The "Rightly Guided One" or Base Impostor?

In many respects, desert sufi elites resembled their urban counterparts, the big-city ulama, in their predilection for social order over disorder as long as the holy law was upheld. As men of the pen, most preferred the zawiya's studious calm to the boisterous game of tribal politics—Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz of Khanqa Sidi Naji is a perfect example of this position. If the saints championed communal opposition to wicked rulers, since they enjoyed a theoretical immunity from state repression, at the same time the ideal of saintliness was that of flight or retreat from violent confrontations.^[67] Nevertheless, saintly leaders had to be responsive to the demands and needs of their clienteles since one of the social indicators of sainthood was collective recognition of piety expressed in the form of popular followings. Thus, the political behavior of religious notables was governed by clusters of implicit cultural codes that were highly contextual in nature.

The myriad responses of local religious notables to the French advance into their respective spiritual bailiwicks were examined in the previous chapter. During this critical period, the different, if ambiguous, positions of Rahmaniyya and other sufi leaders toward the colonial regime and its native allies began to congeal. Moreover, avoidance protest, bet hedging, and apparent accommodation were not mutually exclusive strategies for beleaguered religious notables. Procrastination and temporizing represented attempts to cope until the true intentions of the infidels could be ascertained. At the same time, confusion over France's aims in the Sahara—bolstered by colonial pacts with desert princes like the Banu Jallab of Tuqqurt—added to the collective sentiment of uncertainty but also conferred some measure of political maneuverability. Bu Ziyan's public prophecy abruptly ended the era of ambiguity and feigned compliance. An event long anticipated yet feared, it raised even more catastrophic uncertainties about the true identity of the would-be redeemer.

If the rise of a new saint was a cause for rejoicing within the community, the coming of the mahdi provoked both jubilation and trepidation among religious authorities. The traditions regarding his appearance in time were contradictory; they also warned that impostors would arise to lead the unwary into error. The dilemma faced by members of the provincial Islamic establishment—local saints and sufi notables—was to distinguish the divinely guided from the vile pretender.^[68]

What then was the reaction of Rahmaniyya shaykhs to Bu Ziyan's self-proclaimed mission? Tulqa's sufi elite had already opted for political neutrality and nonresistance as early as 1844. After Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's departure for southwestern Tunisia that same year, Sidi 'Ali b. 'Umar's nephew, 'Ali b. 'Uthman (died 1898), assumed direction of the Tulqa Rahmaniyya center and its secondary zawaya in the Ziban.^[69] Based upon his behavior even before the long siege, Sidi 'Ali b. 'Uthman and his family demurred to publicly recognize the authenticity of Bu Ziyan's mahdist claims; the outbreak of warfare failed to shake their resolve to eschew militant politics. Throughout the cruel siege months, Shaykh 'Ali of Tulqa continually offered his good offices, vainly seeking to effect reconciliation between French authorities in Biskra and the rebels, many of whom were Rahmaniyya brothers. Resolving traditional oasis conflicts was one of the functions expected of saintly mediators; mediating an apocalyptic struggle pitting the infidels against members of the community was new. Nevertheless, Shaykh 'Ali's refusal to sanction Bu Ziyan's movement did not discourage Tulqa's inhabitants from joining in the rebellion. They not only sent fresh recruits to Za'atsha but also dispatched a small band to attack the residence of the shaykh al-'arab in Biskra.^[70]

The stance of Tulqa's sufi leaders toward the mahdi may have been determined by more than theological doubts regarding the legitimacy of Bu Ziyan's divine calling. Older saintly quarrels may also have been at work. After Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's hijra to Tunisia in 1844, any semblance of unity among the Saharan Rahmaniyya was effectively ended. Shaykh 'Ali b. 'Uthman was opposed by some Rahmaniyya figures, most notably Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz of Khanqa Sidi Naji. The lack of cohesion among Rahmaniyya notables at this pivotal juncture was one element working against concerted political action. Clearly evident here is the interplay between older "maraboutic politics" and anticolonial resistance, including mahdist-led movements.

In contrast to those in Tulqa, the region's other Rahmaniyya leaders decided to confer their sociospiritual support to the rebellious prophet by the summer of 1849. On the eve of Colonel Carbuccia's abortive attack, Rahmaniyya shaykhs and their followers gathered in the oasis of Sidi Khalid, not far from Za'atsha. There Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's brother, Muhammad, headed the order's small zawiya. After much discussion, a general call for jihad was publicly announced. The 'Azzuz clan of al-Burj threw in their lot with the rebels; one of Mustafa b. 'Azzuz's brothers joined the battle as a combatant and lost his life in the final showdown. Another sibling, Mabruk b. 'Azzuz, earlier estranged from his family, fought for a time with Bu Ziyan but managed to escape the carnage of late November. In the oasis of Sidi Masmudi, the Rahmaniyya shaykh also lent moral support to Bu Ziyan's movement by preaching jihad to clients in the Awras. A large number of peasants and tribesmen from Sidi Masmudi participated in the hostilities.

When the news of Carbuccia's defeat reached Sidi al-Mukhtar, head of the Rahmaniyya zawiya in Awlad Jallal, he returned to the Ziban from his refuge with the Awlad Na'il. Shaykh al-Mukhtar recruited insurgents from the oases around Awlad Jallal and drew the great Saharan tribe of the Awlad Sassi into the insurrection. As he had done two years earlier during Bu Ma'za's revolt, Shaykh al-Mukhtar was instrumental in achieving popular mobilization based upon tariqa loyalties and patronage ties with tribal groups. In addition, he offered his services to Bu Ziyan in the event of an attack upon Biskra.^[71]

In the Jabal Cherchar, however, Bu Ziyan's prophetic claims initially encountered skepticism. Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz, whose influence stretched from the Zab Sharqi to the southeastern end of the Awras, hesitated to sanction the mahdi. The shaykh entertained grave doubts about the authenticity of his messianic pretensions, particularly Bu Ziyan's dreams in which the Prophet announced his selection as the "rightfully guided one." Perhaps

too the fact that Bu Ziyan was not a member of the region's religious establishment prior to 1849 made his calling suspect. Despite his own personal misgivings, Sidi 'Abd al-Hafiz eventually, albeit reluctantly, joined with the rebels. Intense pressures from below—from the shaykh's tribal clientele in the Awras—forced him to alter his stance.^[72] Here is a striking example of how ordinary people, the rank and file composing the popular followings of revered religious figures, also molded the political behavior of these notables. The unlettered mountain folk exerted their own form of moral suasion from below to force reluctant sufis out into the political arena. Thus, despite—or perhaps because of—his supernatural visions, Bu Ziyan sought the backing of sufi notables and their public acknowledgment of his prophecy. However, the important matter of sequence remains largely unknown: did Bu Ziyan wait until the movement had acquired a critical mass among the villagers to solicit Rahmaniyya confirmation of his mission? Or was his following in the oases dependent upon the blessings of certain activist sufi notables from the start? What is significant is that the endorsement of some prominent Rahmaniyya leaders transformed a local rebellion into a regional and transregional insurrection and that the would-be mahdi felt obliged to court those leaders. This hints at a symbiotic relationship between popular messianic figures and the rural Islamic establishment.