to land.

48. Lishi zupu, juan 15.

49. Li Zilin et al. 1962, 146; 1963, 193.

50. Hu Shaoquan, 51, 56-57.

51. Ibid., 56.

50. Hu Shaoquan, 51, 56-57.

51. Ibid., 56.

52. An ancestral hall was founded in 1759, but it appears poorly endowed and served largely ritual purposes. Fushun Ziliujing Zhenzhushan Wangshi jiapu , preface.

53. The provisions. of the lineage trust rules as outlined in the memorial to the emperor may be found in Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7: 176-177.

54. The Santai academy (shuyuan ) was one of five academies in Fu-Rong during

the Qing period. A separate and considerably smaller school, the Yucai Academy, was established during the early Guangxu reign to educate members of the Wang lineage. Hu Shanquan and Luo Xiaoyuan 1984, 198-190.

55. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7:176-177.

56. This estimate is based on a survey of the signatories to 845 contracts in Zigongshi dang'anguan, ed. According to these editors, approximately 3,000 contracts, many of which are duplicates, are in the Archives.

57. For the history of the Wu Jingrang lineage trust, see Zhang Duanfu 1979, 1980.

58. Aspects of the business management structures described here were probably adapted from those utilized by the Shaanxi merchants, whose presence was so strong at the salt yard. Hu Shaoquan, 56.

59. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8: 185-186, 191.

60. Li Zilin et al. 1962, 152-154.

61. This instability was less a product of consumer demand than of politics. During the Taiping Rebellion a relatively free market existed for Sichuan salt. Following its suppression and the restoration of communications between Huguang and eastern China, an effort was made to restore the Lianghuai salt producers' control over the central Chinese market by demarcating salt territories and differentiating taxation. At the same time, rebellions in Yunnan and Guizhou continued to disrupt salt sales there. In 1872, a new system of salt administration known as guanyun shangxiao , official transport and merchant sale, interposed a governmental purchasing agency between producer and wholesaler; this truncated the Sichuan salt market, with a deleterious effect on the large lineage-based salt firms. For a detailed discussion of the system of official transport and merchant sale, see Wu Duo 1971.

62. Li Zilin et al. 1962, 151-152.

63. Hu Shaoquan, 78-79.

64. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:187-188, 189. For a discussion of the role of gas rental in allowing furnace operators to respond quickly to changing market conditions, see Zelin 1988.

65. Luo Xiaoyuan and Jiang Xiangcheng 1983, 135, 139.

66. Lin Zhenhan, 2, 9: 248; Sichuan yanjing shi, juan 3, plan 2, zhang 10, jie 1: 69 and jie 2:79; Luo Xiaoyuan 1981, 187.

67. The Wang Sanwei lineage trust was authorized to sell approximately 12 percent of the quota of licensed salt in this market. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:190.

68. For the Wangs, see Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8: 190-191. For the Hus, see Hu Shaoquan, 53. For the Lis, see Ma Fangbo, 274.

69. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:187. The lineage regulations of the Wang Hele lineage trust, one of the largest landlords in the Jianwei yard, stipulated that its members could sell the land under its wells and furnaces, but not the wells and furnaces themselves. Ran Guangrong and Zhang Xuejun 1984, 232.

70. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8: 187.

71. Jiang Xiangcheng and Luo Xiaoyuan, 119.

72. The Lis, with the longest history of continuous residence in Fu-Rong, counted among their number many officials and degree holders during the late Ming and early Qing. However, by the mid-Qing, they, too, appear to have concentrated family resources largely on profits from salt. Rowe (this volume) notes a similar phe-

nomenon in Hubei. This retreat from examination-based status among the most successful merchant families may have affected the performance of the region as a whole. Whereas the Lower Basin produced an average of 35.6 percent of Sichuan's jinshi during the Ming and early Qing, between 1706 and 1814 (the last year for which we have complete provincial figures) that share fell to 21.7 percent. See Smith, 22. On the increase in the number of upper-degree holders from this region after 1865, see Fushun xianzhi, juan 10.

73. Fushun xianzhi , 8: 20a-34b.

74. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7:170. The nephew was also granted a posthumous hereditary rank of a low order.

75. For a discussion of the effect of the Taiping on the composition of the bureaucratic elite in China, see Chang Chung-li 1955, 71-141.

76. Sichuan yanfazhi, juan 11:6. These were Yichang and Sashi in Hubei.

77. Wang Shouji, 20-22.

78. For a full account of this protest, see Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7:171-173.

79. Manyin [pseud.], 18-19. In this version Wang Langyun donates 200,000 taels to help China build a modern navy and 10,000 taels to famine relief.

80. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7:174-176.

81. Li Zilin et al. 1963, 195,200. This Li Siyou member was Li Xinzhu, a juren of 1874. Fushun xianzhi , 12: 53b.

82. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8: 185-186.

83. Hu Shaoquan, 59, 60-61.

84. For the Fu-Rong gentry, see Qiao Fu, 185. The Chongqing figure is based on a survey of merchant lawsuits housed in the Baxian archives, Sichuan Provincial Archives. Although I was not able to see all the merchant lawsuits available for the period, a random sample of more than four hundred cases reveals a distinct pattern of degree purchase among resident urban merchants. These men were by no means as wealthy as the salt merchants discussed here.

85. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 7: 173, 196; Hu Shaoquan, 63-67; Li Zilin 1963, 195-196; Qiao Fu, 201.

86. E.g., a daughter of Wang Dazhi is said to have married a jinshi degree holder from Fushun. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:196. Available genealogical records for the Li and Wang lineages do not give sufficient data to undertake a detailed examination of marriage strategies.

87. Fushun xianzhi, juan 3, 12; Rong xianzhi, juan 2.

88. Hu Shaoquan, 65; Fushun xianzhi , 12: 53b.

89. Ibid.

88. Hu Shaoquan, 65; Fushun xianzhi , 12: 53b.

89. Ibid.

90. Qiao Fu, 36.

91. Wang Roude, 24; Qiao Fu, 201. Among the salt merchants known to have had personal guards ranging from several dozen to over a hundred men were Wang Sufeng of the Wang Sanwei tang , Li Xingqiao of the Li Siyou tang , Wang Hefu of the Wang Baoxinglong and Zhang Xiaopo and Huang Dunsan.

92. Keith Schoppa (1973, 17-20) has shown that a majority of those involved in public service were nondegree holders like the merchants examined here.

93. The most striking example is Li Bozhai, discoverer of the rock-salt layer, whose son was a leader of the Ren banner of the Elder Brother Society and who himself joined the Catholic church at the turn of the century. Luo Xiaoyuan 1981,

94-97. Secret society membership appears to have gained in importance during the Republican period when the means to political authority ceased to be as clear as during the Qing.

94. For an excellent treatment of reconstruction as the foundation for later elite cooperation and mobilization, see. 1986, 93-135.

95. E.g., Li Zilin et al. 1963, 193-194, 210; Hu Shaoquan, 70.

96. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:196.

97. Zhang Xuejun, 12; Wang Roude and Zhong Langhua, comp., 1985, 93-96.

98. Hu Shaoquan, 68; Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8: 195.

99. Zhang Xuejun 1983, 12-16.

100. Li Zilin et al. 1962, 166-167.

101. For a discussion of the rock-salt layer, see Lai Mingqin, 3-52. Brine pumped from rock-salt wells had an average saline content of 25 percent; Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, 591. On the pumps, see Yang Duxing et al., 148.

102. Ji Runqing, 189-190.

103. The large lineage trusts continued to control pipes within Ziliujing. In the 1920s, with the help of the Li Siyou lineage trust, newcomer Zhang Xiaopo constructed a new pipe that operated by charging well owners a simple fee for transporting their brine. Other pipe owners were forced to follow suit, allowing direct dealings between brine producers and gas furnace operators. This marked the end of brine-pipe power in the economy of the yard. Luo Xiaoyuan and Jiang Xiangcheng 1983, 141-142; Luo Xiaoyuan 1981, 188-189.

104. By the 1920s most Wang Sanwei lineage trust holdings were being operated by the Chongqing-Shashi credit group, to which it owed almost 650,000 taels. Luo Xiaoyuan 1963, 8:201. The Li Siyou trust alienated most of its salt holdings by 1931 in order to clear debts and provide an income for its members. Li Zilin 1963, 208-210.

1. Bergère 1983.

2. The Jiangnan region and Wuxi's place within it are described in detail below.

3. For the relationship between social structure and economic development in Wuxi, see Bell, draft ms.

4. Bourdieu 1977; Sahlins 1981, 1985. See also the review of recent anthropological theorists by Ortner 1984.

5. A useful summary of these developments in the Jiangnan region is found in Elvin 1973.

6. The following discussion of changing landholding patterns and land tenure practices in Jiangnan in the Ming and Qing periods is based on some of the most important interpretative articles published by Japanese scholars; a summary and

review of much of this literature written by American scholars Linda Grove and Joseph Esherick; and an extensive reevaluation of Ding land tenure patterns by American scholar Kathryn Bernhardt. See notes 7-10 below.

7. Shigeta Atsushi, esp. 350-366; Grove and Esherick, 404-408; Bernhardt, chap. 1.

8. Oyama Masaaki, esp. 136-147; Grove and Esherick, 404-408; Bernhardt, chap. 1.

9. Shigeta Atsushi, 336-379; Oyama Masaaki, 147-150; Grove and Esherick, 408-419; Bernhardt, chap. 1.

10. Bernhardt, chap. 1, esp. 35-42

11. Perkins, 140-151; Shehui jingji yanjiusuo, ed., preface and 1-2.

12. Liu Shiji, esp. 58-68, 120-127.

13. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 81.

14. Rankin 1986, esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

15. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 73-77; Chung-li Chang 1962, 150-151.

16. Rankin (1986, 17-21) provides an excellent discussion of the role of the shendong .

17. Ching-Chih Sun et al., 4, 98; Mantetsu 1940, 69-73; Koain kachu renrakubu, 795-796.

18. On the Qing grain tribute system, see Hinton, 1-15. On Wuxi's role, see Shehui jingji yanjiusuo, preface and 1-2. For a general discussion of Wuxi's development as a major rice marketing center in Qing times, see Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, ed., 36-40.

19. On population growth in Jiangsu as a whole, see Perkins, 202-209. Population figures for Wuxi are derived from taxation records found in Wuxi Jinkui xianzhi, juan 8 and 9, and suggest a rise from 270,621 in 1726 to 1,075,323 by 1795. This is an improbably rapid rate of growth (approximately fourfold within a seventy-year period), reflecting underreporting before 1712 because potential taxpayers tried to keep their names off registers then used for taxes on both land and adult males. An imperial decree in 1712 resulted in the gradual merging of the head and land taxes, and by midcentury, we can assume that taxation records reflect real population more closely. A second problem is that the taxation rolls record only taxable males. I assume that taxable males made up about 53 percent of the population, a figure reported for Songjiang prefecture neighboring Wuxi. For the Songjiang figures, see Liang Fangzhong, 440-441.

20. Xi-Jin shi xiaolu , 6-7.

21. Dennerline 1988: 76, 91-93.

22. Dennerline 1986, 171-181, 190-192; Dennerline 1979-80, 23, 27, 31-34; Dennerline 1988, 98-102.

23. Dennerline 1988, 102.

24. Ibid., 104-105.

23. Dennerline 1988, 102.

24. Ibid., 104-105.

25. Zhang Kai 1979, 54, states that Jiangyin, Wujin, Yixing, Liyang, and Changshou all became important new sericulture districts during this period. Also, a Mantetsu report discusses the growing importance of these counties as a new sericulture region in contrast to the older areas south of Lake Tai. Mantetsu 1940, 71-73; Koain kachu renrakubu, 795-796.

26. Zhang Kai 1979, 54; Ching-chih Sun et al., 98; Mantetsu 1940, 69-73; Koain kachu renrakubu, 795-796.

27. Bell 1985a, chap. 2; Bell 1985b; Bell, forthcoming. In these works, I use a Mantetsu survey study conducted in three Wuxi villages in 1940, to present a detailed analysis of small-peasant-family farming in Wuxi and the role of sericulture in that system. The data from this survey are found in Mantetsu 1941. Preliminary findings from a second survey study of 1,200 farming households in Wuxi conducted in 1929 by the Social Science Research Institute of the Academia Sinica also appear in Bell, forthcoming. These materials are cited in the bibliography as Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehui kexue yanjiusuo 1929. A more comprehensive analysis of this second set of materials will be found in Bell, draft ms.

28. Li Wenzhi 1981.

29. Rankin 1986, esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

30. Zhang Kai 1979, 53-54; Wuxi Jinkui xianzhi , 31: 1.

31. Zhang Kai 1979, 53-54; Dongnan daxue nongke, ed., 2:26; Gongshang banyuekan , 2.15 (Aug. 1, 1930): investigation sec., 3.

32. Yan Jinqing, ed., 10:9; Gao Jingyue and Yan Xuexi, 4.

33. Zhang Kai 1979, 53.

34. Wuxi Jinkui xianzhi , 31: 1.

35. Lu Guanying, 45; Gongshang banyuekan , 2.15 (Aug. 1, 1930): investigation sec., 3.

36. My analysis has benefited from Philip Huang's (1985) demonstration of a close relationship between population growth, labor intensification, and evolving class relationships in villages on the North China plain. Although the situation in Jiangnan was not identical, small-peasant-family farming in Wuxi reveals striking similarities in the correlation between demographic growth, parcelization of landholdings, and an increasingly downward spiral of social differentiation among the peasantry.

37. Mantetsu 1941, 103-104.

38. On grain purchase by Wuxi peasant families, see Mantetsu 1941, 144-145. On the role of cash income in this process, see Mantetsu 1941, Table 15, 109.

39. Cadastral figures in gazetteers indicate 598,483 recorded taxpayers in 1830. In 1865, this number had dropped to 210,061. See Wuxi Jinkui xianzhi , 8:6-7; these figures are also cited in Li Wenzhi, ed., 1957, 1: 151.

40. Accounts of poor migrants from northern Jiangsu coming to Wuxi and other counties south of the Yangzi abound in the periodical literature of the early twentieth century. E.g., Chen Yi, 34; Xue Muqiao, 58-60.

41. Mantetsu 1941, 88-89, 103-104. For descriptions of women working in sericulture, see Rong An, 113; and Mao Tun [Mao Dun], 1-26. For a fuller discussion of the female role in sericulture in Wuxi, see Bell 1985a, chap. 2.

42. Chen Huayin, 44-48.

43. Mantetsu 1941, 23.

44. Dwight Perkins (114-115, 300-301) has argued that the minimum subsistence requirements for grain consumption in China in the early twentieth century were approximately 400 jin per year. In the Mantetsu-surveyed villages, the average yearly rice consumption per adult villager was 312 jin . Wuxi peasants supplemented their

diets with broad beans and peas, which were both locally grown (see food purchase tables in Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehui kexue yanjiusuo). These calculations for Wuxi are made from data in Mantetsu 1940, 144-149, and Table 1. See also Bell (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of minimum subsistence requirements.

45. Jiangnan shangwu bao , 9 (Apr. 21, 1900): commercial raw materials sec., 2; Minguo ribao , May 21, 1916, 3, 10; May 11, 1921, 3, 11; June 5, 1921, 2, 8; Sun Guoqiao, 985; Dongnan daxue nongke, 1:6, 2:49; Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3504, \: 4.

46. Extensive data on debt are found in the Academia Sinica's 1929 survey of Wuxi (Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehui kexue yanjiusuo). Preliminary findings show that most peasant households in the villages surveyed had one or more loans at 20 percent yearly interest rates, and/or had mortgaged a portion of their land at average annual rental rates of 50 percent or more of its market value. Moreover, data in this survey also show a high rate of cocoon crop failure, an important factor contributing to accumulating debt.

47. The dispersion of cocoon firm facilities in many market town locations is documented in Xi-Jin xiangtu dill and also in Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3242, subfile no. 32472.

48. Xi-Jin xiangtu dili , vol. 1, sec. 34; Jiangsu sheng gongbao , May 16, 1923, 2-3; Gao Jingyue interview; Kaihua xiangzhi , 1: 52-53.

49. Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 56-58; Qian Zhonghan 1961:123-125; Xi-Jin xiangtu dill , 2, sec. 3. Qian Zhonghan has also provided more specific details on Zhou Shunqing's cocoon firms and his role in new, locally based political organizations such as the Wuxi Chamber of Commerce and Agricultural Association during the New Policies period. See Qian Zhonghan 1983.

50. Qian Zhonghan 1961, 126; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 42.

51. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo, ed., 3-8.

52. Gongsuo was used since the latter Ming dynasty to refer to organizations that represented merchants in a given locale who participated in the same trade in contrast to huiguan , organizations of men from the same native place sojourning in the same city. For the early history of gongsuo and other forms of merchant organizations, see Fang Mingzhu 1963. For post-Opium War developments in gongsuo activity, see Peng Zeyi 1965.

53. Toa dobunkai, 535.

54. Ibid.

53. Toa dobunkai, 535.

54. Ibid.

55. Gao Jingyue, a former filature manager in Wuxi and member of the Wuxi People's Political Consultative Congress, makes the related point that when borrowing funds for silk filature operation, the "social standing" of the borrower was of crucial importance. See Cao 1983, 106.

56. For a detailed accounting of the types of contracts used and the responsibilities undertaken by comprador agents and cocoon firm owners, see Bell 1985a, 170-180. See also Lillian Li, 177-78.

57. I received a photographed copy of this contract from Zhang Kai, a Chinese scholar who has studied China's silk industry (interview, October 11, 1980).

58. Gao Jingyue interview; Zhang Kai interview. An interview with Xu Ruliang (May 24, 1980), a member of the Wuxi People's Political Consultative Congress

formerly involved in the Wuxi silk industry, confirmed this interpretation of the structure of the early cocoon firm system, claiming that "landlords" were the key link at the local level. Another Japanese source states that "wealthy rural folk" fulfilled this role. See Mantetsu 1940, 794-795.

59. Gao Jingyue 1980, 105.

60. A fuller accounting of cocoon merchant guild activities is found in Bell 1985a, 181-200.

61. For a discussion of "symbolic capital," see Bourdieu, chap. 4, esp. 171-183.

62. I am grateful to Yung-fa Chen for pointing out that gentry members often chose the name wenshe for organizations devoted to community service and local management activities.

63. Kaihua xiangzhi , 1:52-57. In the twentieth century, the adjective "foreign" continued to be used by the peasantry to describe individuals from the local elite involved in various aspects of silk industry development. When sericulture extension station workers, young female members of the local elite, went into the countryside in the 1920S and 1930s, peasants stood in their doorways gawking, calling these strangers who passed by "foreign teachers." Once again, we see that peasants used this term to indicate their growing awareness of the relationship between local elite management and the export-oriented silk industry. Fei Dasheng interview (May 18, 1981).

64. Kaihua xiangzhi , 1: 52-57.

65. Gao Jingyue interview.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

65. Gao Jingyue interview.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

65. Gao Jingyue interview.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. To petition for military protection from the naval police for boats carrying cocoons and cash was the first point in a list of guild functions Gao Jingyue provided in his interview. See Bell 1985a, 185. A sample of a provincial governor's response to a similar sort of petition by the joint guild organization of silk producers in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui is found in Jiangsu sheng gongbao , May 11, 1923, 1-4. Newspaper and periodical accounts of cocoon marketing activity from the teens and twenties also discuss petitions from this joint guild and other merchant groups to the provincial governments in the region for military protection. See Minguo ribao , April 19, 1916, 2, 8; April 29, 1917, 3, 10, May 12, 1917, 3, 10; May 15, 1917, 2, 7, 3, 10; May 24, 1917, 3, 10. An extensive collection of original reports and petitions on cocoon marketing protection, including detailed discussions of why commerce should be protected, is in Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3233. A newspaper account of May 1917 also reports that the Jiangsu provincial governor had instructed the Wuxi county magistrate to dispatch naval and land troops to protect areas in which there was cocoon marketing activity; see Minguo ribao , May 24, 1917, 2, 7. For the most part, the task of protection seems to have fallen to the naval police in each county where cocoon marketing took place. See Jiangsu shiye yuezhi , 67 (Oct. 1924): 4-5.

69. Institute of Pacific Relations, ed., 1939b, 237-238. Translated from Qian Zhaoxiong, "Shangye ziben caozongxia de Wuxi cansang" (Wuxi sericulture under the control of commercial capital), Zhongguo nongcun , 1.4 (Jan. 1935):73-74.

70. Minguo ribao , May 25, 1917, 3, 10; June 4, 1917, 2, 7; June 5, 1917, 3, 10.

71. Ibid., June 5, 1917, 3, 10.

70. Minguo ribao , May 25, 1917, 3, 10; June 4, 1917, 2, 7; June 5, 1917, 3, 10.

71. Ibid., June 5, 1917, 3, 10.

72. A vivid example of spontaneous peasant violence related to cocoon marketing is a 1929 incident where peasants became so angered over silkworm egg price manipulation that they began smashing equipment in the offices of a local sericulture cooperative. The assistance of the local ward head (quzhang ) was sought in order to settle this dispute. See Nongkuang gongbao , 11 (May 1, 1929):73-75; 19 (Jan. 1, 1930):9-10; 21 (Mar. 1, 1930):28-29. Also see Bell 1985a, 240-245, for a detailed account of this incident and its political ramifications.

73. Although sources vary slightly, many cite approximately fifty filatures in Wuxi in the late 1920s. The reason for this variation is that filatures once built were rarely kept open continuously; they were rented only on a yearly basis according to market conditions for raw silk. Sources on Wuxi filatures include: Toa kenkyujo, ed., 132-133, 142-146; Wuxi shizheng , 2 (Nov. 1, 1929): 107-113; Wuxi shizheng choubei chu, 121-123; Wuxi nianjian : industry sec., 12-21; Mantetsu 1940, 79-80; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 42; Lu Guanying, 46-47; and Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3242, subfile no. 32472. Similar problems exist for determining the exact number of cocoon firms in operation at any give time. From 1910 through the early 1930s, the reported number of licensed cocoon firms in Wuxi rose from 217 to 373. For numbers of cocoon firms in operation in Wuxi and other Jiangnan locales, see Toa dobunkai, 528, 538-557; Jiangsu shiye yuezhi , 15 (June 1920):74-75; Nongkuang gongbao , 3 (Oct. 1, 1928): cocoon firm tables following 48; Wuxi nianjian : commerce sec. 28-37; and Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3242, subfile no. 32472.

74. Although this statement is at odds with much prior research on the Nationalist government's role in promoting economic development, my research indicates that, at least in intent, its role was positive. See Bell 1985a, chaps. 3-5.

75. Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 41-42, 57; Qian Zhonghan 1961, 123-126; Lü Huantai interview (May 24, 1980); Dier lishi dang'anguan, file No. 3242, subfile no. 32472.

76. For Xue's economic activities in Wuxi, see Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 41-43; Qian Zhonghan 1961, 126-127; and Lü Huantai interview. For Xue's political roles, see Gongshang banyuekan , 3.2 (Jan. 15, 1931): commercial and industrial news sec., 7-9; Jiangsu jianshe yuekan , 2.3 (March 1935): report sec., 57-88; and Zhang Youyi, ed., 165.

77. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo, 8; Qian Zhonghan 1961, 127.

78. Lü Huantai interview; Qian Zhonghan 1961, 127; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 42.

79. On the "split ownership/management" system of filature operation, see Gongshang banyuekan , 2.1 (Jan. 1, 1930): investigation sec., 2-5; Zhuang Yaohe interview (May 27, 1980); Chushi kensetsu shiryo seibi jimusho, ed., 42-43; Chen Ting-fang, 113; Nongshang gongbao , 3.9 (April 15, 1917): special reports sec., 14-15; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 45-46; and Mantetsu 1940, 85-86. On problems for Chinese silk competing with its Japanese counterpart, see Lillian Li, 87; Yan Xuexi, 1; and Zhou Kuangming interview (Nov. 8 and 13, 1980).

80. Lü Huantai interview; Qian Zhonghan 1961, 127; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 42; Shenbao , May 6, 1934.

81. Qian Zhonghan 1961, 127; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 43; Shen Wenwei, 34; Lü Huantai interview; Wu Yaming interview (Nov. 7, 1980).

82. For the establishment of the Yongtai sericulture affairs office, see Hua Yinchun, 17; Wu Yaming interview. On problems for filatures in maintaining an adequate cocoon supply, see Yin Liangying, 12; Wuxi difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui, 41; Mantetsu 1940, 94; Yinhang zhoubao , 3.34 (Sept. 3, 1929): weekly commerce sec., 2-3, and 3-37 (Sept. 24, 1929): weekly commerce sec., 4; Gongshang banyuekan , 2.17 (Sept. 1, 1930): legislation sec., 4-6; Shenbao (Jan. 19, 1937); 4, 14.

83. Kong Fanlin, 72-73; Gongshang banyuekan , 2.3 (Feb. 1, 1930): commercial news sec., 16, and 4.19 (Oct. 1, 1932): national economy sec., 1-2; He Bingxian, 18; Chushi kensetsu shiryo seibi jimusho, 40.

84. Okumura Satoshi, 247.

85. Gongshang banyuekan , 3.2 (Jan. 15, 1931): commercial and industrial news sec., 7-9; He Bingxian, 20; Kong Fanlin, 72-73; Gongshang banyuekan , 3.10 (May 15, 1931): legislation sec., 8-9; Nongye zhoubao , 71 (Feb. 22, 1931):625-627; Okumura Satoshi, 246; and Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 1328. For a full discussion of the bond program, see Bell 1985a, 271-275.

86. Gongshang banyuekan , 3.2 (Jan. 15, 1931): commercial and industrial news sec., 7-9, and Nongye zhoubao , 71 (Feb. 22, 1931):625-627. Xue Shouxuan's designation as "silk industry magnate" is found in Ku Nong 19371, 103, and 1937b, 62-70. Excerpts from Ku Nong's second article appear in Zhang Youyi, 3: 166-167.

87. Zhu Chuxin, 520. For a full accounting of the gradual process through which Xue acquired Wuxi filatures, including the formation of the Xingye Silk company, an umbrella organization that carried out much leasing activity, see Bell 1985a, 284-291.

88. Zhang Youyi, 3: 163-164; Guan Yida, 1; Jiangsu jianshe yuekan , 2.3 (March 1935): report sec., 57.

89. Shenbao , May 17, 1934.

90. Jiangsu jianshe yuekan , 2.3 (March 1935): report sec., 57-88; Zhang Youyi, 3: 163-165.

91. Shenbao , May 4, 1934.

92. Shenbao , June 2, 1934, 4, 13.

93. Dier lishi dang'anguan, file no. 3242, subfile no. 22061:42.

94. Guan Yida, 1.

95. Lü Huantai interview; Ku Nong 1937a, 67-70.

96. Bell 1985a, chap. 4.

97. Shen Wenwei, 34.

98. Ibid.

97. Shen Wenwei, 34.

98. Ibid.

99. Ku Nong 1937b, 104.

100. On the constant fluctuation of cocoon prices, see the newspaper accounts in Minguo ribao , note 70 above. See also Minguo ribao , May 27, 1917, 3, 10; May 28, 1917, 3, 11; May 30, 1917, 3, 10.

101. Institute of Pacific Relations, ed., 1939a, 187. Translated from Ku Nong 1937b, 106.

102. Shenbao , June 2, 1936, 3, 11.

103. Raw silk prices are calculated from tables in Lillian Li, 74-77. Cocoon prices had risen to highs of seventy yuan per dan in the 1920s. See tables on sericulture and cocoon production in Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehui kexue yanjiusuo.

104. Shenbao , June 1, 1936, 4, 14.

1. A general outline of this case is provided in Shiba 1984. The name of Tianyue came from a rock at the village of Fujiadun said to resemble a seven-stringed guqin , which, tradition said, was played by a Daoist immortal. See Xiaoshan xian dirningzhi , 184.

2. This description is based on TZ , 1b-2b.

3. TZ , la.

4. Professor Chen Qiaoyi (1981, 75) contends that the Qiyan excavation had occurred earlier and that the opening had been diked and reopened several times before the mid-fifteenth century.

5. TZ , 10b.

6. Xiaoshan xianzhi gao 3: 23b.

7. The population density and the economic base in Middle Tianyue, which 1 denote as "peripheral," thus does not differ substantially from that of the surrounding core. In this sense, it may be, as Stevan Harrell has suggested, that the difference between Middle Tianyue and the surrounding core is a difference not in kind but in degree and scale. I would suggest, however, that although this "periphery" does not meet the standard definitional qualifications set forth by Skinner, it evidences key attributes of peripheries: poverty, domination by agents of the core, and a more unified, less diverse elite social and political structure than core areas. This complex of sociopolitical attributes is suggested clearly by the term "periphery." Finally, I would argue that Tianyue's geographical and administrative position meant that the Middle Tianyue populace experienced problems common to those facing inhabitants of peripheries.

8. Gu Shijiang, 46.

9. Xiaoshan xianzhi 111.

10. Ibid., 1:37-38. In 1950 all of Linpu and Tianyue became part of Xiaoshan county.

11. Ibid., 8:11. For an important analysis of commerce and local markets, see Mann, esp. chaps. 4, 5, 9.

9. Xiaoshan xianzhi 111.

10. Ibid., 1:37-38. In 1950 all of Linpu and Tianyue became part of Xiaoshan county.

11. Ibid., 8:11. For an important analysis of commerce and local markets, see Mann, esp. chaps. 4, 5, 9.

9. Xiaoshan xianzhi 111.

10. Ibid., 1:37-38. In 1950 all of Linpu and Tianyue became part of Xiaoshan county.

11. Ibid., 8:11. For an important analysis of commerce and local markets, see Mann, esp. chaps. 4, 5, 9.

12. Xiaoshan xianzhi 23: 27.

13. Ibid., 7:26.

12. Xiaoshan xianzhi 23: 27.

13. Ibid., 7:26.

14. See, e.g., Minguo ribao , Feb. 4, 1929, and Dongnan ribao , Jan. 22, 1948; June 21, 1948.

15. Xiaoshan xianzhi 16:22.

16. Ibid., da shiji , 20-22, 25; 16:22. For specifics on the May 1911 riot, see Cole 1986, 50.

15. Xiaoshan xianzhi 16:22.

16. Ibid., da shiji , 20-22, 25; 16:22. For specifics on the May 1911 riot, see Cole 1986, 50.

17. Shi bao , Sept. 28, 1914; Sept. 30, 1914.

18. Shen bao , Aug. 3, 1927. This citation reports the establishment of surveillance units to prevent merchant price manipulation in earlier years.

19. Xiaoshan xianzhi, da shiji , 22.

20. Xiaoshan xian dimingzhi (184) indicates that the second son of a twelfth-century Xiaoshan magistrate first settled in Tianyue. SXZ (7:27b) contends that it was not until the ninth generation of this lineage (early Ming) that the first settlement in Tianyue occurred.

21. SXZ , 12:4a. All of Shouchong's river-dike and sluicegate repairs protected the land of his and other township lineages.

22. STYT . The remaining thirteen contributors came from a number of different lineages. See the characterization of the Tang family in Rankin 1986, 261-263.

23. MGS , preface: 2a.

24. MGS , 2: 9a-b; TZ , 11a; and SXZ , 12: 3a-b. Lu was also a founding member of the Ji Society.

25. Shi bao , May 20, 1914.

26. Xiaoshan xianzhi gao , 10: 10a, and TZ , 22b-23a.

27. TZ , 20b.

28. Shi bao , May 20, 1914.

29. SXZ , 16: 191b. This information is found in the biography of Tang's father, Pei'en. There is no extant biography of Shouchong.

30. TZ , 38a-b; SXZ , 16: 192a-194a.

31. Xiaoshan xianzhi gao , 10: 10a.

32. Rankin 1986, 261-263.

33. Shouqian's jinshi degree and widespread reputation enhanced the family's local position. He could not, however, provide the patronage and support for his native place and his kin that one might expect. Shouqian actually held office only briefly and spent much of his career in opposition to the government. I am indebted to Mary Rankin for this insight on Shouqian.

The extralocal involvement of the family continued on the provincial level in 1916 when Military Governor Lu Gongwang appointed the youngest brother Shouming an adviser. See Shi bao , Aug. 14, 1916.

34. It has been shown many times that local dominance in South China was often attained through developing effective lineage organizations. E.g., Rubie S. Watson 1982. Marriage ties were one method of increasing a lineage's local dominance.

35. Lineage control of the various villages was plotted using a composite map, taken from Xiaoshan xian dimingzhi (171, 180), and a village-by-village listing of contributors to the reconstruction of the lake dikes in Tianyue township in 1922. See STYT for the maiden names of widowed contributors to the lake dikes. Though the information is only suggestive, in the Tang lineage village, the wide variety of maiden names of Tang widows in contrast to the very limited variety in other villages is notable. Tracking interlineage marriage information through genealogies has proved impossible. Only two of six genealogies from Middle Tianyue at the Zhejiang Provincial Library date from after 1882, and neither provides relevant information.

36. See the biography of Tang Pei'en, SXZ , 16: 191a-192a; STYT , and SXZ, ce 9. The Ges in that time period produced two jinshi , five juren , and two gongsheng .

37. The marriage patterns of Tianyue were strikingly local and suggest a tight unity among local elites. This situation suggests social patterns of a periphery,

perhaps a result of the constraints of poverty and geography. It is impossible to tell on the basis of available sources if some Tianyue families were able to marry their daughters "out" to other areas.

38. TZ . For his lineage, see SXZ , 7:32b.

39. SXZ , 7:1b.

40. Shao-Xiao tangzha gongcheng yuekan , 4 (January 1927): 29.

41. See Lu's account of reconstructing Linpu's Fire God Dike, SXZ , 12:3a-b.

42. Shaoxing xian yihui minguo yuannian yijue an , 12a-b; MGS , preface: 2a.

43. In certain areas such as the inner core, where elite structures were more diverse than in Middle Tianyue, self-government institutions themselves brought a new resource for local power to some among the wider variety of leaders. In peripheral situations, where local elite "oligarchies" had provided leadership for years, the establishment of self-government bodies headed by the same oligarchies did not bring an especially new import to their positions. See Schoppa 1982, esp. chaps. 8, 9.

44. Here "public" and "private" refer not to the nature of the deeds performed but to the status of the performer.

45. Shaoxing xian yihui minguo yuannian yijue an , 31b-32a.

46. By power, I mean "the capacity to produce intended and foreseen effects on others." See Wrong, 2.

47. By legitimacy, I mean the "type of support that derives not from force or its threat but from values held by the individuals formulating, influencing, and being affected by political ends." See Swartz, 10.

48. The phrase is Wrong's, 52.

49. Swartz, 14.

50. For a brief biography of Liu, see Hummel, 532-533.

51. TZ , 13a.

52. Xiaoshan xianzhi gao , 3:24b-25a.

53. Ibid., 3: 25a.

52. Xiaoshan xianzhi gao , 3:24b-25a.

53. Ibid., 3: 25a.

54. MGS , 2: 11a-b; 13a-15a.

55. TZ , 11a.

56. MGS , 4: 1a-5b.

57. SXZ , 11:6a-8a.

58. The implication of immorality as a mask for attacking antagonistic power holders in Chinese society is discussed in Pye, 41. See also Schoppa 1989, esp. chaps. 2, 4.

59. See Cole 1986, chaps. 5, 6. There is no other evidence on which to judge the accuracy of this petition's claim about muyou .

60. Degree holders are listed in SXZ , 8, 9. Information on lineages and their elites are in SXZ , 7. The Kong, Tang, and Ge lineages were resident only in Middle Tianyue. Thus, though subdistrict residence is not included in the degree-listing, these three lineage totals can be quickly ascertained. Population data are in TZ , 5a-6a.

61. TZ , 16a. It is not possible to delineate the degree holders from Lower Tianyue (Suoqian) because residents in other areas of Shaoxing shared surnames with key lineages here (Zhao, Wang, Li, Jin, and Shen). I am therefore relying on qualitative evidence from the Tianyue petition and the circumstances of the case. It is also suggestive that Suoqian, containing 32 percent of the population of the original

Tianyue subdistrict, produced fourteen lineages illustrious enough to be included in the gazetteer lineage survey. Middle Tianyue, with 59 percent of the population, produced only nine. See SXZ , 7.

62. See the comments on the terms daibiao and the more traditional term daili ("agent" or "deputy") in Rankin 1986, 278.

63. See the description of patron-client relationships in S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger 1984, 48-49. The authors note (205) the greater likelihood of patron-client relations in "peripheral units [which] possess few mechanisms through which they control corporate access to outside resources and loci of decisions which affect them."

64. Kuhn 1975, 274-277.

65. MGS , 4:6a-8b; TZ , 11a.

66. MGS , 4: 12a-14b.

67. MGS , 3: 10a.

68. MGS , 4: 15a-16a. The map placed a large branch of the Puyang river in Middle Tianyue and put the dike of Lower Ying Lake along the Little West River (as if to indicate the acute danger of flooding).

69. E.g., the arguments in Schoppa (1989, chaps. 7, 8) regarding the reclamation of Xiang Lake in Xiaoshan county and those regarding the sale of some public river, lake, and pond land in the 1910s in Xiaoshan hetang jinian lu .

I use Richard Madsen's definition of "moral discourse": "an active social process of understanding, evaluating, and arguing about what is right and wrong in a given situation." See his statement in Madsen, 8. "Discourse" refers to more than simply verbal exchange as will shortly be evident.

For the importance of language as a social and political legitimator and the relationship between language and experience at times of crisis, see Bourdieu 1977, 170.

70. See Cohen, 5-9, 126-143.

71. Shaoxing xian yihui minguo yuannian yijue an , 66a-68b. Open meetings to discuss the danger were held in the subdistricts.

72. MGS , 1:14a-15a. On the potency of the threat of disharmony, see Pye's description (33) of the danger of "primitive power" as perceived in Chinese culture.

73. MGS , 3:11a. This threat brought a rebuke from Governor Qu.

74. TZ , 11a-b.

75. MGS , 3:3a-5a.

76. MGS , 3:11b.

77. MGS , preface: 2a.

78. MGS , 4:20a-b

79. Ibid.

78. MGS , 4:20a-b

79. Ibid.

80. MGS , preface: 2b; 3:3a-5a.

81. Bourdieu 1977, 183.

82. For He, see Xiaoshan xianzhi gao , 10: 10a, 12a: MGS , 3:3a-5a. In the late 1920s he would become known as a "local bully, evil gentry" for his heading a rent collection organization called the "Property Protection Association." See Shen bao , Nov. 10, 1927.

83. Bourdieu 1977, 178-179. Madsen (18) uses the term "political capital." The crucial nature of "symbolic status" even in cultural play is underlined in Clifford Geertz 1973a, 412-453.

84. For the information on the Qiu lineage, see Xiaoshan xingshi , 45.

85. STYT . Among the remaining leaders, there were three Tang, four Ge, three Ye, one Hua, and one Tong.

86. MGS , 4:23a-b.

87. Ibid.

86. MGS , 4:23a-b.

87. Ibid.

88. MGS , 3:32a, preface: 3a.

89. TZ , 12a.

90. An alternative interpretation of this episode might suggest that the resignations of Tang and his allies were a sham, that Tang knew what was going on or might even have actively encouraged the destruction behind the screen of "resignation." Although such a reading of the incident fits a political culture whose primary dynamic was the authority relationship between superior and subordinate, it does not explain why the Ji Society was formed after the completion of the episode (when it might earlier have served as an instrument to help solve the crisis) or why Qiu was notably missing from the list of the Ji Society founders. The sources (compiled by the Ji Society) give evidence of an obvious rupture between Tang and the villagers. See the text below.

91. See Schoppa 1985, 64, 222, n. 36. For discussion of the hostility, see Shi bao , May 2, 1914.

92. Shi bao , May 20, 1914. Shouchong had apparently been involved in some accident on his return to Datangwu from Linpu on May 16.

93. F. G. Bailey (1969, 82) argues that in fact the "main political capital of the leader of a moral group is his monopoly of the right to communicate with or symbolize whatever mystical value holds the group's devotion." Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984, 263-267) point to the instability of patron-client ties and frequent combinations of continuity and discontinuity.

94. MGS , 2:13a says summer; TZ , 20b indicates spring.

95. MGS , 2: 13a-15a.

96. For a cogent presentation on the use and meaning of symbol, see Clifford Geertz 1973b, 91-94.

97. Madsen, 9.

98. The inscription is in MGS , 2: 15a; Ge's record is in TZ , 39b-40a.

99. Cohen, 151-153.

100. TZ , 15a.

101. SXZ , 12:3b-4a.

102. For the Fire God Dike repairs, see SXZ , 12:3a-b, 11a-12b. Substantial discussion over the "private" or "public" nature of dams marked deliberations over this dike.

103. Shiba, 328.

104. TZ , 20b.

105. Bourdieu 1977, 191.

106. Bailey (1969, 84) denotes these resources "political capital." He calls those resources the client believes the patron holds "political credit."

107. On the import of synthetic social gradations, see Ossowski, 45-56.

108. On the tendency for elites with greater personal "credentials" to move to social and political levels of greater complexity and variety, see Teune and Mlinar, 145-150.

109. See the description of "practice theory" in Ortner, 153.

110. TZ , 12a.

1. Kuhn 1970.

2. One notable exception is Meskill 1979.

3. According to Skinner (1977c, 214-215, 241), the Yun-Gui macroregion consists of most of Yunnan, central and western Guizhou, and a portion of southern Sichuan. For a general description of the Yun-Gui macroregion, see Naquin and Rawski, 199-205.

4. "Topography of Kweichau," 530.

5. Neville and Bell, 105; The Provinces of China , 97-100; Xue Shaoming, 55.

6. The Provinces of China , 99-100; Neville and Bell, 105, 130; Bourne, 44-45; Tang Zaiyang, 13; Mo Jian and Lei Yongming, 40.

7. Bourne, 44-45.

8. Luo Raodian, 57.

9. Ai Bida, 191; Xingyi fuzhi , 35:2b.

10. Ai Bida, 185, 189.

11. Bourne, 44. Also see "Topography of Kweichau," 530.

12. Ai Bida, 191.

13. Xingyi fuzhi 47:26b-29a. Xingyi prefecture was composed of the counties of Xingyi, Pu'an, and Annan along with the department (zhou ) of Zhenfeng and the subprefecture (ting ) of Panzhou.

14. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 195; Guizhou daxue lishixi, 186-187; Feng Zuyi 1984, 61.

15. Guizhou daxue lishixi, 187.

16. Ibid.

15. Guizhou daxue lishixi, 187.

16. Ibid.

17. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 195; He Jiwu, 267.

18. Yang Defang and Weng Jialie, 70-71.

19. Bourne, 44.

20. Bao Jianxing, 79-82; Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 187-188.

21. "Liu Guanli Xiawutun zhongyi ci ji," 4:29b; "Liu Tongzhi xiansheng nianpu," 4:31a-31b; Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 195.

22. Kuhn 1970, 67.

23. Schoppa 1973, 10, 16-17.

24. For a description of the local strongman as a social type, see Meskill, 88-91.

25. "Liu Guanli," 4: 29b-30b; "Liu Tongzhi," 4:31b-34a.

26. "Liu Guanli," 4: 30a-30b; "Liu Tongzhi," 4:31b, 34a; Wang Yanyu, 245; Guizhou daxue lishixi, 190.

27. "Liu Tongzhi," 4:32a-32b, 34a.

28. Kuhn 1970, 120-121.

29. Liu Guanli's troops had an unsavory reputation for their thorough plundering. In one place, their passing left a popular saying, "Liu's soldiers came to Long-chang, and in one sweep left only dust and smoke." Long Shangxue, Chen Hanhui, and Fang Jian, 91-92.

30. Guizhou daxue lishixi, 189.

31. "Liu Tongzhi," 4:31b.

32. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197; Guizhou daxue lishixi, 190.

33. This feud began during the 1862-63 siege of Xiawutun when the Lius' surrender to besieging rebels allowed the rebels to turn and destroy a militia band that had been sent from the town of Bangzha to aid the Lius by three militia leaders, who originally had been Liu Guanzhen's close personal friends. One of these men was killed, and the other two swore to seek revenge against the Lius for what they saw as a betrayal. When Liu Guanzhen went on a militia inspection tour to Bangzha in 1865 these men took their revenge. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 195-196.

34. Ibid., 196-197.

33. This feud began during the 1862-63 siege of Xiawutun when the Lius' surrender to besieging rebels allowed the rebels to turn and destroy a militia band that had been sent from the town of Bangzha to aid the Lius by three militia leaders, who originally had been Liu Guanzhen's close personal friends. One of these men was killed, and the other two swore to seek revenge against the Lius for what they saw as a betrayal. When Liu Guanzhen went on a militia inspection tour to Bangzha in 1865 these men took their revenge. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 195-196.

34. Ibid., 196-197.

35. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12.

36. Long Shangxue et al., 91.

37. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 196.

38. E.g., Liu Yuezhao, 287-296.

39. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197; Guizhou daxue lishixi, 191; "Liu Tongzhi," 4: 34a.

40. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12; Feng Zuyi 1984, 62.

41. See McCord 1988.

42. Long Shangxue et al., 91.

43. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197.

44. Ling Ti'an, 4: 28a-29b.

45. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12.

46. Ibid.

45. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12.

46. Ibid.

47. Wu Xuezhou and Hu Gang, 197.

48. Bourne, 44.

49. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197.

50. Ibid.; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63.

49. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197.

50. Ibid.; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63.

51. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12.

52. He Jiwu, 267; Li Defang, 71; Xiong Zongren 1987a, 151. Liu Xianshi's son, Liu Gangwu, also earned a shengyuan degree in the last years of the examination system. He Jiwu, 283.

53. Mo Jian and Le Yongming, 46-47.

54. Feng Zuyi 1982, 58-59.

55. He Jiwu, 267; Li Defang, 71.

56. "Liu Guanli," 4:30b. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 198; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63; Feng Zuyi 1982, 59.

57. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63.

58. He Jiwu, 268.

59. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 198; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 12.

60. He Jiwu, 268; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 3, 12.

61. Li Shi, 121.

62. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197-198.

63. Ibid.; He Jiwu, 268; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63-64.

62. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197-198.

63. Ibid.; He Jiwu, 268; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63-64.

64. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197; Feng Zuyi 1984, 63-64.

65. He Jiwu, 268, 287; Boorman and Howard, eds., 2:79.

66. Feng Zuyi 1984, 64; He Jiwu, 283.

67. Feng Zuyi 1984, 64; Li Defang, 71.

68. Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 198; Wu Xuechou 1979, 108.

69. Tang Eryong's grandfather, Tang Jiong, was a provincial degree holder who had held the post of provincial governor. Hummel, ed., 707-708.

70. Zhou Suyuan 1980, 6-7; Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 183; Li Shi, 121.

71. Feng Zuyi 1984, 64.

72. He Jiwu, 268.

73. Tang Eryong was eventually forced into retirement by an exposé of a Tang family scandal in a Self-Government Society newspaper. Zhou Suyuan 1980, 57-58.

74. Wu Xuezhou 1979, 72-87. The best discussion of the composition and character of Guizhou's two reformist factions is Li Shi 1982.

75. Wu Xuechou 1979, 92-93; Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 185-186; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 3.

76. Wu Xuechou 1979, 92; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 3-4.

77. Ping Gang 1981, 14.

78. He Jiwu, 270; Ping Gang 1959, 300; Yang Changming, 206.

79. Huang Jizhou, 164; Zhou Suyuan 1980, 63-64; Yang Changming, 206.

80. Zhou Suyuan 1980, 64; Wu Xuechou 1979, 98.

81. Wu Xuechou 1979, 103-107.

82. Zou Lu, 6:398; Sun Zhongyin, 239, 245-246, 253; Zhou Suyuan 1980, 67; Wu Xuechou 1979, 109.

83. One of Liu Xianzhi's Guizhou colleagues in the Yunnan government, Xiong Fanyu, was a metropolitan degree holder. For a time in the late Qing, Xiong had lectured in Xingyi schools. Together with Liu Xianzhi, Xiong had joined Liang Qichao's reformist circle in Japan and then obtained a post on the Yunnan governor-general's staff. Wu Xuechou and Zhang You, 108; Wu Xuechou and Hu Gang, 197; Sun Zhongyin, 245-246, 252.

84. Wu Xuechou 1979, 109-110, 114-115; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 7-8.

85. When the expeditionary force that had left the province during the Revolution tried to return to Guizhou later in 1912 they were blocked by Liu and Tang's armies, defeated and dispersed. Wu Xuechou 1979, 110-113; Zhou Suyuan 1963, 8-11.

86. Gui Baizhu, 102.

87. Xiong Zongren 1987a, 152-154.

88. Xiong Zongren 1987b, 70-73.

89. Boorman and Howard, eds., 2: 79.

90. Gui Baizhu, 102-103; He Jiwu, 288.

91. He Jiwu, 283-284; Guizhou daxue lishixi, 198. Liu Gangwu's son, Liu Daren, later served as a foreign ministry spokesman and a diplomat for the Guomin-dang government in Taiwan. He Jiwu, 265, 284.

92. Boorman and Howard, eds., 2:80; He Jiwu, 288, 311.

93. Among other posts, Liu Xianqian served as brigade general of Anyi and Weining districts, west Guizhou circuit intendant and bandit commissioner, and as head of southwestern Guizhou salt administration. Zhang Youdong et al., 288; Xiong Zongren 1987a, 152-153.

94. He Jiwu, 282.

95. Guizhou daxue lishixi, 199-200.

96. Zhou Suyuan 1980, 93.

97. Dagong bao (Oct. 14, 1920).

98. The struggle between Liu Xianshi and Wang Wenhua emerged in late 1920 when Liu opposed the return of Wang's army from a three-year sojourn in Sichuau. Wang himself "retired" to Shanghai during the coup to avoid the opprobrium of direct involvement in his uncle's fall. Among the actual coup leaders, however, were He Yingqin, Wang's brother-in-law, and Sun Jianfeng, who was both Wang Wenhua's cousin on the Wang side and the brother of the wife of Liu Xianshi's eldest son, Liu Jianwu. Wang Wenhua gained little from the coup as he was assassinated in Shanghai soon after by another Guizhou military rival. Xiong Zongren 1987b, 74; Lin Zixian, 119.

99. Zhou Suyuan 1963, 16; Xiong Zongren 1987a, 155.

100. Guizhou daxue lishixi, 198-199.

1. Michael, xi-xliii.

2. This observation is made in Schoppa 1982, 3. For another statement of this position see Sheridan, 18-26.

3. E.g., Hanwell 1937a, 1937b; and Chen Han-seng.

4. Fei Hsiao-t'ung 1939; Alitto 1978-79.

5. On the chambers of commerce, see Bergère 1968, 241. On self-government organizations, see Fincher 1981 and Kuhn 1975. On Nationalist attempts to abolish lijin and impose a business tax, see Mann, 163-199. For a discussion of dibao and the establishment of subdistrict government offices, see Barkan 1983, 229-239.

6. Rankin 1986; Bastid 1989; Schoppa 1982.

7. Barkan 1983.

8. Geisert 1979.

9. Duara 1987, 132-161.

10. During their occupation of Rugao, the Japanese divided the county in two. During the early 1940s when Rugao was part of a Communist base area, and again after 1949, the Communists did likewise. Most of early twentieth-century Rugao has become the two counties of Rugao and Rudong. The northern part of the original Rugao is now part of Haian County.

11. Jiangsu dangwu zhoukan 27 (July 20, 1930):92; Shi bao , Mar. 14, 1959, 3. All population figures from this period are approximate.

12. For 1.5 million figure, see Chang Ch'un-ming, 243. For tenancy percentages, see Wang Haoran, 67. For plot sizes, see Jiangsu sheng nongmin yinhang zonghang, ed., 226. Statistics from this period are not accurate. Gao Nong , 1.8 (August 1931):11-13, breaks down tenancy and ownership rates by district within the county. Generally, the districts closest to Rugao City had the highest tenancy rates, and the districts along the coast and the county's southwestern boundary had the highest ownership rates. Districts along the southwestern boundary also had some of the county's poorest land. In these districts—i.e., those with the poorest land but with large numbers of owner-cultivators—the Rugao Communist movement started in the late 1920s.

13. Wang Haoran, 67; Jiangsu sheng nongmin yinhang zonghang, ed., 222; Yin Weihe, 126; North China Herald , Aug. 15, 1934, 240; June 5, 1935, 381; June 28, 1933, 490; July 4, 1934, 12.

14. Yin Weihe, 126-127. Cotton mills were established in Rugao from 1921-1924. None appears to have remained open longer than a year or two. China Industrial Handbooks: Kiangsu , 316.

15. North China Herald , Oct. 14, 1936, 54, and May 17, 1933, 254; Yin Weihe, 126.

16. Yin Weihe, 124.

17. Although Rugao sometimes was officially classified as a "first rank" county, it was always less important than ., where prefects and other officials in charge of groups of counties including Nantong always resided. See Zhao Ruheng, 28, on how Jiangsu classified its counties for financial purposes, and 20-21, on classification for administrative purposes. See also Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao 331 (Jan. 8, 1931):9.

18. For a more extended discussion of the elite, see Barkan 1983, 369-370.

19. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Shas, the Zhus, and the Mas were regarded as the three "big families" (dahu ) upon which all officials had to call upon first reaching the county. In addition, with probably over 10,000 mu of acreage apiece, the Shas and the Zhus were regarded as the county's two biggest landholding families. It was said in Rugao that "the Shas are number one, and the Zhus are number two, but neither of them can surpass the Ding Hui Si [a Buddhist monastery]." "Rugao jiefang shinian shi," chap. 2: 1; He Banghua 1981b, 43.

20. Rugao xianzhi (1808), 14:2b, 6b-7a, 9a-b, 10b, 11b, 14a, 16a-b, 21b, 23a, 32b, 39a; 16: 24a-b, 34b-35a, 69a-b; 17:36a, 80b-81a, 97b-98a; 21:22b. Rugao xian xuzhi (1837), front, 1:11a, 2:1b-2a, 3:7a, 8:10a, 26a. Rugao xian xuzhi (1873), front, 1: 19a; 6: 17b, 18a; 8:23a-23b; 13:2a-3a.

21. E.g., Zheng Zhonghao 1980b, 66; Xu Laiqing, 22; Huang Qiwu 1961, 230; Yuan Caizhi 1980b, 2:36.

22. Sha Yan'gao, 66-67. Even after 1949, the loss of the Sha collection during the 1930s and 1940s Japanese occupation of the county was mourned by Rugao residents. Today, none of the volumes can be traced. Guan Weilin, 91.

23. Bastid, 46.

24. Shi bao , June 23, 1924, 2:4; Sha Yan'gao, 69.

25. Huang Qiwu 1980, 25-27; Yuan Caizhi 1981c, 113; Rugao xianzhi (1933), 1:2.

26. Mao Bijiang was a "gifted scholar," calligrapher, and Ming Dynasty loyalist. Zhang Zhengyu 1980a, 70; Ma Daolai, 13-14. The large Mao family compound, still in excellent repair, is being preserved as a museum. For references to other Mao family members, see Rugao xian xuzhi (1873), 6: 17a, 18b, 20a, 22b, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26a, 29a, 29b, 30b.

27. On Mao, see Fu Dong, 132-136; Mao Xiao (?), 137-140.

28. On Zhang, see Xu Laiqing, 23; Yuan Caizhi 1981a, 105.

29. On Deng, see Yuan Caizhi 1981c, 113; Zhang Naicheng, 98; Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 352.

30. Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 352.

31. For a history of the legal profession in Rugao, see Zhang Naicheng, 99-100. For more details on Xu, see You Yanjia and Chen Baosheng, 87-90.

32. Yuan Caizhi (1980b), 2:36.

33. Hu Langru; 84; He Banghua 1981b, 43.

34. Rugao xian xuzhi (1873), 1:3b, 6b, 25a, 35a, 37a; 3:7a, 12a, 17b.

35. Zhou Deyin and You Yuangui, 28.

36. He Banghua 1981, 44.

37. Both Richard Bush, 47-53, and Schoppa, 72, note local leaders' increasingly specialized training. However, in Zhejiang Schoppa says that until the mid-1920s such individuals were "confined mainly to large centers." The Rugao case shows that in central Jiangsu trained. professionals were common outside the inner core significantly earlier than Schoppa indicates.

38. It is a common mistake to look for the main impact of an event immediately after its occurrence. Even after 1927 older elites continued to be active in local affairs; many of those who compiled the 1933 Rugao gazetteer were Qing degree holders.

39. Chu, 11.

40. For descriptions of Jiang's activities, see Chu and Bastid.

41. Zhang Jian, 54. "Qingchao monian Rugao quanxian xuetang tongji biao," 7; Xu Laiqing, 23; Sha Yan'gao, 66. At various times, Sha also headed each of these institutions.

42. Fujii Masao, 28.

43. On Zhang's membership in the Society for Constitutional Government, see Zhejiang sheng xinhai geming shi yanjiu hui and Zhejiang sheng tushuguan, eds., 217; Bastid, 63. For a brief history of the society, see Wang Shuhuai, 143-151. For Zhang's assembly memberships, see Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 112; Jiangsu sheng neiwu xingzheng baogao shu , 2:60, 64; Xu Laiqing, 23.

44. Bastid, 33, 60, 63.

45. Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 427; Shi bao , July 16, 1924, 2:2, Mar. 21, 1927, 1:3; Jiangsu sheng neiwu xingzheng baogao shu , 1:83. Gao ming bao, June 29, 1913, 9.

46. When Huang told Sha that the arms of the antisalt-smuggling soldiers were insufficient to guard the county and that new weapons were needed, Sha wrote a letter of introduction to the cashier of the Da Sheng company's Shanghai office. The letter enabled Huang to borrow 30,000 yuan from the company to buy a large quantity of weapons and bullets from a Japanese merchant. Huang Qiwu 1961, 230.

47. Huang Qiwu 1961, 231; Xu Laiqing, 22. Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 39-40; Jiangsu sheng neiwu xingzheng baogao shu , 1 (chart after page 10).

48. "Qingchao monian Rugao quan xian xuetang tongji biao," 6-15. Some members were traditional degree holders such as Zhang Fan, a gongsheng and member of the Qing cabinet; see Yuan Caizhi 1981b, 107. Others like Zhang Xiang, one of Rugao's first lawyers and member of the first Jiangsu Provincial Assembly, had modern educations; see Jiangsu sheng zhengzhi nianjian , 112; Jiangsu sheng neiwu xingzheng baogao shu , 2:64.

49. E.g., Chuzo Ichiko, 297.

50. See also Barkan 1983, 368-404. For details concerning Yuan's dissolution of the elected assemblies, see Young, 148-155. For local elite founding and running of local newspapers, see Cai Guanming, 77-78; Yu Men, 84-86.

51. Yuan Caizhi 1980a, 33; Shi bao , Mar. 2, 1927, 1:4. For Sha's negotiating and mediating, see Shi bao , May 13, 1924, 2:4, and Aug. 27, 1924, 2:4; Sha Yan'gao, 68-69.

52. Ma Tongke, 48-49; Shi bao , May 26, 1926, 1:2.

53. Yuan Caizhi 1980c, 40; Zhang Fengting 1980a, 1980b; Shi bao , May 16, 1924,

2:4, and Mar. 5, 1927, 1:4; Tongtong ribao Mar. 5, 1927, 3.

54. Yu Men, 1:84; Lin Xiao, 64; Sha Yan'gao, 68; Shi bao , Nov. 13, 1926, 1:4; Feb. 19, 1927, 1:4.

55. Sha Yan'gao, 67-68.

56. Yuan Caizhi 1980c, 38; Lin Xiao, 59.

57. Zhu Anjun, 109-111; Zheng Zhonghao, 65-67.

58. Zheng Zhonghao 1980b, 66; Ma Daolai, 14; Song Guihuang, 14-18. Zheng Zhonghao (1980a, 75) says the Pingmin she was founded in 1924. Because the first issue of the society's newspaper was dated January 1, 1922, Zheng cannot be correct. Display in Nantong Museum (Nantong bowuguan), seen November 11, 1983.

59. Liu Ruilong, 14; "Rugao xian diyige zhibu de jianli," 26-27. Display in Nan-tong Museum (Nantong bowuguan), seen Nov. 11, 1983; He Banghua 1981a, 25-26.

60. "Rugao xian diyige dang zhibu de jianli," 27; Song Guihuang, 19-20; Wang Yingchao, 45.

61. Interview with Liu Ruilong, Beijing, Oct. 1984; Song Guihuang, 19-20; "Rugao xian diyige zhibu de jianli," 26-27.

62. Song Guihuang, 20. For details on the Rugao Nationalist Party, see Barkan 1983, 80-179.

63. Zhu Anjun, 110-111; Xu Laiqing, 23.

64. Song Guihuang, 18.

65. Liu Ruilong, 17; Sha Yan'gao, 68-69; Shi bao , July 19, 1927, 1:4.

66. E.g., "Rugao dangwu gaikuang," 16; Shi bao , July 19, 1927, 2; Aug. 11, 1927, 5; Dec. 23, 1927, 3; Jan. 26, 1928, 8.

67. Shi bao , July 24, 1927, 3; Dec. 31, 1927, 2; July 8, 1928, 8; Aug. 1, 1928, 4; Tongtong ribao , July 26, 1927, 4; Zhongyang ribao , July 31, 1928, 3:2.

68. Shi bao , Dec. 22, 1928, 4; Aug. 19, 1928, 4.

69. Zhongyang ribao , Feb. 23, 1928, 3:3.

70. On Mao, see Shi bao , Aug. 10, 1928, 4; Sept. 6, 1928, 4. On Zhu, see Shi bao , Feb. 23, 1928, 3; July 18, 1928, 8. On Han, see Pan Yichen, 41-44; Interview in Nantong, Dec. 1984; Barkan 1986.

71. Tongtong ribao , July 8, 1927, 3. As of December 1927, the new Rugao city head was Ma Shaozhou; Shi bao , Dec. 21, 1927, 2.

72. Tongtong ribao , Aug. 13, 1927, 4.

73. See Barkan 1983, 80-179. For a more detailed analysis of the Nationalist government, 180-367.

74. Ibid., 132-133, 144.

73. See Barkan 1983, 80-179. For a more detailed analysis of the Nationalist government, 180-367.

74. Ibid., 132-133, 144.

75. For example, one morning when a gentry member from Zhenzhou and his father left for Rugao city, the two men were ambushed. The son was killed instantly; the father ran into a nearby river and escaped. Shi bao , Oct. 18, 1928, 4.

76. In 1928, the goal of the revolutionary troops was to burn and destroy a particular local landlord's dwelling; e.g., Liu Ruilong, 41. In later, larger battles, the emphasis remained the same. For example, when the Communists attacked Old Tiger Town, a main goal was to capture the fortified dwelling of the local gentry member who commanded the militia. Zhang Aiping, 942.

77. Shi bao , Dec. 11, 1927, 3.

78. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1928, 4; Nov. 26, 1928, 4; July 22, 1929, 4; July 29, 1929, 4; Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan , 1:88, 133.

77. Shi bao , Dec. 11, 1927, 3.

78. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1928, 4; Nov. 26, 1928, 4; July 22, 1929, 4; July 29, 1929, 4; Jiangsu jiaoyu gailan , 1:88, 133.

79. Shi bao , Aug. 6, 1927, 5; Aug. 24, 1928, 8; June 20, 1929, 4; May 16, 1931, 4; "Jiangsu ge xian xinwen shiye diaocha," 64.

80. For lists of post-1927 Rugao district heads see Shi bao , Dec. 21, 1927, 2; Apr. 8, 1928, 7; Dec. 23, 1938, 4; May 8, 1929, 4; Aug. 13, 1929, 4.

81. Wang Haoran, 67-68; Wang Peitang, 265. For examples of the public property management office's involvement in county financial affairs, see Shi bao , Dec. 19, 1929, 3; Zhongyang ribao , Oct. 28, 1931, 2:3; Nov. 4, 1931, 2:3; May 10, 1933, 2:2.

82. North China Herald , Nov. 24, 1931, 269; Oct. 19, 1932, 92; July 12, 1933, 49; Oct. 18, 1933, 90; Mar. 14, 1934, 407; Dec. 26, 1934, 438.

83. North China Herald , Apr. 26, 1933, 134.

84. Shi bao , Apr. 9, 1928, 7; Dec. 29, 1928, 4.

85. Faced with threats from the Nationalists, then from Communists and sea bandits, subcounty leaders raised funds and formed sizable militias. County-level leaders, however, continued to depend on Nationalist government soldiers and police for protection. Between 1927 and 1937 outlying towns and villages were frequently attacked, but the county seat remained safe. In Rugao, gentry militarization only took place in response to a real threat. This example suggests that Chinese militarization was not a uniform linear process, but occurred irregularly in response to localized conditions. For details about the militia, see Barkan 1983, 503-508.

1. Li Hua 1980, 20.

2. Yishibao , Aug. 9, 1922, 7.

3. Ibid., Apr. 22, 1920, 7.

2. Yishibao , Aug. 9, 1922, 7.

3. Ibid., Apr. 22, 1920, 7.

4. L. K. T'ao 1929, 258. The estimate is from 1925.

5. North China Standard , Apr. 18, 1926, 8; Gamble 1921, 101.

6. "Xi Ying," 127.

7. See Nathan (1976) for a profile and analysis of the early Republican political elite.

8. Yuan Shikai's bungled attempt to centralize state power through bureaucratic means suggests both continuity with late Qing reforms and the flaws inherent in a purely administrative strategy. See Young, 205-209.

9. In his study of the Nationalists in Shanghai, Joseph Fewsmith (1985) discusses splits between party-led mass constituencies and the civil and military officials loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Parks Coble (1980) argues that the hostility characterizing relations between the Nationalist regime and Shanghai capitalists overrode any sense of shared interests.

10. Clapham, 39.

11. Migdal, 428.

12. Ibid., 427.

11. Migdal, 428.

12. Ibid., 427.

13. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 20-23.

14. Ibid., 6.

13. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 20-23.

14. Ibid., 6.

15. Zhang Yufa, 600.

16. Yishibao , Oct. 15, 1928, 7.

17. For a brief account: of the store's history and current disposition, see Renmin ribao , Mar. 17, 1986, 3.

18. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 11.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 6.

18. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 11.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 6.

18. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 11.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 6.

21. Yishibao , Jan. 10, 1922, 7.

22. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 7.

23. The silk and foreign goods guild participated in planning sessions to deal with war threats in autumn 1925 and contributed the entire monthly "luxury tax" demanded by Zhang Zuolin in spring 1928. Shuntian shibao , Nov. 19, 1925, 7; Yishibao , May 24, 1928, 3.

24. See a retrospective on Beijing economic life in Yishibao , Sept. 6, 1928, 7, and Sept. 14, 1928, 7; and Lou Xuexi, Chi Zehui, and Chen Wenxian, eds., 24-25, 53, 59.

25. Yishibao , Sept. 6, 1928, 7.

26. The controversy is described in Burgess, 6-10.

27. For example, during winter 1925-26 planning of food distribution began in November, but the soup kitchens failed to open until January. Meanwhile two hundred people a month died on the streets of the city. North China Standard , Jan. 5, 1926, 8.

28. Chesneaux, 192.

29. Zou Mingchu, 74.

30. Yue Tianyu, 35.

31. Liu Yifeng, 268.

32. Gamble 1921, 39; L. K. T'ao 1928, 39. Both discuss the class heterogeneity of city neighborhoods. T'ao notes the beginnings of slum formation at the end of the decade.

33. For the importance in the history of class relations of the moment when policing functions no longer are the direct, personal responsibility of the monied and propertied classes but instead are given to modern police forces, see Silver 1967.

34. Yishibao , Apr. 16, 1929, 11.

35. Tarrow, 113.

36. For example, the rural nobility in Europe long justified its privileges on the basis of "leadership over, responsibility for, and protection of" the peasantry until "the state had taken over these functions." Blum, 419.

37. Ibid. The term "deference society" is F. M. L. Thompson's (cited by Blum).

36. For example, the rural nobility in Europe long justified its privileges on the basis of "leadership over, responsibility for, and protection of" the peasantry until "the state had taken over these functions." Blum, 419.

37. Ibid. The term "deference society" is F. M. L. Thompson's (cited by Blum).

38. Yishibao , May 14, 1928, 7.

39. Tan Shih-hua, 282.

40. Tarrow, 111.

41. Philip Kuhn's concept of cadredom is discussed in Susan Mann Jones 1979, 79.

42. For a discussion of the rise of local elite activism in the nineteenth century see Rankin 1986.

43. Mann, 23.

44. Imahori Seiji 1947, 23.

45. Ibid., 59.

44. Imahori Seiji 1947, 23.

45. Ibid., 59.

46. These "New Policies," as Rankin (1986, 28) notes, "can best be assessed in terms of their impact upon an already existing sphere of public activity."

47. Cooptation of local elites through liberal reforms of this kind is a common trait of centralizing, autocratic, and bureaucratic states. For this aspect of late Qing re-

form, see Fincher, 29. For comparable evidence from the Stolypin local governmental reforms in Russia, see Weissman, 140-142.

48. Johnson 1985.

49. Ibid., 47.

48. Johnson 1985.

49. Ibid., 47.

50. Rankin (1986, 16) describes this "intermediate arena where the state and society met" as a "dynamic and expanding sphere, which neither governmental nor societal leaders could fully claim as their own." Fewsmith (1985, 23) refers to developments like the formation of chambers of commerce as an "awakening of civil society." However, by describing chambers as "explicitly private associations" he misses their fundamentally public, as opposed to private or official, character. See Duara 1985, 117-118.

51. Qing reformers imagined that political life should consist only of "a bureaucracy and small surrounding public"; Nathan, 15. Yuan Shikai tried to drastically curtail the role of self-government; Young, 148-155.

52. "Civil society" connotes an organizational life separate from the "state." In European political and social thought, the term "society" came to refer to "an association of free men" as opposed to the "state" as "an organization of power, drawing on the senses of hierarchy and majesty." Williams 1976, 245. During this period of Chinese history, social organization, which once took its larger meaning from the sense of hierarchy associated with hegemonic Confucianism came to have a freer, more independent public profile. This shift in perception of the relationship between officialdom and public life did not constitute a clean break. Judging by the self-consciously independent stance taken by local elites and the corporate bodies they led, it was a break nonetheless.

53. Strand, 417-425.

54. Yishibao , Sept. 17, 1920, 3.

55. Shuntian shibao , Mar. 8, 1920, 7.

56. Gramsci, 229-239.

57. Tarrow, 128.

58. Lei Zhihui, 103. A portion of this increase was due to the increased jurisdiction covered by Beijing.

59. Mann, 1; see also chap. 8, "Tax-Farming and State-Building."

60. Imahori Seiji 1947.

61. Shuntian shibao , Feb. 12, 1922, 7.

62. Yishibao , Mar. 23, 1928, cited in Gendai Shina no kiroku (Records of Contemporary China), Hatano Ken'ichi, comp. (Mar. 1928).

63. Whereas, according to Rankin (1986, 19) the traditional "brokerage function was informal" and "based on personal ties" the local elite broker of the 1920s was a public figure in the modern sense who operated both backstage on a personal, informal level and on the open stage before public opinion and his constituents.

64. North China Standard , Nov. 17, 1927, 3.

65. Ibid., Mar. 29, 1928, 1; Yishibao , May 2, 1928, 2.

64. North China Standard , Nov. 17, 1927, 3.

65. Ibid., Mar. 29, 1928, 1; Yishibao , May 2, 1928, 2.

66. Yishibao , Mar. 2, 1928, cited in Gendai Shina no kiroku (March 1928).

67. Cohen, 220.

68. A classic statement of this kind of elite dilemma is found in Olson 1971.

69. E. P. Thompson 1978, 164.

70. Yoshikawa Kojiro 1974.

71. This happened in the case of a particularly bitter conflict between rival groups in the nightsoil guild; Yishibao , July 17, 1924, 7.

72. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1925, 7; and June 9, 1924, 7, for cases where conflict between a policeman and a rickshaw man led to the puller's death and a fight between a work crew and shop personnel kept mediators at bay.

71. This happened in the case of a particularly bitter conflict between rival groups in the nightsoil guild; Yishibao , July 17, 1924, 7.

72. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1925, 7; and June 9, 1924, 7, for cases where conflict between a policeman and a rickshaw man led to the puller's death and a fight between a work crew and shop personnel kept mediators at bay.

73. Boorman and Howard, eds., 2: 108-110.

74. Guan Ruiwu, 155-166.

75. Yishibao , Feb. 18, 1929, 7.

76. Boorman and Howard, eds., 108-110.

77. North China Standard , Aug. 30, 1929, 1.

78. Shuntian shibao , Jan. 26, 1924, 7; Feb. 24, 1924, 7.

79. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1928, 7; North China Standard , Nov. 15, 1958, 12.

78. Shuntian shibao , Jan. 26, 1924, 7; Feb. 24, 1924, 7.

79. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1928, 7; North China Standard , Nov. 15, 1958, 12.

80. Bailey 1971, 2-3.

81. Ibid., 18.

80. Bailey 1971, 2-3.

81. Ibid., 18.

82. Simmel, 46.

83. Yishibao , Jan. 19, 1923, 7.

84. Ibid., Mar. 1, 1925, 7; March 4, 1955, 7.

83. Yishibao , Jan. 19, 1923, 7.

84. Ibid., Mar. 1, 1925, 7; March 4, 1955, 7.

85. Conflict in the water trade among rival Shandong, Baoding, and Beijing factions accompanied attempts to reestablish a guild in the mid-1920s. Yishibao , Oct. 2, 1924, 7.

86. Yu Side, 125.

87. Deng Haoming, 91.

88. Shuntian shibao , Oct. 25, 1929, 7.

89. Lou Xuexi et al., 1.

90. Oswald Siren, 8.

91. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 20-25; Chinese Economic Bulletin , June 16, 1928, 300-330.

92. Shuntian shibao , Feb. 14, 1929, 7. Sources for the following account of the rise and fall of the clerks association include Wu Bannong, 54; Shuntian shibao , Feb. 15, 1929, 7; Feb. 16, 1929, 7; Feb. 18, 1929, 7; Feb. 19, 1929, 7; Feb. 22, 1929, 7; Mar. 8, 1929, 7; North China Standard , Feb. 15, 1929, 1; Feb. 20, 1929, 11.

93. Shuntian shibao , July 3, 1929, 7. The figure is from a post mortem statement on the movement by remnants of the association and may be exaggerated.

94. Beijing Ruifuxiang , 21.

95. North China Standard , Feb. 20, 1929, 11; Feb. 23, 1959, 11.

96. See Migdal, 402, for a discussion of the impact of an alliance between central state power and mass consitituencies on the power of local elites.

1. See Chung-li Chang 1955; Yung-teh Chow 1966, 244; Ping-ti Ho 1962, 162-165; Kracke.

2. See Beattie 1979b, 8-9, 129; Dennerline 1986; Hartwell, 417-420; Hymes 1986a, 34-61; Twitchett 1959; Walton, 35-77; Odoric Wou 1979.

3. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 92-125; Kracke.

4. Hymes 1986a, 34-41; Hartwell, 418. See also Odoric Wou.

5. In addition to Hymes 1986a, see Beattie 1979b; Dennerline 1986; Walton.

6. Beattie 1979b.

7. Walton, 36.

8. On effects of partible inheritance in China generally, see Philip Huang, 78, 117; Myers 1970, 125, 160—162; Fei Hsiao-t'ung and Chang Chih-i, 19-20, 117.

9. See Le Roy Ladurie, 43-44; Netting; Stone and Stone.

10. Rubie Watson 1982, 1985.

11. Beattie 1979b.

12. Ruble Watson 1985, 137-168.

13. In this study xiang refers to a formal subdivision of the county. Until the 1950s this formal unit coincided with the area of Deng control.

14. On higher-order lineages, see James L. Watson 1982, 608-609.

15. Rubie Watson 1985, 128.

16. Rubie Watson 1981, 593-615.

17. For disscussion and examples of lineage land, see Ebrey 1986, 40-44; Twitchett 1959, 1960-61.

18. For a discussion of tang , see Kuhn 1970, 168-171; Sangren.

19. Twitchett 1959, 1960-61. For another example of yizhuang , see Dennerline 1979-80.

20. For a discussion of entail and "strict settlement," see Stone and Stone, 48-55.

21. Brim, 34.

22. Baker 1968, 171.

23. James L. Watson 1975, 36.

24. Potter, 96.

25. Chen Han-seng, 34—35.

26. In 1905 the Deng had a total of eighty-two ancestral estates in Ha Tsuen xiang .

27. Potter, 97.

28. See Grant, 56.

29. For a discussion of landownership and tenancy in Ha Tsuen, see Rubie Watson 1985, 61-72.

30. C. K. Yang, 47.

31. Dennerline 1979-80, 1986.

32. Dennerline 1986, 187.

33. On the difference between Dennerline's estates and Rubie Watson's estates in the New Territories, see ibid., 187.

32. Dennerline 1986, 187.

33. On the difference between Dennerline's estates and Rubie Watson's estates in the New Territories, see ibid., 187.

34. Quoted in Freedman, 52.

35. Potter, 104.

36. On the importance of personal wealth, see also Beattie 1979b, 117.

37. See Chen Han-seng, 42. Hui-chen Wang Liu, 106.

38. See also Potter, 105.

39. Ibid., 107.

38. See also Potter, 105.

39. Ibid., 107.

40. Rubie Watson 1985, 75-77.

41. For a detailed discussion of this case see Palmer, 40-52.

42. Ibid.

41. For a detailed discussion of this case see Palmer, 40-52.

42. Ibid.

43. Rubie Watson 1985, 62.

44. The penetration of colonial legal procedures into the lives of New Territories residents may, however, have set this region off from its neighbors across the border. It is clear that previously disenfranchised satellite villagers used the new legal struc-

ture to their advantage as did the new urban elite. The extent to which the old rural elite of wealthy landowners used this structure in the early twentieth century is unclear at this point.

45. Kung-chuan Hsiao 1960; Kuhn 1970.

46. Rankin 1986, 166.

47. Cole 1986, 166; Mann 1987.

48. For a discussion of the Rural Committee system, see Miners 1979.

49. Ruble Watson 1985, 91-93. See also Baker, 52; Potter, 29.

50. See James L. Watson 1987.

51. Hayes, 38.

52. For a discussion of violence in the New Territories, see Ruble Watson 1985, 85-88.

53. See James L. Watson 1977, 169, 172; James L. Watson 1988.

54. James L. Watson 1988.

55. Elvin 1973, 258. See also Ping-ti Ho 1962, 257.

56. Philip Huang, 78. On this point, see also Myers 1970, 125. I have already noted (see above) that the effects of inheritance were not uniform, although in general inheritance did contribute to mobility patterns.

57. See Philip Huang, 29-30, 65-66, 223-254, 232, 234; Myers 1970, 125-126, 234; Buck 1937, map 3; Perkins, 90-91; Wilkinson, 6-13.

58. Myers 1970, 125.

59. Ibid., 126.

58. Myers 1970, 125.

59. Ibid., 126.

60. Gamble 1963, 33, 35, 54.

61. Ibid., 49-51.

60. Gamble 1963, 33, 35, 54.

61. Ibid., 49-51.

62. See Rankin 1986.

63. See Myers 1970, 234-235. Elvin 1973, 254-255. Buck 1930, 145.

64. Esherick 1981, 401.

65. See Perkins, 87.

66. See Philip Huang, 82n.

67. See Perkins, 88-91.

68. Chen Han-seng, 3.

69. Ibid., viii.

68. Chen Han-seng, 3.

69. Ibid., viii.

70. C. K. Yang, 46.

71. Potter, 80.

72. It is important to note that although tenancy and landless rates tend to be higher in Guangdong than in the north, high rates of private and corporate landlord-ism are not found in all southeastern villages. Both Edgar Wickberg (1981, 31) and C. K. Yang (42) report a lower rate of corporate property than Ha Tsuen's 50 percent or Ping Shan's 93 percent: Wickberg gives a corporate rate of 35 percent for Pat Hueng (an area near Ha Tsuen), and Yang provides a rate of 6.2 percent for Nanching. A comparison between those Pearl River delta villages that have high rates of corporate property and those that do not would be illuminating, especially with regard to elite dominance and leadership. Perkins (90) has argued that the level of commerce is a major factor in explaining the differing rates of landlessness and tenancy.

73. The comparison between Tongcheng and Wuxi on the one hand and Ha Tsuen on the other cannot produce definitive answers to the questions discussed here.

The works of Beattie and Dennerline have been used because, among the historical work on Lower Yangzi lineages, they deal most explicitly with questions of corporate property, landownership, and elite leadership.

74. Beattie 1979b, 135.

75. Dennerline 1979-80, 54; on the period from 1745-1878, see Dennerline 1986, 188.

76. Dennerline 1979-80; 64n. See also Chen Han-seng, 31.

77. See Potter, 96.

78. See Dennerline 1986, 187.

79. See Dennerline 1979-80.

80. Perkins, 88-91.

81. Ibid., 91.

80. Perkins, 88-91.

81. Ibid., 91.

82. Buck 1937, 58. For more figures on Wuxi land distribution, see China Industrial Handbooks: Kiangsu , 31.

83. Mazumdar, 221. On this general point, see also Esherick 1981, 405; Grove and Esherick.

1. See Philip Huang, 177-179; the other authoritative study of the rural economy of North China is Myers 1970.

2. The principal source for this study is the six-volume Japanese survey of villages in the North China plain, known as Chugoku noson kanko chosa (CN ). I draw particularly from the contracts and interviews in these volumes to gain an understanding of customary law. These investigations were conducted in the early 1940s, but the contracts and other written records date from the turn of the century and even earlier. A fuller picture of the villages themselves can be found in Duara 1988, Myers 1970, and Philip Huang 1985.

3. Philip Huang, 65.

4. Ibid., 78.

3. Philip Huang, 65.

4. Ibid., 78.

5. See Duara 1988.

6. Weber 1978, 1:215.

7. See Bourdieu 1984, esp. 125-168.

8. Baker 1968.

9. See also Rubie Watson 1985, 169.

10. Ibid., 89.

9. See also Rubie Watson 1985, 169.

10. Ibid., 89.

11. Duara 1983, 249-250.

12. Traditional community activities in the village and the effects of state penetration upon them are analyzed in detail in Duara 1988.

13. Myers and Chen, 1-32.

14. CN 2:56; CN 5:438.

15. CN 5:206. See also Duara 1988, 188.

16. See for instance CN 4:22l; CN 3:275; CN 5:206, 578.

17. CN : 3 278-279. See also Duara 1988, 188.

18. Martin Yang, 167, 171.

19. CN 5:preface, 5.

20. CN 5:204.

21. CN 5:268.

22. CN 5:258, 260.

23. CN 5:37-38.

24. CN 5:39.

25. CN 5:5, 39, 37, 41, 50, 58, 131, 258.

26. CN 5:5, 11, 14, 41, 42-43, 152, 258.

27. CN 5:43, 56-58, 100.

28. CN 5:18.

29. CN 5:100.

30. CN 5:17, 24, 32, 39, 58, 95, 206, 258.

31. CN 1:76.

32. CN 2:40, 194, 195.

33. CN 2:40, 195.

34. CN 2:488; CN 1:187, 189, 190.

35. CN 1: 124, 138, 139; CN 2:238-239.

36. CN 1:124; CN 2:32, 41, 44, 77, 107, 108, 260, 311.

37. CN 2:107, 195.

38. CN 2:40, 44, 46.

39. CN 2:20, 143, 169, 211, 229-230.

40. CN 3:preface, 5. Luancheng xianzhi , 2:23.

41. Philip Huang, 129.

42. CN 3:preface, 5-7.

43. CN 3:preface, 5-6.

44. CN 3:preface, 5-6.

45. CN 3:preface, 6-7.

46. CN 3:163-164, 173-174, 193, 215, 226.

47. CN 3:preface, 6, 41, 50.

48. CN 3:50, 51, 53, 56, 63, 170.

49. CN 3:53, 250, 275, 278-279, 348.

50. CN 3:164, 170, 171-172.

51. CN 3:179, 206.

52. CN 3:263, 269, 277, 281, 282, 300, 304, 353.

53. CN 3:275.

54. CN 5:525.

55. CN 5:preface, 6; Liangxiang xianzhi , 3:6.

56. CN 5:preface, 6. The average family owned less than ten mu of land.

57. CN 5:preface, 6, 7.

58. CN 5:420, 426, 430. For the wars, see Sheridan, 60-64.

59. CN 3:13-14; CN 5:435, 579-580.

60. Hosokawa Kazutoshi, 164.

61. Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980. See also Gellner and Waterbury, eds., 1977, and Schmidt, Guasti, Lande, and Scott, eds. 1977.

62. Gouldner, 28-43.

1. Yan Xiuyu and Xie Yingju, 1:213-222; Mao Zedong 1982, 41-181. The text of Mao's "Xunwu Investigation" was first published in this 1982 collection, using an original copy from the Central Party Archives. Reports from Xunwu , an annotated translation by Roger Thompson, is scheduled for publication by Stanford University Press in 1990.

2. Mao Zedong 1982, 44-55. For the concept of macroregion, see Skinner 1977a. Originally Skinner included Jiangxi within the Middle Yangzi macroregion as it appears on Map 1.1., but he has since come to consider it a macroregion in its own right.

3. Ganzhou fuzhi 2:41a, 42a; Ruijin xianzhi gao , 54; Jiang Yuchang, Gongdu cungao 1:60a; Yang Chaolin, 1:28b-29a.

4. This general description of the southern Jiangxi hill country is derived mainly from my earlier work. See Averill 1983, 1987, esp. 280-281. For a vivid series of reports on social unrest and antigovernmental activity in early twentieth-century southern Jiangxi, including Xunwu (then known as Changning), see Jiang Yuchang.

5. Mao Zedong 1982, 56-61, 79-81, 87-88, 99.

6. I accept Robert Hymes's definition of local elites as those "whose access to wealth, power, or prestige was, in the local scheme of things, especially privileged: whose control of material resources, hold over men's actions and decisions, or special place in the regard of their contemporaries, set them apart from ... society as a whole and made them people to be reckoned with." Hymes 1986a, 7.

7. In the "Xunwu Investigation," Mao Zedong (1982) also distinguishes among local elites, dividing them into categories such as "merchants" and "landlords," then ranking them on the bash. of economic criteria such as amount of capital or quantity of grain produced on land owned. The present account draws heavily on the information Mao provides but seeks to set it in an analytical framework that more systematically includes noneconomic factors and other elite categories.

8. The term shi (picul) as Mao uses it appears to be equivalent to a dan (also translated picul), which is usually considered to contain 100 jin (catties), each of which is approximately one-half kilogram. Chinese measures varied considerably by region, however, and Mao notes that in Xunwu the shi contained 180 jin (i.e., 90 kg.). I have therefore used this figure in the text when converting shi into metric figures. To put these figures into some context, Mao reported that two shi of grain per year was enough to support a person. See Mao Zedong 1982, 170.

9. Mao Zedong 1982, 113-115.

10. Ibid., 113-114; Pan Shanfu, 25.

9. Mao Zedong 1982, 113-115.

10. Ibid., 113-114; Pan Shanfu, 25.

11. For a description of the central place hierarchy, see Skinner 1977a.

12. Mao Zedong 1982, 67, 100, 102.

13. Ibid., 162-163; Zeng Biyi, 88.

12. Mao Zedong 1982, 67, 100, 102.

13. Ibid., 162-163; Zeng Biyi, 88.

14. Mao Zedong 1982, 118-119.

15. Ibid., 126-1300.

16. Ibid. See also Jiang Yuchang (c. 1908) for descriptions of local elite irregularities and antigovernment attitudes.

14. Mao Zedong 1982, 118-119.

15. Ibid., 126-1300.

16. Ibid. See also Jiang Yuchang (c. 1908) for descriptions of local elite irregularities and antigovernment attitudes.

14. Mao Zedong 1982, 118-119.

15. Ibid., 126-1300.

16. Ibid. See also Jiang Yuchang (c. 1908) for descriptions of local elite irregularities and antigovernment attitudes.

17. Mao Zedong 1982, 119.

18. Zeng Biyi, 88.

19. Mao Zedong 1982, 105. Mao estimated that landlords constituted 3.45 percent of the total Xunwu population, a figure supported by extrapolations from information provided elsewhere in his text. If allowance is made for nonlandowning merchants, teachers, and other elites not included in Mao's estimate, a figure of 3.5 to 4.0 percent seems reasonable.

20. Mao Zedong 1982, 115, 359n.

21. Hsien-chin Hu 1948; Hui-chen Wang Liu 1959b; Mao Zedong 1982, 106-108.

22. Hsien-chih Hu, 20-30; Mao Zedong 1949a, 22; Jiang Yuchang, 64b; Xiao Hua, 227.

23. Mao Zedong 1982, 129-131, 145-149; Mao Zedong 1949a, 22-24.

24. Mao Zedong 1949a, 22; Polachek, 812-813.

25. See essays by William Rowe and Timothy Brook in this volume, and Beattie 1979b.

26. Xunwu, and doubtless many other peripheral Jiangxi counties, had relatively few gentry during the Qing period. By the late nineteenth century the county elite could claim only 4 civil and 1 military jinshi (metropolitan graduate), 10 civil, 4 "imperial favor," and 52 military juren (provincial graduate), and 186 gongsheng (senior licentiate) degree winners. The Pans (present in the county from Song times onward and whose patriarch, Pan Mingzheng, was the dominant elite figure in the county in the early twentieth century) had won no major degrees whatsoever during the Qing and had only a handful of the honorific gongsheng degrees presented to elderly men who had repeatedly taken but failed the regular examinations. Even acknowledging the likely presence in the county at any one time of several hundred shengyuan (whose names are not listed in the local gazetteers) there must have been many local elites who were not degree holders and whose elite status was based on other attributes. Changning xianzhi, juan 2.

27. Deng Zihui, 60.

28. Qiu Zhou, 64-65.

29. Interview, Xiao Zhengqing et al., Xingguo county, May 26, 1984.

30. These comments on county magistrates are derived from such Republican period Jiangxi gazetteers and other sources as Ninggang xianzhi, houzhi :3-14; Fenyi xianzhi , 10; Jiangxi minzheng gongbao , 8 (Apr. 16, 1928). For Qing conditions, see Watt 1972.

31. Zhonggong Ruijin xianwei, 6a.

32. For other examples, see ibid., 5a-b; Jiang Yuchang, 1:60a.

31. Zhonggong Ruijin xianwei, 6a.

32. For other examples, see ibid., 5a-b; Jiang Yuchang, 1:60a.

33. E.g., Tse-tsung Chow 1960. This and most other relevant works concentrate upon the political impact of urban institutions of higher education. As this essay hopes to show, the politics of the May Fourth era and after were also shaped by events in lower-level, more rural schools.

34. This section on education follows Averill (1987, 282-285) and the sources cited therein.

35. For examples of provincial government inspection of schools, see Jiangxi jiaoyu gongbao , 2.14 (Jan. 1, 1929):25-28; 3.2 (May 11, 1929):37-45.

36. For examples of such networks, see Yang Yuanming, 35, and Jiang Bozhang.

37. It is unclear just when this involvement in factional politics began, but certainly the late Qing reformist and revolutionary movements set in motion various changes—the formation of study associations (xuehui ), the New Policies (including

the establishment of the new schools themselves), and the founding of organized political parties—that encouraged its growth.

38. Comments on county-level schools are based on republican period gazetteers; comments on old-style village schools are based on similar biographical materials published in the Taiwan journal, Jiangxi wenxian , and a variety of PRC sources. For an example from Huichang county, on Xunwu's northern border, see Liu Lucheng, 116-119. Information on Xunwu is from Mao Zedong 1982, 160-163. Altogether in 1930 the county had 30 university graduates (6 of whom had also studied abroad), 500 middle-school graduates, and 800 upper elementary-school graduates. It also had 400 living Qing shengyuan and one juren .

39. Mao Zedong 1982, 125-126, 161-162.

40. Ibid., 126-131, 161-162. Mao's impressionistic comments on educational attitudes should be read with caution. But his conclusions are plausible, consistent with other available evidence, and well informed. He drew his information from local CCP cadres, such as Gu Bo, who had past personal involvement in Xunwu's educational circles and considerable recent opportunity to reflect upon the county's class structure.

39. Mao Zedong 1982, 125-126, 161-162.

40. Ibid., 126-131, 161-162. Mao's impressionistic comments on educational attitudes should be read with caution. But his conclusions are plausible, consistent with other available evidence, and well informed. He drew his information from local CCP cadres, such as Gu Bo, who had past personal involvement in Xunwu's educational circles and considerable recent opportunity to reflect upon the county's class structure.

41. Hobsbawm, chaps. 2, 6; Liu Xiaonong 1980; Zou Fuguang 1984.

42. Ibid.; Jiang Yuchang, 1:58a-60a. Many themes mentioned in this discussion of hill-country banditry have been discussed at greater length in Billingsley 1988, which appeared after this article was completed. For an account of banditry elsewhere that also emphasizes connections between bandits and local elites, see Lewin 1979.

41. Hobsbawm, chaps. 2, 6; Liu Xiaonong 1980; Zou Fuguang 1984.

42. Ibid.; Jiang Yuchang, 1:58a-60a. Many themes mentioned in this discussion of hill-country banditry have been discussed at greater length in Billingsley 1988, which appeared after this article was completed. For an account of banditry elsewhere that also emphasizes connections between bandits and local elites, see Lewin 1979.

43. Hobsbawm, 35.

44. Liu Xiaonong, 106-107; Zou Fuguang, 94.

45. The following account of the revolutionary movement in Xunwu is based primarily on Zeng Biyi, 91-98; Bousfield, 109-124; Zhonggong Jiangxi shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, 183-185; Mao Zedong 1982, 67, 100, 127-129.

46. Averill 1987, 284-290.

47. Ibid., 283-284; Zhonggong Ruijin xianwei, 6b; Li Jishan, 26:123; Yifeng xian difang zhi bianzuan wei, 8-9.

46. Averill 1987, 284-290.

47. Ibid., 283-284; Zhonggong Ruijin xianwei, 6b; Li Jishan, 26:123; Yifeng xian difang zhi bianzuan wei, 8-9.

48. For sources discussing these various issues, see Chen Qihan, 408-410; Huang Muxian 1981; Qiu Zhou, 77-79; Mao Zedong 1949a, 90; Guo Qi and Dong Xia 1982.

49. Deng Zihui, 57; Xiao Hua, 239; Chen Qihan, 409; Qiu Zhou, 75.

50. Huang Muxian 1981; He Changgong 1959; Chen Qihan, 408-410; Liu Xiaonong, 116-119.

51. The general point that Communist cadres used their family status and lineage ties to further the movement is well established. E.g., Chen Qihan, 410; Fang Zhichun, 145-146. Although much more indirect, evidence of the use of small lineages against large ones is considerable. E.g., Mao Zedong 1949a, 90; Yan Yaxian 1959; Hu Yueyi, 90; Shao Shiping, 62.

52. Mao Zedong 1982, 127-130.

53. In Mao's listing of over 125 landlords from around the county, he explicitly identified seventeen people belonging to or "colluding with" the New Xunwu clique: two from upper-elite, fourteen from middle-elite, and one from lower-elite families. As of 1930, eight of the seventeen were also active members of the GMD. Mao also mentions names of eleven people who were members of or "linked with" (jiehe ) the

Cooperative Society and four who were linked with the Zhongshan clique or the Zhongshan School: twelve of these fifteen men were from lower-elite and two from middle-elite family backgrounds. Mao also specified that nine of the eleven people explicitly connected with the Cooperative Society were from declining households, a fact that he found characteristic of all people in the society. The vast majority of these fifteen individuals ultimately became CCP members and/or active participants in the revolution, though a few later abandoned the movement. Mao Zedong 1982, 67, 115-124, 128-129.

54. Data gathered on thirty-one pre-1927 Jiangxi CCP members whose biographies contain usable family-background information show that two-thirds of this group (all themselves well-educated individuals) were from families of local school teachers, small merchants, peasants, or artisans. The biographies indicate that some of these families (particularly the school teachers) represented declining branches of formerly more prosperous elites. Other Communists, especially those from peasant or artisan background, were only able to obtain the schooling that made them elites because of money borrowed from elite patrons, lineages, or distant relations. These figures are derived from research still in progress: the main sources are collections of biographies such as Zhonggong Jiangxi shengwei; Jiangxi sheng minzheng ting 1960, Jiangxi sheng minzheng ting 1980.

55. See Averill 1987, 294-295.

56. Somewhat exceptional in this regard are Yung-fa Chen 1986 and Galbiatti 1985. Neither, however, makes local elites a central part of his discussion.

57. See, among other studies, Moore 1966, Skocpol 1979, and Goldstone, ed. 1986.

1. Blum, 11-12, 21-22, chap. 4.

2. See Goody, Thirsk, and Thompson, eds.

3. Stone and Stone, 69-104.

4. Wakeman (1975b, 19-28) points to the significance of elite life-styles. Articles by Rowe and Brook in this volume provide detailed treatment.

5. On merchants as spreaders of elite life-styles, see Naquin and Rawski, 59-60. On frontier gentrification, see Meskill, chaps. 12, 13; McCord and Zelin in this volume.

6. Robert Forster raised the issue of continuity of elite institutions versus continuity of personnel at the Banff conference.

7. Ping-ti Ho 1962 (esp. 258) is the best representative of this argument.

8. See especially Hymes 1986a; Wou, 69-88; and the local studies cited in note 9.

9. Beattic 1979b, 129; Meskill.

10. Esherick 1981, 401.

11. Mingay, 59; see also F. M. L. Thompson, 32, 112-117. For calculations on Chinese landholding, see Esherick 1981, 401. The English figures derive from the New Doomsday Survey of 1873. Because the social categories are different it is hard to make exact comparisons between even late-nineteenth-century England and early-

twentieth-century China. However, clearly the English aristocratic and gentry landowners were not only far fewer than the approximately one million Chinese degree holders (c. 1.3 percent of the population, Chang Chung-li 1955, 111) of the early nineteenth century but also constituted a small percentage of the population compared with the 3 to 4 percent who appear as landlords in the twentieth-century Chinese surveys. The English 1871 census figure was 21,299,683 (see Wrigley, 588). Taking the simplest figures from the New Doomsday Survey—that 7,000 persons owned 80 percent of the land in 1873 (F. M. L. Thompson, 27)—and assuming that these people and their families totaled 35,000 people, they only constituted .0016 percent of the population of 21,300,000 and perhaps 30 percent of these were not members of the peerage, gentry or baronetcy.

12. Blum, 19-20.

13. Ossowski, 66; Forster 1987.

14. E. P. Thompson 1978, 133-165.

15. Ye Xian'en 1983; Wiens, 12-20.

16. For a powerful statement of this view, see Kuhn 1984, 17, 27.

17. For a summary of stratification in the Lower Yangzi, see Bell in this volume; on Hunan, see Perdue 1987, 150-163, 179-180; on North China, see Philip Huang; on Taiwan, see Harrell 1987.

18. Johnson, 36.

19. Min Tu-ki, chap 2, esp. 22, 49.

20. Dennerline 1981, chap. 2; 1986, 170-209.

21. See Cao Xueqin, 1:111, for a reference to a published "Magistrate's Life Preserver" identifying the rich and powerful of a county.

22. Ping-ti Ho 1962, 227-229.

23. Esherick 1987, 30; Rankin 1986, 313-315.

24. Meskill, chap. 10.

25. Schoppa 1989.

26. See also Von Glahn, 181-202; Perdue 1987; Harrell 1987.

27. Lamley, 1-39.

28. Meskill, chaps. 11-12; Harrell 1987.

29. Kuhn 1970, chap. 3; McCord, 156-197.

30. Perdue 1987, 205-218; Faure, 42-43, 173.

31. Skinner 1964, 1965, 1977a, 1977c. For examples of progressive marketing integration in the Lower Yangzi, see Yoshinobu Shiba I977 and Elvin 1977.

32. Rozman, 278-284.

33. Elman, 112-129.

34. Skinner 1976.

35. Cole 1980.

36. Robert Forster, comments at the Conference on Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, Banff, 1987.

37. On this cultural tempering of conflict, see Harrell 1986, 135-136.

38. For a survey of the literature, see James Watson 1982, 589-622. Articles in Ebrey and Watson contain much historical information on lineages. On the history of lineages in Anhui, see Beattie 1979; Ye Xian'en 1983; and Zurndorfer. On the New Territories lineage history, see Faure. On Zhejiang, see Ueda Makoto.

39. Beattie 1979b, 88.

40. Dennerline 1979-80, 41.

41. This observation was made by Keith Schoppa.

42. Faure (56-60), also uses the term "trust" to refer to these lineage corporations. On corporate aspects of Chinese social organization, see Sangren.

43. Ebrey 1983.

44. Dennerline (1979-80, 42) also treats charitable estates as corporate and managerial entities, but he stresses their community educational and welfare functions as a way to maintain group unity and expand combined resources.

45. Naquin 1986; Rawski 1986; Duara 1988.

46. Barnes, 39-58.

47. Wang Dahua, 82-89.

48. Kuhn 1970, 84; Folsom.

49. He Bingdi 1966.

50. Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, 66, 73. China partly fits Eisenstadt's model, though in such respects as lack of community cohesion and weak kin structures, North China fits better than the Yangzi valley and South China.

51. See Skinner 1976 (334, 342, 357) for a general statement about the better political access of cores with many degree holders. The account, in Meskill (chap. 10) of the Lin family's long struggle to get a hearing at court is a wonderful example of the difficulties faced by poorly connected elites on the periphery when they needed the protection of high officials.

52. For a useful general discussion of patronage and its functions in China, see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, esp. 48-50, 139-145, 203-219.

53. See Bourdieu (1977, 190-197) for a discussion of "symbolic violence."

54. This concept originated in Gramsci, 12; see also Williams 1977, 108-109; E. P. Thompson 1978, 163; and Lears.

55. See Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., esp. the articles by Evelyn Rawski, James Hayes, and Victor Mair.

56. Johnson 1985, 47-48.

57. Ortner, 153; Weller.

58. We thank Keith Schoppa for this observation.

59. Cao Xueqin, 1:chap. 18; 2:196-197; 3:248.

60. Meskill, chaps. 11-12.

61. Weller, 55.

62. E. P. Thompson 1974, 389.

63. Bourdieu 1977, 171-183. Bourdieu creates his definition around the ostensibly reciprocal gift giving in North Africa, but the principle can be applied to a variety of social situations.

64. Bailey 1971, 2.

65. E. P. Thompson 1978, 151, 154.

66. This idea comes from E. P. Thompson 1978 (163) who hypothesizes that the poor imposed some of their own terms as a price for the hegemony of the nobility. E. P. Thompson 1974, 403, explores this same issue.

67. Cf. Rowe 1989, chap. 5.

68. Esherick 1987, 235-240.

69. The remark by a Haifeng landlord that the main order of business was to teach troublesome peasants a "lesson in the law" (Marks, 184) can be interpreted in this sense. For the escalation of violence in Haifeng in the mid-1920s, see Galbiatti.

70. This view is shared by Ping-ti Ho (1962, 55, 230-231) and Beattie (1979b, 268-269).

71. Elvin 1973, 164-178. For a general summary of the issues, see Myers 1974, 265-278.

72. On Shanxi merchants, see Wei Qingyuan and Wu Qiyan, 127-144; Li Hua 1983. On the Huizhou salt merchants, see Ping-ti Ho 1954.

73. Huang Qichen and Deng Kaisong; Yu Siwei; Luo Yixing.

74. Peterson, 67-80.

75. Angela Hsi, 135—136, 138-142, 171-178.

76. The Huizhou salt merchants provide some of the best examples of this process. In addition to Ping-ti Ho 1954, see Ye Xian'en 1983.

77. Luo Yixing 1985.

78. See also Yen-p'ing Hao.

79. Chung-li Chang 1955, 114-141. This process led Ho Ping-ti (1962, 256) to conclude that "money, after 1850 at the latest, had overshadowed higher academic degrees as a determinant of higher status."

80. See Stone and Stone, on the English case. The Stones argue against the notion of an open English elite but present much evidence that seems, in comparative terms, to support it. They summarize (3-6) some effects attributed to England's "open" elite and note the literature arguing for them.

81. Cited in Stone and Stone, 23.

82. Wang Shizhen (mid-sixteenth century) cited in Elvin 1973, 223.

83. See Grove (forthcoming, chap. 2) for a full discussion; also Elvin 1973, 172-175.

84. Stone and Stone, 420.

85. On the wide geographic range of the Shanxi merchants see Li Hua. The investment of Shaanxi merchants in the Ziliugong salt wells is an example of such scattering of investment; see Zelin's article in this volume.

86. Ye Xian'en 1983 (123-143) provides compelling examples of this "feudalization" of merchant profits through "contributions" to the state and the purchase of land.

87. Bastid-Bruguière, 539-540.

88. McCord, 156-197.

89. Edmund Fung, 62-113.

90. See Alitto, 220-221; also Perry for a general view of how militarized groups fitted into nineteenth- and twentieth-century North China society.

91. Elman, 87-138.

92. Dennerline 1981, 118-119; on the English case, see Miles, 196-210.

93. On private secretaries, see Cole 1980; on pettifoggers, Macauley.

94. Liang Qizi, 309-310, 313, 317, 322; cf. Joanna H. Smith, 309-338; and more generally, Naquin and Rawski, 44-46, 58.

95. Perdue 1987, 164-233.

96. Zelin 1984, 264-302.

97. Perdue 1987, 75; Mann 1987; Rowe 1989, chap. 4.

98. Kuhn 1970; Mann 1987; Rowe 1989; Rankin 1986.

99. Ping-ti Ho I964, 236.

100. Rankin 1986, 8, 62, 176, 217, 258; Schoppa 1982, 67, 95-109, 121-124, 136, 140—141, 152, 186-190.

101. Esherick 1976, 66-69, 99-105, 243-252; Kuhn 1970, 224. Note that Rankin rejects this notion of a split between urban and rural elites in economically developed cores; see Rankin 1986, 232-233, 243; and 1977, 67-104.

102. On the twentieth-century use of this term, tuhao lieshen , see Kuhn 1975, 287-295.

103. Perdue 1987; Will 1980a; Naquin and Rawski. See also Wong, Will, Lee, Perdue, and Oi.

104. Kuhn 1970.

105. One of the best textbooks on twentieth-century China is China in Disintegration by James E. Sheridan. For an application of this idea to local elites, see Alitto.

106. In addition to his article in this volume, see Duara 1987, 156.

107. Kuhn 1986, 344-352.

108. This conceptualization is employed in Fewsmith, 163-164, 189-191.

109. Bailey 1969, 77.

110. Ibid., 171.

111. Kuhn 1975, 287-595.